THE GRAN CHICHIMECA AND NEW MEXICO
For Mexican Americans the Spanish settlement of the territories that would become the U.S. Southwest was a singular event of monumental consequence. Many of the peoples inhabiting these territories were conquered and came to have a direct influence on the racial history and heritage of the Mexican Americans. In 1598 Spaniards, mestizos, Indians, and afromestizos moved north toward Mexico’s frontier (Hammond 1953:17). Thousands of people left central Mexico in search of land and wealth; for those of color this migratory movement was also highly motivated by the opportunity to flee the restrictions imposed upon them by the casta system (Menchaca 1993; Poyo and Hinojosa 1991). Although people of color were not in charge of the racial projects instituted by Spain, they participated in the conquest of the indigenous peoples they encountered.
I concur with Marshall Sahlins (1985) that certain historical moments, such as the settlement of the Southwest, set off a chain of events changing the course of history. Sahlins calls this type of event a historical conjuncture, for it creates ruptures in people’s everyday lives and generates the conditions to restructure social relations. The colonial movement and settlement of the Southwest initiated a social restructuring of the lives of many indigenous peoples and interjected race as a central source of social organization. In areas where indigenous peoples were conquered, the colonists created alliances, instituted technological changes, intermarried with many indigenous peoples, and instituted a racial hierarchy. These practices commenced an era of colonization which Edward Spicer (1981) has called “cycles of conquest.” The first cycle was launched by Spain and the second by Mexico, culminating in the third cycle, when the United States took possession of most of Mexico’s northern frontier.
I use the term “Southwest” here to refer to the territories where Spanish settlements were founded in New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, and California. I do not examine the entire North American region claimed by Spain, because Nevada, Utah, parts of Colorado, and small sections of Oklahoma, Kansas, and Wyoming remained under the control of indigenous peoples. My purpose in this chapter is to begin to delineate the political conditions that generated the outmigration of people seeking to better their social position. The irony of this seemingly liberating event was that the colonists of color were able to find a place where the quality of their lives indeed improved, at the cost of entrenching the same colonial order that oppressed them. Afromestizos played a minimal role in the conquest of New Mexico, because they did not migrate in large numbers until the colonization of Texas.
Following the fall of the Aztec Empire, the Spanish conquistadores sought to conquer new lands to the north and south. Though militias were commanded by Spanish officers, the vast majority of the invading forces were composed of Indian warriors (Powell 1952). Tlatoques and caciques headed the auxiliaries, under the command of Spanish officers who in turn planned and executed the military maneuvers. In the conquest of the territories lying north of central Mexico the main Indian peoples assisting the Spanish were Tlaxcalans and Tarascans, both longtime enemies of the Aztec (Meyer and Sherman 1995).1 They acted as soldiers, scouts, and intellectual strategists and also served as cartographers, identifying vulnerable villages that could easily be subdued and used as stepping stones to move further north. Otomí soldiers also assisted the Spanish; their most important function was to translate, since they were a multilingual people competent in the languages of many northern Mexican tribes (Gibson 1964). The Otomís were the most recent immigrants in the Valley of Mexico, having migrated after the Mexicas. Their bilingualism served the Spanish well in initiating contact with several of the northern tribes. To repay their allies’ services, the Spanish confirmed the tlatoques titles of nobility and outfitted their armies with Spanish horses and European military artillery (Forbes 1994; Powell 1952). Indian commoners who proved to be valuable assets were also rewarded by being promoted to tlatoques or caciques.
The Spanish derogatorily called the northern region between the Valley of Mexico and the present United States–Mexico border the Gran Chichimeca (see Map 2). The word “Chichimeca” meant the land of uncivilized dogs (Powell 1952). The people inhabiting this region were generically termed Chichimec. The Gran Chichimeca did not include the northwestern or northeastern coasts (Alonzo 1998; Chipman 1992).2 For the Spanish it was of utmost importance to vanquish the Chichimec people, who posed a military threat because they inhabited thousands of villages in the territories bordering the Valley of Mexico. The valley had to be protected, since the Spanish had established their administrative center in Tenochtitlán and renamed it Mexico City. It was also necessary to conquer the Chichimec villages because they obstructed the Spaniards’ northward movement. Sea voyage explorers had identified lands beyond the Gran Chichimeca (Powell 1952:32). To reach these unknown areas, however, the Spanish had to establish land routes through the Gran Chichimeca. They also had to overcome ecological problems in this vast and arid region (Meyer and Sherman 1995). Ironically, the vastness of the Gran Chichimeca eventually became the Chichimec Achilles’ heel, since the villages along its southern border were vulnerable to military attacks. The proximity of these border villages to Mexico City hindered their fortification because they lay closer to settlements under Spanish control than to other Chichimec villages. Nonetheless, these border villages would prove to be difficult for the Spanish to conquer since the thousands of peoples who lived there were prepared to stop the northern invasion (Lafaye 1974).
The first Spanish entradas (official invasions) took place in the early 1520s (Chipman 1992:44–45). A temporary outpost was established in Culiacán, Sinaloa. Because the Spanish did not form alliances with the local Indian population, however, the outpost was recurrently attacked and did not become a stable site until much later (Chipman 1992). Throughout the 1530s it was virtually impossible to befriend the Indians of the Gran Chichimeca (Engelhardt 1929:19–20). Only one official land expedition, headed by Franciscan friars in 1533, was able to move successfully through the southwestern border of the Gran Chichimeca and establish peaceful relations with Indians from the present state of Jalisco (ibid.). There were also several unofficial expeditions led by impatient encomenderos unwilling to wait until the royal crown issued official orders to invade the north (Powell 1952). In the meantime it became necessary to explore the distant north by sea. One of the most famous sea expeditions was commanded by Pánfilo Narváez in 1528 (Weber 1992:42).
After Spaniards conquered the Aztec Empire, they were informed by Aztec nobles that greater mineral resources lay to the north (Lafaye 1974). In an attempt to verify this news Spain launched a series of sea voyage expeditions from Mexico as well as from the Spanish Caribbean Islands (Salinas 1990).3 One of these expeditions was commanded by Captain Pánfilo Narváez. In 1528 he was commissioned to explore Florida and to initiate trade relations with the Indians (Weber 1992:42). An earlier report prepared by Juan Ponce de León had identified Florida as a region where friendly Indians could be contacted. Narváez was given command of three ships containing six hundred men. Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca had been appointed as the secretary of the expedition, in charge of chronicling the exploration and maintaining an account of any goods obtained from the Indians. The Spanish sailors encountered a series of misfortunes. After disembarking in Florida, many of the men were ambushed and killed by the Indians (see Weber 1992). The sailors also suffered from ocean illnesses. The most devastating event, however, occurred when a series of ocean storms demolished the ships (Cabeza de Vaca 1922). Less than twenty men survived after constructing makeshift crafts. Cabeza de Vaca and several of his companions were among the survivors. Their craft was swept away and finally landed near present-day Galveston, Texas (Weber 1992). Within a few days of their arrival, most of the castaways met their deaths at the hands of the Indians. Cabeza de Vaca, Andrés Dorantes, Alonso del Castillo, and Dorantes’s slave Esteban were among the survivors. Although their lives were spared by the Indians, they were taken captive. The four castaways were separated and sent to different villages.
Cabeza de Vaca was released several years later and allowed to leave. He decided to go south in an attempt to reach Mexico City. On his trek he encountered his fellow castaways (Bannon 1970). Together, the four men walked in a southwesterly direction along the coast of Texas and inland toward the Lower Rio Grande River, where they met several hostile and peaceful indigenous groups.4 In 1536 they reached an Indian village near present-day Presidio, Texas (near El Paso), where they found evidence of European contact (Chipman 1992:32). They continued to move south, into the present state of Sonora. Esteban and Cabeza de Vaca temporarily left their companions and went south in search of Spanish soldiers. Somewhere in present northern Mexico, the two men found a Spanish military camp. The soldiers were camping while exploring the north. Cabeza de Vaca and his companions were soon reunited and taken to Culiacán.
