Underground Front

Hong Kong lay inside the Allied powers’ China theatre, which covered the whole of China, Indo-China and Thailand, Chiang Kai-shek became the supreme commander of this theatre in January 1942. Chiang sought to use the war to end the “unequal treaties”. With the support of the United States, he instructed the Chinese ambassador to Britain, Wellington Koo,46 to propose to Britain in mid-1942 that it should give up Hong Kong, or at least the leased New Territories. The British knew the United States, under President Franklin Roosevelt, was not keen on assisting Britain in the restoration of its Empire after the war. The Foreign Office had even suggested that Hong Kong was already a lost cause, so that a gesture of cession would demonstrate to the Americans that the British were not fighting the war for the reactionary purpose of preserving the British Empire.47 The question of Hong Kong’s future became the subject of an intense internal debate within the British government in 1942. The Colonial Office did not want to give-up the colony and it won Winston Churchill’s support (prime minister, 1941–1945 and 1951–1955). A compromise between Britain and the KMT was eventually reached, where China merely informed Britain that the Chinese government “reserves its rights” to raise the issue “for discussion at a later date”.48 Moreover, the Chinese elites in Hong Kong made clear to Whitehall that they preferred British to Chinese rule after the war.

Knowing that Chiang Kai-shek wanted to regain Hong Kong, a Hong Kong Planning Unit was formed in 1943 in London to plan the future civil administration once Hong Kong was recaptured from the Japanese, so that the British could, by regaining physical possession as soon as possible, foil Chiang’s effort. Up until November 1943, Roosevelt was still assuring Chiang that the United States would help him recover Hong Kong. However, by 1944, the United States had softened its position on restoration of the British Empire because it was better to keep Britain strong as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Also the Americans had become disappointed with Chiang’s military efforts in China. Harry Truman (US president, 1945–1953) had become president after Roosevelt passed away in April 1945. The United States no longer insisted that Hong Kong had to be handed back to China after the war, as Truman was less motivated than his predecessor to push decolonisation because on balance, it was better for the United States to keep the British strong in the region. Once the British realised this, they were not about to give Hong Kong up, and it became important to dash to recover Hong Kong once the Japanese surrendered.49

At the end of the World War II, after Japan surrendered on 14 August 1945, the general arrangement among the Allies was for the Japanese forces within China, Taiwan and French Indo-China north of the 16-degree north latitude to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek. This should have included Hong Kong. However, the British government did not see such an arrangement to be in its interest, because Britain wanted to restore British jurisdiction over its Asian colonies and wanted no hiccups, despite Chiang’s assurance that he would not try to retake Hong Kong after accepting the surrender.50 To ensure Chiang would keep his word, Britain made it known that it would accept Japanese surrender irrespective of the Allies’ operational theatres arrangement. Chiang sought to resolve the matter diplomatically. After rounds of tussling, the final compromise was that Rear Admiral Cecil Harcourt would represent both Britain and Chiang when receiving the surrender from the Japanese, and that the acceptance of the surrender would only take place after Chiang had formally accepted the same for China. Harcourt’s fleet was already at Subic Bay in the Philippines and thus could reach Hong Kong quickly.

Why did Chiang acquiesce to an arrangement he was clearly unhappy with? Most likely, his hands were already very full. He had to work out the acceptance of the surrender on the Mainland. Although there were KMT troops in the south that could have been put into action, as Britain did not want to give up Hong Kong, Chiang might well have had to fight to regain it. Perhaps he did not want to risk the possibility of losing, which would have discredited him. Besides, he needed the support of both Britain and the United States to remain an important player on the world stage. Chiang certainly did not want the communists to use the opportunity to expand their influence. In fact, by late August, nationalist troops were on the move towards Hong Kong, but the KMT claimed that it was not going to take Hong Kong but wanted to prevent the communists from doing so.51 Unsurprisingly, some Mainland historians put the blame on Chiang and the KMT for not taking Hong Kong back then.52 However, there is a case to be made that Chiang was so determined to prevent the communists from doing so, that it was better to allow the British to recapture it.53

The KMT wanted Japanese soldiers everywhere to surrender to KMT soldiers. Likewise, the CCP saw no reason why they should not disarm Japanese soldiers in areas under its control. While the KMT issued a directive to its soldiers that the communists should not deal with the Japanese, the CCP sent out its own order to communist forces that they should demand Japanese soldiers surrender to them. From the moment that Japan surrendered, the KMT and CCP in effect started to fight each other again.

Oddly enough, the CCP ended up playing a role in the Japanese surrender in Hong Kong but the communists did not seize the territory for itself. Before the arrival of British forces, the Hong Kong–Kowloon Independent Brigade was the only military force in the territory.54 Its units took control of Tai Po and Yuen Long and all the other market towns in the New Territories, as well as the outlying islands. In most cases, the Japanese gave up or fled as soon as the communists showed-up. The guerrillas got the villagers to organise local administrations and self-defence forces. They collected for their own use ammunition and supplies that the Japanese left behind. Extra supplies were sent to Guangdong to their guerrilla comrades. They gave no signs of wanting to impede the British taking control of Hong Kong. The result was that the mutual suspicion and animosity between the KMT and CCP had in effect cancelled each other out on this occasion, and Hong Kong fell back into the hands of the eager British.55

As news of Japan’s surrender spread in the Stanley prisoner of war camp, the senior British officer kept there, Franklin Charles Gimson (1890–1975, the Colonial Secretary who unluckily arrived in Hong Kong a day before the Japanese invasion), approached the Japanese commandant to say that he would take charge pending the arrival of British troops. Gimson knew that was what he had to do because the British government, through the British ambassador in Chongqing and via the BAAG and others, had relayed a message to him to assume administration of Hong Kong as soon as he could, so that a token British presence could be re-established. This was important to foil any move from Chiang Kai-shek to recover Hong Kong or give the communists a chance. He appointed himself as the acting governor of Hong Kong once the Japanese conceded, and then asked the Japanese to help with maintaining order.56 When Cecil Harcourt and British soldiers finally arrived on 30 August 1945 and control was handed to them, Harcourt declared a military government by proclamation the following day with himself as its head, and Gimson as lieutenant governor. On 16 September 1945, Harcourt formally accepted the Japanese surrender in Government House.

When the Hong Kong–Kowloon Independent Brigade negotiated with the British concerning its role, an understanding was reached that the CCP would be allowed to continue a presence in Hong Kong by setting up a liaison office, and that its members would be guaranteed the freedom of travel and publication, as long as they did not carry out “unlawful” activities.57 Huang Zuomei, also known as Raymond Wong, was the CCP-British go-between. Fang Fang was another prominent guerrilla at the time, who would direct guerrilla activities in Guangdong, Guangxi and Jiangxi from Hong Kong during the civil war until 1949. The liaison office, initially set up at 172 Nathan Road, Kowloon, would eventually morph into the Xinhua News Agency, Hong Kong Branch with Huang Zuomei as its second director. The first director was Qiao Guanhua, who also spent time in Hong Kong during the war years.58

After the surrender in September 1945, since the British did not have enough soldiers to maintain law and order in the territory at that time, they asked the guerrillas to help. The guerrillas agreed and left some troops behind until the 30 June 1946 to police Sha Tau Kok, Yuen Long, and Sai Kung. Nevertheless, the Brigade’s main body of soldiers moved north of the Shenzhen River to the Mainland. A British-funded self-defence unit was then set up in the New Territories, which functioned until the autumn of 1946.59 When the Brigade withdrew from Hong Kong on the 28 September 1945, they issued a moving message, ending thus:

Farewell, our beloved Hong Kong compatriots. Today, we shall depart Hong Kong. But our care and concern for your happiness and liberty remains unchanged. You have experienced a long period of suffering. We hope that the Hong Kong government shall give you adequate relief and to assist you in rebuilding your business and improve your livelihood. We hope that your glorious struggle will earn the well-deserved respect from the international community. Today, we shall withdraw. But our hearts are with you forever.60

Guangdong was a sideshow in the overall Chinese civil war as the hard battles were fought in Northern China. The guerrillas from the Hong Kong–Kowloon Independent Brigade fought the KMT from October 1945 in Guangdong. In one of the many skirmishes that were fought in Shenzhen, it was reported that a hundred guerrillas were killed and over thirty seriously injured. What was interesting was that many of those injured were transported by the Brigade to a hospital in Kowloon for treatment. The East River guerrillas eventually went to Shandong to continue fighting the KMT.

