7 An Overview of the Svātantrika School
This chapter will present a summary of the essential positions of the Svātantrika school as perceived by the author of the best known Tibetan tenet text, Jam-yang-shay-ba. The root text of his Great Exposition of Tenets (Grub mtha’ chen mo) presents in poetry the systems of Indian philosophy, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. He then expands on the stanzas in the body of the text, providing copious quotations from primary materials to support his presentation. There are two excellent commentaries to the root text of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Tenets, one by the Mongolian scholar Nga-wang-bel-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan)1 and the other by the Amdo scholar Lo-sang-gön-chok (bLo-bzang-dkon-mchog).2 Their commentaries to the Svātantrika chapter of Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Tenets provide the basis of this chapter. Most of the points discussed have been considered in detail in the preceding chapters. Others, such as the interpretation of scripture and the structure of the path to enlightenment, which are considered topics unto themselves in the Ge-luk curriculum, are discussed briefly here but must await further studies for their full exposition.
THE MEANING OF SVĀTANTRIKA
An autonomous sign (*svatantraliṅga rang, rgyud kyi rtags), a sign which is established by way of its own power (*svairīsiddhaliṅga, rang dbang gis grub pa’i rtags), and a sign which is established from its own side (*svarūpasiddhaliṅga, rang ngos nas grub pa’i rtags) are synonyms. A Svātantrika is a Mādhyamika who asserts that signs proving the probandum are stated from the viewpoint of three modes—the property of the position,the forward pervasion, and the counterpervasion—and a subject which are established by way of their own power as they commonly appear to the minds of the two parties in the debate.3
DIVISIONS OF SVĀTANTRIKA
Svātantrika is divided into two: Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. The former prove the existence of external objects and the latter refute the existence of external objects.4
SAUTRĀNTIKA-SVĀTANTRIKA
The Three Natures
The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas assert that the three natures are established by way of their own character. However, they assert that impermanent things, which are the bases of the emptiness of true existence, are dependent natures because they are not produced by their own power but are produced by the power of other causes and conditions. The factor of true existence which is imputed to dependent natures is an imaginary nature because it is merely a superimposition (āropa, sgro ’dogs). Dependent natures’ emptiness of the imputed true existence is the consummate nature because it is the final mode of being. Each of the three natures lacks entityness (svabhavatā, ngo bo nyid). Impermanent things, which are the bases of emptiness, are produced from others and are not produced by their own power ultimately. Thus, dependent natures lack the entityness of production. The factor of true establishment that is imputed to forms and so forth is a superimposition which is not the actual mode of being of those phenomena and is a character which ultimately is imagined. Therefore, imaginary natures lack the entityness of character. The reality which is the emptiness of true establishment is consummate without being a superimposition, is the mode of being, is the object of the highest reasoning consciousness, and lacks the entityness of true establishment. Thus, consummate natures are the ultimate and without entityness.5
The Selflessness of Phenomena is Not Taught in Hīnayāna Scriptures
The selflessness of phenomena is not explicitly taught in the Hīnayāna scriptural collections (piṭaka, sde snod) because, if it were, there would have been no purpose in Buddha teaching the Mahāyāna scriptures. Furthermore, it is not necessary for Hīnayānists to realize the selflessness of phenomena—the emptiness of true existence—in order to be liberated from cyclic existence, even though the conception of true existence is the final root of cyclic existence. For example, the fear that arises from seeing a coiled rope and thinking that it is a snake can be removed by being told that it is not a snake but a coiled vine. In the same way, one who has realized and cultivated the selflessness of persons can destroy the afflictive obstructions (kleśāvaraṇa, nyon sgrib) and be liberated from cyclic existence. It is therefore unnecessary to realize the final nature of phenomena—the emptiness of true existence—in order to abandon the afflictive obstructions and achieve liberation.6
Refutation of Yogācāra
There are numerous statements in Mahāyāna sutras that seem to indicate that external objects do not exist and that everything is of the nature of consciousness. Bhāvaviveka argues emphatically that such statements do not indicate the non-existence of external objects. The statement in sutra, “External objects do not exist,” is interpreted to mean external objects do not exist ultimately. The statements by the Buddha, “I propound mind only,” and “These three realms are mind only,” refute that there is a permanent self or that there is a performer of actions that is other than the mind; the meaning of these sutras is not that there are no external objects.7
Bhāvaviveka refutes the Yogācārin assertion that subject and object are produced from the same seed (bīja, sa bon) and are thus simultaneous by arguing that objects and their apprehenders are in a relationship of cause and effect and are thus produced sequentially. Therefore, an object is a separate entity from the consciousness which perceives it.8
