Abandoning the two extremes, the Tathāgata realized the middle path, producing vision, producing knowledge, leading to clairvoyance, enlightenment, and nirvana.
Saṃyutta Nikāya
In his first sermon after his enlightenment, the Buddha spoke of a middle way free from the two extremes. Here, the two extremes referred to were the life of self-indulgence he experienced as a prince and the self-mortification he practiced as an ascetic. In his first sermon, he went on to say that the middle way is the eightfold path, beginning with right view (samyakdṛṣṭi, yang dag pa’i lta ba). In the centuries following the Buddha’s nirvana, schools of Buddhist tenets (siddhānta, grub mtha’) arose, each with its own position as to what constitutes the right view, the philosophical middle free from extremes. Although all Buddhist schools consider themselves to be proponents of the middle way, it is only the school founded by Nāgārjuna that overtly calls itself Mādhyamika.
A Mādhyamika is defined by Jang-gya as a person who propounds the correctness of a middle way which is free from the extreme of permanence (śaśvatānta, rtag mtha’)—that phenomena ultimately exist (paramārthasat, don dam par yod pa)—and the extreme of annihilation (ucchedānta, chad mtha’) that phenomena do not exist even conventionally (vyavahārasat, tha snyad du yod pa).1 The extreme of permanence, also known as the extreme of existence (astyanta, yod mtha’) and the extreme of superimposition (āropānta, sgro ’dogs kyi mtha’) is the true existence (satyasat, bden par yod pa), ultimate existence (paramārthasat, don dam par yod pa), or real existence (samyaksat, yang dag par yod pa) of persons and other phenomena. The extreme of annihilation, also referred to as the extreme of non-existence (nāstyanta, med mtha’) and the extreme of denial (abhyākhyānānta, skur ’debs kyi mtha’), is the utter non-existence of persons and other phenomena.2
Conceiving or actively asserting that things truly exist or that they do not exist even conventionally is a case of falling to an extreme. The extremes are dangerous places, compared to the abyss beneath a rocky precipice3 and holding one of the extremes is likened to falling off a cliff. There are specific dangers associated with each of the extremes. Through holding the view of utter non-existence, one is reborn in one of the bad realms (gati, ’gro ba) as an animal, hungry ghost, or hell being.4 Presumably, such a nihilistic view would inspire non-virtuous actions, such as murder, which would then serve as the cause of a painful rebirth. Through conceiving phenomena to be truly existent, that is, by falling to the extreme of permanence, one could not be liberated from cyclic existence (saṃsāra, ’khor ba).5 Thus, one might engage in virtuous activities which cause rebirth as a god, demigod, or human, but so long as the conception of true existence underlaid those deeds, one could not cut the final root of cyclic existence.
Jang-gya distinguishes between an extreme and holding to an extreme. An extreme is, for example, the non-existence of cause and effect. Holding to an extreme would, in this case, be the conception of the non-existence of cause and effect. Therefore, as Jang-gya points out, an extreme necessarily does not exist whereas holding to an extreme, that is, the consciousness conceiving of an extreme, does exist.6
Tsong-kha-pa clarifies the meaning of the extremes in the first chapter of his commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakaśāstra). He emphasizes that the mere presence of the terms “existence” and “non-existence” does not constitute extremes of existence and non-existence. For example, the non-existence of faults in a Buddha is not an extreme of non-existence, nor is the existence of wisdom and mercy in a Buddha an extreme of existence.7
More important, the fact that phenomena do not exist ultimately is not an extreme of non-existence. To say that something does not ultimately exist does not mean that it is utterly non-existent. The Mādhyamikas hold that since ultimate/real/true existence does not exist conventionally, non-ultimate/non-real/non-true existence must exist conventionally. Ultimate existence and non-ultimate existence are mutually exclusive, the presence of one precluding the presence of the other. They are also a dichotomy, for when ultimate existence is refuted, its negative—non-ultimate existence—is established as an object of awareness.8 Therefore, when ultimate existence—the extreme of permanence—is negated, non-ultimate existence is implied; thus, non-ultimate existence is not an extreme of non-existence. Since ultimate existence does not conventionally exist, its opposite, non-ultimate existence, must conventionally exist.9
Mādhyamikas are so-called because they abide in the middle free from all extremes. They are able to do this because of their understanding of the relationship between emptiness (śūnyatā, stong pa nyid) and dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda, rten ’byung). An emptiness is a phenomenon’s lack of true existence. Each phenomenon is empty of true existence and that mere absence of true existence is the final nature of that phenomenon. Dependent arising is, loosely speaking, the positive implication of the absence of true existence. All phenomena are dependent arisings in the sense that they either arise in dependence on causes and conditions, are designated in dependence on their basis of imputation, or are imputed in dependence on a designating term or thought. This third type of dependent arising is the most subtle and is asserted only by the Prāsaṅgikas.10
