Underground Front

Between 1949 and the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the colony of Hong Kong was an active united front and propaganda centre of the Chinese Communist Party. Hong Kong was also useful for the party to gather intelligence. The party could have made a move to take back the colony but Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai made a calculated decision that Hong Kong should be left in British hands because it could serve the party’s interest better that way during the early years of the founding of the People’s Republic. In the eyes of the CCP, the Kuomintang, and its key backer, the United States, would cause trouble from time to time, thus vigilance on the part of the CCP was essential to ensure their activities in Hong Kong could not subvert the Mainland.

The CCP’s policy to leave Hong Kong in British hands and to maintain good relations with Britain could be seen right from the time when the communists were about to win the civil war. In December 1948, the head of Xinhua Hong Kong, Qiao Guanhua, told the British that CCP policy was not to take the colony by force when it came to power in China, and the party would not agitate for the return of Hong Kong.1 This was verified in April 1949 through confidential party documents obtained by the Hong Kong Police in a raid on the home of Fang Fang which confirmed that the CCP did not have any intention to recover Hong Kong after it had occupied South China. The CCP was prepared to deal with the question of Hong Kong separately from the other issues that had an international dimension. The British noted that:

A deduction of even greater importance that appears to emerge is a CCP decision not to molest Hong Kong following the capture of Kwangtung. Hong Kong is not only not included in the plans for Kwangtung but is deliberately excluded. Its problems are analyzed separately from those of its hinterland.2

With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong, the chairman of the CCP, became state president. Zhou Enlai was appointed as the premier and foreign minister (a post he held until 1958 but even after that, he continued to play a crucial role in charting China’s foreign policy). Zhou’s attitude was to take into consideration the actual conditions, exploit differences among others where beneficial to China, and compromise if necessary so as to win time.

China did not take back Hong Kong for good reason. During the final stage of the civil war, what the CCP was most concerned about was whether the United States would intervene militarily to support the KMT. Zhou Enlai saw the risk that recovering Hong Kong then could arouse great opposition from the West and provide Western powers with an excuse of military intervention in the civil war. As such, when the People’s Liberation Army reached Shenzhen in October 1949, it was instructed not to advance across the border.3

The first instruction from Beijing to the CCP members in Hong Kong came from Zhou Enlai just a few days after 1 October 1949 and the founding of People’s Republic. Zhou laid down specific directions to CCP Hong Kong: the party would not try to liberate Hong Kong in the meantime but would continue to operate in Hong Kong; the party should start a broad patriotic united front to establish connections with different kinds of people, including those who opposed the communists; and party members had to tolerate British rule and capitalism in Hong Kong and should not try to change the existing system.4 These directions were probably the first time that the newly established CCP regime confirmed to local CCP members that it wished to maintain the status quo, though without a comprehensive plan on how to use Hong Kong.

In the spring of 1950, when Huang Zuomei, the second head of Xinhua Hong Kong, visited Beijing, Zhou Enlai articulated a detailed Hong Kong policy to him. Zhou said that: “China’s Hong Kong policy was part of the overall strategic plan for the East-West struggle” and “should not be assessed by a narrow principle of territorial sovereignty”. The United States and Britain had conflicting interests in the Far East and had vast differences in their policy towards China.5 The British were more tolerant of the People’s Republic—Britain recognised the new government in January 1950. The British view was that Hong Kong was Britain’s best hope in doing business with China since British firms could no longer operate on the Mainland after 1949.6 Moreover, it was also longstanding British policy to deal with governments that had established control. Washington, however, saw China as a potential menace and was worried about Hong Kong’s role in supplying both the military and economic needs of North Korea, the Soviet Union, and China.7

