A Study of Svātantrika

Another fundamental distinction between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas lies in the question of whether the selflessness of phenomena (dharmanairātmya, chos kyi bdag med) is taught in the Hīnayāna sutras. The positions of the two schools on this point entail further differences concerning the object of the Hīnayāna wisdom, the distinguishing feature of the Mahāyāna, and the root cause of suffering.

Bhāvaviveka argues that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hearer scriptural collection (śrāvakapiṭaka, nyan thos kyi sde snod) because the exposition of the selflessness of phenomena is the distinguishing feature which sets the Mahāyāna apart from Hīnayāna. According to Bhāvaviveka, that which obstructs liberation from cyclic existence is the conception of a self of persons (pudgalātman, gang zag gi bdag). That which obstructs the attainment of Buddhahood is the conception of true existence. If the selflessness of phenomena were set forth in the Hīnayāna scriptures, Hearers¹ (śrāvaka, nyan thos) and Solitary Realizers² (pratyekabuddha, rang rgyal, rang sangs rgyas)—who merely seek liberation from rebirth—would be able to achieve Buddhahood by realizing the selflessness of phenomena taught in their scriptures. In that case, there would be no reason for the Buddha to have taught another vehicle, the Mahāyāna, because the means for achieving Buddhahood, the wisdom of the selflessness of phenomena, is accessible in the Hīnayāna.

In Bhāvaviveka’s view, Hīnayānists realize the selflessness of persons in order to overcome the afflictive obstructions (kleśāvaraṇa, nyon sgrib) and thereby gain liberation. It is unnecessary for them to realize the more subtle selflessness of phenomena, the object of Bodhisattvas’ wisdom. Thus, Bhāvaviveka admits that it is possible to be liberated from cyclic existence without penetrating the final nature of reality—the selflessness of phenomena.

The Prāsaṅgikas, in the persons of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, hold that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hearer scriptural collection and that Hīnayaāists realize the subtle selflessness. They assert that there is no difference in subtlety between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena and that in order to achieve the enlightenment of the Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna path, both selflessnesses must be realized. Therefore, unlike Bhāvaviveka, the Prāsaṅgikas see no difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna in terms of the subtlety of the object of their wisdom; Foe Destroyers³ (arhan, dgra bcom pa) and Buddhas realize the same subtle emptiness of inherent existence. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the Mahāyāna is distinguished from the Hīnayāna in terms of method, not wisdom.

As is the case with the debate over syllogisms and consequences, the commentaries to Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way provide the context for this controversy. In commenting on the seventh stanza of the fourth chapter of the Treatise, “Analysis of the Aggregates” (Skandhaparikṣā), Buddhapālita cites the following passage from a Hīnayāna sutra:

Before considering the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika positions on whether the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna sutras, it is worthwhile to digress into a general analysis of the meaning of this stanza in order to provide a background for the discussion to follow.

In this stanza, Buddha describes the insubstantial nature of the five aggregates (pañcaskandha, phung po Inga). The form aggregate (rūpaskandha, gzugs kyi phung po) encompasses not only visible forms which are objects of the eye consciousness, but includes also sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. The five sense powers (indriya, dbang po) which provide the physical bases for the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses are also instances of the form aggregate. A final category included within the form aggregate are those forms which are imperceptible by the sense consciousnesses and can only be known by the mental consciousness, such as a single minute particle.

Forms are compared to a ball of foam that when seen from a distance appears to be a solid whole but disappears when one tries to separate it into parts. In the same way, a form appears to be a single mass until reasoning is used to analyze the apparent whole, dividing it into its component parts, at which point the subjective apprehension of the form as a solid unit disappears.

The use of analysis to destroy the misconception of objects as single, independent wholes is found throughout Buddhist philosophy. In the Vaibhāṣika school, anything which can be broken down into parts, either physically or analytically such that the thought apprehending that object ceases, is identified as a conventional truth⁷ (saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa), a truth for ignorance which does not exist in the way that it appears. A clay pot, for example, is a conventional truth because, although it appears to be a solid whole, the thought apprehending that pot ceases when it is smashed with a hammer. The Vaibhāṣikas assert that there exist directionally partless physical particles and temporally partless moments of consciousness which cannot be broken down into component parts. These subtle particles and moments of consciousness are identified as ultimate truths by the Vaibhāṣikas.⁸ The existence of partless particles is refuted by the Sautrāntikas Following Reasoning, the Yogācārins, and Mādhyamikas.⁹

In the Mādhyamika school, the assertion that all phenomena, permanent and impermanent, have parts provides the foundation for the reasoning of the lack of being either one or many which proves that all phenomena are empty of true existence (see pp. 167-191).

The second of the five aggregates, feeling (vedanā, tshor ba), is one of the five omnipresent (sarvatraga, kun ’gro) mental factors (caitta, sems byung), which accompany every moment of an eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, or mental consciousness. The other four omnipresent mental factors are discrimination (samjñā, ’du shes), intention (cetanā, sems pa), contact (sparśa, reg pa) and mental engagement (manaskāra, yid la byed pa).¹⁰

In Asaṅga’s Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuccaya), feeling is defined as “that which has the character of experience, that is, the entity of experience which experiences individually the fruitions that are the effects of virtuous and non-virtuous actions.”¹¹ Feelings are of three types—those of pleasure (sukhā, bde ba), of pain (duḥkha, sdug bsngal), and of neutrality (aduḥkhasukhā, sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin), pleasure being that which one wishes to meet with again when it ceases, pain being that which one wishes to separate from when it arises, and neutral feeling, that which one wishes neither to meet with nor separate from when it arises.¹² All feelings of pleasure and pain, all happiness and suffering, are the effects of past actions, the fruitions of potencies established on the mind by virtuous and non-virtuous activities of body, speech, and mind performed in the past. A clear understanding of the cause and effect of actions is seen as an essential prerequisite for the practice of the path because with the understanding that one’s happiness and suffering is a direct result of one’s own action, virtue is adopted and non-virtue discarded. Tsong-kha-pa writes in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path:

Therefore, one determines that pleasures and suffering do not arise causelessly, nor do they arise from a dissimilar cause, such as the principal (pradhāna, gtso bo) or Īśvara, [and one recognizes] the definite, incontrovertible [relationship] of action and effect in which general pleasure and suffering arise respectively from general virtue and non-virtue, and the variety of specific pleasures and sufferings [arise respectively] from the variety of specific [cases] of the two actions without the slightest disorder. This is called the correct view of all Buddhists and is praised as the foundation of all pure qualities.¹³

The Buddhists reject the assertions of the non-Buddhist schools, such as the Nihilists (carvāka, ayata, rgyang ’phen pa) who assert that happiness and suffering arise causelessly, of the non-theistic Sāṃkhyas who assert that all manifest objects, including happiness and suffering, are transformations of the general principal (pradhāna, gtso bo), and the theistic Sāṃkhyas who hold that pleasure and pain are creations of the god Īśvara.¹⁴ It is the Buddhist position that all experiences of pleasure and pain—the general, such as rebirth in a happy or bad realm, and the specific, such as the individual feelings of pleasure and pain in a given lifetime—are the definite results of actions performed in the past and that this relationship of cause and effect is unconfused in the sense that happiness always arises from virtue and suffering always arises from non-virtue. Furthermore, a person never experiences the effect of an action that he did not perform.¹⁵

Thus, the happiness of cyclic existence is achieved through the practice of virtue, which brings pleasurable feelings, and the manifest sufferings of cyclic existence are avoided by abandoning non-virtuous activities, which fructify in feelings of pain. However, this identification of the means for gaining pleasant feelings and avoiding unpleasant feelings is not the final position; the Buddha indicates the unsatisfactory nature of all feelings when he states that, “Feeling is like a bubble.”

Feeling is compared to a bubble for two reasons, the first being that just as a water bubble is destroyed as soon as it appears, so feeling disintegrates in the moment following its production and becomes non-existent. This metaphor points to the impermanent nature of all feelings, whether they be pleasurable, painful, or neutral. The Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins, and Mādhyamikas assert that all conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛtadharma, ’dus byas kyi chos) are produced and cease every moment. Unlike the Vaibhāṣikas, who assert that production (utpatti, skyed pa), abiding (sthiti, gnas pa), aging (jarā, rga ba), and disintegration (vināśa, ’jig pa) are four external agents that affect a conditioned phenomenon in succession, the other schools hold production, abiding, aging, and disintegration to be four qualities of the object itself that exist simultaneously.¹⁶ Thus, the object’s quality of being the arising of that which did not exist before is its production, its remaining as a type similar to the former moment is its abiding, its being of a different character from the former moment is its aging, and its not staying for a second moment is its disintegration. Rather than being four agents acting on the object in sequence, production, abiding, aging, and disintegration are four different perspectives on one instant, with the object ceasing in the very moment that it is produced. Thus, according to the Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins, and Mādhyamikas, conditioned phenomena are unable to last beyond the moment of their production; momentary disintegration is inherent in everything that is produced from causes and conditions.¹⁷ Feelings, which are conditioned phenomena produced by actions in the past, are produced and disintegrate every instant.

The second reason why feelings are compared to water bubbles is that just as bubbles have a nature of water, so feelings have a nature of suffering. In order to understand the meaning of this statement, it is essential that the three types of suffering—the suffering of pain (duḥkhaduḥkhatā, sdug bsngal gyi sdug bsngal) the suffering of change (vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā, ’gyur ba’i sdug bsngal), and the suffering of conditioning (saṃskāraduḥkhatā, ’du byed kyi sdug bsngal)—be identified.

Sufferings of pain include all feelings of physical or mental pain, discomfort, or dissatisfaction, that is, all feelings ordinarily identified as unpleasant in the world. Such manifest forms of suffering are commonly recognized as having a nature of suffering.

All feelings of pleasure in cyclic existence are sufferings of change, so called because such feelings inevitably turn into suffering. When feelings of pleasure are observed over a long period of time, it is seen that suffering eventually arises, such that what is imagined to be pleasure is in fact merely the period between the gradual cessation of one suffering and the gradual arising of another. For example, if one remains in the shade too long and becomes cold, one moves into the sunlight. If standing in the warmth of the sun was truly pleasurable, then no matter how long one stayed in the sun, pleasure would continue without any feeling of discomfort. Since this is not the case and one must eventually return to the shade to avoid suffering the heat of the sun, the feeling of pleasure that initially arose from moving to the sunlight is a suffering of change. What was experienced as pleasure was the period between the cessation of the feeling of cold and the time at which the feeling of warmth became uncomfortable—a suffering of pain. If one has become exhausted by walking a long distance, sitting down appears to be pleasurable, but this apparent pleasure is the cessation of the suffering of standing. Because the suffering of sitting is increasing gradually, it is not manifest. When the suffering becomes apparent, one must get up and go for a walk. Upon rising the suffering of sitting quickly ceases and the suffering of standing gradually is produced, even though it is not immediately evident.¹⁸

Furthermore, present feelings of pleasure that increase attachment are for the most part cases of creating an awareness of pleasure in a lessening of suffering; there is no pleasure that does not depend on the elimination of suffering. For example, when one suffers because of traveling too much, the awareness of pleasure arises through resting. At that time of the rapid cessation of suffering, pleasure appears to be gradually increasing, but it is not pleasurable by nature because again, if one rests too long, suffering is produced as before. If it were naturally a cause of pleasure, then just as due to merely relying on a cause of suffering, suffering continues to increase, so as long as one relies on such things as moving and resting, sleep, food and drink, sunlight, and shade, pleasure should continue to increase for that long. However, [if one relies on these] for too long, it seems that only suffering is produced.¹⁹

The existence of feelings of pleasure is not being denied. The essential point is that those activities identified as pleasurable are so only in relation to a corresponding decrease of suffering. Further, nothing in cyclic existence has an inherent nature of pleasure such that one could continually eat a certain food or listen to a particular piece of music and constantly derive enjoyment from doing so. Unlike causes of suffering which will continue to bring discomfort indefinitely, these activities commonly identified as sources of pleasure will eventually bring pain. Since feelings of pleasure turn into suffering, they are said to have a nature of suffering and are identified as sufferings of change.