Huang Zuomei, the interpreter and director of international relations for the East River Column, was considered by the British to be an agent of the BAAG. He was invited by the British government to join the victory parade in London in May 1946 and was awarded a medal by King George VI for courage during the war and given an MBE.61 The relationship between the CCP and the colonial government could be said to have reached a high point.

Having recovered Hong Kong, the British needed to re-establish authority. They had outlawed the KMT in the colony before the Japanese occupation, but it had to be accepted after the World War II. Most crucially, it was the ruling party in China. On the whole, the KMT also saw it in its interest to cooperate with the British authorities in Hong Kong and not to stir up trouble there.62 At the same time, the CCP adopted a low profile. The communists did not want to cause trouble for the British either. The party never lost sight of the bigger picture: its concern was on the Mainland. Its goals were to promote the united front against the KMT, to support guerrilla activities in Guangdong, and to use the colony as a contact point internationally.63 When the British military administration was replaced by a civil government in 1946, the British could focus on rebuilding its support base among the local elites without interference from the KMT and CCP. Most of the former business and professional elites were brought back to serve the British colonial administration, and in return, the elites worked doubly hard to restore British rule. The symbiotic need was strong on both sides.64

The return of Mark Young (governor, 1941 and 1946–1947) on 1 May 1946 to resume the governorship that he had surrendered in December 1941 provided a brief spell of democratic talk in Hong Kong. Young proposed a plan to increase political representation that was accepted by Whitehall but with the change of governor in July 1947, the Young Plan was dropped, as his successor, Alexander Grantham (governor, 1947–1957), had very different ideas. As Hong Kong would not be independent, he thought it did not need the same kind of reform that other colonies would need to prepare for independence. Moreover, colonial administrators were concerned that elections could turn Hong Kong into an electoral battleground between the KMT and CCP as civil war broke out on the Mainland, and the British government was not insisting on constitutional change.65 The people of Hong Kong were grateful that the local economy had picked up and they were not embroiled in more fighting.

Fang Fang became a vice-chairman of the Guangdong provincial CCP after 1949 and was responsible for imposing the party’s land reform but was considered too soft on the locals. He was accused of the dual fault of refusing to learn from the country’s land reform experience and defying his superiors by promoting “localism”—euphemism for not following central orders. To protect Fang and others, Ye Jianying accepted responsibility as the most senior cadres in the province, and both Fang and Ye had to make self-criticisms. Many cadres were demoted or lost their jobs in Guangdong. Fang was then further demoted, and eventually dismissed from all his party posts. Through the efforts of fellow Chaozhou clansmen who held senior positions at the Overseas Chinese Commission in Beijing, Fang was posted there in 1955 to serve as the deputy director. Ye Jianying was extremely unhappy about the purges in Guangdong although there was not much that he could do at the time. During the Cultural Revolution, discussed in Chapter 6, Fang Fang and many people like him were accused of having foreign connections. Fang was arrested in December 1966, detained, tortured and died after five years in 1971. It was only in the 1994 that the party acknowledged that the accusations and punishments against Fang Fang were wrong.66

As for the other East River guerrillas, Zeng Sheng became deputy provincial governor of Guangdong and mayor of Guangzhou in 1960 and was regarded as having done a good job. However, he was arrested in 1967 in Beijing, beaten and incarcerated until 1974. It was extreme irony that his alleged fault was having been an agent of the imperialists and a “bandit” during the war. Zeng was appointed vice-minister of transport in October 1975, became minister in 1979, retired in 1983 and died in Guangzhou in 1995. Of the East River Guerrillas, Tan Gan worked in Xinhua Hong Kong from its earliest days until his retirement in the early 1990s; Chen Daming went on to do party work in Beijing but was transferred to Xinhua Hong Kong to take up the post of deputy director in 1982 when the Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong began; and Yang Qi was purged in the 1950s but subsequently transferred to Xinhua Hong Kong to head the regular news section. In 1982, Yang became the secretary general at Xinhua Hong Kong before becoming the publisher of Ta Kung Pao in 1984. He retired in 1992.67

As of 1997, there were estimated to have been about 300 members of the Hong Kong–Kowloon Independent Brigade still living in Hong Kong, about 130 on the Mainland and some also in Macao. The organising committee for the reunification celebrations invited former brigade members to join the activities. Moreover, chief executive Tung Chee Hwa held a reception for them in August 1997 after which the HKSAR government begun to compile a list of brigade members who died in action and eventually added 115 names to the Roll of Honour at the City Hall Memorial Shrine in October 1998. Members of the brigade and their surviving spouses were accorded the same treatment as other veterans in pension entitlements from 1999.68 There is still much good historical research work of this period waiting to be done. Besides the archives of the Hong Kong Public Record Office and the British archives, the Hong Kong University Library also has records left by Lt. Col. Lindsay Ride of the BAAG.69

The Chinese people were exhausted after eight years of Japanese occupation. The war had disrupted their lives enormously. There were vast numbers of traumatised and destitute people with no help in sight. Families had been separated, and the scars of war were deep. The economy was in tatters, and hyperinflation would soon set in. Chiang Kai-shek’s government faced the daunting task of re-establishing administration, restarting industry and dealing with famine in several parts of the country. Post-war recovery and reconstruction was a Herculean task. The last thing China needed was more bloodletting.

There was a brief moment of hope that the KMT and CCP could find a way to coexist. The CCP’s realism about the relative weakness of the communists—although much recovered since 1927—led Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to travel to Chongqing in August 1945 to negotiate a power-sharing deal with Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. Chiang had issued an invitation to them to meet in Chongqing as he was also under pressure from many quarters to negotiate with the communists.70 The CCP controlled about 20 percent of China’s land mass and perhaps a third of the population, mainly in the rural parts of North China.71 After 43 days of talks, the two sides agreed to adopt a policy of peace, national reconstruction, cooperation and to avoid civil war. But it would come to naught. Neither side could agree terms for the creation of a coalition government and how to unify their respective troops into a national force. President Truman tried unsuccessfully to prevent civil war by sending special envoy General George C. Marshall (1880–1959) to reconcile differences. He became disillusioned with both sides. By then, the KMT and CCP were eager to have a face-off, taking China towards chaos. The civil war started on 26 June 1946. However, the end—victory for the CCP—was not a foregone conclusion.