Despite Britain’s recognition of the People’s Republic and awareness of the need to maintain good relations with the Chinese, the British looked at the security problems of Hong Kong in 1949 with some apprehension. The CCP could destabilise the colony if it wished. Governor Alexander Grantham knew he needed to reassure the business community that Britain was determined to maintain its position in Hong Kong. In the ensuing years, the colonial administration passed the Societies Ordinance to prohibit all societies which were branches of, or affiliated with, foreign political parties. In other words, the CCP and the KMT became outlawed organisations. Other laws were passed to ban politically-inspired strikes, allow deportation of undesirable aliens, and close communist-controlled schools. These were the Emergency (Principal) Regulations, which could be brought into operation one by one.8 The Societies Ordinance also outlawed organisations in Hong Kong that were created by the KMT for operations against the communists. The triad society known as the 14K, which also engaged in criminal activities, was originally formed for such a purpose in Guangzhou before the communist victory in 1949 and later migrated to Hong Kong.9

China’s one-party system entails the CCP making policy, which is then carried out by the government, with party members holding both party and government posts concurrently. From 1949 to 1957, China’s policy towards Hong Kong was primarily devised by the CCP Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs Leading Group in which Zhou Enlai was the chairman and Chen Yi the deputy chairman. On important issues, such as on Hong Kong, Zhou would have consulted closely with Mao Zedong. The decisions of this body were then put to the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Staff Office, headed by Chen Yi with Liao Chengzhi as the first deputy head. The Staff Office had a number of small groups, including the Hong Kong and Macao Group and the Propaganda Group, both of which had responsibilities for matters relating to Hong Kong. Li Hou, who would have a long career dealing with Hong Kong until 2008, was the deputy chairman of the Propaganda Group in 1950s.10

The policy apparatus relevant to Hong Kong matters went through numerous structural rearrangements between 1949 and 1957. Shortly before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Qiao Guanhua, the first head of Xinhua Hong Kong, was transferred back to Beijing. With his transfer, duties for the party work committee in Hong Kong were taken over by the CCP’s South China Bureau in Wuhan. Ye Jianying was one of the party secretaries of the South China Bureau. Huang Zuomei, the East River guerrilla discussed in Chapter 4, was sent to Hong Kong as the special envoy of the South China Bureau. At the same time, Huang was appointed as the director of Xinhua Hong Kong. In 1952, the South China Bureau was reorganised and established a new Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee in Guangzhou.11 Its first secretary was Qu Mengjue, also the party secretary of Guangdong, and the second secretary was Wang Kuang, who would one day be the director of Xinhua Hong Kong (Chapter 7). Instructions from the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Staff Office were first conveyed to the State Council’s Overseas Affairs Committee and then through the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee to the Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee for implementation.12

In 1955, Zhou Enlai requested the British government to allow China to set up a Chinese Foreign Affairs Envoy’s Office in Hong Kong. The British suggested that China establish a consulate instead. This was unacceptable as it would imply China acknowledged Hong Kong as part of British territory. Governor Grantham strongly opposed the idea of a special Chinese presence because he believed such an arrangement would bolster the CCP’s united front activities and there would be endless disputes as to the political functions of the Chinese representative: “There is no room for two governors in Hong Kong.”13 The Chinese made similar requests in succeeding years but to no avail.14 Thus, Beijing looked to use Xinhua Hong Kong more intensively instead. Britain’s refusal to allow Beijing to set up a special office in Hong Kong resulted in two outcomes: firstly, the Chinese government had to continue to use Xinhua Hong Kong to perform a quasi-official role in the colony up until 1997. Secondly, the Hong Kong colonial administration would not have a direct communication channel between Beijing and Hong Kong, and such a channel might have given Hong Kong more “diplomatic stature and possibly more bargaining leverage as a virtual third party dealing with both London and Beijing”.15

