1. C.S.A. Journal 7, 11.
2. Kerry Noble, Tabernable of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City (Prescott, Ontario: Voyageur Publishing, 1998), 216.
3. Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 5.
4. Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161–91. See also Lifton, Nazi Doctors.
5. Kathleen Norris, “Native Evil,” Boston College Magazine, winter 2000, last accessed 12 January 2003, www.bc.edu/publications/bcm/winter_2002/ft_evil_
native.html.
6. Definitions from Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
7. I find the relational analysts’ definition of empathy as vicarious introspection to be closest to what I try to achieve in my interviews.
8. Francine de Plessix Gray, Simone Weil (New York: Viking, 2001).
9. Jillian Becker, “Simone Weil: A Saint for our Time?” The New Criterion Online, last accessed 25 December 2002, www.newcriterion.com/archive/20/mar02/weil.
htm.
10. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, pt. 1. Excerpts of the book were translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). See “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Publishes Extracts from Al-Jihad Leader Al-Zawahiri’s New Book,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 2 December 2001, in FBIS-NES-2002-0108, document ID GMP2002010
8000197.
11. Al-Zawahiri, Knights, pt. 1.
12. In his famous discussion of “supreme emergency,” Michael Walzer writes that in a context where defeat is imminent, and where defeat might be accompanied by the annihilation of a population or its way of life, ordinary limitations on fighters are temporarily suspended. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 2000). In the aftermath of the Arab wars of conquest that followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad, religious specialists developed a set of judgments relating to the resort to and conduct of war. They distinguished between two understandings of the military aspect of jihad: first, a “collective duty” (fard kifaya) of Muslims to support an armed struggle in which Muslim troops—as opposed to the whole population—led by a legitimate Muslim ruler secure the boundaries of a Muslim state; and second, an “individual duty” of fighting in the name of Islam in the case that an enemy is violating Muslim rights by invading the territory of Islam, damaging Muslim property, and hence endangering Islam itself, i.e. delimiting the Muslim community’s capacity to carry out its duty of serving God. In this latter case, the scholars said that fighting is fard ‘ayn, an individual duty. Fard ‘ayn involves the existence of an emergency condition in which “necessity makes the forbidden things permitted.” It involves the suspension of traditional lines of authority so that, for instance, women and children are allowed to participate in the struggle. Citing what he says are unequivocal passages from the Koran, John Kelsay adds that without a doubt, Islam’s understanding of fard ‘ayn is inconsistent with the killing of civilians. John Kelsay, “War, Peace, and the Imperatives of Justice in Islamic Perspective: What do the September 11, 2001, Attacks Tell Us about Islam and the Just War Tradition?” forthcoming in P. Robinson, ed., War and Justice in World Religions (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2003).
13. This section makes use of arguments and definitions I developed for my earlier book, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
14. Philosopher Virginia Held argues that not all terrorists aim to terrify. Alternative objectives include gaining concessions, obtaining publicity, or provoking repression. But since terrorists attempt to achieve these objectives with the instrument of dread, this argument is more semantic than useful. Virginia Held, “Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals,” in R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, Violence, Terrorism, and Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 59–85.
15. It is the means of terrorism that are morally unique, not its end. “It would be naive to pretend that terrorism is an innocuous term,” Martha Crenshaw admonishes, “but ends must be separated from means in politics.” See Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation (New York: Institute for East West Security Studies, 1989), 5. This is precisely what this definition attempts to do: to define terrorism as a technique that can be used in the service of good or evil.
16. The definition of combatants continues to be the subject of intense debate. The Geneva Convention and its relevant protocols provide some guidance. Legitimate targets are limited to those objects, which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. (Geneva Convention, Article 52, paragraph 2). For a comprehensive analysis see Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross; Dordrecht, Netherlands: M. Nijhoff, 1987), 88–95. Virginia Held argues convincingly that it is often impossible to differentiate categorically noncombatants from legitimate targets—in many countries children are forced to perform military service. See Held, “Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals,” 59–85. Moreover, civilian populations are often producing armaments. Russel Ewing argued in 1927, “Whereas wars once affected merely the fighting men who make up a small percent of the total population, today almost the entire population of a belligerent nation becomes engaged in wartime industries.” See Russel Ewing, “The Legality of Chemical Warfare,” American Law Review 61 (1927): 58.
17. In addition to the 125 people who were killed inside the Pentagon, 64 people were killed aboard American Airlines flight 77.
18. The description that follows is based on David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” American Political Science Review 78.3 (September 1984): 658–76.
19. Ibid., 669.
20. Ibid., 658–76. See also Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
21. I am using the term holy terrorism to mean religious terrorism as I have just defined it.
22. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 87–130.
23. Susan Nieman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 8.
24. Leibniz’s answer to why God would allow a natural order that involved so much innocent suffering was that man brought such natural evils upon himself: natural evil was collective punishment for moral evil, including, but not limited, to the Fall. A massive earthquake, which destroyed the city of Lisbon in 1755, evoked a similar reaction among Enlightenment philosophers and theologians as Auschwitz did for their twentieth-century counterparts, Susan Nieman explains. Rousseau would reject Leibniz’s view, ushering in a more modern conception of evil. Innocent suffering was not punishment for sin, but a symptom of ignorance. In regard to the earthquake at Lisbon, for example, it made no sense for humans to live in large cities where they were vulnerable to earthquakes. Nieman, Evil in Modern Thought, 1–57. Interestingly, psychiatrists are seeing new links between suffering and sin today, as we shall see.
25. It may be that to persuade themselves that the atrocities they have committed or ordered others to commit were justified, terrorists dehumanize their enemies more and more and willingly inflict pain, in some cases for profit. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, On Killing (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1995). Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
26. Sue Grand, The Reproduction of Evil: A Clinical and Cultural Perspective (Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytic Press, 2000). Victims of repeated abuse, or children who live in violent neighborhoods or war zones, may experience PTSD. T. G. Veenema, K. Schroeder-Bruce, “The Aftermath of Violence: Children, Disaster, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” Journal of Pediatric Health Care 16.5 (September–October 2002): 235–44.
27. Shakespeare’s Richard III, for example, attributes his determination to become “a villain” (morally evil) to his having been “cheated of feature by dissembling nature” (natural evil). This might be a good example of how victimization—including by fate—can be used to justify moral wrongs. Derek Summerfield observes that “the profile of post-traumatic stress disorder has risen spectacularly, and it has become the means by which people seek victim status and its associated moral high ground in pursuit of recognition and compensation.” Derek Summerfield, “The Invention of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category,” British Medical Journal 322 (13 January 2001): 95–98.
Judith Lewis Herman, a leading authority on trauma, reminds us that it is important to keep in mind that one should not subscribe to the belief that traumatized victims become evil, since that would involve “blaming the victim,” which is morally wrong. Herman points out that there is a popular literature of the “cycle of abuse” theory. This theory involves sex offenders who have undergone past traumas themselves. The theory suggests that “the sexual offense is…a reenactment of the trauma or an attempt to overcome it through the mechanism of ‘identification with the aggressor.’ ” She adds that “proponents of this theory often invoke the concept of a ‘cycle of abuse,’ or of ‘generational transmission,’ whereby the sexually victimized children of one generation become the victimizers of the next.” Herman points out that this theory is not empirically valid, explaining that “its most glaring weakness is its inability to explain the virtual male monopoly on this type of behavior. Since girls are sexually victimized at least twice to three times more commonly than boys, this theory would predict a female rather than a male majority of sex offenders.” Judith Lewis Herman, “Considering Sex Offenders: A Model of Addiction,” Journal of Women in Culture and Society 13.4 (summer 1988): 703–4.
28. Some studies suggest that PTSD may be at least partly heritable. Adult children of Holocaust survivors are at greater risk for PTSD—perhaps because they are more likely to expose themselves to traumatic events through life choices, or because susceptibility to PTSD is heritable. See R. Yehuda et al., “The Cortisol and Glucocorticoid Receptor Response to Low Dose Dexamethasone Administration in Aging Combat Veterans and Holocaust Survivors with and without PTSD,” Biological Psychiatry 52.5 (September 2002): 393–403; and M. B. Stein, K. L. Jang, and S. Taylor, “Genetic and Environmental Influences on Trauma Exposure and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms: A Twin Study,” American Journal of Psychiatry 159.10 (October 2002): 1675–81.
29. Judith Herman reports that the majority of trauma victims do not become perpetrators, but that trauma appears to amplify common gender stereotypes among victims of childhood abuse. Men are more likely to take out their aggression on others, while women are more likely to injure themselves or to be victimized again. Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 113. For adolescent males, exposure to violence and victimization is “strongly associated with externalizing problem behaviors such as delinquency, while adolescent females exposed to violence and victimization are more likely to exhibit internalizing symptoms,” according to a study of African-American youth. Z.T. McGee et al., “Urban Stress and Mental Health among African-American Youth: Assessing the Link between Exposure to Violence, Problem Behavior, and Coping Strategies,” Journal of Cultural Diversity 8.3 (fall 2001): 94–104. A 1999 study showed that male Vietnam veterans seeking inpatient treatment for PTSD were more likely to exhibit violent behavior than a mixed diagnostic group of inpatients without PTSD. M. McFall et al., “Analysis of Violent Behavior in Vietnam Combat Veteran Psychiatric Inpatients with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” Journal of Trauma Stress 12.3 (July 1999): 501–17. Combat exposure was found to have an independent positive association with interpersonal violence, when controlling for PTSD among combat veterans. F.C. Beckham et al., “Interpersonal Violence and Its Correlates in Vietnam Veterans with Chronic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” Journal of Clinical Psychology 53.8 (December 1997): 859–69. Dr. Jerrold Post argues that PTSD, secondary to living in a Palestinian refugee camp, could play a role in the creation of a terrorist. Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist on Trial: The Context of Political Crime,” Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry Law 28.4 (2000): 489.
30. Nieman, Evil in Modern Thought, 284–85.
31. This paragraph summarizes Nieman, Evil in Modern Thought, 284–85.
32. The Pakistani jihadi groups, for example, are largely the creation of the Pakistani military establishment. When they fight the Indian military, the term mercenary might be more appropriate than terrorist. They are included in this book because they also target noncombatants and because they have joined forces with an organization, Al Qaeda, whose modus operandi is murdering innocents in large numbers.
33. Note that religious terrorism and just terrorism overlap, but religious terrorism is no more likely to be just than any other form of terrorism. What counts, at least for me, is that the intention is to save innocent lives that would otherwise be lost, the probability of success, the use of a discriminate weapon, balancing of other ethical goals, and the complete lack of other alternatives. I am deeply grateful to a group of theologians, ethicists, and other scholars convened by Mark Moore to help me think through these questions: Mary Jo Bane, Brent Coffin, Ronald Thieman, and Kenneth Winston. I would also like to thank Michael Reich, who strongly encouraged me to write this section and was also a careful reader.
34. They claim also to be following in the footsteps of the White Rose activists, a group of German youths who publicly protested the Nazis’ attempt to exterminate the Jews. These youths were guillotined for their insistence that Jews were human beings, just as the doctor killers insist that unborn children are human beings.
35. Abraham Lincoln, “The Seventh and Last Joint Debate, at Alton, Illinois, October 15, 1858,” in The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 5, ed. John Hay (New York: Francis D. Tandy Company, 1894). Available on the Web site of the Northern Illinois University Libraries, last accessed 29 December 2002, www.lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/getobject_?c.2229:2./
lib35/artfl1/databases/sources/IMAGE/.
36. Ibid.
37. The case I am making here would be more difficult in an authoritarian regime, where there are no legal or political institutions worth protecting, and where the polity is morally corrupted, perhaps in part as a result of fear. Examples include Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime, the Soviet Union under Stalin, or in Nazi Germany. Would it be morally appropriate to kill the person who is flipping the switch in the crematorium, for example, to save the lives of hundreds or thousands of Jews, in part by terrorizing other crematorium workers into leaving their jobs? In this case, trying to change government policy would not be an option. And while killing the tyrant would be an easier case to make, we will assume that doing so would not be possible, and certainly not possible in time to save those lives. It can be argued—especially in nondemocratic regimes—
that government officials are not noncombatants. It can also be argued that although assassinating tyrants is a crime, it is sometimes morally justified. Saint Thomas Aquinas argued that because tyrannical governments are directed toward the private good of the ruler, rather than to the common good of the governed, overthrowing such governments is to be praised, unless it produces such disorder that society’s suffering is increased. Aristotle and Cicero, among others, made similar arguments. But who has the right to identify a tyrant, the terrorist, or his victim? In any case, another tyrant might immediately take his place. While, in my view, it would be morally problematic to kill the crematorium worker, it would be even more problematic not to do so. If there was reason to believe that another killer would not come to take the dead one’s place, or it was possible to keep killing the killers, the right thing to do, under these narrowly specified circumstances, would be to kill the killer, but then submit to the law, in my view. Here is an example of terrorism that is probably just. If the case were a contemporary one, we might demand of our terrorist that he look beyond his own country and consider whether involving international organizations might achieve the same objective. We would demand of our just terrorist that terrorism truly be a last resort, as required for a just war under the just-war tradition. The existence of CNN and of the Internet make it harder to imagine just terrorism today; it would be necessary to exhaust these avenues before contemplating murdering innocents—even in defense of a large number of other innocents. Ajai Sahni argues that it is absurd to call terrorism “just” under any circumstances, in the same way that genocide cannot ever be just, in his view. Ajai Sahni conversation with the author, Delhi, 17 January 2003. I include this example because I consider it a useful exercise to help us understand precisely the evil of terorrism.
38. Martha Nussbaum, “Making Philosophy Matter to Politics,” New York Times, 2 December 2002, A21.
39. Cited in Lifton, Nazi Doctors, xvii.
40. Ibid.
41. While many terrorists are motivated by more mundane concerns, such as financial payments for killing, especially in mature terrorist groups, the groups start out by appealing to operatives’ desire to purify the world—and we need to understand this.
1. The theory of collective action was developed in Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). Many people find the application of this theory to terrorism surprising or even shocking. I do not subscribe to the notion that terrorists promote social justice, but it is critical to understand that terrorists and their sympathizers believe this. Given that, the same questions Olson raised with regard to voting or pollution abatement ought to apply when individuals are deciding whether or not to contribute to terrorist organizations.
2. Joel Mowbray, “How They Did It: An ‘evil one’ confesses, and boasts,” National Review, 23 December 2002; Vol. LIV, No. 24.
3. Desmond Butler and Don Van Natta, “A Qaeda informer Helps Investigators Trace Group’s Trail,” New York Times 17 February 2003, A1.
4. Political scientist Edward Banfield asserts that riots occur mainly for “fun” or “profit,” not for the purported political objectives the participants claim to seek. Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little Brown, 1968.) Cited in James B. Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988).
5. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), 203.
6. Clearly, people do contribute to public goods in the absence of selective incentives. Do-gooders are likely to be rewarded for their efforts with improved self-esteem, prestige, power, and (possibly) economic benefits. For example, voluntary workers acquire leadership skills and networks of influence that could be marketable in other areas, as Melucci points out. See Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes, 167. But for some individuals, some of the time, factors other than individual self-interest clearly motivate behavior. Altruists, for example, take pleasure from the pleasure of others. Volunteers may also enjoy the process of contributing to the public good, and don’t require rewards for their efforts. In this case, contributing is a rational strategy. But Jan Elster points out that for some individuals, some of the time, conscience trumps “rationality.” Individuals motivated by social or moral norms will contribute to public goods even when they receive no particular utility from knowing that others benefit or from the process of contributing. While the norms we choose to follow appear partly to be shaped by self-interest (the poor often favor the norm of equality, while the rich are more likely to favor the norm of reward for effort), “norms are not fully reducible to self-interest…. The unknown residual is a brute fact, at least for the time being,” Elster argues. See Jan Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 150. People motivated by social norms may contribute to public goods because they may be alarmed by the prospect of social disapproval, or they may like to be seen doing the “right thing,” he argues. People motivated by moral norms may feel compelled to follow the rules, even if no one is watching.
7. Religion appeals to a continuum of interests concurrently. It appeals simultaneously to “rational” (selfish), teleological, deontological, and aretaic interests all at once. It encourages adherents to do the right thing for its own sake, but also in the hope of rewards after death.
8. In organizations of professional killers, such as the Pakistani jihadi groups discussed in chapter 5, material incentives play such an important role that the organization is best understood with the tools of economic analysis, analogously to an NGO or even a firm. Astute leaders become price discriminators for labor. When a prize operative no longer finds the spiritual or emotional appeal sufficient, money and power become the most important currency for encouraging him to continue his work. The higher the opportunity cost of a particular operative’s time, the more he will have to be paid.
1. They were from the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and state, county, and local police agencies.
2. Kerry Noble, Tabernable of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City (Prescott, Ontario: Voyageur Publishing, 1998), 22.
3. Robert G. Millar, “The FBI and I,” unpublished manuscript.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Kerry Noble, interview with the author, 2 March 1998. For other studies of CSA, see James K. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (Seminole, Fla.: Interpact Press, 1997); James Coates, Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987); and Brent Smith, Terrorism in America; Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
7. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 73.
8. C.S.A. Journal 7.
9. The government relied extensively on Ellison’s testimony against his coconspirators to make its case, but jury members suspected that Ellison’s assessment was influenced by his desire for a reduced sentence. Lamar James, “Jurors Finish ‘Hard’ Task; Most Decline Comment,” Arkansas Gazette, 8 April 1988.
10. Kerry Noble, interview with the author, 2 March 1998.
11. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 39. Noble, interview.
12. Ibid.
13. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 145–46.
14. Kerry Noble, e-mail message to the author, 7 April 1999.
15. “Keith” (unidentified former government agent), interview with the author, 22 December 1998. He had retired from the U.S. government some ten years earlier.
16. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 51.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 68.
19. Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 126.
20. Ibid. Doubling is similar—but more extreme and sustained—to Melanie Klein’s notion of “splitting,” in which the hated parts of the self are projected onto the Other.
21. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
22. Lifton, Nazi Doctors, 427.
23. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 119.
24. Web site of the Aryan Nations, last accessed 8 January 2003, www.aryan-nations.org/.
25. Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 182.
26. Lifton, Nazi Doctors, 427.
27. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 86.
