The presentation of the tenets of the Mādhymikas has two parts: (1) the division of definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation by Nāgārjuna and his spiritual sons and (2) the actual explanation of their tenets.
THE DIVISION INTO DEFINITIVE SUTRAS AND THOSE REQUIRING INTERPRETATION BY NĀGĀRJUNA AND HIS SPIRITUAL SONS
The section has two parts: citing what is said in the sutras and an explanation of the meaning of those [statements].
Setting Forth Statements from Sutras
An explicit statement by the protector Nāgārjuna [identifying] a sutra source by means of which he divided scriptures into the definitive (nītārtha, nges don) and those requiring interpretation (nēyartha, drang don) does not appear in the Superior’s own works, such as the “Collections of Reasoning” and the Compendium of Sutra. However, an implicit indication exists in the way he explains the meaning of sutras. The glorious Candrakīrti establishes [the division of scriptures] citing the Teaching of Akṣayamati (Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra). Avalokitavrata also explains [the division] in that way in his explanatory commentary to Bhāvaviveka’s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”. In addition, the master Kamalaśīla in his Illumination of the Middle Way uses that same sutra as the source for the division into definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation. Thus, just the Teaching of Akṣayamati is the source for the division into the definitive and that requiring interpretation.
This is what the sutra itself says:1
If it is asked, “What is a sutra of definitive meaning? What is a sutra whose meaning requires interpretation?” Sutras that teach the establishment of conventionalities are called [sutras] whose meaning requires interpretation. Those sutras that teach the establishment of ultimates are called [sutras] of definitive meaning. Sutras that teach by way of various words and letters are called [sutras] whose meaning requires interpretation. Those sutras that teach the profound—difficult to see and difficult to realize—are called [sutras] of definitive meaning. Sutras which teach things that must be expressed by way of various words [such as] self, sentient being, living being, the nourished, creature, person, born of Manu, child of Manu, agent, and experiencer in the manner of [there being a truly existent] controller, for instance, when there is no [truly existent] controller are called [sutras] whose meaning requires interpretation. Those sutras that teach the doors of liberation—emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, no [truly existent] composition, no [truly existent] production, no [truly existent] birth, no [truly existent] sentient beings, no [truly existent] living beings, no [truly existent] persons, and no [truly existent] controllers—are called [sutras] of definitive meaning. This is called relying on sutras of definitive meaning and not relying on sutras whose meaning requires interpretation.
The Purpose of the Master’s [Nāgārjuna’s] Division Into the Definitive and the Interpretable
From among the doctrines taught by the Supramundane Victor (bhagavan, bcom ldan ’das) in many forms—existence and nonexistence, truth and falsity, and so forth—some [persons] become doubtful as to which have true meanings and which have false meanings and some have mistaken ideas who, because of their own low intelligence, mistake the interpretable for the definitive and similarly mistake the definitive for the other [the interpretable. Nāgārjuna] clearly made the distinction between the interpretabie and the definitive for them with the intention of fulfilling their purposes. The glorious Candrakīrti says [in his Clear Words]:2
Some have the doubt, “Here, what is the teaching that has the meaning of suchness? Here, what is that which has a special intention?” Also, some due to having a weak intellect, think that inter pretable teachings are definitive. In order to eliminate with reasoning and scripture the doubt and misunderstanding of both of those [types of people], the master [Nāgārjuna] composed this [Treatise on the Middle Way].
Regarding the way in which [Nāgārjuna] differentiated the definitive and interpretable, he stated all qualms that the meaning of definitive sutras should be interpreted in another way and refuted [those qualms] well, bestowing highest certainty regarding the path of purification from the point of view of many reasonings. He also established that meaning [of definitive sutras] by way of scripture, that is, with the word of the Supramundane Victor as witness. Thus, at the end of the passage [quoted above], the glorious Candrakīrti says:3
Regarding that, reasonings are stated by [Nāgārjuna’s] saying such things as [MMK 1.1]:
From themselves, other,
[Both, or causelessly
Things are never produced
At all, anywhere].
Statements of scripture are such [stanzas] as [MMK XIII.1]:
The Supramundane Victor said that deceptive
[Phenomena are falsities.
All products have the quality of deception.
Therefore, they are falsities].
With respect to the actual meaning of [the passage quoted from] the Teaching of Akṣayamati, the first two sentences which begin, “Sutras that teach the establishment of conventionalities ...” differentiate definitive and interpretable sutras from the point of view of their object of expression; they are not posited from the point of view of such things as the place and time [of the teaching. Those sentences] also briefly indicate that sutras that mainly teach conventionalities are categorized as interpretable and sutras that mainly teach ultimates are categorized as definitive. The next two sentences, which begin, “Sutras that teach by way of various words and letters ...” identify sutras that teach conventionalities and sutras that teach ultimates. Teachings of a variety of different objects with a variety of different words and letters are categorized as the former [sutras that teach conventionalities] and teachings of the meaning that is difficult to realize and that is of one taste [in the sense of being] an elimination of elaborations are categorized as the latter [sutras that teach ultimates]. The last two sentences that begin, “Sutras which teach things that must be expressed ...” indicate the mode of teaching of conventionalities by which [a sutra] comes to set forth conventionalities and the mode of teaching ultimates by which [a sutra] comes to set forth ultimates.
