The Svātantrikas assert that the conception of ultimate existence is the final root of cyclic existence and that Bodhisattvas must realize that phenomena lack ultimate existence in order to achieve Buddhahood. Ultimate existence is thus the object of negation, the conception of which must be identified and destroyed in order to attain highest enlightenment. Although the Svātantrikas assert that ultimate existence has not, does not, and never will exist, the conception of it very much does, and that conception is the final root of cyclic existence. In order to destroy it, one must first identify its referent object—one must understand the meaning of ultimate existence. Śāntideva says in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds:
Without contacting the imputed existent
Its non-existence cannot be apprehended.1
For the Ge-luk-bas, there are two loci classici in the Svātantrika literature which most clearly identify the object of negation. The first appears in Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning.
Bhāvaviveka says in the third chapter of his Essence of the Middle Way (III.26):
Here, earth and so forth
Are not entities of the elements ultimately
Because of being produced
And because of having causes, like a consciousness.2
In the autocommentary, the Blaze of Reasoning, he explains what he means by “ultimately”:
Regarding ultimate (paramārtha, don dam), with respect to “object” (artha, don), it is an object because of being that which is to be known; this is synonymous with “that which is to be examined (parīkṣaṇīya, brtag par bya ba)” and “that which is to be understood (pratipādya, go bar bya ba).” “Highest” (parama, dam pa) is a word [meaning] supreme. With respect to the compound paramārtha, because it is an object as well as being highest, it is the highest object. Or [it means] the object of the highest (paramasya artha, dam pa’i don); because it is the object of the highest non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna, rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes), it is an object of the highest [consciousness]. Or, it [means] that which accords with the highest object [that is, the highest consciousness]. Since the ultimate exists for a wisdom that accords with a realization of the ultimate, it accords with [that which directly realizes] the highest object.3
Thus, Bhāvaviveka interprets the compound paramārtha (translated here as “ultimate”) in three ways. In the first, taking paramārtha as a karmadhāraya compound, both the terms “highest” (parama) and “object” (artha) refer to the object—emptiness—because it is both highest or supreme as well as an object, something which is known. In the second interpretation, he takes paramārtha as a tatpuruṣa compound meaning “object of the highest,” with “highest” referring to a Superior’s non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise (samāhita, mnyam bzhag) and object referring to emptiness, the object realized by that highest wisdom consciousness. He calls the third type of paramārtha a concordant ultimate, applying both “highest” and “object” to the subject, a wisdom consciousness. Interpreting paramārtha as a bahuvrīhi compound, he designates the wisdom that accords with a Superior’s non-conceptual exalted wisdom directly realizing the ultimate with the term “ultimate.”4
Thus, in Bhāvaviveka’s three interpretations of the compound paramārtha, the first two refer to emptiness in that it is both the highest object and the object of the highest consciousness. In the third interpretation, a consciousness is identified with the term paramārtha. It is important to note, however, that Bhāvaviveka does not interpret paramārtha as a simple bahuvrīhi compound, “that which has the highest object,” in which case it would refer to all consciousnesses realizing emptiness. He is careful to specify that the wisdom that accords with the realization of the ultimate is a concordant ultimate because it has the ultimate as its object. Jam-yang-shay-ba thus explains the third paramārtha as a wisdom of subsequent attainment of hearing, thinking, or meditation which realizes emptiness. Such a wisdom is similar to or concordant with the ultimate wisdom and thus is posited as the ultimate.5 By identifying this third type of paramārtha as a wisdom of subsequent attainment (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna, rjes thob ye shes), which is a conceptual consciousness that follows after a direct cognition of emptiness, Jam-yang-shay-ba indicates that Bhāvaviveka wishes to restrict the third type of paramārtha to conceptual consciousnesses, excluding non-conceptual wisdom consciousnesses of meditative equipoise from the category. Bhāvaviveka makes this point himself later in the Blaze of Reasoning, in which a hypothetical opponent raises the objection:
The ultimate is beyond all awareness, but the negation of the entityness of things is an object [expressed] by letters. Therefore, is it not the case that there is no negation?6
That is, the ultimate is free from all elaborations and cannot be conceived of just as it is by any conceptual consciousness. Therefore, the opponent argues, the presentation of refutations and proofs is inappropriate in the context of the ultimate. Yet, the opponent argues, when Bhāvaviveka seeks to refute that earth is an entity of the elements ultimately, he claims that the refutation by reasoning of the entityness of individual things is capable of being explicitly expressed by words composed of letters; however, because it is ultimate, that entityness cannot be negated by the power of verbal conventions. Therefore, the opponent claims, Bhāvaviveka’s assertion that earth does not ultimately exist does not refute the entityness of things.7
The opponent sees the ultimate and conventional as two unconnected spheres. The ultimate is beyond all elaboration, beyond conception, beyond expression. Bhāvaviveka’s hypothetical opponent finds a modern-day supporter in J. W. de Jong, who describes paramārtha in this way:
But this absolute by its very nature is inaccessible to philosophical thought. One might try to approach it by indirect means, but all one could say or think about it would of necessity be false. It cannot be thought of as being or as nothingness.8
If this is the case, how can Bhāvaviveka bring the inconceivable into the conventional realm of his syllogism and assert that earth does not exist “ultimately”?
