Bryan S. Turner
Inter-civilizational contact invariably creates a sense of the otherness or alterity of different societies and cultures. Any society with a more or less coherent cultural boundary and identity, acting as an inclusionary social force, tends to have an exclusionary notion of membership and hence otherness; the more inclusive the feeling of ethnicity and national membership, the more intense the notion of an outside. With globalization involving the compression of spatial relations between societies, the problem of alterity has been magnified. Thus a paradoxical relationship exists between the growing cultural hybridity, interconnectedness, and interdependency of the world—indeed, the modernization of societies—and the notion of alterity in politics, philosophy, and culture. The emergence of alterity as a theme of inter-civilizational and transnational contact should not, however, be seen as an evolutionary progression, marching in tandem with modernization. The divisive question of alterity has been closely associated with the rise of world religions, the creation of imperial powers, and the history of colonialism and post-colonialism. The question of the other is not easily separated from the “fear of diversity,” which can be seen as in fact the foundation of ancient Greek thought (Saxonhouse 1992).
We should be careful to distinguish between a number of separate meanings of the other, otherness, and alterity. The concept of the other has been important in phenomenology and psychoanalysis, where the self as a subject presupposes the existence of a non-self or other. And in existentialism the other often assumes an antagonistic relationship with the self. Because the individual resides in a world of other subjectivities, there exists a mode of existence that is properly referred to as “being-for-others.” In the work of Emmanuel Levinas (1998), the other can play a positive role in questioning the confidence and assurance of the subject. The face of the other challenges us to take responsibility for the other, and hence otherness creates the conditions that make ethics possible. Jacques Derrida (2000), playing on the etymological connections between “stranger” and “host” (hostis and hospes), neatly summarized the issue by saying simply that ethics is hospitality.
This philosophical analysis of the role of the other in modern ethical discourse has an important and obvious relationship to nationalism, ethnic cleansing, and globalization. With the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1992, there has been a resurgence of ethnic identity as the basis of political communities, and ethnic violence has largely replaced class conflict as the major arena of political confrontation. The disintegration of Yugoslavia that began in 1991 and the 1992 crisis in Bosnia were tragic illustrations of the importance of ethnicity in international conflicts. Globally there are new and unanticipated conflicts between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims, often in hitherto harmonious communities. Where globalization weakens the nation-state and promotes identity politics, alterity can play a violent role in ethnic conflict. These modern conflicts thus appear to be a long way removed from what had been relatively successful patterns of social co-operation between Muslims, Jews, and Christians in medieval Spain, for example (Menocal 2002).
By connecting alterity with twentieth-century globalization, we must not ignore the historical roots of the sense of otherness. Fear of the other was fundamental to Greek politics, because endless wars against “barbarians” always involved the threat of capture and enslavement. Slave status entailed the loss of freedom, exclusion from the public arena, and the denial of rationality. Alterity arose out of the growth of international trade and warfare, and it was expressed powerfully in the anthropological writings of Herodotus. However, with the collapse of the ancient world, the question of alterity became closely associated with the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Because Yahweh was a jealous God, there was a sacred covenant between God and the tribes of Israel, which excluded those who worshiped idols and false gods. In Christianity, a universalistic orientation that recognized the other was expressed in Paul’s letters to the Galatians and Romans, which rejected circumcision as a condition of salvation. Because the uncircumcised (non-Jews) were among the righteous, the message of Jesus had, at least in Pauline theology, a global significance. The righteous were those who were circumcised in the heart, and hence faith came, at least in principle, to be separated from specific cultural practices and ethnic membership. Because Christianity and Islam developed an evangelical faith that stressed human equality, they in a sense denied the problem of alterity. However, the persistence of slavery in both Christendom and the Islamic Household of Faith raises a stubborn problem about the nature and depth of universalism and egalitarianism in both religions (Segal 2001).The competition between Christianity and Islam resulted eventually in the nineteenth-century dominance of Christianity, when the Church often functioned as the civilized veneer of Western colonialism. Because Christian theology treated Islam as a false religion, many in the West imagined Islam as an irrational, stagnant, and licentious sect—thus the origins of what social critic Edward Said (1978) described as “Orientalism.”