Only the Mādhyamikas assert that all phenomena are empty of true existence and that all phenomena are dependent arisings. Nāgārjuna says in his Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Śūnyatāsaptati):
The peerless Tathāgata taught
That because all things
Are empty of inherent existence,
Things are dependent arisings.11
The other schools of Buddhist tenets assert the true existence of at least some phenomena and limit the category of dependent arisings to impermanent things, taking the term “arising” (samutpāda, ’byung ba) in “dependent arising” to mean arising in dependence on causes and conditions. Since whatever is a caused phenomenon is necessarily impermanent (anitya, mi rtag pa) according to the Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins, and Mādhyamikas, dependent arisings must be impermanent. The Mādhyamikas, however, take the term samutpāda also to mean “established” and assert that all phenomena, caused and uncaused, impermanent and permanent, are dependent established.12
Jang-gya notes that dependent arising means being empty of true existence and being empty of true existence means dependent arising.13 This compatibility of emptiness and dependent arising is a hallmark of Mādhyamika philosophy. Something that lacks ultimate existence cannot be independently established, it must be dependently established, a dependent arising. Something that is a dependent arising cannot be ultimately existent, it must lack ultimate existence, be empty of ultimate existence. This is what is meant by the synonymity of emptiness and dependent arising.
The emptiness of a phenomenon such as a sprout and the sprout’s dependent arising are synonymous because if the sprout were truly established it would not be a dependent arising and if it were not a dependent arising, it would be truly established.14 Technically, however, emptiness and dependent arising are not synonymous because, in that case, whatever was a dependent arising would have to be an emptiness. Although whatever is an emptiness is necessarily a dependent arising, the converse is not true because an emptiness is necessarily a permanent (nitya, rtag pa), non-affirming negative (prasajyapratiṣedha, med ’gag) phenomenon, whereas dependent arisings include all phenomena, permanent and impermanent. Nonetheless, it is accurate to say that whatever is empty of true existence is a dependent arising and whatever is a dependent arising is empty of true existence.15
Dependent arising is called the king of reasonings because it allows the Mādhyamikas to refute both extremes simultaneously. The Yogācārins, for example, need two separate reasons to abandon the two extremes as they define them. They claim that they abandon the extreme of annihilation because they assert that impermanent phenomena truly exist as the same entity as the consciousness perceiving them. They abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that impermanent phenomena do not have a nature separate from that of consciousness.16 The Mādhyamikas refute both extremes merely by asserting that all phenomena in the universe are dependent arisings. Specifically, the fact that they are “dependent” refutes the extreme of permanence. Whatever is dependent cannot be truly existent. The fact that they are “arisings” or “established” refutes the extreme of annihilation because whatever is arisen or established cannot be utterly non-existent.17
A formal statement of the reasoning of dependent arising in syllogistic form would be “All phenomena do not truly exist because of being dependent arisings.” By ascertaining the property of the subject (pakṣadharma, phyogs chos)—that all phenomena are dependent arisings—the extreme of annihilation is refuted because if something is dependently arisen, it must exist. The extreme of permanence is also refuted because whatever is dependently arisen cannot be independently or ultimately established. Having ascertained the pervasion (vyāpti, khyab pa), that “whatever is a dependent arising does not truly exist” and having ascertained the property of the subject, that all phenomena are dependent arisings, one ascertains the thesis (pratijñā, dam bca’), that all phenomena do not truly exist. The thesis further refutes the two extremes because the fact that phenomena do not truly exist avoids the extreme of permanence (that phenomena truly exist) and the extreme of annihilation in that only true existence, not conventional existence, is negated.18
That Nāgārjuna found dependent arising to be the most praiseworthy of Buddha’s teaching is evident from the expressions of worship of his major works. His Treatise on the Middle Way begins:
Obeisance to the perfect Buddha
The best of proponents [who teaches]
That what dependently arises
Has no cessation, no production,
No annihilation, no permanence,
No coming, no going,
No difference, no sameness,
Pacified of elaborations, at peace.19
Dependent arisings lack truly existent cessation, production, annihilation, permanence, coming, going, sameness, and difference.
His Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktiṣaṣtikākārikā) beings:
Obeisance to the King of Subduers (Munīndra)
Who set forth dependent arising,
This mode by which production and
Disintegration are abandoned.20
Because of being dependent arisings, phenomena lack truly existent production and disintegration.21
His Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavyāvartinīkārikā) begins:
Obeisance to the perfect Buddha
Who made the supreme, unique statement
That emptiness and dependent arising
Are synonymous with the middle way.22
Dependent arising, the middle path free from the two extremes, and the emptiness of true existence are synonyms.23
His Praise of the Inconceivable (Acintyastava) begins:
Obeisance to the one with incomparable,
Inconceivable, unparalleled wisdom
Who taught that dependently arisen things
Are just without entityness.24
Because phenomena are dependent arisings, they lack a truly established entity.25
Finally, his Friendly Letter (Suhṛllekha) says:
This dependent arising is the most precious and profound
Of the treasures of the Conqueror’s speech.
Those who see it correctly see the supreme aspect
Of [the teaching of] the Buddha, the knower of suchness.26
Dependent arising is thus praised by Nāgārjuna as the most valuable of all the Buddha’s teachings.
Dependent arising and its compatibility with emptiness are seen as a unique tenet of Mādhyamika by the Ge-luk-ba doxographers, distinguishing it from and raising it above the other Buddhist tenet systems. All schools of Buddhist tenets purport to follow the middle way and offer their own interpretation of the extremes. The Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas assert that all impermanent phenomena are dependent arisings in the sense that they arise in dependence on causes and conditions. They refute the extreme of permanence, which for them is the existence of an unchanging agent such as the principal (pradhāna, gtso bo) asserted by the Sāṃkyas. They avoid the extreme of annihilation by upholding the doctrine of the cause and effect of actions, which is rejected by the Cārvākas.27
The Yogācārins assert that the extreme of permanence is the true existence of imaginary natures (parikalpitasvabhāva, kun btags rang bzhin). Specifically, they identify as cases of holding the extreme of permanence the belief that objects exist as separate entities from the consciousnesses perceiving them and the conception that objects truly exist as the bases of their names. They abandon this extreme because they hold that dependent phenomena (paratantra, gzhan dbang) lack this imaginary nature. They identify the extreme of annihilation as the utter non-existence of dependent natures—impermanent phenomena—and consummate natures (pariniṣpannasvabhāva, yongs grub rang bzhin)—the emptiness of subject and object existing as separate entities. They avoid this extreme by asserting that these two natures ultimately exist, that is, that objects truly exist as the nature of consciousness, that consciousnesses truly exist, and that the emptiness of the duality of subject and object truly exists.28
From the Mādhyamika perspective, the extremes identified by the other tenet systems are trifling (nyi tshe pa) in the sense that they do not apply to all phenomena and fabricated (blos byas pa) in the sense that they are inaccurate. The Hīnayāna assertion that impermanent phenomena are free of the extreme of permanence because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions is not rejected by the Mādhyamikas, but it does not apply equally to all phenomena, specifically to permanent phenomena, and is therefore trifling.29 The Yogācārin middle way is also considered to be trifling. The fact that dependent phenomena and consummate phenomena exist by way of their own character (svalakṣana, rang gi mtshan nyid) avoids the extreme of annihilation and the fact that imaginary natures do not exist by way of their own character avoids the extreme of permanence. But because the Yogācārins are incapable of positing one mode of being by which all phenomena are free of both extremes (as the Mādhyamikas do with dependent arising), the extremes as they understand them are considered to be trifling by the Mādhyamikas.30
