Chapter 3

8. The Unification of Words

When about to establish a state, it is necessary to examine standards and measures, to pay attention to law and order, to be vigilant in government duties, and to consolidate occupations with what is primary. [1] When standards and measures are regulated in accordance with the times, the customs of the country may be changed and the people will follow the standard regulations; if rules and laws are clear, the officials will commit no depravity; if the duties of the government are dealt with uniformly, the people will be available for use; if occupations with what is primary are consolidated, people will take pleasure in agriculture and will enjoy warfare. Now a sage, in establishing laws, alters the customs and causes the people to be engaged in agriculture, night and day. It is necessary to understand this. Indeed, people abide by their avocations and obey the regulations even to death, when the honorific titles which the ruler has instituted, and the rewards and penalties which he has established, are clear, and when, instead of employing sophists and intriguers, men of merit are set up. The result will be that the people will take pleasure in farming and enjoy warfare, because they see that the ruler honours farmers and soldiers, looks down upon sophists and artisans, and despises itinerant scholars. Therefore, when the people concentrate on one occupation, their families will be rich and their persons will be distinguished in the country; the ruler opens the way to public benefit and bars the gate of private intrigue, so that the people’s strength is developed to the utmost. If toil in one’s own interest does not gain distinction in the state, nor is admittance to the prince obtained through the gate of private intrigue, then under these circumstances, meritorious ministers will be encouraged, and in consequence the orders of the ruler will be performed, waste lands will be opened up, dissolute people will disappear, and villainies will not sprout. He who, in administrating a country, is able to consolidate the people’s strength and to make their occupation one, will be strong; he who is able to make the people attend to what is primary, and to prevent what is secondary. [2] is rich. A sage, in administrating a country, is able to consolidate its strength or to reduce it. When standards and measures are clear, then the people’s strength is consolidated; if it is consolidated, but not developed, it cannot take effect. If it does take effect, but there are no riches, it will give rise to disorder. Therefore, for one who administers a country, the way to consolidate its strength is to make the country rich and its soldiers strong; the way to reduce the people’s force is to attack the enemy and to encourage the people. If one only opens the way, without barring the gate, the short will grow long; when it has grown, and one does not attack, there will be villainy; if one debars without opening up, the people will be chaotic; if they are chaotic, and one does not make use of them, their strength will become great; if their strength is great, and one does not attack, there will be villainy and the parasites. So, consolidating their strength is brought about by unifying their occupation; reducing their force is brought about by attacking the enemy. In administrating a country, one should value the single-mindedness of the people; if they are single-minded, they are simple, and being simple, they farm; if they farm, they easily become diligent, and being diligent, they become rich. The rich should be despoiled of their riches by means of titles, so that they do not become dissolute. Those who are dissolute should be divested of their dissoluteness by punishments, so that they may concern themselves with agriculture. Therefore, if one is able only to consolidate force, and not to use it, disorder ensues; and one who is able only to reduce force, but not to consolidate it, will perish. So an intelligent ruler, who knows how to combine these two principles, will be strong, but that of one who does not know how to combine these two, will be dismembered.

Indeed, if a people are not orderly, it is because their prince follows inferior ways; and if the laws are not clear, it means that the prince causes disorder to grow. Therefore, an intelligent prince is one who does not follow an inferior way, nor causes disorder to grow; but he establishes himself by maintaining his authority, and creates order by giving laws; so that he gains possession of those who are treacherous towards their ruler; thus for all officials respectively rewards or penalties are fixed, so that employment will have a fixed standard. Under these circumstances, then, the country’s regulations will be clear and the people’s force will be used to the utmost; the titles granted by the ruler will be honoured and the . . . will be advanced. [3]

The rulers of the present day all desire to govern the people, but their way of helping them is disorderly – not because they take pleasure in disorder, but because they rest on antiquity and do not watch for the needs of the times; that is, the ruler models himself on antiquity, and as a result, is hampered by it; subordinates follow the present and do not change with the times, and when the changes in the customs of the world are not understood, and the conditions for governing the people are not examined, then the multiplication of rewards only leads to punishments, and the lightening of punishments only eliminates rewards. [4] Indeed, the ruler institutes punishments, but the people do not obey; his rewards are exhausted, but crimes continue to increase; for the people in their relation to the ruler think first of punishments and only afterwards of rewards. The sage’s way, therefore, of organising a country is not to imitate antiquity, nor to follow the present, but to govern in accordance with the needs of the times, and to make laws which take into account customs. For laws which are established without examining people’s conditions do not succeed, but a government which is enacted fittingly for the times does not offend. Therefore, the government of the sage-kings examined attentively the people’s occupations, and concentrated their attention on unifying them and on nothing else.