Cabeza de Vaca immortalized his journey in 1542, when he wrote the first book about the Indians of North America (Chipman 1992:243), entitled Naufragios y comentarios (Cabeza de Vaca 1922). He recounted his experiences among the Indians of Texas, noting that the coastal Indians of Texas were hostile toward their neighbors and practiced hunting and gathering; most groups were politically organized into bands (this probably refers to the Karankawa Indians). Indians along the Lower Rio Grande, however, were peaceful and appeared to practice a more complex political organization, resembling rulership by committee. These Indians lived in villages most of the year, formed alliances with neighbors, practiced religious rituals, and mourned their dead. Some of the Indian groups also cultivated crops. Cabeza de Vaca described the Indians near Presidio as the most advanced group he met. They lived in adobe houses, harvested crops, and wove cloth; the women covered their bodies with skins and cotton blouses. Anthropologists have identified the last group encountered by Cabeza de Vaca as Jumano.
Cabeza de Vaca’s journey sparked interest in Mexico’s far northern frontier, and in the late 1530s the Spanish crown commissioned a series of sea and land explorations (Chipman 1992:39–42).5 By this time, temporary passageways had been established through the Gran Chichimeca. Between 1539 and 1543 Spaniards explored the Southwest and other parts of the present United States (ibid.).6 Spanish soldiers and missionaries claimed this land on behalf of Christianity and the Spanish crown during four major expeditions. In 1539 Fray Marcos de Niza was commissioned to lead the first expedition; Esteban, Cabeza de Vaca’s former companion, acted as the guide and advance scout (Lafaye 1974). Fray Marcos and his companions set camp on the Río Mayo of Sonora, Mexico, while Esteban moved onward (Bandelier 1990; Bannon 1970). Esteban, walking two days ahead of Fray Marcos, became the first non-Indian to set foot in Arizona and New Mexico. Esteban was probably a Malinké, because Spain was importing Malinké slaves at this time (Aguirre Beltrán 1946). He was certainly an experienced explorer and adept in nautical sciences (Dubois 1975), skills that Malinké sailors were experts in before becoming captives (Thornton 1996). Their homeland in West Africa, Mali, encompassed a region with three major rivers, the Niger, Gambia, and Senegal. The Senegal and Gambia emptied into the Atlantic Ocean.
Esteban was killed in Cíbola, in present-day New Mexico, and the region was more fully explored several months later by Francisco Vásquez de Coronado. In a second expedition the Spanish crown commissioned Coronado to investigate Fray Marcos’s report of Cíbola. Accompanied by Fray Marcos, Coronado explored the region and then moved east into Texas and north to the area currently known as Oklahoma and Kansas (Bannon 1970; Chipman 1992). A third expedition was commanded by Hernando de Soto. He began his trek in Florida and moved west to discover what is now known as Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas (Chipman 1992). After three years in the field, De Soto was struck by a raging fever that took his life. He appointed Luis de Moscoso Alvarado to complete the expedition. Moscoso then explored present-day Arkansas and Texas. A fourth expedition was commissioned to explore the territory west of New Mexico (Bolton 1921). On this expedition, Juan Rodríguez-Cabrillo was the first European to reach California. Rodríguez-Cabrillo died during the voyage; his second-in-command, Bartolomé Ferrelo, completed the exploration of the coast of California and Oregon.
These early expeditions gave Spaniards the necessary information to initiate settlement projects. Sedentary villages located in ecologically rich environments were identified as possible colonization sites. New Mexico in particular became the favored site. Although the Spanish were able to explore the Southwest, their settlement plans were put on hold, because the Mixtón Wars broke out and the Chichimec villages blocked further intrusion into the far north (beyond Querétaro). When the wars began, it became impossible to establish land routes to launch a colonization plan in the U.S. Southwest.
When the era of Spanish exploration and conquest began in the north of Mexico, it was the tlatoques, caciques, and their Indian warriors who provided most of the forces (Gibson 1967; Powell 1952). Their complicity clearly delineates the political restructuring that Spain instituted in Mexico and shows that Indian elites were willing to practice accommodative politics to retain their positions of power. Don Nicolás de San Luis, Don Juan Bautista Valerio de la Cruz, and Don Hernando de Tapia were the most powerful tlatoques aiding the Spanish (Powell 1952:160). Although the Spanish had formed a strong military alliance with many tlatoques from central Mexico, the Chichimec people were not easily vanquished.
The level of Chichimec political organization ranged from chiefdoms to autocephalous villages. Six powerful chiefdoms, however, controlled the central and southern regions of the Gran Chichimeca: the Guamares, Pames, Guachichiles, Zacatecos, Caxcanes, and Tecuexes. The Caxcanes were an independent nation that had branched from the Zacatecos.7 The people of these chiefdoms were difficult to conquer because they were unified and prepared for war. Scattered within the territories controlled by the six nations, however, were independent villages that could easily fall.
In 1536 the first successful Spanish invasions were launched (Powell 1952:3). The first villages to be subdued were located in the present cities of Guadalajara and Querétaro. Spaniards made alliances with many Indian groups there and in turn used these relations to befriend other Indians. Defeated villages were assured that no harm would come to them if they helped the Spanish vanquish other groups. As a further enticement to side with Spain, Indians were given tools, cooking utensils, and clothing. Through this divide and conquer process the Spanish gradually gained support from some Indian groups and began to move further north, each village becoming a stepping stone in the northern invasion.
The movement north, however, came to a halt when the Chichimec nations united for purposes of self-defense. Tenamaxtle became the head of the coalition (Powell 1952). He was the tribal chief of several Caxcan rancherías, and his people often intermarried with Zacatecos and Tecuexes. In 1541 he was able to unite over 60,000 warriors under his command (Rodríguez Flores 1976:74). Second in command was Citlacotl, a Caxcan Indian from Mixtón, a ranchería in Jalpa. Between 1541 and 1542 the Chichimec Indians fought the Mixtón War and successfully defeated their enemies (Forbes 1994:24; Powell 1952:30). Their uprising was massive and spread outside the Gran Chichimeca, reaching villages in northwest Mexico. The only Spanish northwestern garrison in Culiacán was temporarily abandoned after the local Indians joined the Chichimec rebellion (Chipman 1992; Spicer 1981).
Ironically, although the Chichimec forces were able to stop the northward invasion, Tenamaxtle’s army suffered a severe blow when Citlacotl betrayed him (Rodríguez Flores 1976). Citlacotl secretly made a treaty with Captain Miguel Ibarra in exchange for the protection of his people. About 1,000 Caxcanes and Zacatecos were to be secretly relocated to Guadalajara. In return Citlacotl revealed Tenamaxtle’s military plans to Ibarra. On 26 December 1541 Tenamaxtle’s army was ambushed and a large number of his warriors were killed. With a nearly depleted army Tenamaxtle was temporarily forced to retreat. This demoralized his troops (Rodríguez Flores 1976:79).