In terms of party organisation and work, when Mao Zedong visited Guangdong in 1956, he criticised the CCP’s work in relation to Hong Kong as unsatisfactory and that the CCP organ responsible for Hong Kong should not be stationed on the Mainland. Mao saw no reason why Hong Kong work should be done from Guangzhou and not more directly.16 Mao’s criticism led to a number of structural changes. Firstly, CCP Hong Kong moved back to the colony from Guangzhou and operated inside Xinhua Hong Kong once more with Liang Weilin (a former East River guerrilla leader) as the head. Just prior to going to Hong Kong, Liang was the director of the Education Department of Guangdong. Interestingly, the CCP Hong Kong’s deputy, Huang Shimin, remained in Guangzhou. Perhaps this was an accommodation to the Guangdong party agencies that the second-in-command would stay across the border. Secondly, all the party’s work in Hong Kong was centralised under the direction of CCP Hong Kong. Thirdly, the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Staff Office would directly communicate with CCP Hong Kong without going through either the State Council’s Overseas Affairs Committee or the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee.17 From the time of Liang Weilin, Xinhua Hong Kong shed its principal function as a news agency and channel for government exchange in the colony to become the shop front from which the CCP operated.18

China’s entry in the Korean War (1950–1953) to fight the United States was decisive in more ways than one. Beyond keeping North Korea’s Kim Il-Sung in power, the war forced Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow into closer alliance but made China’s rapprochement with the West, especially Washington, impossible. In fact, Beijing’s participation in the Korean War had the effect of extending the Cold War to Asia.19

Although China was unenthusiastic about becoming involved in Korea as it was challenging enough to deal with national reconstruction, the Chinese felt they had no choice but to side with North Korea and the Russians. From the American perspective, communism was on the move: “There can be little doubt but that Communism, with China as one spearhead, has now embarked upon an assault against Asia with immediate objectives in Korea, Indo-China, Burma, the Philippines, Malaya and with medium-range objectives in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Siam, India and Japan.”20 Thus, even before the United States had got a mandate from the United Nations to assemble a force to defend South Korea, President Truman ordered American forces into action. After three years of fighting, the Korean War ended in a truce that left China and the United States deeply suspicious of each other.

In December 1950, the United States slapped on a trade embargo against China, which involved a total ban on all commercial and financial transactions (which was to last until 1971). A partial embargo was imposed by the United Nations in May 1951 on exports to China of strategic goods and materials. Thus, China became isolated from world markets. The United States ignored Hong Kong’s political status as British territory. All American exports to Hong Kong were banned unless licensed, which was granted on a case-by-case basis. Transhipments to China via Hong Kong were reduced to a trickle, seriously hurting the colony’s trade. The colonial administration had to lobby Washington to treat Hong Kong differently from the rest of China. By 1952, the United States agreed to a degree of relaxation, but further relaxation was only allowed in 1953 after fighting stopped in Korea. Nevertheless, Hong Kong had to adopt a range of re-export controls demanded by the United States.21

The United States set up a large consulate in Hong Kong partly to ensure Chinese goods did not move on to the American market via the colony in some way, and vice versa.22 The decisions of American inspectors illustrated perverse Cold War–inspired logic that also provided moments of high farce. Governor Grantham provided an example of Hong Kong’s frustration: “The classic example is that of dried ducks. These ducks were processed in Hong Kong and then exported to America. Many of them came from eggs laid in China and bought to Hong Kong to hatch. Were the ducks from these eggs communist ducks or true-blue British ducks?”23 The solution found was mind-twisting but comical. Provided an inspector was present when the eggs hatched and could rubberstamp the ducklings’ feet, and an inspector could stamp the matured ducks before slaughter, the ducks could be dried and exported to the United States. Shrimps faced a similar predicament. If caught in Hong Kong waters, might they have begun life in communist waters? No administration solution could be found and so all shrimp exports to the United States from Hong Kong were banned.24

The Korean War was particularly lucrative for the indigenous villagers of the New Territories however, as they provided a lifeline to China and the CCP for obtaining scarce products:

many became very rich. The trade embargo against China gave many the opportunity to smuggle illegal goods into China. This was quite simple since there was only a small, symbolic fence marking the Sino–Hong Kong border, so it was easy to get back and forth . . . Smuggling took place all along the border from Kat O in Mirs Bay, to Lok Ma Chau and on to Yuen Long. Everything that was needed in China was smuggled—tyres, petrol, medicine, even engines for aircraft!25