Furthermore, according to the Mādhyamikas, not only is the Yogācārins middle way trifling, it is wrong. Because the Mādhyamikas (with the exception of the Yogācāra-Svātantrikas) assert that objects conventionally exist as separate entities from the perceiving consciousness, they reject the Yogācārin assertion that the duality of subject and object is an extreme of permanence. Because the Mādhyamikas also assert that all phenomena are empty of true existence, they do not identify the lack of ultimate existence of dependent phenomena as an extreme of annihilation. The Yogācārins come to this view because they assert, in contrast to the Mādhyamikas, that if dependent natures and consummate natures did not ultimately exist, they would not exist at all.31
Furthermore, besides contending that the other systems misidentify the extremes, the Mādhyamikas assert that all non-Mādhyamika systems fall to the extremes. The Vaibhāṣikas assert that partless particles are ultimate truths and truly exist.32 The Sautrāntikas assert that impermanent phenomena are ultimately able to perform functions and truly exist.33 The Yogācārins assert that dependent and consummate natures truly exist. Thus, although the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and Yogācārins respectively assert that partless particles, functioning things, and dependent natures are impermanent, from the Mādhyamika perspective they have fallen to the extreme of permanence by asserting true existence.34 Once they assert true existence, they also implicitly fall to the extreme of annihilation, according to Candrakīrti. In his Clear Words, he quotes the Treatise on the Middle Way and comments on it:
Whatever exists inherently is permanent
Since it does not become non-existent.
If one says that what arose before is now non-existent,
Then it follows that this is [an extreme] of annihilation.
Since inherent existence is not overcome, that which is said to exist inherently never becomes non-existent. In that case if follows that through asserting it to be just inherently existent, one has a view of permanence. Because one asserts that things inherently exist at an earlier time and then asserts that now, later, they are destroyed and thus do not exist, it follows that one has a view of annihilation.35
If a phenomenon is truly existent, it must be unchanging in nature; thus, for it to cease, it must become utterly non-existent. Since the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and Yogācārins assert that these impermanent phenomena, which they hold to be truly existent, disintegrate every moment, they thereby come to hold the extreme of annihilation. The Yogācārins explicitly fall to the extreme of annihilation by asserting that sense objects do not exist even conventionally as entities separate from a perceiving consciousness.36
The fact that the non-Mādhyamika systems fall to the two extremes does not negate their heuristic value. The Mahāyāna tenet systems believe that Buddha telepathically knew the minds and capacities of his listeners and through his skillful means (upāyakauśala, thabs shes) taught what was most appropriate for each. To those who could not accept or understand the view that the self does not exist, he taught that a self does exist. In that way he was able to inspire faith in his teaching and eventually lead these disciples to the more subtle view.37 Nāgārjuna describes Buddha’s approach in his Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī):
Just as grammarians
Begin with reading the alphabet
So the Buddha teaches doctrines
That students can bear.
To some, he teaches doctrines
For reversal of sins.
To some, for the sake of achieving merit;
To some, doctrines based on duality;
To some, [he teaches doctrines] based on non-duality.