Bhāvaviveka specifies what he means by ultimate when he refutes ultimate existence:
The ultimate is of two types. One is a supramundane non-contaminated [consciousness] free from elaborations which operates without activity. The second, possessing conceptual elaborations, is called a pure mundane wisdom which accords with the collections of merit and wisdom and operates with activity. Here [in the context of the passage from the Essence of the Middle Way], this is held as the qualification of the thesis [“does not ultimately exist”]; thus, there is no fault.9
That is, ultimate consciousnesses are of two types. The first is a supramundane, non-contaminated meditative equipoise of a Superior which operates without conceptual activity, that is without involvement with any object of thought. The second type of ultimate consciousness (the third type in the discussion above, p. 135) is an exalted wisdom of subsequent attainment which is a conventional mundane subject but which is pure in the sense that it does not come under the power of mistaken appearances. Such a consciousness accords with the trainings in the collection of merit and wisdom and operates with conceptual activity; it is involved with objects of thought. When Bhāvaviveka says that earth does not exist as the entity of the elements ultimately, “does not exist ultimately” in that thesis means not to exist for this latter type of ultimate consciousness. Since the entity ness of phenomena does not exist in the face of such a wisdom consciousness, Bhāvaviveka is justified in saying that they do not ultimately exist, and the fault raised by the opponent is not incurred.10
This second type of ultimate consciousness, what Bhāvaviveka calls the concordant ultimate, is not restricted only to exalted wisdoms of subsequent attainment. Kamalaśīla says in this Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakāloka):
All wisdoms arisen from correct hearing, thinking, and meditation are non-mistaken subjects. They are called ultimates because their [object] is the ultimate.11
Thus, all wisdom consciousnesses ranging from those of hearing and thinking which analyze suchness through to inferential reasoning consciousnesses in the continuum of a Superior are categorized as concordant ultimates. A wisdom arisen from hearing is produced in dependence on a sign that arises from remembering the three modes due to hearing the statement of another person. Wisdom arisen from thinking refers to an inferential consciousness that understands the meaning to be inferred in dependence on a correct proof which is arrived at through the power of one’s own correct thought without relying on its being set forth by someone else.12 Thus, here, both the wisdoms arisen from hearing and thinking are inferential consciousnesses.
To summarize, an opponent challenges Bhāvaviveka’s use of the term ultimate. On the one hand, he says, Bhāvaviveka wishes to assert that the ultimate transcends all awareness, that is, that ultimate truths are not within the sphere of any dualistic consciousness. At the same time, he asserts that the meaning of not existing ultimately is not existing in the face of analysis by a dualistic reasoning consciousness, thereby implying that the refutation of a truly established or ultimately existent nature must be accomplished using terms and thought consciousnesses. The opponent finds these two assertions contradictory, entailing the consequence that either the ultimate existence of phenomena cannot be negated because conventional, dualistic consciousnesses are incapable of dealing with the ultimate or that ultimate truths do not stand beyond the sphere of dualistic consciousnesses but rather are the objects of conventional, conceptual, dualistic awarenesses because the refutation of an ultimate entityness is posited in terms of terms and thought consciousnesses.13
Bhāvaviveka responds that there are two types of ultimate consciousnesses, one that directly realizes emptiness without taking an image of emptiness as its appearing object (*pratibhāsaviṣaya, snang yul) and which is free from all dualistic appearance, and another that operates conceptually, through the medium of images, and is a mundane or conventional wisdom consciousness. It is this second type of wisdom that refutes ultimate existence. Thus, for Bhāvaviveka there are two types of reasoning consciousnesses that understand the lack of ultimate existence, conceptual and non-conceptual. A non-conceptual reasoning consciousness, despite the fact that it is not explicitly engaged in the process of reasoning, is so-called because it arises as a result of the process of reasoning. A conceptual or dualistic reasoning consciousness is not able to understand emptiness in the way in which a non-conceptual reasoning consciousness sees emptiness. In this sense, ultimate truths—emptinesses—transcend the sphere of dualistic awareness. However, when a conceptual reasoning consciousness properly analyzes the mode of being of an object, it finds that the object does not truly exist. This is the meaning of not existing ultimately according to Bhāvaviveka.14
By delineating these two types of ultimate consciousnesses, Bhāvaviveka is able to preserve the unique character of meditative equipoise, which realizes emptiness directly in a non-dualistic cognition. However, such a cognition is difficult to understand and does not occur until the path of seeing (darśanamārga, mthong lam). Also, a non-conceptual reasoning consciousness is not engaged in analysis; it does not refute ultimate existence. Therefore, Bhāvaviveka posits as his third type of ultimate that which accords with realization of the ultimate. Such a consciousness is ultimate (paramārtha), in that, since a conceptual reasoning consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditation which realizes emptiness is realizing suchness, it is the highest (parama); and, since it is the object sought by those who wish to abandon the obstructions, it is an object (artha).15
However, by creating the category of the concordant ultimate and then further specifying that it is the conceptual wisdom consciousness which, through analyzing the mode of being of phenomena, determines whether an object ultimately exists or not, Bhāvaviveka is not suggesting that a Superior’s meditative equipoise is to be explicitly excluded from the determination that phenomena do not ultimately exist.16 Rather, he is arguing that the understanding of the mode of being of phenomena need not wait for the attainment of the path of seeing. He is indicating that rational thought, a reasoning consciousness, is fully capable of analyzing and investigating the mode of being of an object and is further capable of ascertaining that that object does not exist in the fact of the reasoning consciousness, that the object does not ultimately exist. The conceptual reasoning consciousness is what actually carries out analysis of the object and discovers that it does not truly exist. Based on this analysis, direct cognition of the lack of true existence—emptiness—occurs on the path of seeing. Bhāvaviveka thereby emphasizes that the analysis of reality is to be undertaken by ordinary beings and that reasoning and analysis yield an understanding of the fact that things do not exist in and of themselves, but in fact are empty of ultimate existence. By giving the exalted name “ultimate” to conceptual reasoning consciousnesses in the continua of common beings, Bhāvaviveka emphatically upholds the place of reasoning and analysis on the path.
