DEFINITION OF A MĀDHYAMIKA
A member of one of our own [Buddhist] schools who refutes well the extreme of existence—that all phenomena are ultimately established (paramārthasiddha, don dam par grub pa)—and the extreme of annihilation—that phenomena do not exist even conventionally—and who asserts that [phenomena] are not truly established (satyasiddha, bden grub) is a Mādhyamika. Regarding the extremes, Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way [XV. 10] says:
“Existence” is the conception of permanence.
“Non-existence” is the view of annihilation.
Therefore, the wise do not abide
In existence or non-existence.
Thus, there are two, the extreme of existence and the extreme of non-existence. Extreme of existence (astyanta, yod mtha’), extreme of permanence (śaśvatānta, rtag mtha’), and extreme of superimposition (āropānta, sgro ’dogs kyi mtha’) are synonyms. Extreme of nonexistence (nāstyanta, med mtha’), extreme of annihilation (ucchedānta, chad mtha’), and extreme of denial (apavādānta, skur ’debs kyi mtha’) are synonyms. Extreme (anta, mtha’) and holding to an extreme are not the same because an extreme must be something that does not exist whereas holding to an extreme must be something that does exist.
Other [that is, non-Buddhist] schools never assert that any person or phenomenon is a dependent arising, a mere conditionality (idampratyayatā, rkyen nyid ’di pa) arising in dependence on causes (hetu, rgyu) and conditions (pratyaya, ryken); they assert that these [persons and phenomena] are only truly established. All of our own schools assert that they [i.e., the non-Buddhist schools] have fallen into the abyss of the views of permanence and annihilation.
Our two Hearer (śrāvaka, nyan thos) schools [Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika] assert the dependent arising of conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta, ’dus byas) which arise in dependence on causes and conditions and assert that they thereby abandon the two extremes. They refute the extreme of permanence, such as an agent who is unchanging in nature, and the extreme of annihilation which [according to them] is the assertion that cause and effect, the four truths, and so forth are utterly incorrect.
The Proponents of Awareness Only (vijñaptimātravādin, rnam par rig pa tsam du smra ba) delineate a suchness (tathatā, de kho na nyid) which is the non-duality of object and subject. They assert that they abandon the extreme of permanence, such as the true existence of imaginaries (parikalpita, kun brtags), and abandon the extreme of annihilation, which [for them] is the assertion that the other two natures [the dependent (paratantra, gzhan dbang) and the consummate (pariniṣpanna, yongs grub)] are utterly non-existent (as was explained earlier [in the Cittamātra chapter not translated here]).
The wise Mādhyamikas assert that dependent arising means being empty of true existence, and they assert that emptiness of true existence means dependent arising; it does not mean a non-entity that lacks the ability to perform a function. Therefore, they do not need two separate reasons to refute the two extremes, and they can present [cyclic existence and nirvana] in the context of those very bases upon which a nature of true existence is refuted. Thus, the reason “[because of being] a dependent arising” alone refutes the extremes of permanence [because whatever is a dependent arising does not truly exist] and annihilation [because whatever is a dependent arising conventionally exists].
Therefore, since among our own schools, the Cittamātrins and below [that is, the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas] assert that phenomena have a truly existent nature, they come to have the view of permanence even though they do not propound that [things] are permanent. Also, since they assert that something [impermanent] that truly existed at an earlier time is destroyed in the next moment, even though they do not assert that its continuum is severed, they nevertheless come to have a view of annihilation. Therefore, once it is asserted that things have a nature of true existence, one never passes beyond the extremes of permanence and annihilation.
Specifically, the Yogācārins [Cittamātrins] assert that they abandon the view of non-existence because mentally arisen dependent phenomena (paratantra, gzhan dbang) truly exist [as the same entity as the consciousness perceiving them] and they abandon the view of permanence because dependent phenomena do not have an imaginary nature (parikalpita, kun btags) [which is a different entity from the perceiving consciousness. Thereby] they deny the conventional existence of subject and object in terms of external objects, and they superimpose [true existence] onto dependent phenomena, which [according to the Mādhyamikas] do not truly exist. Therefore, they fall to the extremes of both permanence and annihilation.
Hence, only the Mādhyamika view does not fall to the extremes of existence and non-existence and is free from the faults of permanence and annihilation; the others are not. This point [appears in] Candrakīrti’s Clear Words, which says:
According to those who assert that dependent phenomena are merely things which are minds (citta, sems) and mental factors (caitta, sems las byung pa) and that these do not have an imaginary entity [that is, a difference of entity between subject and object], they thereby abandon the view of existence [according to them]. And through the fact that these dependent things which are causes of the thoroughly afflicted (saṃkliṣṭa, kun nas nyon mongs pa) and the completely pure (vaiyavadānika, rnam par byang ba) do exist, [they say] that they abandon the view of non-existence. But because, [according to them] the imaginary does not exist and dependent phenomena do exist, they come to have both views of existence and non-existence. Therefore, how could they abandon the two extremes?1
Also:
Thus, in that way it should be known that only the Mādhyamika view lacks the consequences of being views of existence and non-existence and that the views of others, such as the Vijñānavādins, are not [free of the consequences of holding the two extremes].2
The protector Nāgārjuna says [in his Precious Garland]:
Ask the worldly ones, the Sāṃkhyas, the son of Uluka,3
And the Nirgranthas who propound that the person
And the aggregates [substantially exist4]
If they assert what passes beyond existence and non-existence.