The CCP’s military history notes that the communists’ strategy was to sap the effective strength of the KMT first before engaging in major battles.72 The communists had perfected guerrilla operations fighting the Japanese. They adapted ideas from Sun Zi (544–496 BC), which Mao Zedong articulated in his famous essay “On Guerrilla Warfare” in 1937.73 The civil war had three distinct phases. The first stage between July 1946 and June 1947 was a war by gradual attrition. The strategy was to draw the KMT army units far into Manchuria in the northeast and deep into Shanxi in central China thus splitting-up the enemy’s army. The People’s Liberation Army deliberately gave up Yenan (Yan’nan) in March 1947 without contest, withdrew into the countryside, and would only take on the enemy where it could win due to having numerical superiority, such as when the enemy troops were dispersed or isolated.74 The second stage was aimed at preserving its own strength, but eroding that of the enemy’s in limited, well-chosen counter-offensives while extending the range of engagements. The communists saw an opportunity to attack the KMT troops in Manchuria in the autumn and winter of 1947. The success of the CCP in the north was watched from afar by the rest of China. The increase in the power of the CCP set off “seismic shifts in Chinese society” bringing new recruits to the communist cause.75 By then, the CCP had a compelling ideology that resonated with the people who had suffered so long, a charismatic leader in Mao Zedong, and now an ability to assert authority over the less-than-endearing KMT. By the late summer of 1948, the CCP had 2 million troops, reaching parity in numbers with the nationalists. Many CCP soldiers were defectors from the KMT. It was time to go on the final stage—to be on the offensive, as enemy soldiers had become not only physically tired, but the KMT had become highly unpopular as a result of its cruelty to dissenters and widespread corrupt practices. Meanwhile, infighting within the KMT resulted in Chiang Kai-shek being pushed out of office in January 1949. Within a mere five more months of fighting, the communists had won.76 On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China from the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Beijing. In December, Chiang Kai-shek, who was holding out in Chengdu, climbed aboard an aeroplane on a foggy day and flew to Taiwan to rule China from there. Chiang intended to return one day in triumph to win back the Mainland, while the communists continue to regard Taiwan as unfinished business left over from history.

During the civil war, Hong Kong, under British administration was useful to the CCP primarily because it was not under KMT control.77 To the CCP, Hong Kong’s relatively liberal political environment provided significant strategic value, as it could be used as an operational base to facilitate war against the KMT in South China. The Hong Kong population was not its main target. The CCP cultivated relations with British officials and took care not to challenge British sovereignty in Hong Kong.

The CCP understood the importance of combining overt and covert activities. While it conducted open propaganda and mass mobilisation work, its underground activities collected intelligence and penetrated organisations it wanted to influence. Zhou Enlai was the party’s master organiser and he recognised Hong Kong’s undoubted usefulness. After the first phase of the civil war had begun, senior party members were sent to Hong Kong from the latter half of 1946 to use the colony to support CCP activities.78 Zhou noted in December that the role of Hong Kong had become more important, not only in relation to its activities in Guangdong, Guangxi and among the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, but also for liaison with Europe and United States. Zhou saw the need to resolve how better to use Hong Kong so that the party’s overt and covert activities could be properly coordinated.79 The CCP Central Committee’s solution made on 16 January 1947 was to set up a Hong Kong Central Branch Bureau in Hong Kong. Its major tasks would be to drive propaganda campaigns against Chiang Kai-shek and the United States (which was supporting the KMT) as well as facilitate guerrilla fighting on the Mainland.80 The secretary for the Branch Bureau was the guerrilla leader Fang Fang. The Hong Kong Central Branch Bureau, formally established in May 1947, was placed under the direct leadership of the CCP Central Committee, but operationally it was to take direction from the Shanghai Central Branch Bureau, although in effect communication and direction mainly came from the CCP Central Committee.81 The geographic scope of the Branch Bureau’s work was extensive and regional in nature, covering CCP activities in Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Hunan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. In February 1949, the Branch Bureau in Guangzhou was renamed the CCP Central South China Bureau to reflect its regional nature. Within this structure were several committees and groups—there was a municipal work committee responsible for covert CCP work in the large cities of the various provinces; a rural armed forces work committee, an organisational work unit, and small groups to manage overseas Chinese work, united front work, cultural work, finance and economic work, and youth and women’s work. There were also various local party committees, which supervised the underground CCP work in small cities and rural areas.82 In addition, a Hong Kong Work Committee was also set up to manage a range of activities in Hong Kong and South China. The open activities included united front work to bring people to the side of the communist cause, such as publishing journals and newspaper, cultural activities, and connecting to youths, workers, women and the Overseas Chinese communities, as well as foreign affairs. It also carried out covert intelligence gathering work.83

Within this structure, the party devised guerrilla warfare, organised cadres and supporters to receive military training and mass mobilisation skills in Hong Kong, after which they were dispatched to various rural areas in southern China to instigate military struggles against the nationalists. From 1946 until the end of 1948, about 3,000 people went through training for the communist cause.84

Another important task at the time was to build relations with people who had arrived in Hong Kong to get away from the KMT. These groups included members of smaller parties, intellectuals and youths who had come under KMT pressure. Others who fled the Mainland, such as business people, were worried about the growing political instability.85 The CCP considered them important targets to build a broad alliance against the enemy. The party invited them to discussions and meetings to explain CCP policies so as to gain their support.86 For example, it was important for the CCP to cultivate prominent political figures like General Li Jichen and He Xianging, both former high-ranking KMT members, who broke with the nationalists and formed the KMT Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong with the goal of overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek. Another target was the China Democratic League, a small political party formed by intellectuals and proscribed by the KMT. The league decided at a meeting in Hong Kong in January 1948 to form an alliance with the CCP.87 Many of these non-CCP political figures returned to the Mainland after the founding of People’s Republic of China in 1949 and were allowed to play various political roles in the CCP regime. In General Li’s case, he became a vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC in 1954.88 The party’s aim was to use them to serve the communist cause. In examining papers obtained by the Hong Kong Police after a raid of the home of a leading CCP member in Hong Kong at the time, the British had the following observations: “They will be used, but if they are given any place in a so-called Coalition Government they will have to enter on the Communist Party’s terms and they will be allowed no policy of their own. There is clearly no intention to allow an opposition Party outside the Government.”89

During the civil war period, Hong Kong had an important role in promoting propaganda work, the aim of which was to stoke anti-KMT sentiments and spread the CCP’s political ideas back into South China. To promote “cultural hegemony”, a Press Committee and a Culture Committee were set up under the Hong Kong Work Committee to carry out extensive united front and propaganda work in the education, journalism, literature and arts sectors in Hong Kong. The CCP always recognised the importance of intellectuals, who had strong skills in the use of language for publication, as well as using cultural and educational activities for mass mobilisation.

