The mere mention of this area conjures up visions of blinding snowstorms, rough seas, and fog. In the winter particularly, the weather is subject to very sudden changes and a calm sea can suddenly turn extremely rough in hurricane-like conditions. Areas of low pressure are very frequent and there was once a case of a warship capsizing due to the gale and mountainous seas. Even in spring when it becomes a little warmer, there is still incessant fog. Although the shortest route between Japan and the U.S.A. runs through these waters, it never became a main theater of operations for there were few days in the year when ships and aircraft could operate without a natural hindrance of some kind. This applied in a big measure to submarines and other small vessels. If a submarine put on any speed in these high seas, the glass on the bridge would get broken. It was necessary to fit steel baffles to counteract this. The hands of the lookouts, holding binoculars, would freeze, and the icy wind would go right through cold-weather clothing to the very marrow. Even submerged, where there was no wind, it was an existence in a steel tube washed by sea water whose temperature was never far from zero. It was just like being shut up in an ice chest, causing one to shiver despite warm winter clothing, which being very bulky, made it difficult to pass along the narrow passages below deck. Thus life in a submarine in these waters was no sinecure!
In contrast to other warships, submarine crews, both officers and men, left the majority of their personal effects at the base or on board the depot ship, and only took the minimum amount to sea. Therefore when changing station from the warm climate of the southern seas to the cold north, submarines had to put into their home ports to pick up winter clothing, which took up far more room than ordinary uniforms, making it difficult to find sufficient stowage space. The Japanese Navy had been built on the assumption that the southern tropical seas would be its battleground, and therefore it was inevitable that the supply of equipment for operations in the far north had fallen short of requirements.
Among the troubles which submarines have to face is the difficulty in getting below the surface when submerging in rough weather, as the hull is thrown upward by the waves. With a beam sea it is not difficult but the boat may list up to forty or fifty degrees, for while submerging it has no power to right itself. This may be dangerous, besides causing confusion on board. Conditions usually right themselves at a depth of about ninety feet. In very rough weather, however, rolling may be felt down to one hundred and eighty feet. Fog, too, is the bugbear of submarine navigators. In foggy conditions when the bows of one’s own ship are invisible, not even the Japanese Navy’s special binoculars were of any avail. Within the boat it is abnormally humid and the condensed moisture drips and trickles everywhere.
The Japanese submarines which operated in northern waters included the new boat I-26, which carried out a reconnaissance of Kiska, Dutch Harbor, and Adak Channel between November 25 and 30, 1941, immediately before the outbreak of war. She was followed by submarines I-174 and 175 which left Kwajalein in the South Seas at the end of January, 1942, for a reconnaissance of the Aleutians, which included patrols off Unalaska Island, Amukta Island, Atka Island, and the vicinity of Kiska. They returned to home waters during mid-February.
The 1st Submarine Squadron comprising I-9, 15, 17, 19, 25, and 26 under the command of Rear Admiral Yamazaki carried out preliminary patrols in the Aleutians prior to May, 1942, in preparation for the invasion of strong points in the Aleutian group. These submarines pressed on with the task of reconnaissance making use of fog-free days or the short nights, when darkness lasted only two or three hours.
I-25 carried out an air reconnaissance of Kodiak, sighting a cruiser and two destroyers. I-26 sighted what were apparently two heavy cruisers while on passage from Alaska Bay to Seattle. The remainder of the squadron provided reconnaissance reports of Dutch Harbor and other places, while awaiting the attacks of the main Japanese forces, which made a successful landing on Attu in June, 1942. Meanwhile submarines I-25 and 26 had each sunk a transport. The whole squadron returned to home ports at the end of June. They were relieved by the 2nd Submarine Squadron comprising I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, which operated in these waters until early August of the same year. The fogs were very severe during the end of June and early July, making patrol conditions very difficult, but in mid-July I-7 managed to sink a transport to the south of the Unimak Passage.
