The presentation of the tenets that appear in those texts has four parts: the etymology, divisions, definition, and assertions of the Mādhyamikas.
ETYMOLOGY OF MĀDHYAMIKA
The master Bhāvaviveka says, “It is the middle (madhya, dbu ma) because it is similar to a center that is free from two extremes. It is the very center or madhyama, [the ma being] a tadhita affix [which indicates just] that meaning.” Thus, the very center that is free from the extremes of existence and non-existence is the middle. And because they express that [middle way], a treatise on the middle way, tenets of the middle way, and persons who propound the tenets of the middle way acquire the name “Madhyamaka.” That same master says, “Because of teaching and proclaiming the path of the middle way, ‘ka’ [is added]. In terms [of ka being] the verbal root [for ‘proclaiming’], a treatise or one who has the name ‘Madhyamaka’ is a Madhyamaka. Or again, because of being expressed by the name ‘ka’ it is called Madhyamaka, that is, a tenet of the Madhyamaka.”1
DIVISIONS OF MĀDHYAMIKA
This section has two parts, the actual divisions and, ancillarily, the history.
Actual Divisions
Among the students of the glorious Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva is held to be valid like the master himself by the others, such as Buddhapālita. Therefore, earlier scholars gave the designation “Mādhyamikas of the Model Texts” to both the father [Nāgārjuna] and the [spiritual] son [Āryadeva], and “Partisan Mādhyamikas” to the others. Tsong-kha-pa and his spiritual sons also assert that this is correct.
The reason for designating them as Models and Partisans is this: although the final thought of the father and son rests in the Prāsaṅgika system, in terms of what is taught in their texts, there is no clearly delineated presentation of whether they assert that things conventionally exist by way of their own character (svalakṣaṇa, rang gi mtshan nyid), whether they assert the existence of external objects, whether it is possible to generate an inferential consciousness in another party from the viewpoint of what is merely renowned to others, and so forth. Therefore, since [their texts] remain as a generality [common] to both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika factions, they are called “Models.” Although a brief refutation of Cittamātra appears in Nāgārjuna’s Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment, there is no detailed explanation of whether or not he asserts external objects in his own system.
The great master Buddhapālita, in his Buddhapālita, Commentary on the “Treatise on the Middle Way” stated many consequences (prasaṅga, thal ’gyur) in commenting on the meaning of the reasonings set forth in the Treatise on the Middle Way and did not use autonomous reasons (*svatantrahetu, rang rgyud kyi gtan tshigs). After that, the master Bhāvaviveka found many faults with Buddhapālita’s commentary and explained many reasons why autonomous reasons must be stated. Thus, he founded the system of commenting [on the thought of Nāgārjuna] as Svātantrika. Later the glorious Candrakīrti explained that the faults [ascribed] to Buddhapālita did not apply, did much damage to the assertion of autonomous signs, and put forth many proofs of the unsuitability of asserting [autonomous reasons], thus founding the system of commenting on the thought of the Superior Nāgārjuna as Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Therefore, these [masters—Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti]—are known as Partisan Mādhyamikas.
Kay-drup-jay’s Thousand Doses, Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate (sTong thun skal bsang mig ’byed)2 says, “Later, the master Buddhapālita wrote a commentary on the Treatise on the Middle Way which interprets the thought of the Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his [spiritual] son [Āryadeva] in the manner of consequences (prasaṅga, thal ’gyur).” Some scholars of our own [Ge-luk] sect say that this means that Buddhapālita is the founder of Prāsaṅgika. However, this is not the opinion of the foremost great being Tsong-kha-pa. Although Buddhapālita did not use autonomous reasons and commented on the meaning of the text only through consequences, this alone is not sufficient to make him the founder of Prāsaṅgika. For in order to be designated as the founder of this or that system, one must clearly delineate proofs for the correctness of that system and [prove] why interpretation in any other way is unsuitable. For at the point of identifying founders in general, Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad snying po) says:
One must seek out the thought of the scriptures of definitive meaning (nītārtha, nges don), following one who has delineated their meaning well with reasoning damaging interpretation in any other way and reasoning proving that that meaning is certain, it being impossible to be interpreted otherwise.3
That mode [of delineating a distinct system] is similar here as well. Similarly, Gyel-tsap’s (rGyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen) Heart Ornament, An Explanation of the Root Text and Commentary of the “Ornament for Clear Realizations” (mNgon rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi rtsa ba ’grel pa dang bcas pa’i mam bshad snying po’i rgyan)4 and Kay-drup’s Thousand Doses explain the meaning of founding a system in that [same] way, but fearing excessive length I will not write [about their explanations]. If the meaning of founding a system is identified in this way, it is easy to understand that the venerable Maitreya should not be designated as the founder of the Mādhyamika, and that only the protector Nāgārjuna is the founder of Mādhyamika.
Furthermore, if Buddhapālita were the founder of Prāsaṅgika, there would be no reason whatsoever for Bhāvaviveka’s assertion that there is no difference between himself and Buddhapālita in terms of their being Svātantrikas. If it asked how it is evident that Bhāvaviveka asserted this, the foremost great being Tsong-kha-pa clearly speaks to this in his Essence of the Good Explanations:
Even Bhāvaviveka did not think that there was disagreement between Buddhapālita and himself regarding the assertion or non-assertion of autonomous [syllogisms] (svatantraprayoga, rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba); [Buddhapālita’s] system appears to [Bhāvaviveka] as one in which the use of autonomous syllogisms is unavoidable. Consequently, he did not assert that there is a difference between himself and Buddhapālita regarding the object of negation (pratiṣedhya, dgag bya) in the inherent existence (svabhāva, rang bzhin) of phenomena and persons.5
Thus, what could one say that would be more senseless than that the master Bhāvaviveka asserted that the founder of Prāsaṅgika was a Svātantrika!
