¹ One important sceptical discussion of the bioterrorism threat is Milton Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat (U.S. Army War College, 2005).

² For a statement by Ambassador Donald Mahley, US Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Arms Control Issues, refer to http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/5497.htm

³ Meaning that the scientific or engineering details of what occurs ‘inside’ a particular component or technique need not be understood by the individual investigator in order to make use of it.

⁴ Scientifically, one distinguishes between the microorganism, Bacillus anthracis, and the disease it causes, anthrax. Here we have adopted the more casual popular usage that conflates the organism itself with the name of the disease, at the risk of some loss of precision.

⁵ A base, or a nucleotide, is the fundamental unit of a DNA molecule.

⁶ Once they are inside their target cells, viruses hijack cellular proteins to convert their genomes into viral particles. However, viruses that contain negative strand RNA genomes, like Marburg and Ebola, cannot be turned into mature viruses with host proteins alone. Conversion of such genomes into virus particles also requires proteins that are normally packaged within the virus itself. Thus, the Ebola and Marburg genomes are not infectious on their own.

⁷ The US federal advisory group, NSABB, has called for self-regulation within the scientific community. Under the proposed plan, scientists themselves decide whether their research constitutes dual-use experiments of concern. For a discussion of NSABB’s proposal, refer to Jocelyn Kaiser (2007). ‘Biodefense: Proposed Biosecurity Review Plan Endorses Self-Regulation’ Science, 316(5824), 529.

⁸ For a discussion of codes of conduct in the case ofbiodefence research, see Roger Roffey, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau, September 2006 ‘Crucial Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists’, Arms Control Today. For a review and critical discussion of the broader need for codes applicable to all life scientists, see Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006), pp. 246–250.

⁹ For key publications in this literature, see Wolfgang Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998); J.F. Rischard, High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

¹⁰ We define ‘sub-state’ groups to be those that receive substantial assistance from a state or state entities; ‘non-state’ groups by contrast are those that do not. The Rajneeshees and Aum Shinrikyo were non-state groups. Because of its accommodation by the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda arguably was, at least for a time, a sub-state group.

¹¹ The implication of plague in Surat has been some what controversial. A number of studies, however, including Shivaji et al. (2000), have used DNA forensics to show that the causative agent of the disease out break was, infact, Yersinia pestis.

¹² Much of the discussion here, regarding disease preparedness and response, has been based on WHO strategies that can be found here: http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/biochemguide/en/index.html

¹³ There are a host of legal and ethical issues regarding implementation of quarantines. For a discussion, refer to Cécile M. Bensimon and Ross E.G. Upshur, 2007 ‘Evidence and effectiveness in decision making for quarantine’. American Journal of Public Health (Suppl. 1), pp. 44–48; Richard Scabs, 2003. SARS: prudence, not panic Canadian Medical Association Journal, 169(1), pp. 1432–1434.

¹⁴ Recombinant DNA technology facilitated the exchange of genetic material between vastly different organisms and opened new frontiers for molecular biology research, but it also brought with it a number of safety concerns regarding potential harm to laboratory workers and to the public.