Samuel Huntington’s article on “the clash of civilizations” in Foreign Affairs (1993) has defined much of the academic debate about inter-cultural understanding and misunderstanding for over a decade. Huntington’s thesis follows Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political (1996) in terms of seeing the world as a struggle between friend and foe. In retrospect, Said’s criticisms of Orientalism and especially his Representations of the Intellectual (1994) offered some prospect that intellectuals could cross boundaries between cultures and forged a pathway towards mutual respect and understanding. After 9/11, Huntington’s bleak analysis of the development of micro faultline conflicts and macro core state conflicts has more successfully and completely captured the mood of foreign policy in the West in the era of the “war on terror.” Huntington of course believes that the major division is between the Christian West and the Muslim world. More recently, he has even more openly written about “the age of Muslim Wars” and the existence of widespread Muslim grievance and hostility towards the United States (Huntington 2003). Any attempt to engage with Islamic civilization is now seen as a “war for Muslim minds” (Kepel 2004).
Opposing the Huntington thesis is not easy, particularly because it is in many respects a self-fulfilling academic prophecy. The more scholars have talked about it, the more it appeared to shape American foreign policy. Much of the criticism of Huntington has been couched at an empirical and practical level in showing, for example, that conflicts within Christianity (such as Northern Ireland) and within Islam (between Sunni and Shi’ite) are as, or more, important than conflicts between religions. In addition, Huntington is said to have no real explanation for the faultline, because the thesis is “an ethnocentric blind to avoid having to discuss the things that Muslim opponents of the US actually care about” (Mann 2003: 169). Although it is important to question the Huntington thesis at the level of empirical social science, his argument opens up the opportunity to engage in a deeper normative and epistemological debate about the moral grounds for recognizing and respecting other cultures. In this discussion, I shall call this normative stance one of “cosmopolitan virtue,” by which I mean the ethical imperative for respect, mutual dialogue, recognition, and care (Turner 2008).
From what vantage point can we take up this debate? One starting point might be the early German origins of the Enlightenment, and the work and vision of the philosopher Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716). In the twentieth century, the Enlightenment became, especially after the attack by the critical theory of Horkheimer and Adorno (1947), a target of critical inspection, precisely because its vision of universal reason was said to be blind to cultural differences. Reading Leibniz on China shows how misguided this interpretation has often been. Leibniz, the (German) precursor of the (French) Enlightenment, is probably best known as a mathematician, who, independently of Newton, developed the calculus, and for his theory of entities (monads). But there is a different, though equally complex, side to Leibniz’s philosophy, which appears extraordinarily pertinent to modern times (Perkins 2004). Leibniz lived in a period when European trade with the outside world, including Asia, was expanding rapidly. It was a time of intense commerce of commodities, and, alongside this emerging capitalist enterprise, Leibniz advocated a “commerce of light,” namely a trade of mutual enlightenment. Against Spinoza’s view that there is only one substance, Leibniz argued that the world is characterized by its infinite diversity and richness. The world is teaming with entities that exist in their fullest capacity and in a state of harmony. According to Leibniz (1989) in his Discourse on Metaphysics, God has created the best of all possible worlds (a theodicy), which is “the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena.”
What bearing has this theory of monadology on relations with China? Recognition of the diversity of cultures and civilizations leads us to embrace the inherent value of difference. Leibniz, like Spinoza, advocated a tolerance of diverse views, but went beyond the philosophers of his day to establish a moral imperative to learn from cultural diversity. Applying this ethic to himself and committing much of his life to studying China from the reports of missionaries and merchants, Leibniz went about establishing a philosophical platform for cosmopolitanism. Differences between entities or monads require exchange, but they also establish a commonality of culture. Leibniz was not, in modern terms, a cultural relativist: If all cultures are equal (in value), why bother to learn from any one of them? Although all knowledge of the outside world is relativistic, Leibniz argued that there are enough innate ideas to make an exchange of enlightenment possible. Leibniz once wrote to Peter the Great, who was at the time engaged in a struggle with Islam to protect Moscovy from being engulfed by Crimean Tartars, to say that he was not one of those “impassioned patriots of one country alone” but a person who works for “the well-being of the whole of mankind, for I consider heaven as my country and cultivated men as my compatriots” (Wiener 1951: 596–97). From the doctrine of blind monads, Leibniz developed a hermeneutics of generosity and hospitality that regarded inter-cultural understanding as not merely a useful tool of anthropological field methods, but an ethical imperative. Leibniz developed an implicit cosmopolitan virtue in his attempt to establish an exchange with China that offers us a guideline for understanding our own times, especially a “commerce of light” with Islam. In this respect, Leibniz provides a sort of rational and moral antidote to Huntington.