Contaminated feelings of equanimity are identified as pervasive sufferings of conditioning (vyāptisaṃskāraduḥkhatā, khyab pa ’du byed kyi sdug bsngal), the most subtle and difficult to comprehend of the three types of suffering. Lacking the manifest discomfort of the suffering of pain and the observable tendency to turn into suffering of the suffering of change, feelings of equanimity are identified as suffering because of being under the “other power” of contaminated actions and afflictions. Although a feeling of equanimity is neither pleasurable nor painful, since it is an impermanent phenomenon, suffering can arise in an instant upon the aggregation of suitable causes and conditions. As soon as one has a mind and body under the power of contaminated actions and afflictions, even though manifest suffering may be temporarily absent, suffering is ready to appear immediately. Therefore, the pervasive suffering of conditioning is extended to all five aggregates and is not limited to feelings of equanimity. Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path says:

In carrying a great burden, inasmuch as that burden must be carried, there is no pleasure. Similarly, as long as one must bear the burden of the appropriated aggregates (upādānaskandha, nyer len gyi phung po), so long must one suffer. When the suffering of conditioning exists due to these aggregates having as their basis the assumption of the bad states of suffering and the afflictions, although there occasionally occur times when there are no feelings of suffering temporarily, many sufferings are produced immediately from a myriad of sources. Therefore, the suffering of conditioning pervades all suffering and is the root of the other two types of suffering.²⁰

The suffering of conditioning is then called pervasive because it pervades sufferings of pain and sufferings of change; the domination of mind and body by the power of contaminated actions and afflictions, the fact that mind and body are so conditioned so as always to be ready to experience feelings of pleasure and pain make the first two types of suffering possible.

The third type of suffering is called pervasive also because it is a quality of the three realms and nine levels of cyclic existence. Sufferings of pain occur only in the Desire Realm, sufferings of change occur in the Desire Realm and the first three Concentrations of the Form Realm; in the Fourth Concentration and the four levels of the Formless Realm the feeling is only one of equanimity.²¹

The pervasive suffering of conditioning, though serving as the root of the sufferings of pain and change, is difficult to understand and is not identified as a suffering by common beings. As it says in sutra:

A fool, like the palm of the hand, does not feel the wisp of the suffering of conditioning.

Worldly beings do not identify the aggregates as sources of suffering and continue to seek pleasure in cyclic existence whereas the wise understand that as long as mind and body are under the power of past actions and the afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance, there can be no final happiness and no control over the indiscriminate occurrence of feelings of pain. Worldly beings allow feelings of pain and pleasure to serve as the causes of future suffering by becoming attached to pleasurable feelings and hating feelings of pain, with attachment producing the suffering of future births in cyclic existence and hatred producing sorrow in this life and rebirth in the bad realms in the future. The wise, on the other hand, see feelings of pleasure as suffering and stop desire. Since the aggregates are a collection of causes for suffering, the wise consider feelings of pain as arising from the aggregates and endeavor to stop the hatred of pain. They see feelings of equanimity as impermanent and having a nature of extinction and cessation and thus stop obscuration. In this way the wise do not allow the three feelings, which have a nature of suffering, to become causes of the three poisons—desire, hatred, and obscuration—the sources of future suffering.²³

The doctrine of the three types of suffering points out that almost all experience is suffering on some level, in the sense of being manifest feelings of pain, feelings of pleasure that are merely designated to periods of non-manifest suffering, or feelings of equanimity that are so conditioned as to be ready to turn into suffering upon the aggregation of appropriate conditions. It is not being said that feelings of pleasure are feelings of pain. When the Buddha said, “Whatever is experienced here is suffering,” he did not mean that all feelings are feeling of actual pain. Rather, as he says, “Ānanda, I said that ‘Whatever is experienced here is suffering,’ referring to the impermanence of conditioned things and the change of conditioned things.”²⁴ Experience is a form of suffering because the three feelings have a nature of impermanence and are produced by contaminated actions and afflictions, and are, therefore, unable to provide any final source of happiness. All those activities that sentient beings perform in hope of gaining final happiness in cyclic existence are thus doomed by their very nature to end in failure, or as the Buddha says in the chapter on impermanence in the Verses of Uplift (Udānavarga, I. 22):

Thus, nothing in cyclic existence can provide a final source of happiness, and specifically, none of the three feelings offers satisfaction. Tsong-kha-pa graphically illustrates the displeasing nature of the three feelings when he compares feelings of pleasure to the relief felt by pouring cool water on a burn, feelings of pain to the added suffering of pouring hot water on a burn, and feelings of equanimity to the sensation just at the moment of being burned before the pain becomes intense.²⁶ From this analogy it can be gathered that what is perceived as pleasure is merely a brief lessening of pain, what is perceived as pain is an intensification of already present suffering, and feelings of equanimity are capable of yielding feelings of pain in the next moment.

In the verse, feelings are compared to bubbles because just as a bubble is destroyed as soon as it arises, feelings disintegrate in the second moment after their production. This expresses the impermanent nature of feelings, that they disintegrate as soon as they arise, and thus cannot provide a permanent source of happiness. On the contrary, just as a bubble has a nature of water, all contaminated feelings—pleasurable, painful, and neutral—have a nature of suffering, as the presentation of the three types of suffering—of pain, change, and pervasive conditioning—indicates.

Discrimination, the third of the five aggregates, is, like feeling, an omnipresent mental factor that accompanies every main mind whether it be a sense or mental direct perceiver or a conceptual thought consciousness. It is that factor which apprehends the uncommon signs of an object. Discrimination involves the distinguishing and identification of objects.²⁷ The fact that we are able to differentiate one object from another and identify an object as something we have seen before is the result of discrimination.

Discrimination is compared to a mirage in the sense that, just as a mirage appears to be water but is not, discrimination appears to be something owned by a self-sufficient person but is not established as such. An individual’s discriminations falsely appear to be self-sufficient possessions of the person due to considering one’s own discriminations to be valid and those of others to be invalid.²⁸

In the division of awarenesses into minds and mental factors, the six main minds—the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental perceivers—constitute the fifth aggregate, consciousnesses. The fifty-one mental factors are divided into six categories: the five omnipresent factors (sarvatraga, kun ’gro) [feeling (vedanā, tshor ba), discrimination (samjña, ’du shes), intention (cetanā, sems pa), contact (sparśa, reg pa), mental engagement (manaskāra, yid la byed pa)], the five determining factors (viniyata, yul nges) [aspiration (chanda, ’dun pa), belief (adhimokṣa, mos pa), mindfulness (smṛti, dran pa), stabilization (samādhiting nge dzin), knowledge (prajñā, shes rab)], the eleven virtuous factors (kuśala, dge ba) [faith (śraddhā, dad pa), shame (hrī, ngo tsha shes pa), embarrassment (apatrāpya, khrel yod pa), non-attachment (alobha, ma chags pa), non-hatred (adveṣa, zhe sdang med pa), non-ignorance (amoha, gti mug med pa), effort (vīrya, brtson ’grus), pliancy (prasrabdhi, shin tu sbyangs pa)), conscientiousness (apramāda, bag yod pa), equanimity (upekṣā, btang snyoms), non-harmfulness (avihiṃsā, rnam par mi’tshe ba)], the six root afflictions (mūlakleśa, rtsa nyon) [desire (rāga, ’dod chags), anger (pratigha, khong khro), pride (māna, nga rgyal), ignorance (avidyā, ma rig pa), doubt (vicikitsā, the tshom), afflicted view (dṛṣṭi, lta ba nyon mongs can)], the twenty secondary afflictions (upakleśa, nye nyon) [belligerence (krodha, khro ba), resentment (upanāha, ’khon ’dzin), concealment (mrakṣa, ’chab pa), spite (pradāśa, ’tshig pa), jealousy (irṣya, phrag dog), miserliness (mātsarya, ser sna), deceit (māyā, sgyu), dissimulation (śaṭhya, g.yo), haughtiness (mada, rgyags pa), harmfulness (vihiṃsā, rnam par ’tshe ba), non-shame (āhrīkya, ngo tsha med pa), non-embarrassment (anapatrāpya, khrel med pa), lethargy (styāna, rmugs pa), excitement (auddhatya, rgod pa), non-faith (āśraddhya, ma dad pa), laziness (kausīdya, le lo), non-conscientiousness (pramāda, bag med pa), forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛtitā, brjed nges pa), non-introspection (asaṃprajanya, shes bzhin ma yin pa), distraction (vikṣepa, rnam par g.yeng ba)], and the four changeable factors (aniyata, gzhan ’gyur) [sleep (middha, gnyid), contrition (kaukṛtya, ’gyad pa), investigation (vitarka, rtog pa), analysis (vicāra, dpyod pa)].²⁹ From among the five omnipresent factors, two—feeling and discrimination—are distinguished as separate aggregates because they are causes of disputation; discrimination serves as the basis of quarrels among philosophical systems and feeling serves as the basis of quarrels among ordinary people.³⁰ The other three omnipresent factors—intention (cetanā, sems pa), contact (sparśa, reg pa), and mental engagement (manaskāra, yid la byed pa)—and the remaining forty-six mental factors fall into the category of compositional factors, specifically as compositional factors associated with mind (cittaprayuktasaṃskāra, sems dang ldan pa’i ’du byed).

The other components of the compositional factor aggregate are those which are neither form nor consciousness, numbering twenty-four according to the Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins, and Mādhyamikas, fifteen according to the Vaibhāṣikas. These are the non-associated compositional factors (viprayuktasaṃskāra, ldan min ’du byed), called non-associated because of not being associated with minds or mental factors. They are called compositional because they allow for the aggregation of the causes and conditions and allow for the production, abiding, and cessation of products.³¹

The twenty-four non-associated compositional factors are: person (pudgala, gang zag), acquisition (prāpti, thob pa), absorption without discrimination (asaṃjñisamāpatti, ’du shes med pa’i snyoms fug), absorption of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti, ’gog pa’i snyoms ’jug), one having no discrimination (āsaṃjñika, ’du shes med pa pa), life faculty (jīvitendriya, srog gi dbang po), similarity of type (nikāyasabhāgata, rigs ’thun pa), birth (jāti, skye ba), aging (jarā, rga ba), duration (sthiti, gnas pa), impermanence (anityatā, mi rtag pa), group of stems (nāmakāya, ming gi tshogs), group of words (padakāya, tshig gi tshogs), group of letters (vyañjanakāya, yi ge’i tshogs), state of an ordinary being (pṛthagjanatva, so so skye bo nyid), continuity (pravṛtti, ’jug pa), distinction (pratiniyama, so sor nges pa), relatedness (yoga, ’byor ’grel), rapidity (jāva, ’gyogs pa), order (anukrama, go rim), time (kāla, dus), area (deśa, yul), number (saṃkhyā, grangs), and collection (sāmagrī, tshog pa).³² Since these are factors which apply to both form and consciousness, they cannot be placed in the form aggregate or in one of the mental aggregates, but are placed in a separate category, the aggregate of compositional factors.

These compositional factors are compared to a banana or plantain tree (Musa Sapientum). The Buddha provides the background of the metaphor in the Kindred Sayings (Saṃyuttanikāya III) where he describes a man who goes into the forest in search of heartwood, the hard, dry core of a tree trunk. He comes upon a tall, strong plantain tree and chops it down. Having cut off the top, he begins to peel away layers of bark to reach the heartwood. But below the first layer, he finds a second; he peels away the layers until there is nothing left, for the plantain tree has no heartwood, no core.³³

Just as a banana tree is taken apart in many ways but a core does not appear, so compositional factors are analyzed with numerous reasonings, but the essence of something owned by a substantially existent person is not found.