Beijing’s view of Hong Kong was that: “if Hong Kong remained in British hands, the CCP could hold the initiative” and could “influence Britain so it would not, and dared not, follow the US’s China policy and its Far East arrangements too closely”. Thus, China could “widen and use the Anglo-American contradictions” for its own benefit. In other words, China would exploit their differences. In these circumstances, “Hong Kong possesses a lot of benefits and functions” for China. The CCP could start “the largest and broadest possible patriotic united front work” in Hong Kong to support China’s struggle against the United States and facilitate economic development. Besides, Hong Kong could serve as a window for China to the outside world and as “an outpost to break the blockade and embargo imposed on China by the American-led Western coalition”.26 Zhou Enlai instructed Huang Zuomei that CCP Hong Kong must recognise this “great strategic significance” and should try their best to “preserve the status quo of Hong Kong, including the British colonial economic and capitalist systems”.27 This policy was later articulated by the CCP, as “making full use of Hong Kong in the interest of long-term planning”, which basically remained unchanged for the next 40 years.28

Thus, while the Mainland represented a direct challenge to British rule, Hong Kong’s survival in British hands depended on whether it remained useful to the Mainland. Most importantly, Hong Kong continued to import food, raw materials and other products from the Mainland despite the trade embargoes. Then, as Hong Kong’s export manufacturing business grew over time, rapid industrial expansion resulted in greater and greater imports from the Mainland.29 The tiny British-run colony provided China and the CCP with a reliable stream of funds to finance national development, and for that, it was worth putting ideology aside.30

In 1957, Zhou Enlai further elaborated how Hong Kong could be used by the CCP to facilitate China’s economic development:

In order to survive and develop, Hong Kong has to strictly abide by the capitalist system and this is advantageous to us . . . Hong Kong should be converted as a useful port to our economy . . . In the course of our socialist building, Hong Kong could become an operation base for us to establish overseas economic connections, and through Hong Kong we could attract foreign investment and foreign exchange.31

In terms of political strategy, Zhou believed Hong Kong could become an “observatory” and “communication centre” for China to gather information from the West and to make friends.32 In other words, Zhou saw from the start that Hong Kong was not only important to China’s economy, but also for the CCP’s propaganda and united front work, and intelligence gathering.

By 1959, the Hong Kong authorities noted the CCP machinery was making fewer attempts to undermine its authority. Governor Robert Black (1958–1964) ascribed the change to worsening external relations between China and the Soviet Union, and also with India, while internally, the Great Leap Forward was collapsing. It was a time for the CCP to refrain from making enemies unnecessarily. In particular, there was no reason to alienate Britain since there were economic advantages to be derived from the continued existence and prosperity of Hong Kong. Indeed, the Chinese were

realistic enough not to allow ideological considerations to deter them, and they have, on the whole, refused to be drawn by Russian attempts to needle them on the grounds that their policy over Hong Kong . . . is inconsistent with their professed views . . . Communist organisations in Hong Kong have shown similar restraint, clearly as a result of instructions. The leftwing Federation of Trade Unions has confined their main public activities to more or less genuine trade unions matters and has refrained from anti-Government agitation . . . Similarly, the leftwing schools have avoided clashes with authority, and the political indoctrination of pupils has been on a limited scale and has not been specifically directed against Government.33

Black noted in 1964 that: “Our present relations with China are probably as satisfactory as it is reasonable to expect between a Colonial administration and a Communist state.”34

Although the CCP showed flexibility on the question of Hong Kong’s sovereignty, it was not without limits. The CCP did not distinguish between the secession of Hong Kong and Kowloon to Britain and the lease on the New Territories. It considered all three treaties signed in the nineteenth century governing the status of Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories were “unequal” and therefore not binding.35 As such, Hong Kong belonged to China and it would be “recovered one day”. The presence of the British in Hong Kong continued only because China tolerated them out of practical need and Beijing retained the right to exercise sovereignty over Hong Kong at any time.36 The logic of this position meant that in the CCP’s view, Britain had never had sovereignty of Hong Kong and any unilateral political reforms relating to decolonisation, democratisation and increasing autonomy would be an infringement of China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong.

