The refutation of the Proponents of True Existence has two parts: a demonstration of the incorrectness of their explanation of the three natures and a demonstration of the incorrectness of their explanation that external objects do not exist.
THE INCORRECTNESS OF THE [CITTAMĀTRIN] EXPLANATION OF THE THREE NATURES
Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.8-9] says:
All the words of the Tathagathas
Explained here are valid for us,
For they are believable, valid scriptures.
The good assert that [these] are proven.
Others who have doubt and wrong ideas
From other scriptures do not accept them.
Therefore, in order to engage in proving them
The rational procedure should be sought.1
This explains that since the Vijñaptikas [Cittamātrins] ascribe faults to the Mādhyamikas that are not valid and [since] the [Mādhyamikas’] own system is valid, all the cases in which the Cittamātrins take the Mādhyamikas as the opponent should be refuted.
Regarding the mode of refutation, that same text says [V.10], “Non-dualistic things [are not reasonable] ...” This refutes the true establishment of consciousnesses which are empty of duality [of subject and object] and indicates the unreasonableness of refuting external objects. Bhāvaviveka also refutes the Cittamātrin presentation of the three natures with statements such as [at V.55], “The imaginary does not exist ...”
With respect to that, the Cittamātrins say:
The subject, imaginary natures, lack entityness (svabhāvatā, ngo bo nyid) in the sense of lacking their own character (lakṣaṇa, mtshan nyid) because of being entities which are completely superimposed, as is the case, for example, with imagining a rope to be a snake.
[Bhāvaviveka says] that this is not correct because of the indefiniteness of the reason. Does the reason, “because of being entities which are completely superimposed,” mean that an own-character (svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan) of an imaginary entity is utterly non-existent, like a snake which is imputed to a rope? Or does it mean that because [imaginary natures] are objects of expression by terms and thought consciousnesses, the own-character of imaginary entities, like the entity of the rope, does exist? If you say that even the rope is not established by way of its own character, that [position] is damaged by worldly renown, because in the world it is renowned that there exists an entityness of rope, which is water and hemp twisted with the exertion of human hands. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.55] says:
It is not asserted that “the imaginary does not exist
Because of being imputed, like a snake [to a rope]”
Due to indefiniteness concerning the entity of the rope.
Or [if you say that the rope does not exist by way of its own character, your position] is damaged by [worldly] renown.2
Furthermore, in the example, the factor of wrong imputation—the snake—and the basis of imputation, the rope which exists by way of its own character, both exist. Similarly, in the case of the meaning [that is exemplified], the mistaken factor—the imputer—and the non-mistaken factor of the imputed entity, the basis of imputation, must both exist because, in the example, “like imputing a snake to a rope” stated by you, there are mistaken and unmistaken factors in the basis of imputation and the imputation, and there must be similarity between the example and the exemplified. However, you are not able to accept that [both exist] because you assert that entities of imputation do not exist by way of their own character, and since entities of imputation do not exist by way of their own character, they must not exist. Even incurring that fault, it is not correct that objects which are imputed as entities and attributes do not have an entityness of their own character because objects which are imputed as entities and attributes exist by way of an entityness of their own character conventionally. Thinking of this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.56ab] says:
That [imputed entity] is not mistaken
Because [the example] is seen to have many factors [erroneous and not erroneous].3
Furthermore, your explanation that entities of imputation are mistaken in all ways is not correct because, if that were the case, conventional phenomena would be denied, and because if conventionalities did not exist, it would be impossible also to realize ultimate entities—the objects of individual knowledge (pratyātmavedya, so so rang gis rig pa)—as well. Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.56cd] says:
You deprecate things because
You refute objects in all ways.4
Also, Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning says:
If you say that things which are not literal entities are hardly like the objects of individual knowledge, it would still be contradictory to the presentation of conventional truths because sutra says, “It is impossible to realize the ultimate without conventional phenomena.”5
The Cittamātrins also say:
Although external objects do not exist, the appearance of the signs of [external] objects occurs in dependence on names and terminology. Since all conceptions are produced from that, it is correct that the imputations do not have an entityness of own-character.