The communists established secondary schools with financial support from sympathetic businessmen and had its members become teachers. This arrangement, on the one hand, helped to propagate communist ideology among young people, and at the same time, enabled CCP members to earn a living in Hong Kong.90 Together with members of the various democratic parties, the communists formed Dade College in Tuen Mun in October 1946 in a handsome weekend house. The creation of a college followed instructions from Zhou Enlai that there was a need to provide a base for cadres and sympathisers who had gone to Hong Kong. Many famous left-wing intellectuals taught at the college, such as Qian Jiaju, Guo Moruo, and Mao Dun. Its students came from the Mainland, among the guerrillas in Guangdong, and from communist parties in Southeast Asia. There were few students from Hong Kong. Of the 250 students in 1948, only 10 percent were local recruits. Numbers from Hong Kong were dismal because young people in the colony were assessed to have suffered from “Hong Kong head . . . an ideological syndrome that included arrogance, a selfish and city-oriented view, as well as a tendency to forget their Chinese identity and to despise their own culture”.91 Intensive training in Marxism was provided and the students were then sent to the Mainland. In 1949, the Hong Kong government cancelled the school’s registration because it was accused of acting as a training centre for CCP cadres and pursuing activities inconsistent with Hong Kong’s security interests. During its short history, Dade College trained more than 740 students.92

The party invested in newspapers and magazines because it was well aware that these publications were the major means to spread ideas. The CCP-controlled Zheng Bao, Huashang Bao, Jingji Daobao, Guangming Bao, Renmin Bao, Wen Wei Po, Yuanwang Zhoukan, and Qunzhong Zhoukan. The English bi-monthly journal, China Digest, was also published to appeal for support from overseas. Though these publications had their own editorial focus, in general, they spread anti-KMT messages and drummed up support for the communist cause.93 The CCP cadres met regularly with the editorial staff of other local newspapers, like the Huaqiao Ribao and Xingdao Ribao to persuade them to adopt a sympathetic stance towards the CCP position.94 A number of music, drama, and literature clubs were also formed to cultivate relations with people in arts and culture.95

One of the most important decisions made by the CCP in relations to Hong Kong was to create the Xinhua News Agency, Hong Kong Branch in November 1946—the agency’s first office outside the Mainland. The decision was made by Zhou Enlai, then the party secretary of the South China Bureau. This agency eventually became the Chinese quasi-diplomatic mission and CCP organ in the colony up until 1997.

The Xinhua News Agency was first founded in April 1937 at Yenan, the CCP headquarters from 1936 to 1947. Its first director was Liao Chengzhi. It became the official voice of the party, as well as a news agency and broadcasting station. Its mission was to sway public opinion to support the communist cause. During the Sino-Japanese War, it set up branch offices in various provinces, and began English broadcasting in September 1944 in order to appeal for overseas support.96

The Hong Kong agency’s first director, Qiao Guanhua, was also the then party secretary of the Hong Kong Work Committee,97 and would one day lead China’s delegation to the United Nations, and then become foreign minister. His son, Qiao Zhonghuai, would also work at Xinhua Hong Kong in the 1980s (Chapter 7). When Xinhua was first established in Hong Kong, it only had a staff of 15 split into three groups of five. The first consisted of the members of the Hong Kong administrative office of the East River Column, the second was in charge of the underground radio station run by the South China Bureau, and the third was made up of the five people in the editorial office of the former Cheng Pao (the party newspaper in Hong Kong then). A key task was to play the role of the CCP’s mouthpiece in South China by preparing Chinese and English press statements for the local press and foreign correspondents stationed in Hong Kong. Qiao liaised with the colonial authorities on behalf of the CCP whenever necessary. From its earliest days, Xinhua Hong Kong was a quasi-diplomatic channel for government exchange. Owing to Qiao’s special position, foreign correspondents frequently approached the agency for information about China and CCP policies, and through these contacts, the agency could in turn gather information about how the West saw events on the Mainland. Xinhua Hong Kong was conducting “united front work on an international level”.98 The strength of the communist presence in Hong Kong then was unknown but it had been estimated at about 5,000 supporters.99

CCP’s activities in Hong Kong reached an unprecedented level during the early period of the civil war. The CCP was well aware that their existence in Hong Kong to a very large extent depended on the tolerance of the British. Reportedly, Mao Zedong told a British journalist in 1946:

China has enough trouble . . . for us to clamour for the return of Hong Kong. I am not interested in Hong Kong; the Communist Party is not interested in Hong Kong; it has never been the subject of any discussion among us. Perhaps ten, twenty or thirty years hence we may ask for a discussion regarding its return, but my attitude is that so long as Chinese are not treated as inferior to others in the matter of taxation and a voice in the Government, I am not interested in Hong Kong, and will certainly not allow it to be a bone of contention between your country and mine.100

On another occasion while speaking to journalists about Hong Kong, Mao said: “We are not going to demand for the return of Hong Kong at the present moment. China has a big territory, and many places have not yet been governed well. Why on earth do we have to prioritise to deal with such a small territory? In future, the Hong Kong issue could be resolved by consultative methods.”101

Thus, a guiding principle of the CCP’s work in Hong Kong during the civil war period was that, while facilitating the party’s activities on the Mainland, it should avoid conducting any activities harming the interests of Hong Kong. Thus, the party would not organise labour or student movements to unsettle the territory.102 Also, there were reports that when some local activists suggested promoting the idea of returning Hong Kong to Chinese rule in their printed materials, they were censured by the party.103 In fact, in 1948 when there were communist activities in Malaysia, another British colony in Asia, the CCP in Hong Kong quickly issued a public statement to distance itself from those activities. The comments made by the British afterwards were illuminating:

In so far as Hong Kong is concerned, their [CCP] line is to avoid incurring the displeasure of the authorities and this has been in fact the basis of the Communist Party’s activities in Hong Kong over the past year. Hong Kong as a base from which to direct activities abroad is too valuable to be frittered away in local activities which might result in the banning or even expulsion of the Party with its leaders.104

Further, the improved relationship between the CCP and the British government during World War II also made the British more tolerant towards the CCP in Hong Kong. The British were impressed by the CCP’s war effort against the Japanese and its achievements on the Mainland, and they had become disillusioned with the KMT’s governing ability.105 Moreover, the British had problems with Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT over the future of Hong Kong. As Qiao Guanhua noted: “On the one hand, [Britain] had a highly-strained relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. On the other hand, it did not refuse us (the CCP).”106 This attitude contributed to the neutral stance adopted by the British towards the Chinese civil war and resulted in the colonial authorities in Hong Kong not curbing CCP’s activities there.

The CCP’s united front work played a significant role in shaping a favourable British policy towards China. During World War II, Zhou Enlai emphasised improving the Sino-British relationship, as he considered Britain an important political power in international politics and that China must promote friendship with it in order to resist Japan. Zhou took the initiative to cultivate relations. He invited British officials, journalists and other influential figures to visit the CCP headquarters at Yenan.107 He was also particularly keen on building friendships with the British diplomatic representatives in China. In particular, he kept in regular contact with Sir Horace Seymour (British ambassador, 1942–1946) and eventually befriended Seymour. CCP-British relations were also helped by Song Qingling’s friendship with Lady Seymour. During Seymour’s term as ambassador, he made several favourable reports about the CCP to the Foreign Office that influenced British policy. Seymour advised the Foreign Office that the correct policy to follow was neutrality and non-intervention in the Chinese civil war.108