Although Tenamaxtle’s army was defeated, other Chichimec tribes continued fighting. The fighting force changed from a well-organized military army to independent battalions led by hundreds of village chiefs. In particular, small Zacateco villages took up arms. The Tecuexes, one of the smallest nations of the Gran Chichimeca, began to unify the village chiefs and brought order to the attacks launched against the Spanish. Surprisingly, the Tecuexes, who did not have a well-trained army, fought many successful battles against the Spanish. Tenamaxtle’s spirit to continue fighting rose when he heard that village chiefs and the Tecuexes, who were among the weakest military tribes in the Gran Chichimeca, had taken over the fighting and refused to be vanquished. No longer demoralized, Tenamaxtle took charge and once more recruited a massive army. Captain Ibarra, seeing that the Chichimec forces were once again unified under one leader, quickly attempted to bribe Tenamaxtle by promising him wealth in return for the surrender of his people. The captain sent a letter to Tenamaxtle informing him that Spain was prepared to enact a treaty if his people surrendered. Tenamaxtle boldly responded to the audacity of Ibarra’s request and stated that his people would defend their land to the death. The land rightfully belonged to them and not to the intruders: “Surely you must be insane, or you must want us to kill you, if you think that we will give you our land and not defend it; who do you think you are, and who has asked you to come here?” (Rodríguez Flores 1976:76; my translation).8
Spain’s military losses and inability to push northward led the royal government to reconsider its colonization plan and retreat temporarily. Economically it was no longer expedient to attack the Gran Chichimeca when financial investments were more fruitful elsewhere, such as among the Maya along the southern frontier, where the region had been stabilized (Perry and Perry 1988). If Spaniards or Indian tlatoques chose to continue fighting after the Mixtón Wars, they had to fund their own battles. For a short period both sides reduced their attacks.
In 1546 social conditions began to change in the Spaniards’ favor after Captain Juan de Tolosa discovered silver in the present state of Zacatecas (Frye 1996:43; Powell 1952:10–11). Tolosa obtained the support of three wealthy war veterans, and together they took on the royal crown’s challenge. They decided to recruit a large army and finance three mining camps in Zacatecas. Tolosa, Captain Cristóbal de Oñate, Diego de Ibarra, and Baltasar Temiño de Bañuelos were prepared for any challenge. They had previously benefited financially from successful campaigns against rebellious Indians. To them the north was a land of opportunity, a potential patrimony that could ensure their families’ wealth for generations to come. They knew the cost of fighting the Chichimecs could ultimately be their deaths, yet the rewards for conquering the north exceeded the risks.
Before silver could be extracted from the mines it became necessary to increase the fortification of Zacatecas. For two years the Chichimecs left the camps alone and the four entrepreneurs gave the new frontier its first stability; they held on when others thought the job was impossible or not worth the risk (León-Portilla 1972). Within a few years, the news that silver had been discovered in Zacatecas prompted a large migration of settlers. Moreover, with the arrival of thousands of colonists in Zacatecas, they now had the forces to launch a fatal attack against the Chichimecs. As a result of the mining activities, the four investors were among the wealthiest men in the Americas and were prepared to finance the establishment of more mining camps. With increasing numbers of people prepared to settle in the north, Mexico’s viceroy Don Luis de Velasco was willing to finance new colonies. After 1555 the settlements in the present state of Zacatecas grew into towns and mining camps were founded in the present states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Durango (Forbes 1994:32; León-Portilla 1972:90).
As more colonists settled in the north the Chichimecs responded by launching several attacks and temporarily causing many to abandon their camps outside of the heavily fortified region in Zacatecas. The Spanish retaliated, forcing the Indians to retreat. Once the Spaniards had re-stabilized the region north of Zacatecas, the colonists returned, but only for short periods, because the Indians launched counterattacks. Miguel León-Portilla describes this process of settlement and abandonment:
To assure communications between Zacatecas and Mexico City, the authorities began to establish new towns, missions, and forts. Soon, too, new deposits were discovered where other mining centers were established: Guanajuato in 1555, Sombrerete in 1556, Fresnillo and Mazapil in 1568. Frequent assaults and rebellions on the part of the Chichimecs, although they were subdued time after time, made constant precaution and defense necessary. However, the zeal to exploit the gold and silver deposits from that time on prevented the abandonment of what had been achieved and, furthermore, impelled new attempts at penetration. (León-Portilla 1972:90)
By 1561 the Chichimecs had killed over 200 Spaniards and mestizos and 2,000 Indian colonists (Powell 1952:61).
A few years later the royal government responded to the setbacks by instituting radical military policies. The new viceroy, Don Martín Enríquez de Almanza, authored several enslavement policies allegedly to pacify the north. The policies of “guerra a fuego y a sangre” (war by the sword) were instituted in 1569 (Powell 1952:105–107). The intent was to promote factionalism and dissuade Indians from fighting, for if they continued challenging Spain the captured villagers would be enslaved for thirteen years and forced to work in the mines. Though the enslavement policies conflicted with Mexico’s New Laws of 1542–1543, which prohibited Indian slavery, an exemption was made for the Chichimec captives (Hanke 1949:4). Among the first Indians to be enslaved were villagers near the mining camps of Zacatecas and Santa Bárbara in Chihuahua. Slaves were later captured from various villages in Guaynamota, Sinaloa, and Nuevo León (Powell 1952:110). People were captured, sentenced, distributed among the colonists, and then forced to work in the mines (Lafaye 1974; Forbes 1994). Many Indians were transported to Mexico City and sold at auction. After the first groups were enslaved, surrounding communities feared a similar fate and ended their revolts. The viceroy’s campaign of terror was effective and coerced many to form alliances. The zone under Spain’s control gradually grew.
In response to the enslavement activities, many Chichimec villages launched several battles against the Spanish from 1570 to 1580 (Powell 1952:37, 109). The main targets were the garrison and mining camps in Zacatecas. Travel north of the fortified regions in Zacatecas and Durango became very dangerous. With the exception of the mining camps in Santa Bárbara and San Bartolomé, Chihuahua, which were under the control of a handful of wealthy mining entrepreneurs and soldiers, very few settlers ventured past Zacatecas (Alonso 1995; Chipman 1992).9 In an effort to hasten the colonization of the north, Viceroy Enríquez petitioned the royal government to provide more incentives for the settlers. He asked that all settlers be given Indian slaves and the right to retain them for life.
At first, many New World clergy supported the viceroy, because temporary slavery was an effective policy. When he asked that Indians be enslaved for life, however, the church protested and instead offered a more humane solution. Rather than instituting a war policy, the church proposed that a pacification strategy be implemented through a large-scale missionization program (Engelhardt 1929). They would build missions among the Chichimecs and entice Indians to relocate there, a process replicating the Maya mission system. The proposed plan would begin with the aid of Indian allies. Each mission would have at least three Christian Indians who in turn would convince others to move to the missions (Engelhardt 1929). If Indians did not want to live in the missions but were willing to become allies, they would be asked to relocate their villages near the missions (Polzer 1976; Spicer 1981). This policy was called reducción. The church also suggested that Indians from central Mexico be asked to form colonies, as this type of settlement would be less threatening to the Chichimecs (Bannon 1970).
The royal government responded favorably. King Philip II ordered a reduction of the armed forces, funded the mission program, and passed the royal Ordinance of Pacification of 1573, which nullified the enslavement policies (Chipman 1992:55; Cutter 1986:28). Although the king sided with the church, many colonists continued capturing and illegally enslaving Indians (Chipman 1992; Forbes 1994; Gibson 1964).10 After many more battles, and the ongoing arrival of colonists and missionaries, the Chichimecs reduced their fighting. In 1591 the north was declared safe and ready for large-scale settlement (Powell 1952:194). The Chichimec Indians were no longer unified and did not pose a threat.
The settlement of Mexico beyond Zacatecas proceeded by way of missions and Indian towns. The royal crown considered these type of settlements to be less threatening to Indians unaccustomed to state systems. Once regions were stabilized, Spaniards and mestizos would follow. To unravel this colonial process I need to provide a brief overview of Mexico’s mission system.
The first large-scale conversion of Indians occurred in 1523 among the Tlaxcalans (Engelhardt 1929:11). It was successful, as many Indians welcomed the fathers. The following year twelve Franciscans came to central Mexico to spread Christianity. Three years later Dominicans arrived, followed by Augustinians in 1533 and Jesuits in 1572 (ibid., 3). The Christianization of the Indians of central Mexico succeeded. In the north the first religious entrada began in 1533 among the Indians of Jalisco. A few Indians converted. Throughout the sixteenth century the church tried to Christianize the Indians of the north, but repeatedly failed. Most missionaries were forced to retreat, and those who remained behind were killed.