Further, the CCP also laid down ground rules for Britain’s continued presence in Hong Kong. When Governor Grantham paid an unofficial visit to Beijing in 1955, Zhou Enlai warned that Britain’s presence would only be tolerated if Hong Kong was not used as an anti-communist base; any activity which undermined the People’s Republic must be prevented in Hong Kong; and the colonial administration must protect the Chinese government’s representatives and organisations in the territory.37 The understanding between the British and Chinese governments on the rules of conduct for Hong Kong endured through the late 1950s and the early 1960s, despite the turmoil on the Mainland as a result of the various political campaigns. Mao Zedong apparently gave this policy his direct blessing in 1959 that: “It is better to keep Hong Kong the way it is, we are in no hurry to take it back, it is useful to us right now.”38

Despite the generally cordial Sino-British relations, there were occasional rumblings. The KMT was a great irritant, and Taiwan was and remains a “great wound” to the CCP.39 From time to time, Hong Kong was reminded that there was unfinished business between the KMT and CCP and, as discussed in Chapter 4, the colony was at risk from the fallout of this conflict.

Sensitivities flared in December 1949 during a Sino-British dispute over whether the People’s Republic or Taiwan had rights to 71 aeroplanes that had been transferred to Hong Kong in the summer of that year as a result of the CCP occupying Shanghai during the final stage of the civil war. The KMT argued that they should be impounded so they could not be used by the communists to invade Taiwan. They also established an American company and transferred titles of all the aeroplanes to that company and litigation begun in Hong Kong as to who had the rightful claim to them. In February 1950, the Supreme Court awarded all the aircraft to China, Britain having recognised the People’s Republic the month before. The United States exerted pressure on the British not to hand over the aeroplanes to China, threatening to cut off Marshall Aid and military assistance. Under instructions from Whitehall, the Hong Kong authorities used every administrative means to detain the aircraft for several months. KMT agents then blew up seven of the aircraft. The court decision was appealed and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London ruled in 1952 that the aeroplanes belong to the American company. The CCP could have made a much bigger fuss than it did but “it chose to stomach the injury and injustice because it did not wish to upset its relations with Britain”.40 Since the aircraft could by then no longer in fact fly, that was probably also a factor in the CCP’s decision.41 In the midst of the controversy over the aeroplanes, a more serious incident took place in April 1951. Under very strong American pressure, the British requisitioned a Chinese tanker, the SS Yung Hao, in Hong Kong. Beijing regarded it as a blatantly unfriendly act—one even more so than over the aircraft—because the ship was not a war vessel and its ownership was indisputably Chinese. Beijing retaliated by requisitioning most of the properties of the Shell Company on the Mainland.42

On 11 April 1955, the Kashmir Princess, a chartered aircraft owned by Air India, exploded in mid-air and crashed into the Pacific Ocean after refuelling in Hong Kong while en route to Jakarta carrying Chinese and other delegates to the Bandung Conference. Huang Zuomei was on board and was one of the sixteen people killed. An Indonesian inquiry reported that a time bomb was responsible for the crash and it was highly probable that the bomb was installed in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong authorities offered money for information on suspects and questioned 71 people connected with the servicing of the aeroplane. When police began to focus on a janitor who worked at the airport named Chow Tse-ming, he escaped to Taiwan. The true target was thought to have been Zhou Enlai. The official explanation for the change of his travel plan at the last minute was that he had appendicitis and needed an operation.43 After the Kashmir Princess incident, the Mainland intensified its intelligence work relating to Taiwan. There was apparently even a plot to assassinate Mao Zedong and other party leaders one year during the National Day celebration in Tiananmen, but Chinese agents in Hong Kong intercepted intelligence and the Taiwan agents were arrested after crossing the border.44