28. Ibid., 120. This concept is based primarily on I Thessalonians 4:17: “Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord.” As interpreted by Christian fundamentalists, the rapture, which lifts the chosen few out of the mayhem of end-time destruction to meet the returning Messiah, is a reward for their steadfastness. The Darbyite movement of 1830s to the 1880s was the forerunner to modern Christian fundamentalism and supplied the theological basis for the rise of fundamentalism’s emphasis on biblical literalism and inerrancy and the notion of “premillennial dispensationalism”—that Jesus will return prior to his millennial rule, and that mankind has entered the end time after receiving previous “dispensations” from God in the form of Adam’s banishment from Eden, the Flood, and Christ’s grace, to which man has failed to respond. Anglican John Nelson Darby’s seven dispensations, although reflecting earlier thinking and sources regarding the rapture, premillenialism, and dispensationalism, were original in their focus on the rapture, which became a central feature in his prophetic system, and in his ideas pertaining to ingathering of the Jews and Israel. Charles B. Strozier, On the Psychology of Fundamentalism in America (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1994), 183–84. James A. Aho, The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1990), 53–54.
29. Pastor Robert Millar, interview with the author, 21 April 1998.
30. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 88.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 93.
34. Ibid., 34.
35. Ibid., 56. Noble provides some examples of where the body composed of many members is mentioned in the scriptures, but it would be hard to support the “sonship” doctrine exclusively with those passages.
36. Ibid., 55.
37. Rosabeth Moss Kanter observed many of these commitment mechanisms in nineteenth-century utopias and communes. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 83–84.
38. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 74.
39. Ibid., 67.
40. Ibid., 68.
41. Ibid., 96.
42. C.S.A. Journal 7.
43. Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken, Stanley Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (New York, Harper and Row, 1956).
44. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 73.
45. Ibid., 75.
46. Coates, Armed and Dangerous, 137.
47. Ibid.
48. C.S.A. Journal 7, 34.
49. “Keith,” interview.
50. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 63.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 35.
53. Robert S. Robins and Jerrold M. Post, Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 140.
54. Response of United States of America to James D. Ellison’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence, United States of America v. James D. Ellison, Criminal Nos. 85-20006-01 and 85-200017-01, 11 May 1988.
55. Rodney Bowers, “White Radical Activities that Led to Indictments Recounted for 1983–85,” Arkansas Gazette, 27 April 1987, A1.
56. Noble, interview; Testimony of James Ellison and Kerry Noble, United States of America v. Robert E. Miles et al., 87-200008, 15 March 1988, U.S. District Court, Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division, 38. Ellison’s recollection of the federal building they had considered targeting was “vague,” he claimed in his testimony, although Noble is explicit in his recollection both in conversation and in his book.
57. Noble, Tabernable of Hate, 132–33.
58. FBI Agent Knox claimed that “substantial damage was done to the natural gas pipeline.” United States of America v. Steve Scott, 85-20014-01, U.S. District Court, Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division.
59. Noble, interview.
60. Bowers, “White Radical Activities,” A1.
61. As defined in Title 18, Section 2384, of the United States Code, sedition involves two or more persons conspiring to “overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof.” Quoted in United States of America v. Robert E. Miles et al., 9 February 1988, 11.
62. Ibid., 4.
63. Terrorists have rarely been accused of sedition. Another case of a sedition trial against a terrorist group besides that of The Order occurred in Chicago in 1981, when a sedition trial was brought against ten suspected members of a Puerto Rican terrorist organization. Matthew Wald, “U.S. to Try Eight on a Rare Charge, Plotting to Overthrow the Government,” New York Times, 22 May 1987, A14.
64. “Supremacists Had Hit List, FBI Agent Says,” New York Times, 7 March 1998, 30.
65. United States of America v. James D. Ellison, 85-20006-01, Affidavit for Search Warrant, Jack Knox, 6.
66. Ibid., Direct Examination of Jack Knox.
67. Ibid., Response of the United States of America to James D. Ellison’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence.
68. Victoria Loe Hicks, “About-Face from Hate,” Dallas Morning News, 16 May 1998.
69. United States of America v. James D. Ellison, Response of the United States of America to James D. Ellison’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence.
70. Howard Pankratz, “Blast Blamed on Revenge Attack Linked to Militant’s Execution,” Denver Post, 12 May 1996.
71. April 19 is an important date for antigovernment groups. It is Patriots’ Day, the day the American Revolution began in Lexington, Massachusetts, in 1775. Some Identity Christians associate the date with 1943 when Hitler began deporting the Jews of the Warsaw ghetto to concentration camps. April 19 was also the date in 1993 when followers of David Koresh died in a fire accidentally initiated in an FBI raid. Koresh had barricaded himself and his followers in a heavily armed compound in Waco, Texas. He believed himself to be “the lamb” whose death would open the seven seals, signifying the end of the world as foretold in Revelation. For many right-wing patriots, the “Second American Revolution” will begin on that date.
72. United States of America v. James D. Ellison, Response of the United States of America to James D. Ellison’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence.
73. “Keith,” interview.
1. Hamas regards all of present-day Israel to be Palestinian territory. (Charter of Hamas, Chapter Two, Article 9). For a translation see Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine, Muhammed Maqdsi, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1993): 122–134.
2. See, for example, “The Palestinian Debate over Martyrdom Operations, Part II: A Palestinian Communiqué against the Attacks Inquiry and Analysis Series,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Inquiry and Analysis No. 101, 5 July 2002, available on the MEMRI Web site, last accessed 14 January 2003, www.memri.org/.
3. My translator asked to remain anonymous and asked me to refer to her by her nom de guerre.
4. Although the Palestinian leadership usually refers to itself as the Palestinian National Authority, the term more common in the United States is Palestinian Authority. I will hence refer to the Palestinian Authority (PA).
5. Water is a crucial aspect to this conflict. Its scarcity, misallocation, use, and abuse is yet another point of conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, especially those in the Gaza Strip. Israel declared all water resources state-owned following the 1967 war, severely restricting water access to the now 1.2 million Palestinians of the Gaza Strip, while simultaneously subsidizing and encouraging water consumption for six thousand Israeli settlers living in the Strip. The land appropriated for the settlements was also superior in terms of groundwater quality and quantity, a source of much anger amongst Gazan Palestinians to this very day. Stephanie Goeller, “Water and Conflict in the Gaza Strip,” updated December 1997, last accessed 2 September 2002, www.american.edu/projects/mandala
/TED/ice/GAZA.HTM.
6. Chris Hedges, “A Gaza Diary,” Harper’s, October 2001, 1–14.
7. Ibid., 11; see also the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, “Fact Sheet: An Overview of the Gaza Strip,” updated 18 March 2002, last accessed 2 September 2002, www.pchrgaza.org/facts/fact1.htm.
8. Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 91.
9. Anonymous Palestinian student, interview with the author, 18 October 2002.
10. Hedges, “Gaza Diary,” 12.
11. Philip Jacobson, “Home-Grown Martyrs of the West Bank Reap Deadly Harvest,” Sunday Telegraph, 19 August 2001, 20.
12. UNRWA stands for United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. UNRWA’s Web site can be accessed at www.un.org/
unrwa/.
13. “Annual Growth Rate of Registered Palestine Refugees and Female Percentage, 1953–2000,” last accessed 29 August 2002, www.un.org/unrwa/pr/pdf/figures.
pdf.
14. Abu Shanab’s assertion that Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank is illegal is questionable. Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 does not require that Israel withdraw unilaterally from the occupied territories; it requires a negotiated settlement based on the principle of exchanging land for peace. But Abu Shanab is not the only person confused on this score. In March 2002, Secretary General Kofi Annan called Israel’s occupation illegal, an assertion that was subsequently retracted by his spokesman. According to Sir Adam Roberts, professor of international relations at Oxford University, it is not the occupation per se that is illegal, but Israel’s activities as an occupying power. Israel’s attempts, since 1967, to colonize the occupied territories with its settlements is inconsistent with its obligation under Resolution 242 and with the rules of “belligerent occupation.” See “Double Standards: Iraq, Israel, and the UN,” Economist, 12 October 2002.
15. The full name of the militant wing is Izz-al-Din al-Qassam brigades.
16. Medical historians are uncertain about the nature of the disease; some suspect it may have been the first appearance of smallpox in the West. Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press), 73; and Hans Zinsser, Rats, Lice, and History (1934; reprint, New York: Bantam, 1960).
17. Ibid.
18. Elaine Pagels, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 32.
19. Passio Sanctarum Perpetuae et Felictas 3, trans. H. Musurillo, in The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford, 1972), 106–13. Cited in Pagels, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent, 34.
20. Stark, Rise of Christianity, 181.
21. Herbert Musurillo, “The Martydom of Saints Perpetua and Felicta,” last accessed 6 March 2003 www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/
maps/primary/perpetua.html.
22. Stark, Rise of Christianity, 181.
23. Pagels, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent, 48.
24. Stephanie Goeller, “Water and Conflict in the Gaza Strip,” updated December 1997, last accessed 2 June 2002, www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/ice/
GAZA.HTM.
25. Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, “Terror, Islam, and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 13.2 (April 2002): 7–8.
26. Ibid., 7.
27. Quoted in Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (London: Al Saqi Books, 1985), 41.
28. Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 44.
29. Boroumand and Boroumand, “Terror, Islam, and Democracy,” 8–9.
30. See, for example, Howard Schneider, “Egypt’s Brutal Response to Militants,” Washington Post, 7 October 2001, A25.
31. Boroumand and Boroumand, “Terror, Islam, and Democracy,” 5–6.
32. Ibid., 6.
33. Conversation with a young Palestinian man who was then in graduate school in the United States, September 2000.
34. Jerrold Post, “Thematic Analysis: The Terrorists in Their Own Words,” unpublished manuscript, 79.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 79–80.
37. See, for example, Leslie Susser, “Expulsion: Anatomy of a Decision,” Jerusalem Report, 14 January 1993, 15, last accessed 3 September 2002, www.jrep.com/Info/
10thAnniversary/1993/Article-1.html/.
38. Acting upon Executive Order 13224, the Bush administration froze the assets of several American-based Islamic charities in December 2001, including the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), the Global Relief Foundation (GRF), and the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF). “Shutting Down the Terrorist Financial Network,” updated 4 December 2001, last accessed 20 July 2002, www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po841.
htm. Amira, my translator, adds that Washington has attested that there is no direct evidence (at least none available to the public) that proves the link between HLF and GRF and the finance of terrorism. The U.S. government made the accusations and arrests based on what is known as secret evidence. The counterargument, Amira adds, is that providing funding to orphans is legitimate (which HLF claims to have done), and that it would be unfair to discriminate against orphans whose parents happen to be suicide bombers. An excerpt from a joint statement of major American Muslim organizations reads, “No relief group anywhere in the world should be asked to question hungry orphans about their parents’ religious beliefs, political affiliations, or legal status. Those questions are not asked of recipients of public assistance whose parents are imprisoned or executed in the United States, and they should not be a litmus test for relief in Palestine.” See “Petition to the U.S. government to reverse its action against Palestinian Charity,” last accessed 3 September 2002, www.petitionoline.com/hlf2001/petitionhtml/.
39. Johanna McGeary and David Van Biema, “Radicals on the Rise,” Time 158, no. 26 (December 17, 2001): 50–57.
40. Ibid.
41. According to the Hamas Web site, Emad al-Alami is an elected member of the Hamas Political Bureau. He was arrested by Israel in 1988 on the charge of “performing information activities with the aim to externalize Hamas’ achievements.” He was released in 1990 and subsequently deported to Lebanon. See “Hamas Symbols and Leaders,” Web site of Hamas, last accessed 3 September 2002, www.palestine-info.co.uk/
hamas/leaders/index.htm#Emad.
42. McGeary and Van Biema, “Radicals on the Rise,” 50–57.
43. In response to criticism of its funding activities, the embassy posted a statement on its Web site denying that it supports suicide bombing or terrorism, but did not remove these earlier press releases. See Web site of the Embassy of Saudi Arabia to the United States, last accessed 30 May 2002, www.saudiembassy.net/. Cited in David Tell, “The Saudi Terror Subsidy,” Weekly Standard vol. 7, no. 35 (20 May 2002): 9.
44. Ariel Merari, lecture on suicide terrorism before the author’s class on terrorism, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 21 May 1999.
45. There are examples of individuals apparently acting on their own. In February 2001 a Palestinian bus driver deliberately ran over eight Israelis, apparently without organizational help. But these attacks take place in a societal context of suicide bombing as theater, with the shaheed the hero of the play. In some ways, as we shall see, society is now fulfilling some of the organization’s role.
46. Merari, lecture on suicide terrorism; and Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers; Talking to the ‘Human Bombs,’ ” New Yorker, 19 November 2001, 36.
47. Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics,” in International Policy Institute of Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference (Herzliyya, Israel: ICT, 2000), 82–83.
48. There are precedents, however, to the use of female suicide bombers in the Middle East. In March 1985, eighteen-year-old Sumayah Sa’ad drove a car loaded with dynamite into an Israeli military position in southern Lebanon, killing twelve Israeli soldiers and wounding fourteen others. Roughly two weeks later, on March 25, seventeen-year-old San’ah Muheidli drove a TNT-laden car into an IDF convoy, killing two soldiers and wounding two more. Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1987), 126–129, cited in Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Conceptual Framework,” in Reuven Paz, ed., Project for the Research On Islamist Movements, last accessed 28 April 2003, www.e-prism.org.
49. McGeary and Van Biema, “Radicals on the Rise,” 50–57. An Israeli security official told Lelyveld, “These days they don’t have any problem to recruit suicides. For every suicide they want, they have five, seven, ten volunteers.” Joseph Lelyveld, “All Suicide Bombers Are Not Alike,” New York Times magazine, 28 October, 2001, 17.
50. Abdul Hadi Palazzi, “Orthodox Islamic Perceptions of Jihad and Martyrdom,” in International Policy Institute of Counter-Terrorism, Countering Suicide Terrorism, 69–70.
51. The nature of these gifts, which usually include seventy-two virgins, is now being questioned. Christoph Luxenberg, in The Syro-Aramaic Reading of the Koran, argues that the term hur (white raisin, a delicacy in the ancient Near East) was misconstrued as houri (virgins). Islamic tradition holds that the correct translation is “virgins,” although the word in the earliest texts is hur. The ambiguities in the text are caused, in part, by the lack of vowels and diacritical dots. At least one respected dictionary of early Arabic reportedly defines hur as “white raisin,” however. Hur is also translated as “white raisin” in ancient Aramaic, which is closely related to the language used in the earliest texts of the Koran. Luxenberg is a scholar in Germany of ancient Semitic languages. The name he publishes under, Luxenberg, is a pseudonym. Alexander Stille, “Scholars Are Quietly Offering New Theories of the Koran,” New York Times, 2 March 2002, A1.
52. Emile Durkheim, Suicide (New York: Macmillan, 1966); and Gould et al., “Clustering of Attempted Suicide: New Zealand National Data,” International Journal of Epidemiology 23.6 (1994): 1185–89. Both cited in David Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser, and Karen Norberg, “Explaining the Rise in Youth Suicide,” NBER Working Paper Series (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000).
53. Cutler, Glaeser, and Norberg, “Explaining the Rise in Youth Suicide.”
54. See Raphael Israeli, “Islamikaze and Their Significance,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9.3 (autumn 1997): 104. See also Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Bombings,” 10–11.
55. Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Bombings,” 36.
56. Ibid.
57. Cutler, Glaeser, and Norberg, “Explaining the Rise in Youth Suicide.” On the culture of violence, see in particular Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999); Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
58. Cutler, Glaeser, and Norberg, “Explaining the Rise in Youth Suicide.”
59. Mark H. Moore et al., eds., Deadly Lessons: Understanding Lethal School Violence (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002).
60. Alfonso Chardy, “Parents Defusing Children: Palestinians Seek Help to Keep Kids from Suicide Bombing,” Montreal Gazette, 26 May 2002, A1.
61. James S. Robbins, “The Bombing Strategy,” National Review, 15 May 2002; and Chardy, “Parents Defusing Children,”
62. Chardy, “Parents Defusing Children,” A1.
63. Ibid.
64. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 183.
65. The previous paragraphs based on a report published by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI): Yotam Feldner, “ ‘72 Black-Eyed Virgins’: A Muslim Debate on the Rewards of Martyrs,” last accessed 3 September 2002, www.memri.org/.
66. Jack Kelley, “The Culture of Suicide Bombers,” USA Today, 26 June 2001, 1A.
67. Moshe Sunder, “The Lost Garden of Eden,” Ma’ariv, Weekend Section, 17 August 2001, 28, in Hebrew. Cited in Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26.2 (March/April 2003), 73.
68. Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 11 May 2001. Cited in Feldner, “ ‘72 Black-Eyed Virgins.’ ”
69. According to Human Rights Watch, 670 Palestinians were killed during the first two and a half years of the first Intifada—the most active years of the uprising. See Web site of Human Rights Watch, last accessed 2 September 2002, www.hrw.org/campaigns/israel/intifada-intro.htm/. According to the B’Tselem organization, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, the number of Palestinian casualties reached 762 by the end of 1990, and 1,124 by 13 September 1993, the official ending date of the First Intifada. See “Palestinians Killed in the Occupied Territories (Including East Jerusalem) Since the Beginning of the Intifada (Dec. 9, 1987) Until the End of January 2002,” Web site of B’Tselem, last accessed 3 September 2002, www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Total_Casualties.asp.
70. Senior-ranking Israeli counterterrorism specialist, interview with the author, 8 August 1999.
1. Sadanand Dhume, “Islam’s Holy Warriors: Laskar Jihad,” Masariku Network, 26 April 2001.
2. The Bali bombing was carried out by Jamaah Islamiya, a rival group to Laskar Jihad, which works very closely with Al Qaeda. For a complete assessment see “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Works,” ICG Asia Report, no. 43, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=845.
3. Timothy Mapes, “After Militancy, a New Threat? Indonesian Officials Fear Former Laskar Members May Stir Unrest,” Wall Street Journal, 5 December 2002, A15.
4. “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links,” Strategic Comments 8, no. 4 (May 2002), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
5. Greg Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President: a View from the Inside, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
6. “Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku,” ICG Asia Report, no. 31, 8 February 2002, 16, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.
cfm?reportid=544.