In central Mexico the Christianization of the Indians took place in the corregimientos, Indian pueblos, and encomiendas. There they were taught religious doctrines during their catechism lessons. Since the Indians were not under the constant supervision of the fathers, Fray Juan de Zumárraga proposed to the crown that missions be established to accelerate Indian acculturation. A few years after the conquest a small number of Indians in central Mexico were removed from the encomiendas and placed in experimental missions (Perry and Perry 1988). The church and the crown, however, decided that it was not necessary to construct missions in central Mexico because most Indians were already accustomed to the social order imposed by state governments. Isolating Indians for purposes of acculturation was expensive and unnecessary. Missions were to be established only in newly pacified frontier zones where other types of colonial settlements were not functional.
According to this plan, after a frontier region had been pacified and friendly Indians had been identified, a parish would be constructed as well as dormitories for the fathers and Indians. Acculturating Indians in missions was seen as a strategic method to entice people to live under the control of Spaniards. Most missions also were to contain rooms for religious instruction, occupational production (e.g., crafts, weaving, candles, winery), and other functions as well as stables (Engelhardt 1929). Missions located in dangerous zones would be protected by soldiers and a military center built for self-defense (with an office, jail, and soldiers’ dormitories).
The chiefs of tribes who were allies of the fathers but were unwilling to live in the missions would be asked to move their villages near the missions. In this way, Indian villages would become part of the mission communities without threatening the social distance preferred by the people. The first frontier mission was built in 1542 at Nachi Cocom among the Mayas of the Yucatán Peninsula (Perry and Perry 1988:20). Within forty years, 22 Maya missions were established as well as 186 visitas, Indian villages regularly visited by missionaries to officiate mass, baptize Indians, and teach catechism (ibid., 35). In the Yucatán, and later throughout Mexico, it became common for mission communities to begin as visitas and later be elevated to missions (Polzer 1976).
The first missions in northern Mexico were established in 1590 in the present states of Sinaloa and Durango (Engelhardt 1929; Polzer 1976).11 The large-scale construction of missions did not take place until after the Gran Chichimeca was pacified. By the early 1700s missions had been constructed in Baja California, Florida, Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Nayarit, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, and the U.S. Southwest. Throughout the frontier zones the missions proved to be essential in the pacification of hostile Indians. In the Gran Chichimeca, missions served that purpose, but they were also accompanied by Indian pueblos. The church and crown decided that the conquest of this region had been delayed long enough and that the missions alone could not rapidly acculturate the Indians. For that purpose Tlaxcalan Indians were ordered to help the mission fathers settle the Gran Chichimeca.
After the Chichimec revolts ended, missions and Indian pueblos were founded throughout northern Mexico (Frye 1996). The first Indian colonists were Tlaxcalan. They founded the first towns and populated the first missions. At least three Tlaxcalan Indians lived in each mission (Bannon 1970:73; Bolton 1960:15; Simmons 1964:102, 103). All settlements were established near the largest Indian villages. In this way, the Tlaxcalans and the fathers had access to large communities and a place to retreat quickly when the other Indians became hostile.
Four hundred Tlaxcalan families set out to settle the north on 4 March 1591 (Hernández Xochitiotzin 1991:3).12 The families were accompanied by Tlaxcalan captains Don Lucas Téllez, Don Buenaventura de la Paz, Don Lucas Montealegre, and Don Francisco Vásquez. These captains acted as guides and temporary civil judges. The head of the expedition was Miguel de Caldero, a Tlaxcalan mestizo who was well acquainted with the Indians of the north. Father Jerónimo de Mendieta and Indian scholar Don Diego Muñoz Camargo were appointed to chronicle the expedition and record events. Several other Franciscan friars were also among the settlers. In addition to these volunteers, twenty-five Tlaxcalan slaves accompanied the settlers (letter of Tlaxcala governor Martín López de Guana, 1591). These Indians had been condemned to slavery for having protested and attempted to prevent the march north. The idea that the north was to be settled by Indians had caused considerable turmoil in the city of Tlaxcala. Over 925 people, divided into four groups, left the present state of Tlaxcala (Hernández Xochitiotzin 1991:5).13 The colonists rode in 111 covered wagons. Once they arrived at their destinations they were under the command of Captain Don Rodrigo del Río y Loza and Captain Don Agustín de Hinojosa y Villacencio.
The Spanish crown granted the colonists the title of hidalgos libres, designating persons who were the founders of a colony and deserved special privileges, including exemption from paying tribute and the right to receive land grants with alienation rights (the right to sell their property) (Alessio Robles 1934:4).14 Interestingly, all hidalgos, regardless of their social standing, were also allowed to wear Spanish clothing, ride horses, and carry arms in public. This indeed was an honor, as these privileges were reserved for Indian nobles and Indian soldiers.
Overall, Tlaxcalans founded at least eight towns, and some of the settlers moved to the town of Zacatecas. The newly founded towns were located in the present states of Jalisco (San Luis de Colotlán), San Luis Potosí (San Miguel de Mixquitic, Tlaxcalilla, Agua de Venado Chanaca, Agua Hedionada, San Luis Potosí), and Coahuila (Saltillo, San Esteban de Nueva Tlaxcala).15 Once established, the towns in Coahuila became the furthest northeastern colonies and strategic stepping stones in the settlement of Texas (Alessio Robles 1934; Baga 1690; Gibson 1967). Shortly after the arrival of the Tlaxcalans, thousands of Spaniards, mestizos, and afromestizos followed. Ironically, after Tlaxcalans helped to stabilize the north their political significance declined, and they were stripped of all political power (Frye 1996). By 1646 the Spanish Empire was entrenched in the Gran Chichimeca. Over 127,891 colonists and Christianized Indians became subjects of the crown: 102,289 Christian Indians, 16,230 Spaniards, 1,082 mestizos, and 8,290 afromestizos or Blacks (Cook and Borah 1974:197, 198, 200).16 Nearly half of the Christian Indian population lived in or near the missions.
By the time the colonization of the Southwest began, the Spanish crown and the Catholic Church had passed laws to protect the Indians (see Chapter 2). After Indians were subdued or befriended they were to be peaceably colonized in missions or in Indian villages under the judicial control of the Spanish, as ordered by the royal Ordinance of Pacification of 1573 (Cutter 1986; Polzer 1976). The church became their legal protector and the main agent of cultural change (Cutter 1986; Polzer 1976; Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias 1774: Book 1, Title 1, Laws 1, 3, and 9). As long as Indians accepted colonial rule, their land rights were validated; otherwise their property rights were abolished (Hanke 1949). The royal government also had the right to set the boundaries between Spanish and Indian settlements and to claim land on behalf of the colonists. In theory, this was the legal philosophy; in practice, many settlers disobeyed the royal orders and abused the legal rights of the Indians.
Spanish settlement of the Southwest began in 1598 when Juan de Oñate led over 400 male settlers to New Mexico; 130 of these men were accompanied by their wives and children (Prince 1915:139; Villagrá 1933: 103).17 Plans for the northward movement began in 1595, after viceroy Luis de Velasco approved Oñate’s petition (Hammond 1953:1). Oñate was selected to head the first colony in the Southwest due to his family’s frontier legacy. He was an experienced frontiersman and the son of one of the wealthiest men in Mexico, Cristóbal Martín de Oñate, a war veteran who had pacified the Indians of Zacatecas and founded the frontier city of Guadalajara. Eventually Oñate spent over 400,000 pesos of his own funds to pay for the journey (Bannon 1970:41). Although Velasco approved Oñate’s petition, the movement north had to wait several years, because the viceroy was removed from office.