On 10 October—the Double Tenth anniversary—in 1956, disorder broke out after what seemed to have been a minor incident. On the morning of the anniversary of the 1911 Revolution celebrated by the KMT as China’s national day, a manager removed some Republic of China flags in a resettlement estate that residents had put up on a wall. Though the manager was acting upon building regulations, a crowd gathered and demanded that the flags be allowed to be posted again. The situation became tense and the police were called in. The crowd got larger and violence broke out with some stoking from triads. Stores and offices owned by pro-communist sympathisers, particularly those in Tsuen Wan, were looted and damaged. At first, the colonial authorities refrained from taking tough action in the hope that tempers would subside, but things got worse, as the pro-nationalist supporters turned into an out-of-control mob. They stormed premises, perpetrated attacks and killed a number of people. The Hong Kong police had to scale up its response. A curfew was declared that afternoon and the government called in the troops to deal with the disturbances, after which the rioting eased. The violence took twelve days to subside, at the end of which 59 people were dead, including the wife of the Swiss Consul who was burnt to death in a car that got into the way of the mob, and 443 people were injured. Six thousand arrests were made and in the subsequent trials, four people were convicted and sentenced to death.45 After the 1956 riots, the British charge d’affaires in Beijing was summoned twice by Zhou Enlai and Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu to receive complaints about the British allowing mob action of “cold-blooded murders and looting by KMT agents” in Hong Kong, and that the British had colluded with the KMT under American direction. Zhou went as far as saying that the Chinese government reserved the right to make demands of the Hong Kong government in the future although he did not provide specifics.46

Despite the general concern among the CCP leadership that Hong Kong could be used as a base for anti-CCP intrigue, Liao Chengzhi, who looked after the daily operation of CCP work concerning Hong Kong, laid down directions for local members in Hong Kong. As recollected by Liang Weilin, Liao said in 1958 that:

Do not indoctrinate the Hong Kong public with socialist education. It is not correct to adopt the Mainland’s way of doing things in Hong Kong . . . the struggle against Britain has to be reasonable, advantageous to us and limited.47 You have to distinguish the situation between the Mainland and Hong Kong. Your task is not to recover Hong Kong. Instead, your task is to use Hong Kong fully. Unless Hong Kong is in serious chaos, we are not going to consider the recovery of Hong Kong in the next 10 years. Therefore, your work has to adopt a long term perspective and should not make the situation too tense, and over-expose yourself in Hong Kong. You need to struggle against Britain, but have to stop before going too far. You have to keep a cool head and should not be overly heated.48

Moreover, it was emphasised that the party’s propaganda work in Hong Kong and Portuguese-held Macao should be careful not to infringe local policies and laws and the local political and cultural norms had to be taken into account.49

Several obvious messages could be distilled from these various statements: firstly, the CCP in Hong Kong should operate in a manner different from that on the Mainland; secondly, its activities should avoid creating conflict with the colonial administration; and thirdly, party members should abide by local laws and norms. Liao Chengzhi once joked with Li Zisong, the former chief editor of Wen Wei Po, that those who broke the law and were deported to the Mainland would be spanked.50

The CCP in Hong Kong focussed on the local population to counter the influence of the KMT, as well as to ensure that the British or the other foreign powers would not be able to turn Hong Kong into a subversive base against the CCP.51 Zhou Enlai had instructed the CCP machinery in Hong Kong to make as many friends with as many people as possible, including foreigners living in the colony. Liang Weilin revealed that conducting united front work in Hong Kong was the most important task during his 20 years in office. He recalled that Zhou Enlai regularly reminded him that the CCP should do a good job in united front work in Hong Kong in order to “unite with different kinds of friends in ordinary times so that we can ask for help when necessary”. As such, CCP Hong Kong considered united front work as “the basis and starting point of various tasks”.52 The party carried out a wide range of activities. United front work included influencing foreigners, the local elites and the working class, strengthening media influence, and providing education in Mainland-funded schools.