[Bhāvaviveka responds that] this is also incorrect because animals such as birds and deer who do not know names, letters, etymologies, and terminology are seen to generate great afflictions (kleśa, nyon mongs). Thus, external objects such as forms which are the objects [in relation to which] these afflictions are produced only exist. To explain this the Essence of the Middle Way [V.57] says:
Even without names there are afflictions;
It is not the case that objects appear from using names
Because of the production of afflictions
Even in animals who do not know speech.6
Also, the commentary following the stanza says, “It should be known that forms and so forth in dependence on which the afflictions are produced are only externally existent objects.”7
Furthermore, you Cittamātrins’ proving to us that dependent phenomena exist by way of their own character is meaningless because if you are proving [that they exist that way] conventionally, you would be proving what is already established, since we also assert that dependent phenomena are established by way of their own nature conventionally. If you are proving that they exist by way of their own character ultimately, then that is even more incorrect because an example which has the sign [reason] and predicate of the proof that dependent phenomena ultimately exist cannot be found.
The reason stated by you, “Things do not have entityness because of lacking a nature of expression” has the fallacy of being contradictory because the sign—lacking a nature of expression—eliminates that the subject—things—ultimately exist. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.71] says:
To say that dependent phenomena exist conventionally
Would be to prove what is [already] established [for us].
If [you say that they exist] ultimately,
There is no example and the reason is contradictory.8
This is also clearly explained in the commentary following this [stanza],9 but fearing excess, I will not cite it.
Also, your assertion that the consummate nature—the suchness which is the emptiness of duality [of subject and object]—is ultimately existent is not correct because if consummate entities exist ultimately, freedom from the extreme of superimposition would not be possible, since they ultimately exist, and if the entity which is non-uitimate existence [itself] ultimately exists, one is not free from the extreme of deprecation. Furthermore, if consummate natures are ultimately established, it would follow that the exalted wisdom perceiving the modes (yathāvajjñāna, ji lta ba gzigs pa’iye shes) would have observation [of signs of true existence], and [it would follow that] complete, perfect enlightenment (samyaksaṃbodhi, yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub) would lack equality [since it would perceive both ultimate and non-ultimate existence]. In order to explain these fallacies, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way (V.95, 97] says:
If an entity of the nature of existence and non-existence
Were ultimate,
How are you free
From the extremes of superimposition and deprecation?10
The Teacher would not be without observation [of true existence]
Because he would observe [a truly existent] reality.
Enlightenment would not be equal
Because different natures would appear to it.11
The commentary following this says:
If the observation [of the true existence] of the reality which is the consummate entity exists, then the Teacher—the Supramundane and Victorious Buddha—would not be without observation [of true existence] because of observing [an ultimately existent] reality. Hence, [your assertion] contradicts such scriptures as that which says:
The Buddha has the character of space
Space also has no character.
Homage to you who is without observation,
Free from illustration and definition.
The enlightenment of the Teacher would also be unequal. Why? Because the two—the reality called the consummate entity and the exalted wisdom which perceives it—would be different. If they were two in that way, how could clear realization of the two entities be equal?12
[Bhāvaviveka’s mode of] flinging the fallacy of the consequence that enlightenment would be unequal not only damages the Cittamātrins’ assertion that consummate natures are truly established, but also damages their assertion that there manifestly exists a self-knower (svasaṃvedana, rang rig) which directly realizes the exalted wisdom at the time of meditative equipoise on suchness within the vanishing of dualistic appearance:
Also, you Cittamātrins assert that:
The various appearances of objects, sense powers, and consciousnesses are established merely through the force of their respective potencies being deposited on the mind-basis-of-all (ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi’i rnam par shes pa).