When Don Gaspar de Zúñiga y Acevedo, count of Monterrey, was appointed the new viceroy he rescinded Oñate’s commission, choosing instead Don Pedro Ponce de León. The viceroy allegedly disapproved of Oñate because of the dubious company he kept and the character of the colonists he had recruited. In a letter to the crown on 11 June 1596 he supported his decision by questioning the colonists’ civility:
… it is very important that the people taken by Don Juan de Oñate be orderly and disciplined and cause no harm, and that they be corrected and punished if they cause any trouble …wemay well fear that when these people cross the provinces of New Galicia and New Vizcaya, great injury and damage will result to the cattle ranchers of those provinces, and also to the mining establishments, by which these people must of necessity pass. (letter of Don Gaspar de Zuñiga y Acevedo in Hammond and Rey 1953:98)
The viceroy’s motives were highly suspect, as Oñate was a second-generation war veteran and one of the wealthiest entrepreneurs of Mexico. Why the viceroy instead selected a peninsular unaccustomed to the frontier is uncertain, but racial politics were obviously involved. At that time the loyalty of criollos was highly suspect, and commissioning mestizos for high-level positions was against the law (Haring 1963; Menchaca 1993). Oñate’s political loyalty was in doubt because there were many substantiated allegations that he was a mestizo assuming the legal status of a criollo (Cornish 1917:459). Even Oñate’s friends questioned his racial purity. Gaspar Pérez de Villagrá, one of the chroniclers and later a captain in Oñate’s expedition, wrote about the rumors and investigated the family’s genealogy, claiming that on his mother’s side Oñate was a descendant of Moctezuma II (Villagrá 1933:73). Villagrá and many others proposed that the peninsular woman recorded as Oñate’s mother could not have been his mother because she lived in Spain at the time of his birth (Cornish 1917). Adding to the viceroy’s consternation, it was a well-known fact that Oñate’s wife, Doña Isabel de Tolosa Cortés Moctezuma, was not White: she was the daughter of Juan de Tolosa (one of the founders of Zacatecas), the granddaughter of Hernán Cortés, and the granddaughter of Emperor Moctezuma II (Chipman 1977; Cornish 1917).
Despite these questionable associations, Oñate triumphed in the end. His wealth and political connections served him well: the royal crown disagreed with the viceroy and interceded on Oñate’s behalf. On 2 April 1597 King Philip II personally approved his petition on the grounds that he was a frontiersman well suited for the commission (letter of King Philip II, in Hammond and Rey 1953:196).
Oñate was immediately granted the titles of captain-general and governor of New Mexico. This gave him the right to govern the colony and assign land grants to the settlers. On 26 January 1598 Oñate’s colonists departed from Santa Bárbara, Chihuahua,18 with 83 wagons and some 7,000 head of stock, accompanied by 10 Franciscans, 8 priests, and 2 lay brothers (Bannon 1970:36; Engelhardt 1929:14; Weber 1992). Fray Alonso Martínez was in charge of all religious matters and was appointed to begin the mission program (Hammond 1953:16). Oñate’s colonists were also well prepared to launch a military attack if necessary; they brought horses, swords, shields, daggers, cannons, harquebuses, lances, spears, helmets, gunpowder, saddles, horseshoes, leather jackets, corsets, beaves, cosques, and halberds (Uolla Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:136–137; Salazar Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:225–227). Indeed they were equipped with the most advanced technology of the time.
The members of Juan de Oñate’s colony were recruited from different regions of Mexico and included peninsulares, criollos, mestizos, Indians, and approximately five Blacks (Bannon 1970:41; John 1975:39–43; Salazar Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:514–519; Uolla Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:94–168). Those who were born in Spain came primarily from Castille, Estremadura, Laredo, and Biscay, while the majority of those who were born in Mexico came from Zacatecas, Mexico City, and Puebla (Salazar Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:514–519; Uolla Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:94–168). Very few records remain describing the settlers. The main accounts are based on military inspections conducted by Lieutenant Captain Juan de Frías Salazar and Don Lope de Uolla. The inspections were conducted in several of the mining camps in Chihuahua. Unfortunately, the royal government ordered that detailed information be collected only on the White soldiers. We thus have little information on the colonists of color, who were merely asked to appear for roll call and register their belongings. General descriptions indicate that the colony was racially diverse. It is unclear why so little information was collected.
Nonetheless, one of Salazar’s roll calls, conducted on 8 January 1598, contains valuable racial information (Salazar Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:287). On the day of the inspection, in the mining camp of Todos Santos, Salazar ordered all the White soldiers to assemble inside the church. They were to be counted, declare where they were born, and identify their father. Salazar warned the soldiers that any person who attempted to impersonate a Spaniard would be severely penalized. He ordered that “no Indian, mulatto or mestizo present himself at the review unless he clearly states that he is such, under penalty of death, so that, with this knowledge, that which best suits the service of his majesty may be done” (ibid.).
Salazar faithfully executed the viceregal order and compiled a list of 117 Spaniards (Salazar Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:289–300). He also identified which of the Spaniards were married, but did not report the race of the spouses. Interestingly, it appears that on one occasion Salazar doubted the ancestry of one Spanish officer but did not pursue the matter. He carefully described Captain Alonso de Sosa Peñalosa, a wealthy man who was accompanied by his wife: “Captain Alonso de Sosa Peñalosa, native of Mexico, son of Francisco de Sosa Albornoz, 48 years of age, of dark complexion, somewhat gray, with his arms; the other arms which he had declared he had given to a soldier” (ibid., 290).
Perhaps it was expedient to overlook Peñalosa’s color and not inquire into his paternity, because he was a valuable asset to the colony. Among Peñalosa’s registered supplies were jewels, silver, silk, 35 horses, 30 steers, 80 milk cows, 500 sheep, and 80 goats (Salazar Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:241).
Although Salazar’s inspection provides little demographic information on the colonists of color it is an extremely valuable record because the exclusion of information is itself significant. The historical erasure of racial information indicates a hesitancy on the part of the royal government to keep records of the activities of the people of color. Anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995) argues that this practice was quite common during the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. Chroniclers consciously distorted events by deliberately ignoring the accomplishments of people of color or by documenting events in generalities to hide specific information. This was not done out of malice but emanated from a historiographic tradition that did not consider the heroic acts of people of color to be possible or of value. Nonetheless, another registry by Don Lope de Uolla provides some information on the nativity and racial composition of the settlers. Together the two inspections indicate that most of the colonists were not peninsulares. The Uolla registry taken between 10 and 17 February 1597 gives detailed information on all of the soldiers, not solely on those who were White. It also provides a few glimpses of the women.
Uolla registered a total of 228 enlisted men (Uolla Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:150–168). Because nativity, rather than race, was used as one of the main variables to describe the soldiers, the registry obscures the racial background of the men born in Mexico; thus it is uncertain how many of the men were non-White. Of the men registered by Uolla 126 were peninsulares and 77 were either criollos or mestizos (ibid.). The registry indicates that 15 male servants accompanied their peninsular masters and were fully equipped with military gear (ibid., 94–168). The race of the servants was not recorded.
We also learn from various sources that a few Blacks were part of the expedition. Uolla’s registry indicates that Oñate’s personal servant was Black (Uolla Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:129). In addition, Salazar’s supply registry notes that Francisco de Sosa Peñalosa brought four female slaves and one male slave (Salazar Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:247). Captain Gaspar Pérez de Villagrá reported in government documents that there were Blacks among the settlers and that Oñate felt comfortable socializing with them (Hammond 1953:15). On one occasion Villagrá noted that Oñate and his Black companions mocked Inspector Salazar. Uolla and Salazar provide little information on the women. We learn more about them from Villagrá’s chronicle on the founding of the colonies in New Mexico. The notes on the women primarily indicate that many soldiers were married and many spouses came from Tlaxcala (Uolla Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:151–168). In sum, though most of the information in the records refers to the peninsulares, the inspections, the roll calls, the letters sent by the viceroy, and Villagrá’s account clearly indicate that Oñate’s colony was racially mixed.