Bhāvaviveka’s labelling of conceptual reasoning consciousnesses as ultimates flies directly in the face of T. R. V. Murti’s claim, “Kalpanā is avidyā par excellence,”17 and that “the viewing of it [emptiness] through thought-forms is avidyā.”18 For Bhāvaviveka, thought (kalpanā, rtog pa) is not ignorance (avidyā, ma rig pa). Thought consciousnesses can be ignorant consciousnesses, but a thought consciousness may also be a wisdom consciousness, an ultimate consciousness. Emptiness, the lack of ultimate existence, must initially be understood through “thought-forms” before it can be realized directly on the path of seeing. Indeed, according to the Mādhyamika presentation of the Bodhisattva path, the Bodhisattva spends at least one period of countless aeons viewing emptiness through “thought-forms” on the paths of accumulation (sambhāramārga, tshogs lam) and preparation (prayogamārga, sbyor lam) before his initial direct realization of emptiness.19 Thus it is not the assertion of Bhāvaviveka that thought is necessarily a form of ignorance, which is defined as an active misconception of the nature of reality. As Bhāvaviveka makes so clear, conceptual reasoning consciousnesses are the indispensible tools of the Bodhisattva who is seeking to dispel all forms of ignorance. By designating conceptual reasoning consciousnesses with the term “ultimate,” Bhāvaviveka certifies their place in the path.
Like Bhāvaviveka’s hypothetical opponent, Murti sees the ultimate, which he calls “the Absolute,” as utterly transcendent and totally beyond comprehension by thought and analysis. Bhāvaviveka on the other hand, recognizing the rigidity of such a view, is able to expand the category of the ultimate to include not only emptiness but consciousnesses by which it can be known.
Jang-gya provides a useful summary of the various meanings of the term ultimate in Svātantrika. He explains that there are ultimates that are objects and ultimates that are subjects and that each of these can be further divided into actual and concordant ultimates.
Emptiness—the lack of true existence—is an actual ultimate in that it is free from the elaborations of true existence as well as the elaborations of dualistic appearance when it is directly realized by a Superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise. When emptiness is realized by a conceptual reasoning consciousness, it is free from the elaborations of true existence but appears dualistically, that is, emptiness and the conceptual consciousness realizing it remain separate. The conceptual consciousness is not directly realizing emptiness; it understands it through the medium of a generic image or meaning-generality (arthasāmānya, don spyi), which is the appearing object of that consciousness. Emptiness is its referent object. When emptiness serves as the referent object of a conceptual consciousness, it is called a concordant ultimate because, for that consciousness, it is not free from the elaborations of dualistic appearance. Thus, the two types of objective emptiness, actual and concordant, are differentiated from the point of view of the type of consciousness realizing them, non-conceptual and conceptual wisdom consciousnesses respectively.
As is clear from Bhāvaviveka, the two types of consciousnesses realizing emptiness may also be called ultimates. A Superior’s non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is capable of eliminating both the elaborations of true existence and dualistic appearance when it realizes emptiness. It is, therefore, called an actual ultimate within the ultimates which are subjects. The conceptual reasoning consciousness is able to remove the superimpositions of true existence but still has dualistic appearance. It is, therefore, called a concordant ultimate.20 It is important to note that although all of these are called ultimates, only emptiness is an ultimate truth, and none of the ultimates, nor any other phenomenon for that matter, ultimately exists.
Having identified what Bhāvaviveka means by ultimate, it is now necessary to explore what he means when he says that phenomena do not ultimately exist. To conceive of a phenomenon as ultimately existent is to believe that it is its own mode of being; that it exists in and of itself such that the final nature of the object is the object itself. To conceive of a table as ultimately existent is to conceive that the ultimate or final nature of the table is the table itself.21 The purpose of reasoning consciousnesses is to discover whether phenomena exist as their own final nature, whether they ultimately exist or not. A reasoning consciousness is searching for the final nature of the object under analysis; it is an awareness that comprehends the mode of being of the object it analyzes; it is an analyzer of the ultimate. Therefore, in order for a phenomenon to be ultimately existent, it must be found by or exist for an inferential reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate. If it does not exist for such a consciousness, it does not ultimately exist because it is the sole purpose of the reasoning consciousness to investigate the final mode of being of that phenomenon. If a table, for example, truly or ultimately exists, the reasoning consciousness will find that the table itself is the mode of being of the table.22 If the table is truly established it must be found to be truly established by a reasoning consciousness because that consciousness analyzes whether phenomena truly exist or not. Through a process of reasoning (that will be described in the next chapter), the consciousness searches for the ultimate existence of the object and does not find it; it finds the mere absence of the object’s ultimate existence, its emptiness of ultimate or true existence. The consciousness searches for the ultimate existence of the object and finds its non-ultimate existence. This non-ultimate existence of the object is its reality (dharmatā, chos nyid) and its final nature.23
Therefore, whatever is ultimately existent must necessarily exist for a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate. Is it also true that whatever exists for a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate is necessarily ultimately existent? No, because emptiness exists for a reasoning consciousness but does not ultimately exist. If the reasoning consciousness turns its light of analysis on the lack of ultimate existence that it has found when searching for ultimate existence and investigates that lack of ultimate existence in an effort to discover whether it ultimately exists, it will find that the lack of ultimate existence itself does not ultimately exist; emptiness is empty of true existence. Thus, although emptiness—the lack of ultimate existence—exists in the face of a reasoning consciousness, it does not ultimately exist.