9. Establishing Laws

I have heard that when the intelligent princes of antiquity established laws, the people were not wicked; when they undertook an enterprise, the required ability was practised spontaneously; when they distributed rewards, the army was strong. These three principles were the root of government. Indeed, why people were not wicked, when laws were established, was because the laws were clear and people profited by them; why the required ability was practised spontaneously, when an enterprise was undertaken, was because merits were clearly defined; and because these were clearly defined, the people exerted their forces; and this being so, the required ability was spontaneously practised; why the army was strong when rewards were distributed refers to titles and emoluments. Titles and emoluments are the goal of a soldier’s ambition. Therefore, the principle on which princes distributed titles and emoluments was clear; when this was clear, the country became daily stronger, but when it was obscure, the country became daily weaker. Therefore, the principle on which titles and emoluments are distributed is the key to the state’s preservation or ruin. The reason why a country is weak or a prince is ruined is not that there are no titles or emoluments, but that the principles followed therein are wrong. The principle followed by the Three Kings and the five Lords Protector was no other than that of giving titles and emoluments, and the reason that people emulated each other in merit was because the principles which they followed were clear. Thus the way in which intelligent princes utilised their ministers was that their employment was made dependent on the work which they had done, and rewards were bestowed on the merits which they had acquired. When the relation between merit and reward was clear, then the people emulated each other in merit. If, in administering a state, one succeeds in causing the people to exert their strength so that they emulate each other in merit, then the army will certainly be strong.

To be of the same rank as others and yet to stand to them in such relations as subject or concubine points to poverty or wealth; to be of the same territory as others and yet to be annexed by them points to strength or weakness; to have land, but the prince being in the one case strong and in the other weak, points to disorder or order. If there is a right method, even a territory of a square li is sufficient to give room to the body, and people may be attracted (to colonise); and if it but contains a market-place, riches may become many. Whoever has land cannot be called poor, and whoever has people cannot be called weak. If land is made truly productive, one need not be anxious about not being wealthy; if the people are truly employed, one need not fear force or violence; if virtue be clear and with the right teaching prevailing, one will succeed in utilising for oneself what the people have. Therefore, the intelligent kings utilised what was not their own, and employed those who were not their own subjects. The point to which intelligent kings attached importance was that of rewarding with titles only men of real merit; if this condition was fulfilled, honour and outer marks of distinction were awarded to them. If there were no honour connected with them, then people would not be anxious for noble rank, and if there were no outer marks of distinction, then people would not be concerned about titles. If titles are easily obtained, then people do not appreciate the highest titles nor the various other titles; if emoluments and rewards are not obtained through a definite gateway, people will not strive to the death for rank. For a prince there exists the fact that people have likes and dislikes; therefore, for it to be possible to govern the people, it is necessary that the prince should examine these likes and dislikes. Likes and dislikes are the basis of rewards and punishments. Now, the nature of man is to like titles and emoluments and to dislike punishments and penalties. A prince institutes these two in order to guide men’s wills, and he establishes what they desire. Now, if titles follow upon the people’s exertion of strength, if rewards follow upon their acquisition of merit, and if the prince succeeds in making people believe in this as firmly as they do in the shining of sun and moon, then his army will have no equal. Among the princes of men there are some who bestow titles, but whose army is weak; there are some who grant emoluments, but whose state is poor; there are some who have fixed laws, but who yet suffer disorder. These three things are calamities for a country. For if a ruler of men places the making easy of audiences before the acquiring of merit, then although he bestows titles, his army will be weak; if people, without risking their lives in dangers, can obtain profit and emoluments, then the granting of emoluments will only make the country poor. If the law has neither measures nor figures, then affairs will daily become more complicated, and although laws have been established, yet the result will be that the administration will be in disorder. Therefore, an intelligent prince, in directing his people, will so direct them that they will exert their strength to the utmost in order to strive for a particular merit; and if, when they have acquired merit, riches and honour follow upon it, there will be no bravery in private causes. Therefore, if this teaching spreads and becomes successful, then when that is the case, ministers will be loyal, princes intelligent, order manifest, and the army strong. Therefore, in general, an intelligent prince in his administration relies on force and not on virtue, and thus, without his being anxious or fatigued, merit will be established. When measures and figures have been instituted, law can be followed. Therefore, it is necessary that a ruler of men should pay attention to himself.