On 26 January 1598 Oñate’s colonists assembled and left Santa Bárbara, Chihuahua, commencing their trek toward New Mexico (Bannon 1970: 36; Chipman 1992:59). Along the way, they stopped in present-day El Paso, where they met two Indians from central Mexico named Tomás and Cristóbal. The two men were former scouts from an earlier expedition that had passed through New Mexico who had chosen to remain in El Paso and live among the Pueblo Indians. Oñate convinced them to accompany the party and serve as translators, as both men were familiar with some of the languages spoken by the Pueblo peoples (John 1975:40, 41). A bilingual chain of translation was immediately organized through Caso Barahona, a member of the colony who spoke Spanish and one of the Indian languages known by Tomás and Cristóbal.
When Oñate passed through villages, he greeted the Indians and announced that they had become vassals of the king of Spain. He informed them that if they voluntarily complied they would live in peace, justice, and orderliness, but if they resisted they would be severely punished. To repay the Indians for their allegiance, Oñate promised to protect them and to enrich their culture by teaching them Spanish traditions, trades, and farming technology. He then offered gifts as a token of peace and a confirmation of their conquest, including knives, necklaces, combs, scissors, tomines, shoemaker needles, mirrors, glass bottles, hats, bells, tin images, beads, headdresses, rosaries, lace edgings, fans, rings, thimbles, anklets, and flutes (Uolla Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:134–135). Allegedly, the Indians accepted the gifts courteously and agreed to become vassals, or at least that was Oñate’s assumption. What the Indians thought of this ritual is uncertain. We know only what Oñate wrote. These colonial contracts survived for centuries and became legal statutes validating the Pueblo Indians’ land rights.
Some of the colonists finally arrived at an Indian village called Caypa on 11 July 1598, and the missionaries renamed the village San Juan de los Caballeros (Hammond 1953:17).19 The village was occupied by Tewa Indians (Hodge 1953:365). The main body of Oñate’s colony reached San Juan approximately a month later. For several months the colonists and Indians of San Juan lived in peace until news arrived in early December that Captain Juan de Zaldívar and twelve of his men, who had left San Juan in search of food, had been killed by Acoma Indians (Villagrá 1933:214; John 1975:47). Oñate immediately declared war against the Acoma and ordered his men to prepare for battle. The Indians of San Juan, frightened by a change of affairs, cautioned their neighbors about the potential danger the Spanish posed. After the soldiers left for Acoma, some of the Indians from San Juan and from the surrounding villages became hostile. Oñate, who had remained behind, ordered his soldiers to launch a counterattack. With insufficient men to defend the colony, it became necessary for the women to arm themselves. Acting like veteran soldiers, the women hid on the housetops and positioned themselves to shoot their enemies. Doña Eufemia, the wife of Francisco de Sosa Peñalosa, organized the women. Villagrá chronicled the women’s defensive attack:
The general was in his quarters when the Indians raised an alarm that all the neighboring tribesmen were in arms and marching to destroy all the Spaniards. The pueblo of San Juan was so situated that it formed an immense square with four entrances. The general posted his men and guns at each of these approaches …. The Indians continued their alarms. The men were all well stationed and ready to defend the capital when the general noticed that all the housetops were crowded with people. He quickly sent two captains to investigate who they were and what they meant. They returned soon, informing him that Doña Eufemia had gathered all the women together on the housetops to aid in the defense. Doña Eufemia had stated that they would come down if the general so ordered, but that it was their desire to be permitted to aid their husbands in the defense of the capital. Don Juan was highly pleased at this display of valor coming from feminine breasts, and he delegated Doña Eufemia to defend the housetops with the women. They joyfully held their posts and walked up and down the housetops with proud and martial step.20 (Villagrá 1933:223–224)
Finding San Juan well fortified, the Indians decided to retreat. While trouble brewed in San Juan, Oñate’s soldiers arrived in Acoma and defeated the Acoma Indians after several days of fighting. Cannons and other artillery were used to disable them. The Acoma forces surrendered, but they refused to identify which Indians had killed Zaldívar and his companions. The Indians were then rounded up and placed in bondage. Some resisted and tried to hide in the kivas, while others escaped through underground passages.
At this point there are two distinct accounts of what transpired. According to Acoma descendants, their oral tradition says that their people surrendered because they knew if they resisted the entire tribe would be massacred (Forbes 1994:89–90). A conflicting account was advanced by Oñate’s soldiers. Oñate’s report claimed that, although many Indians surrendered, a large number resisted, and in defense his men set Acoma on fire (cf. Hammond 1953:21).21 Based on these two contradictory versions of events it is uncertain what happened; but the Spanish destroyed Acoma and captured approximately 80 men and 500 women. The hostages surrendered and were charged with the murder of Zaldívar and the other Spanish soldiers. Oñate ordered a trial, appointing Captain Alonso Gómez Montesinos as their defense attorney. The Acoma captives were found guilty, and Oñate pronounced their sentences. Men over twenty-five years of age were condemned to have one foot cut off and were placed in servitude for twenty years. Males between twelve and twenty-five years of age and women over twelve were sentenced to twenty years of servitude. Boys and girls under twelve were placed under the supervision of the colonists. The boys were to live under the command of Spanish officers, and the girls were turned over to the missionaries (Bannon 1970:36; Hammond 1953:21). Unfortunately, these girls became the first mission neophytes of the Southwest.
Life for the colonists continued to be difficult. Six months later they left San Juan and resettled a few miles north in Yukewingge among another Tewa people (Hodge 1953:371). Oñate renamed the village San Gabriel. Though conditions in San Gabriel improved, many colonists found life there unbearable and asked Oñate to allow them to leave New Mexico. He rejected their petitions and cautioned everyone that they were prohibited from leaving under penalty of law. Abandoning the colony was treason. While problems brewed in New Mexico, Captain Juan de Sotelo was on his way with a new colony. The settlers arrived in San Gabriel on 24 December 1600 (Hammond 1953:24). Most of de Sotelo’s colonists were from Puebla and Mexico City. A more detailed record was left of these colonists. There were a total of 110 registered members:22 46 peninsulares, 39 mestizos or criollos, 2 Black servants, 20 Indians, and 3 young women whose race and parentage were not noted (Gordejuela Inspection, in Hammond and Rey 1953:514–579). Most of the female colonists were women of color. There were 14 Indian females, 9 criollas or mestizas, 1 Black woman, 5 peninsulares, and 3 others (ibid., 557–566). Within a year, Oñate’s troubles worsened, as the new colonists also wanted to leave. A few of the families deserted. Most, however, remained behind and dispersed themselves in the two colonial settlements already established in San Gabriel and San Juan (Prince 1915).
Although life was difficult for the colonists, relations with the Indians gradually improved. Stability was achieved through the missionaries’ ability to befriend the Indians. As more communities welcomed the fathers and allowed them to live in their villages, amicable social networks developed. Memories of the Acoma affair became less divisive as friendships developed between the colonists and Indians. By 1608 the friars reported a total of 4,000 Christian converts (Bannon 1970:39).
Though the Spanish colonies were finally getting a foothold, Oñate was forced to resign his post as governor of New Mexico and his son, Cristóbal, was denied the privilege of becoming the new governor. The Council of the Indies, a branch of the royal government that oversaw the New World colonies, charged Oñate with three major crimes. First, he had sentenced deserters to death without giving them a trial. Second, the sentencing of the Acomas and the crimes committed against them were considered improper. Third, Oñate had disregarded his obligations as governor and spent excessive time exploring New Mexico, rather than assuring the welfare of the colonists. On 24 August 1607 Oñate resigned his post, and Don Pedro Peralta became the new governor (Hammond 1953:33).