Despite Leibniz, the Enlightenment has often been treated as the origin of modern universalism, but a universalism that functions as the basis for cultural domination and exclusion. The Enlightenment notion of universalism set in motion a series of contrasts or binary oppositions between the universalistic world of bourgeois civility and citizenship, and local practices and customs that were considered antithetical to the march of progressive world history. The result was to create a world of minorities who were seen to be in need of education, reform, modernization, and regeneration, leading wherever possible to an eventual assimilation. There is of course much more to this story. In 1793 in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1998), Immanuel Kant created the modernist division between the moral impulse of Protestant rationalism and the cultic religions that promised to give health and prosperity to ordinary people, provided they surrendered themselves to the gods through the magical powers of the shaman, the wizard, and the witch. He created, at least implicitly, a comparative view of the division between the popular religions of the uncivilized world and the ascetic this-worldly religions. This contrast formed the basis for Max Weber’s comparative sociology of the economic ethics of world religions. It was not only or simply a Kantian view of world development, since Hegel in a series of lectures between 1821 and 1831 developed the idea of Christianity as “the consummate religion,” namely a religion in which the evolution of the spirit, or Geist, of history found its contemporary “consummation” (Hodgson 1985). For Kant, Hegel, and Weber, Judaism did not belong to this world of rational consummate religions.
The Jews were seen to be resistant to the modern Enlightenment, because their passionate commitment to bizarre customs, especially their dietary requirements, was viewed as pre-eminently an example of how “thick” local cultures stood out as a rational offence to the modernizing impulse of the Enlightenment and its political progeny, the French Revolution (Mufti 2007). Weber (1952) adopted a similar view of Jewish dietary culture as an erosion of genuine, rational asceticism in his Ancient Judaism. It was on the basis of such reasoning that the revolutionary republican call of Napoleon Bonaparte summoned the Jewish community to assimilate under a banner of rationalist secularism. Progressive secular Jews would leave their ancestral allegiances and throw off their ancient customs to become French or German citizens.
The issues of Jewishness and the Jewish Question are inevitably connected to Karl Marx and his critique of bourgeois capitalist society in his 1843 “On the Jewish Question” (Marx and Engels 1975). Hirschel Levi, Marx’s father, was influenced by the secular ideas of the French and German Enlightenment, eventually changing his name to Heinrich Marx and adopting Christianity in 1824. In part Heinrich’s conversion to the state religion was designed to avoid the anti-Jewish laws of 1816, which would have undermined his law practice (Berlin 1978). The issue of Jewish identity and the Enlightenment was therefore a concrete rather than abstract issue for the young Marx and it gave rise to his famous argument against Bruno Bauer on liberal political rights. Bauer had argued that political emancipation would give Jews the opportunity to become full citizens, thereby entering the process of modernization by abandoning their medieval religious customs. Marx used the debate about Jewishness to criticize bourgeois liberalism as a shallow political doctrine in which social emancipation was necessary to give political emancipation any substantial content. Genuine citizenship was not possible in capitalism because abstract Man was an alienated creature in which political life had become detached from the real conditions of existence. This discussion in many respects provided the fatal starting point of the long history of the separation of the universal rights of Man from the social transformation of class society by revolutionary action.
