A Study of Svātantrika

THE REASONING REFUTING TRUE EXISTENCE

In his Ornament for the Middle Way, the master Śāntarakṣita exhaustively explains just the reasoning of the lack of being one or many, which is an analysis of the entity [of objects]. In doing so, he is explaining the thought of such sutras as:

When phenomena are mentally broken up,

An entity is not apprehended.

Therefore, these are explained to be without expression

And also without entityness ...

Also, the Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra) says:

These phenomena [such as] trees should be known

To be like the appearance of a reflection,

Which does not inherently exist,

[Appearing] in a very clear mirror.

My explanation of “emptiness of inherent existence”

Should [itself] also be viewed as empty.

And the Descent into Laṅkā says:

The entities of things are like

Appearances [of things] in a mirror

Which do not exist there

Because of lacking oneness or otherness ...

In his Illumination of the Middle Way, the great master Kamalaśīla set forth many ways in which the Cittamātrins oppose the Mādhyamikas, and in explaining answers to those [objections] he used many scriptures and reasonings. In terms of reasonings, he extensively set forth the diamond silvers, the refutation of production from the existent and non-existent, the refutation of the four extremes of production, the lack of being one or many, and the reason of dependent arising. Here, I will speak briefly just about the reason of the lack of being one or many.

Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

These things propounded by ourselves and others,

Because they lack in reality

A nature of unity or plurality

Do not inherently exist, like a reflection.¹

Thus, he states the sign, and with respect to proving the modes (rūpa, tshul), there are two parts: the proof of the property of the position (pakṣadharma, phyogs chos) and the proof of the pervasion (vyāpti, khyab pa). The first of these has two parts: the proof of the lack of true unity and the proof of the lack of true plurality. The first of these has two parts: the refutation of true pervasive unity: the refutation of true unity in permanent phenomena and impermanent things imputed by our own and other schools and the refutation of the true unity of the person imputed by the Vātsīputrīyas; and the refutation of true non-pervasive unity: the refutation of external objects that are composed of partless particles and the refutation of the true unity of consciousness imputed by the two Proponents of [External] Objects [the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas].

For the proof of the lack of true plurality, the non-existence of the true unity itself is stated as the sign. The proof of the pervasion is accomplished just by proving that one and many are explicitly contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive.

If this were explained extensively in connection with the texts, it would indeed be good but would be far too much. Therefore, I will explain just the essence of the meaning.

Here, regarding what is held as the subject (dharmin, chos can), just things that are imputed by our own and other schools, such as the principal (pradhāna, gtso bo) and a self-sufficient person are permissible because it was explained in the Sautrāntika chapter [not translated here²] that it is permissible to hold a non-established base [a non-existent] as the subject when the sign (liṅga, rtags) and predicate (dharma, chos) being proven are mere eliminations [non-affirming negatives]. Also, from among the three types of non-established [reasons] (asiddhahetu, ma grub pa’i rgyu mtshan) in relation to a fact (artha, don), in relation to an awareness (buddhi, blo), and in relation to [another] party (pakṣa, rgol pa)—the explanation of the five types of non-established signs with respect to the first [those in relation to the fact], such as the reason’s not being established due to the non-existence of the entity of the subject, refers to when the sign and predicate being proven have a positive aspect; it is not definite [that the reason is not established] when the sign and predicate being proven are non-affirming negatives. Specifically regarding this point, the master Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way says:

For one who does not wish to prove a phenomenon that is a thing to be an existent entity but wishes to express a mere proof of an elimination of a phenomenon that is a superimposition, the expression of faults, such as not being established, does not require, even conventionally, a subject that is a thing because it [the reason] is not a quality of it [the subject] and because [the subject] is not feasible as the possessor of the quality that is based on that [subject]. Even though it is not established [as such], a reason that has [the relationship] such that if [the predicate of] the probandum (sādhyadharma, bsgrub par bya ba) did not exist it would not occur, is not prevented from establishing the meaning being sought.

Thus, it is clearly stated that a subject which is an actuality is not necessary when the sign and the predicate being proved are mere eliminations. However, it was already analyzed earlier [in the Sautrāntika chapter] whether or not when generating an inferential cognizer, the meaning-of-the-term (śabdhāartha, sgra don) [generic image] of a mere subject is needed as the basis for establishing pervasion for the mind of the other party.

Objection: If the sign and the predicate of the probandum of this syllogism of the lack of being one or many are only non-affirming negatives, then it is not feasible that the probandum is proved because the entities of the sign and the predicate of the probandum themselves do not exist, and if they do not exist, then it is not feasible that they are the same entity, in which case there is no relationship of one essence [between them] whereby it is not suitable that they be the object understood and the means of understanding. If you say that the sign and the predicate of the probandum are affirming negatives, that is also not feasible because, if that were the case, there would have to exist an actuality (bhāva, dngos po) which is the lack of the nature of unity or plurality, and the Mādhyamikas do not assert that.