Indeed, Li Chu saw an autumn’s hair at a distance of more than a hundred paces, but he could not transfer his sharp vision to others; Wu Huo was able to lift a weight of a thousand chün, but could not transfer his great strength to others; and indeed sages cannot transfer to others the personality and nature that is inherent in them.

But that whereby success may be attained – that is the law.

10. The Method of Warfare

Generally in the method of warfare, the fundamental principle consists in making government measures supremely prevalent. If this is done, then the people concerned will have no disputes; and having no disputes, they will have no thought of self-interest, but will have the interest of the ruler in mind. Therefore a real king, through his measures, will cause people to be fearful in fights between various cities, but brave in wars against external foes. If people have been trained to attack dangers with energy, they will, as a result, think lightly of death. Should the enemy be routed as soon as the engagement has begun, and should he not stop in his rout abstain from further pursuit. Therefore does the The Art of War say: [1] ‘In a big battle, in the event of victory, pursue the fugitives not further than 10 li; in a small battle, in the event of victory, pursue the fugitives not further than 5 li.’ When hostilities begin, weigh the strength [2] of the enemy; if your organisation is not equal to his, do not engage him in battle; if your provisions are not equal to his, do not protract the war; if the enemy is numerically strong, do not invade his territory; [3] if the enemy is in every way your inferior, attack him without hesitation. Therefore it is said: ‘The great rule of an army is prudence.’ By estimating the strength of the enemy and by examining one’s own hosts, victory or defeat may be known beforehand. [4]

The army of a real king does not boast of victory, nor does it harbour rancour for defeat. That it does not boast of victory is because it ascribes it to its clever tactics; [5] that it does not harbour rancour for defeat is because it knows why it has failed. If the relative strength of the armies is well-matched, the side that has clever leadership will win, and the side that has inferior leadership will lose. If the organisation has its origin in the calculations made in the temple, [6] then it will win, whether the leadership is clever or inferior. He who holds victorious tactics will be so strong that he will attain supremacy. If people are submissive and obey their ruler, then the country will become rich and the army victorious; and if this state of affairs is maintained for long, he will surely attain supremacy.

But it is a mistake for an army to penetrate deeply into the enemy’s country, in difficult and unsurmountable terrain and cut off in a cul-de-sac; the men will become exhausted, hungry and thirsty as well, and will, moreover, fall victims to disease. This is the way to defeat. Therefore he who intends to direct the people . . . and he who mounts a good horse cannot but be on his guard. [7]

11. The Establishment of Fundamentals

Generally, in the utilising of soldiers, there are three stages to victory: prior to the outbreak of hostilities, laws should be fixed; laws being fixed, they should become the custom; when they have become customary, supplies should be provided. These three things should be done within the country before the soldiers can be sent abroad. For performing these three things, there are two conditions; the first is to support the law, so that it can be applied; the second is to obtain the right men in appointments, so that the law can be established. For reliance on masses is said to be the assembling of a mob; reliance on outward appearances is said to be smartness; reliance on fame and sight is said to be deceitfulness. If one relies on any one of these three, one’s soldiers may be captured. Therefore is it said: ‘The strong are unbending; they fight for what they desire. By fighting, their strength develops to the full, and thus they are prepared. In this way, they have no rival in the four seas, and by order prevailing, products are accumulated; by the accumulation of products, it is possible for the rewards to be big.’ If rewards are uniform, rank will be honoured; if rank is honoured, rewards will bring profit. Therefore is it said: ‘The army being based on a state of order, there is a marvellous result; custom being based on law, ten thousand changes of circumstances are brought about; a condition of supremacy being based upon the mind, it is outwardly manifested in a condition of preparedness. If these three points of view are all taken into consideration, the result will be that the strong may be firmly established.’ Thus orderly government is the necessary result of strength, and strength again of orderly government; orderly government of riches, and riches again of orderly government; riches of strength, and strength again of riches. Therefore is it said: ‘The way to orderly government and strength is to discuss fundamentals.’