7. “Indonesia: Lashkar Jihad Head Calls for Urgent Action to Curb Regional Conflict,” Media Indonesia, quoted in BBC Monitoring, 9 August 2001.
8. Buddhism came to Indonesia sometime during the early centuries of the first millennium, soon after the arrival of Hinduism in the first century C.E. Many Buddhist monuments and temples were erected in Java during the Sailendra dynasty, which ruled a large section of Indonesia from the seventh to the ninth century. One of these is Borobudur in Yogyakarta, considered one of the most magnificent Buddhist stupas in the world. Both Hinduism and Buddhism were practiced as court religions from the ninth through the fourteenth centuries, when traders from India brought Islam to Indonesia. Today some 87 percent of Indonesia’s population of 232 million people are Muslim, 10 percent are Christian, 2 percent are Hindu, and 1 percent is Buddhist. The Indonesian constitution established the concept of “Panscasila,” in which all Indonesians must have a religion. The constitution does provide for religious freedom and belief in one supreme God. The government, however, recognizes only Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism as legitimate religions. Atheism is forbidden, and by default, all Indonesians are required to profess one of these five officially sanctioned religions.
9. I have changed her name, but the name she gave me was equally as preposterously long.
10. Robert Hefner, e-mail communication, 12 May 2002.
11. Islamic scholar Robert Hefner explains that Salafism comes in a variety of forms, some of which are austerely puritanical but not particularly extremist as far as militancy and violence are concerned. Some Salafis, for example, are quite moderate and reject Wahhabism and, especially, a jihadi interpretation of Islam. Some observers prefer the term neo-Salafis to refer to extremists like Ja’far, since the term Salafi actually refers to an interest in basing one’s life on that of the Prophet and his followers (salaf), and unaffiliated Muslims sometimes use the term.
12. He uses the term Ahle Sunnah for a particular reason. The term refers to the whole of mainstream Sunni Islam. It usually connotes moderate Islam as opposed to the harsh and violent version promoted by radicals like Ja’far. “Part of Ja’far’s genius,” Indonesia scholar Robert Hefner explains, “is that he appropriates the term to make it seem as if he is utterly mainstream, which he is not.” Hefner, e-mail.
13. Abdul Hadi Palazzi, “Orthodox Islamic Perceptions of Jihad and Martyrdom,” in International Policy Institute of Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference (Herzliyya, Israel: ICT, 2000), 64–74.
14. According to a well-known hadith or tradition, the Prophet called the greater jihad “the jihad against one’s soul, the jihad against our own limitations, our own defects.” The lesser jihad is the jihad of the sword. Denial of this tradition is one of things that set followers of Wahhab apart. Cited in Palazzi, “Orthodox Islamic Perceptions,” 64–74.
15. In the most recent elections of 1999, the majority of votes went to secular parties. Parties calling for the introduction of Shari’a across Indonesia received about 16 percent of the vote. “The Challenge for Moderate Islam: Islam in Indonesia,” Economist, 22 June 2002, 64.
16. According to Robert Hefner, until the 1980s, the majority of Indonesian Muslims were relatively lax in their religious practice. This changed toward the end of the decade, however, when the country experienced an unprecedented Islamic resurgence. Despite the religious revival, the Islam favored by the majority is neither socially conservative nor politically radical. Most Indonesians continue to support religious pluralism and a Western-style democracy. Two-thirds of the people who voted for Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle consider themselves to be pious Muslims, although they have not voted for the imposition of Islamic law. Robert Hefner, “The Strategic Role and Political Future of Islam in Indonesia,” (unpublished manuscript), March 2002.
17. Iannaccone limits the definition of strictness to a single attribute in his formal analysis: “The degree to which a group limits and thereby increases the cost of nongroup activities, such as socializing with members of other churches or pursuing ‘secular’ activities.” Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches Are Strong,” American Journal of Sociology 99.5 (March 1994): 1182.
18. Strict religious communities simplify life by proclaiming an exclusive truth—a closed, comprehensive and eternal doctrine that provides answers to life’s most troubling questions. Strict churches often limit secular pastimes and adherents’ socializing with members of other churches or the secular world. Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches Are Strong,” 1180–1211.
19. Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity (San Francisco: Harper, 1997), 33.
20. Iannaccone’s analysis shows a clear correlation between education, income level, and a tendency to donate money and to avoid socialization with those outside the church, and strictness. Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches Are Strong,” 1200. The research cited here only covers Jewish and Christian churches in the United States, however. See also Stark, Rise of Christianity, 33.
21. Gavin W. Jones and Chris Manning, “Labour Force and Employment during the 1980s,” in Anne Booth, ed., The Oil Boom and After: Indonesian Economic Policy and Performance in the Soeharto Era (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1992), 363–410. Terence H. Hull and Gavin W. Jones, “Demographic Perspectives,” in Hal Hill, ed., Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 123–78. Cited in Hefner, “Strategic Role and Political Future.”
22. John Elster, Ulysses Unbound (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2000). Dixit and Nalebuf, for example, identify precommitment mechanisms to achieve self-regulation largely without enforcement by another. These include writing contracts, cutting off communication, and burning bridges behind you. Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, “Making Strategies Credible,” in R. Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy and Choice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). See also Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
23. Privileged young men living in largely traditional societies feel most acutely the tension between the simultaneous claims of modernity and tradition. This helps to explain why middle- and upper-middle class young men join or support militant groups in some parts of the Islamic world, for example, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
24. The “traditionalists” are regarded as more liberal and more comfortable with the notion of a secular state, while the “modernists” tend to favor a greater role for Islam in government. “Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform,” ICG Asia Report No. 24, 10 October 2001, 11. “Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku,” ICG Asia Report No. 10, 19 December 2000. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: Free Press, 1960).
25. Fabiola Desy Unidjadja, “Juwono Speaks on Maluku Tragedy,” Jakarta Post, 15 July 2000. Quoted in ICG Asia Report No. 10, 19 December 2000, 13.
26. ICG reports that military cooperation with Laskar became more pronounced by June: “Credible witnesses saw military units providing covering fire for Muslim attacks on Christian neighborhoods in and around Ambon. Though the Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob), a paramilitary unit, had tended to side with Christians, they began to back down in the face of superior numbers and organization. On 21 June, Laskar Jihad fighters with support from soldiers overran Brimob headquarters in Ambon, effectively ending the police’s role as a counterbalance.” The civil emergency began with a frank admission from TNI spokesman Vice Air Marshal Graito Usodo that a significant proportion of the soldiers in Maluku were “emotionally involved” in the conflict. Roughly fourteen hundred potentially “contaminated” soldiers were rotated out of the province and steps were taken to reduce the likelihood of future involvement. See “Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku,” 10.
27. All the countries Ja’far mentions are part of the territory of Indonesia and Borneo (which is two-thirds Indonesian.) There are eight major islands or island groups. The largest land masses consist of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan (also known as Borneo, whose capital city is Palangkaraya), Sulawesi (Celebes), and Irian Jaya (the western half of Papua New Guinea, where Sorong is located). The smaller islands fall into two main groups: the Moluccas (Maluku) to the northeast, and the lesser Sunda chain east of Bali.
28. ICG Asia Report No. 31, 8 February 2002, 2.
29. The province of Maluku is made up of thousands of small islands just north of East Timor. It is divided into roughly three regions, north Maluku, central Maluku, and south Maluku. However, the capital of Ambon and the northern municipality of Ternate, a recently independent Muslim province, are also considered their own regency. The general religious breakdown of Maluku is 57 percent Muslims and 43 percent Christian. Less than 1 percent of the population are “other.” Each of the regencies has a distinct religious characteristic. North Maluku and Ternate have the highest percentages of Muslim population, 80 percent and 70 percent respectively. Central and Ambon have distinct religious populations, with 70 percent and 42 percent Muslims respectively. As you go to the southern regencies, the Christian majority grows, with close to 76 percent of the population.
30. “Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku,” ICG Asia Report No. 31, 8 February 2002, 2.
31. “Support for Ambon Martial Law Grows,” Jakarta Post, 25 June 2000. Quoted in ICG Asia Report No. 31, 5.
32. Ibid.
33. “Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku.”
34. Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,” World Politics 53.3 (April 2001).
35. Ibid.
36. ICG Asia Report No. 10.
37. “Settling the War of God and Gold,” Economist, 2 February 2002.
38. Hefner, “Strategic Role and Political Future of Islam.”
39. ICG Asia Report No. 31, 21.
40. Consultations with Jacqueline Babha, Chaim Kaufmann, Samantha Power, and Monica Toft, June 2002.
41. Laskar Jihad in “Berita Harian,” 19 September 2000, quoted in “Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku.”
42. Lindsay Murdoch, “Brutal Religious War Leaves a Paradise Soaked in Blood,” Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 2001. Cited in ICG Asia Report No. 31. The article claims that the war began with a fight between a Muslim bus driver and a Christian passenger in January 1999. Within hours the fighting spread to all of the islands. Forced conversions must have happened within the following two years.
43. Sidney Jones, Testimony before the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 13 February 2001. Quoted in ICG Asia Report No. 31, 10.
44. Somini Sengupta, “Hindu Right Goes to School to Build a Nation,” New York Times, 13 May 2002, A1.
45. Ibid.
46. Suresh Joshi, national coordinator for the educational wing of the voluntary service, says that his organization spends over a million dollars per year on its charitable projects, most of it focused on tribal peoples and dalits. Vidya Barati, an educational charity affiliated with the RSS, runs some twenty thousand low-cost private schools serving 2.4 million children throughout India. The organization has built over a thousand new schools every year in the last decade, all with the aim of returning the population to Hinduism. Sengupta, “Hindu Right Goes to School.”
47. The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the largest of Pakistan’s religious parties, was founded in 1941 by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi on the idea of the ummah (the Worldwide Community of Muslims) as an unadulterated and exclusive embodiment of the vision of Islam that would help purge the community of deviant behavior. The party would serve as a vehicle for propagating this vision and hence control Muslim politics of the time. Initially, Maududi opposed the Pakistan movement, arguing that Islam was a universal religion not subject to national boundaries nor subject to political principles. The JI changed its position once the decision was made to partition India on the basis of religion. In 1947 Maududi redefined the JI’s purpose as the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan. To achieve this objective, the JI believed it was its duty to establish a political system in which decision making would be undertaken by a few pious people well versed in Islam.
48. Tassawuf means “Sufi.” The Naqshbandi Order, an austere Sunni-Sufi order found in almost every Muslim political struggle around the world, was a precursor of Deobandism. Michael Rinder, e-mail communication with the author, 15 February 2002. But today, Deobandis of South Asia consider themselves very different from Sufis. In the Indonesian context, the Naqshbandis are a liberal force ardently opposed to jihadis. Hefner, e-mail.
49. “Laskar Jihad Worry Bogor Residents,” Jakarta Post, 10 April 2000.
50. Jane Perlez, “Indonesia Arrests Leader of Militants in Islam Group,” New York Times, 7 May 2002.
51. Derwin Pereira, “Arrest Me, Not Clerics, Says Indonesian VP,” Straits Times (Singapore), 31 May 2002.
52. Robert Hefner argues that toward the end of his rule, beginning in 1994, Suharto began favoring the Islamists. He began providing funding and tactical support to radical militant organizations, in part because he saw them as allies against the democracy movement, which threatened his power. Testimony by Robert Hefner at a hearing of the East Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, “South East Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests,” Washington, D.C., 12 December 2001. Another view, expressed by a senior Singaporean official, is that Soeharto used the Islamists to fight communism.
53. Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib in Panji Masyarakat, 26 April 2000. George Aditjondro, “Notes on the Jihad forces in Maluku,” last accessed 8 August 2002, www.geocities.com/Choyse/PAPER/Aditjondro_l.
htm.
54. Robert Cribb, “From Petrus to Ninja,” in Bruce Campbell, ed., Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). See also Dietrich Kebschull, “Indonesia: The Transmigration Program in Perspective” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1986).
55. In Aceh, guerrillas in the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are often accused of carrying out robberies and extortion—both of the population and the security services. The military provides bullets to a pro-government militia in central Aceh, although it is not clear whether as a policy or for personal enrichment.
56. ICG Asia Report No. 31, 26.
57. “TNI Urged to Probe Guns Used in Ambon Clashes,” Jakarta Post, 10 December 1999. Cited in ICG Asia Report No. 31, 5.
58. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 2.
59. “Around 2.5 million nonagricultural workers (3 percent of the labor force) were displaced during the crisis. Most of the displaced workers were wage employees and the job losses were most severe in the manufacturing and construction sectors. About three-quarters of the job losses were in the rural areas.” IMF Country Report No. 02/154, Indonesia: Selected Issues, July 2002, 83. Figures for Indonesia’s economic contraction vary from 12 to 17 percent of GDP. “The depth of the collapse in Indonesia, a 17 percent GDP contraction in 1998 according to the latest consensus forecast, if not unparalleled, is among the largest peacetime contractions since at least 1960.” Joseph Stiglitz, “Must Financial Crisis Be This Frequent and This Painful?” World Bank representative at McKay Lecture, Pittsburgh, 23 September 1998.
60. John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 July-August 2002. Also Hefner, “Strategic Role and Political Future of Islam.”
61. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Cause Connection?” NBER Working Papers, 22 July 2002. The paper was pulled from a World Bank presentation in response to complaints about how the authors defined terrorism.
62. The study relies on the observation that the frequency of hate crimes went down during the American Depression and that wealthier and better-educated Palestinians are more likely to support terrorism in Israel. The problem with the first example is that hate crimes are hobbies, not full-time jobs, while the terrorism we worry about most today tends to be a full-time occupation. People are likely to have less time for their hobbies when money and jobs are scarce. And they are likely to be less discriminating about the nature of their employment, which might make a full-time paying job for a terrorist organization more attractive even as it made nonpaying hate crimes less appealing. Regarding the survey results in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it is unclear whether wealthy and well-educated Palestinians would support attacks against Israeli civilians if the Palestinian National Authority had the means to attack the Israeli army. Thus, it is not clear that wealth and education would be positively correlated with Palestinian support for terrorism if a military response were available. The study also makes use of data that purportedly show that Hezbollah fighters tended to be better educated and wealthier than their “civilian” counterparts. But a fifth of the militants were educated in Hezbollah schools. It is not the level of education that is likely to count, but the type. If children are educated in pro-jihadi schools, it is no surprise that the more educated they are, the more likely they are to join. Information about the militants’ economic status was available for less than half the sample, and the authors of the study were forced to infer economic status from other indicators such as the militants’ parents’ professions. The economic findings are significantly less conclusive when militants’ region of origin is taken into account.
63. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers: Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?” New Republic, 24 June 2002.
64. “Indonesia: Selected Issues,” IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/132, International Monetary Fund, October 2000. Although this may be unpaid employment, families receive rewards if their sons become martyrs, and at least the boys have something to do while they are unemployed.
65. Joshua Angrist, “The Economic Returns to Schooling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” American Economic Review 85.5 (December 1995): 1065–87, in Krueger and Maleckova, “Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers.”
66. Alexis de Tocqueville, L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution (Paris: Garnier Flammarion Philosophie, 1993); Harlan Cleveland, an American government official, coined the phrase “the revolution of rising expectations.” When Cleveland was working in Asia in the 1950s, he observed that newfound political and social freedom, access to education and information, and the opening up of opportunities released enormous social energy and activity. Rising aspirations have spread across Europe, Africa, and Asia. Expectations, however, have outpaced actual human achievements. Rising aspirations, when not satisfied, can fuel resentment.
67. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Al Qaeda Feared to Be Lurking in Indonesia,” Washington Post, 11 January 2002, A1. Ja’far claimed elsewhere that Al Qaeda had offered funding for his group, but he had refused it, saying he disapproved of bin Laden. Hefner reports that some Laskar Jihad members have had contacts with Al Qaeda for specific operations, but Ja’far’s subsequent turning away from bin Laden is the more important development. Ja’far relies on funding from wealthy Indonesian industrialists, he says, and continued links with Al Qaeda could put that funding in jeopardy, at least for now. Testimony by Hefner, “South East Asia After 9/11.” National Intelligence Agency chief Hendropriyono said that Al Qaeda was using a training camp in central Sulawesi, but he subsequently changed his mind. “Al-Qaeda ‘Runs Camps on Island in Indonesia,’ ” Financial Times, 13 December 2001, 12.
68. Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia,” Washington Quarterly, spring 2002.
69. “Al Qaeda Trained in Indonesia,” Australian Financial Review, 21 November 2001, 3.
70. ICG Asia Report No. 31, 19. See also Fabiola Desy Unidjadja, “International Training Camp in Poso ‘Empty,’ ” Jakarta Post, 13 December 2001.
71. Hefner, “Strategic Role and Political Future of Islam,” 50. Hefner considers Ja’far’s post–September 11 view of Al Qaeda to be “revisionist.”
72. ICG Asia Report No. 31, 20.
73. Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?”
1. Isaiah Berlin, “The Origins of Israel” (1953), in Isaiah Berlin, The Power of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London and Princeton: 2000), 143 Princeton University Press. The full quote of Berlin is: “I should like to begin with the strange fact that the State of Israel exists. It was once said by the celebrated Russian revolutionary, Alexander Herzen, writing in the mid–nineteenth century, that the Slavs had no history, only geography. The position of the Jews is the reverse of this. They have enjoyed rather too much history and too little geography. And the foundation of the State of Israel must be regarded as a piece of historical redress for this anomalous situation. The Jews have certainly had more than their share of history, or, as some might say, martyrology.’ ”
2. See Gershon Gorenberg, The End of Days: Fundamentalism and the Struggle for the Temple Mount (New York: Free Press, 2000), 170–71.
3. Midrash Tanhuma, written in the third century. Cited in Kanan Makiya, The Rock (New York: Pantheon, 2001), 283.
4. Chrysostom’s Sermons, cited in J. Parkes, The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue, 105–6. Cited in Lambert Dolphin, “The Destruction of the Second Temple,” The Temple Mount in Jerusalem Web site, last accessed 11 January 2003, www.templemount.org/destruct2.html.