Answer: There is no fallacy because, since the relationship of one essence is not just for [impermanent] things, non-[impermanent] things also have it [and in this reasoning the predicate of the probandum and the sign are non-affirming negatives, permanent phenomena]. Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way says, “Here, [one] essence is another way of saying that [two things] lack being different entities, and even these [two] non-entities [the sign and predicate] are also similar [in being] selflessnesses.” His idea is that if a difference of entity is refuted with respect to existents (sat, yod pa), they become the same entity, and, since it is also refuted that in general they [the sign—not being a truly existent unity or plurality—and the predicate of the probandum—not ultimately existing] are one, they have the relationship of one essence in the sense of being different within being one entity, and since the sign [not being a truly existent unity or plurality] and the predicate of the probandum [not ultimately existing] are both similar in being entities of selflessness, it is not contradictory that although they are non-affirming negatives, [the predicate of the probandum] is the object understood and [the sign] is the means of understanding. Also, Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way says:

That is not correct because [one] essence is another way of saying non-difference [of entity], and because those non-entitynesses are similar [in being] selfless, [this] is just non-contradictory.

Also:

In the same way, when things are, in reality, in opposition to being a nature of unity or plurality [i.e., the sign], like a reflection, it is definite that they are also in opposition to being ultimate entities [the predicate of the probandum]. Therefore, [the reason and the predicate of the probandum] are different in relation to [different] particulars of opposition, whereby [the predicate of the probandum and the sign] can serve as those things that are the object understood and the means of understanding.

Regarding this point, earlier Tibetan scholars have said that when the appearance of non-true existence is proved through the appearance of the lack of being one or many, an affirming negative is proved, and when the lack of being one or many proves the emptiness of the suitability of applying the verbal designation “ultimate thing,” a non-affirming negative is proved. Such statements are due to their not having understood these points and due to their not understanding that it is a fundamental tenet of Nāgārjuna and his spiritual sons to hold that the predicate of probandum in the proof of non-true existence is only an elimination.

It is stated in Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way that the reasoning set forth by the statement, “These things propounded by ourselves and others ...” [see p. 357] in Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way may be taken either as a statement of refutation—a consequence (prasaṅga, thal ’gyur)—or as a statement of proof—a syllogism (prayoga, sbyor ba).

Objection: If it is taken as a consequence, it is not suitable to state, “Because they lack, in reality, /A nature of unity or plurality” as a reason for the lack of being either a truly existent unity or plurality because in a consequence an assertion of the opponent is stated as the sign, and then a consequence must be thrown that is not wanted by the opponent [but in this case, the sign is not asserted by the opponent].

Answer: There is no fallacy because although the sign, the lack of being a truly existent unity or plurality, is not explicitly asserted by the opponent, it is implicitly asserted. This is because the opponent explicitly asserts an object of pervasion by that sign and because, if he explicity asserts the object pervaded, he comes to assert implicitly the pervader as well. As Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way says:

Regarding this, if [this reason is used] to prove a consequence, it is not the case that the reason is not established because, although the opponents have not asserted that things lack being either one or many, since they assert phenomena that are pervaded by that, they just assert that implicitly as well.

Objection: It is not correct that, since the pervaded is explicitly asserted, the pervader is implicitly asserted because otherwise, even the Nihilists would come to assert former and later lifetimes and omniscience. This is because the Nihilists assert that this life’s consciousness exists, and it is pervaded by being preceded by the consciousnesses of previous lifetimes. Also, they assert that the four elements exist, and their existence is pervaded by being seen by an omniscient consciousness. If you say that you are not propounding that those parties assert these but that they come to assert them implicitly, that is also incorrect because, if that were the case, when one phenomenon was expressed, that term would implicity express all phenomena which exist as pervaders of that [phenomenon] and the awareness which is induced by that term would implicitly ascertain those [phenomena].

Answer: I will discuss this. Here, if the way in which the pervader is implicitly asserted due to explicitly asserting the pervaded were merely a case of generally having to assert the pervader implicitly when the pervaded is asserted, then it is true that those faults would be incurred. However, the meaning of [Kamalaśīla’s] text is stated in that way considering the opponent’s explicit assertion of a special object pervaded by not being a truly existent unity, which is asserted implicitly. Thus, there is not fault.

This is illustrated with the example of a permanent Īśvara asserted by the opponent. Regarding their mode of assertion that Īśvara is permanent, they assert that everything about Īśvara himself that exists in the morning also exists in the evening. Therefore, they do not assert that some of Īśvara’s factors that exist in the morning exist in the evening, but other factors do not exist in the evening; they assert that all the factors that exist at the earlier time exist at the later time and that there are not factors that exist at the later time that did not exist at the earlier time. Thus, their not asserting that the factors of being Īśvara are mutually different is the way they assert that Īśvara is permanent and one. Therefore, that is the reason for saying that they do not explicitly assert that Īśvara lacks a nature of unity.

Also, they assert many phases of such an Īśvara, producing effects, like happiness in the morning and suffering in the evening. One who asserts such a serial creation of effects implicitly asserts that [Īśvara] is not a truly exist one because, since there must be a serial existence of the Īśvaras at many different times of producing pleasure and pain, Īśvara must have many stages and these Īśvaras are partless unities. In this way, one can understand the manner in which an object pervaded by not being a truly established unity is also asserted with respect to other bases, such as the principal [of Sāṃkhya] (pradhāna, gtso bo), time [of Vaiśeṣika] (kāla, dus), and so forth.