12. Military Defence

A state that has to fight on four fronts values defence, and a state that rests against the sea values attack. For, if a state that fights on four fronts is fond of raising soldiers, it will be in a dangerous position, as it has to resist four neighbours. As soon as a country with four neighbours begins hostilities, four countries mobilise armies; therefore is it said that the country is in a dangerous position. If a state that has to fight on four fronts is unable to raise, from a city of ten thousand houses, an army of more than ten thousand men, then the state will be in a dangerous position. Therefore is it said: ‘A state that has to fight on four fronts should concern itself with defensive warfare.’ In defending walled cities, the best way is, with the strength of the worn-out men, to fight the fresh strength of the invaders. It is assaults upon walled cities that wear out the strength of men. So long as the walled cities have not all been razed, the invaders have no means of penetrating the country. This is meant by the saying that the strength of worn-out men should fight the fresh strength of the invading force. But when the walled cities have all been razed and the foreign army thus finds the means of penetrating, then certainly it will be exhausted, and the people within the country will be rested. Fighting with rested strength against those of exhausted strength is said to be fighting with the strength of fresh men against the worn-out strength of the invading forces. All these are called the misfortunes attendant upon the besieging of walled cities. It is regarded as a misfortune that always, in capturing cities, the strength of the army is worn out. In these three things misfortune is due, not to insufficient effort, but to mistaken generalship.

The way to hold a city is to have abundant strength. Therefore is it said: ‘When the invading force musters its levies, mobilise as many as three armies, and divide them according to the number of the chariots of the invading force.’ Of these three armies, one should be formed of able-bodied men, one of able-bodied women, and one of the old and feeble men and women. These are called the three armies. Cause the army of able-bodied men, with abundant provisions and sharp weapons, to marshal themselves and to await the enemy; cause the able-bodied women, with abundant provisions and ramparts at their backs, to marshal themselves and to await orders, so as to make, at the approach of the invaders, earthworks as an obstruction, and traps, chevaux-de-frise and pitfalls, to pull down the supporting beams and to tear down the houses, to transport what is transportable, and to burn what is untransportable, so that the invaders are not able to make use thereof in their attack. Cause the army of the old and feeble to guard the oxen, horses, sheep and swine, and to collect all that is consumable of plants and water, to feed them therewith, so as to obtain food for the able-bodied men and women. But see to it carefully that the three armies do not intermingle. If the able-bodied men mingle with the army of the able-bodied women, they will attach great value to the safety of the women, and wicked people will have opportunities for intrigue, with the result that the state will perish. Taking pleasure in the women’s company, the men will be afraid of disturbing reports and so not even the brave will fight. If the able-bodied men and women intermingle with the army of the old and feeble, then the old will arouse the compassion of the able-bodied, and the feeble the pity of the strong. Compassion and pity in the heart cause brave people to be more anxious and fearful people not to fight. Therefore is it said: ‘See to it carefully that the three armies do not intermingle.’ This is the way to have abundant strength.

13. Making Orders Strict

If orders are made strict, orderly government is not delayed, and if laws are equable, officials are not wicked. Once the law is fixed, one should not damage it with virtuous words; if men of merit are appointed to office, people will have little to say; but if men of virtue are appointed to office, people will have much to say. The practice of good government begins with making judgments. Where five hamlets are the unit for judgments, supremacy is attained; where ten hamlets are the unit for judgments, there is merely strength. He who procrastinates in creating order will be dismembered. Govern by punishments and wage war by rewards; seek transgressors and do not seek the virtuous. Therefore, if the law is fixed and not altered, then . . . [1] If in the country there are no wicked people, there is no wicked trade in the capital. If affairs are many and secondary things are numerous, if agriculture is relaxed and criminals gain the upper hand, then the country will certainly be dismembered.

If the people have a surplus of grain, cause them to obtain office and rank by means of their cereals; if through their own efforts they can count upon obtaining office and rank, farmers will not be lazy.

If a tube of no more than four inches has no bottom, it can certainly not be filled; to confer office, to give rank and to grant salaries, without regard to merit, is like having no bottom.