The fifth aggregate includes the six minds: the eye consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna, mig gi rnam par shes pa), which observes visible forms, the ear consciousness (śrotravijñāna, rna ba’i rnam par shes pa) which observes sounds, the nose consciousness (ghrāṇavijñāna, sna’i rnam par shes pa) which observes odors, the tongue consciousness (jihvāvijñāna, lce’i rnam par shes pa) which observes tastes, the body consciousness (kāyavijñāna, lus kyi rnam par shes pa) which observes tangible objects, and the mental consciousness (manovijñāna, yid kyi rnam par shes pa) which observes phenomena. No mental factors are included in the consciousness aggregate. The six consciousnesses, like all impermanent phenomena, arise in dependence on causes and conditions with three conditions being necessary for the production of any consciousness: 1) the uncommon empowering condition (asādhāraṇa-adhipatipratyaya/thun mong ma yin pa’i bdag rkyen) which for the five sense consciousnesses is clear subtle matter located in the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and throughout the body. These are the physical sense powers (indriya, dbang po) which provide the physical ability to perceive objects. For the mental consciousness, the uncommon empowering condition is not physical; any former moment of consciousness can act as the uncommon empowering condition of a mental consciousness. 2) The observed-object-condition (ālambanapratyaya, dmigs rkyen) is the object of observation of the consciousness, that is, the visible form, sound, odor, taste, tangible object, or phenomenon apprehended by the particular consciousness. 3) The immediately preceding condition (samanan-tarapratyaya, de ma thag rkyen) is a former moment of any of the six consciousnesses which serves as a cause of similar type of the consciousness produced and accounts for the fact that the continuum of consciousness is never severed; at least one of the six types of consciousness is constantly operating.³⁴

The five sense consciousnesses (*indriyajñāna, dhang shes) are necessarily non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka, rtog med) whereas the mental consciousness can be either non-conceptual as in the case of a yogic direct perceiver (yogipratyakṣa, rnal ‘byor mngon sum) and superknowledge (abhijñā, mngon shes) or conceptual, as in the case of thought (kalpanā, rtog pa).

The Buddha compares consciousness to an illusion. A magician is able to cause a pebble to appear as a horse to his audience by casting a mantra that affects their eyes. The illusion appears to be a real horse but, in truth, is not. In the same way, consciousness appears to be a self-sufficient person but is not established as such.

When consciousness is spoken of as appearing as a self-sufficient person, it is the mental consciousness that is being referred to more than the five sense consciousnesses. The mental consciousness which thinks thoughts, makes assumptions, draws conclusions, and directs activities of body and speech is wrongly conceived to be a substantially existent person in the sense of being self-sufficient. The nature of this misconception must be explored.

The term substantial existence (dravyasat, rdzas yod) occurs in many different contexts in Buddhist literature, in most cases meaning one of the following:

1 substantial existence which is established by reasoning; this is synonymous with being an object of knowledge (jñeya, shes bya)

2 substantial existence which is steady and unchanging; this is synonymous with permanent phenomenon (nitya, rtag pa)

3 substantial existence which is the ability to perform a function; this is synonymous with impermanent thing (bhāva, dngos po)

4 substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency (Tib. rang-rkya-thub-pa, literally “the ability to support itself’).

This last sense of substantial existence is of interest in delineating the manner in which the mental consciousness is misconceived to be a self. All four schools of Buddhist tenets agree that substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency refers (hypothetically) to an existence which does not depend on the apprehension of some other phenomenon in order to be identified.³⁵ Nothing substantially exists in that sense. In the context of the conception of a substantially existent or self-sufficient self, it is the conception of the existence of a self which can be identified independently without recourse to the identification of the aggregates.³⁶

When consciousness is said to appear as a substantially existent self, it is difficult to construe consciousness as such a self in the sense of being identified without depending on the aggregates, since consciousness is itself the fifth of the five aggregates. Rather the mental consciousness is wrongly conceived to be a substantially existent self in the sense of being the master or controller of the aggregates, the servants—those controlled. This conception of self does not require that the self be a different entity from the aggregates, be totally independent of them, or have a character completely unlike that of the aggregates.

A magician’s illusion appears to be a horse but is not established as such. In the same way, the mental consciousness appears to be a substantially existent person but, in fact, is not. Such a person does not substantially exist because its identification must depend on the appearance of other phenomena.³⁷ Therefore, the mental consciousness is not a substantially existent self. In the Svātantrika system, the mental consciousness is identified as the imputedly existent (prajñaptisat, btags yod) person, as will be explained below (pp. 109-114). All four tenet systems refute the existence of a substantially existent person.³⁸

Having thus explained the manner in which form is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a bubble, discrimination is like a mirage, compositional factors are like a banana tree, and consciousness is like an illusion, it remains to be seen how this stanza from a Hīnayāna sutra became a point of contention between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas.

In commenting on the thirty-fourth stanza of the seventh chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way which says:

In this way, the Supramundane Victor set forth the categories of an illusion, an echo, a reflection, a mirage, a dream, a ball of foam, a water bubble, and a banana tree as examples of the selflessness of conditioned phenomena. There is nothing whatsoever real or non-mistaken in these. It is said that these are elaborations, these are falsities. In the statement, “All phenomena are selfless,” selfless means non-entityness because the term “self’ is a word for entityness.³⁹

The Buddha used the examples of deceptive phenomena such as illusions, mirages, and dreams to indicate that phenomena do not exist in the way that they appear. All phenomena are selfless in the sense that they lack inherent existence and do not exist by way of their own entity. When the Buddha said in Hīnayāna sutras that form is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a water bubble, discrimination is like a mirage, compositional factors are like a banana tree, and consciousness is like an illusion, he was indicating that all conditioned phenomena are selfless, empty of inherent existence. This is Buddhapālita’s position.

In commenting on the same verse from Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way (VII. 34), Bhāvaviveka disagrees with Buddhapālita’s assertion that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in Hīnayāna sutras:

Self and mine are without entityness, but they are perceived in that way. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions, the Supramundane Victor taught in the [scriptures of the] Hearer vehicle:

In the Mahāyāna [scriptural collection], conditioned phenomena are just without entityness, but they are perceived in that way and are [wrongly] taught to be that way [by others]. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, it is said [in the Diamond Cutter (Vajracchedika)]:

Therefore, this is not something to be feared: the intelligent, having analyzed, should become forbearant.

The Supramundane Victor set forth the categories of illusion, echo, reflection, mirage, dream, ball of foam, water bubble, and banana tree as examples of the selflessness of conditioned phenomena. There is nothing whatsoever real or non-mistaken in this. It is said that these are elaborations, these are falsities. In the statement, “All phenomena are selfless,” selfless means non-entityness because the term “self’ is a word for entityness.

Regarding that, one who is not another [i.e., myself, Bhāvaviveka], says that here, since the appearance as self is a mistaken reality, and since the term “self’ is a word for self [of persons and does not mean entityness], and since a self that is a separate entity does not exist in those [aggregates] and they themselves are not a self just as they are not Īśvara, that scripture, because of referring to the selflessness of persons which is to be specifically realized in the Hearer Vehicle, cannot indicate that phenomena are selfless. If it could, it would be meaningless [for the Buddha] to have taken up another vehicle [the Mahāyāna].⁴⁰

Before exploring Bhāvaviveka’a argument in detail, the stanza he cites from the Diamond Cutter Sutra warrants explanation.

According to Jam-yang-shay-ba and the annotator of his Great Exposition of Tenets, Nga-wang-bel-den, this stanza sets forth nine examples that illustrate four characteristics of products.⁴¹ The characteristic of nature is indicated by the examples of stars, cataracts, and a butter lamp. The characteristic of experience is indicated by the example of a magician’s illusion. The characteristic of fault is indicated by the examples of dew and bubbles, and the characteristic of renunciation, by the examples of dreams, lightning, and clouds.

Products’ nature of being a composite of appearance and emptiness is illustrated by stars. All phenomena have two natures. Their emptiness of true existence is their final, ultimate mode of being that appears to a non-conceptual exalted wisdom (nirvikalpakajñāna, rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes). This ultimate mode of being, which is the mere elimination of true existence, is illustrated by the fact that during the day, only the clear sky appears and stars are not visible. In the same way, the exalted wisdom consciousness sees only the emptiness which is the negative of true existence and does not see any conventional elaborations whatsoever.

The other nature of products is their conventional mode of being that appears to a conventional conceptual consciousness. This conventional mode of being is posited through appearing to a non-defective awareness. Just as when the night is covered by darkness, the constellations of stars appear clearly, so the varieties of conventional phenomena appear to a conventional thought consciousness. For those with the obstructive covering of ignorance (like darkness), various mistaken appearances (like stars) are perceived. Nevertheless, not all appearances to conventional thought consciousnesses are mistaken in the Svātantrika system. Products appear correctly to factually concordant consciousnesses—conventional valid cognizers. The appearance of objects as truly established from their own side, without being posited through appearing to a non-defective awareness, exists only for mistaken minds. Phenomena do not exist in that way and appear so only through the force of predispositions for ignorance.

The example of stars, which do not appear during the day but do appear at night, illustrates the mode of apprehension of a non-conceptual exalted wisdom and a conceptual conventional consciousness. For a non-conceptual exalted wisdom of those who have not achieved Buddhahood, only emptiness—the absence of true existence and the final mode of being of phenomena—appears. To a conceptual conventional consciousness the varieties of conventional truths appear. This appearance of conventional phenomena is not an object of abandonment of the path to Buddhahood, for conventionalities appear to a Buddha’s exalted wisdom knowing the varieties (yāvajjñāna, ji snyad gzigs pa’i ye shes). Rather, it is the conception of these phenomena as truly existent, ultimately existent, without being posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective consciousness, which is abandoned on the path.

Due to ignorance, products appear to be truly established but, in fact, are empty of being established in the way that they appear. This nature of emptiness is exemplified by cataracts.

If a phenomenon were ultimately established, then the phenomenon itself would have to be its own final mode of being, its own essence. If this were the case, then a reasoning consciousness searching for the mode of being of that phenomenon would have to find the phenomenon itself at the conclusion of its analysis. However, a consciousness which analyzes with reasonings, such as the lack of being one or many, finds that the phenomenon under investigation is not ultimately one or many and, therefore, is not ultimately established. The reasoning consciousness finds that the mode of being of the phenomenon, rather than being the phenomenon itself, is its very lack of ultimate establishment, its emptiness of being established in the way in which it appears.

This is similar to the case of a person with cataracts who sees falling hairs. If the falling hairs actually existed, they would have to be seen even more clearly by a person with good vision. The fact that such a person does not see falling hairs indicates that they do not exist. Similarly, if phenomena were ultimately established, as they appear to be to an ignorant consciousness, that ultimate establishment would have to be ascertained by an analytical consciousness specifically investigating ultimate establishment. The fact that such a consciousness, after searching for ultimate establishment, does not find it indicates that phenomena are empty of ultimate establishment.

Although phenomena do not ultimately exist, they do exist, and it is necessary to posit the factors of the category of appearance—conventional truths. This is illustrated by a butter lamp. Although the flame of a butter lamp does not naturally abide in the lamp, it is undeniable that the flame arises when such things as butter and a wick are assembled. In the same way, although no phenomenon whatsoever ultimately exists, all of cyclic existence and nirvana arise in dependence on the phenomena of the impure class, such as contaminated actions and afflictions, and the phenomena of the pure class, such as the six perfections, the eighteen emptinesses, and the four noble truths.