[Bhāvaviveka counters that] in that case, the generation of an awareness observing suchness in the continuum of common beings (pṛthagjana, so so skye po) would be very contradictory [that is, impossible] because the potency for a mind observing suchness could never have been placed on the mind-basis-of-all in the continua of those common beings earlier [without their actually having realized reality directly, in which case they would not be common beings, but Superiors (ārya, phags pa)]. If there is such production without that potency, then, in your system, the mind observing suchness would be causeless, like an awareness perceiving a flower in the sky. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.98] says:
How can an awareness observing suchness
Arise without the depositing of a potency?
It is as infeasible as a mind seeing a sky-flower
Without the depositing of its potency.13
Also, the commentary following that says:
It is not feasible that a potency which was never deposited before on the mind-basis-of-all could be posited later. It is like the infeasibility of an awareness being produced which [actually] sees a flower in the sky.14
Regarding these reasonings, the opponents [Cittamātrins] assert that external objects do not exist but the appearance of objects arises only from the power of potencies on the internal basis-of-all, and they assert that the potencies are truly established as well. Therefore, [although] there is no fault within the context of conventionalities, within true establishment, reasoning entails that once a potency was not deposited [in the past], it cannot be deposited later. This is probably [Bhāvaviveka’s position], for this discussion in the Blaze of Reasoning is prior to these passages where it says, “It [the consummate nature] is in all ways inexpressible because of being empty of entityness. Such an entity [i.e., a consummate nature] is treated as ultimate.”15 Also, the root text, the Essence of the Middle Way [V.95], says: “If an entity of the nature of existence and non-existence/Were ultimate.”
These very extensive statements—in the root text and commentary of the Essence of the Middle Way—of the master Bhāvaviveka’s refutation of the Cittamātrin presentation of the three natures do not seem to have been explained clearly by anyone. Since they are extremely subtle points of reasoning by a great charioteer, I have written what could be figured out with small intelligence hoping that this might serve as a cause for the intelligent to look at these texts. Thus, I ask them to look at length at the texts themselves.
This master [Bhāvaviveka] also set forth a brief refutation of the Cittamātrin presentation of the three natures in his commentary of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way, the Lamp for (Nāgārjuna’s) “Wisdom”, which is kindly explained in the foremost great being Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence of the Good Explanations. I want to explain that elsewhere.
THE INCORRECTNESS OF THE [CITTAMĀTRIN] EXPLANATION THAT EXTERNAL OBJECTS DO NOT EXIST
Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.15] says:
If [you say] the awareness [perceiving] forms is not correct
Because [you] assert that it perceives [them] as [external] objects,
Then your reason is mistaken
And your thesis falls apart.16
The commentary preceding that says:
[The Cittamātrins] assert that any awareness which lacks the conception of object and subject accords with the fact in reality, but an awareness [apprehending] forms and so forth, although non-conceptual, is not correct because of perceiving [them as external] objects, as is the case with an awareness seeing the appearance of a double moon.17
With regard to the meaning of this, the reason stated by the Cittamātrins [is as follows]:
The subject, a direct perceiver (pratyakṣa, mngon sum) [that is, a directly perceiving consciousness] apprehending blue which perceives blue as of a different nature from itself [that is, the awareness], is not non-mistaken as to what it perceives because of being a knower which perceives an object as other [than it is, i.e., as an external object], as is the case, for example, with a sense consciousness perceiving a double moon.
[In the quotation from Bhāvaviveka’s commentary above], “although non-conceptual” indicates that the subject (dharmin, chos can) is a direct perceiver; “is not correct” indicates the probandum (sādhya, bsgrub bya)—mistaken with respect to appearance—, and “because of perceiving [them as external] objects” indicates the reason (hetu, gtan tshigs).