If a state, when poor, applies itself to war, the poison will originate on the enemy’s side, and it will not have the six parasites, but will certainly be strong. If a state, when rich, does not apply itself to war, the poison is transferred to its own interior, and it will have the six kinds of parasites and will certainly be weak. If the state confers office and gives rank according to merit, it may be said to be planning with complete wisdom, and fighting with complete courage. Such a country will certainly have no equal. If a state confers office and gives rank according to merit, then government measures will be simple and words will be few. This may be said to be abolishing laws by means of the law and abolishing words by means of words. But if a state confers office and gives rank according to the six parasites, then government measures will be complicated and words will arise. This may be said to be bringing about laws by means of the law and causing volubility by means of words. Then the prince will devote himself to talking, officials will be distracted with ruling the wicked, wicked officials will gain their own way, and those who have merit will daily retire more. This may be said to be failure. When one has to observe ten rules, there is confusion: when one has only one to observe, there is order. When the law is fixed, then those who are fond of practising the six parasites perish. If people occupy themselves entirely with agriculture, the state is rich; if the six parasites are not practised, then soldiers and people will, without exception, vie with one another for encouragement and will be glad to be employed by their ruler; the people within the borders will vie with one another to regard it as glorious, and none will regard it as disgraceful. Following upon this comes the condition where people will do it because they are encouraged by means of rewards and restrained by means of punishment. But the worst case is when people hate it, are anxious about it, and are ashamed of it; then they adorn their outer appearances and are engaged in talking; they are ashamed of taking a position and exalt culture. In this way they shun agriculture and war, and outside interests being thus furnished, it will be a perilous position for the country. To have people dying of hunger and cold, and to have unwillingness to fight for the sake of profit and emolument, are usual occurrences in a perishing state. The six parasites are: rites and music, odes and history, moral culture and virtue, filial piety and brotherly love, sincerity and faith, chastity and integrity, benevolence and righteousness, criticism of the army and being ashamed of fighting. If there are these twelve things, the ruler is unable to make people farm and fight, and then the state will be so poor that it will be dismembered. [2] If these twelve things come together, then it may be said that the prince’s administration is not stronger than his ministers and that the administration of his officials is not stronger than his people. [3] This is said to be a condition where the six parasites are stronger than the government. When these twelve gain an attachment, [4] then dismemberment ensues. Therefore to make a country prosperous, these twelve things should not be practised; then the state will have much strength, and no one in the empire will be able to invade it. When its soldiers march out, they will capture their objective, and having captured it, will be able to hold it. When it keeps its soldiers in reserve and does not attack, it will certainly become rich. The court officials do not reject any merits, however few they may be, nor do they detract from any merits, however many they may be. Office and rank are obtained according to the acquired merit, and even though there may be sophistical talk, it will be impossible thereby to obtain undue precedence. This is said to be government by statistics. In attacking with force, ten points are gained for every one point undertaken, but in attacking with words, a hundred are lost for every one marched out. If a state loves force, it is said to attack with what is difficult; if a state loves words, it is said to attack with what is easy. If penalties are heavy and rewards few, then the ruler loves his people and they will die for him; if rewards are heavy and penalties light, then the ruler does not love his people nor will they die for him.

If the profit disappears through one outlet only, the state will have no equal; if it disappear through two outlets, the state will have only half the profit; but if the profit disappears through ten outlets, the state will not be preserved. If heavy penalties are clear, there will be great control, but if they are not clear, there will be the six parasites. If the six kinds of parasites come together, then the people are not fit for employment. Therefore, in a prosperous country, when punishments are applied, the people will be closely associated with the ruler, and when rewards are applied they will reap profit.

In applying punishments, light offences should be punished heavily; if light offences do not appear, heavy offence will not come. This is said to be abolishing penalties by means of penalties, and if penalties are abolished, affairs will succeed. If crimes are serious and penalties light, penalties will appear and trouble will arise. This is said to be bringing about penalties by means of penalties, and such a state will surely be dismembered.

A sage prince understands what is essential in affairs, and therefore in his administration of the people there is that which is most essential. For the fact that uniformity in the manipulating of rewards and punishments supports moral virtue, is connected with human psychology. A sage-prince, by his ruling of men, is certain to win their hearts; consequently he is able to use force. Force produces strength, strength produces prestige, prestige produces virtue; and so virtue has its origin in force, which a sage-prince alone possesses, and therefore he is able to transmit benevolence and righteousness to the empire.