Regarding these points, although a pot is posited as an illustration of a unity in our own system and in asserted to exist in both the morning and the evening, the pot of the morning is not asserted to be one with the pot of the evening, and those two are posited as illustrations of plurality. Also, blue is asserted to be one, and it serially produces many earlier and later consciousnesses apprehending blue. One must know the reasons why these fallacies [adduced to the opponent above] do not apply [to our own position].

These [points] are the meaning of [this statement from] Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way:

Regarding this, those who imagine Īśvara and so forth to be a permanent and single entity assert [that Īśvara has] the quality of creating the occurrence of his effects serially. Therefore, they implicitly assert [that Īśvara] lacks an entityness of unity because [if Īśvara were] one entity, due to Īśvara’s not being different from the state of non-production, it is not suitable [for Īśvara] to be a producer at a later time, since he was not at a former time. If he is a producer [at a later time], since Īśvara would be an entity that is of a discordant character from the earlier state [of non-production], unity falls apart.

Permanent and single [phenomena] that are imputed by the non-Buddhist Proponents of Permanence—such as the person (puruṣa, skyes bu), principal (pradhāna, gtso bo), time (kāla, dus), and Brahmā as well as the three unconditioned phenomena (asaṃskṛta, ’dus ma byas) that are propounded to be permanent things (*nityabhāva, rtag pa’i dngos po) by the Vaibhāṣikas among our own schools [those three being space (ākāśa, rnam mkha’), analytical cessations (pratisaṃkhyānirodha, so sor brtags ’gog), and non-analytical cessations (apratisaṃkhyānirodha, so sor min pa’i brtags ’gog)], the inexpressible person propounded by the Vātsīputrīyas, and the consciousnesses that is imputed to be a truly existent entity by the Cittamātrins are set forth extensively in that text [the Illumination of the Middle Way] in terms of their respective modes of asserting [some sort of] non-unity—the object pervaded that is [used as] the reason [why they implicitly assert] the lack of truly existent unity.

There are many different subtleties in logically forcing our own and other schools to assert implicitly the lack of truly existent unity. Also, with regard to our own schools, there are many subtle differences in how the demonstration of logical damage applies to the opponent’s assertion for the system of the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas] and the Vijñaptikas [Cittamātrins]. These should be known in detail.

If one investigates by striving for many causal collections, such as not being satisfied with detailed analysis of the texts of the great charioteers until one’s intelligence is [as sharp] as the point [of a blade] of kuśa grass as well as properly relying on a skillful spiritual guide, one will find the essential points of the subtle path of reasoning of the great charioteers. Although one studies over months and years until the flesh is wasted at merely arranging statements that reveal nothing to oneself other than training the mouth to speak, it would seem to be difficult to understand [the essentials].

I will briefly explain how the modes of the sign of this reasoning are proved when it is treated as an autonomous [syllogism] and whether [this sign] proves a meaning or an expression. The proof of the modes has two parts, the proof that the reason is a property of the subject³ and the proof of the pervasion. The first [that the reason is a property of the subject] has two parts, the proof of the lack of being a truly existent unity and the lack of being [a truly existent] plurality.

The Proof of the Lack of Being a Truly Existent Unity

The subjects, the principal (pradhāna, gtso bo) and so forth, are not established as a truly existent unity because of being involved in many series of assistance to many former and later series of effects. If one thinks that there is no fallacy because there are many different potencies that create many different former and later effects, then it follows that the subjects [the principal, etc.] are not truly permanent and unitary because, due to having a series of effects, their former and later natures arise and disintegrate. To explain this, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

Because of being involved in series of effects

The permanent does not have a nature of unity.

If there are different [potencies] for each of the effects,

Then their permanence would disintegrate.⁴

With regard to the refutation of the assertion by others of our own [Buddhist] schools that the three unconditioned phenomena that are objects known by a Superior’s exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise arisen from meditation (bhāvanāmayī, bsgom byung) are truly existent unities, the subjects, the three unconditioned phenomena, are not truly one, because of being in the relationship of subject and object with many series of former and later consciousnesses arisen from meditation. To explain this, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

Also, for a system which propounds that

The three unconditioned phenomena

Are objects which are known by a consciousness arisen from meditation,

Those are not one because of being related with series of consciousnesses.⁵

If you say that it is not contradictory for these objects to exist as truly existent unities even though they are related to series of consciousnesses, then, if the object of knowledge that is the object of a former consciousness exists at the time of a later consciousness, the former consciousness must also exist at that [later] time because object and subject are simultaneous. If you accept that, then it [absurdly] follows that the former and later consciousnesses arisen from meditation are disordered.

If you say that the object of the former consciousness is not present at the time of the later consciousness, then it follows that the subjects, those unconditioned phenomena, are momentary because of being things whose former nature does not occur at a later occasion and whose later nature does not occur at a former occasion, like a consciousness arisen from meditation.

Or, the subjects, the later [moments of these] unconditioned phenomena, are not unconditioned phenomena because of arising in dependence on the power of the earlier unconditioned phenomena, as is the case, for example, with the minds and mental factors arisen from meditation. If you say that the reason is not established, then it follows that these subjects arise under their own power because of arising without depending on other causes. If you accept that, then it follows that [these unconditioned phenomena] either exist permanently or are utterly non-existent because of being things that do not follow from causes. In explanation, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

If the nature of the objects known

By the former consciousness follows later,

The former consciousness would become later

And the later would similarly become former.