In this way, the nature of products is illustrated by the examples of stars, cataracts, and a butter lamp. The nature of emptiness is exemplified by cataracts, the nature of appearance by a butter lamp, and the nature of a combination of emptiness and appearance is illustrated by stars.

A magician is able to take pebbles or sticks and, by rubbing them with a salve and casting a mantra, cause them to appear as various pleasant or unpleasant things. The audience, viewing these false appearances, reacts to them with attachment or fear even though, in fact, there is nothing there to bring benefit or harm. In the same way, sentient beings are tortured by the sufferings of cyclic existence due to misconceiving the nature of phenomena. They generate various attachments and hatreds through the force of being affected by the ignorance that conceives of true existence, whereas, in fact, phenomena are not truly existent, and they experience suffering as the result of desire and hatred. Being led like a dog who chases a stone thinking that it is food or tempting a child with an empty fist that it thinks holds candy, sentient beings manufacture various hopes and fears about things that do not truly exist. This suggests that one must reverse attachment and not follow after those objects, attempting to experience their taste.

Products are viewed as faulty from the viewpoint of their nature of impermanence and from the viewpoint of their nature of suffering.

A tiny dewdrop on the tip of a blade of grass immediately dries up at the slightest cause, such as being touched by sunlight. It has a nature of utter instability. In the same way, all conditioned phenomena, as soon as they are established, have an inner nature of disintegration, without depending on a later cause for them to fall apart. For this reason, the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas (Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra) and Maitreya’s Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra) refer to impermanence as the aspect of non-being and the aspect of non-existence (because of being the aspect of the non-existence of permanence).⁴²

When water bubbles appear, they have a nature of water, when they disappear, they return to the nature of water. With regard to contaminated feelings, sutra says, “Whatsoever feeling here is a suffering.” Feelings of suffering arise in the aspect of suffering as soon as they are produced. When contaminated pleasures cease, they become entities of suffering and are, therefore, called sufferings of change. Because feelings of equanimity are the basis of ail suffering, they are explained to be pervasive sufferings of conditioning.

Thus, the three types of contaminated feelings—those of pain, pleasure, and equanimity are all identified as being types of suffering: the suffering of pain, the suffering of change, and the pervasive sufferings of conditioning respectively. Common beings (pṛthagjana, so so skye bo) (etymologically, those who take birth (jana) by the power of individual (pṛthak) contaminated actions and afflictions)⁴³ do not perceive the three types of feelings as having a nature of suffering. Rather, such beings, often derogatorily referred to as children (balaka, byis pa) by the Buddha, attribute qualities of pleasure and pain, pleasantness and unpleasantness to contaminated feelings. To the sight of Superiors, those who have achieved the path of seeing or above, it is said that “Pleasure never exists on the point of the needle of cyclic existence.” That is, all experience in the cycle of existence has a nature only of suffering. This is something that can only be understood fully by Superiors; it cannot be understood by common beings. Therefore, the suffering nature of all contaminated feelings is called a truth for Superiors (āryasatya, ’phags pa’i bden pa).

The characteristic of renunciation is the lack of true existence of products—that quality of products which, when realized, causes them to be renounced. This characteristic of non-true existence of past, present, and future products is illustrated by a dream, lightning, and clouds, respectively.

When remembering a dream, one may feel desire or hatred for objects that appeared in the dream. Even though the dream objects are not real, they are nonetheless capable of serving as the basis of desire and hatred. In the same way, although the effects of past actions are experienced, it is not necessary that the actions that cause those effects be truly established. The mere fact that an effect is experienced does not entail that its cause must truly exist. Past products, such as actions in former lifetimes, produce effects yet are empty of true establishment, much as past dream objects can cause desire and hatred.

Lightning appears with radiant whiteness just for an instant and then immediately becomes non-existent without one being able to say, “It first appeared there, then it remained here, and finally disappeared there.” In the same way, when one searches for present things, whether it be from the viewpoint of object, agent, and action or cause, effect, and entity, one can find no nature that is more than an appearance to a non-defective awareness. Through merely seeking for a truly existent thing with a reasoning consciousness, this object sought is broken down and disappears; it cannot be found anywhere.

A pure empty sky does not have the capacity to produce rain, but rain falls from clouds gathered in the sky, and those clouds can continuously yield such effects as a ripened harvest. In the same way, contaminated actions, afflictions, and predispositions for assuming bad states gather in the natural clear light of the mind. These defilements are merely adventitious and are not the final nature of the mind; otherwise, liberation would be impossible because the mind could not be purified of defilement. The mind is naturally pure and empty of true existence. As the clouds are capable of producing harvests, contaminated actions, afflictions, and predispositions for assuming bad states are capable of producing a variety of fruitional effects in the future, such as rebirth as an animal. These future fruits are empty of true existence. If future things were ultimately established, they would have to exist at all times whereby all effects would have to abide in their causes, in which case it would absurdly follow that all the effects which arise in dependence on a cloud, such as a harvest, would have to exist in the cloud. Because future effects do not exist in their causes but rather arise gradually through a process of maturation, it can be inferred that future products lack ultimate establishment; they are empty of true existence.

Having examined the meaning of the stanza from the Diamond Cutter, it is now necessary to explore Bhāvaviveka’s argument that this stanza in particular and the Mahāyāna scriptures in general teach the selflessness of phenomena, whereas the stanza from the Hīnayāna sutra which says, “form is like a ball of foam ...” and all other Hīnayāna sutras teach only the selflessness of persons.

The Buddha is ostensibly saying very nearly the same thing in the two stanzas, even repeating the two metaphors of bubbles and a mirage. On face value, there is nothing to point to that indicates that the passage from the Hīnayāna sutra merely teaches the selflessness of persons while the Mahāyāna passage teaches the more subtle selflessness of phenomena. Bhāvaviveka’s assertion that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collection (piṭaka, sde snod) revolves around two essential points of disagreement between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas: the meaning of the term self (ātman, bdag) and what constitutes the two obstructions—the afflictive obstructions (kleśāvaraṇa, nyon sgrib) and the obstructions to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇa, shres sgrib). This becomes clear through reexamining his commentary to the thirty-fourth stanza of the seventh chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way:

Therefore, this is not something to be feared; the intelligent, having analyzed, should become forbearant.

The Supramundane Victor set forth the categories of illusions, echoes, reflections, mirages, dreams, balls of foam, water bubbles, and banana trees as examples of the selflessness of conditioned phenomena. There is nothing whatsoever real or non-mistaken in them. It is said that these are elaborations, these are falsities. In the statement, “All phenomena are selfless,” selfless means non-entityness because the term “self” is a word for entityness.

Regarding that, one who is not another [i.e., myself, Bhāvaviveka], says that here, since the appearance as self is a mistaken reality, and since the term “self’ is a word for self [of persons and does not mean entityness], and since a self that is a separate entity does not exist in those [aggregates] and they themselves are not a self just as they are not Īśvara, that scripture, because of referring to the selflessness of persons which is to be specifically realized in the Hearer vehicle, cannot indicate that phenomena are selfless. If it could, it would have been meaningless [for the Buddha] to have taken up another vehicle [namely, the Mahāyāna].⁴⁴

Bhāvaviveka states that the self of persons lacks entityness but is falsely perceived to exist truly. This misconception of the nature of the person constitutes the chief of the afflictive obstructions, which prevent liberation from cyclic existence. Since Hīnayānists seek to be liberated from cyclic existence, they must overcome the afflictive obstructions, and, therefore, the Buddha taught the selflessness of persons—the thorough knowledge of which is the antidote to the afflictive obstructions—in the Hearer or Hīnayāna scriptural collection. For Bhāvaviveka, the stanzas, “Form is like a ball of foam ...” are an instance of a Hīnayāna scripture that teaches the selflessness of persons.

Bhāvaviveka goes on to say that all conditioned phenomena, persons and other things, lack entityness but are falsely perceived to exist truly. The conception of phenomena as truly existing by way of their own entity is the chief of the obstructions to omniscience preventing the achievement of the omniscient consciousness of a Buddha, which is able to perceive directly all objects of knowledge (jñeya, shes bya) simultaneously. This conception of phenomena as truly existent is more subtle than the conception of a self of persons, and therefore the wisdom realizing that phenomena do not truly exist serves as an antidote to the more coarse afflictive obstructions as well as to the obstructions to omniscience. It is Bhavaviveka’s view that the Buddha taught that conditioned phenomena are without entityness in the Mahāyāna scriptural collections so that those with the Mahāyāna aspiration to achieve Buddhahood for the welfare of all sentient beings could realize the non-true existence of phenomena and overcome both obstructions. Bhāvaviveka cites the passage from the Diamond Cutter as an instance of a Mahāyāna sutra that teaches that conditioned phenomena are without entityness.

He then goes on to quote Buddhapālita’s commentary to the Treatise on the Middle Way (VII.34) in which Buddhapālita states that the similes of illusions, balls of foam, banana trees, and so forth that the Buddha employs in the Hīnayāna sutras denote the selflessness of phenomena, not merely that of persons. This is due to the fact that, according to Buddhapālita, when the Buddha the says that all phenomena are selfless, the word selfless (anātman, bdag med pa) means non-entityness (niḥsvabhāva, ngo bo nyid med pa), that is, not being established by way of its own entity, because self (ātman, bdag) is another word for entityness (svabhāva, ngo bo nyid).

Bhāvaviveka disagrees, saying that the term self in this context refers only to a misconceived nature of the person. The Hīnayāna scriptures, by saying that form is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a bubble, discrimination is like a mirage, compositional factors are like a banana tree, and consciousness is like an illusion, are indicating that a self that is a different entity from the aggregates does not exist anywhere among the aggregates, nor are the aggregates individually or collectively the self. The passage discusses only the nature of the person in terms of the five aggregates and in no way refers to the lack of entityness of phenomena, as Buddhapālita contends. Hearer scriptures teach only the object of a Hearer’s wisdom, namely, the selflessness of persons. If the object of a Bodhisattva’s wisdom, the non-entityness of phenomena, were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, then the complete antidote for the removal of both obstructions would be available in the Hīnayāna canon and the Buddha’s teaching of the Mahāyāna scriptures would be totally redundant.

This controversy between Bhāvaviveka and Buddhapālita rests on the disagreement between the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas on three fundamental issues: the meaning of self and selflessness, the nature of the two obstructions, and the distinguishing feature of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

According to the Svātantrikas, Yogācārins, Sautrāntikas, and Vaibhāṣikas, the term “self” (ātman, bdag) in isolation, and not in phrases such as “selflessness of phenomena” (dharmanairātmya, chos kyi bdag med), refers only to an attribute falsely ascribed to the person (pudgala, gang zag); it does not refer to other phenomena. It should be noted that self, in this context, is not a synonym for person as it usually is; when these tenet systems refute the existence of self, they are not refuting the existence of persons. Rather, they are negating a special type of person, a person which can appear to the mind independent of the appearance of other phenomena.⁴⁵

The Prāsaṅgikas apply the bare term “self” to a wider context than merely the false nature of the person.⁴⁶ Buddhapālita says that self is a word for entityness,⁴⁷ the inherent existence which is falsely ascribed to all phenomena, including persons. Candrakīrti says in his Commentary to Āryadeva’s “Four Hundred” (Catuḥśatakaṭīkā):

Regarding this, “self’ is the entity of things that does not depend on another, [it is] inherent existence. The nonexistence of that is selflessness. Through the division into phenomena and persons it is understood as twofold, the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons.⁴⁸

Thus, for the Prāsaṅgikas, self does not refer merely to a falsely attributed quality of just persons, but refers to an independent entity, an entity which exists under its own power, the existence of an objective mode of subsistence which is not merely imputed by terminology.⁴⁹ A person’s quality of being an independent, inherently existent entity is a self of persons. Such a quality superimposed on phenomena other than the person is a self of phenomena. The non-existence of those two false qualities of persons and phenomena is the selflessnesses of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. In the Prāsaṅgika system there is no difference in subtlety between the two selflessnesses. They are distinguished from the point of view of the bases that are selfless, that is, persons and phenomena.