The Northern Ocean Base Force Submarine Squadron, then newly organized, was equipped with the older medium-type submarines of the RO class which had been used for the nearer South Sea operations at the beginning of the war. These boats were hardly able to stand up to the rough weather in the northern seas but they were entrusted with the defense of Kiska and took up their stations early in August, 1942. Most of the captains of these boats had passed through the Submarine Commanding Officer’s course with me. We met just before they sailed from Yokosuka and none were in good spirits, for they were apprehensive lest their boats would break up in the rough northern weather.
On August 28, 1942, one of our aircraft sighted an enemy force including a cruiser at Nazan on Atka Island, and submarines and flying boats were ordered to attack. Submarines RO-61, 62, and 64 made for Nazan and on August 31, RO-61, commanded by Lieutenant Tokutomi, penetrated the bay, scored a hit with one torpedo on a seaplane carrier, and duly made her escape, but was pursued by destroyers and aircraft and unfortunately sunk. RO-61 was an old boat of the L-4 class which operated in World War I and this was the only occasion she had had to attack the enemy. Other boats of a later type also ventured inside the bay and fired torpedoes but were unable to escape the combined surface and air counterattacks. The old boats were unable to dive deeper than about a hundred and twenty-five feet, and, having little time to make their escape after being attacked once they were spotted, there was little hope. To explain more fully: the danger area of a depth charge, that is the distance at which the explosion could damage the submarine’s inner hull and cause an influx of water, was from sixty to seventy-five feet. If the depth setting on the depth charge is taken to be ninety feet, a submarine at any depth between one hundred and fifty feet to the surface would be in the danger area. Thus, with a safe diving depth of only a hundred and twenty-five feet, the old RO-class submarines were always vulnerable. In any case the equipment in these old boats was liable to crack up irrespective of depth-charge attacks, and the slightest concussion was quite enough to finish them.
On September 28, 1942, RO-65 dived when being attacked from the air, and came to rest on the sea bottom. She was unable to surface but most of the crew succeeded in escaping. The remainder of the RO-class boats soon had to return to home waters for repairs, leaving the northern force without any submarines.
At the end of the year, two I-class boats which joined the command were assigned the task of harassing the enemy, who was building an aerodrome on Amchitka Island, but the heavy seas made the operation impossible and they had to withdraw.
In February, 1943, the submarine strength was reinforced by I-31, 168, 169, and 171. Despite the heavy seas and icy winds this force persevered with transport work and patrolling until the middle of March. On May 12, when the enemy began landing on Attu Island, a further reinforcement of twelve submarines of the I class arrived. Before this it had been planned to use surface transport for carrying materials for the urgent completion of the shore bases on Kiska and Attu islands, but this operation was so impeded by the enemy that surface craft had to be replaced by submarines after the second attempt failed. I-7 and six other submarines took over the supply work.
On May 12, 1943, when the enemy landed on Attu, submarines I-7, 31, 34, and 35 hastened to the scene of action. At 1:30 P.M. the next day I-31 scored two hits on an enemy warship off Horutu and also reported damage inflicted on a second vessel, class unknown. The following day the same boat attacked a U.S. cruiser, causing severe damage. After this nothing more was heard of her.{17}
At 6:30 A.M. on May 16, I-35 torpedoed a light cruiser off the north coast of Attu, inflicting grave damage. I-35 was subsequently depth-charged but suffered little damage. I-34 also was depth-charged thirty miles to the west of Attu on May 14 but escaped with only slight damage.
In February, 1943, I took over command of I-158 which was being fitted out for surface radar experiments. Initial trials were not a success, as we were only able to spot the presence of a submarine on the surface at a distance of two thousand yards, either ahead or astern. This same equipment had already been tried out with some success in surface vessels, but certain features of it were not suitable in submarines. While discussions were still proceeding as to whether the equipment should be adopted, in spite of its deficiencies, news came of the American landing at Attu, and two boats of the flotilla sailed immediately for the north. My boat was left behind to undergo further trials with underwater W/T reception. We heard that our sister ship I-157 had run aground. On June 16, in thick fog, she was making for Kiska at fourteen knots on the surface, when she suddenly grounded at the foot of a precipice on enemy territory. She went hard astern but could not shift. The captain gave the order to lighten the boat by jettisoning twelve tons of lubricating oil, six torpedoes, one hundred and thirteen batteries, and seventy-four tons of oil fuel. Even so, it wasn’t easy to dispose of the torpedoes and batteries. Normally part of the hull would be opened up when taking batteries in and out, but in this emergency they were broken up for removal. Eventually I-157 got off the reef at 1:20 P.M. the next afternoon and by good fortune returned safely to Kure on the 26th. She was of course unable to dive but no enemy was encountered en route. Had she been equipped with radar, the accident would have been avoided.
