10 Refutation of Ultimate Existence

THE REASONING REFUTING THAT [OBJECT OF NEGATION]

In general, the five great reasons¹ are asserted in this system because most of them are stated in Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning and because the refutation of the four alternatives of production is emphasized in the root text and commentary of Jñānagarbha’s Two Truths. However, in the interest of ease in proving the sign and similar example (*sadṛṣtanta, mthun dpe), they primarily use a reasoning of parallelism in which the reason is shared.

In the root text and commentary of Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way, [all phenomena] are included in the five aggregates (skandha, phung po), the twelve sources (āyatana, skye mched), and the eighteen elements (dhātu, khams), and from among those, going from coarse to subtle, he first analyzes the form aggregate (rūpaskandha, gzugs kyi phung po), and within that, the elements (bhūta, ’byung ba). Bhāvaviveka’s Essence of the Middle Way [III.26] says:

Here, earth and so forth

Are not entities of the elements ultimately

Because of being produced

And because of having causes, like a consciousness.²

“Earth and so forth” identifies the specific subjects (dharmin, chos can) and the term “and so forth” identifies water, fire, and wind [also] as bases of debate. “Are not entities of the elements ultimately” indicates the predicate (dharma, chos). “Ultimately” indicates that the conventional entities [of the elements] are not refuted, and that an existence by way of the object’s own mode of subsistence without being posited by the power of the awareness to which it appears is refuted. “Are not entities” indicates that between negative phenomena (pratiṣedha, dgag pa) and positive phenomena (vidhi, sgrub pa), a negative phenomenon is held as the predicate, and that from among negative phenomena, only a non-affirming negative (prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag). The commentary says, “Here, the negative ‘is not’ is taken to mean a non-affirming negative and is not taken to mean an affirming negative (paryudāsapratiṣedha, ma yin dgag)”³ The combination of the predicate and the subject is the position (pakṣa, phyogs). “Because of being produced” indicates the reason (hetu, gtan tshigs).

Regarding the elimination of fallacies [ascribed to Bhāvaviveka’s] position, [the following objection might be raised].

Objection: Your proof that earth and so forth are not entities of the elements is not correct because of contradicting [your own] assertions, contradicting direct perception (pratyakṣa, mngon sum), and contradicting [worldly] renown.

The first [reason, that your position contradicts your own assertions] is established because a scripture of the Teacher says, “Brahmins, ‘everything’ is [included in] the five aggregates, the twelve sources, and the eighteen constituents,” and “Similarly, the definition of form is that which is suitable as form.” Such statements set forth phenomena such as the aggregates as well as their definitions, whereas you refute these phenomena while asserting those scriptures to be valid.

The second [reason, that your position contradicts direct perception] is established because, when one engages in ascertaining the specific character of objects, a sense (indriya, dbang po) [consciousness] is renowned as a direct perceiver (pratyakṣa, mngon sum), and there is no valid cognizer (pramāṇa, tshad ma) which surpasses its perception, and while you yourself perform actions such as seeing and apprehending with the eyes the shapes of the elements, forms, and so forth, you refute those [elements] and disavow direct perception.

The third [reason, that your position contradicts renown] is established because earth and so forth as well as its hardness are renowned to everyone in the world, from the lowest class on up.

Answer: None of these three fallacies exists because we have affixed the qualification “ultimately” to the thesis. Furthermore, the first fallacy does not exist because the presentations of the entities and characters of phenomena were made by the Supramundane Victor in terms of the conventional and are said not to have entityness ultimately. The Perfection of Wisdom says:

Kauśika, all phenomena lack entityness. That which is the lack of entityness in all phenomena is non-true existence. That which is non-true existence is the perfection of wisdom.

The second fallacy also does not exist because the sense consciousnesses are stupid with respect to seeking the nature [of phenomena], and because a person with cataracts does not have a capacity for [true] seeing and so forth, but he perceives falling hairs.

The third fallacy does not exist because worldly persons are incapable of investigating the nature [of phenomena] due to being under the influence of obscuration, whereas this is a case of analyzing the ultimate.

Regarding the meaning of the reason, “because of being a product,” “product” is that which is established by causes (hetu, rgyu) and conditions (pratyaya, rkyen). With respect to the statement of concomitance with the similar class (sapakṣa, mthun phyogs), whatever is a product is not an entity of the elements ultimately, as is the case, for example, with a consciousness. Here, an example and reason for a proof [of product] as just not existing in the dissimilar class (vipakṣa, mi mthun phyogs) are not indicated because there does not exist even the smallest particle of a thing which has entityness and is [a member of] the dissimilar class in the proof of that.

“Because of having causes and so forth” indicates other forms of reasons, such as having causes, being a [functioning] thing (bhāva, dngos po), being an object of knowledge (jñeya, shes bya), and being an object of expression (vākya, brjod par bya ba).

Here, the important point is that if something ultimately existed, it would have to exist by the power of the object’s own mode of subsistence without being posited by the power of the awareness to which it appears. Thus, since it would have to exist under its own power, it could not depend on anything else. Therefore, as they are similar in being products, there would be no valid cognizer that could make the distinction that consciousness is not an element and that earth and so forth are elements [ultimately]. Thinking of this, [Bhāvaviveka] set forth a reasoning of parallelism in which the reason is shared, as [explained] before. Hence, this must be understood well.

Furthermore, in Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning, the progression of reasoning is the same in setting forth many analyses, such as of instances of the elements, the other aggregates, the sources, the constituents, definitions (lakṣana, mtshan nyid), illustrations (lakṣya, mtshan gzhi), the functioning of production (utpatti, skye pa) and disintegration (vināśa, ’jig pa), and bondage (bandha, being ba) and liberation (mokṣa, thar pa).

Regarding the proof [that these do not ultimately exist] from the point of view of scripture, the Supramundane Victor said:

Those which are internal earth constituents and those which are external earth constituents are for the Tathagāta non-dualistic objects, are non-dual, not to be treated as dualistic. For he is perfectly and completely enlightened with respect to no-character and sameness of character.

And:

When analyzed with awareness,

Forms do not actually exist.

Therefore, I say that the elements do not exist

And true existence does not exist.

The reasoning of the lack of being one or many is also stated; Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning says:

Even the Tathāgata does not ultimately exist because of not being observed to be the same as or different from his body, like self, sentient being, person, and so forth.

Regarding the scriptures which prove that [phenomena] exist like illusions conventionally, such statements are made in sutras as:

The Tathāgata is a reflection

Of uncontaminated virtuous qualities.

Though there is no reality or Tathāgata in these,

An image appears to all the world.