Because we cannot escape modernity, we cannot escape the identity conflicts that result in civil disturbance, and we cannot easily guard against the threat of communal violence. Cleaning up the language of discrimination is not going to significantly change the politics of ethnic violence. The current crisis of liberal secularism involves a struggle over claims to identity—a struggle that can no longer be housed within the legacy of the Treaty of Westphalia, in which it was assumed that religion could be simply a matter of private consciousness, not public practice. The Treaty of 1648 came at the end of the Wars of Religion. Separating church and state, it made religion a matter of personal belief rather than public practice and allowed princes to decide which version of Christianity would be hegemonic within their principalities. However, these arrangements are breaking down, partly because, although they may have been relevant to the social characteristics of Christianity in the seventeenth century, they are less relevant to Islam and Hinduism in the modern period. Is there no alternative to this growth of ethnic conflict, especially in societies where the state often appears to take sides with the majority against minorities, for instance in Thailand between a majority Buddhist culture and Muslim minority one, or in Malaysia, where a policy of Islamization of law and education appears to weigh against Buddhists, Hindus, and Christians (McCargo 2007)? What models or metaphors of cosmopolitanism could one appeal to against the homogenizing force of modernity?
One possibility of cosmopolitan inspiration can be illustrated by a story told by Abul Kalam Azad, who confronted a flock of sparrows invading his prison cell during his incarceration by the British at the Ahmednagar Fort in Western India during World War II. After some fruitless confrontation and after many tentative steps of negotiation and persuasion, Azad eventually feeds the birds, and through this “conference of birds” an ethics of coexistence emerges. This little story is in fact based on a twelfth-century Sufi allegory by the Persian poet Fariduddin Attar. Aamir Mufti (2007: 171–72) concludes that these allegorical narratives “reveal the utter human poverty of the politics of separatism and communalism, and constitute perhaps one of the most far-reaching critiques of these corrosive tendencies in India’s modern life.” Furthermore, “they also contain the elements of a critique of the implicit majoritarianism of ‘secular’ nationalism itself and its failure ultimately to produce a convincing ethico-political practice of coexistence in an undivided India” (Mufti 2007: 172). This argument is intended to be an attempt “to unravel the assumption of inevitability” that has become attached to the endless cycle of ethnic violence in modern societies. This unraveling represents an important scholarly contribution, but it is also a major contribution to the ethics of hospitality in a world deeply divided between hosts, guests, and strangers.
We can usefully distinguish between negative and positive alterity. Negative alterity exclusively defines the other as dangerous, inferior, and antithetical to the subject’s own culture; Orientalism is the classical form of negative otherness. By contrast, positive alterity recognizes the other, embracing the ethical opportunities afforded by global diversity. In contemporary social theory, a variety of authors have defended recognition ethics, multiculturalism, and diversity as positive aspects of globalization. Although successful democracies may require safe—if porous—borders, patriotism can be successfully distinguished from nationalism. Cosmopolitan virtue—celebrating difference, and promoting the care of the other—is an ethical consequence of globalization and constitutes an obligation that complements human rights.
The contemporary philosophical debates about the other have their origins in G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of recognition (Williams 1997). The master–slave dialectic suggests that neither slave nor master can achieve authentic recognition, and hence, without some degree of social equality, no ethical community—a system of rights and obligations—can function. Rights presuppose relatively free, autonomous, and self-conscious agents capable of rational choice. Recognition is required if people are to be mutually acceptable as moral agents, but life is unequal. Economic scarcity undercuts the roots of solidarity (community), without which conscious, rational agency is difficult. A variety of modern writers, in particular Charles Taylor (1992), have appealed to recognition ethics as the baseline for the enjoyment of rights in multicultural societies. Without recognition of minority rights, no liberal democratic society can function. The growth of human rights is a major index of the growth of juridical globalization, and recognition of the rights of others is an ethical precondition for global governance. Cosmopolitanism now appears as the most articulate alternative to a bleak set of assumptions about the clash of civilizations. Cosmopolitanism has many distinguished supporters—most recently Kwame Appiah (2006). In the West we need to remind ourselves that cosmopolitanism is neither new nor Western as such. We need to recognize the long history of Sanskrit cosmopolitanism as well as Buddhist cosmopolitanism, and more recently various writers have drawn attention to Islamic cosmopolitanism (Marsden 2008). This openness to the alternative versions of cosmopolitanism could be developed as a more general platform for communication between religions and for recognizing opportunities for mutuality that are present in other traditions (Seligman 2004). The search for religious roots of cosmopolitanism can be a useful alternative strategy to the dominant view that cosmopolitanism is an essential secular quest. Religious notions about human vulnerability can be deployed to support the view that human rights are not simply part of a Western juridical tradition (Turner 2006).