If a phenomenon is truly established, it must be established for a reasoning consciousness. However, whatever is the mode of being of an object and exists for a reasoning consciousness is not necessarily truly established, because the emptiness of a table is both the final mode of being of the table and exists for a reasoning consciousness analyzing the table but is not truly established.24 Still, it can be said that any phenomenon, including emptiness, which is analyzed by a reasoning consciousness investigating the mode of being of that phenomenon does not exist for that reasoning consciousness. The non-existence of that phenomenon for that consciousness analyzing the ultimate is the reality or final nature of the object.25 It is, therefore, important to make a distinction between being the object found by a reasoning consciousness and being able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness. When such a consciousness analyzes an object in order to determine whether it ultimately exists, that object’s lack of ultimate existence is the object found by the reasoning consciousness. This does not imply that the lack of ultimate existence itself ultimately exists. The object found by the reasoning consciousness is what that consciousness understands—which is the non-true existence of the object under scrutiny. Again, if that non-true existence is analyzed, it also is found to lack ultimate existence; it cannot bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness.26
Nothing is able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness. Therefore, to not exist ultimately is to not be established as capable of bearing analysis by a conceptual reasoning consciousness which properly analyzes the mode of being of phenomena.27 Due to not recognizing that the object found by a reasoning consciousness cannot itself bear analysis by that consciousness, one may be led to the conclusion that the object found by a reasoning consciousness must truly exist. This was the opinion of the great Tibetan logician Cha-ba-chö-gyi-seng-gay (Cha-pa-chos-kyi-seng-ge), who asserted that non-true existence is truly established. On the other hand, if one wishes to assert that emptiness—the lack of ultimate existence—is itself empty but also believes that the object found by a reasoning consciousness must ultimately exist, one is forced to assert that emptiness is not found by a reasoning consciousness and hence is not an object of knowledge. According to this view, if emptiness were found by a reasoning consciousness, it would have to exist truly. This was the position of the great translator Lo-den-shay-rap (bLo-ldan-shes-rab).28
The conception that an object is able to withstand analysis by a reasoning consciousness is identified as the artificial conception of true existence by some Tibetan scholars. Such a conception of true existence is not present in the continua of all sentient beings; its cause is the study of wrong tenet systems that propound the ultimate existence of phenomena.29 The innate conception of true existence, the final root of cyclic existence for the Svātantrikas, is identified in a passage from Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakāloka):
An awareness that mistakenly superimposes the opposite onto things that are in reality without entityness is called the “concealer” (saṃvṛti, kun rdzob) because it obstructs [itself] from [perception of] suchness or because it veils [other awarenesses] from [perception of] suchness. As it says in the [Descent into Laṅkā] Sutra:
Things are produced conventionally;
Ultimately they are without inherent existence.
That which is mistaken about what does not inherently exist
Is asserted to be a concealer of reality.
Because [an artificial awareness] arises from that [conception of true existence], all false things which [such an artificial awareness] sees displayed by that [conception of true existence as if they are truly established] are called “mere conventionalities.” Moreover, that [conception of true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error, whereby all living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if [they had] a true nature in reality. Therefore, all entities of false things [which exist] through the power of those [sentient beings’] thoughts are said to “only exist conventionally.”30
“An awareness that mistakenly superimposes the opposite onto things that in reality are without entityness” refers to the innate conception of true existence that superimposes ultimate existence onto phenomena that lack ultimate existence. Such an ignorant consciousness—the conception of true existence—is called a concealer or an obstructor because the ignorant consciousness obstructs other minds from seeing reality—non-true existence—and thus conceals the final mode of being from them. The ignorant consciousness itself is also obstructed from seeing suchness, as an eye obstructed by cataracts is prevented from clearly seeing forms.
“Because [an artificial awareness] arises from that [conception of true existence], all false things which [such an artificial awareness] sees displayed by the [conception of true existence as if they truly existed] are called mere conventionalities.” This sentence indicates that due to the conception of true existence, phenomena appear to the thought consciousnesses of sentient beings to be truly existent. This is a false appearance; those phenomena do not truly exist, they exist only conventionally.
It is the opinion of Tsong-kha-pa that the consciousnesses to which the appearance of true existence is displayed are necessarily conceptual consciousnesses and are not sense consciousnesses because, in his view, the object of negation—true existence—does not appear to the sense consciousnesses in the Svātantrika system. There are a number of statements in the works of the Svātantrika masters that support his position, such as Jñānagarbha’s comments that, “Just as what is seen by cowherds and above abides as conventional truths ...,”31 “When a thing appears, real [that is, truly existent] production and so forth do not,”32 and “No one has any quarrel concerning the factor which appears to the consciousnesses of the two parties [in a debate].”33 The first quote implies that everything that common beings, such as cowherds, see is validly established in the way in which it appears. The second indicates that the truly existent production of an object, which is to be negated, does not appear when that object appears to the senses. The third quotation supports the Svātantrika assertion of a commonly appearing subject, which appears to the sense direct perceivers of the parties in a debate, those sense consciousnesses being non-mistaken with respect to the subject’s existence by way of its character (svalakṣaṇa-siddha, rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). The fact that the Svātantrikas have no quarrel with the way that the subject appears to the parties in the debate indicates that they do not assert that the object of negation appears to the sense consciousnesses. This point will be discussed further in the context of the two types of conventional truths (pp. 210-212).
“Moreover, that [conception of true existence] arises through the maturation of beginningless predispositions for error, whereby all living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if [they had] a true nature in reality.” This sentence indicates that the conception of true existence, which causes objects to appear falsely to thought consciousnesses, is the innate conception of true existence that has operated beginninglessly and that causes phenomena to appear falsely to the minds of all sentient beings, regardless of whether their minds have been affected by the study of tenets.
“Therefore, all entities of false things [which exist] through the power of those [sentient beings’] thoughts are said ‘only to exist conventionally.’ ” This last sentence provides Kamalaśīla’s understanding of the conventional status of phenomena. The entities of those phenomena which appear falsely due to the conception of true existence do validly exist though the power of sentient beings’ thoughts. For a Svātantrika, it is not suitable to posit phenomena as existing through the power of the conception of true existence. There are valid consciousnesses that are not affected by ignorance which can posit the conventional existence of phenomena. Thus, conventional existence means existence which is posited by the power of appearing to a non-defective mind, the perception and conception of which has not been affected by the power of the conception of true existence. Such a non-defective mind may be non-conceptual or conceptual. Since the object of negation—true existence—does not appear to the non-conceptual sense consciousnesses, a sense consciousness is non-defective if it has not been affected by one of the superficial causes of error (see pp. 67-68). A though consciousness is non-defective if it is non-mistaken with respect to its determined or referent object (*adhyavasāyaviṣaya, zhen yul), that is, if the thought consciousness is correct regarding the general characteristics of its object. A thought consciousness conceiving of a permanent sound would be considered mistaken. For the Svātantrikas, if the object of negation appeared to the sense consciousnesses, they would not be capable of positing the conventional existence of objects because ultimate existence would be certified by sense experience.34
Thus, it can be inferred from Kamalaśīla’s statement that true existence or ultimate existence is a mode of subsistence that is established from the object’s own side, without being posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective consciousness. What it means to be “posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness” is elucidated with the example of a magician’s illusion.