If their entities do not arise

At the former and later times,

It should be known that the unconditioned,

Like consciousness, would be momentary.

Since they arise through the power

Of earlier moments

They would not be unconditioned,

Like minds and mental factors.

If you assert that [the unconditioned]

Arise by their own power in these moments,

Then, since they do not rely on another,

They exist permanently or do not exist.⁶

Concerning these modes of refuting the truly existent permanent unities asserted by our own and other schools, it is essential that one know well the way in which the opponent asserts [phenomena] to be unitary due to which they have the burden of the fallacy. Otherwise, if one refutes mere unity and mere permanence with those reasonings, all the fallacies stated about the others will undeniably apply equally to oneself, whereby it will be difficult to explain the texts of the great charioteers without error.

Refutation of the Truly Existent Unitary Person Asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas

It follows that the subject, the person, lacks being a truly existent unity or plurality because of inexpressible as permanent or impermanent, like a flower in the sky. It follows [that it is inexpressible as permanent or impermanent] because if it were momentary, it would have a plural nature, and if it were not momentary, it would be suitable as a single entity, but since [according to the Vātsīputrīyas] it is inexpressible as either [momentary or non-momentary], there is no difficulty in establishing that it is empty of a nature of unity or plurality. To explain this, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

Since it is unsuitable [according to the Vātsīputrīyas] to indicate that the person

Is momentary or non-momentary,

It is clearly known that it lacks

A nature of being one or many.⁷

Refutation of a Truly Existent Pervasive Unity

The subjects, space (ākāśa, rnam mkha’), time (kāla, dus), and so forth are not truly existent unities, because of being related with a composite of directional parts, such as east, and temporal parts, such as the past. To explain this, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

Because of being related with different directions,

How can pervasives be one?⁸

The Refutation of Truly Existent Gross [Objects That Are] One

The subjects, gross objects such as pots, are not truly existent unities because of involving conjunctions of contradictions in terms of substance, such as being obstructed and not obstructed; in terms of activity, such as moving and not moving; and in terms of quality, such as being colored or not colored.. To explain this, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

Because of factors such as being obstructed and not being obstructed,

Gross phenomena also are not one.⁹

Refutation of Minute Particles That Are Truly Existent Unities

It follows that the subject, a minute particle that dwells in the middle of particles in the ten directions, does not have a different location from the eastern particle and the remaining nine particles because its side that faces the east and its sides that face the other nine directions are the same. If you accept that, then it follows that gross objects such as earth could not be formed [because they would have no extension]. If you assert that there are individual sides that face the ten directions, then it follows that the subject, that minute particle, is not a partless unity because of having many sides that face particles in the ten directions. To explain this, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

[Particles] either abide in contact,

Circling, or without interstice.

What is the nature of the central particle

That faces an [other] particle?

If you say that that which faces other particles

Is the same [side of the central particle],

How would earth, water, and so forth

Become extensive?¹⁰

If the side facing another particle

Is asserted to be other [than other sides]

How could a particle

Be a partless unit?¹¹

Since partless minute particles are not established in that way, one can know that the ten physical constituents (dhātu, khams) [the five sense powers (indriya, dbang po), and the five sense objects] propounded by our own schools and the substance (dravya, rdzas), quality (guṇa, yon tan), action (karma, las), generality (sāmānya, spyi), particularity (viśeṣa, bye brag), and inherence (samavāya, ’du ba), and so forth imputed by other schools are not truly established. Specifically, if one knows that the ten physical constituents propounded by our own schools do not truly exist, one knows that the five constituents that are consciousnesses also do not truly exist because they are produced in dependence upon the physical constituents. If the five constituents that are consciousnesses do not truly exist, it is not correct that the mental consciousness (manovijñāna, yid kyi rnam par shes pa), which is established through [their] acting as [its] immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya, de ma thag pa’i rkyen), is truly established. If the six collections of consciousness are not truly established, it is not feasible that the mental constituent, [which is comprised of] those consciousnesses just passed, truly exists. If main minds (citta, sems) do not exist in that way, mental factors (caitta, sems las byung ba) such as feeling (vedanā, tshor ba), discrimination (samjñā, ’du shes), and intention (cetanā, sems pa), which are non-different in establishment and abiding with that [main mind], are easily established as not truly existing. Therefore, non-associated compositional factors (viprayuktasaṃskāra, ldan pa ma yin pa’i ’du byed) and non-revelatory forms (avijñāptirūpa, rnam par rig byed ma yin pa’i gzugs), which are propounded to be established through the great elements (mahābhūta, ’byung ba chen po) acting as causes, can be known to be not established as truly existent unities. Also, unconditioned phenomena (asaṃskṛta, ’dus ma byas) such as space have been refuted earlier.

Therefore, the autocommentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way states that it is easy to realize that all eighteen constituents are not established as truly existent unities. That is how to apply the reasoning refuting objects that are truly existent unities to the refutation of subjects as well.