To some, the profound, frightening to the fearful,
Having an essence of emptiness and compassion,
The means of achieving highest enlightenment.38
The first stanza indicates that just as a grammar teacher begins by teaching children the individual letters of the alphabet before teaching them how the letters are put together to form words, the Buddha teaches doctrines which are suitable to the level of awareness of his followers.39
The first three lines of the second stanza identify the doctrine of the cause and effect of actions whereby non-virtues may be abandoned and virtuous actions practiced, resulting in the accumulation of merit that will bring rebirth in a good realm. The last line of the second stanza refers to the doctrine taught to followers of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika lineages to whom the Buddha teaches that a self of persons (pudgalātman, gang zag gi bdag) does not exist but that objects and subjects do truly exist as separate entities.
The first line of the third stanza identifies the doctrines taught to those Mahāyānists who are temporarily incapable of understanding the Mādhyamika view and therefore are taught the existence of an emptiness of duality of subject and object. The last three lines refer to the teachings of non-true existence and compassion that the Buddha gives to Mahāyāna disciples of greatest awareness; the teaching of emptiness would frighten those who believe strongly in true existence because they would mistake it for utter non-existence.40
This idea of a progression of doctrines, culminating in the Mādhyamika view is also reflected in Āryadeva’s Four Hundred (Catuḥśataka):
In the beginning non-merit is overcome.
In the middle self is overcome.
In the end all [bad] views are overcome.
Those who understand this are wise.41
Initially the Buddha teaches the existence of a substantially existent (dravyasat, rdzas yod) self which is the accumulator of actions and experiencer of effects in order that his followers may turn away from non-virtues which are causes of rebirth in the lower realms. He then refutes the existence of a substantially existent self in order to make them suitable vessels for the practice of the path. Finally, they are liberated through his teaching of the subtle emptiness of true existence which overcomes all elaborations (prapañca, spros pa) of bad views.42
Thus, as long as the teaching of non-true existence was not compatible with the viability of all phenomena for a student, the Buddha made distinctions, with some phenomena truly existent and some not; students were led gradually, being taught a portion of selflessness in the belief that it is not suitable to set forth even a coarse form of emptiness if there is the possibility that it will undercut the validity of cause and effect. Therefore, for some, the Buddha refuted the true existence of the person but, for the most part, did not refute that of the aggregates (skandha, phung po). For those of the Yogācārin lineage, he refuted a difference of entity of subject and object but did not refute the true existence of the emptiness of duality of subject and object. When his followers of sharp faculties were able to realize that dependent arising is the meaning of emptiness, there was no purpose in making the distinctions he had made before because it was possible to uphold the viability of all presentations of phenomena in terms of the basis of refutation of true existence.43 That is, because of the compatability of emptiness and dependent arising, the Mādhyamikas are able to assert that there does not exist, has never existed, and never will exist a single atom which is truly established, while at the same time being able to make accurate presentations of cyclic existence and nirvana, of all the varieties of phenomena in the universe. The very phenomena that are empty of true existence—the bases with respect to which true existence is refuted—are themselves dependently established and validly existent.44
This compatibility of dependent arising and emptiness is difficult to maintain. Tsong-kha-pa notes that among those having the Mahāyāna lineage, there are many who are in little danger of falling to the view of annihilation but who refute a coarse form of true existence and do not refute the subtle form. There are also many, he says, who refute the subtle object of negation but thereby are rendered incapable of maintaining validly established phenomena.45 There has been a greater proclivity to this latter imbalance among Tibetan scholars as well as in the study of Mādhyamika in the West. Due to misunderstanding a number of statements in the Mādhyamika literature, they draw the conclusion that the Mādhyamikas merely refute the views of others and have no system of their own. Let us examine the statements that they put forth as support for their idea that Mādhyamika has no system. Nāgārjuna’s Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavyāvartinī) says:
If I had any thesis
Then I would have that fault.
Because I have no thesis
I am only faultless.46
He says in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktiṣaṣṭikā):
Those of great nature have
No position and no dispute.