After replacing Oñate, the council changed its indifferent policies and began taking steps to ensure the survival of the colony by increasing financial support and sending more missionaries. The council also decided that it was time to build a capital in New Mexico. In 1609 some of the settlers were ordered to move from San Gabriel to Santa Fe, where the capital was founded (Bannon 1970:41). By 1630 Santa Fe had 250 residents claiming pure Spanish ancestry and approximately 700 Indians and mestizos. There were also over 50 friars serving 25 missions (ibid.; Prince 1915:46–48). A large number of the residents in Santa Fe were Tlaxcalan Indians, as a colony of Tlaxcalans had been established in New Mexico between 1600 and 1605 (Prince 1915:86; Simmons 1964:108–110). It is uncertain how many Tlaxcalans migrated to New Mexico and later resettled in Santa Fe. Mission fathers, however, reported that by 1680 there were close to 500 Tlaxcalan Indians living in Analco, a neighborhood of Santa Fe (Forbes 1973; Gibson 1967; Prince 1915:88).
A large number of Pueblo villages in New Mexico had a corporate government structure, resembling the political systems of the Indians of Mexico’s central valley (Gibson 1964; Hall 1989). Many Indians lived in towns and small cities governed by theocratic councils, with judicial systems that set penalties and fines when laws were broken (Deloria and Lytle 1988). This level of political development had been one of the main attractions leading the royal government to select New Mexico as the first place of settlement in the Southwest (Spicer 1981). The crown’s representatives in central Mexico had found that it was more convenient to colonize people who were organized under a central government, who, once conquered, would already be socialized to obey laws, pay fines, and most important of all pay tribute.
Spaniards conquered most Pueblo Indians by using military force and then coercing alliances. Pueblo villages which were militarily stronger were able to keep the Spanish at a distance, however, and resist the vassalage conditions imposed upon them. Such was the case of some Hopi villages (Lomawaima 1989). The Tewa, Tiwa, Jemez, Piro, and Keresan Pueblo villages were militarily weak and were subjected to heightened forms of exploitation (John 1975; Kessell 1989). The governors of New Mexico forced these Indian peoples to pay tribute and accept the construction of missions adjacent to their villages (Bronitsky 1987; Hall 1989). Many of these Indians were also forced to move to Santa Fe and work as servants or farm laborers. Though few scholars question that Indians were coerced into making alliances, intertribal warfare also prompted the Pueblo Indians to retain alliances with the colonists (Kessell 1989; Spicer 1981; Swanton 1984). Most Pueblo villages were enemies of the Navajo, who resided in present northern Arizona, and the Apache, who were dispersed throughout Arizona and New Mexico. Warfare frequently broke out when Apaches and Navajos raided Pueblo villages in search of food. To keep them at a distance and to protect crops during harvest season, Pueblo villagers often sought the military aid of their colonial neighbors.
As the region under Spanish control grew, the settlers were able to disperse themselves throughout northern New Mexico, where they established ranches and farms. A settlement pattern emerged. Mestizos and Indians were given small plots of land in the region north of Santa Fe, which came to be known as Río Arriba (Scholes 1937:139–140). Many of the ranches were established near Pueblo villages. Indian-colonist relations were relatively peaceful, and the Pueblo and settlers banded together when under Apache and Navajo attack (Hall 1989; Swadesh 1974). In Río Abajo, where peninsulares and criollos concentrated their settlements and were awarded large agricultural estates, colonial relations became very exploitative (Swadesh 1974). This region consisted of the town of Santa Fe and the surrounding ranches. Many soldiers and elites were awarded encomiendas in the Santa Fe zone and needed labor to work their fields. Tiwas and Tewas were often removed from their villages and forced to live under a peonage system, while Apaches were illegally enslaved under the pretense that they were dangerous and needed to be civilized (Kutsche 1979). It became common for colonists to raid Apache settlements and capture children, converting them to slaves.
As a result of the harsh treatment experienced by the Indians of Río Abajo, seeds of discontent were planted. Missionaries began to lose their followers. In many villages the fathers were no longer welcomed and were forced to leave. The fathers complained to the royal government and won a partial victory in 1641 when the third governor of New Mexico, Luis de Rosas, was replaced (Scholes 1937:142). Rosas was hated by the Indians because he allowed the settlers to capture Indians and enslave them for personal use (Forbes 1994). Upon reviewing the church’s report warning of the potential threat that slavery posed to the stability of the colony, the royal government ordered that all slaving activities immediately end. Under subsequent governors slavery decreased, yet it did not entirely cease; a peonage system that nearly replicated a slave system became commonplace in Río Abajo. Many Indians were forced to work in the fields of the colonists without being paid wages. The actions of the colonists against the Indians continued to worsen, leading to political disorder (Forbes 1994:121; Gutiérrez 1991:107). Pueblo alliances with the colonists completely broke down, motivating the Pueblo Indians to seek Apache and Navajo support. Finally, in 1680, Pueblo Indians, Apaches, and Navajos temporarily united, launching an attack called the “Great Pueblo Rebellion” (Bannon 1970:80). Their motive was to force the colonists to leave. Over 401 colonists were killed, and approximately 2,000 people abandoned their homes in New Mexico (Forbes 1994:174; cf. Gutiérrez 1991:107). Among the refugees were 317 Christian Indians.
Although the Pueblo Rebellion was an indigenous uprising, the governor of New Mexico, Antonio de Otermín, reported that many mestizos and Tlaxcalans sided with the rebels (Forbes 1994:179, 181). In particular, many Tlaxcalans from Santa Fe conspired in the ambush and attack. They helped the Pueblos burn Santa Fe and force the colonists to retreat (Forbes 1973; Prince 1915:88). Governor Otermín also reported that many mestizos chose to remain among the Pueblo Indians.
The refugees were forced to march south and seek refuge in the colonial settlement of El Paso del Norte, founded in 1659 and located where Ciudad Juárez, El Paso, San Elizario, Ysleta, and Socorro are today (Metz 1994:10). The refugees gave life to the small colony, increasing the number of settlers and stabilizing the region. The royal crown granted the refugees permission to establish missions and ranches. Initially, most of the colonists established settlements in what is today Ciudad Juárez, while the mission communities were established on what is today the U.S. side of the border. Franciscans were in charge of the mission communities (Engelhardt 1929). The settlements located on the U.S. side came to constitute a zone within El Paso del Norte called El Paso Valley. In 1682 two mission communities called Ysleta and Socorro were established in El Paso Valley (Bowden 1971:129; Bronitsky 1987:153).23 Senecú, an Indian pueblo, was also established at the same time along the present border of Ciudad Juárez and El Paso. Ysleta came to be inhabited by Tiwas, Senecú by Piros and Tompiros, and Socorro by Piros, Tanos, and Jemez (Bowden 1971). Socorro also contained a large number of mestizos who had married local Indians.
In 1681 the royal crown approved the construction of a presidio (a military administrative center) in El Paso del Norte as a means of assisting its colonists to fortify their settlements (White 1923:9). El Paso del Norte was also declared the new capital of New Mexico. Presidio del Paso del Norte was built a few miles south of El Paso in what is today Ciudad Juárez (Castañeda 1936:311). The presidio brought stability to the region, and the settlements soon prospered.