Regarding the specific reasoning that refutes a truly existent unity with respect to consciousness, the root text and commentary of the Ornament for the Middle Way extensively explain the reasoning proving the lack of truly existent unity from the viewpoint of three modes of refutation and so forth in terms of the refutation of the Vaibhāṣika system, which asserts consciousness as aspectless (anākāra, rnam med), and the refutation of the systems of the Non-Pluralists, Half-Eggists, and Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects in the Sautrāntika system. With respect to the refutation of the non-Buddhist systems, there are refutations of the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika systems, the Kṣayaṃkara [Jaina] system, the Cārvāka system, the Sāṃkhya system, and the Guhyavedānta system. The Cittamātra system is refuted from the viewpoint of the refutation of the True Aspectarians (satyākāravādin, rnam bden pa) and the False Aspectarians (alīkākaravādin, rnam rdzun pa), and with regard to the former [the True Aspectarians], by way of how they assert aspect (ākāra, rnam pa).

Regarding [these modes of refutation], it appears that the tradition of explaining and listening to the three texts illuminating Svātantrika [Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way, Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way, and Jñānagarbha’s Two Truths] was very widespread in the Land of Snow Mountains at the time of the earlier dissemination of the teaching as well as at the time of such [figures] as the great translator from Ngok (Lo-den-shay-rap) and his spiritual sons during the later dissemination. As a consequence, the tradition of explaining and listening to [these texts] was still widespread at the time of the foremost Tsong-kha-pa and his spiritual sons. Hence, this is the reason why, with the exception of a few essential points of reasoning that have not been dealt with by earlier [scholars], they [Tsong-kha-pa, Gyel-tsap, and Kay-drup] did not extensively explain each type of reasoning, aligning it with the Svātantrika texts. That this is the case can be known from some remarks of the foremost Tsong-kha-pa and from Kay-drup-ma-way-nyi-ma’s Thousand Doses.

Nowadays it is as if the tradition of explaining and listening within the framework of these texts has disappeared. On the occasion of explaining the expression of worship of Maitreya’s Ornament for Clear Realization with Haribhadra’s Clear Meaning Commentary (Sphuṭārthā), when the phrase “because of lacking an entity of one or many” comes up, people only repeat, like counting [om] mani [padme hum], whether beginning and end are complete or not, [what] appears in the arrangements of words by earlier scholars, explaining a little about the lack of being one or many. Through this, their pride fancying that they know well the reason of the lack of being one or many becomes firm. Aside from that, it appears to be rare for anyone to direct his mind to how to expand the reasonings, how to seek understanding, and so forth in connection with the basic texts.

The foremost great being Tsong-kha-pa’s Differentiation of the Interpretable and Definitive (Drang nges rnam ‘byed) [also known as the Essence of the Good Explanations] says:

It indicates that in whatever is asserted by our own and other schools, there does not exist anything partless that does not have many parts such as temporal series, or parts of the object, or aspects of an object of consciousness.

“Temporal series” [indicates] the principal, the person, Īśvara, a permanent self, and so forth as well as the three permanent unconditioned things propounded by the Vaibhāṣikas. “Parts of the object” [indicates] gross objects, such as pots, and partless particles. “Aspects of objects of consciousness” [indicates] consciousness in accordance with the five non-Buddhist systems, the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas], and the two Cittamātrin systems [True and False Aspectarians]. Tsong-kha-pa is saying that one needs to know the adaptations of the reasoning proving that [these phenomena] individually have many parts.

After that, Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence of the Good Explanations says:

When [phenomena] are established as having many parts, it is not contradictory for one phenomenon to exist as an entity of many parts, within conventionalities. However, damage is done to ultimate establishment [due to the fact that] if parts and whole are different entities, they would be unrelated and if they are the same entity, the parts would become one [because the whole is one] or the whole would become many [because the parts are many].

This indicates the need to know how the adaptations of the reasoning refuting truly existent unity or plurality apply to the individual assertions about those phenomena by our own and other schools and the need to know the modes of refuting true existence with that [reasoning]. Furthermore, when refuting [them], one should affix the qualification “truly” [or “ultimately”] in relation to the thought of the opponent. Because, in general, [there are cases when the opponent’s position] must be refuted in terms of both truths [ultimate and conventional], there are some cases in which it is not necessary to affix the qualification “truly.” However, in most cases, the qualification “truly” must be affixed. Once either their [the opponents’] system asserts a permanent partlessness, or even though they do not explicitly assert it, they are logically forced such that it is impossible for them not to assert partlessness, one demonstrates logical damage upon putting together [their] contradictions with the general non-occurrence of the partless. There are many such distinctions.

These are the ways to refute the object of negation imputed by our own and other schools, but in order also to refute the object of the innate conception of true existence, one must know well how damage is done by these reasonings. For, if phenomena were established in the way that they are held to be by the conception of true existence, they would have to be established as the object’s mode of subsistence, and that would be a mode of subsistence that did not rely on an awareness. Although I am capable of expounding in detail on the specifics of these, since I fear the burden of too many words, let us leave it just at that.

The Proof of the Lack of Being a Truly Existent Plurality

The subjects, those things propounded by ourselves and others, are not established as a truly existent plurality because of the lack of a truly existent unity. [If there is no truly existent unity, a truly existent plurality cannot be established] because a plurality has the character of a composite of ones. To explain this, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

When anything is analyzed

It is without unity.