How could those with no position
Have another position?47
Āryadeva says in his Four Hundred (Catuḥśataka):
It is impossible to blame
Even after a long time
Someone who does not have a position that [things]
Exist, do not exist, or [both] exist and not exist.48
Based on such statements, a number of Western interpreters of Mādhyamika have been led to believe that Mādhyamikas only refute the assertions of others and have no position of their own. T.R.V. Murti writes, “The Mādhyamika is a prāsaṅgika or vaitaṇḍika, a dialectician or free-lance debater. The Mādhyamika disproves the opponent’s thesis, and does not prove any thesis of his own.”49 Conze quotes this statement by Murti when he describes the Mādhyamika dialectic in his Buddhist Thought in India.50
Similar views are expressed by the earlier generation of Indologists. Surendrenath Dasgupta describes the final Mādhyamika view in his History of Indian Philosophy, explaining that:
the nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with the question of truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus there are neither works nor cycles of births (saṃsāra) and also he does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of any of the appearances.51
Thus, for Dasgupta, if phenomena are empty, they are necessarily utterly non-existent and causation becomes impossible.
Louis de la Vallée Poussin, in an article entitled “Nihilism (Buddhist)” in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics states that, “there is no doubt that the absolute truth (paramārthasatya) of the extreme Buddhist and of the extreme Vedāntist is an unqualified negation of the world of appearance, a negation of existence (saṃsāra).”52 Finally, A.B. Keith describes Nāgārjuna’s method in his Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon:
Nāgārjuna denies consistently that he has any thesis of his own, for to uphold one would be wholly erroneous; the truth is silence, which is neither affirmation nor negation, for negation in itself is essentially positive in implying a reality. He confines himself to reducing every positive assertion to absurdity, thus showing that the intellect condemns itself as inadequate just as it finds hopeless antimonies in the world of experience.53
This leads Keith to conclude that:
If we accept the strict doctrine of Nāgārjuna, as interpreted by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, and accepted by Cāntideva, we must admit that the phenomenal world has not merely no existence in absolute truth, but has no phenomenal existence, difficult as this conception is, and numerous as are the failures of its holders to exactly express it.54
Opinions similar to those above were held by contemporaries of Tsong-kha-pa, whose positions he reports in his Great Exposition of Special Insight (lHag mthong chen mo). Tsong-kha-pa refutes the contention that Mādhyamika has no system of its own. His arguments bear consideration because they speak directly against the positions of Murti, Conze, Dasgupta, La Vallée Poussin, and Keith.
Tsong-kha-pa explains the meaning of the passages cited from Nāgāruna and Āryadeva above. With regard to the passage from the Refutation of Objections which says, “Because I have no thesis/I am only faultless,” Tsong-kha-pa admits that there are explanations of no position and no thesis such as the stanzas cited, but it is also stated many times that one must present one’s assertions. Therefore, it is impossible to prove that the Mādhyamikas have no thesis merely by citing that stanza. He then elucidates the context of Nāgārjuna’s statement. A Mādhyamika has said, “Things do not inherently exist” to which a Proponent of True Existence (bhāvavādin, dngos smra ba) responds, “Thus, if the words of that thesis inherently exist, then it is not correct that all things lack inherent existence. If the words of the thesis do not inherently exist, they are incapable of refuting inherent existence.” Thus, the context of the passage from the Refutation of Objections about having or not having a thesis is not a dispute about the possession of a thesis in general; it is a debate about whether the words of the thesis, “All things lack inherent existence” inherently exist or not. When Nāgārjuna replies:
If I had any thesis
Then I would have that fault.
Because I have no thesis
I am only faultless.
what he means, Tsong-kha-pa argues, is that, “If I asserted that the words of such a thesis inherently existed, then I would incur the fault of contradicting the thesis that all things lack inherent existence. However, since I do not assert such, I do not have that fault.” Thus, for Tsong-kha-pa, this passage from the Refutation of Objections is not suitable as a proof that Mādhyamikas have no thesis. Nāgārjuna is saying that he has no inherently existent thesis and that for the Mādhyamikas there is a very great difference between non-inherent existence and non-existence.55 The Mādhyamikas uphold the conventional existence of phenomena while denying their true existence. This distinction was not clear to Keith, for example, when he wrote that the Mādhyamikas contend that the world has no phenomenal existence.