The other submarines operating in this area in foggy conditions without radar continued their game of blind-man’s buff. They were unable to reap any harvest against American ships which had efficient radar equipment.
Three submarines out of the seventeen attached to the Northern Force were employed in withdrawal operations from Kiska. They made no less than thirteen trips and evacuated a total of eight hundred and twenty men from Kiska to the Kuril Islands. They also landed a hundred and twenty-five tons of equipment and ammunition and a hundred tons of provisions on Kiska during the evacuation.
Meanwhile submarine I-24, in which I had served at the beginning of the war, received orders to take on board the liaison personnel of the Attu defense force who had escaped to the Chichagof area. She approached the harbor on three separate occasions, but, having found no trace of the party, her orders were canceled and nothing more was heard of her. It was surmised she was sunk off the north coast of Attu during the early part of June.{18}
Submarine I-9 was lost during her second trip to Kiska on transport operations. We heard after the war that she was sunk in a fog off Kiska by a U.S. antisubmarine vessel on June 10.{19}
I-7 arrived in Vega Bay at Kiska Island on her third transport operation and was involved in a surface action with an enemy patrol vessel. She was hit in the conning tower and the Officer Commanding Flotilla and the captain were both killed. Then she ran aground inside the bay but got off the next day and made for Yokosuka. However, the following night, June 22, she was fired on by three U.S. destroyers out of the fog. The first lieutenant who had taken over command was killed, and while the boat was making her escape under the command of the gunnery officer she ran aground and became a total loss.{20}
It was in fact a fight between the blind and those who could see. The enemy was able to track us down even through the fog and open fire without warning. Enemy shells would find their mark, making us unable to dive with the conning-tower holed. On hearing the fate of I-7, withdrawal operations by submarine were canceled. Destroyers successfully took over these duties. There was consternation in the operations department in Tokyo when reports of this “blind” warfare were studied. Questions were asked as to why the submarines had not been equipped with radar. This resulted in a reversal of policy and all submarines were ordered to be fitted immediately with surface radar. For the rest, submarines I-2, 21, and 109 were all fired on without warning out of the fog, but were able to dive and escape without any damage, subsequently returning safely to harbor.
After the Kiska withdrawal operation, I-2 and 56 were left behind with the northern force and were engaged in destroying lines of communication and patrols. They were greatly handicapped by the low temperature (ten degrees below freezing point) and extremely rough weather. Their hulls received severe damage from the heavy seas and in fact they were hampered more by the weather than the enemy.
Submarine I-2 sank a transport off Amchitka during the middle of November.
A total of six submarines—I-7, 9, 31, 24, RO-61, and 65—were sunk during the northern operations, and submarine successes were four transports, a battleship, two light cruisers, one seaplane carrier, and an unknown vessel. Five midget submarines had been sent to Kiska, but through various causes, including heavy seas, they were damaged and were not put to any good use. Our bases in this area were inadequately equipped and when compared with the special pens in use at German bases could only be described as primitive.{21} Disregard for defensive measures might be regarded as a traditional strong point of the Japanese Navy, but it also had its grave weaknesses. At the present time, when air power is so predominant, bases without adequate defenses are quite useless in serving their purpose. In fact, under such conditions, the weapons which have had so much time and material devoted to their construction will be utterly wasted.
Crews who had lost their ships joined up with the landing parties ashore and were busily occupied reinforcing the antiaircraft batteries in the intervals between the fog. With the arrival of autumn, there was fierce competition for good fishing grounds to catch the salmon making their way up the small rivers.