In India it is said that a magician could take an ordinary object such as a pebble or a twig, rub it with a certain salve, and then cast a mantra, thereby causing the pebble or twig to appear as some other object, such as a horse or an elephant. At that time, both the magician and the audience for whom he is performing the trick see a horse where the pebble once was. However, the ways in which the magician and the audience perceive the horse are different. The magician sees the horse but does not believe it to be a real horse, knowing that he has conjured the appearance of a horse from a pebble with the use of the salve and mantra. The audience sees the horse and believes that is is real. A person who arrives after the show has begun will only see the pebble because his eyes have not been affected by the mantra cast by the magician.
For both the audience and the magician, the appearance of the pebble as a horse comes about through the power of the mind affected by the mantra; the appearance is not produced naturally from the pebble without depending on that mind. The magician understands this, but, for the audience, it appears that a real horse is standing in front of them and that this appearance is not dependent on the power of the mind.
Since the magician actively intends for the pebble to appear as a horse, the way in which the horse appears to him is different from the way in which someone might mistake a coiled rope in a dark corner to be a snake. It is not because the rope is in any way a snake that the rope appears as a snake; it is merely due to the external condition of darkness which causes the rope to appear in that way. The same can be said about a pebble which has not been conjured with mantra and salve; it is the nature of the pebble not to appear as a horse. However, a pebble which has been affected by mantra and salve is said to gain an additional objective status which is its appearance as a horse. At the time of the magic show, it is as if the pebble becomes the entity of the illusory horse.35
Jang-gya makes this point when he says that for the magician, the pebble is merely posited as a horse through the power of the mind that was affected by the mantra; the pebble does not appear as a horse from its own side, independent of that mind. Nevertheless, there does exist an objective mode of being of the pebble itself which appears as a horse, a mode of being which is posited in dependence upon the awareness affected by the mantra. The appearance of the illusory horse must exist in order for it to be mistaken for a real horse by the audience.36
For the Svātantrikas, a consciousness innately conceiving true existence conceives of phenomena as existing from the side of their own objective mode of subsistence, without being posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness. In the same way, the audience at the magic show believes that the horse that they see in front of them is a real horse and is not appearing to them through the power of their minds, which have been affected by the magician’s spell. Ordinary beings who have not understood emptiness conceive things to be established from their own side without depending at all on being posited through the power of an awareness.
Someone who has understood emptiness, the lack of ultimate existence, understands that phenomena do not exist exclusively from their own side, that an object’s mode of being depends on being posited by the non-defective awareness to which it appears. A person who has understood emptiness is like the magician who sees the appearance of the horse but knows that the horse is not real, that it is appearing through the power of the mind that has been affected by the mantra. The appearance of the horse is not merely a mental projection; it is a mode of subsistence of the pebble affected by the mantra and salve. However, the illusory horse does not exist until the magician or the audience have looked at the pebble. Thus, although there is an objective mode of subsistence, it does not exist until it is perceived by the mistaken sense consciousnesses affected by the mantra. In the same way, the Svātantrikas assert that all phenomena are merely posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective mind, but they do not assert that they are merely posited by the mind. There is an objective mode of subsistence of phenomena that exists from the object’s own side and that is established by way of the object’s own character. However, just as the illusory horse does not exist until it is perceived by the mistaken sense consciousnesses, the objective mode of subsistence of objects does not exist without appearing to a non-defective awareness.
Thus, for the Svātantrikas, two factors are essential. The first is the objective mode of subsistence of the object which exists from the object’s own side but does not exist independently. If it did, it would be an extreme of permanence. This mode of subsistence is posited by appearing to a non-defective consciousness which is either conceptual or non-conceptual. Phenomena gain their entities through the power of the awarenesses to which they appear. However, such consciousnesses do not subjectively impute those phenomena without any objective basis; that would be an extreme of annihilation. They rather, more passively, posit that which appears to them. As Jang-gya says:
According to these Mādhyamikas, the fact that things are posited through the power of an awareness that is not damaged by valid cognition and the fact that there also exists the thing’s own mode of subsistence that is posited by the power of that [awareness] is not contradictory, just as a basis of conjuring [that is, a pebble] can be posited as appearing as a horse or elephant by the power of an awareness affected by mantra and salve, and there [also] exists a mode of subsistence which is the appearance of a horse or elephant even from the side of the basis of conjuring and which is posited through the power of that awareness.37
This mode of being which is established from the object’s own side but which is posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective consciousness is the conventional mode of being of phenomena in the Svātantrika system. Their final mode of being is their lack of ultimate existence, their emptiness of being established from their own side without depending on being posited by a nondefective awareness. A Superior directly realizing this emptiness perceives only the lack of this ultimate existence; no conventionalities appear to his mind. He is like a latecomer to the magic show who neither sees the illusory horse nor conceives it to be real.38
Thus, in the Svātantrika system, when it said that phenomena do not exist ultimately, there are two types of non-ultimate existence. The first, deriving from Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning, is the inability to bear analysis by an ultimate consciousness—a conceptual consciousness of hearing, thinking, or meditating that analyzes suchness. The second type of non-ultimate existence, described in Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way, is the non-existence of an objective mode of subsistence that is not merely posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness.39
For the Svātantrikas, true existence, ultimate existence, real existence, existence which is not posited by the power of an awareness, and existence which is capable of bearing analysis by a reasoning consciousness engaged in ultimate analysis are all objects of negation and do not exist even conventionally. Existence by way of the object’s own character, inherent existence, existence by way of the object’s own entityness, existence by way of its own entity, and existence capable of withstanding a search for the object designated are asserted by the Svātantrikas to be conventionally existent.40 Bhāvaviveka holds that it is a deprecation of phenomena to refute inherent existence without affixing the qualification “ultimately.” That is, for Bhāvaviveka phenomena inherently exist conventionally but not ultimately. In the fifteenth chapter of Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”, an opponent asks Bhāvaviveka:
If entityness does not exist, how are there things? If there are things, it is not the case that entityness does not exist. Therefore, [your] thesis has the fault of deprecating that meaning.41
In response, Bhāvaviveka says:
It has been asserted that things have entityness ultimately; it is not [our] thesis that they are just without entityness. Thus, since the meaning of the thesis is not a deprecation, it is not the case that the meaning of the reason is not established. Therefore, this [thesis] is without fault.42
Thus, Bhāvaviveka asserts that he is not deprecating or denying phenomena because he asserts that things are without entityness ultimately. It is, therefore, clear that he asserts that if phenomena lacked an entityness in the sense of establishment by way of the object’s own entity conventionally, it would be a deprecation.43 According to the Svātantrikas, phenomena are established by way of their own character and are established from their own side conventionally. Therefore, inherent existence cannot be refuted conventionally. It is only when the qualifications “ultimately” or “truly” are affixed to inherent existence or existence by way of the object’s own character that they can be refuted; phenomena exist by way of their own character, they do not exist by way of their own character ultimately.44
The Prāsaṅgikas assert that phenomena do not inherently exist even conventionally, and, therefore, when they negate inherent existence or existence from the object’s own side, they find it unnecessary, indeed redundant, to add the qualification “ultimately” or “truly” because, according to them, if something exists by way of its own character or inherently exists, it necessarily also truly exists and ultimately exists.45 Whereas the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena exist by way of their own character, exist from their own side, and inherently exist while negating true existence, ultimate existence, and real existence, the Prāsaṅgikas assert that existence by way of the object’s own character, existence from the object’s side, inherent existence, ultimate existence, true existence, and real existence are synonymous and refute them all.46
In his Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle Way” Candrakīrti attacks the Svātantrika assertion that phenomena exist by way of their own character conventionally, stating four absurd consequences that are entailed by that position:
1 If phenomena did inherently exist, then it would absurdly follow that the meditative equipoise of a Superior would destroy phenomena because if things were established from their own side, they would be established in reality, in which case they would be observed by a Superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise—the consciousness that directly perceives reality. However, when emptiness is directly cognized, such an inherently existent nature does not appear, which means that either it did not exist in the first place or that the exalted wisdom consciousness destroyed it. Since the Svātantrikas assert that phenomena inherently exist, they incur the latter fault.47
2 If phenomena did inherently exist, it would absurdly follow that conventional truths would be able to withstand analysis by reasoning because they would ultimately exist.
3 If phenomena did inherently exist, it would absurdly follow that production from the four extremes of self, other, both, and neither would not be refuted because production from other would be findable under analysis and thus would ultimately exist.
4 If phenomena did inherently exist, it would absurdly follow that the Buddha was wrong when he said in the Kāśyapa Chapter Sutra (Kāśyapaparivarta) that phenomena are empty of themselves, that is, as being established as their own mode of being.48
Thus, the Prāsaṅgikas find it contradictory for the Svātantrikas to assert that phenomena are posited by an awareness on the one hand and are established by way of their own character on the other. Although it can be said that both the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas assert that phenomena are posited by the power of awareness, they differ greatly on what they mean by that. The Prāsaṅgikas assert that phenomena such as forms are posited by the power of a conceptual awareness that imputes verbal conventions, that designates an object to its basis of designation. Such a designation is completely subjective; the object designated cannot be found in its basis of designation. The mode of subsistence of the object that is posited by the designating consciousness is merely a nominal imputation. The Svātantrikas assert that phenomena are posited conventionally by the power of appearing to a non-defective consciousness such as a sense direct perceiver. While they hold that there is no mode of subsistence that is not posited by the power of appearing to an awareness, they also assert that this mode of subsistence which is posited by the power of appearing to an awareness is not merely nominally designated. The Prāsaṅgikas find this to be contradictory.49
For the Prāsaṅgikas, the awareness by which the object is posited is necessarily a designating thought consciousness which actively imputes the name and qualities of the object. For the Svātantrikas, the awareness which posits the object may be conceptual or non-conceptual as long as it is non-defective, for its function is to posit the inherently existent object that appears to it. The role of the awareness is more passive in the Svātantrika scheme because the awareness posits the entity of that which appears to it. For the Prāsaṅgikas, the analytically unfindable object is merely designated by terms and thoughts; it is utterly non-existent from its own side. The Svātantrikas cannot conceive of a valid mode of subsistence that is merely designated; for them, if something exists, it must exist by way of its own character.
To reiterate, for the Svātantrikas, objects are posited through the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness. The existence of the object depends both on the basis of designation and the designating consciousness. There is an objective mode of subsistence that is posited through appearing to an awareness. Thus, the consciousness is positing something that exists from the object’s own side. They assert that there is no mode of subsistence that is not posited by appearing to such an awareness. A mode of subsistence that is not so posited is the meaning of true existence and is the object of negation of the Svātantrikas.
For the Prāsaṅgikas, the existence of the object is posited only by an awareness. The power to posit the existence of the object lies only with the awareness. The term “objective mode of subsistence” (yul gyi sdod lugs) suggests to the Prāsaṅgikas that the object exists from its own side, exists inherently. They thus concur with the Svātantrikas that there is no objective mode of subsistence that is not posited by an awareness, but they go further and take the more radical position that there is also no objective mode of subsistence that is posited by an awareness. The lack of such a mode of subsistence that is posited by awareness is the emptiness of inherent existence. From the Prāsaṅgika perspective, then, the Svātantrikas refute only a coarse self of phenomena but assert a subtle self of phenomena, inherent existence. The Prāsaṅgikas refute both.
Because the Prāsaṅgikas are able to refute the inherent existence that the Svātantrikas conventionally uphold while at the same time maintaining the viability of all phenomena within the emptiness of inherent existence, Tsong-kha-pa considers Prāsaṅgika to be the highest of the Indian schools of Buddhist philosophy.