The passage cited above from Nāgārjuna’s Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning also makes use of the term “no position,” saying that “Those of great nature have/No position and no dispute.” Candrakīrti’s commentary to this stanza says:
When the positions of [a truly existent] self and other do not occur because things do not exist in that way, the afflictions of those [yogis] who see such definitely cease.56
Here, the non-existence of things (bhāva, dngos po) is stated as a reason for not having a position. Tsong-kha-pa identifies the term “thing” as referring to existence by way of the object’s own character (svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan) or inherent existence (svabhāva, rang bzhin). If it were taken to mean the ability to perform a function, which is its primary meaning, it would be contradictory to say that through seeing the non-existence of functionality the afflictive emotions (kleśa, nyon mongs) cease. Therefore, in this passage from the Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning, having no position refers to having no position which is an assertion of inherent existence.
That “thing” refers to existence by way of its own character is evident from another passage in Candrakīrti’s commentary to the Sixty Stanzas, where he says:
If those who have not penetrated this reality of dependent arising and who thoroughly conceive of the existence of things by way of their own character assert [that] things [exist inherently], then it is only certain that:
Disputation will arise
From holding the unbearable and unsuitable view
[Which is the basis] of the arising of desire and hatred.57
Here, the superimposition of an existence by way of the object’s own character onto things is referred to as asserting things. Therefore, according to Tsong-kha-pa the stanza from the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning is not a source proving that the Mādhyamikas have no position.58
In commenting on Ārvadeva’s statement that:
It is impossible to blame
Even after a long time
Someone who does not have a position that [things]
Exist, do not exist, or [both] exist and not exist.
Candrakīrti says, “This indicates that it is impossible to refute, even after a long time, a proponent of emptiness.”59 Existence and non-existence thus refer to true existence and utter non-existence. Thus, Ārvadeva’s statement indicates that the Mādhyamikas, who assert that phenomena are imputedly existent (prajñaptisat, btags yod) and who refute substantial existence (dravyasat, rdzas yod) (which means to be established by way of the object’s own entity), are not refuted by those who propound that things “exist”; that is, that they are established by way of their own entity. Nor are they refuted by those who propound that things “do not exist,” who negate all functionality of things such as forms. From this, Tsong-kha-pa concludes that:
It is exceedingly clear that [Āryadeva’s stanza] is not suitable as a source [proving] that [the Mādhyamikas] have no system of their own; the positions of existence, non-existence, etc. are like the positions of the proponents of the two [extremes of permanence and annihilation].60
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the statements by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva that they have no position cannot be taken at face value but must be understood in the context of the specific argument being put forth at the point at which those statements occur. When Nāgārjuna says that he has no position, he means, according to Tsong-kha-pa, that he has no inherently existent position. When Āryadeva says that he does not have a position that things exist nor that they do not exist, he means that he does not hold that things inherently exist nor that they do not exist even conventionally. By taking these statements literally, the Western scholars cited above have been led to the conclusion that the Mādhyamikas have no position of their own, that they refute all philosophical views while upholding none. From this point it is a short jump to the charge that the Mādhyamikas are nihilists.
In his Clear Words, Candrakīrti answers this charge directly:
[An opponent] says: “If you posit things as without inherent existence in this way, then you would thereby refute all those statements of the Supramundane Victor (Bhagavan)61 like, ‘One will experience the fruition of the actions one performs,’ and would deny cause and effect. Therefore, you are the chief of Nihilists.”