The Yogācārins argue that there are no external objects because the minute particles (paramāṇu, rdul phra rab) of which such objects are said to be composed are too subtle to be perceived by the sense consciousnesses and because aggregations of minute particles are not suitable as the objects of sense consciousnesses because they do not substantially exist. Bhāvaviveka counters the argument by drawing a distinction between aggregations (saṃghata, ’dus pa) and composites (saṃcita, bsags pa). An aggregation is a collection of many entities of dissimilar type, such as a forest or an army, and does not substantially exist. Individual particles as well as multiple particles of similar type that exist on one base are composites and substantially exist. Bhāvaviveka asserts that the minute particles of a composite can serve as the observed-object-condition (ālambanapratyaya, dmigs rkyen) of a sense consciousness.9
To support their claim that all appearances of external objects are false, the Yogācārins point to the fact that objects which do not exist, such as a double moon, appear to the sense consciousnesses. Bhāvaviveka responds that the appearance of a double moon is a false appearance to a consciousness that misperceives a single moon, and a single moon exists. Thus, consciousnesses depend on objects for their production; if there were no external objects, apprehending subjects could not be produced. If there were no external objects, direct perception (pratyakṣa, mngon sum) would be denied.10
Bhāvaviveka denies the existence of a self-knowing awareness (svasaṃvedana, rang rig) that perceives an apprehending consciousness, saying that an ordinary consciousness cannot appear without its object appearing, in which case a self-knower that perceives only the consciousness and not its object does not exist.11
The Reasoning Consciousness
Whatever is truly established must exist for a reasoning consciousness that analyzes the ultimate because the reasoning consciousness is that which seeks to discover whether an object is truly established or not; what it is seeking is true establishment. However, whatever exists for a reasoning consciousness is not necessarily truly established; reality—emptiness—is found by a reasoning consciousness but does not truly exist. Although there is an object, namely emptiness, which is found by a reasoning consciousness but which does not truly exist, if something is capable of bearing analysis by a reasoning consciousness, it must be truly established. Being able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness is the meaning of true existence and is the object of negation.12
Because it is easy to prove a similar example that possesses both the sign and the predicate of the probandum (sādhyadharma, bsgrub bya’i chos), Bhāvaviveka, in his Essence of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahṛdaya) and Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvālā), for the most part states syllogisms with negative signs, specifically, signs that are observations of a contradictory object. For example, he states, “The subject, an eye sense, does not ultimately see forms because of being a sense, as is the case, for example, with a nose sense.”13
The Two Truths
Objects of knowledge (jñeya, shes bya) are the basis of division into ultimate truths (paramārthasatya, don dam bden pa) and conventional truths (saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa). In the term “ultimate truth” (literally, “highest object truth”), “highest” refers to a Superior’s uncontaminated wisdom of meditative equipoise (samāhita, mnyam bzhag) realizing non-true existence. “Object” refers to the object found by that awareness, emptiness. It is a “truth” because of existing as it appears; it appears undeceivingly.
Conventional phenomena, phenomena other than emptiness, are truths for a concealer. The concealer is the ignorance that conceives of true existence and which is so-called because it conceals or obstructs reality. Conventionalities are of two types: (1) phenomena renowned in the world, illustrated by those that are able to perform functions in accordance with their appearance to a mind to which they appear clearly, these being real conventional truths (tathya-saṃvṛtisatya, yang dag kun rdzob bden pa) and (2) objects posited from the viewpoint of being renowned in the world as unreal, illustrated by those that are unable to perform a function in accordance with how they appear, these being unreal conventionalities (mityāsaṃvṛti, log pa’i kun rdzob). Real and unreal conventionalities are differentiated in terms of their truth or falsity within the conventional. Real conventional truths are things such as forms and sounds. Unreal conventionalities are, for example, reflections, the self of persons (pudgalātman, gang zag gi bdag), the self of phenomena (dharmātman, chos kyi bdag), and the principal (pradhāna, gtso bo) asserted by the Sāṃkhyas.14
Valid Cognizers
Like all Buddhist schools, the Svātantrikas assert that there are two valid cognizers (pramāṇa, tshad ma), direct perceivers (pratyakṣa, mngon sum) and inferential consciousnesses (anumāna, rjes dpag). The Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas assert that there are three types of direct perceivers: sense direct perceivers (indriyapratyakṣa, dbang po’i mngon sum), mental direct perceivers (manasapratyakṣa, yid kyi mngon sum), and yogic direct perceivers (yogipratyakṣa, mal ’byor mngon sum). The Yogācāra-Svātantrikas add a fourth type which is rejected by the Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas, self-knowing direct perceivers, making a total of four in their system.15
The Paths and Fruits
A person definite in the Mahāyāna lineage exhausts the two obstructions—the predispositions (vāsanā, bag chags) of the afflictive emotions (kleśa, nyon mongs) and the conception of true existence—and achieves complete Buddhahood simultaneously. The afflictive obstructions are abandoned on the first seven Bodhisattva grounds (bhūmi, sa).