In 1957, the Marco Polo Club was founded by lawyer Percy Chen, a CCP supporter, as a way for the CCP to connect with people it wished to exchange views with. Chen was born in Trinidad. He studied at University College in London and did his legal apprenticeship at the Middle Temple. In 1926, he went to China and felt he “had come home”. His father, Eugene Chen, was the KMT’s foreign minister and Percy Chen was given a job at the ministry. Percy Chen became increasingly disappointed with the KMT and eventually supported the CCP instead. In 1947, he established a private law practice in Hong Kong. The Marco Polo Club was a dinner club with a select membership. These included mainly foreign businessmen, journalists, trade representatives and consular officers. There were no membership fees to pay although they paid for their meal when they came. Invitation reminders came in the form of a simple postcard mailed once a month to members. The card requested their presence at cocktails, a European-style formal dinner, and a screening of Chinese films on the last Thursday of each month in a private dining room of the Mandarin Hotel. Percy Chen did not allow Americans to dinner gatherings until 1972 because of poor relations between China and the United States. This was the world’s only social organisation in which Westerners could mix regularly and informally with officials of the People’s Republic of China. The main attraction for the Westerners, Japanese and others was the opportunity to sound out, over whisky and soda, representatives from Xinhua Hong Kong and the Bank of China on the latest developments in the Mainland. In the 1970s, usually about 30 CCP cadres attended the dinners.53

One of the jobs of the united front machinery was to explain Mainland policies along the correct party line, so that misunderstandings could be clarified. The CCP successfully cultivated local business tycoons like Richard Charles Lee Ming Chak, who was a member of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council,54 Mok Ying Kwai, who was from a prominent comprador family,55 Ho Yin, who was influential in Macao,56 and Henry Fok Ying Tung, who violated the UN-imposed trade embargo during the Korean War by smuggling steel and rubber to China.57 Mok became a committed communist supporter and was deported by the British to Guangdong in 1952. He and Fok would be appointed to help draft the post-1997 constitution (Chapter 8). These contacts also helped the party to make important connections with other prominent figures in Hong Kong. Trips were arranged for important contacts to visit the Mainland to meet Chinese leaders. Liang revealed that these influential business and social figures enabled him to connect with other people and so facilitated the party’s united front work. Contacts were also made with ethnic Chinese civil servants in the colonial administration although they could not be invited to travel to the Mainland as non-official contacts could.58

Apart from the elites, the united front also targeted the working class. Xinhua staff regularly visited the squatter and temporary housing areas and provided assistance to them in order to win hearts and minds. They were also active within labour unions and sought to cultivate union leaders.59 The local CCP carried out its work primarily through the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) founded in 1948 and its friendly unions. According to the Registrar of Trade Unions’ Report, there were more than 90,000 workers affiliated with the FTU and its sister bodies in 1962.60 A confidential government report then noted that the FTU “aim(s) to unite all Hong Kong workers in support of the communist cause and to recruit more members for affiliated unions in view of increased efforts by right-wing unions to counteract left wing influence in the labour movement”.61 Providing free schooling for the children of workers and providing medical services were common methods to recruit union members.62

The left-wing unions organised study groups regularly. For example, in 1960 there was a political study campaign among left-wing unions. Political study groups were formed to study Volume IV of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, and members of the study groups were the leading office bearers and active members of the FTU and its affiliated unions.63 Union leaders were invited to visit the Mainland to meet Chinese officials to give a sense that they were valued. For example, on a particular visit to Beijing in the 1960s, the unionist delegation was seen by both Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi. When they talked in their meeting about the scheme for re-issuing identity cards in Hong Kong, Liao commented that it was a measure for the colonial government to control local Chinese more easily and to those people who chose to claim British nationality under the scheme, Liao chose not to criticise them but said that “efforts should be made to unite and educate them”. Liao also said that the Chinese government “had never recognised Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories as British territory, but that the present status of Hong Kong was favourable to the Chinese government for reason of trade and contact with people of other countries, and for obtaining materials which are badly needed in China”.64

