Dorit Bar-On is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut. She has published extensively in the philosophy of mind and language, as well as epistemology and metaethics. In her book Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2004), she developed a neo-expressivist framework for understanding first-person authority, later applied to ethical and other evaluative discourses. In recent years, she has become interested in continuities and discontinuities between animal expressive communication and language. She is currently working on a book manuscript tentatively titled Expression, Communication, and the Origins of Meaning. She is the director of an eponymous interdisciplinary research group at the University of Connecticut.
Sorin Bangu is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bergen, Norway. He has previously held positions at the University of Cambridge and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author of The Applicability of Mathematics in Science: Indispensability and Ontology (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and the editor of Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge: Approaches from Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science (Routledge, 2017). He has published widely in Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Mathematics, with a particular interest in the work of Wittgenstein and Quine.
Stina Bäckström is a Senior Lecturer at Södertörn University and a researcher at Åbo Akademi University. She received her PhD in philosophy from the University of Chicago in 2013. She works on issues in the philosophy of mind and action, inspired by figures such as Anscombe, Wittgenstein, Cavell, and McDowell. Her dissertation, “The Mind’s Movement: An Essay on Expression”, treats acts of expression and intentional action. Since then she has written papers on, for example, what it is to depsychologize psychology, Ryle’s conception of skilled action, knowing other minds, and expression and self-consciousness.
Kevin Cahill is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bergen. He works mainly on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. His publications include The Fate of Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Critique of Metaphysics and Modernity (Columbia, 2011).
William Child is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford and a Fellow in Philosophy at University College, Oxford. He is the author of Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind (Oxford University Press, 1994) and Wittgenstein (Routledge, 2011), and co-editor, with David Charles, of Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears (Oxford University Press, 2001). He has published widely on Wittgenstein and on issues in the Philosophy of Mind.
Annalisa Coliva is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. She is the author of ten books, in both English and Italian, including The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London (Palgrave, 2016), Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (Palgrave, 2015) and Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (Palgrave, 2010). She has published numerous articles in Epistemology and Philosophy of the Mind, with a particular focus on the work of Moore and Wittgenstein.
Eugen Fischer (BPhil, DPhil, Oxford; Habilitation, LMU Munich) is a Reader in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia. He has been a Heisenberg Research Reader (DFG), Golestan Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS), and Senior Research Fellow at Collegium Budapest. He currently is perhaps the only Wittgenstein scholar who is also an experimental philosopher. His main interests are in the philosophy of philosophy and the philosophy of perception. His main projects are the exploration of therapeutic conceptions of philosophy and the study of how automatic cognition (intuition) shapes philosophical thought. He has examined automatic stereotypical inferences and analogical reasoning with metaphors (‘philosophical pictures’), in the development of philosophical problems, arguments, and theories. His empirical work on stereotypical inferences (with psychologist P.E. Engelhardt) has pioneered the use of psycholinguistic methods in experimental philosophy. He is the author of Linguistic Creativity: Exercises in ‘Philosophical Therapy’ (Springer 2000) and Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy (Routledge 2011, p/b 2013). He has co-edited (with Erich Ammereller) Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the “Philosophical Investigations” (Routledge 2004) and (with John Collins) Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method (Routledge 2015).
Daniel D. Hutto is a Professor of Philosophical Psychology at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He is the author of Folk Psychological Narratives: The Socio-Cultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (MIT Press, 2008) and Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory Nor Therapy (Palgrave, 2003), and he is the co-author, together with Erik Myin, of Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (MIT Press, 2017) and Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (MIT Press, 2013). He has published very extensively in Philosophy of the Mind and Cognitive Science, as well as frequently writing about Wittgenstein and on Meta-Philosophy.
Jonathan Knowles is a Professor of Philosophy at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim. He took his doctorate in 1995 at Birkbeck College, London, with a thesis on philosophy of cognitive science and linguistics. Specializing initially in philosophy of the mind, language, and psychology, he has since become interested in metaphilosophical issues concerning the interrelations between naturalism, realism and representationalism and the possibility of metaphysical inquiry. He has published a number of articles in journals such as Analysis, Philosophical Quarterly, Erkenntnis and Synthese and is author of the monograph Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology: The Case for Science Without Norms (Palgrave 2003).