That which does not have unity

Also is without plurality.¹²

And the commentary following that says:

For a plurality has the character of a composite of unities. If a unity does not exist, [plurality] also does not exist, just as if trees and so forth do not exist, forests and so forth do not exist.¹³

The Proof of Pervasion

In general, in order to ascertain the existence of the sign in the similar class (sapakṣa, mthun phyogs) and the non-existence [of the sign] in the dissimilar class (vipakṣa, mi mthun phyogs), three valid cognizers (pramāṇa, tshad ma) are necessary:

1 a valid cognizer that ascertains the instance (lakṣya, mtshan gzhi) of the sign [in this proof],

2 a valid cognizer that refutes [that there is] a common locus of the sign and the object of negation (pratiṣedhya, dgag bya) and

3 a valid cognizer that ascertains that the predicate of the probandum (sādhyadharma, bsgrub bya’i chos) and the object of negation are a dichotomy.

With respect to the first, the valid cognizer that ascertains the lack of a truly existent unity or plurality has already been explained here. With respect to the other two, regarding the valid cognizer which ascertains that true existence and non-true existence are a dichotomy, since it is ascertained that existence and non-existence are a dichotomy such that by the exclusion of one the other is included, one eliminates the superimposition that a third category might occur with respect to true existence and non-true existence whereby, through merely turning one’s mind [to them], one can ascertain that [true existence and non-true existence] are a dichotomy.

Objection: Since true existence lacks being a truly existent unity or plurality, does the sign not occur in the dissimilar class?

Answer: That alone does not constitute the occurrence of the sign in the dissimilar class; in order for the sign to occur in the dissimilar class, a common locus that is both the object of negation and the sign must occur, and since a common locus that both truly exists and lacks being a truly existent unity or plurality does not occur, there is no fault.

Regarding the ascertainment with valid cognition that a common locus of those two does not occur, the valid cognizer which ascertains that one and many are a dichotomy such that if one is excluded the other is included eliminates superimpositions of a third category that is both one and many or neither [one nor many] with respect to mere existence. Having thereby also, with respect to true existence, eliminated superimpositions [that there is] a third category that is both a truly existence unity and plurality or neither [a truly existent unity nor plurality, one can ascertain that a common locus of the lack of being a truly existent unity or plurality and true existence does not occur merely by turning one’s mind to it. This was stated by the omniscient Kay-drup.

Also, Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way says:

Things which have an aspect

Other than one or many

Are not feasible because

These two are mutually exlcusive.¹⁴

The commentary following that says at the point of proving the pervasion of this reason, “Since a nature of unity and a nature of plurality are characteristics that abide in mutual exclusivity [as a dichotomy], another category is eliminated.”¹⁵ Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way says:

Those which pervade all aspects are eliminators of another category, for example, particularities such as physical and non-physical. One and many are like that. Through eliminating the pervader [i.e., one and many], it is definite that the pervaded [true existence] is eliminated whereby there is no doubt that the reason [i.e., not being one or many] is eliminated from the discordant class [true existence] because another category does not occur.

Objection: Does the valid cognizer that ascertains the pervasion in the proof of the person as not truly existent by the sign of lacking being either a truly existent unity or plurality ascertain the pervasion of the emptiness of true existence with respect to all categories of instances of the lack of being a truly existent unity or plurality? If it does ascertain [it with respect to everything], then it follows that the inferential cognizer that comprehends the probandum in the proof of that does not newly eliminate superimpositions. If you say that it does not ascertain [that pervasion with respect to all phenomena], that is not correct because if the emptiness of the generality (sāmānya, spyi) is ascertained, the emptiness of the particularities (viśeṣa, bye brag) is necessarily ascertained.

Answer: Kay-drup-ma-way-nyi-ma says:

The valid cognizer that comprehends that the permanent is empty of [being a] product does not ascertain the non-occurrence of [being a] product with respect to all categories of the instances of the permanent, but it does eliminate the superimpositions of conceiving [the permanent] as being [products such that] at a later time, through merely turning the mind to a specific permanent phenomenon, the ascertainment of its emptiness of [being a] product is induced without relying on another valid cognizer.

Objection: Then, the valid cognizer that ascertains the forward pervasion (anvayavyāpti, rjes khyab) would have to be able to eliminate the superimpositions of apprehending that all categories of instances of products are not necessarily impermanent, in which case it would [absurdly] follow that when the forward pervasion is ascertained, superimpositions with respect to the probandum are necessarily eliminated.

Answer: This is not similar because although there is pervasion by the generality, there is not necessarily pervasion by its particulars and when the generality is negated, the particulars are necessarily also negated.

It is asserted that here it is the same.

Gyel-tsap-rin-bo-chay says:

Although one might allow that the valid cognizer that ascertains that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent ascertains, in relation to product, sound’s emptiness of being permanent, it does not ascertain the emptiness of being permanent in the context of taking sound as the substratum. Thus, there is no fault. The valid cognizer which ascertains that all categories of the instances of products are necessarily impermanent does not ascertain that whatever is sound’s productness is necessarily impermanent; rather, the probandum must be established when, having turned the mind to sound’s productness, the assemblage of impermanence in all categories of the instances of products becomes the object of a valid cognizer. Hence, one does not incur the fault of the [absurd] consequence that the valid cognizer which comprehends the modes proving that [sound is impermanent] establishes the probandum.