With respect to [how Bhāvaviveka] expresses the fallacy in this [position], it is not a correct reason (samyakhetu, gtan tshigs yang dag) because the subject—an awareness [apprehending] forms—and the reason—a perceiver of objects—are not different because when the meaning of the reason is established, the entity of the subject is already established as false [because the establishment of the subject must be separate from the establishment of the reason]. The commentary following [the stanza] says:
For, an awareness [apprehending] forms does not have an entity separate from a perceiver of apprehended objects, whereby a correct inference of [it as] a perceiver of apprehended objects is eliminated. Thus, since the entity of the subject is established as incorrect, it is contradictory [to your own theories of logic.]18
Furthermore, the assertion of mind only, without external objects, is not correct because of being damaged through contradiction with [the Cittamātrins’ own] assertion and through [worldly] renown. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.17] says:
If only mind is observed
And forms and so forth are not apprehended,
Your thesis is damaged
Through assertion and renown.19
The way that [their own] assertion is contradicted is that [the nonexistence of external objects] contradicts [their] acceptance of the scripture which says, “An eye consciousness arises in dependence on the eye and form.” The damage done by renown is that it is renowned in the world that without an object, such as a form, eye consciousnesses and so forth which apprehend them are not produced.
Also, the Cittamātrins say:
Objects do not exist, but consciousnesses are produced, as is the case, for example, with a dream consciousness.
This is also incorrect. Even in dreams forms are seen by a conscious eye which is affected by beginningless predispositions (vāsanā, bag chags) for objects and subjects. Therefore, even a dream consciousness has an object of observation (ālambana, dmigs pa), like a consciousness remembering the blue seen before. Thus, the example is not similar [to the exemplified]. In addition, because [the Cittamātrins] abandon objective things, such as forms, they also deprecate objects. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V. 18-19] says:
Thus, because appearances are produced,
Like the awareness of forms and so forth in dreams,
Consciousness lacks [external] objects such as forms.
Saying such is unsuitable.
Since consciousnesses in dreams and so forth
Observe phenomena,
Even an example does not exist
And objects are deprecated.20
Though the commentary to this states, “with a conscious eye”21 rather than “dream consciousness,” it is not being asserted that sense consciousnesses are present in dreams, but rather it is being explained that, in general, consciousnesses which see dream forms have objects of observation.
Also, the Cittamātrins say:
The existence of external objects is not feasible because it is incorrect if you assert that a single minute particle is an object [of a sense consciousness], and it is also incorrect if you assert that an aggregation of many minute particles is an object [of a sense consciousness]. The first [part of the reason] is established [since] a single minute particle is not an object of sense consciousnesses because of not appearing as a thing which is an object of a sense consciousness, as is the case, for example, with the physical sense powers (indriya, dbang po) [which are subtle matter and hence invisible to the senses]. The second [part of the reason] is established [since] an aggregation of many minute particles is not an object of a sense consciousness because of not being substantially established (dravyasiddha, rdzas su grub pa), as is the case, for example, with the appearance of a double moon.
[Reporting the Cittamātrin position] in that way, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.32-33] says:
Regarding that, a single particle
Is not an object of operation of an awareness of form
Because of not appearing to it
Just as a physical sense power is not an object of operation [of a sense consciousness].
Many minute [particles of] form
Are not held to be objects of operation of the mind
Because of not being substantially existent
Like, for example, a double moon.22
In answering this, [Bhāvaviveka says that] if you are proving that an individual minute particle, that is, a single minute particle which has not aggregated with [other particles] of a similar type, is not the object of a sense consciousness, then you are proving what is already established [for us], because we also do not assert that it is the object of a sense consciousness. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.34] says:
Regarding that, if the opponent
Is proving that a non-composite form
Is not the object of operation of a mind,
Then he would be proving what is already established.23
If you are proving that a form which is a composite of minute particles of a similar type is not an object of operation of a sense consciousness because of not being substantially established, then that reason is not established for us because we assert that a composite of conjoined minute particles is a substantially existent thing. We assert that such a composite object is an object of observation of a sense consciousness because it produces the sense consciousness apprehending it into having its aspect (ākāra, rnam pa). To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.35-36] says:
[If (you say that objects do not exist because of being) composite forms,
The reason would not be established]
Because a composite of other [particles of] form
Produces an awareness which perceives it.