Thus, between 1946 and 1948, the CCP did not pose a challenge to the government of Hong Kong. There was an incident concerning the Walled City that had some importance, but it was clear that the CCP did not want to cause trouble. The legal status of this small part of Kowloon was an unsettled element of British administration in Hong Kong. Upon Chinese insistence, the 1898 Convention of Beijing that ceded Kowloon to the British, provided for an area of about 6 acres to enable Chinese administration to continue. In 1899, the British claimed by means of issuing an Order-in-Council to incorporate the area into the colony. While the Chinese never recognised the unilateral revision, they could not physically claim jurisdiction there. Through the years, the Walled City became a world of its own. It was crowded, dilapidated, a constant fire hazard, a crime spot and inhabited by the poor. In 1947, the colonial authorities decided to clear the Walled City for redevelopment, a move that would have affected the 25,000 residents there. On 27 November, the government gave them two weeks’ notice to vacate. The residents organised themselves to resist the development and requested help from the KMT government, a move that bought them more time. However, the Hong Kong authorities charged them with squatting on Crown land. On 12 January 1948, the government lost patience and sent in the police, but they bungled the clearance by opening fire. One resident died and dozens were injured. While things had to be settled between the KMT and the British, the CCP avoided adding fuel to the fire. The CCP-controlled newspapers expressed sympathy for the residents throughout and heaped criticisms on the KMT. Even after the shootings, they merely expressed regret and said the Hong Kong government was wrong not to give more time to negotiations. Assurances were also passed on to the British that the CCP did not intend to cause trouble.109

Nevertheless, the British became less tolerant toward CCP activities in Hong Kong in the later stage of the civil war. In May 1948, British assessment of the political development in China was that the CCP might eventually defeat the KMT and dominate the whole of China. As far as Hong Kong was concerned, the British worried that, in case Guangdong fell to the communists, the “communists could be expected to exploit the opportunity of directing and assisting vigorously the subversive activities of Chinese Communist groups in Hong Kong”.110 This worry was also clearly reflected by Governor Alexander Grantham:

It still remains the policy of the Communists in Hong Kong to lie low and to avoid a head-on collision with the administration which would hamper their more overt activities . . . How long this policy will be maintained depends entirely on circumstances, but, as the Communists advance south of the Yangtze, a change to a more active attitude of hostility may be anticipated, and at any moment a decision by the Communists higher command to turn to the direct offensive [might also be anticipated]. This would mean strikes internally and possibly guerrilla or direct military attack externally.111

From 1948, in anticipation of possible internal subversive activities, the colonial authorities began to tighten the control over the CCP in Hong Kong. CCP activists and supporters came under increasingly surveillance, and residences of CCP leaders, such as Fang Fang, Lian Guan, and Zhang Bojun were raided by the police. CCP-controlled publications like Zheng Bao and Huashang Bao were also regularly inspected by the political branch of the colonial government and personnel of these publications interrogated.112 The colonial government also enacted legislation to restrain CCP activities. For example, in 1948 the Education Ordinance was amended to the effect that any school organised for political purposes would be banned. Dade College was consequently shut down in February 1949. The Registration of Persons Ordinance, Expulsion of Undesirable Persons Ordinance and Emergency Regulations Ordinance were either enacted or amended so that the security authorities were empowered to search, detain, arrest and remove troublemakers from Hong Kong. The Societies Ordinance was also amended to require all local societies to register with the government, which had the power to refuse registration on the grounds of affiliation with a political organisation outside Hong Kong. The authorities regarded this amendment as:

An essential measure, not only to forestall a demand for the establishment by the Chinese Communist Party of an office in Hong Kong, but also to control the infiltration, under respectable disguise, of Communists. There is no intention of suppressing political activity for the benefit of the Colony, but only political activity which has no relation to the Colony and merely projects external troubles and quarrels into the life of Hong Kong.113

The colonial government knew that the Chinese Democratic League and the KMT Revolutionary Committee were important CCP’s allies in Hong Kong and would be affected under the new legislation.114 Further, another 38 leftist social clubs were also refused registration, thus becoming unlawful.115 The amendment of the Societies Ordinance had far-reaching implications for the CCP in Hong Kong. Since it could only operate openly in Hong Kong with the approval of the colonial government, the amendment forced them to continue working as an underground political party in Hong Kong after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, and this underground nature has continued until the present day.

Though the colonial government viewed communism as a “political menace” and “extreme vigilance is exercised in order that no subversive movements may be hatched underground”,116 it did not want to provoke the communists into outright hostility. The British worried that “if there is a serious deterioration in relations between the colonial government and the Chinese authority in control of South China, strong economic pressure may be brought to bear by boycotting the colony, by interfering with the passage of its supplies from South China, and by fomenting strikes within the colony”.117 Most likely, the economic difficulties brought by the Strike-Boycott in 1925–1926 still haunted colonial officials.

There would be one more incident before the communists defeated the KMT that affected relations with the British. On 20 April 1949, the British frigate, HMS Amethyst, was en route from Shanghai to take supplies to the British embassy in Nanjing. When it was about 160 miles up the Yangtze River it was fired upon by communist troops as they were preparing to launch an attack on KMT forces across the river. There were many deaths and injuries. The captain of the warship was injured and soon died from his wounds. Subsequent attempts by the British Far Eastern Fleet to rescue the Amethyst resulted in serious damage to the rescue ships. In May 1949, in a private meeting with the US ambassador to China, a top CCP official demanded that, as part of the settlement for the dispute over the Amethyst, the British should agree to discuss the question of Hong Kong. The point was made moot when the ship managed to slip away at night under the command of a new captain, after which the CCP did not raise the issue again either directly or indirectly. By the time the ship escaped on 30 June, it had in effect been under arrest by the communists for more than three months.118

On 1 April 1949, the People’s Liberation Army crossed the Yangtze River, took Nanjing and other large and smaller cities, and seized strategic posts at the lower reaches of the river. At that time, the British warship, HMS Amethyst was guarding the waters nearby in support of KMT troops. Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng gave an order to blockade the Yangtze intending to hold the Amethyst at bay. Edward Youde got wind of the information. The British embassy instructed him to notify the vessel to make a sortie on the night of 22 April. Young Edward was later commended for his exploits.119

Edward Youde would become governor of Hong Kong in 1982. In 1949, he was the attaché at the British embassy in China. In fact, Youde was dispatched to negotiate for the ship’s release with the communists. He trekked through communist-controlled territory for a day and a half, but by the time he reached the Yangtze the ship had already escaped, although he was still commended for his effort.120 Xu Jiatun thought Youde was an intelligence officer, which was unlikely in view of the fact that he was overtly the attaché. Perhaps Xu’s assumption was based on Chinese practices that someone of Youde’s position would also be in intelligence. Soon after Youde took over as governor, he would meet Xu Jiatun, the director of Xinhua Hong Kong, who was the political commissar of the 88th Division under the 29th Army commanding a battalion to cross the Yangtze on 21 April 1949. Xu and his division were forging ahead at night on 22 April toward the eastern front at Wuxi. Xu recalled that his division did not know until the next day that the Amethyst had managed to flee.121 The ship escaped to Hong Kong.