Both the former [Kay-drup’s] and latter [Gyel-tsap’s] assertions seem for the most part to agree in their position, and the Great Table of Contents [?] (Sa bchad chen mo) speaks similarly to the matter.

When the assertions of the two sons are arranged in accordance with the thought of the foremost Tsong-kha-pa, [the position is as follows]. The valid cognizer that ascertains the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent neither implicity realizes that sound is impermanent nor does it remove the superimpositions of apprehending that sound is permanent. When the valid cognizer that ascertains the three modes is produced, it can generate an awareness the mode of apprehension of which explicitly contradicts the superimpositions that conceive sound to be permanent in dependence on its [the awareness’] force without the need for an intervening valid cognizer. Therefore, there is no fault that the probandum is established when the pervasion is ascertained. Also, between those [the valid cognizer ascertaining the three modes and the inferential consciousness realizing the probandum], there is no need to state another sign that produces the inferential cognizer.

This appears to be the fundamental thought of all three, the foremost omniscient father [Tsong-kha-pa] and his sons [Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup]. Also, I think that it also accords with the thought of the [Indian] texts and that the procedure is similar here in this context [of the reasoning of the lack of being one or many] as well.

Regarding this, it seems good that some later scholars have used the term “realization through the power of reasoning” which is neither explicit realization nor implicit realization, but it is not suitable for “realization” here to refer to realization by that valid cognizer [which ascertains the three modes] because when statements in Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Commentary to [Nāgārjuna’s] Treatise on the Middle Way and Kay-drup’s Thousand Doses are compared it seems that they assert that the inferential cognizer which realizes that sound is impermanent is merely capable of being produced in dependence on the power of that valid cognizer without interruption by another awareness.

Now I will analyze whether this reason of the lack of being one or many proves a meaning (artha, don) or an expression (vyavahāra, tha snyad). With regard to this, it is stated in Śāntarakṣita’s Ornament for the Middle Way and Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way that this sign is a sign that is a non-observation of a pervader (vyāpakaanupalabdhi, khyab byed ma dmigs pa), but it is also explained in several statements of the foremost Tsong-kha-pa and his sons that it is [a sign] that is a non-observation of a nature (svabhāva-anupalabdhi, rang bzhin ma dmigs pa). Also, Kay-drup’s Thousand Doses says, “It proves a mere expression. Therefore, whatever is a proof of a mere expression is not necessarily a sign that is a non-observation of a nature.”

Some authors of textbooks on Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on [Dignāga’s “Compendium on] Valid Cognition” (Pramāṇavarttika) say that whatever is a reason which is a non-observation of a cause (karāṇa-anupalabdhi, rgyu ma dmigs pa) or non-observation of a pervader must be a sign proving both a meaning and an expression because the great paṇḍiṭa Dharmottara says:

With respect to [cases when] the perceivability of the effect or the pervaded is unsuitable, the non-observation of a cause and a pervader bring about understanding of the actual non-existence of fire and the expression of the actual non-existence of fire.

However, it is not certain that that is the meaning of the passage.

Thus, there are many presentations such as just what proofs of expressions that are effect, nature, and non-observation signs are and how mere expressions are proved, but because they would interfere with the topic at hand, I will not elaborate on them here.

Regarding what is relevant here, generally two modes of positing meaning and expression appear in the statements of scholars. In the first, meaning refers to the definition (lakṣaṇa, mtshan nyid) and expression refers to the definiendum (lakṣya, mtshon bya), and in the second, meaning refers to the meaning-reverse (*arthavyatireka, don ldog) of the predicate of the probandum and expression refers to its three conventions. The three conventions are verbal, mental, and physical conventions. Regarding this, some scholars of our own [Ge-luk] sect assert that this reason [of the lack of being one or many] is a sign proving a meaning, but since the omniscient Kay-drup asserts that it is a sign proving a mere expression and the foremost Gyel-tsap says in his Great Purification of Forgetfulness (brJed byang chen mo) that it proves a mere expression, this is the actual thought of the foremost Tsong-kha-pa.

Jam-yang-lek-ba-chö-jor-wa (’Jam-dbyangs-legs-pa-chos-’byor-wa) raises these qualms:

One might think that the reason for their asserting that this is a sign proving a mere expression is that if something has the full meaning of being truly established, then it must be true as either one or many, whereby the lack of being truly one or many is a correct sign proving a mere expression because, having already proven the meaning of non-true existence—the lack of being truly one or many—one is only proving the mere expression, “not truly existence.”

However, this is not correct, for if sound fulfilled the meaning of permanence, it would have to be a non-product whereby product would [absurdly] become [a sign] proving a mere expression in the proof of sound as impermanent.

Also, if [you think] that the awareness that comprehends the presence of the reason in the subject of that sign must be asserted as a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate [because you say that it is a sign proving a mere expression], this is also incorrect because the mere non-establishment of the person as being truly the same as or different from the aggregates is not an ultimate truth.

There appear to be many cases of others’ answering him. However, it seems that they have not clearly distinguished whether or not the mere way in which Jam-yang-lek-ba-chö-jor interprets the ideas of Kay-drup-rin-bo-chay constitutes the assertion of [his] opponent. [In other words, they mistakenly think that Jam-yang-lek-ba-chö-jor has accurately represented Kay-drup’s ideas.]