The Tibetans brought their own approach to the study of Buddhist philosophy in that, in addition to cataloguing the Indian schools, they ranked them and compared their assertions on the basis, path, and goal, establishing a hierarchy the study of which provided a new insight into the various problems and solutions of Indian Buddhist philosophy. The hierarchy established by the Geluk-bas is as follows:
Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika
Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika
Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika
Cittamātra (Yogācāra) Following Reasoning
Cittamātra (Yogācāra) Following Scripture
Sautrāntika Following Reasoning
Sautrāntika Following Scripture
Vaibhāṣika50
From lowest to highest there is an increase in the subtlety of the two extremes identified by the individual schools. The Vaibhāṣikas abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that all conditioned phenomena are impermanent and abandon the extreme of annihilation by asserting that the past and the future are substantial entities (dravya, rdzas), that is, that the past of an object exists after its present existence and the future of an object exists before its present existence.51 The Sautrāntikas abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that uncaused phenomena are not substantially existent and abandon the extreme of annihilation by asserting that objects are naturally established as places for imputing designations and as bases of conception by thought. The Yogācārins abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that objects are not naturally established as the bases of conception by thought and as places for imputing designations. For example, a table is not established by way of its own character as a basis for the affixing of the name “table”. They assert that dependent phenomena and consummate phenomena are truly established, thereby abandoning the extreme of annihilation. As we have seen, the Svātantrikas abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that no phenomenon is established from the side of its own objective mode of subsistence without being posited by the power of appearing to a non-defective awareness. They abandon the extreme of annihilation by asserting that all phenomena are established from their own side, that they exist by way of their own character. The Prāsaṅgikas abandon the extreme of permanence by asserting that phenomena are not established from their own side and under their own power, and abandon the extreme of annihilation by asserting that phenomena are imputedly existent, being mere designations by terms and thoughts.
In the progression from Vaibhāṣika to Prāsaṅgika, the middle way of the lower school becomes an extreme to be abandoned by the higher. The Vaibhāṣikas assert that everything is substantially established (dravyasiddha, rdzas su grub pa). The Sautrāntikas refute this by asserting that some phenomena are imputedly existent, by which they mean that these phenomena do not exist independently as a separate substantial entity, but rather are designated to other factors. The Sautrāntikas assert that all phenomena are established by the power of their own particular status as bases of conception by thought and as places for the imputation of designations. The Yogācārins refute this with reasoning, proving that imputations do not truly exist. The Yogācārins assert that the dependent and consummate natures are truly established. The Svātantrikas refute this by proving that phenomena lack a mode of subsistence that is not posited by the power of an awareness. Still, the Svātantrikas contend that all phenomena are established from their own side. This is refuted by the Prāsaṅgikas, who assert that when the object designated is sought among its bases of designation, there is nothing to be found.52
This is not to imply that in the Tibetan scheme the lower systems have no purpose other than to be refuted by the upper, serving as straw men for the upper schools’ polemics. The tenets of the lower school are seen as a stepping stone to the higher, as means of understanding the increasingly profound philosophical positions of the upper systems. The structure of Tibetan doxographies reflects this appreciation in that they begin with the non-Buddhist systems and then proceed to Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, Svātantrika, finally culminating with the presentation of the Prāsaṅgika system. With this approach one is able to see a development and refinement of concepts and terminology that would be imperceptible if one began one’s study with Prāsaṅgika.
This approach to the study of Buddhist philosophy allows one to discern a progression away from substantial existence, away from objects’ existing in and of themselves, toward imputed existence, toward analytical unfindability. For the Vaibhāṣikas there are phenomena which substantially exist (dravyasat, rdzas yod) and phenomena which do not substantially exist, such as a table, but all are substantially established (dravyasiddha, rdzas su grub pa). For the Sautrāntikas, some phenomena are substantially established and some are not, but all are truly existent. For the Yogācārins, some phenomena are truly existent and some are not, but all phenomena are inherently established (svabhāvasiddha, rang bzhin gyis grub pa). The Svātantrikas refute the true existence of all phenomena but cannot refute their inherent existence, feeling that if phenomena did not inherently exist, they would not exist at all. The Prāsaṅgikas refute this inherent existence and assert that all phenomena are merely imputedly existent (prajñātisat, btags yod) and do not cover their bases of designation.53 Phenomena thus become more and more nominal as one progresses from Vaibhāṣika to Prāsaṅgika.
There is also a discernible progression in their views on the nature of sense experience. Among the four tenet systems there are two explanations of how a direct perceiver knows a sense object. The Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins, and Mādhyamikas assert that the object casts an aspect (ākāra, rnam pa) toward the perceiving consciousness. The Vaibhāṣikas assert that no such aspect exists. According to the other systems, an eye consciousness perceiving a table cognizes that table by the eye consciousness being generated into the aspect of the table, as a mirror takes on the aspect of the object reflected in it. This does not mean that the consciousness becomes the object, but it can be said that it becomes like the object. These schools assert that all of the uncommon characteristics of an object, such as its subtle impermanence and its production, abiding, aging, and disintegration, appear to the sense consciousness perceiving it. However, these qualities are not necessarily ascertained by the sense consciousness because the consciousness was not generated in the aspect of those qualities. In order for an object to be ascertained, the object must appear to the consciousness and the consciousness must also be produced in the aspect of the object. This provides an explanation of how an object could appear but not be seen, as in the case of being deeply absorbed in a conversation while walking and thus being unaware of one’s surroundings.54
The aspect into which the consciousness is generated is similar to the object but is of the nature of consciousness; the aspect and the consciousness are one entity. A sense consciousness knows an object through an aspect similar to the object being generated in the consciousness.55
In contrast, the Vaibhāṣikas assert that the eye consciousness and eye sense extend out to the object so that there is no need for the object to be reflected in the consciousness. They do not distinguish between a subjective aspect and the object itself; the appearance of the object is the object itself.56
The Buddhist schools’ positions on aspected and aspectless sense perception have correlates to the various types of realism elaborated in Western philosophy. Here, realism is taken to mean the view that material objects exist externally and independently of sense perception.57 In this scheme, the Vaibhāṣika position represents a form of direct realism, the view that sense perception is a direct, straightforward, and immediate contact of the consciousness and its object.58 That the Vaibhāṣika view does not represent the simplest form of direct realism, naive realism, which holds that things exist exactly as they are perceived to, is evidenced by the Vaibhāṣikas’ assertion that all gross objects, things that can be either physically or mentally broken down into parts, are conventional truths. They also assert that all impermanent phenomena with the exception of true paths (mārgasatya, lam gyi bden pa) are contaminated in the sense that they can serve as causes for the increase of the afflictive emotions because impermanent phenomena can be objects of desire or hatred.59 Thus, although the Vaibhāṣika position may be classified as one of direct realism, it is not to be assumed that their approach to sense experience is non-analytical.