Britain had not expected the attack and felt humiliated. Although Britain did not believe that was a certain sign at the CCP would soon attack Hong Kong, military reinforcements were sent to beef up the garrison in the colony, increasing the strength from a few thousand to 30,000 soldiers supported by tanks, fighter aircrafts and a naval unit. The unhappy Amethyst incident led to further crackdowns in Hong Kong of left-wing groups and activities.122

Despite the shelling of HMS Amethyst, a significant feature of the CCP activities in Hong Kong during the civil war period was its flexibility over the problem of the sovereignty of Hong Kong, although there were occasional rumblings of discontent. With anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism as two of the CCP’s main political doctrines, it should have sought to challenge the British over Hong Kong. However, the CCP were willing to put the issue aside. CCP members were in fact instructed to leave the question of Hong Kong alone and focus on South China:

We had to make a trade-off in the struggle [between us and KMT]. Openly, we could not oppose the KMT to recover Hong Kong otherwise we would be put in a passive political position; but if the KMT recovered Hong Kong our party would also be put in a very disadvantageous position. If we could have a firm start in Hong Kong, we may then use it. Therefore, the CCP Central directed us to use the contradictions between the KMT, Britain and United States, as well as the foundation laid down by us in the Sino-Japanese War, to force the British colonial government to make a few concessions under which favourable conditions would be created to facilitate the [CCP] members to conduct activities, and to make Hong Kong an operational base for the democratic movement in South China.123

Politburo member Peng Zhen explained that it would be “unwise” for the CCP “to deal with the problem of Hong Kong rashly and without preparation”.124 That flexible and pragmatic approach continued to be adopted by the CCP after 1949 and lasted until early 1980s when Sino-British negotiation over the future of Hong Kong commenced. Nevertheless, British officials felt Hong Kong was “living on the edge of a volcano” which could erupt at any time.125 Governor Grantham noted that: “The attitude of the Chinese authorities towards Hong Kong was a combination of passive hostility with occasional outbursts of active unfriendliness.”126 Rumblings would occur on several occasions in the 1950s, and violently in 1967.

1. Many Guangdong communist and labour leaders like Liu Ersong (劉爾崧), Deng Pei (鄧培), Li Qihan (李啓漢), and Xiao Chunu (蕭楚女) were arrested and executed. A number of communist activists who had close connection to Hong Kong, like Peng Yuesheng (彭月笙), Zhang Ruicheng (張瑞成), and He Yaoquan (何耀全) were also killed. See Chan Lau Kit-ching, From Nothing to Nothing, p. 78.

2. The Nanchang uprising on 1 August 1927 was the first CCP military revolt in its history. Its purpose was to seize the local government from the KMT. Many prominent CCP leaders and generals like Zhou Enlai, Zhu De (朱德), He Lung (賀龍), and Ye Ting (葉挺) were all involved in this military uprising. However, the CCP was quickly defeated and many members had to flee to Hong Kong and Shanghai. The date 1 August is regarded by the CCP as the anniversary of the founding day of the PLA. See Chan Lau Kit-ching, From Nothing to Nothing, p. 84.

3. Chan Lau Kit-ching, From Nothing to Nothing, pp. 86–89.

4. Michael Share, Where Empires Collided, p. 8.

5. For details of the arrests and raids made by Hong Kong Police against CCP members, see 中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《中國共產黨廣東地方史（第一卷）》, pp. 339–43. See also John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 102.

6. Ho Chi Minh was arrested in Hong Kong in June 1931 and jailed until 1933. The first party congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party was held in Macao in 1935.

7. Chan Lau Kit-ching, From Nothing to Nothing, p. 123.

8. Chan Lau Kit-Ching, “The Perception of Chinese Communism in Hong Kong 1921–1934”, The China Quarterly, p. 1060.

9. Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong, pp. 20–24; and Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 17.

10. Japan had already occupied Manchuria in 1931. On 7 July 1937, the Japanese army telegraphed the KMT forces saying that a Japanese soldier was missing and demanded that its army be allowed to enter Beijing to search for the soldier, who was later found unharmed. Some historians believe that this was an unintentional accident while others believe that the incident was fabricated and used as a pretext for the invasion of central China.

11. The fall of Shanghai and Nanjing were in October and December 1937 respectively. Guangzhou was occupied by the Japanese army in October 1938.

12. Zhang Xueliang was put under house arrest by the KMT for 54 years. Chiang Kai-shek took him to Taiwan when he fled in 1949. When Zhang turned 90 he was allowed to leave Taiwan (15 years after Chiang died). Zhang went to Hawaii, where he lived out his days. He outlived everyone of importance of that era except Madam Soong Meiling, Chiang’s wife, who died in 2003.

13. Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3, p. 252.

14. Margaret Macmillan, Seize the Hour, p. 43.

15. Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 27.

16. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, Whitehall adopted an ambiguous attitude towards the Japanese invasion of China. The British allowed the passing of military supplies through Hong Kong to the Chinese army. At the same time, Whitehall was carefully not to do anything openly to anger Japan. For example, despite calls from the local Chinese community, the colonial government refused to provide financial assistance to China for the relief of war victims. See Norman Miners, Hong Kong under Imperial Rule, p. 26.

17. John M. Carroll, Edge of Empires, p. 161.

18. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 117.

19. 楊漢卿，〈八路軍駐香港辦事處的統戰工作〉，《廣東黨史》，p. 53; and Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 28.

20. Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, p. 29.

21. The CCP Central Southern Bureau organised leftist writers like Xia Yan (夏衍) and Zhang Youyu (張友魚) from Guilin and Chongqing to go to Hong Kong, and under the direction of Liao Chengzhi, started publications like《華商報》，《大眾生活》，《筆談》，《文藝陣地》，《耕耘》，《世界知識》，《青年知識》，《大地畫報》, etc. See 葉漢明、蔡寶瓊，〈殖民地與革命文化霸權：香港與四十年代後期的中國共產主義運動〉，《中國文化研究所學報》, p. 195.

22. 楊漢卿，〈八路軍駐香港辦事處的統戰工作〉，《廣東黨史》，p. 53. “司徒慧敏等上海電影工作者和香港電影工作者合作，拍攝了《血濺寶山血》and《游擊進行曲》等一系列抗日影片。”

23. 楊漢卿，〈八路軍駐香港辦事處的統戰工作〉，《廣東黨史》，pp. 54–55.

24. Song Qingling successfully invited the wife of the colonial government’s chief medical officer Situ Yongjue (司徒永覺) and Professor Norman of Hong Kong University to be the honorary secretary and treasury of the League respectively. On an international level, she successfully appealed to the mother of US President Roosevelt for support. Further, many medical staff from Western countries were organised to go to the war zones on the Mainland to provide medical services. See 楊漢卿，〈八路軍駐香港辦事處的統戰工作〉，《廣東黨史》，pp. 56–57.

25. The overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia were mainly from Guangdong and Fujian. The Hakkas are identified with the counties of Meixian, Huizhou, Bao’an, and Huiyang as their main homes. See Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, pp. 9–14 and 20–21.

26. Vivienne Poy, speech “Hong Kong, 1941–1945” to the China and Hong Kong History, Philately and Culture Society, 1 May 1999. Poy spoke about the Japanese Occupation and the East River Guerrillas, see http://www.viviennepoy.ca/english/speeches/1999Speeches/09-010599_HK_Stamp_Soc_e.pdf.

27. Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, pp. 27–28.

28. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 117.

29. Oliver Lindsay, The Battle for Hong Kong, p. 48.

30. Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, p. 38.

31. Ibid., p. 41.

32. Ibid., pp. 24 and 81.

33. Ibid., p. 67.

34. Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, pp. 38–39. The Hong Kong–Kowloon Independent Brigade is also referred to as the Hong Kong Independent Battalion or the Hong Kong–Kowloon Independent Company in some publications.