[The part of the sentence] from “a [truly existent] controller” through “experiencer” taken literally gives only synonyms for “person,” but in fact does not refer only to persons; it must refer to all teachings of things that are objects and actions related to that agent as existent. For example, the chapter that is an analysis of coming and going [chapter II] and the chapter that is an analysis of action [chapter VII] in Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way refutes all qualms that, if the goer who comes here from another worldly life and goes from this one to another exists, then the person must truly exist and [the qualm that] if the agent of virtuous and non-virtuous actions exists, then the person must truly exist. Therefore, although [these chapters] teach both agent and action, they must be taken as chapters that principally delineate the selflessness of persons [since agent and actions are phenomena directly related to the person]. In the same way, this [passage from the sutra] must be taken as having individual parts that indicate both phenomena and persons. The second sentence, from “emptiness” through “no [truly existent] birth” principally indicates the mode of the selflessness of phenomena (dharmanairātmya, chos kyi bdag med). “No [truly existent] sentient beings” through “no [truly existent] controllers” principally indicates the mode of the selflessness of persons (pudgalanairātmya, gang zag gi bdag med).
The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (VII.5) says:4
Instances of definitive sutras are known
To accord with the Sugata’s teaching of emptiness.
All doctrines teaching sentient being, person, or creature
Are known to require interpretation.
With respect to that, “interpretation” [literally: drawing or leading] in the sense of an interpretable scripture does not refer merely to teachings for the sake of leading disciples. Either (1) the meaning of the sutra is not suitable to be held in the way in which it is set forth and through explaining the [basis in Buddha’s] thought, must still be interpreted otherwise, or (2) even though [the meaning of the sutra] is suitable to be taken literally, still, it alone is not the mode of being—the suchness—of those [phenomena discussed], due to which their suchness must be sought elsewhere. Thus, their meaning is interpretable—the meaning requires interpretation.
An example of the first is [the statement in the Purposeful Statements (Udānavarga, XXIV.23)5] “Father and mother are to be killed.” Since the literal meaning of the statement to kill one’s father and mother is not suitable to be taken as it is, it must be interpreted otherwise—[that one should destroy] the existence (bhava, srid pa) [the tenth link in the chain of dependent arising, the fully potentialized state of] karma and attachment (tṛṣṇa, sred pa) [the eighth link]. Such an interpretation is still interpretable in the latter sense [because the final mode of being of existence and attachment—their emptiness—still has not been set forth]. An example of the second is the teaching that resources arise from giving, despite the fact that its meaning is suitable to be taken literally. Someone might say that the production of resources through giving is the mode of being of that [giving] and that a mode of being of giving which is other than that does not exist. [In response to that qualm, one would] explain that the mode of being of giving is not merely that; its suchness must be sought elsewhere.
Definitive meanings are taught in the manner of eliminating elaborations of self, [truly existent] production, etc. with respect to phenomena and persons. Since the explicit meaning itself is the final mode of being, (1) it cannot be interpreted beyond that, (2) it is not suitable to be intrepreted as something other than that by another person, and (3) it also has valid proofs. Therefore, its meaning is definite—it is a definitive meaning. Although there are valid proofs for a statement such as that a sprout is produced from a seed, its meaning requires interpretation since [the statement] does not deal with the ultimate.
Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way says, “What is the definitive meaning? It is that which has validity and is explained in terms of the ultimate because it cannot be interpreted otherwise by another.”6 Thus, he says that a definitive meaning must be a combination of that which has valid proofs and which teaches the ultimate. If the definitive and the interpretable referred merely to the existence or non-existence of a meaning which accords with how it is taught, having validity alone would be sufficient and it would not be necessary [for Kamalaśīla] to add the qualification “in terms of the ultimate.” Thus, one must carefully distinguish the presence of special implications in portions of the statements of the great charioteers.
When the categorization into the definitive and interpretable is divided from the point of view of the means of expression, since the categorization must be made in terms of whether or not the meaning of a scripture must be interpreted in another way, only scriptures are to be taken as illustrations of the definitive or interpretable. Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way says, “Therefore, it is to be understood that only that which expresses the ultimate is definitive and the opposite of that is interpretable. ... Also, the Teaching of Akṣayamati teaches that the non-[true] existence of production, etc. are definitive.”7
When the definitive and interpretable are divided in terms of the object of expression, then the object itself which must or must not be interpreted otherwise has to be categorized as definitive or interpretable. Therefore, conventional truths (saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa) are categorized as interpretable, and ultimate truths (paramārthasatya, don dam bden pa) are categorized as definitive. The Ornament Illuminating the Wisdom Engaging the Sphere of All Buddhas Sutra (Sarvabuddhaviṣayāvatārajñānālokālaṃkārasūtra) which says, “That which is definitive is the ultimate,” and the passage from the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra cited earlier establish this.