Having recognized the possibility of religious roots of cosmopolitanism, we must acknowledge that in the twentieth century much of the burden of cosmopolitan hope was borne on the shoulders of human-rights initiatives, and even here the question of the universality of culture, and thereby the nature and intellectual role of cultural anthropology, became a deeply problematic issue. To counter arguments that humanity is divided by race, it became important to assert the commonality of culture, especially language, in the definition of humanity. The great champion of “culture” as a category and of cosmopolitanism as a moral and political platform was Franz Boas. In Race and Democratic Society (1945) and Anthropology and Modern Life (1962), he had condemned racism, imperialism, and colonialism as factors that prevented people from openness to the full spectrum of human culture, and he attacked nation and nationalism as artificial and inappropriate receptacles of human cultural production. In almost Kantian terms, Boas embraced a philosophy of cosmopolitanism and international peace as necessary consequences of his belief in the integrating power of human culture. It is ironic that modern anthropology, having had a transfusion of poststructuralism and postmodernism, now deconstructs the Boasian concept of culture, which is considered too essential, bounded, and rigid to cope with the idea of culture as process. Critics of the notion of culture include Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) and Joel Kahn (1989), but without a notion of culture there is another ironic question: Does anthropology still exist (Turner 2008)? This ironic question takes us back to Leibniz and the problems of cultural relativism. While Boas tried to use “culture” in his campaign against nationalism and racism, much of the relativism that fueled the postmodern critique of Enlightenment came from the ethnographic research of anthropology, but with the assault on culture there is little common ground for defending some idea of social justice, human dignity, or human rights (Bauman and Briggs 2003).
In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States in 2001, the social tensions between the West and Islam have been intensified. Political Islam has, in the post-Cold War period, replaced communism as the imaginary enemy of liberal capitalism. As a result, the Huntington thesis of a “clash of civilizations” is compelling and optimism about our political future is in short supply. In this discussion I have explored briefly the case for recognition ethics and cosmopolitan virtue, but the defense of these normative positions is problematic in the light of a civil war in Iraq, and military conflicts in Afghanistan, Thailand, Chechnya, and the Sudan. Huntington’s thesis has plausibility because in all of these modern conflicts Islam has been prominent, albeit for a great variety of reasons. Of course there is an equally compelling argument that orthodox Islam does not condone or counsel violence but on the contrary offers the prospects of religious pluralism and mutual respect (Sachedina 2001). One interpretation of Islamic radicalism is that it has involved the re-interpretation of the meaning of jihad in response to Western colonialism. Originally meaning a personal struggle against evil, it became under Sayyid Qutb a doctrine of struggle against foreigners to protect the faith, and under Ali Shariati a revolutionary doctrine against state oppression and foreign intervention (Rahnema 2000). By contrast, Olivier Roy (2004: 41) counsels us that all attempts to sort out the “correct” theological interpretation of jihad are, especially from a social science perspective, largely sterile, since all of these terms are highly contested within Islam itself and it is not the role of sociology to adjudicate between different theological claims. Western social commentary can make mistakes of interpretation in this particular arena, as we can discover from the journalism of Michel Foucault (Afary and Anderson 2005). Rather, our task is more properly to understand the social forces that sustain these interpretations. For Roy, one crucial issue is that the internet has opened up opportunities for an endless competition between fatwas, resulting in a deep crisis of authority within the Muslim community (Turner and Volpi 2007). If there is to be an open dialogue between civilizations, it will not be intellectually adequate to pretend that radical Islam is deeply democratic. Recognition cannot begin with such artificial characterization of difference. Cosmopolitanism must start with the understanding that agreements through dialogue must begin with a recognition of cultural differences, but in the case of jihad, Western observers will have also to recognize the parallel role of the notion of crusade and just war in the West.
Finally, much of the intellectual equipment that would be valuable in criticizing the Huntington thesis—such as the idea of a common human culture or a Leibnizian commitment to dialogue—has been compromised or at least brought into question by various intellectual movements such as postmodernism and poststructuralism. Academics who retain a commitment to ideas about universalism, recognition ethics, and cosmopolitanism will need to defend some version of human rights as a transnational movement, some notion of human dignity, and some explication of our common vulnerability if a “commerce of light” is to survive.
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