That the founder of Prāsaṅgika is the glorious Candrakīrti is stated very clearly by the foremost great being Tsong-kha-pa:
In the Clear Words [Candrakīrti] showed that Buddhapālita did not assert autonomous syllogisms and set forth many proofs that it is unsuitable for a Mādhyamika to use autonomous syllogisms and he did much damage to the opposite position, thereby founding [Prāsaṅgika].6
With respect to this, some have said that the meaning of this passage is that Candrakīrti demonstrated the damage [to the opposite position], but Buddhapālita is the founder. It is easy for those with intelligence to understand that this is totally meaningless.
Question: Then what is the meaning of the statement in Kay-drup’s Thousand Doses that Buddhapālita wrote a commentary on the Treatise on the Middle Way that comments on the thought of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] in the manner of consequences?
Answer: As was explained before, this refers to his not using autonomous reasons when explaining the meaning of the text, but rather commenting on the meaning of the text only through consequences. [Kay-drup] is not explaining that [Buddhapālita] is the founder of Prāsaṅgika.
The king Indrabhuti and the great brahmin Saraha were holders of the Mādhyamika view who came before Nāgārjuna, and even though they composed texts that set forth the final view, they are not designated as the founders of Mādhyamika. Also, prior to Bhāvaviveka there was the master Devaśarman who held the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika view, and prior to the master Śāntarakṣita there were masters who held the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika view, such as Āryavimuktisena, who, even though they wrote texts [on the view], are not designated as the founders of those systems. Please think well about the reason for this.
The great scholar and adept Jam-yang-shay-ba put forth an explanation that accords with the earlier statements [about Buddhapālita being the founder] in some places, but it is certain that in his own mind he held that just Candrakīrti is the founder of Prāsaṅgika. The root text of his Tenets (Grub mtha chen mo) says, “Candrakīrti refuted [Bhāvaviveka] well and established [the Prāsaṅgika system] as uncommon”7; the commentary explains that only the glorious Candrakīrti clearly distinguished the uncommon Prāsaṅgika system.8
The glorious Śūra, Nāgabodhi, and so forth are also clearly Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas as can be known through Śūra’s Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment (Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākramavarnasaṃgraha) and Nāgabodhi’s Ordered Stages of the Means of Achieving Guhyasamaja (Samājasādhanavyavasthāli), and so forth. The foremost great being Tsong-kha-pa says that the great Child of the Conqueror, Śāntideva, accords with the glorious Candrakīrti. That the peerless great elder Atlsa is a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika can be known from the root text and commentary of his Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradīpa) and the root text and commentary of his Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way (Madhyamakopadeśa), and [the fact that he is a Prāsaṅgika] is explained more than once by Tsong-kha-pa and his sons.
The divisions of Mādhyamika are definitely two from the point of view of their assertions on conventionalities—those who assert and do not assert external objects. The former are Bhāvaviveka and the glorious Candrakīrti together with their followers. The latter are Śāntarakṣita, his [spiritual] son [Kamalaśīla], and so forth. If [Mādhyamika] is divided from the viewpoint of how the view ascertaining the ultimate—emptiness—is generated in one’s continuum, [the divisions] are definitely two—Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. Svātantrika has two divisions, Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. The former [includes] the father Bhāvaviveka and his [spiritual] sons, and the latter, the father Śāntarakṣita and his [spiritual] sons. The difference between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika will be explained later.
Some earlier Tibetan scholars designated two Mādhyamikas: those who propound an establishment of illusion through a reason ing consciousness (māyopamādvayavādin, sgyu ma rigs grub pa), who assert that a composite of appearance and emptiness is an ultimate truth and the proponents of thorough non-abiding (apratiṣṭānayādin, rab tu mi gnas par smra ba) who assert that the mere elimination of elaborations with respect to appearance is an ultimate truth. The great translator Lo-den-shay-rap of Ngok (rNgog bLo-ldan-shes-rab) refutes this in his letter Drop of Ambrosia (bDud rtsi’i thigs pa), saying that the position that [Mādhyamika] is twofold from the point of view of assertions on the ultimate is an obscured presentation causing amazement. The foremost great being Tsong-kha-pa also says, “This statement by the great translator from Ngok is very good because there is no Mādhyamika whatsoever who asserts that merely the object comprehended by an inferential reasoning consciousness is an ultimate truth.” However, the foremost great being is explaining that it is incorrect to assert the meaning of propounding a reasoned establishment of illusion in that way; he is not asserting that the mere designations “reasoned establishment of illusion” and “thoroughly non-abiding” are incorrect for Mādhyamika, because such designations are clearly used by the master Śūra in his letter Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment. This was stated by the great scholar and adept Nor-sang-gya-tso (Nor-bsang-rgya-mtsho) and I think that it is probably good. There are many reasons for these [points] yet to be explained but I will leave [the topic] for the time being.