The Sautrāntikas criticize the Vaibhāṣika position, arguing that if direct perception were not aspected, either objects could not be perceived at all because there would be no way for the consciousness to perceive the object, or it should be possible to see through walls because a consciousness, being immaterial and going out to its object, would not be obstructed by matter.60 The Sautrāntika introduction of the aspect into the process of sense perception represents a development away from the Vaibhāṣika view toward what would be classified in the West as a form of indirect realism, specifically representive realism, which states that actual perception is perception of sensa; to perceive an external object is to perceive the sensa caused by it so that sense perception is technically limited to the perception of sensa, not of the object itself.61 The Sautrāntikas do indeed distinguish between the object and its aspect, but would balk at the suggestion that for this reason sense perception is somehow indirect. Although they assert that objects exist external to the mind perceiving them and cause the sensa or representations that we perceive, they would not be frightened by the notorious pitfall of representative realism—if sense experience is technically only of sensa and never of external objects, how are the objects to be ascertained? Are material objects not unobserved and thus finally unintelligible?62 The Sautrāntikas assert that the aspect is similar to the object and thus allows the object to be directly perceived. The aspect is not mistaken for the actual object; it merely allows the object to be perceived. For the Sautrāntikas, a sense direct perceiver is a complete engager (*vidhipravṛttibuddhi, sgrub ’jug gi blo) that is, everything that exists in the same substantial entity with the object, all of its specific characteristics, appears directly to a sense consciousness.63
Persuaded by the argument from illusion, that the same thing sometimes appears differently to different people, the Yogācārins sever the relationship between the external object and its aspect that the Sautrāntikas maintain, asserting instead that external objects are utterly non-existent and that the object is not a cause of the consciousness perceiving it. The Yogācārins hold that subject and object arise simultaneously, both arising from the same latency (vāsanā, bags chags) or seed (bīja, sa bon) that resides in the mental consciousness or mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi rnam shes). A seed is activated, causing the appearance of the object and the consciousness perceiving it. Subject and object are the same substantial entity, arising from the same cause; there are no objects that are not of the nature of consciousness. Thus, the Yogācārins maintain that there are sensa without objects external in entity to the perceiving consciousness and that these sensa are of the nature of the mind. In this way, their view approaches one of idealism or Berkeley’s immaterialism, for the Yogācārins assert that objects composed of material particles do not exist.
The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas, in the person of Bhāvaviveka, reacted strongly against the Yogācārin view, holding that external objects do exist as they appear to direct perception, although they do not truly exist. The Yogācāra-Svātantrikas assimilated the Yogācārin idealism, asserting that subject and object do not exist as separate entities conventionally, but rejected the Yogācārin contention that consciousness truly exists.64
Thus far, the process of perception has originated with the subject—consciousness—as in the assertion of the Yogācārins and Yogācāra-Svātantrikas, or with the externally existent object, as in the assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas. The Prāsaṅgikas incorporate elements of both the subjective and objective approaches, at once maintaining factors of realism and skepticism. The Prāsaṅgikas are realists in that they assert that external objects exist as separate entities from the perceiving consciousness. They are skeptics in that they deny the veracity of sense perception in terms of the appearance of inherent existence. From another point of view, they are not realists in that they do not accept that all of the characteristics of the object that appears to a sense consciousness are true; a sense consciousness correctly perceives the general object and its primary characteristics but misperceives the object as inherently existent. In this way, they go beyond the position of the critical realists, who hold that in veridical perception those characters that appear to the senses are the actual characters or properties of the external object.65 The Prāsaṅgikas also are not skeptical in a certain sense in that they do not deny that indubitable information can be gained about the nature of things.66 For them, external objects exist, but they do not exist in the way that they appear. Objects appear to exist inherently, and this false appearance is perceived by the non-conceptual sense consciousnesses. There are two factors that appear to the sense consciousness, the appearance of inherent existence and the mere appearance of the imputedly existent object. For common beings these two appearances are mixed.67 There are thus true and false aspects present in the sensa which ordinarily cannot be distinguished. The Prāsaṅgikas turn to the other valid source of knowledge, inference, to discern and destroy with reasoning the conception of inherent existence by thought and the perception of inherent existence by the sense consciousnesses. Reasoning reveals that the object does not exist in and of itself but is empty of inherent existence. By becoming accustomed to this emptiness again and again from the viewpoint of many different reasonings, the false factor in sense perception can be identified and, through developing direct perception of emptiness and accompanying that practice with altruistic deeds, that false appearance can finally eliminated at Buddhahood.68
Thus, in the Prāsaṅgika system, reasoning and analysis provide the means for eliminating the deceptive factor in sense perception. The objects of the senses exist validly as external objects but do not exist in the way that they appear; they appear to exist in an of themselves when in fact they are merely subjectively designated. All of the lower schools assert that phenomena appear to exist inherently and do exist inherently.69 The Prāsaṅgikas concur that phenomena do indeed appear to exist in and of themselves but argue that this is a false appearance, unfindable under analysis.