David Macarthur is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney. He works at the interface of contemporary pragmatism, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology and language, and philosophy of art. In addition to these topics, he has published articles in leading philosophy journals and books on liberal naturalism, skepticism, common sense, Stanley Cavell, perception, language, philosophy of architecture, and philosophy of photography and film. He has co-edited three collections of papers with Mario De Caro (Roma Tré): Naturalism in Question (Harvard, 2004); Naturalism and Normativity (Columbia, 2010); and Philosophy in an Age of Science: Physics, Mathematics and Skepticism (Harvard, 2012). He is currently editing Pragmatism as a Way of Life: Hilary and Ruth-Anna Putnam on the Lasting Legacy of James and Dewey for Harvard University Press.
Thomas Raleigh is currently a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Ruhr-University, Bochum. He is also a Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London. He has previously held positions at the University of Vienna, the Norwegian University of Science & Technology, Concordia University (Montreal), and U.N.A.M in Mexico City. His research is primarily in Philosophy of the Mind and Epistemology, with a particular interest in the work of Wittgenstein. As well as the present volume, he is also the co-editor, together with Jonathan Knowles, of Acquaintance: New Essays (forthcoming, Oxford University Press).
Bjørn Torgrim Ramberg is from Oslo, Norway, where he also began his studies in philosophy in 1979. Going to Canada in 1982, he completed his MA and PhD in philosophy at Queen’s University, submitting a dissertation on Donald Davidson’s philosophy of language (1987). His first academic appointments were at Queen’s University, Harvard University, and Simon Fraser University. Since 1997, he has been a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he has also been a Core Group member of the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN). Ramberg has also been a visiting professor at the University of Chicago (2012) and Nan Jing University (2012). He has published on various aspects of pragmatism, interpretation and meaning, focusing mainly on work by Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson and linking their work with the hermeneutical tradition in philosophy. Ramberg has an abiding interest in the relation between philosophy and other disciplines and between theoretical philosophy and life.
Glenda Satne is a Vice-Chancellor’s Fellow at the University of Wollon-gong. She was previously a Marie Curie Experienced Researcher at the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. Her research focuses primarily on Philosophy of the Mind, Social Ontology, and Philosophy of Language. She is currently engaged in several collaborative international projects on Collective Intentionality, the Second-Person, and the role played by culture in human evolution.
Benedict Smith was an undergraduate at the University of Glasgow and a graduate student at the University of Warwick. He is currently a Lecturer in Philosophy and Director of the MA at Durham University, having previously been a Research Fellow at Durham. His research interests include ethics, philosophy of the mind, history of philosophy, and philosophy of psychiatry, and he teaches a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate modules, including metaethics, phenomenology, and history of philosophy. His publications include Particularism and the Space of Moral Reasons (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) and articles on topics including motivation, trust, and the role of concepts in our thought and practice. His current research projects include the nature of belief, realism and moral perception which continue his long-standing interest in the relation between naturalism and normativity.
Paul Snowdon is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University College London, where he was previously, for many years, the Grote Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic. He is the author of Persons, Animals, Ourselves (Oxford University Press, 2014) and the co-editor, along with Stephen Blatti, of Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity (Oxford University Press, 2016). He has published extensively in Philosophy of the Mind, with a particular focus on perceptual experience and on personal identity.
Julia Tanney has written numerous articles on philosophy of the mind and language, focusing especially on reason explanation, rule-following, self-knowledge, and the nature of philosophical investigation. Her book, Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge, was published by Harvard University Press in 2013. She is an international expert on the philosophy of Gilbert Ryle and the later Wittgenstein. Having spent most of her career in the UK, with visiting posts in France, she now works independently, dividing her time between Paris and the South of France.
Charles Travis is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at King’s College London. He is also currently a Professor at the Institute of Philosophy of Porto, Portugal. Before coming to King’s, he was a Professor at Northwestern University, and before that at the University of Stirling. He has also held visiting professorships at the University of Michigan, and at Harvard. He is the author of many books—including Thoughts Footing (OUP, 2009), Unshadowed Thought (Harvard University Press, 2000) and The Uses of Sense (OUP, 1989). Oxford University Press has also published three volumes of his selected essays. His work focuses primarily on the philosophy of language, thought, and perception, with an especial focus on the work of Frege and Wittgenstein.