Within a few years after the revolt, the Pueblo, Apache, and Navajo alliances began to dissolve. Many Pueblo Indians were angered when Popé, one of the Pueblo leaders of the rebellion, began to demand tribute from villages. Likewise, many Apache chiefs began to demand that they be given part of the valuables seized from the colonists, such as cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs. In 1691 the governor of New Mexico, Don Diego de Vargas, received news that the political union of the Indians of New Mexico was falling apart (Sánchez 1983:147).24 This prompted Vargas to prepare a counterattack and begin negotiations with those chiefs who were prepared to switch alliances. The next year Luis Tupatú of Picuris, who was in favor of a Spanish reconquest, obtained support from many Picuri, Tano, and Tewa villages (Gutiérrez 1991; Hall 1989; Sánchez 1983; Weber 1992). Though a substantial number of Pueblo Indians preferred to have Spanish rather than Apache allies, the majority of them did not.
When Tupatú and his allies met with Vargas, they presented their demands: an end to the encomienda system, less scrutiny of ceremonial rights, and recognition of tribal property boundaries (Cutter 1986:44). Vargas conceded these points and agreed that the settlers would be ordered to establish small farms, rather than big estates requiring a large labor force. In this way the temptation to enslave Indians would be avoided. Vargas in turn demanded from Tupatú’s people that they protect the settlers and allow the Catholic Church to reestablish missions in the Indian villages. Tupatú agreed to protect the settlers and to help Spain reconquer the region (Kessell 1989). The reconquest of New Mexico was launched in 1692, and a year later the Spanish military took over Santa Fe and most of New Mexico (ibid., 131). The Acoma, Zuni, and Hopi peoples, however, continued to resist for a few years longer. They were finally subdued when the chiefs of Zia, Pecos, and Santa Ana put an end to their rebellion (Lomawaima 1989). After the Spanish obtained control of New Mexico, the colonies were safe; anyone who resisted was condemned to a life of servitude or placed in prison.
By 1804 New Mexico had approximately 35,750 to 40,000 inhabitants dispersed in colonial towns, missions, ranches, military settlements, and Indian pueblos (Bautista Pino 1812::216).25 The settlements in El Paso Valley were part of New Mexico until 1823 (Bowden 1971:157).26 In the interior, three Spanish towns had been founded in Santa Fe, Santa Cruz, and Albuquerque (Carroll and Haggard 1942:50; Gutiérrez 1991:146), and over twenty-three Indian pueblos were under colonial control (Bautista Pino 1812:217).27 Five of these Indian pueblos were largely populated by detribalized Indians and people of mixed Pueblo and Spanish descent (Archibald 1978:211; Carroll and Haggard 1942:27–28). In addition, most of these settlements contained missions.
In the southern region of New Mexico, in El Paso Valley, there were two additional mission communities in Socorro and Ysleta. By 1751 they had grown substantially and the residents had been given land grants to establish separate towns adjacent to the missions (Bowden 1971:41; Metz 1994:15). Ysleta and its adjoining mission continued to be solely populated by Indians, while the population of Socorro included many genizaros (detribalized Pueblo people of mixed Indian and colonial heritage) and mestizos (Bronitsky 1987). The Indian town of Senecú was also a lively community and came to be heavily populated by mestizos. By 1766 the population of these three communities is estimated to have grown to 5,000, with 2,000 being non-Indians (Metz 1994:16, 17).
In 1789 Presidio San Elizario was relocated to El Paso Valley from Porvenir, Mexico (Hendricks and Timmons 1998:15).28 It was moved to the Socorro area to protect the residents of Socorro and Ysleta. There were other military headquarters in San Miguel del Vado and Taos, as well as a military jail in Santa Fe, an outpost in La Joya, and several cavalry detachments throughout New Mexico (Carroll and Haggard 1942:69–70; Hendricks and Timmons 1998:42, 44).29
San Elizario became one of the most important settlements in New Mexico as well as on the frontier because it was the resting place for travelers moving between Chihuahua and Santa Fe. It was also an important colonial-Indian trading center, founded in the same location as the abandoned Hacienda of Nuestra Señora de la Soledad de los Tiburcios.30 The presidio consisted of outer walls, officer quarters, barracks, a chapel, stables, two defense towers, and several other buildings. A year after the presidio was founded, a presidial pueblo was constructed for the soldiers’ families and other colonists. And a few years later seven Apache rancherías settled in the presidial pueblo, helping to stabilize the region by negotiating with other Apache groups to cease fighting. Among the allies were the families of Apache chiefs Barrio, Maya, and Maselchide. Throughout the Spanish period the settlements in San Elizario remained colonial strongholds in spite of the severe Apache attacks between 1792 and 1798 (Hendricks and Timmons 1998:31–37).
Throughout New Mexico sexual relations between male colonists and female Tiwas and Tewas became quite common by the mid-1700s (Morfí 1977:2–28; see Gutiérrez 1991). Missionaries disapproved of these relations and attempted to enforce the Indian residency laws, prohibiting colonists from living in Indian towns or remaining there for prolonged periods (Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias 1774: Book 6, Title 3, Law 21). This was futile, however, because the governors did not enforce the residency laws in spite of protests by the church (Gutiérrez 1991; Morfí 1977). Often the children of mixed parentage became tribal outcasts and were forced to live among the colonists. If their parents did not provide for them, they were placed in missions or in homes where they worked as servants. These orphans, called genizaros, became detribalized Indians. In most cases they were treated as outcasts by Indians and as social inferiors by the colonists (see Hall 1989:96).
Because the genizaros eventually constituted a large impoverished population without tribal lands, the Catholic Church was morally forced to intervene on their behalf. The church petitioned the royal government to assist them by giving them farmland and the opportunity to establish their own villages. By the early 1800s they had received land; Santa Rosa de Abiquiú, Belén, Tomé, Ojo Caliente, Socorro, and San Miguel del Vado became known as genizaro settlements (Archibald 1978:211; Bustamante 1991:148; Cutter 1986:82; Gutiérrez 1991:305). Not all children of mixed parentage met the same fate as the genizaros. When Pueblo Indians married colonists, it was common for the families to live in the colonial settlements; the children were treated as part of the colonial population, rather than as outsiders (see Olmstead 1981). Historian Ramón Gutiérrez (1991:103) adds that after the seventeenth century most colonial settlements grew through local birth rates and a large number of the colonial residents were of Pueblo Indian descent. After that date few people from the interior of Mexico migrated to New Mexico.
The exact number of genizaros living in New Mexico during the Spanish era is uncertain because census enumerators generally did not classify them under a separate category. Census data from 1789 indicate that in New Mexico, including El Paso Valley, there were 10,664 Indians, 14,553 people who claimed to be Spanish, and 5,736 people of mixed ancestry (Cook and Borah 1974:214, 220). The size of the Spanish population, however, is dubious, as fair-complexioned castizos were often counted as Spaniards. Of the Indians, 1,667 lived among the colonists in the towns, villas, or ranches (Bustamante 1991:153).31 The size of the afromestizo population is also uncertain, as local censuses often omitted the racial categories of the mixed population and counted them as part of the “gente de razón” (people of reason; see Chapter 6). Nonetheless, a census of Albuquerque in 1750 by Father Joseph Yrigoian offers a glimpse of the afromestizo population. Of the 196 families of Albuquerque, 43 were of partially African descent. Most of these families were composed solely of afromestizos, but in some cases the racial composition of the families was mixed (Olmstead 1981:73–89). Interestingly, Father Yrigoian was very careful to note the Black blood quantum of the afromestizo families. He found that 36 were mulatto (Spanish and Black), 3 coyote (Indian and mulatto), and 4 lobo (Indian and Black) (ibid.).
Within two centuries of Juan de Oñate’s entrada into New Mexico thousands of Spanish missionaries, soldiers, government officials, businessmen, Indians, and farmers erected missions, towns, presidios, ranches, and outposts and converted other Indians into allies. Though the majority of the settlers were racially mixed, the royal government selected criollos and peninsulares as its ruling elite (Bustamante 1991; Gutiérrez 1991; Weber 1992). White governors and missionaries ruled the colony.