14. The Cultivation of the Right Standard

Orderly government is brought about in a state by three things. The first is law, the second good faith, and the third right standards. Law is exercised in common by the prince and his ministers. Good faith is established in common by the prince and his ministers. The right standard is fixed by the prince alone. If a ruler of men fails to observe it, there is danger; if prince and ministers neglect the law and act according to their own self-interest, disorder is the inevitable result. Therefore if law is established, rights and duties are made clear, and self-interest does not harm the law, then there is orderly government. If the fixing of the right standard is decided by the prince alone, there is prestige. If the people have faith in his rewards, then their activities will achieve results; and if they have faith in his penalties, then wickedness will have no starting point. Only an intelligent ruler loves right standards and values good faith, and will not, for the sake of self-interest, harm the law. For if he speaks many liberal words but cuts down his rewards, then his subjects will not be of service; and if he issues one severe order after another, but does not apply the penalties, people will despise the death-penalty.

In general, rewards are a civil measure and penalties a military. Civil and military measures are the summary of the law. Therefore an intelligent ruler places reliance on the law; [an intelligent ruler], if things are not kept hidden from him, is called intelligent, and if he is not deceived, is called perspicacious. Therefore he benefits by giving liberal rewards; and by making penalties severe, he ensures that he is feared. He does not neglect those that are distant, nor does he run counter to those that are near. Thus ministers will not hide things from their ruler, nor will inferiors deceive their superiors. Those who are engaged in governing, in the world, chiefly dismiss the law and place reliance on private appraisal, and this is what brings disorder in a state. The early kings hung up scales with standard weights, and fixed the length of feet and inches, and to the present day these are followed as models because their divisions were clear. Now dismissing standard scales and yet deciding weight, or abolishing feet and inches and yet forming an opinion about length – even an intelligent merchant would not apply this system, because it would lack definiteness. Now, if the back is turned on models and measures, and reliance is placed on private appraisal, in all those cases there would be a lack of definiteness. Only a Yao would be able to judge knowledge and ability, worth or unworth, without a model. But the world does not consist exclusively of Yaos! Therefore, the ancient kings understood that no reliance should be placed on individual opinions or biased approval, so they set up models and made the distinctions clear. Those who fulfilled the standard were rewarded, those who harmed the public interest were punished. The standards for rewards and punishments were not wrong in their appraisals, and therefore people did not dispute them. But if the bestowal of office and the granting of rank are not carried out according to the labour borne, then loyal ministers have no advancement; and if in awarding rewards and giving emoluments the respective merits are not weighed, then fighting soldiers will not enter his service.

Generally, the principle on which ministers serve their prince are dependent, in most cases, on what the ruler likes. If the ruler likes law, then the ministers will make law their principle in serving; if the prince likes words, then the ministers will make words their principle in serving. If the prince likes law, then upright scholars will come to the front, but if he likes words, then ministers full of praise for some and blame for others will be at his side. If public and private interests are clearly distinguished, then even small-minded men do not hate men of worth, nor do worthless men envy those of merit. For when Yao and Shun established their rule over the empire, they did not keep the benefits of the empire for themselves, but it was for the sake of the empire that they established their rule. In making the imperial succession dependent on worth and ability, they did not intend to alienate fathers and sons from one another, and to conciliate distant people, [1] but they did it because they had a true insight into the ways of order and disorder. So, too, the Three Kings conciliated people by righteousness, and the five Lords Protector rectified the feudal lords by law; that is, in all these cases, none took for himself the benefits of the empire. They ruled for the sake of the empire, and thus, when those who held positions had corresponding merit, the empire enjoyed their administration and no one could harm it.

But, nowadays, princes and ministers of a disorderly world each, on a small scale, appropriates the profits of his own state, and each exercises the burden of his own office, for his private benefit. This is why the states are in a perilous position. For the relation between public and private interests is what determines existence or ruin.

However, if models and measures are abolished and private appraisal is favoured, then bad ministers will let their standards be influenced by money, in order to obtain emoluments, and officials of the various ranks will, in a stealthy and hidden manner, make extortions from the people. The saying runs: ‘Many woodworms and the wood snaps, a large fissure and the wall collapses.’ So if ministers of state vie with one another in selfishness and do not heed the people, then inferiors are estranged from superiors. When this happens, there is a fissure in the state. If the officials of the various ranks make extortions from the people, stealthily and in a hidden manner, they are for the people like woodworms. Therefore is it exceptional in the world that where there are fissures and woodworms, ruin does not follow. That is why intelligent kings placed reliance on the law and removed self-interest, so that the state should have no fissures and no woodworms.