Answer: “We are not Nihilists; we refute the proponents of the two [extremes] of existence and non-existence and illuminate the path free of those two [extremes], leading to the city of nirvana. We also do not say, ‘Actions, agents, effects, and so forth do not exist.’ What do we propound? We say, ‘These do not inherently exist.’ If you think, ‘That is fallacious because actions and agents are impossible within non-inherent existence,’ there is no [such fault] because activities are unobserved only among things which have inherent existence; activities are observed only among things that lack inherent existence.62
He makes the same point in his Commentary to (Āryadeva’s) Four Hundred (Catuḥśatakaṭīkā):
I do not propound that things do not exist because I propound dependent arising. If you ask, “Are you a proponent of true existence?” I am not because of just being a proponent of dependent arising. If you ask, “What do you propound?”, I propound dependent arising. If you ask, “What is the meaning of dependent arising?”, it has the meaning of non-inherent existence, that is, it has the meaning of non-inherent production, it has the meaning of the arising of effects which have a nature similar to that of magicians’ illusions, mirages, reflections, cities of gandharvas, emanations, and dreams, and it has the meaning of emptiness and selflessness.63
The root of the confusion of both Candrakīrti’s opponent and the modern interpreters cited above lies in a misunderstanding of the meaning of the two extremes. The Mādhyamikas refute one form of existence but uphold the other, refute one form of non-existence but uphold the other. The two forms of existence are that all phenomena ultimately exist and that all phenomena conventionally exist. The two forms of non-existence are that no phenomena ultimately exist and that no phenomena conventionally exist. The Mādhyamikas reject the view that all phenomena ultimately exist and label it the extreme of permanence. They reject the view that no phenomena conventionally exist and label it the extreme of annihilation. They uphold the two remaining views, that all phenomena conventionally exist and no phenomena ultimately exist, the former referring to dependent arising, the latter to emptiness. They further contend that the two are in all ways compatible, that the emptiness of true existence does not contradict but makes possible conventional existence and vice versa. This is what they identify as the middle way free from extremes.64
Thus, the Mādhyamikas refute the two extremes of ultimate existence and utter non-existence and assert emptiness and dependent arising. Not understanding that the Mādhyamikas assert the compatibility of emptiness and dependent arising, Edward Conze describes Bhāvaviveka as having “upheld the well-nigh incredible thesis that in Mādhyamika logic valid positive statements can be made.”65 Yet in the Mādhyamika texts, positive assertions are easily found. Nāgārjuna’s Refutation of Objections says:
We do not put forth the explanation
That conventionalities are not asserted.66
His Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:
Those who assert that dependent phenomena
Are like [reflections] of moons in water,
Not real and not unreal,
Are not captivated by views.67
His Praise of the Supramundane (Lokātītastava) says:
You [Buddha] taught that
Agent and actions are conventionalities
You asserted well
That they are established as mutually dependent.68
Also, Candrakīrti writes in his Supplement to Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on) the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra),69 “The wise should consider this position to be faultless and beneficial and should indubitably assert it.” He also says:
Therefore, because dependent imputation is asserted in the same way as dependent arising, as mere conditionality, it does not follow that for our position all conventionalities are annihilated. It is suitable that the opponent assert this as well.70
In addition to these statements, there are numerous Mādhyamika texts devoted to instructions and advice on the practice of virtue and the path to enlightenment, such as Nāgārjuna’s Compendium of Sutra (Sūtrasamuccaya), Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī), and Friendly Letter (Suḥrllekha), and Śāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhi[sattva] caryāvatāra).71
For Tsong-kha-pa, what sets the Mādhyamika school above all others is its ability to refute the ultimate existence of all phenomena, holding that there is not a single particle in the universe which is ultimately established, while at the same time asserting that conventionally all phenomena are validly established. Nāgārjuna says in his Treatise on the Middle Way (XXIV. 14):
For whom emptiness is possible,
All is possible;
For whom emptiness is not possible,
Nothing is possible.
By upholding the compatability of emptiness and appearance in this way, they abandon the two extremes and abide in the middle.