35. Ibid., pp. 81–83.

36. See Vivienne Poy, speech “Hong Kong, 1941–1945”, 1 May 1999; and East River Column, p. 50.

37. Chan, Sui-jeung, East River Column, pp. 44–49.

38. Ibid., and 張雷鋒，〈香港大營救〉，《軍事歷史》，p. 60.

39. The British Army Aid Group (BAAG) was formed by Lindsay Ride, a British prisoner of war who had escaped from Hong Kong. For accounts of the guerrillas, see Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, Hong Kong Remembers, pp. 17–23; Lau Kam Man, a former guerrilla recalled the guerrillas and the BAAG worked closely throughout the war; see also accounts by Liu Shuyong, An Outline History of Hong Kong, pp. 111–13; Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 420–21; and Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, pp. 49–56; also Vivienne Poy’s speech “Hong Kong, 1941–1945”, 1 May 1999.

40. Ride’s report to the British War Office praised the guerrillas, whom he referred to as “our guerrillas”, see Vivienne Poy’s speech, “Hong Kong, 1941–1945”, 1 May 1999.

41. For a full account, see Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, pp. 49–64.

42. Ibid., pp. 79–80.

43. Vivienne Poy’s speech “Hong Kong, 1941–1945”, 1 May 1999.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Wellington Koo was a member of the Chinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He demanded that Japan returned Shandong to China, which was turned down by the Western powers. China did not sign the Treaty of Versailles.

47. R. W. Louis, “Hong Kong: The Critical Phase 1945–1949”, American Historical Review, p. 1062.

48. For a full account, see Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, pp. 229–60, and Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, pp. 124–26. Tsang argues that Britain decided to keep Hong Kong for three reasons: it was British effort that had built Hong Kong; Hong Kong was even more important post-war as a base for trade; and having lost the colony to Japan, it was a point of national honour to recover Hong Kong, see p. 132.

49. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 127.

50. Ibid., p. 128.

51. For a detailed account of events, see Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, pp. 245–48. See also Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, pp. 134–38. The future of Hong Kong was the most contentious issue between Chiang Kai-shek and the British before 1949. Chiang raised the issue at a meeting with the British ambassador in June 1946. He maintained relations with Britain would not be “satisfactory” or conducted with “mutual confidence” while the question of Hong Kong remained “without some solution”. For an account of the issue of Hong Kong between the KMT and Britain, see S. R. Aston, “Keeping a Foot in the Door: Britain’s China Policy: 1945–50”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, p. 88.

52. Liu Shuyong, An Outline History of Hong Kong, pp. 175–77.

53. Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 248. Kevin P. Lane also provides an account of the nationalist government struggle for the return of Hong Kong, Sovereignty and the Status Quo, pp. 41–60.

54. Lau Kam Man, a former guerrilla said the KMT had soldiers in Hong Kong, in Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, Hong Kong Remembers, pp. 21–22, but it could not have been a significant presence; Philip Snow did not refer to a KMT military presence in The Fall of Hong Kong.

55. Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 248. For a detail account, see Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, pp. 85–106.

56. On 16 August 1945, Grimson left Stanley Prison and took charge from the Japanese as acting governor. He organised all the former officials to form a provisional government. On 27 August, he made a radio announcement that the provisional government had been established. Grimson was made governor of Singapore in 1946. For an account of events, see Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 430–34; and Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, pp. 249–51.

57. 袁小倫，〈戰後香港進步文化革命〉，載於中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《香港與中國革命》，p. 263.

58. Chan Sui-jeung provides extensive discussion on the events and the personalities in East River Column.

59. 港九獨立大隊史編寫組，《港九獨立大隊史》，pp. 184–85.

60. Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, p. 102. See also 周奕，《香港英雄兒女—東江縱隊港九大隊抗日戰史》，p. 217,“別了！親愛的港九新界同胞們！今天，我們離開港九了，但我們關心你們的自由幸福仍和以前一樣。經過了長期困苦鬥爭以後，我們希望你們能獲得香港政府的救濟，重建家業，改善生活。我們希望你們光榮的鬥爭能引起國際人士應有的尊敬，獲得應有自由，和平與幸福的生活。”

61. Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, pp. 103–5. 人民網：http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/paper464/16721/1471723.html.

62. For a full discussion about relations with the KMT, see Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 50–55.

63. Ibid., pp. 29 and 55–57.

64. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, pp. 182–86; and Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong, pp. 253–60.

65. For a thorough discussion of this period of history, see Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 24–31.

66. Chan Sui-jeung noted that the pressure on landowners and cadres responsible for implementing land reform was such that in February 1953, 805 landowners were driven to suicide, and in the Spring of 1953 in west Guangdong alone that 1,165 cadres committed suicide. By 1953, it was estimated that as many as 7,000 senior Guangdong cadres had been punished. For a detail discussion about the fate of the members of the East River Column, see East River Column, pp. 135–58.

67. Chan Sui-jeung, East River Column, pp. 158–61.

68. The Hong Kong War Memorial Pensions Ordinance was amended in 1999 so that a Brigade member (or his spouse) is eligible for pension benefits if the member sustained injury, was killed in action, or was captured by the Japanese authority and held in captivity between 7 and 25 December 1941. As the Brigade was only formed in February 1942, the law was amended to cover the period of the Brigade’s activities between February 1942 and September 1945.

69. Lindsay Rides’ archives, see http://library.hku.hk/record=b2379733.

70. For an account of the Chongqing negotiations, see Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Zhou Enlai, pp. 101–7.

71. Diana Lary, China’s Republic, p. 164.

72. Hu Sheng, A Concise History of the Communist Party of China, pp. 337–39.

73. Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare.

74. Some scholars see the loss of Yenan as a fiasco, and that the communists were then forced to operate on the move, but the loss of Yenan was subsequently explained away by the CCP as a deliberate strategy, see Diana Lary, China’s Republic, pp. 166–67.

75. Diana Lary, China’s Republic, p. 168.

76. Stephen Uhalley Jr., A History of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 66–78.

77. 袁小倫，〈戰後初期中共利用香港的策略運作〉，《近代史研究》，p. 127.

78. 劉子健，〈中共中央香港分局對華南革命鬥爭的指導〉，載於中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《香港與中國革命》，pp. 226–27.

79. Zhou Enlai said at a CCP Central Committee meeting in December 1946 that:“香港地位日漸重要，不但對兩廣、南洋方面，對歐美聯絡方面也日見重要。華南工作甚繁，領導機構需要適當解決，以便統一領導公開和秘密工作”，周恩來年譜（1898–1949），p. 708; and see 中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《中國共產黨廣東地方史（第一卷）》，p. 611.

80. “推動反美反蔣統一戰綫，支援解放區戰爭……英美間及統治階層內部矛盾極多，各種政治關係又極複雜。你們要善於掌握這一複雜環境，倚靠人民力量，在長期鬥爭中爭取勝利”，see 中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《中國共產黨廣東地方史（第一卷）》, p. 612.

81. According to Zhang Zhiyi (張執一), former deputy minister of the Central United Front Ministry (中央統戰部副部長), though the Shanghai Central Branch Bureau was assigned with the task of directing the work of Hong Kong Central Branch Bureau, it never worked that way. The CCP secret radio station in Hong Kong could contact the CCP Central directly, whereas the Shanghai Central Branch Bureau could not always keep in touch with the Central CCP because of its poor technical conditions, see 張執一，〈中央上海局和香港分局從事地下工作〉，《潮流月刊》, p. 67.

82. John P. Burns, “The Structure of the Chinese Communist Party Control in Hong Kong”, Asian Survey, p. 749.

83. 中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《中國共產黨廣東地方史（第一卷）》，p. 613.