Kamalaśīla’s second Stages of Meditation says, “All of the words of the Supramundane Victor were spoken well because they directly or indirectly clarify suchness or flow to suchness.” As he says, [all] doctrines whatsoever spoken by the Conqueror are for the purpose of attaining liberation. This is contingent on knowing that liberation cannot be attained through familiarity with conventional truths alone and that liberation must be attained through the force of meditation, having interpreted [conventional truths] and sought out suchness.
Qualm: Statements such as those in a Mother Sutra [a Perfection of Wisdom sutra] that “Form does not exist, the production of form does not exist,” are not sutras of definitive meaning because they are not suitable to be taken literally.
Answer: These are not non-literal sutras because the Extensive Mother Sutra [the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas (Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra)] affixes a qualification to the object of negation, saying “This is for the conventions of the world, not ultimately.” The qualification of the object of negation in that way in one context applies to statements in other places in that Perfection of Wisdom text in which the qualification is not affixed. Therefore, although [the qualification “ultimately”] is not explicitly stated in this context [of saying that form does not exist], that does not make it non-literal.
With respect to this, according to the Svātantrikas, statements within sutras such as the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas that explicitly apply the qualification “ultimately” to the object of negation are definitive and literal. [Statements] without words that clearly affix the qualification “truly” [or “ultimately”] to the object of negation in sutras such as the Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya) cannot be taken literally and therefore are asserted to be interpretable, requiring interpretation in another way. Therefore, they assert that the statement in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra) that the middle wheel [of Buddha’s teaching, the teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom sutras] requires interpretation is not saying that all [sutras] of the middle wheel [require interpretation].
The Prāsaṅgikas assert that the Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom and so forth are sutras of the middle wheel that do not explicitly affix the qualification “ultimately” to the object of negation. However, since they are similar in type to sutras that clearly affix the qualification “ultimately,” such as the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas, the qualification is implicitly affixed to the object of negation in those [sutras] as well. Therefore, they are only literal and definitive. That the words of the sutra, “Form does not exist, sound does not exist,” and so forth teach that forms, sounds, etc., are utterly non-existent is not suitable even to be taken literally. Therefore, the words of a sutra, “Form does not exist,” are necessarily not words of a sutra teaching that forms do not exist.
Thus, the protector Nāgārjuna set forth many faults, such as that dependence on causes and conditions is contradictory when internal and external causes and effects have a nature of true existence, and he established with many proofs that all presentations of bondage (bandha, ’ching ba) and liberation (mokṣa, grol ba) are feasible within the lack of a truly existent nature. [He thereby] proved that sutras that teach suchness, like the Mother Sutras, are definitive and sutras teaching what does not accord with those are interpretable. Therefore, Nāgārjuna’s “Collections of Reasoning” such as the Treatise on the Middle Way open the way for distinguishing the definitive and interpretable. Furthermore, the fact that this mode of distinguishing the definitive and the interpretable relies on the Teaching of Akṣayamati can be known through Nāgārjuna’s own mode of explanation.
Question: How does one interpret the statement in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought that if dependent natures are seen as not truly existent, it produces a view deprecating all three natures?
Answer: That statement is made in terms of the thoughts of disciples who, though having the Mahāyāna lineage, lack the supreme mind that realizes suchness, because for disciples who possess the supreme mind that realizes suchness, the very realization that dependent phenomena do not truly exist serves as a method of refuting the view of deprecation [because it aids realization of the conventional existence of phenomena].
Thus, in general, sutras of the middle wheel such as the Perfection of Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Stanzas are definitive and sutras of the last wheel such as the Sutra Unravelling the Thought are in ter pretable. However, it is not contradictory that in terms of those disciples [who have not realized suchness], the final wheel becomes definitive and the middle wheel requires interpretation. For example, generally, between the teachings of self and selflessness, the latter is better, but it is not contradictory that the former is better for disciples who are temporarily not suitable vessels for the teaching of selflessness. Thus, as long as those disciples cannot understand the non-contradiction of the non-existence of even a particle of true establishment (*satyasiddhi, bden par grub pa) and the suitability of making all presentations [of phenomena] within that [non-true existence], they must be taught doctrines which divide phenomena, with some being true [that is, truly established] and some being untrue. This is because they must be led in stages, being taught a portion of selflessness, and because the selflessness taught to them is not feasible for their minds if the basis in relation to which it is posited does not truly exist.
Therefore, this is the reason for statements refuting inherent existence (svabhāva, rang bzhin) in the person but not refuting it in the aggregates and statements refuting a difference of substantial entity (dravya, rdzas) between object and subject but not refuting the inherent existence of the emptiness of duality [of subject and object].
There are many points based on these that should be explained in detail, and knowing these well appears to be a supreme door for those with intelligence to generate firm, authentic faith in the word of the Conqueror and the valid treatises commenting on his thought.