The Svātantrikas assert a difference of coarseness and subtlety between the two selflessnesses and also assert different objects of negation by the two selflessnesses. The lack of being a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency is the subtle selflessness of persons. This selflessness is coarser and more easily realized than the selflessness of phenomena—that phenomena do not exist from their own side without being posited by the power of a nondefective awareness (see pp. 143-150). Thus, unlike the Prāsaṅgikas, the Svātantrikas do not negate the same quality when they establish the selflessnesses of persons and phenomena. When they say that the person is selfless, they are negating the person’s substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency. When they say that phenomena are selfless, they are negating the existence of phenomena from their own side without being posited by the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness. Though the Prāsaṅgikas distinguish the two selflessnesses from the point of view of that which is selfless, the Svātantrikas distinguish the two selflessnesses from the point of view of how they are selfless.⁵⁰ Let us examine the Svātantrika presentation of selflessness of persons in more detail.

In the Svātantrika school, the conception of the self of persons (pudgalātmagraha, gang zag gi bdag ’dzin) takes three forms:

1 the conception of a substantially existent self in the sense of self-sufficiency, which is the conception of the existence of a self that is capable of being identified independently without relying on the identification of the aggregates. This is the innate (sahaja, lhan skyes) conception of a self of persons according to the Svātantrikas, present in the continue of all sentient beings.

2 the conception of a self that is of a different character from the aggregates, that is, the conception of the existence of a self that does not share the aggregates’ qualities of production, abiding, and disintegration.

3 the conception of a permanent, single, independent self which is permanent in the sense that it is without production and disintegration, single in the sense that it lacks parts, and independent in the sense that it does not rely on another.

The last two conceptions of a self of persons do not exist in the mental continua of persons whose minds have not been affected bv the study of non-Buddhist systems of tenets that propound such a self, like Sāṃkhya or Vedānta. Because the latter two conceptions do not exist in the continua of all sentient beings, but exist only for those who have studied false systems, these conceptions are called artificial (parikalpita, kun btags) conceptions of a sell of persons by the Svātantrikas.⁵¹

The first conception, that of a substantially existent self, is the subtle conception of a self of persons and must be abandoned in order to be liberated from cyclic existence. This subtle conception of the I holds the self and the aggregates to be like a master and his servants, with the self seen as the controller of the body, for example. This innate conception of self holds the I or person to be substantially existent because it conceives of the I as self-sufficient, not depending on the aggregates.⁵² The self-sufficient person is conceived to have a character different from and independent of the aggregates in the sense of acting as their controller.

The existence of such a self-sufficient person is refuted bv acknowledging that in order for the person to be identified, one must rely on the prior identification of some other phenomenon, namelv one or more of the aggregates, in which case the person cannot be self-sufficient. For example, the mottle of colors on a butterfly’s wing cannot be identified without reference to the colors that compose it; it does not exist separately from those colors.⁵³

The Svātantrikas reject the existence of a substantially existent person that is something other than the aggregates and assert that the person is merely designated to the aggregates. They find support in this statement from sutra:

Thus, the Svātantrikas reject the existence of a self-sufficient person but do not reject the existence of the person. Bhāvaviveka says in the eighteenth chapter of his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”, “Thus, we also actually impute the term self to consciousnesses conventionally because, since consciousness takes rebirth, it is the self.”⁵⁵ For scriptural support that consciousness is the self, Bhāvaviveka cites two statements:

Since one sutra refers to taming the self and the other to taming the mind, the terms mind and self are, according to Bhāvaviveka, used interchangeably in this context. Bhāvaviveka reasons that consciousness is the conventionally existent self because consciousness is that which takes rebirth; it appropriates the other aggregates which, together with consciousness, serve as the basis of designation of the conventionally existent person in the new lifetime.⁵⁸

Those who assert that the five aggregates are the person, citing the quotation above about the chariot, are not saying that all five aggregates are the person nor that the five aggregates individually are the person. Rather, they assert that the collection of the five aggregates is the person. Furthermore, when Bhāvaviveka states that the mental consciousness is the person, he is not implicitly denying that the collection of the aggregates is the person. Rather, he holds that the main mental consciousness is the traveller continuously migrating through cyclic existence and, therefore, is appropriately designed with the term “person.”⁵⁹ The positions on the conventional status of the person of the non-Prāsaṅgika Buddhist schools may be summarized in a general way as follows:

Dispensing with the qualification “continuum” (saṃtāna), which here refers to the possessor of a series of moments, (for example, the continuation of moments of the mental consciousness over time)⁶¹ the non-Prāsaṅgika schools posit either the collection of the five aggregates or some form of the mental consciousness as the person. Their views are summarized by Candrakīrti in his Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s “Treatise on the) Middle Way” (Madhyamakāvatāra) when he says:

[The Buddha said,] “There is no establishment of self which is other than the aggregates.”

Therefore, the object of observation of the view of self is only the aggregates.

Some assert all five aggregates as the basis

Of the view of self, some assert just the mind.⁶²

The Prāsaṅgikas deny that the collection of the aggregates is the person and that the mental consciousness is the person. They reject the view that the collection is the person by analyzing the relationship between a chariot and its parts.

The Svātantrikas assert that the collection of the axle, nails, wheels, car, and so forth of the chariot is the chariot and that when one searches for the object designated by the term “chariot” the collection of the parts of the chariot is found.⁶³ They say that the chariot is not just imputed to its parts nominally; if the basis of the designation of the name “chariot” were not the chariot, then the chariot would not exist. In the same way, they assert that the collection of the aggregates, the basis of designation of the term “person,” is the person.⁶⁴

Candrakīrti, in his Supplement to the Middle Way, rejects the view that the collection of the parts of the chariot is the chariot and that the collection of the aggregates is the person.⁶⁵ Although the chariot is designated in dependence on its parts, the parts of the chariot are not the chariot. If the mere collection of the parts of the chariot were the chariot, it would absurdly follow that the pile of disassembled parts of the chariot would be the chariot itself because, as the Svātantrikas and so forth say, the collection of the parts of the chariot is the chariot.⁶⁶

Someone might object that it is not being said that the mere collection of the parts is the chariot. Rather, the special shape of the arranged parts is the chariot. Candrakīrti rejects this view, saying that there is no difference in the shape of the axles, wheels, and so forth before and after assembly. Therefore, since the chariot does not exist among the disassembled parts, it also does not exist among the assembled parts. It is also not feasible that the parts’ shapes somehow change after they are assembled because no such change is observed. Finally, the general shape of the collection of the parts cannot be the chariot because, according to the Svātantrikas, the chariot is substantially established (dravyasiddha, rdzas su grub pa), but the collection of the parts and its shape are imputedly existent (prajñaptisat, btags yod).⁶⁷

The Prāsaṅgikas do not negate the existence of the chariot; they negate the existence of the chariot as the collection of its parts. They assert that the collection of the parts of the chariot is the basis of the designation of the term “chariot,” but the chariot is merely imputed to those parts. No matter how thoroughly the parts are scrutinized, the chariot cannot be found. The basis of the designation—the collection of the parts—is not and cannot be the object designated—the chariot. The basis of a particular designation and the object of that designation are mutually exclusive.⁶⁸ Just as the collection of the parts of the chariot is not the chariot, the collection of the aggregates is not the person.

The later seventeenth and early eighteenth century Tibetan scholar, Jam-yang-shay-ba, argues that Bhāvaviveka’s contention that the mental consciousness is the person demonstrates that he has not abandoned the conception of a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency because he asserts that the person has a character different from that of the aggregates. According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, the conception of the person as having a character different from that of the aggregates takes two forms. The first is exemplified by that of the master and servant in which the person is the appropriator, the owner of the aggregates, with the self or person having the character of permanence, in contrast to the impermanent nature of the aggregates. It is the view of Jam-yang-shay-ba that this conception of self, the type of self asserted by the non-Buddhists, is what Bhāvaviveka and the Svātantrikas refute. They are unable to refute the more subtle conception of a self of persons in which the person is seen to be like a head salesman and the aggregates as junior salesmen. Here, the head salesman and the junior salesmen are similar in being salesmen, but the head salesman stands apart as the controller and supervisor of the others and thus has a distinct character. When Bhāvaviveka asserts that consciousness is the person, he falls into this type of conception of a self of persons because consciousness is itself an aggregate, as the head salesman is a salesman, but is nonetheless set above the other aggregates as their controller. The fact that consciousness has a distinctive character that separates it from the other aggregates is implicit in Bhāvaviveka’s statement that consciousness is the person; when one searches among the aggregates for the conventionally existent person, it is Bhāvaviveka’s contention that one will find consciousness. Thus, there must be some special quality of consciousness which sets it apart.⁶⁹

What then is the person? In Candrakīrti’s sevenfold reasoning, the person is shown not to exist inherently because when the object designated by the term “person” is sought, it is not found to be inherently the same as the aggregates, different from the aggregates, the basis of the aggregates, based on the aggregates, the possessor of the aggregates, the shape of the aggregates, or the collection of the aggregates. According to the Prāsaṅgikas, the self or person is the mere I which serves as the basis for the generation of the awareness thinking “I” in dependence on the aggregates. The person is merely imputed in terms of the aggregates and is not established by way of its own entity but nonetheless exists, performing the functions of accumulating actions and experiencing the fruition of those actions.⁷⁰

The Prāsaṅgikas assert that the conception of the person as existing by way of its own entity and not merely being posited conventionally is the subtle conception of a self of persons. In reality, the person is merely posited by the power of convention; when the object designated by the verbal convention “person” is searched for, it is not found because the person and the aggregates do not inherently exist in any of the seven ways, which are considered to be exhaustive. That is, if the person is not inherently the same as, different from, based on, the base of, the possessor of, the collection of, or the shape of the aggregates, then the person does not inherently exist, substantially exist, or exist by way of its own character. This non-existence of the person by way of its own entity is the very subtle selflessness of persons.

According to Prāsaṅgika, through directly seeing and meditating on the mere absence of a person that exists by way of its own entity without being designated by conventions, one is able to abandon the innate conception of a self of persons. This is because the wisdom directly realizing the person’s non-existence by way of its own entity and the ignorant consciousness conceiving the person to be established by wav of its own entity both observe the same object—the mere I designated to the aggregates. However, their mode of apprehension of that object is directly contradictory, with the wisdom consciousness apprehending the mere I as empty of inherent existence and the ignorant consciousness apprehending the mere I as inherently existent. Through directly seeing and then becoming accustomed to the emptiness of inherent existence of the person, this wisdom consciousness uproots and abandons the conception of a self of persons.

For the Prāsaṅgikas, the selflessness of persons taught by the Svātantrikas, the lack of being a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency, is not the subtle selflessness of persons, being coarser than the person’s lack of inherent existence. Even though the Svātantrikas, at least in terms of their own assertions, realize the person’s lack of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency, they are incapable of abandoning the conception of the person as established by way of its own character because they hold that the person does in fact exist by way of its own character conventionally in the sense that the person is analytically findable among the aggregates. Thus, according to the Prāsaṅgikas, the Svātantrikas retain the subtle conception of a self of persons.⁷¹

Let us reiterate the coarse and subtle conceptions of self according to the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. For the Svātantrikas, the conception of a self of persons has coarse and subtle forms. The coarse conception of a self of persons is the conception of a permanent, single, independent self. This is also an artificial conception in the sense that it is present only in the continua of those whose minds have been affected by the study of false systems of tenets that propound the existence of such a self. The subtle conception of a self of persons is that of a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency. This conception is innate, existing in the continua of all sentient beings who have not abandoned it, but can also be artificial.