Thus, the ambrosia of Buddha’s teaching
Explains what is called “the profound”
Passed beyond existence and non-existence.
Know that it is an uncommon doctrine.5
Therefore, if one wishes to be free from the views of permanence and annihilation, one should assert that all dependently arisen persons and phenomena have the meaning of [their] emptiness of true existence, like a moon in water [that is, not truly existent but not utterly non-existent, for a moon in water does not exist as a moon but does exist as a reflection]. Nāgārjuna’s Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:
Those who assert that dependent things
Are like a moon in water,
Not real and not unreal
Are not captivated by [wrong] views.6
Objection: The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutras (Samādhi-rāja) says:
Both existence and non-existence are extremes.
Pure and impure are extremes as well.
Therefore, having abandoned both extremes
The wise do not abide even in the center.
Also, the revered Maitreya says in his Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra) [III. 1]:
Because of not abiding here or there
Or even abiding in their center,
And knowing the equality of the times,
It is asserted that wisdom has gone beyond.
Do these passages not reject abiding even in a middle which is an abandonment of the two extremes?
Answer: Many mistaken statements, such as that the Mādhyamika system has no assertions, have arisen through this wrong idea; therefore, I will discuss it. These passages teach that one should not, like the Proponents of True Existence, abandon trifling extremes but then apprehend a middle free from them which is conceived to be truly existent and abide there. How could these [passages] teach that there is no middle free from the extremes!
Vasubandhu’s Reasonings for Explanation (Vyākhyāyukti) says:
Anta means completion, last part,
Nearness, direction, and lowness.
Thus, anta [extreme] has many usages, but with regard to its meaning in this context, the master Kamalaśīla says [in his Illumination of the Middle Way]:
If in Mādhyamika there were anything ultimate that was the nature of the mind’s own entity, then how could the conceptions, “this is permanent” or “this is impermanent” be extremes? It is not reasonable to say that proper mental application that accords with the suchness of things is a case of falling [to an extreme].
Thus, anta here is a place that one falls into, just as in the world, a rocky abyss is called anta and falling into that is called falling into an anta.
Since real existence (*samyaksat, yang dag par yod pa) does not exist even conventionally, non-real existence must exist conventionally. Therefore, [to hold that phenomena] do not ultimately exist is not a case of holding an extreme of non-existence, and making the refutation “does not ultimately exist” is not a refutation of the extreme of non-existence. Still, conceiving that the non-existence which is the negation of the object of negation really exists [that is, to believe that the negation which is emptiness truly exists] is a case of falling to the extreme of non-existence. Hence, refuting that is a refutation of the extreme of non-existence. Therefore, that is a superimpositional extreme of non-existence [superimposing true existence on emptiness] whereas [holding that] such things as actions and their effects do not exist conventionally is a deprecational extreme of non-existence [denying conventional existence]. When phenomena are conceived to exist ultimately, those [ultimately existent] objects are extremes of superimposition, and the subjects conceiving such are [consciousnesses] conceiving of the extreme of superimposition. Because those who profess to be Mādhyamikas must know these things, I have explained them briefly. They should be known in detail from the statements of the foremost omniscient being Tsong-kha-pa.7
Thus, in order to lead those disciples who temporarily are unable to realize the profound path of the middle way, the Supramundane Victor (bhagavan, bcom ldan ’das) taught some that a self of persons (pudgalātman, gang zag gi bdag) exists. To others he gave teachings stemming [from the view that] a self of persons does not exist but subjects and objects exist. To some having the Mahāyāna lineage (gotra, rigs) he said that a non-duality which is an emptiness of the duality of subject and object exists. To those of ripened faculties and surpassing intelligence he taught the middle path free from the two extremes and having the essence of emptiness and compassion. Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland says:
Just as grammarians
[Begin with reading the alphabet,
So the Buddha teaches doctrines
That disciples can bear.
To some, he teaches doctrines
For the reversal of sins.
To some, for the sake of achieving merit;
To some, (doctrines) based on duality;
To some, (he teaches doctrines) based on non-duality.
To some, the profound, frightening to the fearful,
Having an essence of emptiness and compassion,
The means of achieving (highest) enlightenment.]8
Āryadeva’s Four Hundred says:
The [Buddha] taught existence, non-existence
Both existence and non-existence, and neither.
Is it not that due to the illness
All [of these] become medicine?
The Four Hundred also says,
In the beginning non-merit is overcome.
In the middle self is overcome.
In the end all [wrong] views are overcome.
Those who understand this are wise.