5. Cited in Makiya, Rock, 286.
6. Quoted in Ehud Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination (New York: Free Press, 1999), 261–62.
7. Other passages from the Old Testament that are frequently cited to show the Jewish connection to the land of Israel include Genesis 13:14–15, God said to Abram: “Lift up now thine eyes, and look from the place where thou art, northward and southward and eastward and westward; for all the land which thou seest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever.” In Genesis 26:3, God confirms to Abraham’s son Jacob, “Sojourn in this land, and I will be with thee, and will bless thee; for unto thee, and unto thy seed, I will give all these lands, and I will establish the oath which I swore unto Abraham thy father.”
8. F. E. Peters, Jerusalem: The Holy City in the Eyes of Chroniclers, Visitors, Pilgrims, and Prophets from the Days of Abraham to the Beginnings of Modern Times (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 76–84.
9. See, for example, Gorenberg, End of Days, 61–63. A group of rabbis, who included the powerful head of the Merkaz ha-Rav Yeshiva, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, issued a statement prohibiting Jews from stepping foot on the Temple Mount lest they would violate the purity of the compound. The rabbis argued that since the precise location of the Temple remained unknown, one might inadvertently step on the Holy of Holies, the chamber that held the Ark of the Covenant. Each Yom Kippur, the high priest—and only he—would enter the Holy of Holies, and call out the tetragrammaton, the name of God. All others were denied entrance to the Holy of Holies because they were considered impure.
10. The most relevant passage in the Koran is from verse 37:99 to verse 37:109. 102–5: “Then, when [the son] reached [the age of serious] work with him, he said: ‘O my son! I have seen in a vision that I offer thee in sacrifice: now see what is thy view!’ [The son] said: ‘O my father! Do as thou art commanded: thou will find me, if Allah so wills, one of the steadfast!’ So when they had both submitted [to Allah], and he had laid him prostrate on his forehead [for sacrifice], We called out to him: ‘O Abraham!…Thou hast already fulfilled the vision!—thus indeed do we reward those who do right.” All Koranic passages are taken from ‘Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali, The Meaning of The Holy Qur’an (Brentwood, Md.: Amana Corporation, 1993).
11. See King Solomon’s prayer at the dedication of the First Temple, I Kings 8:29–53.
12. Amidah is the core prayer in the Jewish prayer service and literally means “standing,” since it is recited while standing. It is also known by the term Shmoneh Esreh, Hebrew for “eighteen,” which stands for the number of benedictions included in the prayer on ordinary weekdays.
13. See, for example, David de Sola Pool, ed. and trans., under the direction of the Siddur Committee of the Rabbinical Council of America, The Traditional Prayer Book for Sabbath and Festivals (New York: Behrman House, Inc., 1960), 68. Most Jews interpret the instruction to rebuild the Temple as a mystical aspiration that they do not expect to carry out physically. But some interpret the instruction literally. For example, at the Ateret Cohanim yeshiva, located in Jerusalem’s Old City, students are trained not to become Talmud scholars, but to practice Temple rites. Jewish law forbids Jews from ascending the Temple Mount, making active participation in building the Temple unlikely for most observant Jews, especially Orthodox ones. But some Jews believe that ascending the Temple Mount is permitted, now that the Temple is destroyed.
14. For messianic Jews, there is ample “proof” in the Old Testament that the End of the World will be accompanied by a battle over Jerusalem that will provoke divine intervention and, ultimately, a Day of Judgment. Zechariah 14:2–12 describes the scenario of the Last Days: “For I will gather all nations against Jerusalem to battle: and the city shall be taken, and the houses rifled, and the women ravished; and half of the city shall go forth into captivity…. And this shall be the plague wherewith the Lord will smite all the peoples that have warred against Jerusalem.” In Daniel 12:1–2 of the Old Testament, Daniel predicts that the “time of the end” shall be a “time of trouble, such as there never was…. And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to reproaches and everlasting abhorrence.”
For Christians, the Apocalypse is most vividly described in the New Testament’s Book of Revelation. Here too the End of Days is accompanied by a series of catastrophic events that culminates in the battle of Armageddon. “For they are the spirits of devils, working miracles, which go forth unto the kings of the earth and of the whole world, to gather them to the battle of that great day of God Almighty…. And he gathered them together into a place called in the Hebrew tongue Armageddon” (Revelation 16:14–16). All biblical passages from the New Testament are taken from The New Testament: The King James Version (Cambridge: The Bradley Press, 1954). At this junction, Jesus the warrior is believed to fight a coalition of all the kings. The devil is bound, while Jesus embarks on his millennial reign. “And I saw an angel come down from heaven, having the key of the bottomless pit, and a great chain in his hand. And he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan, and bound him a thousand years…. Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection; on such the second death hath no power, but they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years” (Revelation 20:1–6).
Islam too foresees the end of days, according to both the Koran and several hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet). In the Koran, sura 14:48 (Ibrahim) states: “One day the Earth will be Changed to a different Earth, And so will be the Heavens, And [men] will be marshaled Forth, before Allah, the One, the Irresistible.” In sura 18:8 (Al Kahf), it is written: “Verily what is on earth We shall make but as Dust and dry soil.” As in Judaism and Christianity, the End of Days scenario in Islam is far from peaceful. According to several hadith, the Antichrist—a false Messiah by the name of al-masih aldajjal will conquer the world in the last days. Again, the battle will take place in Jerusalem, where the false Messiah, who is Jewish, will be defeated by Jesus, who is regarded as a prophet in Islam. At the end, all human beings will be judged at the valley of Yehoshafat, near Jerusalem. See Gorenberg, End of Days, 44.
15. See “Biography of Chafetz Chaim,” Torah.org Web site, last accessed 19 August 2002, www.torah.org/learning/halashon/ccbio.html.
16. For more on the assassin of Rabbi Meir Kahane, El-Sayyid Nosair, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 3–7.
17. See Jewish Defense League (JDL), “Introductory Message,” JDL Web site, last accessed 11 January 2003, www.jdl.org/information/introductory_message.shtml.
18. Binyamin Kahane, the son of Rabbi Meir Kahane, was killed on 31 December 2000, along with his wife, in a drive-by shooting near the settlement of Ofrah in the West Bank.
19. “Kach and Kahane Chai,” Web site of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Herzliyya, Israel, last accessed 11 January 2003, www.ict.org.il/.
20. Davan Maharaj, “Israel Says It Foiled Anti-Arab Plot,” Los Angeles Times, 13 May 2002, 4.
21. “Kach and Kahane Chai.”
22. Another version of the Pulsa di Nura appeared in the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot. It reads: “Angels of destruction will hit him. He is damned wherever he goes. His soul will instantly leave his body…and he will not survive the month. Dark will be his path and God’s angel will chase him. A disaster he has never experienced will beget him and all curses known in the Torah will apply to him.” Dov Elboim, “The Murder Curse,” Yediot Ahronot, 13 November 1995, quoted in Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, 275.
23. Unfortunately, as Amos Elon points out, Michael Ben Yair published these words in an article that appeared in Ha’aretz in 2002, rather than in a legal brief when he was serving as attorney general. Michael Ben Yair, “The War’s Seventh Day,” Ha’aretz, 3 March 2002. Cited in Amos Elon, “Israelis and Palestinians: What Went Wrong?” New York Review of Books, 19 December 2002.
24. The Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories: A Guide,” Special Report, March 2002, last accessed 11 January 2003, www.fmep.org/reports/2002/SR_March_2002.pdf.
25. For more information on Israeli settlement policy, see Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories.”
26. Molly Moore, “On Remote Hilltops, Israelis Broaden Settlements,” Washington Post, 13 December 2002, A1.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. For the view that Gaza and the West Bank are disputed rather than occupied territories, see “The Truth About 242,” Web site of Christian Action for Israel, last accessed 11 January 2003, www.cdn-friends-
icej.ca/un/242truth.html.
29. Moore, “On Remote Hilltops.”
30. Ehud Sprinzak, “From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 1988), 194–216.
31. Carmi Gillon, interview with the author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 8 August 1999.
32. Sprinzak, “From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism,” 207.
33. Nadav Shragai, “Raising Funds for the Third Temple,” Ha’aretz, 20 July 1999.
34. See Web site of Chai Vekayam, last accessed 19 August 2002, www.geocities.com/Heartland/Estates
/2687/.
35. Yehuda Etzion, interview with the author, 4 August 1999.
1. President Bush blamed Lashkar e Taiba (LET) for the attack, freezing its assets in response. David E. Sanger and Kurt Eichenwald, “Citing India Attack, U.S. Aims at Assets of Group in Pakistan,” New York Times, 21 December 2001, A1. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but India holds and Jaish-i-Muhammad responsible. LET categorically denies its relationship with Al Qaeda per unnamed LET member, e-mail communication, 11 January 2003. On the connection between LET and Al Qaeda, see, for example, Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 206. According to the Center for Defense Information (CDI), “The mercenary character of the group and the MDI’s fraternal nature lead many Western agencies to believe that L[E]T members have participated in other conflicts where Muslims were involved. Reports on L[E]T members fighting in Chechnya, Bosnia, parts of the Middle East, and the Philippines have emerged, possibly indicating close ties with Al Qaeda.” “In the Spotlight: Lashkar-I-Taiba (Army of the Pure),” CDI Terrorism Project. Available on the CDI Web site, last accessed 14 January 2003, www.cdi.org/
terrorism/lt.cfm. LET has spread its base of operations into the Middle East and is now recruiting operatives in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait, according to a government agency that monitors the group closely. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is the formal name of LET’s parent organization, formerly known as Markaz-Dawa-Wal-Irshad (MDI).
2. A former Pakistani official told me that these figures may be somewhat exaggerated, since the jihadi groups often give bloated statistics to show they are beating out the competition, but he felt the figures were in the right ballpark. Interview with former Pakistani official, 8 September 2002.
3. LET was designated a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) on 18 December 2001. It is the militant wing of a Wahhabi educational organization called Markaz-Dawa-Wal-Irshad (MDI), which changed its name formally to Jama’at ud Da’awa (Party of Preachers). Through a presidential decree, General Pervez Musharraf banned Jaish-i-Muhammad, LET, Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehrik e Jafria Pakistan (TJP), and Tehrik e Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, and put under observation the Sunni Tehrik. The News (Lahore), 13 January 2002, last accessed 15 August 2002, www.oureffort2001.com/RESEARCH/TALIBAN/musharrafs
speech.htm. Two terrorist groups, Lashkar e Jhangvi and Sipah e Mohammad, were banned earlier, on 14 August 2001. Both are offshoots of SSP and TJP respectively. Available on the Web site of Rediff, last accessed 15 August 2002, www.rediff.com/news/2001/
aug/14pak4.htm. Until then, the group had been sending me regular updates on its activities by e-mail, which then stopped.
4. Dexter Filkins, “As Pakistani’s Popularity Slides, ‘Busharraf’ Is a Figure of Ridicule,” New York Times, 5 July 2002, A1.
5. Rudyard Kipling, Kim (New York: Tom Doherty, 1999), 53.
6. This interview took place over two days on 24–25 February 1999.
7. “Donation for computer required.” Formerly available on the group’s Web site, last accessed 20 July 2002, www.markazdawa.org/englishweb/Donation%20for%
20computer%20required.htm. The group used to provide its bank account numbers on its Web site, but since it was banned, that information is no longer provided. The general Web page for the group has also changed to www.jamatdawa.org. The Urdu-language page provides a link to a “Website fund,” but it is “under construction.”
8. Text of the 1972 Simla Agreement, last accessed 14 August 2002, www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents
/simla.html
9. Eric S. Margolis, War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet (New York: Routledge, 2001), 74.
10. India asserts that Pakistan incorporated the Northern areas under the federal government to make these areas distinct from the part of Kashmir now under Pakistani control. The inference is that in case of any future bargain, Pakistan would claim the Northern areas to be undisputed and an integral part of Pakistan—a position India rejects. For details about the status of the Northern areas, see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War (London and New York: I. B. Taurus, 2000), 179–81.
11. Margolis, War at the Top of the World, 77.
12. Ayesha Jalal and Sugata Bose, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 226. See also Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 88.
13. Eqbal Ahmad, “Jihad International, Inc.,” Dawn, 4 February 1998. Available on-line at the Dissident Voice Web site, last accessed 6 January 2003, www.dissidentvoice.org/Articles/EqbalJihadInc.htm.
14. Elizabeth Rubin, “Can Musharraf Reform Jihadi Culture?” Christian Science Monitor, 24 January 2002, 8.
15. According to a report by Bruce Riedel, a senior Clinton adviser, U.S. intelligence had reported to President Clinton that Pakistan had prepared its nuclear weapons for potential use. Isabel Hilton, “The General in His Labyrinth: Where Will Pervez Musharraf Lead His Country?” New Yorker, 12 August 2002, 42.
16. For a detailed analysis see Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Rand Corporation Publication, 2000), last accessed 19 January 2003, www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1450.
17. Human Rights Watch, “Rights Abuses Behind Kashmir Fighting,” 1999. Available on the Human Rights Watch Web site, last accessed 20 July 2002, www.hrw.org/press/1999/jul/kas0716.htm.
18. The phrase stands for extrajudicial killings—when military or law enforcement agencies kill suspects in stage-managed encounters. The official press releases announce that a person has been killed during encounters, though in practice unarmed civilians are killed in cold blood.
19. Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, 226. Available on the Human Rights Watch Web site, last accessed 21 August 2002, www.hrw.org/wr2k2/pdf/
india.pdf.
20. Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant Groups Continue,” 1999. Available on the Human Rights Watch Website, last accessed 6 January 2003, www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/mil-abuses.htm.
21. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—India,” 4 March 2002. Available on the Department of State Web site, last accessed 6 January 2003, www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/sa/8230pf.htm.
22. Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 198.
23. Human Rights Watch, “Kashmir: Attack on Civilians in Jammu Condemned,” 16 July 2002, last accessed 20 July 2002, www.hrw.org/press/2002/07/kashmir07
16.htm.
24. Nevertheless, Sayeed is widely believed to have taken cues from Pakistani intelligence agencies, especially Interservices Intelligence (ISI). For details see, Peter Chalk, “Pakistan’s Role in Kashmir Insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 2001.
25. Debt service obligations alone total nearly 50 percent of government expenditures. From 1999 to 2002, General Musharraf’s lead economic wizard, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, has helped Pakistan’s economy to revive to some extent, but Pakistan is still in no position to escape its dire debt situation in the foreseeable future. Since 11 September 2001, the United States has rewarded Pakistan’s cooperation in the war against terrorism by helping the country reschedule its loans with international financial institutions. “US Assures Pakistan of Immediate Debt Relief,” Dawn, 21 October 2001.
26. Pakistan’s economy is currently suffering from a lack of foreign investment due to its unstable security environment. It also suffers from a heavy defense budget that consumes around 40 percent of its GDP. The country’s economic outlook continues to be marred by its weak foreign exchange position, which relies on international creditors for hard-currency inflows. Foreign loans and grants provide approximately 25 percent of the government’s revenue, but development projects and the education sector are only allotted roughly 5 percent of the GDP. For details, see S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
27. In response to the Indian nuclear tests of May 11 and 13, 1998, Pakistan conducted two nuclear tests on May 28 and May 30, 1998. Experts argue that India conducted the tests in the belief that an overt nuclear capability would provide it with the status of a great power. The tests were also a show of strength vis-à-vis China and Pakistan and, in the words of George Perkovich, “reflected an overwhelming desire for global recognition and national pride.” See Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 101; and George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (California: University of California Press, 2001). Many Pakistani political analysts argued that Pakistan should have shown restraint by not conducting tit-for-tat tests and receiving international appreciation and financial support. Military and jihadi elements, however, exerted substantial pressure on the political leadership to conduct the tests. See Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Surviving South Asia’s Nuclear Whirlpool,” last accessed 6 January 2003, www.focusweb.org/focus/pd/sec/Altsec2/hoodbhoy.
htm.
Two Pakistani nuclear scientists, Bashir-ud-din Mahmood and Abdul Majeed, were detained on 23 October 2001 in response to a U.S. request to question ten people with “specific knowledge” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Both scientists were known to have close relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Upon retirement two years ago, the two nuclear scientists started a charity that financed humanitarian and commercial activities in Afghanistan. Some directors of the charity, called Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, or Islamic Reconstruction, signed business deals with the Taliban, which included contracts to build hospitals, schools, and factories. Both scientists were released after a few weeks investigation, when no evidence of nuclear assistance to the Taliban regime was found. Presten Mendenhall, “Pakistan Releases Top Nuclear Scientist,” MSNBC, 3 November 2002, last accessed 23 August 2002. www.msnbc.com/news/651022.asp. In an article published in the Economist in November 2001, however, one correspondent described how in the charity’s house he found “several designs for a long thin balloon, something like a weather balloon, with lines and arrows indicating a suggested height of 10km (33,000 feet). There was also a sketch of a jet fighter flying towards the balloon alongside the words: ‘Your days are limited! Bang.’ ” The correspondent suggested that the inhabitants of the house had worked on a plan to build a helium-powered balloon bomb carrying anthrax. See “Chilling Evidence in the Ruins of Kabul,” Economist, 22 November 2001.
28. For a detailed perspective, see Luis Martinez and John Entelis, The Algerian Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
29. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM)—the “Holy Warriors Movement”—was the first Pakistani jihadi group to be listed by the U.S. Department of State as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The movement has been highly successful in guerrilla operations against Indian security forces in Kashmir, and it allegedly cooperated with the Pakistani army in the 1999 Kargil incursion. Some of HUM’s activities, including the training of militants in Afghanistan, are widely believed to be partly funded by Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born radical with whom the group maintains open ties. Fazlur Rahman Khalil, founder of the group, says that he met bin Laden early in the Afghan war. Khalil was a signatory to bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa against the United States and a member of bin Laden’s international network known as the International Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders. HUM claims to be active in Bosnia, Chechnya, India, Burma, the Philippines, and Tajikistan. U.S. government officials allege that HUM has targeted Western military officials in Bosnia, and India accuses HUM of carrying out “dirty tricks,” including murders in India on behalf of Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence Agency (ISI). (In turn, the ISI accuses India’s intelligence agency of similar activities in Pakistan, usually in connection with sectarian or ethnic violence.) Harkat has changed its name several times. The various Harkat groups are suspected by the Department of State of carrying out a series of kidnappings and killings of Western tourists in Kashmir, as well as killing two American diplomats in Karachi in 1995 and four American oil company workers in 1997, also in Karachi. The hijackers of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 in December 1999 demanded the release of the group’s chief ideologue, Maulana Masood Azhar, who was being held in an Indian prison, in exchange for freeing the hostage passengers and crew. After his release, Azhar formed a new Deobandi group, Jaish-i-Muhammad, which is more openly sectarian than HUM. A leader of a rival group told me in June that the ISI supports HUM, but Military Intelligence supports Jaish. The U.S. government added Jaish to its list of FTOs in October 2001.