The selflessness of phenomena, which is more subtle than that of persons, has only one form for the Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas: a phenomenon’s lack of being established from its own side without being merely posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness (see pp. 143-150). For the Yogācāra-Svātantrikas, this becomes the subtle selflessness of phenomena, adding the emptiness of subject and object being different substantial entities as the coarse selflessness of phenomena to be the object of the wisdom of Solitary Realizers.

The conception of the person as substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency, the subtle conception of a self of persons for the Svātantrikas, is asserted to be the coarse conception of self by the Prāsaṅgikas. Further, this coarse conception has artificial and innate forms, the artificial coarse conception being like master and servant with the self having a character different from that of the aggregates. The innate coarse conception of a self of persons is that in which the self and the aggregates are conceived to be like a head salesman and junior salesmen, with the self sharing some of the qualities of the aggregates but still maintaining a special status, being identifiable as the mental consciousness when analyzed.

The Prāsaṅgikas contend that the Svātantrikas only refute the artificial coarse conception of a self of persons. They are, therefore, said to abandon only the conception of self asserted by the non-Buddhists. They do not abandon, nor are they aware of, the innate coarse conception of a self of persons, that of the head salesman-junior salesmen analogy.

Being incapable of recognizing and abandoning even this form of the coarse conception of a self of persons, which exists naturally in the continua of all sentient beings who have not found the Prāsaṅgika view, the Svātantrikas and other Buddhist tenet systems are afflicted further by the subtle conception of a self of persons, the conception of the person as inherently existent, or established by way of its own entity and existing by way of its own character. This is the very subtle conception of persons and is abandoned by the wisdom realizing the emptiness of inherent existence of the person.

The selflessness of phenomena is the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena other than persons, according to Prāsaṅgika. There is no difference in subtlety nor in the object of negation of the two selflessnesses; they are distinguished merely by the substratum qualified by the emptiness of inherent existence, namely persons and phenomena.⁷²

In summary, what the Svātantrikas assert to be the innate subtle conception of self, the Prāsaṅgikas call artificial and coarse. There is an innate coarse conception of self which the Prāsaṅgikas say is not identified by the Svātantrikas, but even this is coarse. The subtle conception of a self of persons is the conception of the person as inherently existent, and this conception is identified and abandoned only by the Prāsaṅgikas.

The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika schism on the question of self and selflessness relates directly to their assertions concerning the two obstructions. The obstructions to liberation, literally the afflictive obstructions (klesāvaraṇa, nyon sgrib), are those factors preventing liberation from cyclic existence. The obstructions to omniscience, literally the obstructions to objects of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa, shes sgrib), prevent the achievement of a Buddha’s omniscient consciousness which simultaneously cognizes all objects of knowledge (jñeya, shes bya).⁷³

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins, and Svātantrikas, the conception of the person as substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency, having a character different from the aggregates, is the conception of a self of persons and is the chief of the afflictive obstructions, the others being desire, hatred, pride, and so forth. By negating the referent object of that conception—a self of persons—and becoming accustomed to that negation over the path, one is liberated from rebirth in cyclic existence. The selflessness of persons is thus the chief object of meditation for Hearers and Solitary Realizers (except in Yogācāra-Svātantrika, where it is said that Solitary Realizers meditate on the emptiness of subject and object being different substantial entities).⁷⁴ For the Svātantrikas, the obstructions to omniscience (or subtle obstructions to omniscience according to the Yogācāra-Svātantrikas) are the conception of true existence together with its seeds—the conception that phenomena are established as their own mode of subsistence without being posited by a non-defective awareness.

Bodhisattvas meditate on the emptiness of true existence in order to overcome the obstructions to omniscience and achieve Buddhahood. Their motivation is this. It is said in sutra:

Buddhas neither wash sins away with water, nor remove the sufferings of beings with their hands. They transfer not their realizations to others. Beings are freed through the teaching of truth, the nature of things.⁷⁵

Thus, the benefit bestowed on sentient beings by Buddhas derives from their abilities as teachers. In order to teach effectively, it is not sufficient that they have a good motivation; they must know what to adopt and discard, as well as the individual capacities and interests of their students. Therefore, they must be omniscient, and this entails the abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience. The Prāsaṅgikas assert that Bodhisattvas must first abandon the obstructions to liberation—the afflictive obstructions—before beginning to work on the obstructions to omniscience, but the Svātantrikas assert that Bodhisattvas begin to abandon the two obstructions simultaneously, beginning on the first Bodhisattva ground (bhūmisa). The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas hold that the afflictive obstructions are fully abandoned by the eighth ground, with the last three grounds devoted entirely to removing the remaining obstructions to omniscience. The Yogācāra-Svātantrikas hold that the abandonment of both obstructions and the achievement of Buddhahood are simultaneous.⁷⁶

According to the Svātantrikas, Hīnayānists do not realize the emptiness of true existence. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the conception of true existence together with its seeds are the afflictive obstructions, and mistaken dualistic appearance—the false appearance of phenomena as truly existent—together with its predispositions are the obstructions to omniscience. In order to be liberated from cyclic existence, one must destroy the conception of true existence through repeated cognition of the emptiness of true existence of persons and phenomena. After the conception of true existence—the obstructions to liberation—has been destroyed, the false appearance of phenomena as inherently existent remains, even to the non-conceptual sense consciousnesses, despite the fact that Bodhisattvas do not assent to that false appearance, instead viewing phenomena as like illusions, appearing one way but existing another. They then go on to abandon the obstructions to omniscience, removing this false appearance, until they are able to perceive the two truths simultaneously and directly at Buddhahood.⁷⁷

Therefore, it is the position of the Prāsaṅgikas that anyone who wishes to be liberated from cyclic existence must realize the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena. The Svātantrika assertion that one merely needs to cognize the selflessness of persons is rejected, as is their explanation of what constitutes the subtle selflessness of persons. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the conception of inherent existence is the chief of the afflictive obstructions, the root of all the other afflictive emotions such as desire and hatred. The realization of a selflessness less subtle than the emptiness of inherent existence, such as the selflessness of persons realized by the Svātantrikas, does not destroy any afflictions because it has not penetrated to the final nature of the person. Candrakīrti says in his Supplement to the Middle Way (VI. 131):

[According to] you, yogis perceiving selflessness

Would not realize the reality of forms and so forth.

[Therefore,] due to seeing forms [as inherently existent] and relating [to them as such]

Desire and so forth are produced because their nature has not been understood.⁷⁸

The emptiness of being a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency is not the very subtle selflessness of persons because when the former is realized, one does not understand that the person is not established by way of its own entity, and the person’s not being established by way of its own entity is the very subtle selflessness of persons. Furthermore, through merely seeing and then becoming accustomed to the person’s emptiness of substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency, one is not able to abandon the desire that sees forms as real because such a realization does not entail an understanding of forms as empty of inherent existence; the conception of forms as inherently existent is the cause of that desire.⁷⁹ Therefore, Candrakīrti is saying that the Svātantrikas and all others who merely realize a coarse selflessness of persons are incapable of abandoning the afflictive emotions and being liberated from cyclic existence because they have not destroyed the conception of true existence, the chief of the obstructions to liberation. Candrakīrti says in his commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning:

The abandonment of the afflictive emotions simply does not occur for those who wish to abandon the afflictive emotions but who apprehend the inherent existence of forms and so forth.⁸⁰

Merely realizing that the person lacks substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency is not enough to abandon the afflictive emotions. It is impossible to abandon desire without directly realizing that forms do not inherently exist.⁸¹

It is the Prāsaṅgika position, then, that everyone who seeks liberation from cyclic existence must realize the subtle selflessness—the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena—whether that liberation is sought for one’s own sake, the Hīnayāna motivation, or for the sake of others, the Mahāyāna motivation. There is no difference between the objects of the wisdom of Hearers and Solitary Realizers on the one hand and Bodhisattvas on the other. Referring to this subtle selflessness, the Prāsaṅgikas master Śāntideva says in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhicaryāvatara, IX.41cd):

Scripture says that without this path

There can be no enlightenment.

That is, it is said in scripture that without the path realizing the emptiness of inherent existence, one cannot achieve the enlightenment of a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer (arhan, dga’ bcom pa) or that of a Buddha. Candrakīrti stresses that the knowledge of both selflessnesses is necessary in order to be liberated from cyclic existence. He says in his Supplement to the Middle Way:

For the liberation of transmigrators, this selflessness

Was taught in two aspects, with the divisions of persons and phenomena.⁸²

[He also cites the] Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Daśabhūmikasūtra) to support the Prāsaṅgika position that Hīnayānists—Hearers and Solitary Realizers—and Mahāyānists realize the same selflessness. The sutra states that Bodhisattvas on the seventh ground are able to outshine Hearers and Solitary Realizers in terms of their understanding of the non-inherent existence of phenomena. Bodhisattvas on the sixth ground and below are not able to outshine them. If Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not realize the subtle selflessness of phenomena, as Bhāvaviveka contends, then it would follow that even Bodhisattvas abiding on the first ground would outshine all Hearers and Solitary Realizers in terms of their understanding of the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena. However, because the sutra states that they are only outshone on the seventh ground, Candrakīrti concludes that Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas all realize the same subtle emptiness of inherent existence.⁸³

Because Candrakīrti identifies the conception of inherent existence as the root of the afflictive emotions, if Hearers and Solitary Realizers did not realize the emptiness of inherent existence, it would absurdly follow that they could not abandon any of the afflictive emotions and would never be liberated from cyclic existence. Furthermore, if Hearers and Solitary Realizers did not realize the subtle selflessness of phenomena, they would continue to apprehend the aggregates to be inherently existent, in which case they could not fully realize the selflessness of the person, because the aggregates are the basis of the designation of the I or the person. Nāgārjuna says in his Precious Garland:

There is misconception of an ‘I’ as long

As the aggregates are misconceived.

When this conception of an ‘I’ exists,

There is action that results in birth.⁸⁴

Without refuting the referent object of the conception of inherent existence with respect to the aggregates, which are the basis of designation of the person, the referent object of the conception of an inherently existent person—the object designated to the aggregates—cannot be refuted.⁸⁵ In other words, without refuting the inherent existence of the aggregates, the basis of designation of the person, the inherent existence of the person cannot be refuted.

This raises a problem. It is the position of the Prāsaṅgikas that as long as one misconceives the nature of the aggregates, one misconceives the nature of the person because the aggregates are the basis of designation of the person; in order for the person to appear to the mind, the aggregates must appear first. Thus, if the basis of designation is conceived to be truly existent, the object designated, in this case the person, is conceived to be truly existent. The conception of a truly existent person arises from the conception of the aggregates as truly existent. However, in practice it is said that the emptiness of the person is to be realized before the emptiness of the aggregates. Candrakīrti says in his Clear Words:

Because the I is not observed, the mine, the basis of designation as the self, also would not be observed at all. Just as when a chariot is burned, its parts are also burned and thus are not observed, so, when yogis realize the selflessness [of the person], they will also realize the selflessness of the mine, the things that are the aggregates.⁸⁶

How can this be, if the Prāsaṅgikas also wish to maintain that one continues to misconceive the nature of the person as long as the aggregates are misconceived and that without realizing the emptiness of the aggregates, one cannot realize the emptiness of the person? In answer, it is said that the consciousness realizing the emptiness of the person can, without relying on another consciousness, remove superimpositions, misconceptions about the aggregates, and thus induce ascertainment of the emptiness of inherent existence of the aggregates. However, as long as the consciousness actively misconceiving the nature of the aggregates has not been abandoned, it is impossible to generate a wisdom consciousness understanding the emptiness of the person.⁸⁷

A more satisfying solution to the problem would be to say that Candrakīrti’s contention that yogis first realize the selflessness of the person means that they initially realize the selflessness of the internal aggregates (nang gi phung po), which are the basis of designation of the person. They thereby come to understand that the person is also selfless, at which point they go on to investigate the selflessness of other phenomena. Such an interpretation supports Candrakīrti’s statement that yogis begin with the person while at the same time remaining consistent with Nāgārjuna’s assertion that the I is misconceived so long as the aggregates are misconceived; by understanding the selflessness of the internal aggregates, which serve as the basis of designation of the person, yogis destroy the misconception of the aggregates, whereby they cease to misconceive the I.⁸⁸ Candrakīrti also finds support for his contention that Hīnayānists realize the subtle selflessness in statements by Nāgārjuna. In his proof that the Mahāyāna sutras are the word of the Buddha, he says in his Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī):

The teaching in the Mahāyāna of non-production

And of extinction in the Hīnayāna [refer to] the same

Emptiness [since they show that inherent existence] is extinguished

And that nothing [inherently existent] is produced.

Thus, let the Mahāyāna be accepted [as the Buddha’s words.]⁸⁹

The emptiness of inherently existent production taught in the Mahāyāna sutras and the extinguishment of products referred to in the Hīnayāna sutras refer to the same thing. Therefore, the subtle selflessness of phenomena is taught for the sake of Hīnayānists in their own scriptures.

Bhāvaviveka’s contention that the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena differ in subtlety and that they are objects of the wisdom of Hīnayānists and Mahāyānists respectively is objectionable to the Prāsaṅgikas for several reasons. First, as we have seen, the Prāsaṅgikas assert that Hearers and Solitary Realizers realize the selflessness of phenomena. This assertion rests on the Prāsaṅgikas’ identification of the conception of an inherently existent person as the subtle conception of a self of persons. This conception of inherent existence also applies to the aggregates, the basis of designation of the person. Having realized the non-inherent existence of the person through merely reflecting on the same reasoning (such as the sevenfold reasoning), but in this case, with regard to the aggregates, one is able to realize the non-inherent existence of the aggregates. One is thereby able to realize that phenomena do not inherently exist.⁹⁰ Because there is no difference in subtlety between the selflessness of persons and phenomena, having realized one, it is possible easily to realize the other by merely applying a similar form of reasoning, substituting a phenomenon such as “form” in place of the “I” as the subject of the consequence.

The Prāsaṅgikas are thus able to assert that anyone who realizes the selflessness of persons can realize the selflessness of phenomena by shifting the focus of the reasoning. Because Hearers and Solitary Realizers understand the subtle selflessness of persons—the non-inherent existence of the person—they are equally capable of penetrating the selflessness of phenomena. Through merely realizing the non-existence of a self that is substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and that has a character different from that of the aggregates, one cannot realize the selflessness of phenomena because one has not fully refuted the conception of a self of persons.⁹¹ Because the Svātantrikas refute only the coarse conception of a self of persons and have not penetrated the subtle selflessness, they are incapable of asserting that Hīnayānists can realize the selflessness of phenomena through having realized the selflessness of persons, in that they hold the two selflessnesses to differ in the subtlety of their object of negation.

Bhāvaviveka’s contention that there is a difference in subtlety in the two selflessnesses and that only the coarser selflessness, that of persons, must be realized in order to be liberated from rebirth is attacked by Candrakīrti from another perspective as well. He argues that it is not correct that one can abandon the afflictions and their seeds and be liberated from cyclic existence by meditating on the person’s lack of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency because that selflessness is not the final mode of being of phenomena. Bhāvaviveka agrees that the selflessness of persons is not the final reality, rather the more subtle selflessness of phenomena—their emptiness of true existence—is the final reality. Further, Bhāvaviveka holds that ultimately the root cause of cyclic existence is the conception of true existence. Candrakīrti argues that it is contradictory for Bhāvaviveka to assert on the one hand that sentient beings cycle in mundane existence through the force of the innate conception of a self, the conception of true existence, and yet hold on the other hand that through meditating on the selflessness of a substantially existent person one can be liberated from cyclic existence. In other words, Candrakīrti finds it senseless for Bhāvaviveka to assert that the conception of a self of phenomena is the root of cyclic existence but that one can be liberated from cyclic existence without using the antidote to the conception of a self of phenomena. According to Bhāvaviveka, one can be freed from suffering without uprooting the ultimate cause of suffering; one can be released from rebirth, which is caused by the conception of a self of phenomena, by abandoning something which, according to Bhāvaviveka, is less subtle and fundamental, namely, the conception of a self of persons. The Svātantrikas assert that the conception of a self of persons arises in dependence on the more subtle conception of true existence, yet they posit the conception of a self of persons as the root of cyclic existence.⁹² Candrakīrti finds this to be unacceptable. He writes in his Supplement to the Middle Way (VI. 140-141):

[You hold] that when selflessness is realized

One abandons the permanent self, [but] it is not asserted

That it is the base of the conception of self. Hence it is fantastic to propound

That through knowing selflessness [of substantially existent persons], the view of self [i.e., true existence] is eradicated.

That while looking for a snake living in a hole in the wall of one’s house,

One’s qualms can be removed and the fear of the snake abandoned

By [someone’s saying], “There is no elephant here,”

Is, alas, laughable to other [scholars].⁹³

That is, Bhāvaviveka’s contention that one can overcome the view of a self of phenomena by abandoning the less subtle view of a self of persons is like trying to calm someone who fears that there is a snake in his house by telling him that there is no elephant in the house.

Bhāvaviveka, however, has already considered this qualm and answered it. He accepts that sentient beings cycle in mundane existence through the force of the innate conception of a self of phenomena, the conception that phenomena truly exist. He also holds that the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of subsistence of phenomena. However, he argues that one does not have to meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in order to be liberated from cyclic existence. He says in his Essence of the Middle Way:

Some who are frightened

Mistake a rope for a snake,

The knowledge that it is a coiled vine

Is a mind classed as an antidote.⁹⁴

That is, a person might see a coiled piece of speckled rope and think that it was a snake. If that person were told, “It isn’t a snake, it’s a coiled vine from a tree,” the person’s fear of a snake would be allayed. Despite the fact that a vine is not the mode of being a rope, one can nonetheless effectively remove the fear of a snake with an erroneous statement. In the same way, although the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of subsistence of phenomena, it is not contradictory that by meditating on it one can abandon cyclic existence and its causes.⁹⁵ Bhāvaviveka cites a passage from sutra to prove that the Buddha used this technique of expedience: not telling the truth in order to more easily benefit others. The Treasury of Tathāgata Sutra (Tathāgatakośasūtra) says:

Kāśyapa, it is thus. Some persons are pained by the unfounded doubt [that they have drunk] poison and say, “I drank poison! I drank poison!” and beat their breasts and wail. For them, one who is skilled in medical methods acts in such a way as to remove the unreal poison [by giving them a medicine to make them vomit so that they believe that the poison has been removed⁹⁶]. Similarly, Kāśyapa, for childish beings who are beset by the afflictive emotions, 1 teach doctrines in an incorrect way.⁹⁷

Bhāvaviveka is thus willing to go to considerable lengths to uphold his contention that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures and, therefore, not realized by Hearers and Solitary Realizers. He asserts that statements in the Hīnayāna scriptures which state that all phenomena are selfless are teaching that phenomena lack a self of persons because, when the term “self’ is used in those scriptures in referring to phenomena as selfless, it refers to a self of persons.⁹⁸ According to Bhāvaviveka, if the selflessness of phenomena—the emptiness of true existence—were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, then the teaching of the Mahāyāna would have been pointless. As noted before, Bhāvaviveka’s position rests on his understanding of the two obstructions, an understanding not shared by the Prāsaṅgikas. For Bhāvaviveka, the conception of a self of persons is the chief of the obstructions to liberation. By realizing the selflessness of persons, one can achieve liberation from cyclic existence, the goal of the Hīnayānists. The conception of true existence, on the other hand, is the chief of the obstructions to omniscience. Through realizing the selflessness of phenomena, Bodhisattvas achieve Buddhahood. If the selflessness of phenomena, the object of a Bodhisattva’s wisdom, were taught in the Hīnayāna sutras, the means of achieving Buddhahood would be fully accessible in their scriptures; any further exposition would be redundant. Therefore, Bhāvaviveka says that the Buddha’s teaching of the Mahāyāna would have been meaningless. It is clear then that Bhāvaviveka distinguishes the disciples of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna by the object of their wisdom. Although the difference in motivation is clearly important, with Hīnayānists seeking mere liberation from cyclic existence and Bodhisattvas seeking Buddhahood for the welfare of others, motivation alone does not distinguish the two vehicles for Bhāvaviveka; he seems to imply that if the teaching of the selflessness of phenomena were available to Hearers, they would be capable of achieving Buddhahood. In order to defend the efficacy and purpose of the Mahāyāna scriptures, Bhāvaviveka is therefore willing to disregard or explain away any and all references to the selflessness of phenomena that appear in Hīnayāna sutras.

It is important to note that Bhāvaviveka is not arguing with Buddhapālita and the Prāsaṅgikas about the meaning of the selflessness of persons and phenomean. It is his belief that he and Buddhapālita, as Mādhyamikas, are in agreement on that point. He is apparently unaware that the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena that he propounds is something other than that held by the Prāsaṅgikas. Indeed, it is only in the works of Candrakīrti, and later Tsong-kha-pa, that we find this distinction elucidated. Thus, Bhāvaviveka from his standpoint has no quarrel with Buddhapālita about what the selflessness of phenomena is; his objection concerns where it is taught.

Candrakīrti argues strongly against Bhāvaviveka, holding that the non-inherent existence of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayana and that method (upāya, thabs), not wisdom (prajñā, shes rab) is the distinguishing feature of the two vehicles. He writes in his commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning that statements such as “All conditioned phenomena are false, having the character of deception,” appear repeatedly in the Hīnayāna literature.⁹⁹ He interprets this deceptive nature to be that phenomena appear to exist inherently when in fact they do not.¹⁰⁰ The non-inherent existence of phenomena—the selflessness of phenomena—is therefore indicated by such statements in the Hīnayāna scriptures. He further holds that Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school, asserts that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna. For support he cites this stanza from the Treatise on the Middle Way (XV.7):

In the Advice to Katyayana

“Exists,” “not exists,” and both

Are rejected by the Supramundane Victor

Knowing [the nature of] things and non-things.

Nāgārjuna states that the Buddha refuted inherent existence (“exists”), utter non-existence (“not exists”), and both inherent existence and utter non-existence in the Advice to Katyayana. Since that text is a Hīnayāna scripture included in the Brief Scriptures on Discipline (Vinayakṣudravastu), non-inherent existence is taught in the Hīnayāna.¹⁰¹

Demonstrating that Nāgārjuna does not hold Bhāvaviveka’s position that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna constitutes a refutation with scripture (āgama, lung). Candrakīrti’s refutation of Bhāvaviveka’s position with reasoning (yukti, rigs pa) appears in the first chapter of the autocommentary to his Supplement to the Middle Way. His argument is expanded by Tsong-kha-pa in his Great Commentry to (Candrakīrti’s) Supplement as follows:¹⁰²

Bhāvaviveka has stated in his Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom” that if the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collection, then the teaching of the Mahāyāna would be senseless. If he means by this that the teaching of the Mahāyāna would be senseless because the selflessness of phenomena is the only thing taught in the Mahāyāna sutras, then, according to Candrakīrti, he is not correct because the Mahāyāna sutras teach many topics essential for the achievement of Buddhahood. Candrakīrti says in his autocommentary to his Supplement to the Middle Way:

The teaching of the Mahāyāna does not teach the selflessness of phenomena alone. Then what [else does it teach]? The Bodhisattva grounds, the perfections, prayers, great compassion, and so forth, complete dedications, the two collections, and the inconceivable reality [of the Truth Body].¹⁰³

The ten Bodhisattva grounds, the practice of the six perfections, the great aspirational prayers and dedications of Bodhisattvas—the means for generating the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment—the two collections of merit and wisdom, and the Three Bodies of a Buddha all must be understood and cultivated in order to achieve Buddhahood, and they are not set forth in the Hīnayāna scriptural collection. Candrakīrti cites Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland:

Since all the aspirations, deeds,

And dedications of Bodhisattvas

Were not explained in the Hearers’ Vehicle, how

Could one become a Bodhisattva [through the Hearer Vehicle]?