We assert that [composite] to be the object of observation
Because it serves as the cause of the awareness perceiving it,
As is the case with desire. Therefore,
Your thesis is damaged by inference.24
Regarding the reason for this, the autocommentary says:
A form which is a composite of minute particles of a similar type is asserted to be the object of observation itself. Why? Because such a composite of minute particles serves as the very thing which causes the awareness perceiving that composite form. That which serves as a cause for the awareness perceiving it is observed to be a composite, just as it is asserted, for example, that desire which has the character of attachment to an object observes just the composite of the form of a woman, and so forth. Therefore, your thesis, “A form which is a composite is not an object of observation,” is damaged by this inference.25
[The Cittamātrin thesis is] contradictory to scripture [because] it contradicts the scripture which says that the abodes [sense powers] and objects of observation of the five collections of consciousness are composites.
If you [Cittamātrins] are proving that an aggregation of minute particles is not an object of observation of a sense consciousness, then we incur no fault because we also do not assert that an aggregation of minute particles is an object of observation of a sense consciousness. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way (V.38cd] says:
Since we do not hold the thesis that an aggregation [is an object of a sense consciousness],
Your refutation of that does not damage [us].26
What is the difference between the two, a composite (saṃcita, bsags pa) and an aggregation (saṃghata, ’dus pa)? A collection of minute particles of a similar type with the same basis is called a composite. A pot, for example, is composed through combining many minute particles of a similar type which are its basis of composition. A collection in one place of minute particles of dissimilar types of substances with many bases, such as an army, a forest, or a rosary, is called an aggregation.
In addition, many [topics] are set forth, such as a refutation of the observed-object-condition (ālambanapratyaya, de ma thag rkyen) as explained in Dignāga’s Analysis of the Object of Observation (Ālambanaparikṣā) and an analysis of whether minds (citta, sems) and mental factors (caitta, sems byung) are the same or different substantial entities (dravya, rdzas). I will not elaborate on these here.
THIS MASTER’S REFUTATION OF SELF-KNOWERS (SVASAṂVEDANA)
The Cittamātrins say:
When a consciousness meets an object, it is produced as an entity with two parts: an appearance having the aspect of the object apprehended and an appearance having the aspect of the apprehending subject.
[According to Bhāvaviveka] this is incorrect because, apart from the appearance in the aspect of the object, there is no appearance in the aspect of the subject itself. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.20cd] says:
Except for the appearance as the object
What other entity of the mind is there?27
[In answer] to this, [the Cittamātrins] say:
It is not established that another [part] does not exist because the consciousness itself abides in its own entity and because it is produced as having the aspect of another object, as is the case, for example, with a crystal jewel.
This means that when a lump of crystal is placed near an object, such as [something] blue, the crystal’s own entity is clear, but through the power of being near that object it also possesses an aspect such as blue. Similarly, [the Cittamātrins] assert that when perceiving an object, a consciousness also has two aspects: an aspect of the apprehended which is the appearance as the object and the aspect of the apprehender which is the appearance as itself.
[Bhāvaviveka asserts] that this is not correct because the example is not similar to what is being proved. When a lump of crystal is placed close to an object, such as [something] blue, through the power of the object it loses the undefiled clarity of its own entity and comes to have an aspect such as blue. However, that which is a former moment of that clear crystal does not come to have the aspect, such as blue, because it has already ceased. Thus, the former moment of the clear crystal ceases by the power of being placed near the object and its later moments are produced so as to have the aspect of blue. Thus, to think that it is just the crystal of the former moment [that becomes blue] is mistaken. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.21-22ab] says:
We do not assert that, like a crystal,
The two [object and subject] appear because [the subject] is produced like the other [the object].
For it is produced as that [object]
Due to being placed nearby and is not the [former] moment of the crystal.
We assert that, since it has ceased, it is wrong to think
That it is produced as the other [the object].28
Furthermore, the aspects of apprehended and apprehender do not exist because the clarity of consciousness having an entity of selfillumination, which like the crystal when it is not close to, but is separated from, an object like blue, is never apprehendable in utter isolation.