That this sign is a proof of a mere designation is not only the thought of the foremost Tsong-kha-pa and his sons, it also is that of the master Śāntarakṣita because his autocommentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way says, “This reason does not have a thesis in the meaning class because of proving the subjective consciousness, terms, and expressions of the object being proved.”¹⁶ He thus clearly states that it proves a mere expression.

Regarding how [this reason] becomes [a reason] proving an expression, a person who has ascertained with valid cognition the lack of true unity and plurality in terms of the subject and who has ascertained with valid cognition that whatever truly exists is necessarily either truly one or many would not willfully create a superimposing awareness logically proving the meaning of true existence with respect to the subject, and while not forgetting those modes, there is no chance for the superimposition of some third category to be produced. However, in order to have an awareness that thinks about non-true existence in terms of the subject, or in order to actually use the term “non-true existence” [with respect to the subject], this [non-true existence] becomes ascertained as an object or mere expression in dependence on the functioning of the earlier mindfulness of the three modes in a situation of unmuddled awareness. For example, a small child sees a small ox and sees that it is a composite of hump and dewlap and that the expression “ox” is used for it, but later, when he sees a large ox, he is not able to use the mental convention thinking, “This is an ox” or [such] a verbal convention due to the fact of not having known it before. [However], at that time he ascertains that it is an ox through mindfulness of the three modes, such as “This is an ox because of being an entity that is a composite of a dewlap and so forth.” That must be posited as a case of proving a mere expression.

This is also stated clearly by the great paṇḍiṭa Śāntarakṣita. His autocommentary to the Ornament for the Middle Way says:

[The subject] has already been shown to lack a nature of being one or many through the aforementioned logic, which is like, for example, “This is an ox because of being an entity that is a collection of dewlap and so forth.” However, [non-true existence] is established as an object of consciousness, terms, and expressions for those (1) who cannot conceive nor express the definite lack of inherent existence that pervades all things in reality because error—having been transmitted from one [lifetime] to another from beginningless cyclic existence and having thoroughly increased adherence to the true existence [of things]—is difficult to abandon since one has not become accustomed [to the truth] through proper mental application and (2) who, despite wishing to generate ascertainment [of the truth] in others as well, cannot use the expressions. It is like [proving that something] does not exist because of not being observed, whereas it has the character of being observable [if it were present].¹⁷

The master Dharmottara also sets forth the meaning of establishing a mere expression in this way, but I will not elaborate on it here. Thus, it should be known that the explanation of the assertion of the great abbot Śāntarakṣita by the foremost Tsong-kha-pa and his sons accords with the texts and has great meaning.

Kay-drup’s Thousand Doses says:

With respect to any phenomenon, without superimposing that it is either a truly existent unity or plurality, there is no way that a superimposition [of true existence] that would be the superimposition of a third category could be generated. Therefore, [the reasoning of the lack of being one or many] establishes a mere expression.

This means that, at that time, there is no chance that the person could generate the superimposing consciousness which thinks that although the person does not exist as truly the same as the aggregates and does not exist as truly different from the aggregates, there is such and such a type of true existence of the person. Also, something that can be shown to be a third type of true establishment cannot be found. At that time, the proof by that person of a verbal or mental expression of non-true existence in dependence on the modes of the sign within holding the person as the substratum [or subject] is the way in which that sign is a proof of an expression. That is what [Kay-drup] said; he did not say that since, in general, that [person] has already realized the meaning of non-true existence of the person, that sign proves a mere expression. Nor did he assert that the awareness which comprehends the presence of the reason in the subject with respect to that sign is an awareness which comprehends the non-true existence of the person. Nor did he assert that the mere non-establishment of the person as either truly one or many with respect to the aggregates is an ultimate truth.

If it is explained in this way, the qualms stated [earlier] by Jam-yang-lek-ba-chö-jor are removed, and the meaning of the text is also interpreted well. However, to say such things as, “It follows that the non-establishment of the person as truly one with the aggregates is the mode of being of the person because the non-establishment of a truly existent unity is the mode of being of unity,” not only is not helpful in removing the qualms of that king of scholars; it is only a senseless answer.

The non-establishment of the person as truly one or many, and so forth, in the sight of a Superior’s meditative equipoise is the mode of being of the person, but it need not be the case that, in general, the non-establishment of the person as truly one or many has to be the mode of being of the person, just as the non-existence of the aggregates and so forth in the sight of a Superior’s meditative equipoise is the mode of being of the aggregates and so forth, but in general the non-existence of the aggregates and so forth does not have to be the mode of being of the aggregates.

Beginning from these [points] there are still a great many topics to discuss, but let us leave it here for now. Tsong-kha-pa’s Differentiation of the Interpretable and Definitive says, “These are great paths of reasoning of the followers of the protector Nāgārjuna, and those who wish to extend their minds in reasoning should learn them.” Therefore, knowing the essentials of these reasonings is very important, and if they are known well, even if only the reason of the lack of being one or many is cultivated, one will not be bereft of something on which to meditate. Therefore, even if those who claim to view their own mind as the natural face of a Truth Body (dharmakāya, chos sku) learn only this reasoning and straighten their bodies [in meditation], it would be good.