The three bodies of truth (dharmakāya, chos sku), enjoyment (saṃbhogakāya, long spyod sku), and emanation (nirmāṇakāya, sprul sku), the three secrecies of body, speech, and mind, the three hundred unshared qualities of a Buddha, and so forth are qualities of the fruit of Buddhahood.
Regarding the objects of abandonment, the three poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance are the afflictive obstructions and the nine cycles of the conception of true existence are the obstructions to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇa, shes sgrib).
The paths of Hearers (śrāvaka, nyan thos) and Solitary Realizers (pratyekabuddha, rang sangs rgyas) are similar in that both realize the selflessness of persons. They differ in the length of time needed to complete the path; it may take a Hearer three lifetimes to complete the path whereas a Solitary Realizer may take one hundred eons. They also differ in that Hearers rely on the instructions of a teacher in their last lifetime whereas Solitary Realizers do not. Solitary Realizers attain a similitude of a Buddha’s major and minor physical marks; Hearers do not. Hearers teach others using sounds whereas Solitary Realizers may not.16
YOGĀCĀRA-SVĀTANTRIKA-MĀDHYAMIKA
True and False Aspectarians
There are two schools of Yogācāra-Svātantrika, those who accord with the True Aspectarians (satyākāravādin, rnam bden pa) and those who accord with the False Aspectarians (alīkākāravādin, rnam rdzunpa). The former, who include Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, assert that the aspect of blue, for example, which is the factor experienced as blue by an eye consciousness apprehending blue, is a functioning thing and a real conventionality. The Yogācāra-Svātantrikas who accord with the False Aspectarians, such as Haribhadra, assert that the nature of the aspect of blue does not exist as a functioning thing as it appears. Both the true and false aspectarians agree that the factor of blue that appears to be an external object is false; they disagree on the status of the mere appearance of blue as blue, with the former asserting that it is true and the latter that it is false.
The False Aspectarians are further divided into those who assert that the entity of the mind is tainted and those who assert that it is untainted. Among the Yogācāra-Svātantrikas, Jetāri accords with the tainted False Aspectarians and Kambala accords with the un-untainted False Aspectarians.17‘
Scriptural Interpretation
Faced with the vast corpus of sutras, the four schools of Buddhist tenets were faced with the problem of reconciling conflicting doctrines set forth in different sutras and internal inconsistencies within sutras. The Hīnayāna schools who, for the most part, did not accept the Mahāyāna sutras as the word of the Buddha, accepted the teachings of their smaller canon as definitive.18 The Yogācārins and Mādhyamikas, accepting a far larger body of literature as authentic, developed a system of hermeneutics by which sutras were divided into the definitive (nītārtha, nges don) and interpretable (neyārtha, drangs don) and the literal (yathāruta, sgra ji bzhin pa) and non-literal. They looked chiefly to two sutras for their criteria, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Saṃdhinirmocana) and the Teaching of Akṣayamati (Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra) .19
In the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, the Buddha explains to Paramārthasamudgata that he turned the wheel of doctrine three times. The first turning of the wheel of doctrine took place in the deer park in Vārāṇasī where the Buddha taught the doctrine of the four truths to followers of the Hearer Vehicle (śrāvakayāna, nyas thos kyi theg pa). The Buddha states that the doctrines taught in the first turning of the wheel are interpretable.
In the second turning of the wheel of doctrine, the Buddha taught the doctrine of emptiness to those who had entered the Mahāyāna, explaining that all phenomena are without entityness. The teachings of the second wheel are also identified as interpretable in this sutra.