84. 劉子健，〈中共中央香港分局對華南革命鬥爭的指導〉，載於中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《香港與中國革命》，pp. 228–29.

85. Ibid., p. 234.

86. 葉漢明、蔡寶瓊，〈殖民地與革命文化霸權：香港四十年代後期的中國共產主義運動〉，p. 203. See also 劉田夫、吳南生及楊應杉，〈方方主持中共香港分局展開政治鬥爭〉，《潮流月刊》，p. 64.

87. The intellectuals who formed the league included Chen Junru (沈鈞儒) and Zhang Bojun (章伯鈞), see 劉子健，〈中共中央香港分局對華南革命鬥爭的指導〉，載於中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《香港與中國革命》，pp. 234–35.

88. Moreover, He Xiangning became the vice-chairman of the First and Second CPPCC and vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the Second and Third NPC. Chen Junru was the then president of the Supreme People’s Court; Zhang Bojun was the vice-chairman of the Second CPPCC and minister of transportation.

89. Foreign Office, Secret Memorandum by Mr. Bevin on the Situation in China, CP(49)39[CAB 129/32], 4 March 1949, collected in Rohan Butler and M. E. Pelly, Documents on British Policy Overseas.

90. With the financial assistance of some Chinese businessman, the CCP opened the Heung To Middle School (香島中學) , Pui Kiu Middle School (培僑中學), and Hon Wah Middle School (漢華中學) in early 1946. See 葉漢明、蔡寶瓊，〈殖民地與革命文化霸權：香港四十年代後期的中國共產主義運動〉，《中國文化研究所學報》，p. 201.

91. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, p. 86.

92. 袁小倫，〈戰後香港進步文化活動〉，載於中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《香港與中國革命》，p. 271.

93. For detailed discussion of the focus of these publications, see 袁小倫，〈戰後香港進步文化活動〉，載於中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《香港與中國革命》，pp. 265–69.

94. 葉漢明、蔡寶瓊，〈殖民地與革命文化霸權：香港四十年代後期的中國共產主義運動〉，《中國文化研究所學報》，p. 198.

95. 袁小倫，〈戰後香港進步文化活動〉，載於中共廣東省委黨史研究室，《香港與中國革命》，p. 268.

96. See Xinhua News Agency Official Website: http://203.192.6.89/xhs/lsyg.htm.

97. Qiao Guanhua returned to the Mainland after 1949 and worked as a diplomat. He became the PRC’s ambassador to the United Nations in 1971 and foreign minister in 1974. See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/wjrw/3606/t44160.htm.

98. 茆貴鳴，《喬冠華傳》，pp. 308–9.

99. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, p. 56.

100. The British journalist was Gordon Harmon, and what Mao reportedly said to him was recorded in FO371/63318, Boyce (Peking) to Chancery (Nanking) 30 December 1946, see Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, p. 153.

101. “我們現在不提出立即歸還的要求，中國那麼大，許多地方都沒有管理好，先急於要這塊小地方幹嗎？將來可按協商辦法解決”，毛澤東，〈同三位西方記者的談話（一九四六年十二月九日）〉，載於毛澤東，《毛澤東文集》，第4卷，p. 207. See also 毛澤東思想網：http://mzdthought.com/html/mxzz/mzdwj/4/816.html.

102. 葉漢明、蔡寶瓊，〈殖民地與革命文化霸權：香港四十年代後期的中國共產主義運動〉，《中國文化研究所學報》，p. 202.

103. James Tang, “World War to Cold War: Hong Kong’s Future and Anglo-Chinese Interactions, 1941–55”, in Ming K. Chan, Precarious Balance, p. 115.

104. Foreign Office, Minute by China Department on the Communist Threat in Hong Kong (F 15770/154/10), 19 October 1948, collected in Rohan Butler and M. E. Pelly, Documents on British Policy Overseas.

105. Li Shian, “Britain’s China Policy and the Communists, 1942 to 1946: The Role of Ambassador Sir Horace Seymour”, Modern Asian Studies, pp. 49–50.

106. “一方面（英國）和蔣介石拉得很緊。另外，他對我們也不拒絕”，茆貴鳴，《喬冠華傳》，p. 307.

107. 杜俊偉，〈論抗戰時期周恩來「求同存異」國際統戰策略與實踐〉，《中共四川省委黨校學報》，pp. 69–70.

108. Li Shian, “Britain’s China Policy and the Communists, 1942 to 1946: The Role of Ambassador Sir Horace Seymour”, Modern Asian Studies, p. 63.

109. For a fuller account, see Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 81–87.

110. Ministry of Defence, Top Secret Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on the Military Situation in China, JIC (48) 30 (0) Final (Annex) 13 May 1948, Rohan Butler and M. E. Pelly, Documents on British Policy Overseas.

111. Report on Communist Activities in Hong Kong, Alexander Grantham to Secretary of State, Secret, 23 February 1949. FO 371/75779, quoted in Wm R. Louis, “Hong Kong: The Critical Phase, 1945–1949”, American Historical Review, p. 1077.

112. 葉漢明、蔡寶瓊，〈殖民地與革命文化霸權：香港四十年代後期的中國共產主義運動〉，《中國文化研究所學報》，pp. 209–10.

113. Colonial Office, “Memorandum by Mr. Creech Jones on Hong Kong”, CP (49) 120, 23 May 1949, Rohan Butler and M. E. Pelly, Documents on British Policy Overseas.

114. Ibid.

115. 劉蜀永，〈英國對香港的政策與中國的態度（1948–1952）〉，《中國社會科學》，p. 184.

116. Foreign Office, “Minute by China Department on the Communist Threat to Hong Kong” [F 15770/154/10], 19 October 1948, Rohan Butler and M. E. Pelly, Documents on British Policy Overseas.

117. Ministry of Defence, “Top Secret Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on the Military Situation in China”, JIC (48) 30 (0) Final (Annex), 13 May 1948, Rohan Butler and M. E. Pelly, Documents on British Policy Overseas.

118. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelves, p. 105, and Kevin P. Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo, p. 63.

119. Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 194.

120. Mark Roberti, The Fall of Hong Kong, p. 38.

121. Ibid.

122. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, pp. 135–36; see also Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, p. 105. In August 1949, public security legislation was passed to give the governor even wider powers of control.

123. “我們在這場鬥爭中必須有所取捨。在公開宣傳上，我們不能反對國民黨收復香港，以免在政治上處於被動；而一旦國民黨收復香港，又將使我黨處於十分不利的地步。只要能在香港站穩腳跟就可以對其利用。因此，黨中央指示我們，應利用國，英，美之間的矛盾，利用我黨在抗戰期間打下的基礎，迫使港英當局實現若干民主改良，造成便利民主分子活動之條件，並將其建設成為華南民主運動的基地”，譚天度，〈抗戰勝利後我參加的香港中英談判〉，載於中共中央黨史研究室、中央檔案館編，《中共黨史資料》第62輯，p. 60, disclosed by a veteran CCP member who was responsible for the united front work in the Hong Kong Work Committee in the 1940s.

124. Steve Tsang, Hong Kong, p. 71.

125. James Tang, “World War to Cold War: Hong Kong’s Future and Anglo-Chinese Interactions, 1941–55”, in Ming K. Chan, Precarious Balance, p. 114.

126. Grantham, Via Ports, pp. 179–180. See also John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, pp. 137–39.

4. Purge, War, and Civil War

From 1927 to 1948