30. This is a part of the rhetoric employed by most of the jihadi organizations on their Web sites. It has a historical reference as well—313 Muslims, in the battle of Badr in the times of Prophet Muhammad, defeated their opponents, who were reported to be around one thousand, according to Muslim historians.
31. Margolis, War at the Top of the World.
32. For details and history see, Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 87–91.
33. The World Bank Group, “Protecting Natural Resources in Northeastern Pakistan,” June 2000, last accessed 24 August 2002, www.lnweb18.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/Attachments/kashmir/$File/
kashmir.pdf.
34. These figures were provided by the AJK government. The Indian official figures are notably different. The official Web site of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, last accessed 15 August 2002, maintains that a total of 29,488 persons have died during the insurgency, including 9,718 civilians, 14,356 militants, 2,358 foreign mercenaries, and 3,056 special forces personnel. For details, see www.mha.nic.in/annual%20report-4.
htm#profile. Figures generally quoted by organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International also indicate that the total number of casualties are approximately forty thousand. However, none of these groups have provided a definitive figure. Addressing a conference in Boston in 2001, Yasin Malik, chairman of the pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), maintained that since the September 11 tragedy, there is a discernible increase in the intensity of the Indian forces’ oppressive measures. According to him, an average twenty-five people are killed every day. See Hassan Abbas, “Kashmir as a Peace Bridge: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,” News (Pakistan), 20 November 2001.
35. Ibid.
36. “Worldwide Refugee Information: India Country Report, 2002,” U.S. Committee on Refugees, last accessed 6 January 2003, www.refugees.org/world/
countryrpt/scasia/india.htm.
1. Charles Heckscher and Joel Getzendammer, telephone interview with the author, 19 March 2002. The concept of strong and weak ties is developed by Mark Granovetter in “the Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78: 1360–80.
2. As weapons technologies proliferate and continue to improve, it will be possible for leaderless resistors to carry out major attacks. The anthrax letter-attacks of fall 2001 are a foretaste of that future.
3. Joel Mowbray, “How They Did It: An ‘evil one’ confesses, and boasts,” National Review, 23 December 2002; Vol. LIV, No. 24.
1. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 4. I will say more about the requirement for moral action in Burns’s conception of leadership.
2. Jennifer Gonnerman, “The Terrorist Campaign Against Abortion,” Village Voice, 9 November 1998, 36; and Sharon Lerner, “The Nuremberg Menace,” Village Voice, 10 April 2001, last accessed 21 August 2002, www.villagevoice.com/issues/0114/lerner.php.
3. Planned Parenthood, the Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center, and several doctors brought suit against the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA), an antiabortion group, and a group of antiabortion activists, contending they had created a threatening environment that led to Slepian’s murder. Although Horsley wasn’t named as a defendant, the plaintiffs offered his Web site as evidence, since much of the initial information posted on the site was provided by ACLA. The plaintiffs won their lawsuit in February 1999 with a $107-million judgment, and Horsley’s Internet provider immediately removed his Web site. But on March 28, 2001, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the verdict. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc.; Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center; Robert Crist, M.D.; Warren M. Hern, M.D.; Elizabeth Newhall, M.D.; James Newhall, M.D., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Karen Sweigert, M.D., Plaintiff, v. American Coalition of Life Activists; Advocates for Life Ministries; Michael Bray; Andrew Burnett; David A. Crane; Timothy Paul Dreste; Michael B. Dodds; Joseph L. Foreman; Charles Roy Mcmillan; Stephen P. Mears; Bruce Evan Murch; Catherine Ramey; Dawn Marie Stover; Charles Wysong, Defendants, and Monica Migliorino Miller, Donald Treshman, Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 99-35320. See also Frederick Clarkson, “Journalists or Terrorists?” Salon, 31 May 2001, last accessed 21 August 2002, www.salon.com/
news/feature/2001/05/31/nuremberg/index.html. Horsley’s site, last accessed on 21 August 2002, can be found at www.christiangallery.com.
4. See the Web site of the Army of God, last accessed 5 August 2002, www.armyofgod.com
5. Attacks carried out in the name of the Army of God include bombings of an abortion clinic and a gay bar in Atlanta in 1997, and the bombing of an abortion clinic in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1998. These attacks are believed to have been perpetrated by Eric Robert Rudolph, who is also charged with the 1996 bombing at Atlanta’s Centennial Olympic Park, in which one person was killed and over one hundred injured. In early November 2001, anthrax-hoax letters containing white powder and signed by the Army of God were delivered to private abortion clinics in Englewood and Fort Lee, New Jersey, and to more than 130 Planned Parenthood clinics in the United States.
6. Gonnerman, “Terrorist Campaign Against Abortion.”
7. Jewish extremist groups in the United States that can be considered leaderless, are organized as networks, and recruit mainly through the Internet include Kach and Kahane Chai. Smaller radical Jewish organizations, such as the New Kach Movement or Noar Meir, can be regarded as offshoots of Kach and Kahane.
8. This system of organization, Beam claims, is almost identical to “the methods used by the committees of correspondence during the American Revolution.” It is also similar in structure to communist revolutionaries’ cells.
9. Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” Seditionist 12 (February 1992). The essay received significantly more attention after Beam republished it and presented it to the Aryan National Congress in 1992. The essay is published on different Web sites at different times. See, for example, www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm, last accessed 30 August 2002, as well as www2.monet.com/~mlindste/ledrless.html, last accessed 30 August 2002. The idea, at least as practiced in America, was originally conceived by an American named Colonel Amoss in 1962, according to Louis Beam. Beam refined the concept in his essay “On Revolutionary Majorities,” published in the Inter-Klan newsletter and Survival Alert 4 (1984) and again in The Seditionist in 1992.
Most published accounts have wrongly attributed the original idea to the 1992 essay. Mike Reynolds, interview with the author, 11 October 1999.
10. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). See also David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, “Networks, Netwars and the Fight for the Future,” available on the Web site of First Monday: A Peer-Reviewed Journal, last accessed 25 August 2002, www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/.
11. Al Qaeda is known to disseminate information, and possibly instructions for terror attacks, on Web sites. Several Web sites, including Al Qaeda’s former Arabic Web site, alneda.com, have been hacked by U.S. authorities, although U.S. cyberterrorism experts acknowledge that the struggle against cyberterrorism is ongoing, as groups such as Al Qaeda can launch sites from different servers. Much of the information on these Web sites is written in Arabic and is often encrypted or scrambled in texts, and increasingly in digital photographs for better protection, a practice known as steganography. Steganography may well be the wave of the future, and a tactic that could someday permit “swarming” by groups such as Al Qaeda. See Jack Kelley, “Militants Wire Web with Links to Jihad,” USA Today, 10 July 2002, 1A.
12. Soldiers in the Army of God, directed by Marc Levin and Daphne Pinkerson, Home Box Office, 2001.
13. Avram Goldstein, “Doctor Quits, Cites Antiabortion Threats,” Washington Post, 4 November 1999, B1.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. “Abortion Providers Decreased 14% between 1992 and 1996; Declines Mostly among Hospitals and Physicians’ Offices Where Less Than 10% of Abortions Occur; All Measures of Abortion in the United States Now Lowest in 20 Years,” news release, The Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1998, last accessed 11 January 2003, www.guttmacher.org/pubs/archives/newsrelease3006.
html.
17. Neal Horsley’s Nuremberg files were taken down for a while, but were available at the time of this writing. See Christian Gallery Web site, last accessed 24 August 2002, www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/
aborts.html. Bob Lokey’s site, last accessed 24 August 2002, can be found at www.alaweb.com/~savbabys/
lokey1.html.
18. Lokey’s Web site.
19. The pamphlet, last accessed 24 August 2002, is available at www.alaweb.com/~savbabys/holocaust.html.
20. “Incidents of Violence and Disruption Against Abortion Providers, 1977 to Present,” Web site of the National Abortion Federation, last accessed 11 January 2003, www.prochoice.org/.
21. Soldiers in the Army of God.
22. Christian gallery Web site.
23. Ibid.
24. In a televised address to the American public on August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush said that he would allow federal taxpayer money to be used for research into stem cells from human embryos. The research conducted would be limited to those cells already extracted. Bush stressed that the government would not support the destruction of new embryos. See “Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research,” Bush Ranch, Crawford, Tex., 9 August 2001. The remarks are available on the Web site of the White House, last accessed 25 August 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html.
25. Daniel Voll, “Neal Horsley and the Future of the Armed Abortion Conflict,” Esquire, February 1999, 116.
26. Barbara Kellerman, “Leadership as a Political Act,” in Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Barbara Kellerman (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1984), 81.
27. Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism (New York: Vintage, 1967), 141, cited in Kellerman, “Leadership as a Political Act,” 80.
28. Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1987).
29. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1991).
30. Russel Hardin points out that most accounts of ethnic conflict assume that ethnic identity is given rather than “identified.” Russel Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
31. Burns’s approach was revolutionary in that it defined leadership as an exchange that influenced both leaders and followers, rather than a trait of certain great men that, as some theorists suggested, might be brought out only in times of crisis. Burns’s approach refines that of Edwin Hollander, who defined leadership as “a process, not a person,” involving a relationship between leader and led. See discussion in Joseph C. Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1991), 61.
32. For a review of the literature on this point, see Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century. Rost rejects Burns’s view that leadership always entails the promotion of moral values, defining leadership as “an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes.” See Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, 102. For the view that Burns’s insistence that leaders promote fundamental values is correct, see, for example, Ron Heifetz, Leadership without Easy Answers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). Heifetz defines leadership as “an activity that fosters adaptive work and addresses the value conflicts that people hold.” Heifetz argues that leaders use both formal and informal authority to find solutions that promote fundamental values (such as democracy, equality before the law, freedom).
33. See, for example, Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, 124–28, 165–67.
34. It strikes me that the only reasonable view is to admit that from a moral (as opposed to legal) perspective, we don’t know when an embryo becomes a life that must be protected from harm. This becomes increasingly clear as the age of viability moves closer to conception as medical technology continues to improve. Thus, in making abortion legal and promoting it as a morally acceptable choice for those women who choose to undergo it, we are taking the consequentialist position that the evil of bringing an unwanted child into an overpopulated world is a lesser evil than abortion. Most difficult moral dilemmas require both deontological (rule-based) and ontological (consequence-based) considerations. The pro-choice position ought to admit these moral difficulties rather than glossing over them. The antiabortionists’ position is cleaner and simpler: they admit no uncertainty about when life begins, and thus entertain no moral qualms about protecting innocent unborn by killing abortion providers. Where they go wrong, in my view, is in taking the law into their own hands, murdering the “murderers,” rather than trying to change the law. Murdering doctors is not a last resort, a requirement for just war, and it puts institutions (such as the law) at risk that are an important part of our moral universe. For more, see the discussion in the introduction.
35. Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age (Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 293. This thesis is roundly rejected by a group of scholars who believe that the proclivity for “reciprocal altruism,” to use Ann Florini’s term, is even stronger than the drive to demonize the Other. But these scholars, whom I will call collective-action optimists, tend to focus on mobilizing groups to take actions that are nonviolent, like agreeing to set caps on pollution, rather than violent. Florini cites the work of Robert Wright and Richard Rorty as supporting this point of view. Ann Florini, The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World (Island Press, 2003).
36. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 20.
37. Ronfeldt and Arquilla, “Networks, Netwars and the Fight for the Future.”
38. Tony Perry, “Navy Takes a Scene out of Hollywood,” Los Angeles Times, 27 November 2000, C1. Ronfeldt and Arquilla cite this article without quoting it.
39. Michael Bray, interview with the author, 25 April 1999.
40. He also shows me the New International Version, John 7:52–8:11, and others. There is indeed a footnote showing that the passage he refers to in A Time to Kill does in fact have notes explaining that later scholarship has questioned the authenticity of the passage, or in some cases the passage was omitted entirely.
41. Soldiers in the Army of God.
42. In March 2002, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that some forty-six families of Tulkarm received checks of $25,000 for each martyr, and $10,000 for each Palestinian shot by Israeli troops, from Saddam Hussein. See Paul McGeough, “Price of Martyrdom Becomes a Year’s Rent,” Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March 2002, 23.
43. Jerrold Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 25.
44. Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1995).
45. See Barbara Kellerman, “Introductory Remarks,” in Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, ix–x.
46. Twentieth-century theorists have defined leadership variously as the ability to induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation (B.V. Moore, “The May Conference on Leadership,” Personnel Journal 6 (1927): 127, cited in Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, 47); as a means of influencing others that depends on personality traits found only among a select few (see E.S. Bogardus, Leaders and Leadership [New York: Appleton-Century, 1934], 3–5, cited in Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, 47) or only under certain circumstances (see, for example, David M. Rosen, “Leadership Systems in World Cultures,” in Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 41); as a means for influencing a group to achieve its goals (see Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, 75); or as the process by which an organization achieves excellence (Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, 83. This is Rost’s summary of the views expressed by Peters and Waterman, whose work inspired many subsequent studies, but who did not actually define leadership in their work. Leaders themselves disagree about what it is they do. Hitler defined leadership as coercion with a twist, observing that “whatever goal man has reached is due to his originality plus his brutality.” Gandhi focused on the example the leader sets for others. “Clean examples have a curious method of multiplying themselves,” he wrote. Truman defined a leader as “a man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don’t want to do, and like it” (see Kellerman, “Leadership as a Political Act,” 71). Several critical differences among these definitions are important for our purposes, however. Can leadership involve coercion, or must followers follow of their own volition? Are leaders necessarily “great men” with particular traits, such as charisma? Do the great men who lead us arise only in reaction to particular circumstances?
47. Inspirational leadership is different from Burns’s transformational leadership in two senses. First, as noted in the text, it may promote immoral actions. Second, Burns emphasizes that it is the realization of mutual objectives that satisfies people’s needs, but I would argue that in the save-the-babies movement, it is the pursuit of goals that satisfies participants’ needs more than their achievement. Burns says that the “ultimate test of practical leadership is the realization of intended, real change that meets people’s enduring needs.” Burns, Leadership, 461. But here it is the pursuing of goals that meets the militants’ needs, not the accomplishment of those goals. (In any case, it is often hard to assess the effectiveness of inspirational terrorist leadership. For example, it would be hard for most observers to determine definitively whether a given terrorist act influenced the Messiah in some way.) Joseph Rost and others also reject the requirement that leadership involve the achievement of moral goals, but Rost goes a step further, arguing that charisma is a form of coercion “more consistent with the do-the-leader’s-wishes conceptual framework than it is with the leadership-as-transformation framework.” See Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, 85. The key difference between inspirational leadership as I am defining it here and Rost’s “leadership for the twenty-first century” is that I assume that charisma can be used to inspire followers to take action they want to take, whether for spiritual, emotional, or material reasons, and that it may lead to more effective individuals and organizations; and that charisma can be part of inspirational leadership.
Unlike Rost, I do not see the function of charisma as only to persuade others to do the leader’s bidding. Charismatic leaders often persuade us to do more of what we already want to do, but perhaps are too lazy or too afraid or too selfish to do without additional persuasion. Charisma, in my view, can make transformational or inspirational leaders more effective. It can, similarly, make transactional leaders or managers more effective.
48. Inspirational leaders are only successful when some of their followers also become leaders, while commanders do not necessarily aim to transform their subordinates into leaders. Inspirational leaders may be more effective if they have “great-man traits,” especially charisma, but such traits are not required. From around 1910 and until World War II, the scientific study of leadership focused on the paradigm of “personality traits.” The “traits theory” assumed that individuals who became leaders possessed a set of distinct characteristics, or traits, that separated them from followers. The aim of the scientific research on leadership during the period of the traits theory was to identify the characteristics of the individuals associated with leadership. See, for example, Martin M. Chemers, “The Social, Organizational, and Cultural Context of Effective Leadership,” in Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 93–94. See also James G. Hunt, “Organizational Leadership: The Contingency Paradigm and Its Challenges,” in Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 113–14.
Similarly, inspirational leaders may be more effective during political or social crises, but they may arise during crises that only they and their followers detect.
Inspirational terrorist leaders are bearers of symbolic goods. They use religion as a kind of technology. They use it to create community, thereby promoting altruism. They use it to promote the idea that joining a holy war and martyring oneself to a higher calling is a way to fulfill spiritual and emotional needs. Some try to create a kind of circle of grace in which all members see themselves as unusually good. The threat of being banished from that circle then deters defection. Inspirational terrorist leaders and their followers seek to alter the world as it currently exists (whether in a spiritual way such as bringing on Armageddon, or in a more material way, such as ending abortion or ousting U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia). Leaders and followers may aim to achieve multiple purposes, but they may not necessarily be pursuing an identical basket of goals. Some antiabortion activists are also racist and aim to provoke a race war, while others care only about abortion, for example.
49. Bob Lokey, telephone interview with the author, 1 May 1999.
50. “Paul Hill Speaks, Pro-Defending Life—A Reply to Credenda Agenda’s ‘Moving Beyond Profile,’ ” vol. 8, no. 5, issue no. 1, June 1997, last accessed 25 August 2002, www.trosch.org/bra/ph-v8_n5.htm.
51. Paul J. Hill, “Should We Defend Born and Unborn Children with Force,” July 1993, last accessed 22 April 1999, www.trosch.org/bks/defnd-
ph.htm.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Paul J. Hill, letter to the author, 26 April 1999.
57. National Abortion Federation, “2001 Year-End Analysis of Trends of Violence and Disruption Against Reproductive Health Care Clinics,” Web site of the National Abortion Federation, last accessed 26 August 2002, www.prochoice.org/. The Web site also contains statistics of antiabortion violence since 1977.
58. Paul J. Hill, interview with the author, 27 April 1999, Florida State Prison. Journalist Steve Goldstein also participated in this interview.
59. Soldiers in the Army of God.
60. Ibid.
1. Alex Tizon and the Seattle Times Investigative Team, “John Muhammad’s Meltdown,” Seattle Times, 10 November 2002, A1.
2. Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); see also, Joseph S. Nye Jr., “A Whole New Ball Game,” Financial Times, 28 December 2002.
3. Robert O’Harrow Jr., “Kansi’s Shadowy Stay in U.S. Leaves a Hazy Portrait,” Washington Post, 3 March 1993, A1.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. According to testimony by Special Agent Bradley J. Garrett of the FBI, who helped arrest Kansi in Pakistan, “He was especially furious over the Persian Gulf War and the treatment of Palestinians by Israel.” Tim Weiner, “Pakistani Convicted of Killing 2 Outside CIA Headquarters,” New York Times, 11 November 1997, A19.
7. John F. Burns, “Family of Pakistani in Killings at CIA Also Seeks a Motive,” New York Times, 21 June 1997, A1.
8. Ibid. See also Tim Weiner, “FBI Men Sent to Karachi to Investigate the Slaying,” New York Times, 13 November 1997, A10.
9. Weiner, “FBI Men Sent to Karachi,” A10.
10. Mary Anne Weaver, “The Stranger,” New Yorker, 13 November 1995, 59–72.
11. Jeff Stein, “Lone Gunmen,” Salon, last accessed 4 September 2002, www.salon.com/news/1997/11/
21news2.html.
12. See Weaver, “Stranger,” 59–72.
13. On Kansi’s denial, see Mir Aimal Kansi, interview with the author, Sussex One State Prison, Waverly, Va., 7 November 1999. The relatives of Kansi denied Abdullah Jan’s involvement in court. See Burns, “Family of Pakistani in Killings,” A1.
14. At the end of March 1993, the FBI reclassified Kansi as a suspected international terrorist. This move allowed the Department of State’s Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program to raise the reward offered for information leading to the arrest of Kansi to $2 million. David B. Ottaway, “Frustrating the FBI,” Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, 24–30 July 1995, 32, cited in “Central Intelligence Agency 1997—Capture and Trial of Kansi,” Web site of The Literature of Intelligence: A Bibliography of Materials, with Essays, Reviews, and Comments, by J. Ransom Clark, Muskingum College, Ohio, last accessed 5 September 2002, www.intellit.muskingum.edu/cia1990s_folder/cia1997kansi.
html. See also “Facing Justice,” on-line NewsHour transcript, 18 June 1997, last accessed 4 September 2002, www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/june97/cia_6-18.
html.
15. Zahid Hussain, “The Great Cover-Up,” Newsline, July 1997, 18–24.
16. General Musharraf established the National Accountability Bureau in October 1999 to investigate major corruption cases involving politicians, government officials, money laundering, and loan write-offs to industrialists. Headed by a lieutenant general, the bureau employs many retired ISI officials, bankers, legal experts, and a few police officials.
17. The senior Pakistani official adds that the junior ISI official, who apparently received only $10,000 out of the total reward payment, came under investigation as his bank account statement showed an unusually large transaction, which NAB officials believed to be corruption money. As soon as the matter was reported to top NAB officials, the official adds, immediate instructions were given to close the case and destroy the interrogation reports. Senior Pakistani government official, interview with the author, 8 September 2002.
18. Burns, “Family of Pakistani in Killings,” A1.
19. Senior Pakistani government official, interview.
20. According to the same senior Pakistani government official, who asked to remain unidentified, “The informed circles in Pakistan believe that Kansi was convinced that his father was ditched by the CIA after using him, and he sought revenge for this reason. It is believed by many that another of [Kansi’s] close relatives was killed by the CIA in 1984 and may have also led Kansi to seek revenge.” Former Pakistani spy chief Hamid Gul also suggested that Kansi might have had a personal motive in attacking CIA employees. See Stein, “Lone Gunmen.”
21. Bill Baskervill, “Pakistani Who Killed CIA Agents in ’93 Is Executed; Appeal Rejected; Reprisals Feared,” Boston Globe, 15 November 2002, A2.
22. The material on James Dalton Bell summarizes Jessica Stern and Darcy Bender, “James Dalton Bell,” forthcoming publication.
23. Jim Bell, “Assassination Politics,” 3 April 1997, last accessed 30 August 2002, www.vader.com/ap.htm/.
24. Ibid.
25. For background information on diisopropyl fluorophosphate, see “EPA Chemical Profile: Isofluorphate,” Web site of the Environmental Protection Agency, last accessed 30 August 2002, www.epa.gov/
swercepp/ehs/profile/55914p.txt/. Isofluorphate is a synonym for diisopropyl fluorophosphate.
26. United States of America v. James Dalton Bell, 00-5172M, Complaint for Violation, 5.
27. Ibid., 97-5048M, Complaint for Violation, 4.
28. “Inco Nickel-Coated Carbon Fiber,” Inco Material Safety Data Sheet, issued 31 March 1998, revised 4 January 1999.
29. James Bell, telephone interview with the author, 14 February 2000.
30. United States of America v. James Dalton Bell, 97-5048M, Complaint for Violation, 4.
31. United States District Court, Western District of Washington, 97-5047M, Inventory of Items Seized Under Authority of a Warrant, 1.
32. United States of America v. James Dalton Bell, 97-5048M, Complaint for Violation, 6.
33. Ibid., 5; and John Branton, “Judge Delays Bell’s Sentencing,” The Columbian (Vancouver), 21 November 1997, Section A.
34. John Painter Jr., “IRS Says Man from Tacoma Part of Plot,” Oregonian (Vancouver), 21 November 1997; and Branton, “Judge Delays Bell’s Sentencing.”
35. United States of America v. James Dalton Bell, 97-5048M, Complaint for Violation, 5.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 6.
38. Bell, telephone interview.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. United States District Court, Western District of Washington, Application and Affidavit for Search, 97-5025M, 28 March 1997, 9. The issuance of such documents are “in violation of both the Criminal Code of Oregon, Section 162.355, Simulating Legal Process, and Title 26, U.S. Code, Section 7212(a), Corrupt Interference with the Administration of Internal Revenue Laws.” Ibid., 7.
42. Ibid., 6.
43. United States of America v. James Dalton Bell, 00-5172M, Complaint for Violation, 4.
44. B. J. Berkowitz et. al, Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons (Santa Barbara: ADCON Corporation, 1972), 3–9, 4–4.
45. Robert S. Robins and Jerrold M. Post, Political Paranoia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
46. For more on how people can be simultaneously paranoid and correct about others’ negative intentions, see Robins and Post, Political Paranoia.
47. As of 5 December 2001, eleven cases of inhalational and seven cases of cutaneous anthrax had been confirmed. There were four additional suspected cases of cutaneous anthrax. See “Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, 7 December 2001,” Web site of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), December 7, 2001 / 50(48), 1077–79, last accessed 30 August 2002, www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5048a1.htm/.
The fatalities included a ninety-four-year-old woman from rural Connecticut, a hospital employee in New York City, both of whom are suspected to have contracted the disease from contaminated mail, two Washington, D.C., area postal workers, and a newspaper picture editor in Florida. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, who has studied the anthrax case extensively, reports some uncertainty about the date the letter to the American Media Inc. office was mailed. See Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “Analysis of the Anthrax Attacks,” Web site of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), last accessed 30 August 2002, www.fas.org/bwc
/news/anthraxreport.htm/.
On 5 April 2002, CDC reported a case of suspected cutaneous anthrax in a worker who had been processing environmental samples for Bacillus anthracis in support of CDC investigations of the 2001 bioterrorist attacks in the United States. See “Public Health Dispatch: Update: Cutaneous Anthrax in a Laboratory Worker—Texas, 2002,” Web site of the CDC, MMWR, June 7, 2002 / 51(22), 482, last accessed 30 August 2002, www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5122a4
.htm.
48. Jonathan Knight, “Crackdown on Hazardous Agents Raises Concern for Bona Fide Labs,” Nature 414 (2001): 3–4.
49. Gerald Epstein, “Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 27, no. 4 (2001): 321–54.
50. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, enacted on April 24, 1996, required HHS to regulate the transfer of “select agents.” CDC came up with a list of twenty-four microbial pathogens and twelve toxins that, if transferred to another facility, would require registration with the CDC. Part 72 of Title 42 of Code of Federal Regulations. The act can be accessed through the Web site of the American Society of Microbiology (ASM), last accessed 30 August 2002, www.asmusa.org/pcsrc/pl104-132.pdf.
51. See “The Culture Collection in This World: WDCM Statistics, 27 November 2001,” Web site of the World Data Centre for Microorganisms (WDCM), last accessed 30 August 2002, www.wdcm.nig.ac.jp/statistics2001.html/.
52. Michael Barletta, Amy Sands, and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Keeping Track of Anthrax: The Case for a Biosecurity Convention,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58.3 (May/June 2002): 57–61. The purpose of these collections is to make cultures available for medical research. Hospitals use them to check the accuracy of diagnostic methods and instruments. Pharmaceutical companies use them to test the effectiveness of vaccines and other medical countermeasures. Universities use them in basic research.
53. Barry Kellman, “Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 24.2 (spring 2001): 425–88.
54. United States of America v. James Dalton Bell, 00-5172M, Complaint for Violation, 10.
55. Ibid., 14.
56. Ibid., 1.
57. See Declan McCullagh, “Crypto-Convict Won’t Recant,” Wired News, 14 April 2000, last accessed 30 August 2002, www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283
,35620,00.html/. See also United States of America v. Carl Johnson, CR98-5393RJB, Superseding Indictment, last accessed 30 August 2002, www.cryptome.unicast.org/cryptome022401/cej040399.htm#
Superseding, and United States of America v. Carl Johnson, CR98-5393RJB, Plea Agreement, last accessed 30 August 2002, www.cryptome.unicast.org/cryptome022
401/cej040399.htm#PLEA/.
1. “About CPL,” Web site of the Center for Public Leadership, last accessed 7 January 2003, www.ksg.harvard.edu/leadership/aboutcpl.html.
2. In the American attack, which consisted of a barrage of seventy-nine Tomahawk missiles, some twenty-one people were killed and fifty wounded, according to Pakistani reports quoted by the Washington Post. Several Harkat operatives were killed during the raid. Eugene Robinson, “Reports of U.S. Strikes’ Destruction Vary; Afghanistan Damage ‘Moderate to Heavy’; Sudan Plant Leveled,” Washington Post, 22 August 1998.
3. “Osama bin Laden—Links with Kashmiri Militants,” undated Indian government document. Indian government officials, interviews with the author.
4. United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, last accessed 22 September 2002, www.usis.usemb.se/terror/rpt2000/.
5. Daniel McGrory, “Public Schoolboy Became bin Laden Pupil,” Times (London), 4 October 2001.
6. Indian government official, interview with the author, 17 April 2002.
7. Daniel McGrory, “Public Schoolboy Became bin Laden Pupil.”
8. Nick Fielding, “London Student Has Key Role in Terror Network,” Sunday Times, 23 September 2001.
9. Indian government official, interview with the author, 17 April 2002.
10. The actual sum was 22 lakh. One lakh denotes one hundred thousand rupees. One hundred lakhs are one crore. In early January 2003, one dollar was worth approximately forty-eight Indian rupees.
11. In 1991, Azhar traveled with the vice chief of HUM, Maulana Farooq Kashmiri, to Saudi Arabia during Ramadan, raising some $6,500. After this, Azhar quit his teaching job to work full-time for HUM. In 1992, Azhar traveled again to Saudi Arabia on a fund-raising mission, this time with the assistance of Harkat’s permanent representative in Saudi Arabia. He returned with $10,000. When he returned six months later in September 1993, a Saudi businessman secured an “Ekama” for Azhar, which allowed him to travel to Saudi Arabia anytime at will, without a visa. From there, he traveled to England, where he visited a number of towns where Pakistani expatriates tend to live. He raised some $30,000. While in England, Azhar arranged to acquire a fake Portuguese passport to travel freely throughout Europe on fund-raising missions. The next time he traveled, to Zambia, in February 1993, Azhar was able to raise another $30,000. From there he traveled to Saudi Arabia and Sharjah (UAE), where he collected an additional $12,000. In November 1993, Azhar traveled to Kenya at the behest of Somali Muslims, to lobby the Pakistani government to pull its troops out of the UN peacekeeping force there.
12. “Borderless Web of Killers,” Los Angeles Times, 26 February 2002, Part 2, 12. See also Nick Fielding, “Pearl Murder Case Briton ‘Was a Double Agent,’ ” Sunday Times, 21 April 2002.
13. Interrogation Report of Masood Azhar, Alias Adam Issa, undated document provided by Indian government.
14. Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) was founded by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a cleric and leader of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islami, in the mid-1980s to counter Shiite and Iranian influence in Pakistan. Pakistani Shiites believe that the SSP was the creation of Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence (ISI), at the behest of General Zia-ul-Haq. The SSP later gave rise to a number of breakaway groups, including Lashkar e Jhangvi (LEJ), formed in 1996. The SSP, which has been involved in sectarian killings for the past fifteen years, recently expanded its activities to Kashmir and became involved in the killing of Shiite political leaders in the region’s Indian-administered part. It regularly issues a “hit list” of prominent Shiite professionals, scholars, and government servants. General Musharraf’s government recently banned the SSP, along with its rival Shiite group Sipah-i-Mohammad. One of the SSP’s leaders, Riaz Basra, who was killed by Pakistani law enforcement agencies in April 1999, was reportedly a part of the inner circle of Osama bin Laden. In certain areas of Punjab, the SSP is a relatively popular political party. Hassan Abbas, Shelley Cook, Brett Kenefick, Joseph Kopser, and Silbi Stainton, “Pakistani Terror,” unpublished term paper written for the course “Non-State Threats to International Security,” taught by Jessica Stern, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 24 October 2001.
15. David Sanger and Kurt Eichenwald, “Reacting to Attack in India, U.S. Aims at Pakistan Group’s Assets,” New York Times, 21 December 2001, A1.
16. Brigadier Abdullah is in all likelihood an alias used to hide the identity of an important ISI official. Former high-ranking Pakistani government official, interview with the author, 8 September 2002.
17. Peter Finn and Dana Priest, “Weaker Al Qaeda Shifts to Smaller-Scale Attacks; Experts Say New Strategy Aims at Disruption,” Washington Post, 15 October 2002, A1. According to Ajai Sahni of the Institute for Conflict Management in India, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, the head of the Binori Mosque and Azhar’s patron, had a long and close association with Mullah Omar, and is reported to have hosted bin Laden at the Mosque as far back as 1989. The JEM was one of the major facilitators of the Al Qaeda–Taliban relocation to Pakistan after September 11. Ajai Sahni, e-mail communication with the author, 2 February 2003.
18. Fielding, “Pearl Murder Case Briton.”
19. Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan Is Willing to Give Up Suspect in Reporter’s Death,” New York Times, 27 February 2002, A1.
20. Ibid.
21. Jon Stock, “Inside the Mind of a Seductive Killer,” Times (London), 21 August 2002, 4.
22. The humanitarian group said that Sheikh became ill and never left Croatia. According to Asad Khan, the charity’s founder, Sheikh went alone to meet Bosnian refugees, who told him about rape and ethnic cleansing practiced by Serbs, claiming to be Orthodox Christians on a crusade against Islam. Aslan Cowell, “This Mild Schoolboy, Lost in the Islamic Inferno,” New York Times, 11 October 2001, A4.
23. One prominent member of the SSG is Pakistan’s president, Pervez Musharraf. Many leaders of the SSG have been trained in the United States, and the SSG is not known to be involved in training of jihadi groups.
24. Nasarullah Manzoor Langaryal was deputy commander of Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI). He was arrested in November 1993. His Indian interrogators describe him as a “highly motivated, committed, and fundamentalist militant.” He fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1983 until 1992 and got involved in militancy in Kashmir immediately after leaving Afghanistan. “List of disclosures made by mercenaries arrested in Jammu and Kashmir,” undated Indian government document.
25. Ibid. “Profile of Ahmed Umar Saeed Sheikh,” undated document provided by the Indian government.
26. Sayantan Chakravarty with Sheela Raval, Uday Mahurkar, and Hasan Zaidi, “Deadly Duo: The Dons of Terror,” BBC Monitoring, 25 February 2002, 28. Undated documents provided by the Indian government.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. Suman K. Chakrabarti, “West Bengal: Prosecution Weakness,” India Today, 5 August 2002, 30.
29. “Hijacker Received Money Through Pakistan,” The News, 2 October 2001. Available on the Web site of Karachi–The News International, last accessed 22 September 2002, www.karachipage.com/news/Oct_01/10
0201.html. Undated Indian government documents supplied to author.
30. Chakravarty et al., “Deadly Duo,” 28. Undated Indian government documents supplied to author.
31. Ibid. Paul Watson and Sidhartha Barua, “Worlds of Extremism and Crime Collide in Indian Jail,” Los Angeles Times, 8 February 2002, 1.
32. Chakravarty et al., “Deadly Duo,” 28.
33. Zahid Hussain and Daniel McGrory, “A World Apart, Two Young Men Twisted by One Idea,” Times (London), 16 July 2002.
34. Tariq Ali, “Who Really Killed Daniel Pearl?” Guardian, 5 April 2002.
35. Senior Pakistani government official, interview with the author, 8 September 2002.
36. Isabel Hilton writes that a source told her that Saeed felt that he would escape the death penalty in return for his silence on operations that he claimed to have carried out in India for the ISI. Isabel Hilton, “The General in His Labyrinth,” New Yorker, 12 August 2002. Robert Fisk writes that Saeed was not turned over to U.S. agents, and not tried publicly, out of fear that he might reveal links between the ISI and Al Qaeda. Robert Fisk, “The Murder of Daniel Pearl,” Independent, 16 July 2002, 3.
37. Indian government official, interview with the author, 17 April 2002.
38. Robert Fisk, “U.S. Wary of Pakistan Intelligence Services’ Links to Al-Qa’ida,” Independent on Sunday, 21 August 2002.
39. Stimson’s refusal in 1929 to expend State Department funds for cryptanalysis was made public in 1931 in a book by cryptanalyst Herbert O. Yardley, as a result of which the Japanese adopted machine ciphers more complex than the system employing simultaneous use of multiple codebooks that U.S. cryptanalysts had managed to crack before. David Kahn, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor,” Foreign Affairs, 70, No. 5 (winter 1991/1992): 138.
40. Erik Eckholm, “Qaeda Operative Is ‘Hero’ to Some in Pakistan,” New York Times, March 2003, A13.
41. Syed Salahuddin, interview with the author, 2 August 2001.
42. Profile of Syed Salahuddin, supreme commander of Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM), undated Indian government document.
43. Ibid.
44. See, for example, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68, No. 2 (spring 1989): 162–77. See also Ann M. Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Washington, D.C. and Tokyo, Japan: Brookings Institution Press/Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000).
45. Taiba bulletin, 11 August 2000.
46. RAW is India’s foreign intelligence agency, the counterpart to the ISI. The name stands for Research and Analysis Wing. Indian officials and scholars deny this claim.
47. Like the other interviewees for the Harvard project on leadership, this interviewee’s identity cannot be revealed.
48. Interview with TUM-2, Pakistan, 2002. Interviewer: Muzamal Suherwardy.
49. Interview with HM-3, Pakistan, 2002. Interviewer: Muzamal Suherwardy.
50. Interview with HUM-1, Pakistan, 2002. Interviewer: Muzamal Suherwardy.
51. Interview with HM-3.
52. Interview with HUM-1.
53. Interview with HM-1, Pakistan, 2002. Interviewer: Muzamal Suherwardy.
54. Interview with JEM-2, Pakistan, 2002. Interviewer: Muzamal Suherwardy.
55. Of all madrassahs, only roughly 10–15 percent espouse an extremist ideology. Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, 115. See also P. W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education, Not Jihad,” Brookings Institution Analysis Paper #14, November 2001. Available on the Web site of the Brookings Institution, last accessed 7 January 2003, www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/
views/papers/singer/20020103.htm.
56. This conversation took place in Moinhuddin Haider’s office in Islamabad on 8 June 2000, but Haider has publicly promoted this plan many times since.
57. “Elections in Pakistan,” Electionworld.com, last accessed 7 January 2003, www.electionworld.org/
election/pakistan.htm.
58. David Rhode, “Turning Away from U.S., Pakistan’s Elite Gravitate toward Islamic Religious Parties,” New York Times, 13 October 2002, A8; see also David Rhode, “Pakistani Fundamentalists and Other Opponents of Musharraf Do Well in Elections,” New York Times, 11 October 2002, A13.
59. Interview with TUM-2. Others responded more simply “education.”
60. Interview with JEM-2.
61. Ibid. JEM-2 had worked for several militant groups: Harkat e Jihadi Islami, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Harkat-ul-Ansar. He is now closest to Jaish-i-Muhammad.
62. Interview with HUM-1.
63. Firdous Syed, e-mail communication, 22 February 2003.
64. E-mail communication with Ajai Sahni, 2 February 2003. Interviews with Indian government officials in Delhi, January 2003.
1. Hidaya Rubea Juma, mother of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed. Quoted in “Special Assignment,” SABC Africa News, date unavailable.
2. R. F. Burton, Zanzibar: City, Island, and Coast (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1872), 117. The monsoon between December and February blows north, northeast from the Arabian peninsula and the west coast of India, then reverses direction in April. This remarkable pattern of winds made oceangoing trade possible long before overland commerce was possible. Michael F. Lofchie, Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 21.
3. Lofchie, Zanzibar, 24. Lofchie explains the Persians mingled completely with the Africans and were no longer detectable as a separate group. Arabs, who arrived later, became the upper classes in Zanzibar, while immigrants from the Indian subcontinent were traders, and the Africans became the lowest class.
4. Nathalie Arnold, telephone conversation with the author, 14 October 2002. Bruce McKim, telephone conversation with the author, 16 October 2002; Human Rights Watch, “Tanzania: ‘The Bullets Were Raining’—The January 2001 Attack on Peaceful Demonstrators in Zanzibar,” Human Rights Watch Report, 14, no. 3 (A) (April 2002), last accessed 16 October 2002, www.hrw.org/reports/2002/tanzania/zanz0402.pdf.
5. Arnold, telephone conversation. McKim, telephone conversation.
6. Quoted in “Pemba Island,” All About Zanzibar Web site, last accessed 16 October 2002, www.allaboutzanzibar.com/indepth/guidebook/pb00-01-11.htm.
7. Alice Werner, Myths and Legends of the Bantu (London: Cass, 1968). See chapter 16, “Doctors, Prophets, and Witches,” available in the book’s on-line version at the Najaco Website, last accessed 16 October 2002, www.najaco.com/books/myths/bantu/16.htm.
8. Werner, Myths and Legends. See also John. E. E. Craster, Pemba: The Spice Island of Zanzibar (London: T. F. Unwin, 1913). Werner believes that some of these stories reflect the prejudices of white Christians.
9. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (27 June 2001), 8321.
10. Ibid., 8324–25.
11. This material summarizes Federal Bureau of Investigation, FD-302a, of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, 10/5–7/99 at Cape Town, South Africa. Marked “particularly sensitive.” This document was entered into evidence at Mohamed’s trial.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden (27 June 2001), 8327–28.
16. Ibid., 8329.
17. Ibid., 8328.
18. This material summarizes Federal Bureau of Investigation, FD-302a.
19. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, (2 May 2001), 5437.
20. This material summarizes Federal Bureau of Investigation, FD-302a.
21. Ibid.
22. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, (28 June 2001), 8431.
23. Ibid., 8431–32.
24. Ibid., (3 July 2001), 8740.
25. Quoted in Benjamin Weiser and Tim Golden, “Al Qaeda: Sprawling, Hard-to-Spot Web of Terrorists-in-Waiting,” New York Times, 30 September 2001, 1B4.
26. Testimony of Jerrold Post, United States of America v. Usama bin Laden (27 June 2001), 8311–62.
27. Excerpts of the Al Qaeda training manual are available at the Web site of the U.S. Department of Justice, last accessed 14 January 2003, www.usdoj.gov/ag/training manual.htm.
28. See the Web site of the U.S. Department of Justice, last accessed 11 October 2002, www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf, “Declaration of Jihad (Holy War) against the Country’s Tyrants—Military Series,” First Lesson, p. 13 (translated version).
29. Ibid., Second Lesson, pp. 15–20 (translated version).
30. Copies of the more extensive Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad were found from Al Qaeda members arrested in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Encyclopedia covers tactics, security, intelligence, handguns, first aid, explosives, topography, land surveys, and weapons, and has been compiled since Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. Originally designed as a record of the Afghan fighters’ knowledge and experience in guerrilla warfare, it gradually came to include terrorist tactics, as Al Qaeda developed into a terrorist organization. A work of several thousand pages written and translated over five years, the Encyclopedia also appeared in CD-ROM in 1996. For more information on the Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, see Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 70.
31. Well-known members of the Shura Council include Muhammad Atef, an Egyptian who served as military commander and was reportedly killed in Afghanistan in late 2001; and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a surgeon who runs the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, responsible for the 1981 assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt. For other members of the council, see testimony of Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, United States of America v. Usama bin Laden (6 February 2001), 204–07.
32. Ibid., 204–214.
33. Bruce B. Auster et al., “The Recruiter for Hate,” U.S. News & World Report, 31 August 1998, 48.
34. The explosion blew a hole in the fuselage, and only an extraordinary flight performance by the pilot enabled an emergency landing at Naha airport in Okinawa. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 175.
35. For more on the Bojinka Plot—also known as Oplan Bojinka—see Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston, Mass.: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 71–93; and Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 175–77.
36. Judy Aita, “U.S. Completes Presentation of Evidence in Embassy Bombing Trial: Defense Expected to Begin Its Case April 16,” The Washington File, Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, April 2002, last accessed 2 October 2002, www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/security/a1040558.
htm.
37. See, for example, United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari, S(4) 00 Cr. 15 (3 July 2001), 630–35 (www.news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/haouari/ushaouari70301rassamtt.pdf).
38. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001), 185.
39. Statement for the Record of J. T. Caruso, Acting Assistant Director, Counter-Terrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), on Al-Qaeda International Before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 18 December 2001. Available on the Web site of the FBI, last accessed 2 October 2002, www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/caruso121801.htm.
40. For a summary of President Musharraf’s 12 January 2002 speech, see “Musharraf Declares War on Extremism,” BBC News Online, 12 January 2002, last accessed 18 October 2002, www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
south_asia/1756965.stm. See also “Pakistan’s Leader Comes Down Hard on Extremists,” CNN.com, 12 January 2002, last accessed 18 October 2002, www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/01/12/pakistan.india/.
41. See, for example, “Confessions of an Al-Qaeda Terrorist,” Time, 23 September 2002, 34.
42. Kit R. Roanet, David E. Kaplan, Chitra Ragavan, “Putting Terror Inc. on Trial in New York,” U.S. News & World Report, 8 January 2001, 25.
43. See, for example, Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 80.
44. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 58–59.
45. Peter Baker, “Defector Says bin Laden Had Cash, Taliban in His Pocket,” Washington Post, 30 November 2001, A1. See also Molly Moore and Peter Baker, “Inside Al Qaeda’s Secret World; bin Laden Bought Precious Autonomy,” Washington Post, 23 December 2001, A1.
46. Baker, “Defector Says bin Laden Had Cash,” A1.
47. Osama bin Laden established the International Islamic Front in a statement calling for a jihad against the Jews and Crusaders on 23 February 1998. Signatories other than Osama bin Laden were Ayman al-Zawahri, leader of Egypt’s Jihad group, Rifai Taha, head of Egypt’s Gama’a al-Islamiya, Mir Hamza, secretary general of Pakistan’s Ulema Society, and Fazlul Rahman, head of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. Other organizations whose membership in the IIF has been publicized include the Partisans Movement in Kashmir (Harkat ul-Ansar), Jihad Movement in Bangladesh, and the Afghan military wing of the “Advice and Reform” commission led by Osama bin Laden. last accessed 21 March 2003, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/IIF
.htm.
48. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 57–58.
49. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden (4 June 2001), 7007.
50. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 60.
51. “Exclusive Interview: Conversation with Terror,” Time, 11 January 1999, available on-line at Time Asia last accessed 8 October 2002, www.time.com/time/
asia/news/interview/0,9754,174550-1,00.html.
52. Pamela Constable, “Bin Laden Tells Interviewer He Has Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, 11 November 2001, A32.
53. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, chap. 11. Excerpts of the book were translated by FBIS. See “Al-Sharq al-Awsat Publishes Extracts from Al-Jihad Leader Al-Zawahiri’s New Book,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 2 December 2001, in FBIS-NES-
2002-0108, Document ID GMP20020108000197.
54. James Risen, “Question of Evidence: A Special Report; To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle,” New York Times, 26 October 1999, A1.
55. Testimony by Ahmed Ressam, United States of America v. Mokhtar Haouari (5 July 2001), 620–22.
56. See, for example, Peter Finn, “Five Linked to Al Qaeda Face Trial in Germany; Prosecutors Focus on Alleged Bombing Plans,” Washington Post, 15 April 2002, A13.
57. This manual was found in the house of a Libyan Al Qaeda member who lived in Manchester, England. Benjamin Weiser, “A Nation Challenged: The Jihad; Captured Terrorist Manual Suggests Hijackers Did a Lot by the Book,” New York Times, 28 October 2001, A8.
58. The manual was part of the so-called Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, a seven-thousand-pages-long collection, which used to consist of ten volumes, of guidelines for terrorist attacks against targets worldwide. See Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 70. See also Mark Boettcher, “Evidence Suggests Al Qaeda Pursuit of Biological, Chemical Weapons,” CNN.com, 14 November 2001, last accessed 8 October 2002, www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/14/chemical.bio/.
59. On 13 March 2001, Italian authorities bugged a conversation in which a Milan-based Al Qaeda cell led by a Tunisian, Essid Sami Ben Khemais, spoke of “an extremely efficient liquid that suffocates people” and that was to be “tried out” in France. The liquids, one cell member was overheard saying, could secretly be placed in tomato cans and would be dispersed when the cans were opened. See Peter Finn and Sarah Delaney, “Al Qaeda’s Tracks Deepen in Europe; Surveillance Reveals More Plots, Links,” Washington Post, 22 October 2001, A1. See also “Disturbing Scenes of Death Show Capability with Chemical Gas,” CNN.com, 19 August 2002, last accessed 8 October 2002, www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/19/terror.tape.chemical/index.html.
60. Barton Gellman, “Al Qaeda Near Biological, Chemical Arms Production,” Washington Post, 23 March 2003, A1.
61. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, (7 February 2001), 357–365.
62. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 36.
63. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden (19 June 2001), 7464.
64. “Report Links bin Laden, Nuclear Weapons,” Al-Watan al-Arabi, 13 November 1998; available from FBIS, Document ID FTS19981113001081. Quoted in Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, “CNS Reports: WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden,” Web site of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, last accessed 8 October 2002, www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/
binladen.htm. The November report in Al-Watan followed that in another Arabic newspaper, the London-based Al-Hayat, which declared that bin Laden had already acquired nuclear weapons. “An Aide to the Taliban Leader Renews His Refusal to Give Information on Nuclear Weapons to bin Laden from Central Asia,” Al-Hayat, 6 October 1998, quoted in McCloud and Osborne, “CNS Reports.” See also Joseph, “Chemical Labs Show Al Qaeda Still Active.”
65. Joseph, “Chemical Labs Show Al Qaeda Still Active.”
66. Steven Erlanger, “Lax Nuclear Security in Russia Is Cited as Way for bin Laden to Get Arms,” New York Times, November 12, 2001.
67. Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “2 Nuclear Experts Briefed bin Laden, Pakistanis Say,” Washington Post, 12 December 2001, A1. See also Peter Baker and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan to Forgo Charges Against 2 Nuclear Scientists; Ties to Bin Laden Suspected,” Washington Post, 30 January 2002, A1.
68. Ibid.
69. David Albright, Kathryn Buehler, and Holly Higgins, “Bin Laden and the Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002, 23.
70. ICT, “Al-Qa’ida (The Base),” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Herzliyya, Israel, last accessed 9 October 2002, www.ict.org.il/
inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=74.
71. “Bin Laden’s Martyrs for the Cause: Thousands of Terrorists. Dozens of Cells. One Mission,” Financial Times, 28 November 2001, 17.
72. The information about the European recruiters is taken from The Recruiters, produced by Alex Shprintsen, edited by Annie Chartrand, June 2002, CBC News, Canada. A summary of the documentary is available on the Web site of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, last accessed 10 October 2002, www.cbc.ca/national/news/recruiters/network.html/.
73. “Bin Laden’s Martyrs for the Cause,” 17.
74. Michael Powell, “Bin Laden Recruits with Graphic Video,” Washington Post, 27 September 2001, A19.
75. “Alliance Says It Has Found a School run by a Titan of Terrorism,” New York Times, 1 December 2001; Jane Perlez, “School in Indonesia Urges ‘Personal Jihad’ in Steps of Bin Laden,” New York Times, 3 February 2002.
76. The German Bundeskriminalamt, the Federal Criminal Agency, estimates the number of militant Islamic trainees at Al Qaeda training camps at 70,000. See “Bin Laden’s Martyrs for the Cause,” 17. The CIA estimates the number at 110,000. Quoted in Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 8. Of the 6–7 million Al Qaeda supporters, some 120,000 are willing to take up arms. Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, quoted in Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 95.
77. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 8.
78. Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb, “Former Recruits Provide Best Knowledge of Camps; Intelligence on Targeted bin Laden Training Sites Sketchy,” Washington Post, 8 October 2001, A16.
79. Department of Defense, Interrogation Report of John Walker Lindh, JPWL-000389-000407, 402–03. Declassified 5 March 2002.
80. Bryan Preston, “Inside Al Qaeda’s Training Camps,” National Review, 1 October 2002. Available at the Web site of National Review Online, last accessed 19 October 2002, www.nationalreview.com/comment/
comment-preston100102.asp.
81. “Al-Sharq al-Awsat Publishes Extracts.” Parts one through eleven of serialized excerpts from Egyptian Al-Jihad Organization leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s book, “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner” (FBIS translated text, henceforth: Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner Part: 1).
82. Ibid. Part I
83. Ibid. Part XI
84. Ibid. Part XI
85. Department of Defense, Interrogation Report of John Walker Lindh.
86. Interview with HM-1, Pakistan, 2002. Interviewer: Muzamal Suherwardy.
87. Lashkar e Taiba public affairs officer, interview with the author, 3 August 2001. This interview was attended by a Pakistani journalist who writes under a pseudonym for tehelka.com, an electronic newspaper published in India. He wrote an article that highlighted this surprising admission.
88. Frederick R. Karl, Introduction to Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent, (New York and London: Penguin, 1983 edition).
89. Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 94.
90. Ibid., 195–97.
91. See John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 43.
92. Ibid.
93. Based on interviews in the United States, Lebanon, Gaza, Israel, Pakistan, and Indonesia, 1998–2001.
94. Andrew Higgins and Allan Cullison, “Saga of Dr. Zawahiri Sheds Light on the Roots of Al Qaeda Terror: How a Secret, Failed Trip to Chechnya Turned Key Plotter’s Focus to America and bin Laden,” Wall Street Journal, 2 July 2002.
95. Neil MacFarquhar, “Islamic Jihad, Forged in Egypt, Is Seen as bin Laden’s Backbone,” New York Times, 4 October 2001, B4.
96. Lawrence Wright, “The Man behind bin-Laden,” New Yorker, 16 September 2002, 77.
97. See, for example, Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999; Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002); and Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 168–72.
98. C. J. Chivers, “Uzbek Militants Decline Provides Clues to U.S.,” New York Times, 8 October 2002, A15.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Bernard Lewis, “License to Kill,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998, 15.
103. John F. Burns, “Bin Laden Taunts U.S. and Praises Hijackers,” New York Times, 8 October 2001, A1. A transcript of President Bush’s 20 September 2002 speech is available at the Web site of the White House. “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 September 2002, last accessed 19 October 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109
20-8.html.
104. Judith Miller, “Bin Laden’s Media Savvy: Expert Timing of Threats,” New York Times, 9 October 2001, B6.
105. “UK-Based Paper Notes Al-Qa’ida Military Training on Internet Site, Encyclopedia,” in Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 16 February 2002. Available in FBIS-NES-2002-0216, Article ID GMP200202160
00057.
106. Thaqafat al-Jihad, placed by “OBL2003.” http://
members.lycos.co.uk/himmame/vb/printthread.php?threadid=1881. Printed (in translation) in Reuven Paz, editor, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), Occasional Papers, Volume 1 (2003), Number 3 (March 2003).
107. Bayan li-Taliban yu’akid an bin Laden taliq walam yu’taqal (A statement by Taliban confirms that Bin Laden is free and has not been arrested). See on-line in: http://www.oalshahada.net/vb/printhead.
phb?s=&threadid=82. Printed (in translation) in Reuven Paz, editor, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), Occasional Papers, Volume 1 (2003), Number 3 (March 2003).
108. Dee Hock, Birth of the Chaordic Age (San Francisco: Berrett Koehler Publishers, 1999).
109. Virtual networks of leaderless resisters make sense for groups that will be satisfied with the kind of attacks that can be carried out by small groups or individuals acting on their own. The mission is openly communicated, but detailed plans are not discussed with the leadership of the movement or among groups. The need for secrecy and the need for inspirational leaders to be able to plausibly deny their knowledge of past or present plots distort the communication flow.
110. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). Quoted in Joel Garreau, “Disconnect the Dots,” Washington Post, 17 September 2001, C1.
111. Richard Wolfe, Carola Hoyos, and Harvey Morris, “Bin Laden’s Wealth Put in Doubt by Saudi Dissidents,” Financial Times, 24 September 2001, 5.
112. Paul McKay, “The Cost of Fanatical Loyalty,” Ottawa Citizen, 23 September 2001, A8.
113. Barry Meier, “ ‘Super’ Heroin Was Planned by bin Laden, Reports Say,” New York Times, 4 October 2001, B3.
114. For more information on the remittance system of hawala, see the Web site of Interpol, last accessed 7 January 2003, www.interpol.int/Public/Financial
Crime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp#2.
115. Douglas Frantz, “Ancient Secret System Moves Money Globally,” New York Times, 3 October 2001, B5. See also Judith Miller and Jeff Gerth, “Business Fronts: Honey Trade Said to Provide Funds and Cover to bin Laden,” New York Times, 11 October 2001, A1.
116. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden (26 February 2001), 1415.
117. Interviews with Laskar Jihad, Jakarta, 9 August 2001, and Yogyakarta, 11 August 2001; questionnaires administered in Pakistan.
118. Mark Hosenball, “Terror’s Cash Flow,” Newsweek, 25 March 2002, 28.
119. See for example, “Hate Literature Blitz Planned by Neo-Nazi Groups to Coincide with Jewish Holidays and 9/11,” Anti-Defamation League (ADL) press release, 27 August 2002. Available at the ADL Web site, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.adl.org/PresRele/
ASUS_12/4148_12.asp. The flyer can be viewed at the National Alliance Chicago Web site, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.natallchicago.com/Human-Shields
2.pdf.
120. See the Web site of the World Church of the Creator, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.creator.org/.
121. The article can be found in German at www.deutsches-reich.de/, last accessed 17 March 2003.
122. Louis Beam, “Battle in Seattle: Americans Face Off the Police State,” last accessed 14 January 2003, www.louisbeam.com/seattle.htm.
123. See Web site of the American Revolutionary Vanguard, last accessed 14 January 2003, www.attackthesystem.com/islam.html.
124. Thanassis Cambanis and Charles M. Sennott, quoting Magnus Ranstorp et al., “Fighting Terror: Going After the Network Cells; Qaeda Seen Still Dangerous,” Boston Globe, 6 October 2002, A17.
125. In December 2001, Singapore authorities arrested fifteen Islamist militants who had plotted to bomb U.S. targets, including naval vessels in Singapore. The commander of the group was an Indonesian based in Malaysia named Ruduan Isamuddin (known as Hambali), whom Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew referred to as Bashir’s “right-hand man.” The same group was accused of planning to bomb U.S. embassies in Southeast Asia on the anniversary of September 11. Details of the plot, and the relationship of Jamaah Islamiyah to Al Qaeda, were revealed to U.S. investigators by Al Qaeda’s regional manager in Southeast Asia, Omar al Faruq.
Jamaah Islamiyah has been involved in a series of failed attempts to attack Western targets in Singapore, and information about its planned attacks led the United States to shut embassies in Southeast Asia on several occasions. The group has also attempted several times to assassinate Megawati. Singaporean investigators have learned about how JI functions from the operatives they took into custody in December 2001 and August 2002. Several JI members had been trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Others were trained in Mindanao by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. JI leaders were instructed by Al Qaeda to stay away from mainstream Muslim life in Singapore to avoid drawing attention to themselves. They were not active in madrassahs.
126. A good example of a broad mission statement is the one that was used to mobilize participants in the Battle of Seattle. Groups opposed the World Trade Organization (WTO) for multiple reasons. American unions, supporters of Ralph Nader, and environmentalists were on the same side for completely different reasons. They demanded that WTO members adopt mandatory standards regarding pollution and protecting workers—in the case of the unions, because it would help them compete with their third-world rivals, and in the case of the environmentalists and “Naderites” because it would reduce worldwide emissions and promote workers’ health. Developing countries opposed the WTO because they feared it would impose precisely those standards, which would help rich companies in the West at the expense of the poor in the third world.
127. The Battle of Seattle is perhaps the best example of an operation that succeeded despite the inherent difficulties of surmounting this problem. Individuals came to Seattle for their own reasons.
128. Ronfeldt and Arquilla argue, in contrast, that swarming is the ideal approach for networked terrorist organizations. But I argue that the requirement for secrecy will make large-scale swarming difficult for terrorist organizations, absent impenetrable communication systems. For their argument, see David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, “Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future,” last accessed 15 August 2002, www.firstmonday.dk/issues.issue6_10/ronfeldt/.
1. While several of the militants interviewed for this book felt they communicated with God, none felt satisfied that God was taking care of their grievances, at least not in real time.
2. See Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2000), 199.
3. The relationship of many religious terrorists in the Arab and Islamic world to modernism is contradictory: on the one hand, they feel threatened by it, while on the other hand there is a feeling of being left behind, almost an inferiority complex. A recent Gallup Poll conducted in Arab and Islamic countries revealed that Muslims overwhelmingly cited technology, computers, and knowledge when asked what they liked most about the West. In Iran, Kuwait, Indonesia, Jordan, and Morocco, more respondents chose the category “Technology/Computers/Expertise/Knowledge” than any other category when asked what they liked most about the West. In Iran, Indonesia, and Kuwait, the percentage of people who said that technology was what they liked best about the West was above 52 percent. The Gallup Organization, “The 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World.” Surveys can be purchased at the Web site of the Gallup Organization, last accessed 10 December 2002, www.gallup.com/poll/summits/islam.asp.
4. It is important to point out that macro-level studies of the root causes of terrorism, however, can only get us so far. When it comes to terrorism, the actions of a single individual, together with chance, can make a big difference. Consider the chain of events set in play by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serb terrorist. Moreover, we would need a lot more data at all these levels before we could identify root causes of terrorism. My goal here is to identify possible risk factors that have emerged from my interviews, which, when more data are collected, could be measured systematically (even if root causes probably cannot be identified). It is also important to realize that different terrorist movements attract different sorts of persons; and that, as Martha Crenshaw points out, internal bargaining and interactions both inside and outside the group must be taken into account, in addition to individual terrorist psychologies. Martha Crenshaw, “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Context,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). The chapters in this volume provide an excellent introduction to the variety of individual, social, and political factors that have given rise to terrorism.
5. The term bad neighborhood was used by Michael Ignatieff. See Michael Ignatieff, “Intervention and State Failure,” Dissent, winter 2002, 115–123.
6. Valerie Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, “A Surplus of Men, a Deficit of Peace: Sex Ratios in Asia’s Largest States,” International Security 26, no. 4 (spring 2002): 5–38. See also the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook 2002 for recent data, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. Some studies suggest that a high ratio of males to females occurred at the time of the Vikings. See, for example, Carol Clover, “The Politics of Scarcity: Notes on the Sex Ratio in Early Scandinavia,” Scandinavian Studies 60, (1988): 147–88. However, as Judith Jesch, professor of Viking studies at the University of Nottingham, explains, not enough evidence exists to support such a claim as far as the Vikings and other ancient societies are concerned. She adds that there are a variety of reasons for privileging males in the sources, such as a higher likelihood for burials of high-status males to be observed in the archaeological record, and the clear preference for males in memorial inscriptions. Jesch adds that there is also little evidence that Viking society was more violent than its counterparts in other contemporary societies. Judith Jesch, e-mail correspondence with the author, 14 January 2003.
7. Robert Bates, interview with the author, 8 October 2002. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, No. 1 (February 2003): 75–90.
8. Robert J. Barro, “Inequality, Growth, and Investment,” NBER Working Papers 7038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1999.
9. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On the Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998).
10. Without surveying a large number of Indonesians, it is not possible to disaggregate the partial effects of the economic downturn and/or Soeharto’s fall (which in any case was also precipitated by the crisis), or other factors not yet identified.
11. For more on the idea of cultural humiliation, see Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
12. Michael Kimmel and Abby L. Ferber, “White Men Are This Nation: Right-Wing Militias and the Restoration of Rural American Masculinity,” Rural Sociology 65, no. 4 (2000): 582–604.
13. Military psychologist Dave Grossman estimates that two percent of men take pleasure from killing. Dave Grossman, On Killing (New York: Little Brown, 1995). Psychiatrist Jerrold Post argues that terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and “that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit.” In Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998). For a discussion of male genetic predisposition to violence, see Dale Peterson and Richard Wrangham, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). See also Grossman, On Killing.
14. Anti-U.S. feelings intensified after the attack and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Four percent of Saudis have a favorable opinion of the United States, according to a poll conducted by Zogby International in March 2003. Ninety-seven percent of those polled in Saudi Arabia believed that the threat of terrorism against America would increase after the war in Iraq. The findings were only marginally better elsewhere in the Arab world. Only 6 percent in Jordan and Morocco, 8.8 percent in the United Arab Emirates, 13 percent in Egypt and one out of three in Lebanon had a favorable opinion of the United States. These findings represent an enormous drop in sympathy for the United States. Only a year earlier, a Zogby poll revealed that youth, in particular, were far more sympathetic to the United States, when the main complaint was U.S. policy in regard to Israel. In March 2003, there was widespread perception in the Islamic world that U.S. government policies were anti-Muslim across the board. John Zogby explains, “We have lost a lot of good will for a long time.” He is especially concerned about angry youth. “The problem is that someone will reach them and organize them and that does not bode well for the United States.” E-mail communication with John Zogby, 23–24 April 2003. Discussion with Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, 23 April 2003. Discussion with Youssef Ibrahim, 16 April 2003. See also Pew Global Attitude Project, “What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View Their Lives, Their Countries, the World, America,” 53–72. The full survey report is available at the Web site of the Pew Research Center for the Public and the Press, last accessed 10 December 2002, www.people-press.org/reports/files/report165.pdf.
15. It is unlikely that Al Qaeda could have managed the sophisticated embassy bombings and the September 11 attacks without the Egyptians’ help. Al Qaeda established operational cooperation with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) by 1989 and later absorbed the group, co-opting its leaders into high ranks within Al Qaeda. Egypt has long been at the center of the Muslim religious revival movement, and hence the Egyptian alumni brought with them a substantial amount of experience in guerrilla and terrorist operations. EIJ also provided a ready-made officer corps for Al Qaeda.
16. See, for example, the 2002 Arab Human Development Report, and in particular chapter 2, “The State of Human Development in the Arab Region,” and chapter 6, “Using Human Capabilities: Recapturing Economic Growth and Reducing Human Poverty.” Available at the Web site of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), last accessed 10 December 2002, www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/bychapter.html. For data on individual countries in the Middle East, see the MENA region Web page, available at the Web site of the World Bank, last accessed 10 December 2002, www.lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf.
17. See, for example, Michael L. Ross, “Does Resource Wealth Cause Authoritarian Rule?” paper presented at Yale University, 10 April 2000, available at the Web site of Yale University, last accessed 11 December 2002, www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/ross.pdf. See also Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” Development Discussion Paper No. 517a, 1995, Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge, Mass.; Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth,” IMF Working Paper WP/99/85, 1999; and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50, 1998. Barro argues that democracies take hold only after a certain degree of wealth is achieved. Robert J. Barro, “Democracy and Growth,” NBER Working Paper 4909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1994.
18. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13.1 (2002): 5–21. See also Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997.
19. Abdelaziz Testas, “The Roots of Algeria’s Religious and Ethnic Violence,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 3 (May–June 2002): 161–84.
20. According to Ahmed Rashid, some observers believed that the victory of the Islamists was sponsored by the Pakistani military in an attempt to gain concessions from the United States, to “ensure that the West does not question continued military rule and keep the Kashmir issue on the boil, ensuring a predominant role for the army.” See Ahmed Rashid, “EU Condemns ‘Flawed’ Pakistan Elections,” Daily Telegraph, 14 October 2002, 15.
21. Paul Schulte, “Reflections on watching The Battle of Algiers for the first time after September 11th,” unpublished manuscript. Also see, J-L Marret, “Terrorism and Its Raison d’Être: What Makes Terrorists Tick?” unpublished manuscript, Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris.
22. Ron Scherer and Alexandra Marks, “Gangs, Prison: Al Qaeda Breeding Grounds?” Christian Science Monitor, 14 June 2002, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.csmonitor.com/2002/0614/p02s01-usju.html. See also David E. Kaplan et al., “Made in the U.S.A.,” U.S. News & World Report, 10 June 2002, 17. For an assessment of French Islamists, see Marret, “Terrorism and Its Raison d’Être.”
23. Sometimes purchasers are not required to show ID when purchasing guns from private vendors at gun shows. A known member of Hezbollah was found to have purchased weapons with the intent to ship them to Lebanon. A suspected member of Al Qaeda was found to have frequently bought and sold weapons at shows and was convicted on various weapons charges. Agents of the Provisional IRA were found to have purchased firearms to ship them back to Ireland hidden in toys. Susan Page, “Terrorists Use Gun Shows, McCain Says,” USA Today, 28 November 2001, 14A. Jonathan Cowan, president of Americans for Gun Safety, letter to the author, 1 March 2002.
24. Martha Crenshaw, “The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War,” in Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, 475 n. 4.
25. Michael Ignatieff, “The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror,” The Gifford Lectures, 2002/2003.
26. Milton J. Bearden, “War of Secrets: When Playing the Field, the Game Gets Rough,” New York Times, 8 September 2002, 4.
27. In April 2002, for example, Chris Patten, the European Union’s external affairs commissioner, was quoted saying, “I see the U.S. unilateralist temptation as one of the central problems, perils, challenges, and opportunities confronting the English-speaking peoples of today.” Roy Watson, “EU Calls on U.S. to Resist Unilateralist ‘Temptation,’ ” Times (London), 1 May 2002. With regard to the death penalty, German and French authorities, for example, have been reluctant to turn over evidence in their possession that could help the United States in its trial against Zacarias Moussaoui, who is suspected of having conspired with the nineteen September 11 hijackers to commit acts of terrorism. Moussaoui, if convicted, could face the death penalty in the United States. See, for example, James Harding, “Handover of Evidence Condemned in Trial of Alleged Terrorist,” Financial Times, 29 November 2002, 8. See also Peter Finn, “Germany Reluctant to Aid Prosecution of Moussaoui,” Washington Post, 11 June 2002, A1. For an overview of the European Union’s law against the death penalty, see “EU Law and Policy Overview: EU Policy on the Death Penalty,” Web site of “The European Union in the U.S.,” last accessed 6 March 2003. www.eurunion.org/LEGISLAT/Death
Penalty/deathpenhome.htm.
28. While at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, along with Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, discussed in chapter 9, stabbed two prison guards, sprayed hot sauce, and stabbed one prison guard in the eye, while attempting to escape captivity. Benjamin Weiser, “Traces of Terror: The Inmate; Suspect Admits to a Plot,” New York Times, 7 September 2002, 7.
29. Rohan Gunaratna, Debriefing of John Walker Lindh, Virginia, 25–26 July 2002.
30. Peter Maass, “Dirty War,” New Republic, 11 November 2002, 18.
31. Ibid.
32. “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” in Terrorism: Questions and Answers, Council on Foreign Relations, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/tamiltigers.html.
33. “LTTE Attack Paralyzes Sri Lanka’s International Airport,” International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), July 24, 2001. Available at the ICT Web site, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.ict.org.il
/spotlight/det.cfm?id=644.
34. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). Members stop caring about the purported mission as much as they care about their jobs. Over time, grievance shifts to greed—whether for political power, money, attention, or the satisfactions of leadership. Groups whose grievances have in large measure been addressed, but whose organizations persist, include ETA, the Basque separatist organization, and both sides in the dispute in Northern Ireland, which have turned what was a kind of holy war into a business. Other groups that we have discussed switch missions to ensure the group’s survival. It is unlikely that Mubarak’s replacement with a religious leader would satisfy his enemies today, for example.
35. Most of the world’s nuclear weapons stockpiles and the world’s stockpiles of weapons-usable materials (both military and civilian) are concentrated in the five nuclear weapons states acknowledged by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France. Additional nuclear weapons or components exist in Israel, India, and Pakistan, and enough civilian plutonium for many nuclear weapons also exists in Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. Some “twenty tons of civilian highly enriched uranium (HEU) exist at 345 operational and shut-down civilian research facilities in fifty-eight countries, sometimes in quantities large enough to make a bomb.” See Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Wier, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action,” Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 2002. Available on-line at the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, last accessed 11 December 2002, www.nti.org
/e_research/securing_nuclear_weapons_and_materials_May2002.pdf. See also Ashton Carter et al., “Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union,” Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1991; and Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
36. “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” September 2002, available at the White House Web site, last accessed 13 January 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
37. For an article that examines the complexity of the double-standard debate, see “Double Standards—Iraq, Israel and the UN,” Economist, 12 October 2002.
38. While the view of economists like Dani Rodrik and Joe Stiglitz, who believe that free trade harms some countries, are debated by many of their mainstream colleagues, few would argue with the proposition, put forward by Amartya Sen, that the industrialized West is benefiting more from globalization than the developing world.
39. Susan Nieman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 287.