In the third and final turning of the wheel of doctrine, the Buddha explained to those of all vehicles what he meant when he said that all phenomena are without entityness in the second turning of the wheel. He distinguished three types of non-entityness in terms of the three natures: imaginary natures are without an entityness of character, dependent natures are without an entityness of production, and consummate natures are without an entityness and are ultimates. Imaginaries are not established by way of their own character. Dependent phenomena and consummate phenomena are. This doctrine of the third wheel is said to be definitive.20
The Teaching of Akṣayamati also divides sutras into the definitive and interpretable but uses different criteria. Sutras that teach conventionalities require interpretation to arrive at the final mode of being of the phenomena taught. Sutras that teach ultimates are definitive because emptiness, the final mode of being, is definite; there is nothing to be interpreted beyond that.21
The Yogācārins base their interpretation of scripture on the Sutra Unravelling the Thought classifying Hīnayāna sutras—first wheel sutras—and Mahāyāna sutras, such as the Perfection of Wisdom sutras—middle wheel sutras—as interpretable. For the Yogācārins, the division into definitive and interpretable is made in terms of how the doctrine is expressed; if a particular sutra can be taken literally it is definitive, if its meaning must be explained it is interpretable.22
The Mādhyamikas accept the difffrentiation of the three turnings of the wheel of doctrine but do not classify the sutras of the mddle wheel as interpretable. They draw the distinction between definitive and interpretable, not in terms of how the doctrine is expressed, but in terms of what the doctrine is, taking their lead from the Teaching of Akṣayamati. If the sutra teaches emptiness it is definitive, if it does not it is interpretable. They do not equate being literal with being definitive and being non-literal with being interpretable, as do the Yogācārins. The definitive is the true—ultimate truths—and the interpretable is the false—conventional truths.23
Within this rubric, the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas differ slightly. For the Svātantrikas, for a sutra to be definitive, it must both teach emptiness and be able to be taken literally. Therefore, the statement in the Heart Sutra (Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra) that “Form does not exist,” although it teaches emptiness, is interpretable because it cannot be taken literally. The meaning of the sutra is not that form does not exist but that form does not truly exist. Other Perfection of Wisdom sutras that teach that phenomena do not ultimately exist are definitive because they teach emptiness and can be taken literally.
The Prāsaṅgikas do not require that the negation be so qualified in the sutra; if it teaches ultimate truths it is definitive; if it teaches conventional truths it is interpretable.24
Bhāvaviveka accepts sutras of the final wheel, such as the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, as definitive but rejects the Yogācārin interpretation of those sutras. For example, he accepts the doctrine of the three non-entitynesses, but gives it his own Mādhyamika interpretation, as explained above. The Prāsaṅgikas classify sutras of the final wheel as interpretable, accepting that they are intended for Yogācārin disciples.25
The Object of Negation and Reasoning Consciousness
Both branches of Svātantrika agree that the object of negation (pratiṣedhya, dgag bya) is existence by way of the object’s own mode of subsistence without being posited through the force of appearing to an awareness. This awareness is one which is not damaged by another valid cognizer in terms of its perception of existence by way of the object’s own character.
In the autocommentary to his Ornament for the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāra), Śāntarakṣita states the reasoning of the lack of being one or many, citing the Descent into Laṅkā (Laṅkāvatārasūtra) and the Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra) as scriptural sources. An example of a syllogism using that reasoning is, “The subjects, things such as forms, do not truly exist because of not being a truly established unity or a truly established multiplicity, as is the case, for example, with a reflection.” The pervasion is established because whatever is truly established must be ascertained as being truly one or truly many. The property of the position is established because form and so forth are not truly established unities because of having parts; they are not truly established multiplicities because a truly established unity does not exist. In addition to the reasoning of the lack of being one and many, the Svātantrikas prove non-true existence mainly using the diamond slivers, the refutation of production of the existent and non-existent, the refutation of production by the four alternatives, and the sign or dependent arising.26
The Two Truths
The presentation of the selflessness of the person is shared by both branches of Svātantrika. The explanation of the basis of division of the two truths, their definitions, and divisions are also common.27
The Path
The Yogācāra-Svātantrikas assert that the obstructions to omniscience are of two types, coarse and subtle. The coarse obstructions are the conception of subject and object as being different substantial entities, together with the seeds of that conception. The subtle obstructions to omniscience are the conception of true existence and its seeds. The afflictive obstructions are the three poisons. The subtle obstructions to omniscience are the main object of abandonment by the Mahāyāna, the coarse obstructions to omniscience are the chief object of abandonment of the Solitary Realizer Vehicle, and the afflictive obstructions, the chief object of abandonment of the Hearer Vehicle. Thus, the three vehicles have different types of realization, with Hearers realizing the sixteen aspects of the four truths, Solitary Realizers understanding the emptiness of duality of subject and object, and Mahāyānists realizing the emptiness of true existence.