The subjects based on the deeds of Bodhisattvas

Were not explained in the [Hīnayāna] scriptural collection

But were explained in the Mahāyāna, therefore

The wise should hold [it to be the Buddha’s word].¹⁰⁴

In the first stanza, Nāgārjuna enumerates some of the practices necessary for becoming a Bodhisattva and progressing to Buddhahood that are taught only in the Mahāyāna and do not appear in Hīnayāna scriptures. One cannot achieve Buddhahood merely by following the teachings of the Hīnayāna. The full path to Buddhahood is presented only in the Mahāyāna (which, therefore, should be accepted as the word of the Buddha, as Nāgārjuna states in the second stanza). Notable by its absence in the list of teachings unique to the Mahāyāna is any mention of the selflessness of phenomena. This lends significant weight to Candrakīrti’s argument, for if Bhāvaviveka were correct in his assertion that only Bodhisattvas realize the selflessness of phenomena in order to achieve Buddhahood and that this selflessness is taught only in the Mahāyāna, then Nāgārjuna should have included the selflessness of phenomena among the topics taught only in the Mahāyāna sutras. He does not.

Even if the debate is limited to a consideration of the exposition of the selflessness of phenomena, Candrakīrti still finds fault with Bhāvaviveka’s assertion. The Prāsaṅgikas hold that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, but it does not necessarily follow from that that the teaching of this selflessness in the Mahāyāna would be purposeless. According to Candrakīrti, even though the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collections, there is purpose in its being taught in the Mahāyāna because, whereas the selflessness of phenomena is taught briefly in the Hīnayāna, it is set forth extensively in the Mahāyāna. The reason for this is that Bodhisattvas take as their main object of abandonment the obstructions to omniscience such that they must greatly expand their awareness of suchness (tathatā, de kho na nyid). Hearers and Solitary Realizers, on the other hand, are able to abandon the afflictive obstructions and attain the state of a Foe Destroyer by meditating on emptiness with abbreviated reasonings. Candrakīrti says in his autocommentary to his Supplement to the Middle Way:

It is suitable that the Mahāyāna was taught in order to elucidate the selflessness of phenomena because [the Buddha] wished to express the teaching extensively. The selflessness of phenomena is confined merely to a brief illustration in the Hearer vehicle.¹⁰⁵

Therefore, in the Mahāyāna scriptural collections, the selflessness of phenomena is taught completely, in limitless forms of reasoning, because Bodhisattvas must have a vast awareness of emptiness in order to abandon the more subtle obstructions to omniscience and achieve Buddhahood. Nevertheless, it is the position of the Prāsaṅgikas that liberation from suffering cannot be achieved without realizing the subtle emptiness, the lack of inherent existence of persons and phenomena. Therefore, the selflessness of phenomena must be taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures. Thus, according to Candrakīrti, the selflessness of phenomena is set forth in both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sutras; there is a difference, however, in the way in which it is set forth.¹⁰⁶

Again, Candrakīrti cites Nāgārjuna for support. His Praise of the Supramundane (Lokātītastava) says:

You [the Buddha] said that without realizing signlessness

There is no liberation.

Therefore, you taught it completely

In the Mahāyāna.¹⁰⁷

The first two lines refer to the fact that it is impossible to achieve liberation from cyclic existence without cognizing signlessness—the emptiness of inherent existence. That emptiness must therefore be taught in the sutras of both vehicles. The last two lines state that the Buddha taught signlessness fully in the Mahāyāna; by implication it was not taught fully in the Hīnayāna.¹⁰⁸

Thus, the selflessness of phenomena is taught completely in the Mahāyāna scriptural collections and meditated on completely on the Mahāyāna path. It is not taught completely in the Hīnayāna scriptural collection nor is it meditated on completely over the Hīnayāna path. What does it mean not to be meditated on completely, if Hīnayānists must directly realize the selflessness of phenomena again and again in order to be liberated from cyclic existence?

It might be suggested that in the Mahāyāna the non-inherent existence of all objects of knowledge is realized whereas Hearers and Solitary Realizers cognize the non-inherent existence of only some objects of knowledge. This is not correct because when the non-true existence of one object is understood with valid cognition, if one then analyzes whether or not another object truly exists, one is able to realize its non-true existence through the reasoning employed before.¹⁰⁹ That is, having realized the emptiness of one object, one can automatically infer the emptiness of any object to which one turns one’s mind. Furthermore, it would be impossible for Hīnayānists to realize the emptiness of only a portion objects of knowledge because the emptiness of all objects of knowledge is directly realized in meditative equipoise (samāhita, mnyam bzhag) on the path of seeing and beyond.

According to Tsong-kha-pa, the difference between the two vehicles with regard to the selflessness of phenomena is that in the Mahāyāna it is set forth in limitless forms of reasoning and in the Hīnayāna it is set forth in abbreviated reasonings. Further, on the Mahāyāna path the selflessness of phenomena is meditated on using those limitless forms of reasoning whereas Hīnayānists only employ the abbreviated forms in their meditation. Tsong-kha-pa says in his Great Commentary to (Candrakīrti’s) Supplement:

Although [Hīnayānists] do not generate the wisdom that refutes the true establishment of the person with limitless forms of reasoning, they do completely cultivate the antidote to the seeds of the afflictive emotions; they do not completely cultivate the antidote to the obstructions to omniscience.¹¹⁰

Thus, Hīnayānists—those seeking to become Foe Destroyers—do not meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in such a way as to abandon the obstructions to omiscience. They do not meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in terms of limitless forms of reasoning. However, if it is asked whether Hearers and Solitary Realizers fully meditate on the selflessness of phenomena, it must be asserted that they do, because they abandon completely the conception of a self of phenomena, that phenomena truly exist.¹¹¹

Bhāvaviveka’s rejection of Buddhapālita’s assertion that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures and Candrakīrti’s subsequent attack against Bhāvaviveka’s position bring into focus several fundamental differences between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika schools. First, the selflessness of the person is identified by the Svātantrikas as the person’s lack of being substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency. The Prāsaṅgikas label this selflessness as coarse and contend that meditation on it is not an antidote to the afflictive obstructions, as the Svātantrikas hold it to be. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the selflessness of persons is the person’s emptiness of inherent existence. With respect to the selflessness of phenomena, Bhāvaviveka asserts that it is phenomena’s lack of existing from their own side without being posited by the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. This is again labelled as coarse by the Prāsaṅgikas, who assert that a phenomenon’s lack of inherent existence is the selflessness of phenomena. Thus, the Svātantrikas present two selflessnesses with two different objects of negation and assert that there is also a difference in subtlety between them, with the selflessness of phenomenon being more difficult to penetrate than that of persons. The Prāsaṅgikas assert that the two selflessnesses are equally subtle and distinguish them by the basis of negation—persons and other phenomena; the object of negation—inherent existence—is the same.

The question of the coarseness and subtlety of the two selflessnesses extends into the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika presentation of the two obstructions. For Bhāvaviveka, the conception of a self of persons is the chief of the obstacles to be overcome in order to gain liberation from cyclic existence and thus is the chief obstruction which Foe Destroyers must eradicate; the more subtle conception of true existence is the chief obstruction to omniscience, overcome by Bodhisattvas. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the conception of self, of both persons and phenomena, equally subtle, is the chief of the obstructions to liberation and is abandoned by all Foe Destroyers. The appearance of phenomena as inherently existent is the obstruction to omniscience.

Since, according to Bhāvaviveka, only Bodhisattvas realize the selflessness of phenomena, he contends that it is only taught in the Mahāyāna scriptures. For him, this is the fundamental purpose of the Buddha’s teaching the Mahāyāna. For the Prāsaṅgikas, everyone who achieves liberation from cyclic existence must realize the subtle selflessness of persons and other phenomena. They assert, therefore, that the Prāsaṅgika view is found in the Hīnayāna scriptures, that the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures.

In the end, the question of whether the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna revolves around the conception of the root of cyclic existence and of what constitutes liberation. For Bhāvaviveka, the fundamental cause of cyclic existence is the conception of true existence yet one can be liberated through realizing the less subtle selflessness of persons. According to the Svātantrikas, the final root of cyclic existence is the conception of a self of phenomena whereas the root of cyclic existence is the conception of a self of persons. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the root of cyclic existence is the subtle conception of self, the conception of persons and phenomena as inherently existent, and it is this which must be overcome in order to be released from suffering. Eliminating the conception of true existence as identified by the Svātantrikas does not cut the root of cyclic existence. Not only do the Prāsaṅgikas assert that both conceptions of self must be eradicated for liberation, they posit a more subtle conception of self as the root of cyclic existence and assert that its antidote is taught in both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna scriptures—briefly in the Hīnayāna and extensively in the Mahāyāna.

The Prāsaṅgikas do not assert that every time the term “selflessness” appears in the Hīnayāna sutras does it mean the emptiness of inherent existence. They freely admit that the Buddha often taught the coarse selflessness for disciples who temporarily cannot realize the more subtle. Nor do they argue that everyone understood the same thing when the Buddha described phenomena as selfless; the differing conceptions of the meaning of that term gave rise, in part, to the various tenet systems. However, they do assert that there are coarse and subtle conceptions of self and coarse and subtle selflessnesses. Because there are two conceptions of self, there are two levels of afflictive emotions induced by those conceptions. According to the Prāsaṅgikas, the conception of the person as substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency is identified by the Svātantrikas who are thus able to abandon the afflictive emotions induced by that conception through realizing the emptiness of such as self. However, from the Prāsaṅgika perspective, the subtle conception of self, the conception of the person as inherently existent, is asserted to be a valid form of consciousness by the Svātantrikas; they do not identify it as an erroneous conception.¹¹²

The Prāsaṅgikas assert that when the understanding of the coarse form of selflessness is present, the more subtle conception of self may operate, but when the emptiness of inherent existence is understood, none of the coarser misconceptions of the nature of the person is possible. Since the Prāsaṅgikas identify the subtle conception of self—the conception of inherent existence—as the root of cyclic existence, they assert that the wisdom of selflessness taught by the Svātantrikas and the other schools are not antidotes to suffering and rebirth. The Prāsaṅgikas thus display a rather strict exclusiveness in their appraisal of the other schools of Buddhist philosophy in that they assert that only by realizing the most subtle selflessness, which is only taught in their school, can anyone be liberated from the cycle of mundane existence. At the same time, they demonstrate a catholicity in their assertion that everyone who is liberated from suffering and rebirth, whether they follow the Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna path, must realize the exact same thing, the emptiness of inherent existence.

School	Conventionally Existent Person
Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika	continuum of the aggregates
Sautrāntika Following Scripture	continuum of the aggregates
Sautrāntika Following Reasoning	mental consciousness
Yogācāra Following Reasoning	mental consciousness
Yogācāra Following Scripture	mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna)
Sautrāntika-Svātantrika	mental consciousness
Yogācāra-Svātantrika	continuum of consciousness⁶⁰