Thus, that which is called the Mādhyamika view must be a combination of the two: (1) the non-existence of even the smallest particle of a truly established nature in all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena and (2) the compatibility of asserting all presentations of cyclic existence and nirvana, such as produced (utpādya, bskyed bya) and producer (utpatti, skyed byed) and negative (pratiṣeda, dgag) and positive (vidhi sgrub) [phenomena] within that [non-true existence]. If one wishes to analyze whether the views of the many Tibetan systems are the Mādhyamika view, they must be analyzed from this very viewpoint alone. This mode [of assertion] is the fundamental tenet of both Mādhyamikas—Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika—of the Land of Superiors. The Superior Nāgārjuna says [in his Treatise on the Middle Way, XXIV 18-19]:
We explain dependent arising
As emptiness.
That is dependent imputation,
That is the middle way.
Because there are no phenomena
That are not dependent arisings,
There are no phenomena
That are not empty.
Even those Mādhyamikas [the Svātantrikas] who assert existence by way of its own character (svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan) conventionally do not, in any way, assert that phenomena are truly established. Therefore, they explain the synonymity of dependent arising and emptiness that was explained above [in the quotation from Nāgārjuna]. Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for [Nāgārjuna’s] “Wisdom” says:
The emptiness that is called “dependent arising” is dependency imputed. The convention is asserted for the mundane and the supramundane. Therefore, it is imputation in dependence on appropriation. It itself is the middle path because the middle is the abandonment of the extremes of production and non-production and existence and nonexistence.
When one has gained certainty with respect to this unmistaken mode of settling the view of the basis [, the two truths,] in this way, then, at the time of path, the unmistaken essential of the inseparability of method (upāya, thabs) and wisdom (prajñā, shes rab) will come easily. One is then able to create in one’s continuum the unmistaken causes of the fruition—the two bodies [the Truth Body (dharmakāya, chos sku) and the Form Body (rūpakāya, gzugs sku)]. Therefore, one must seek to ascertain this Mādhyamika view, which is extremely important on all occasions of the basis, path, and fruition in the Mahāyāna.
Now, this [qualm] must be analyzed: If, in order to be designated as a Mādhyamika, one’s view has to be a realization of the meaning of the subtle dependent arising that is free from all extremes, then it would not be suitable for the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas to be Mādhyamikas because they do not refute the subtle extreme of existence by way of [the object’s] own character (svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan) since upon searching with reasoning for persons and phenomena—the objects designated—they posit a particular base of designation as this or that particular [phenomenon]. If a Mādhyamika were posited not [because of] refuting all extremes regarding phenomena, but through asserting a middle way that destroys all extremes in terms of his own [mind], then it would [absurdly] follow that the Proponents of True Existence [the non-Mādhyamika schools] would be Mādhyamikas because they assert their own view as the middle path from the point of view of their [particular] refutation of the two extremes.
This must be explained. In general, [if] a mode of emptiness—the refutation of an object of negation in terms of [a false system’s] tenets—is posited as the mode of being of phenomena, despite the fact that phenomena do not abide in that way, such is a mentally fabricated emptiness; it is not the meaning of the middle way. [On the other hand,] although a phenomenon abides in a way such that it is determined to be empty of an object of negation, [if] that mode of emptiness does not apply to all subjects, such is a trifling emptiness; therefore, it is not suitable to be the sphere of reality (dharmadhātu, chos dbyings), suchness (tathatā, te bzhin nyid).
Regarding that, the emptiness of forms being established as distant and cut off from the consciousness apprehending them or the emptiness [of forms] naturally being bases of conception for the thought consciousness apprehending them [asserted] in the system of the [Cittamātrin] Proponents of True Existence does not apply to all phenomena. Therefore, through those modes of emptiness one cannot realize the synonymity of dependent arising and emptiness for all phenomena, nor do those modes of emptiness apply to all phenomena. Therefore, they do not know how to posit well a refutation of the two extremes for all phenomena, nor [do they know how to posit] the compatibility of appearance and emptiness.
The Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas assert existence by way of its own character because [they say] that if existence by way of its own character is refuted conventionally, it is impossible to posit the conventional existence of an object. However, they do not assert that all phenomena are established by way of a mode of subsistence that does not depend on a non-defective awareness, and they refute (such a mode of subsistence] with numerous reasons. Because it is not the case that this type of emptiness which is such a negation [of a mode of subsistence that does not depend on a non-defective awareness] is inaccurate, it is not mentally fabricated. Also, because it applies to all conditioned and unconditioned things, it is not a trifling emptiness. Therefore, since that type of emptiness can be understood to be synonymous with dependent arising, this abandonment of the two extremes with respect to all objects is far more subtle than that of the Cittamātrins. Thus, Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas are fit to be called Mādhyamikas whereas the term Mādhyamika is not applicable to Cittamātrins. The foremost great being Tsong-kha-pa said, “These scholars also refuted the tenet of true existence of phenomena through many doors of reasoning and asserted non-true existence well. Hence, they are Mādhyamikas.” It should be understood in this way. Avalokitavrata says:
The knowledge that external and internal dependent arisings conventionally exist as mere illusions capable of performing functions and ultimately are without entityness is the mode of the perfection of wisdom taught by the proponents of the middle path, the Superior (Nāgārjuna] and his [spiritual] son [Āryadeva], Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita, and so forth.
However, those who realize the very subtle meaning of dependent arisings are only the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas.