Underground Front

One of the most important tools of the Chinese Communist Party is the “united front”. Originally developed in the early days of the party, it is a strategy to unite with all forces that could be united with the CCP in order to fight a common enemy. It is thus a co-optation strategy to bring as many people on side as possible, and coupled with propaganda, these were, and remain, the essential hand-in-glove tools to win the “hearts and minds” of the Hong Kong community throughout much of the time that the party has been active there. While propaganda work provides the substance and materials of the party line on various issues, united front work targets people of influence to bring them on-side so that they could accept the party line or at least not object to it. United front and propaganda work are placed at the heart of the CCP’s metabolism. The United Front Department and the Propaganda Department are two of the CCP Central Committee’s core organs.

The success of the united front in Hong Kong during the transition years was helped by the certainty that China was going to resume sovereignty in 1997. United front work prior to 1997 focussed on promoting “patriotism”, making people comfortable with China’s resumption of sovereignty, emphasising the paramount importance of good communication between Beijing and Hong Kong, and that achieving democracy was not viable in the short term. Post-1997, the emphasis shifted to instilling a sense of nationalism among Hong Kong people, that “harmony” in politics would bring the “stability” necessary for economic advancement, and more significant democratic reform might be possible in the future if Hong Kong people became sufficiently patriotic. Working alongside united front efforts is the extensive propaganda system, which involves itself in many areas, such as culture, media, publishing, education, religion and sports, all helping to create a new political order to realise the CCP’s vision for one country, two systems.

United front work is about building personal relationships with a large group of non-party folks. It is heavy-manpower work requiring great patience and a large bevy of people to cultivate relations with all sorts of people in Hong Kong. Since personal relationships are very important in this line of work, the party often uses its best people for those contacts that are considered the most valuable. They would even pay attention to the target’s birthday and other anniversaries to ensure gifts were sent and well-wishes delivered so that the friendship could be cemented. They would invite them to travel to the Mainland and to meet important people so as to give the target a sense that the authorities valued the relationship. It is vital that the target is made to feel important. Over time, trusted relations can be built but it is primarily professional in nature.

Intellectuals and artists have always been targets of the united front because they are valuable to propaganda work. They are seen as agents who can shape the message into something ordinary people can understand and associate with. The party has a long record in running study groups, organising classes and schools. It has also been publishing everything from leaflets, posters, journals, magazines and newspapers, producing films, songs, operas, as well as using the arts to promote its ideas. As can be seen in various chapters of this book, the CCP has engaged in all these activities in Hong Kong for a considerable period of time.

In CCP-speak, “intellectuals” include managers, administrators, technicians and experts. These people are often influential as models for other groups because as knowledgeable people they are considered to have social authority. In its battle for power with the KMT prior to 1949, the CCP built alliances with intellectuals and artists to help isolate the nationalists. By winning over more intellectuals to the revolutionary cause, the party could more successfully influence other groups to join in. In terms of its strategy to take back Hong Kong, cultivating the intellectuals in Hong Kong has also been one of the tactics.

The CCP may be said to have had five major united front episodes since its founding, with the fifth being the absorption of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999, and thus most relevant to this book. For the sake of completeness, all five phases are noted below:

Phase I and Phase II—Draw strength through alliances: The CCP had to enter into various alliances—“fronts”—because it was relatively weak and needed to build strength through collaboration with others. These were times to show willingness to negotiate and compromise because the communists were a minority. The first phase was between 1924 and 1927 when the KMT and CCP cooperated to fight the warlords during the Northern Expedition, and the second phase saw them banding together once more to fight the Japanese between 1936 and 1945. The “First United Front” and “Second United Front” are touched upon in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 4 enumerates many of the united front and propaganda activities in Hong Kong in order to support and raise funds for revolutionary activities on the Mainland, as well as establishing connections in various fields, such as culture, media and education, and establishing the Xinhua News Agency as the de facto presence of the CCP in Hong Kong in 1946.

Phase III—Transitional co-optation: After 1949, the CCP sought to achieve communism on the Mainland. In the early days, the party still needed time to train-up their own people and thus there were good reasons to be conciliatory, but it was also a time to use thought reform based on self-criticism and re-education to transform society. By 1957, Mao Zedong felt the transition had been sufficiently completed and the party could assert power. This stage then morphed into the Cultural Revolution. Throughout this period the CCP was busy with united front and propaganda activities in Hong Kong, with the Hong Kong communists provoking the riots of 1967 (Chapters 5 and 6).

Phase IV—Win back support: In 1979, a fourth united front was designed to give support to modernisation. Former allies and many others had to be rehabilitated from Cultural Revolution purges. United front work was necessary to bring about “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. This is discussed in Chapter 7. This phase dovetailed with cultivating the Overseas Chinese elites, including those in Hong Kong, to assist China’s modernisation by investing and setting up enterprises on the Mainland. This phase also overlapped with Phase V to take back capitalist Hong Kong as negotiations started with the British government in the early 1980s.

Phase V—Win over capitalists, stop independence advocacy: In order to resume sovereignty in 1997, a massive fifth united front campaign had to be rolled out in Hong Kong to build alliances with all manners of groups, but in particular with the political and economic elites of the day so as to win their loyalties. The “landlord”, “comprador” and “bourgeoisie” classes were all to be actively cultivated. Anyone who supported reunification was a patriot even if they opposed socialism. Their self-interests also opened them to manipulation. Those who were co-opted were invited to sit on important bodies to legitimise the transition process to Chinese rule. Winning over capitalists is discussed in Chapters 8 and 9; Chapter 10 deals with the united front against independence advocacy.

It can be seen that it was at times of crisis or directional change that the role of ideas was most important to the party. After all, it is the strength of inspiring ideas that enable people to put up with inconveniences and make sacrifices for a better tomorrow. These are the junctures when heavy doses of propaganda and united front work were felt to be essential. Even those who could not be won over, work could still be focussed on ensuring that they remained neutral because their withdrawal would help to defeat the opposition. In other words, potential opposition could be neutralised. The united front strategy for Hong Kong was one of co-optation as well as exclusion. Co-optation may be defined as the process of formally incorporating individuals or groups into decision-making or consultative processes. The target may be helpful as an informant, adviser or committee member.1 Those who were considered “representative” of key interest groups were targeted to be brought on-side as a matter of priority.

Anyone with influence can be useful to the CCP. For example, in united front work, there is no separation of church and state. Religious bodies in Hong Kong are seen to represent interests and they are seen to have influence over believers. Thus, representatives from various religions have been given seats on the Election Committee that selects the chief executive of the HKSAR as part of the CCP’s united front strategy. In the mid-1980s, when united front work intensified, the most important targets were the political elites—the appointees to the Executive and Legislative Councils, the economic elites—the tycoons—and then the intelligentsia and the technical-managerial professionals. The party looks at representation not in terms of formal representation (i.e. public consent) but influence. The purpose of the strategy was to influence the outlook and decisions of leaders in various fields in Hong Kong because the party regarded them as important shapers and influential agents of its governing values and beliefs. Moreover, the united front enabled the targeted groups to grow accustomed to the fruits of their membership in the post-reunification establishment so that they have a stake in maintaining it. This was the inclusive side of the strategy.

There was also an excluding side that sought to sideline opposition voices. In classic united front fashion, anyone who could be brought on-side would be since it was best to minimise opposition than to fight them. Those who continued to oppose, however, became the enemy and the focus of attack for being “unpatriotic”. For those who were co-opted—the “patriots”, the price for basking in the new status was also to share the burden of the new ruling authority in maintaining the new status quo. The most influential individuals were given greater say in the drafting of the post-1997 constitution—the Basic Law—for example, whereas the less influential were given advisory positions or used for window-dressing. There was also a concerted effort to bring on-side former government officials, presumably because they could provide advice on how Hong Kong was administered and also, should there be a need, they could be asked to manage things post-1997. How the united front worked in Hong Kong during the transition years is explained in Chapters 8 and 9. Soon after 1997, it was necessary to continue the united front to nurture a new generation of pro-government supporters in Hong Kong, since those who had been co-opted from around 1984, when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, were reaching retirement age. The next generation had to be organised differently because they had to face elections. Moreover, after more than a decade of Chinese rule, the younger generations felt Hong Kong was losing its identity, giving rise to “localism”, and some even called for “self-determination” and “independence”, which the party must quash. This last phase is discussed in Chapter 10.

A discussion about the united front would not be complete without touching upon the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National People’s Congress because there has been a long tradition of appointing Hong Kong people to them as part of China’s political co-optation strategy. In the past, leading pro-China left-wing figures from the labour, education, cultural and patriotic business sectors were appointed to serve in China’s political institutions as representatives of Hong Kong compatriots. Apart from the national CPPCC and NPC, appointments were also made to provincial and municipal CPPCCs and local people’s congresses. Between 1984 and 1997, China became much more active in co-opting Hong Kong elites from outside the traditional left-wing circles. Appointments to the CPPCC have been used as a way to cultivate people the CCP wanted to bring on-side. After all, there is no doubt about what the terms of reference of the CPPCC are:

The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is an organisation of the united front of the Chinese people, an important institution of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, a major form for carrying forward socialist democracy in the political life of the country. Unity and democracy are two major themes of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference . . . The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference shall be composed of the Communist Party of China, the various democratic parties, public personages without party affiliation, people’s organisations, ethnic minority groups and people of all walks of life, compatriots of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan, returned overseas Chinese and specially invited personalities, who are divided into a number of sectors.2

The existence of this body pre-dated the establishment of the People’s Republic. After World War II, there was a brief moment in time when the KMT and CCP agreed to an armistice and held talks in 1945 on post-war political reforms via a Political Consultative Conference, where other smaller parties were invited to join. This agreement to form such a conference was included in a wider agreement known as the Double Ten accord. The first assembly was held in Chongqing from 10 to 31 January 1946 with representatives from various groups but trust broke down between the KMT and CCP and civil war ensued (Chapter 4). After gaining control of most of the Mainland, the CCP organised a new consultative conference in September 1949 inviting delegates from various parties to attend and discuss constructing a new state with the CCP playing the leading role. This conference was then renamed the CPPCC, holding its inaugural meeting on 21 September 1949. It became the official manifestation of the united front with the mission to:

realise New Democracy, oppose imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism and establish an independent, democratic, peaceful, united, prosperous, and strong new China. To this end, we unite with the democratic classes and nationalities in the country and Overseas Chinese as well as form the great people’s united front. It is not only the Chinese Communist Party which has been struggling for the last twenty-eight years to achieve this goal; the democratic parties, people’s organisations, regions, troops and minorities nationalities, Overseas Chinese and democratic personages likewise favour and support it.3

In effect, the first conference was a quasi-constitutional body playing the role of a constitutional convention. It enabled party leaders, leading members of other smaller political parties who were the CCP’s allies against the KMT, and representatives of mass groups to interact within an institutional framework. The CPPCC’s 1949 Common Programme served as the state constitution until superseded by the 1954 Chinese Constitution. At the first CPPCC meeting, it also approved the new national anthem, flag, capital city, and state name, and created the first government. During the early years, the CPPCC was also the de facto legislature until the NPC was created and took over the role the CPPCC had played.

The major function of the CPPCC is to conduct political consultation. The national CPPCC usually has over 2,200 members and its Standing Committee usually has about 300 members.4 The chairman of the CPPCC is usually the fourth ranking member of the Politburo. Members are selected through consultation and recommendation. The Standing Committee decides through consultation on the number of members and the candidates. The usual practice of the membership mix of the CPPCC is to adhere to a one-to-two ratio of CCP members to non-party members. Thus, if one CCP member is added to the CPPCC, two non-party members must also be added. A portion of the national CPPCC members are top local officials who at the time of appointment were reaching the retirement age limit of 65; some were the leaders of ministries and commissions in the CCP Central Committee while others were the CPPCC chairpersons and vice-chairpersons at the local levels. For example, Chen Zuoer, after retiring as the deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office was appointed to the CPPCC Standing Committee in 2008.5 There are also members from the military and religious groups, as well as the descendants of some notable persons. There has also been an increase in members from Hong Kong and Macao.

In 2005, Tung Chee Hwa was made a vice-chairman of the national CPPCC after he resigned as the chief executive of Hong Kong. Tung had been a member of the Eighth CPPCC in 1993, when 84 individuals from Hong Kong were appointed to the national CPPCC, but stepped down when he became chief executive in 1997. In March 2017, Leung Chun Ying was made a vice-chairman even though he had not yet finished his term of office. There were 124 Hong Kong appointees to the 12th national CPPCC.6 As can be seen in Chapter 9, there are now many Hong Kong appointees to provincial and local people’s political consultative conferences. This co-opts the lesser elites into the party’s united front bodies. In accepting membership to the CPPCC, those who are not party members are nevertheless expected to uphold the leadership of the CCP. This obligation was not always understood by the Hong Kong appointees, as one declared: “When I was appointed as a delegate to the CPPCC, no one told me that my obligation was to uphold the leadership of the Party.”7

Dealing with patriotic appointees takes great patience, however. An example of this could be glimpsed from the two statements made during the March 2009 NPC and CPPCC meetings in Beijing. The first was Xi Jinping telling NPC deputies from Hong Kong that they should lead the public in tackling the financial crisis by offering ideas and suggestions to the HKSAR government. The second was in a closed-door meeting between Li Guikang, deputy director of the Liaison Office, and CPPCC members from Hong Kong, when Li revealed that his office had reach a 10-point agreement with the Hong Kong administration on measures to enhance the participation of CPPCC members in local affairs. These included appointing them to public bodies and setting-up some kind of working mechanism to help them participate in local affairs. Both the Liaison Office and the HKSAR government later denied the existence of such an agreement.8 It is unclear what led to those statements. Perhaps they were in response to CPPCC and/or NPC members complaining that their views were not being sought on Hong Kong affairs. While some of them hold positions in the HKSAR political structure, such as serving on the Executive Council or Legislative Council, and are deeply involved in local affairs, it would be difficult to have any kind of formal institutional arrangements to involve CPPCC deputies as a whole under the one country, two systems principle. The same goes for NPC deputies. Furthermore, CPPCC and NPC members have so far not been regarded by the Hong Kong community as providing the intellectual force required to articulate the many complex issues relating to post-1997 governance and Mainland–Hong Kong relations, precisely because they are seen as united front mouthpieces. Unless and until they no longer carry that perception, and unless they wish to play a genuine role in deliberation and debate, they will continue to play the role of merely “explaining” the Mainland’s views. This is the inhibiting and debilitating legacy of the united front.

In English, if the word “persuasion” is considered neutral, then “propaganda” is a word that carries heavy negative sentiments because it connotes bias and untruth. This is presumably why the Propaganda Department changed its English name to the Publicity Department although the old name is still by far the more often used. The Chinese word for propaganda does not carry the same negative connotations that it does in English. The Chinese meaning is “to spread information” or “to broadcast”. Nevertheless, the Chinese people are skilled decipherers of official-speak. The party certainly understands how important propaganda is. Emphasis on the correct use of terms on politically sensitive topics is an effective way of constraining public debate and resisting social change. Since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, propaganda work has become the very “life blood” of maintaining the CCP’s ongoing legitimacy and hold on power.10

The use of propaganda in China versus official-speak elsewhere is not just a matter of language but a matter of major differences in political systems. While every political system and government provides official information that ranges from data, facts and straight forward information to messages that are constructed to persuade, rally, deflect or serve propaganda purposes—more commonly referred to nowadays as “spin”—it is the Leninist system that puts propaganda at the institutional and spiritual core of the one-party structure (Chapter 1). At the apex is a top party cadre who oversees propaganda work, and the central-level Propaganda Department is directly supervised by the CCP Central Committee. The propaganda system “is the most extensive and, arguably, the most important of all CCP-controlled bureaucratic systems in China”.11 The work of the department today has been described thus:

We are a department in charge of political work . . . We mainly provide spiritual impetus, intellectual support and positive public opinion for [China’s] economic development. We aim to make party policies become the masses’ conscious actions and kindle the masses’ positive thinking and creativity, to unite all forces which can be united, arouse all positive elements, transform negative forces into positive forces and mobilise them to throw themselves into economic construction, reform and opening-up.12

The extensive propaganda system consists of four parts: the network of cadres and offices installed throughout the party-state bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises; within the People’s Liberation Army; within the state-run education, sports, science, technology, health, culture and media sectors; and all mass organisations such as labour unions, youth and women groups, universities, government-operated NGOs, and non-government ones (which are required to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs that is under the leadership of the Propaganda Department on ideological issues).

The party has historically divided propaganda work into “internal” (directed at the Chinese people) and “external” (directed at foreigners, Overseas Chinese and the outside world); and into four types—political, economic, cultural, and social. The Propaganda Department and its sister unit, the Office of Foreign Propaganda, are supervised by a handful of senior party—government figures in the party-state propaganda system under two leading groups with some overlapping membership. The CCP Central Committee Secretariat coordinates and facilitates linkages between the various organisations involved in propaganda work.

The CCP has a deep understanding of the use of propaganda. Even pre-dating the formation of the party in 1921, the communists had to learn how to disseminate a new ideology—Marxism—in China. Lenin thought newspapers were the best collective propagandists, agitators and organisers. If he were alive today, he would no doubt include the electronic media and new communication means through the Internet, mobile phones, text messaging, and social media as well. It was no accident that in 1937, the party decided to establish its own news agency—the Xinhua News Agency; in 1948, it created the People’s Daily, so it has its own mouthpiece; and in 1958, Beijing Television was created as the party’s broadcaster, which in 1978 changed its name to China Central Television. In terms of organisational arrangements today, the Xinhua News Agency is an institution of the government’s State Council; and the People’s Daily14 is an organ of the CCP Central Committee. The directors of both organisations are members of the CCP Central Committee. Xinhua owns many other publications. China Central Television is under the control of the government’s State Administration of Radio, Film and Television. These key media agencies do not have editorial independence, although in recent years they have had more leeway in some aspects of programming so as to produce more popular programmes for the public, but it would be a mistake to equate increased commercialisation of the Chinese media with the decline of either the CCP or its propaganda efforts.15 Essentially, their news reporting and programming follow guidelines provided by the Propaganda Department. In other words, the party controls content, while the government supervises operation. As for journalists, Liu Yunshan, a former head of propaganda, made it clear that: “one of the primary tasks of journalists is to make the people loyal to the Party”.16 Moreover, as explained in Chapter 1, the nomenklatura system gives authority to the Propaganda Department to appoint and remove publishers, chief editors and other key officials to media bodies.

During the Mao Zedong era, official-speak was designed to perpetuate revolution so that China could become a modern communist state. Today, it is designed to maintain the political status quo and promote the CCP’s regime values. The new approach is to emphasise the CCP’s legitimacy through its ability to make China economically strong and its people prosperous. Scholars have noted that in giving-up socialism, the CCP realised it faced a threat to its legitimacy. In response, the regime replaced its ideological legitimacy to lead the revolution with not only performance legitimacy provided by strong economic development, but also nationalist legitimacy, such as hosting the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 and for Chinese athletes to sweep many gold medals. A major setback was 4 June 1989, after which the party had to launch an extensive education campaign. The campaign appealed to patriotism to ensure loyalty in a population that had many domestic discontents. In order to maintain authoritarian control at a time when Marxist-Leninist ideology was becoming obsolete, the party warned of the existence of hostile international forces in the world trying to hold China back.17 For example, in January 1994, Jiang Zemin warned at the national annual meeting on propaganda work that: “The international community is steadfastly opposed to China becoming strong and powerful and will never give up its plot to ‘Westernise’ and break-up China” and that work on “patriotic collectivist and social education” must support each other.18 This has essentially remained a key task for on-going propaganda work.

These have also been key propaganda messages in Hong Kong—the HKSAR could do even better economically with the opening-up of the Mainland and appropriate party-government policies. Hong Kong people needed to be made more patriotic, however, which makes cultural exchanges and patriotic education important.

An example of the use of cultural means could be seen in 2004 in the way that the Mainland media reported the display of a Buddhist treasure in Hong Kong:

A high-profile display of the finger bone relic of the Sakyamuni Buddha—one of the most sacred relics in Buddhism—is expected to “inject a proud feeling and patriotism,” a prominent Buddhist master said in Beijing . . . At a news conference, Master Sheng Hui, executive deputy director of the Mainland Buddhist Association, described Hong Kong Buddhism as a branch of the religion on the Mainland. The bond between the two organisations has always been close, he said. “This showcase event is approved by the central government, and that shows it cares very much about the Hong Kong people” Sheng said. . . . Kok Kwong, chairman of the Hong Kong Buddhist Association, said . . . he hoped the exhibition of the holy relic will encourage peace, patriotic compassion and national unity in Hong Kong.19

It is noteworthy what the chief executive, Tung Chee Hwa, also said: “On behalf of the HKSAR government and the people of Hong Kong, I express heartfelt gratitude to the central government for granting special permission for the Buddha’s finger relic . . . to be displayed in Hong Kong.”20 He also noted that local Buddhist followers and all citizens were privileged to have the rare opportunity to see such sacred and precious assets and that the welcoming ceremony for the relic and other treasures was not only a gala event for the Buddhist community, but also a good deed advocating peace, virtues and social harmony in Hong Kong.21

On the same occasion, Liu Yandong, the then head of the CCP Central Committee’s United Front Department, who was sent to Hong Kong for the unveiling ceremony the press that the display of the relic indicated that:

the central government’s respect and care for Hong Kong Buddhism community and Hong Kong people. She said the exhibited national treasures represented China’s long history and splendid culture and she believed that every Chinese people would be proud of those cultural relics. She said, since Hong Kong’s return to the motherland, the central government has made all the efforts to ensure the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and happiness and well-being of the Hong Kong people. She emphasised that “if the family lives in harmony, all affairs will prosper”. With the support from the central government and led by the HKSAR government headed by chief executive Tung Chee Hwa, Hong Kong compatriots will surely make Hong Kong a splendid city so long as they work together with one heart.22

All the key messages were there—“inject a proud feeling and patriotism”; Beijing “cares very much about the Hong Kong people” and since the reunification has “made all the efforts to ensure the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong”; the exhibition would “encourage peace, patriotic compassion and national unity in Hong Kong”; and Hong Kong people needed “to work together with one heart” with Beijing under the leadership of the Hong Kong chief executive. The timing of the display was important. In 2003, the HKSAR’s clumsy push for passing national security legislation led to a massive demonstration and calls for democratic reform. The CCP saw what happened as a threat to stability that had to be dealt with resolutely. With meticulous and secret planning, the party stunned Hong Kong in April 2004 with the announcement that the SCNPC would provide a Basic Law interpretation to rule out Hong Kong achieving universal suffrage for the election of the chief executive and the legislature in 2007 and 2008 respectively (Chapter 10). After making such an aggressive move, soothing and education was felt to be necessary and thus using the display of the Buddhist relic to promote harmony and unity was a specially organised event to show the party’s care for Hong Kong.

In terms of propagating patriotic education, the 2007 Policy Address of the HKSAR chief executive, Donald Tsang, provides an excellent example of government plans, although Tsang would not have anticipated at the time that it would lead to the first mass movement for his successor Leung Chun Ying in 2012. The relevant section, entitled “National Education”, is worth quoting full:

The decade following Hong Kong’s return to the motherland has seen a growing sense of national identity in our community. To prepare ourselves for the next decade, we must have a better understanding of our country’s development and a stronger sense of our national and cultural identity. If Hong Kong people make their life and career plans from the perspective of national development, both individual citizens and the community at large will surely have a brighter future.

At the welcoming banquet the HKSAR Government hosted on 30 June this year, President Hu Jintao earnestly advised that “we should put more emphasis on national education for the youth in Hong Kong and promote exchanges between them and the young people of the Mainland so that they will carry forward the Hong Kong people’s great tradition of loving the motherland and loving Hong Kong”.

The future lies with our young people. In the interest of our country’s development and the continued success of “One Country, Two Systems” the HKSAR Government will make every effort to promote national education. In particular, we will attach great importance to promoting national education among our young people, so that they grow to love our motherland and Hong Kong, aspire to win honour and make contributions for our country, and have a strong sense of pride as nationals of the People’s Republic of China.

The promotion of national education is an undertaking of the whole community. The HKSAR Government will work closely with various sectors in the community, in particular the education sector, to enhance our young people’s awareness and understanding of our country’s development, the land and the people, the history and the culture. This can be done through different means and channels, such as classroom teaching, teacher education, extra-curricular activities and exchanges with young people from the Mainland. The objective is to foster among young people a sense of affinity with our motherland and heighten their sense of national pride and identity.

We will give more weight to the elements of national education in the existing primary and secondary curricula and the new senior secondary curriculum framework to help students acquire a clearer understanding of our country and a stronger sense of national identity. The Government will also encourage more schools to form flag guard teams and to stage more national flag-raising ceremonies, and subsidise more Mainland study trips and exchange programmes for youths. We will rally the efforts of various sectors to bring about synergy in enhancing the overall effectiveness of national education.23

When will Hong Kong people be considered sufficiently patriotic? According to Ma Lik, a former chairman of the DAB, patriotism was the prerequisite for universal suffrage meaning, among other things, that people must stop thinking of what happened in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989 as a “massacre”. He reckoned that, at the rate Hong Kong was moving, it would take until 2022 for the public to have experienced enough “national awareness education” to accept CCP rule and thereby win the right to directly elected local government. Still, some progress had been made. Initially, he thought the appropriate date would be 2047.24 A mark of the first 20 years post-reunification was the repeated need to remind Hong Kong people about the importance of being patriotic (Chapter 10).

Propaganda is about influencing language, thought and emotions. Once this is done, there is less need for direct censorship. Thus, much effort is spent on using the right (i.e., official) definitions and terminologies in public discourse. Some of the use of propaganda may appear crude, but when they are applied constantly through the media that the party controls and are repeated by its supporters, repetition can be overwhelming. Even if the public recognises that the propaganda messages for what they are, it becomes clear what is politically correct and what is not, and with patriotic education focussed on young people, the propaganda system seeks to reap a long-term harvest of influencing young minds. How the techniques have been used in Hong Kong is illustrative:

Repetition for assurance: This technique is simple and basic. By repeating a well-chosen slogan, an idea takes on form because it can be easily repeated by many people. For example, the slogan “stability and prosperity” was most often repeated prior to 1997 to reassure the Hong Kong community that everything would be fine.

Intentional vagueness: Broad generalities are useful to clinch a deal, leaving details to be worked out. Since the devil is in the details, workability and public acceptability depend on the final details. The policy of granting the HKSAR “a high degree of autonomy” was in effect a cleverly designed slogan to give a sense that the HKSAR would enjoy day-to-day autonomy without interference from the Mainland.

Personal attack and labelling: Attacking the opponent personally rather than his or her argument, aims to identify flaws or weakness in the opponent, and so weaken public trust in or arouse prejudice towards him or her. By labelling some people in the democratic camp in Hong Kong as “always opposing” it aimed to show that those people were constantly unreasonable. When the party was at its most furious, unforgettable labels were used, such as “sinner of a thousand years”, a label Chinese officials gave to Chris Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong. Those who are called “patriots” are right-minded and those who are “unpatriotic” are “anti-China” or “running-dogs of the British”.

Alleging a sex scandal: A man may be accused of having mistresses or that he visits prostitutes. If the target is a woman, she may be described as having loose morals.

Diverting from substance: Labelling also diverts the attacker away from having to address the opponent’s argument. For example, a certain person may be said to be “anti-China” but no evidence is produced to support the attack.

Demonising the opposition: By putting the opposition, whether individuals or groups, in a bad light, such as that they are ignorant, inexperienced, rude or unacceptable to those in power, the aim is to project them as unworthy of public support. Thus, by saying that certain democrats were unacceptable to Beijing there was in fact no more that needed to be said. The people should know those named would never get very far in political life.

“Some people” or “few people” argument: By claiming that some people, or only a few people, are disagreeing or causing trouble, this tactic aims to deny that there may be a large number of people who disagree.

One of the key responsibilities of the Propaganda Department is to issue regular rulings and briefings on the correct definitions and terminologies to be used through directives and notices, as well as, through the use of the law, to require the media to consult the propaganda authorities in specific circumstances, such as when there is a disaster and in cases of high sensitivity.25 Thus, propaganda work affects not only how news is reported but also the language used for public discourse. The fruit of the party’s propaganda efforts can be seen in the way party members and those affiliated with the party articulate various issues where there are party lines to take. Examples include submissions to the HKSAR Government on legislating national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law, and on the various rounds of public consultation on constitutional development since 2004 (Chapter 10).

In 2003, the CCP published a Practical Manual for Party Propaganda Work, which provides a fascinating look at how the party sees an essential part of its work today.26 The principles in the book are applied throughout the party’s propaganda work, and thus are also relevant to how it is done in Hong Kong.

President Hu Jintao, the general secretary of the CCP, wrote the foreword to the book showing its importance. The manual states that the goal of party propaganda is to mould generation after generation to understand the socialist cause. Propaganda must serve the party and give proper guidance to the people. It should fill society since the object of a propaganda message is to get it continually out to the people by using many different means, such as through books, movies, periodicals and the Internet, so that they can reinforce one another. Propaganda should be positive—news reporting should hold to a “positive principle” by balancing praise and exposing problems. In other words, it should not overdwell on problems, particularly problems that are hard to solve. Readers should have a positive feeling after hearing the reports and believe that problems are being dealt with by the authorities. The manual stresses that development is China’s Number One task and that it is the key to solving most of the country’s problems. The manual observes that the Internet is having greater impact on the people’s thinking. Moreover, it notes that people outside the Mainland are always plotting to infiltrate China ideologically; so the party needs to strengthen its management of news websites and other types of websites because ideological strength is important to China’s overall national strength.27 The manual also notes that preparing the people for a change in the party line is “an art form”. The manual warns that change must be introduced gradually and subtly, so as not to create stress among the people because of the capacity of the masses to accept change. Once the party has changed a party line, propaganda should intensify so that it penetrates everywhere.28

The manual contains an interesting section on feeding propaganda to foreigners, noting that it is a different task from domestic work because the targets and their backgrounds are different. Foreigners are useful to spread propaganda overseas, so the manual warns that foreigners should be given what they can accept and care must be taken that what they see and experience in China will help to build a good image of China internationally. Moreover, it is essential to take gentler and subtler approaches with foreigners, avoiding the use of slogans or saying things that may cause disagreement. It is best to present facts in such a way that foreigners are enabled to draw their own conclusions. Explain what the foreigner does not understand, even if it means over simplifying things if need be.29

The manual also contains a section on religious propaganda. It starts by acknowledging that while the principle of religious freedom should be respected, it is also necessary to strengthen the education of the people, especially young people, in dialectic materialism, which in Leninism-speak means the action of the party to do what it deems fit to “accelerate the march of history” towards communism (Chapter 1). The manual explains that the roots of religion will remain for a very long time and the party has no alternative but to implement a policy of religious freedom. Nevertheless, through education in socialist culture and civilization, the roots of religion can be weakened over time. The party should not use words that offend believers and if there is any doubt on what to do, officials should contact the United Front Department. Religious publications should be closely monitored.30

1. Adapted from Michael Saward, Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy, pp. 1–2.

2. Charter of the CPPCC. See the official website of the National Committee of the CPPCC: http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/English/cppcc/.

3. Zhou Enlai, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol. 1, p. 405.

4. See the Official Website of CPPCC: http://www.cppcc.gov.cn.

5. Fanny W. Y. Fung and Albert Wong, “Veteran Head of HK and Macao Office Steps Down after 14 Years”, South China Morning Post, 9 April 2008.

6. See the Official Website of CPPCC: http://www.cppcc.gov.cn.

7. Peggy Lam, speech in the Legislative Council, Official Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 26 April 1995, p. 3339.

8. Gary Cheung and Eva Wu, “City Liaison Office Deputy Defends HK Delegates”, South China Morning Post, 19 March 2000; Mary Ma, “No Truth to Power Sharing”, The Standard, 25 March 2009; and Joseph Wong, “Liaison Office Must Put Out Fire Raging over Delegates”, South China Morning Post, 25 March 2009.

9. The definitions of “persuasion” and “propaganda” used in the box in this chapter are taken from G. S. Jowatt and V. O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion.

10. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, p. 1.

11. Ibid., p. 12.

12. Ibid., quoting Ding Guangen (丁關根 1929), who headed the United Front Department from 1990 to 1992 and the Propaganda Department from 1992 to 2002, pp. 13–14.

13. For a thorough discussion, see He Qinglian, The Fog of Censorship.

14. Other national party newspapers are the Guangming Daily and the English-language China Daily, which are both controlled by the Propaganda Department, and the Economic Daily, which is controlled by the State Council. These organisations carry the rank of vice-ministries.

15. For a wider discussion, see Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, and Alex Chan, “From Propaganda to Hegemony: Jiaodian Fangtan and China’s Media Policy”, Journal of Contemporary China, pp. 35–51.

16. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, p. 80.

17. For a detailed discussion, see Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, pp. 287–302.

18. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, p. 50.

19. Wang Zhenghua, “Hong Kong to View Buddhist Finger Bone Treasure”, China Daily, 20 May 2004.

20. “HK Holds Grand Opening Ceremony for Veneration of Buddha Sarira”, Xinhuanet, 26 May 2004, http://english.sina.com/special_report/040526buddha.shtml.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Donald Tsang, Policy Address 2007–2008, paragraphs 116–20.

24. Ambrose Leung, “Fury at DAB Chief’s Tiananmen Tirade”, South China Morning Post, 16 May 2007.

25. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, pp. 101 and 104. The use of regulation as a means of control is discussed in pp. 104–9.

26. 《新編黨的宣傳工作實用手冊》, 2003.

27. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, pp. 80, 82, 88–89, and 98.

28. Ibid., pp. 107–8.

29. Ibid., pp. 118–19.

30. Ibid., pp. 124–25.

2. The Chinese Communist Party Tools of Co-optation and Persuasion