The basis of division of the two truths, the divisions, the difference between real and unreal conventional truths, the sameness and difference of the two truths, and so forth are similar to what was explained in the context of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas.
With regard to the valid cognizers that ascertain the two truths, there are two [types of Yogācāra-Svātantrikas] in terms of the mode of assertion of aspects (ākāra, rnam pa). Āryavimuktisena, the master Śāntarakṣita, the king of scholars Kamalaśīla, and so forth are Mādhyamikas who are like the True Aspectarians conventionally. Tsong-kha-pa’s Differentiation of the Interpretable and Definitive says:
This system asserts that the aspects of blue, yellow, and so forth are things. Since the assertions of Dharmakīrti are also laid out that way, they are Mādhyamikas who make assertions that accord with the True Aspectarians conventionally.
Furthermore, they make assertions in a way similar to the Non-Pluralist True Aspectarians.
The great scholar and adept Den-ba-dar-gyay (bsTan-pa-dar-rgyas), Jam-yang-shay-ba, and so forth said that although the great master Haribhadra is a follower of Śāntarakṣita, he is similar to a False Aspectarian because he clearly explains a false aspect at points such as [this statement] in his Clear Meaning Commentary (Sphuṭārthā):
Those who definitely think “if apprehended objects do not exist, apprehenders do not exist” refute the character of an aspect of an apprehender that is mere awareness, and ascertain that this non-dual exalted wisdom alone is an entity that exists in reality.
Paṇḍiṭa Sahajavajra explains in his Commentary on the “Ten Stanzas on Suchness” (Tattvadaśakaṭika) that the great master Kambalapāda (La-ba-ba) is a Mādhyamika who makes assertions that accord with the False Aspectarians conventionally, and the fact that the master Jetari also is a False Aspectarian is known from his commentary to his Sugata Treatise (Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā).
There were many scholars and adepts who were followers of these masters, and they are for the most part similar in making an assertion of self-knowing awarenesses and in not asserting a basis-of-all that is a different entity from the six collections of consciousness. In general, in the Land of Superiors (āryavarśa) [India] a few paṇḍiṭas who claimed to be Mādhyamikas asserted both self-knowers and a basis-of-all (ālaya, kun gzhi), and there also were a couple who asserted meditative equipoise with appearance—holding that the explicit object of the non-conceptual exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise is a composite of emptiness and appearance. However, merely because of that, the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system does not come to assert that a Superior’s non-contaminated exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise has illusion-like appearance, etc. Such Indian paṇḍiṭas are merely cases [of people] putting the faults of their own minds into the tenet systems without having arrived at the thought of the great charioteers; they do not state positions having ascertained the mode of their own tenet system. For example, it must be said that the many incorrect presentations made by those who claim to be Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas in Tibet are faults of their minds and that theirs is not the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika system. Therefore, Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path says,
Although in general a few Indian and Tibetan masters who claim to be Mādhyamikas asserted this, I will delineate the system of the great Mādhyamikas who follow the master Nāgārjuna. Who could explain the minor ones?
Thus, the foremost, omniscient one asserts that he will primarily delineate the thought of the indisputable great charioteers who validly commented upon the thought of the Conqueror. This appears to be a statement of his displeasure with merely amassing many enumerations, drawing together in one place the many systems of all those who are called “paṇḍiṭa” and all those who were said to have become “adepts” (siddha, grub pa).
Although a basis-of-all that is a different entity from the six collections of consciousness is not asserted, the indication of certain subtle factors with the term “basis-of-all” upon dividing the sixth—the mental consciousness—into parts was set forth even by some great Mādhyamikas. This appears frequently, particularly in texts of the Mantra category.
In dependence on these ways of delineating non-true existence and the ways of presenting conventionalities, there are many distinctions with regard to how they comment on the meaning of interpretable and definitive sutras. They assert that Mother Sutras and so forth are indicated as being sutras of definitive meaning through the teaching in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, of [the Buddha’s] thought [when he taught] the three types of non-entityness. Their system’s presentation of the three natures, which is unlike the presentation of the three natures as posited by the Cittamātrins, is asserted to be the main meaning of those sutras. However, the Cittamātrins’ system of categorizing the three natures is set forth as a meaning of the sutra in relation to the thought of those disciples who temporarily are unable to realize emptiness and must be led gradually.
Also, with respect to the middle wheel [sutras], those passages that explicitly or implicitly affix the qualification “ultimately” to the object of negation are asserted to be literal and definitive. In those [middle wheel] sutras, those which teach with [statements] such as “Form does not exist,” without clearly affixing the qualification “ultimately” or “truly” are asserted to be interpretable and not suitable to be taken literally. These should be known in detail from Tsong-kha-pa’s Essence of the Good Explanations, and I wish to explain them elsewhere as well.