Also, although it is suitable that a lump of crystal appears as having the aspect of blue when it is placed near a color such as blue, in no way is the crystal itself transformed into the entity of the color, such as blue, nor is the color transformed into the entity of the crystal. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow that the lump of crystal was the color or that the color was the lump of crystal. Similarly, when a consciousness is near a form, such as earth, the consciousness is produced as having the aspect of earth, but neither is consciousness itself transformed into the entity of form nor is the form itself transformed into the entity of consciousness. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow that earth and so forth would be sentient or that even mind would be mindless like earth and so forth. These [arguments] are stated in Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning, but fearing excessive length I will not cite the sources.29
After that, he refutes the Cittamātrins’ sign of the definiteness of simultaneous observation and refutes the Cittamātrin presentation of valid cognition (pramāṇa, tshad ma) and its effect. One should look there [in the Blaze of Reasoning] for an extensive treatment.
[REFUTATION THAT MIND-ONLY IS TAUGHT IN SUTRA]
The Cittamātrins say:
Your refutation of mind-only is not correct because it is stated in a scripture of the Supramundane Victor [the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Daśabhūmika)], “These three realms are mind only.”
There is no fault because the meaning of this scripture is that this was said in order to refute the existence of an agent or enjoyer which is other than the mind, such as that imputed by the Forders (tīrthika, mu stegs pa) [non-Buddhists]; it was not so stated in order to refute external objects. In this way, the Sutra on the Ten Grounds says:
A Bodhisattva on the sixth Bodhisattva ground viewing dependent arising in forward and reverse order thinks, “These mere aggregates of suffering, devoid of an agent or experiencer, arise from the twelve branches, ignorance and so forth, and the tree of suffering is manifestly established.” O Children of the Conqueror, because it is definite that way, it is thus: the three realms are mind only, they are completely composed and written by mind; there is no agent or experiencer whatsoever other than mind.
Thus, the meaning of the passage is not a refutation of external objects.
Also, the Cittamātrins say that the emptiness of external objects is the intention of sutra because the “Questions of Maitreya Chapter” (Maitreyaparipṛccā) of the Perfection of Wisdom in Twenty-Five Thousand Stanzas (Pancaviṃsatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra) says:
What is the form of reality? It is that which is the permanent non-entityness of imaginary forms [imaginary natures] in imputed forms [dependent phenomena]; [it is] the selflessness of phenomena itself, the limit of reality, and so forth. It is not substantially existent and not non-substantially existent because the emptiness of superimposed objectivity and consciousness exist.
With regard to the meaning of this passage, [Bhāvaviveka replies] that it is a proof of the consciousness which perceives the emptiness of that which is superimposed; it is not establishing a consciousness without an object, because the object which is the form of reality—the object of a Tathāgata’s individual knowledge—exists. Thus, since objects which are not superimpositions are not refuted, consciousness is in no way empty of objects which are a different substantial entity from it. To explain this, Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [V.29] says:
If, due to the emptiness of superimposed objectivity,
You are proving that consciousness [is devoid of external objects],
Since objects which are not superimpositions exist,
It is not the case that objects do not exist.30
The meaning of that is to be taken as explained above. I do not think that the thought of the passage is to be interpreted that, “... because if the object—the form of reality—which is the object of the individual knowledge truly exists, an object which is not a superimposition exists,” for this master [Bhāvaviveka] asserts that there are external objects but does not assert that there are truly existent objects. Also, the statement in the autocommentary, “The.object that is the form of reality exists,” proves that an object which is a different substantial entity from consciousness exists but in no way proves that reality is an external object, nor does it imply that it [reality] truly exists. The statement in the autocommentary that, “Since that which is the thing that is not a literal entityness exists, [a non-imputed object exists]”31 refers to the existence of an object which is empty of a superimposed entity; it should not be taken as an inexpressible thing, as is asserted by the Cittamātrins.