The provision of education in Mainland-funded schools became the most serious cause of friction between the local CCP and the colonial administration in the 1950s and 1960s.65 Recruiting young people to join the CCP’s cause was important, although Beijing could have exploited the situation even more in light of the fact that there was a strong desire on the part of parents to send their children to school, and yet no universal provision of education for the young in Hong Kong. Those who lost out because of this government failure were the children of working-class and poor families, including the largely illiterate fishing community, who could not afford to pay for school.

In 1950, there were estimated to have been approximately 150,000 students in the colony attending registered schools and only a third of them received government support. By the mid-1950s, the school population had increased to nearly 300,000. While the total enrolment of Hong Kong students at leftist schools is not known, it has been estimated at 10,000 to 20,000 in the mid-1950s, which would have been about 4 percent of the total student body.66 In 1960, there were estimated to have been about 20 leftist schools in Hong Kong and about 3 percent of the overall student body were studying at them. At the secondary school level, approximately 11 percent of Hong Kong high school students were studying at CCP-controlled schools. The colonial administration described these schools as “real hard-core” institutions with “little doubt that they served as indoctrination centres for communist youth cadres”.67 At the same time, there were also a large number of unregistered schools operated by left-wing trade unions. In January 1959, reports from the Education Department showed that there were as many as 1,263 such schools, accommodating some 60,000 to 70,000 pupils.68 The CCP also did youth work. The most famous leftist youth group was the After-School Social Club.69

Contemporaneous government documents showed that the local CCP would give instructions to the teachers on the correct line to follow on such issues as the Great Leap Forward and other CCP policies. Teachers were also instructed to keep in close touch with students’ parents and cultivate friendship with teachers in non-communist schools.70 The colonial authorities had various methods to curb communist infiltration of education. For example, the Director of Education regularly sent officials to inspect the communist schools, and if a school was found to have persistently breached the education regulations, the government would withdraw financial aid to the school. The Director of Education could also refuse to register a teacher if he or she was found to have been educated in a communist environment. The colonial government also used town planning legislation to stop the expansion of communist schools.71 Another measure was the use of building safety legislation to shut down communist schools, where they were found to have been in breach, such as in the case of the Chung Wah Middle School in 1958, where the first Chief Executive of the HKSAR Tung Chee Hwa studied.72 The principal of Pui Kiu Middle School was deported for using the school for propaganda purposes.73 The tussle between the colonial government and the local CCP in the education sector only became less vigorous following the decline of communist schools after the riots in 1967.

In comparison with the CCP’s activities in the education sector, there were less open conflicts between the left-wing labour unions and the colonial government though the unions were closely monitored. The authorities were always concerned about the unions’ continuous stressing of the need to “strengthen the unity of the workers and to consolidate their position through improved welfare conditions” because such a policy “is unlikely to bring the local left-wing labour movement into direct conflict with the government. But if these efforts to increase unity are successful, they would produce a left-wing labour movement that would be more formidable to deal with should the FTU’s policy change back to more aggressive tactics”.74

Propaganda work was also a vital aspect of party activities. The party’s propaganda work in Hong Kong was carried out mainly through several CCP-controlled newspapers. These included Wen Wei Po, Ta Kung Pao, New Evening Post, Ching Pao Daily, and Hong Kong Commercial Daily. These newspapers had their own specific editorial interests and targeted readership. Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao were directed by the local CCP and charged with the specific task of reporting news about China in a positive fashion. The director of Xinhua Hong Kong would hold discussions with the editorial staff to decide what to report and how to report Mainland news. As such, they had limited editorial freedom. Wen Wei Po’s targeted readers were the Hong Kong general public, whereas Ta Kung Pao aimed to attract readers from business circles and among intellectuals. For Ching Pao Daily and Hong Kong Commercial Daily, their editorial direction was to conduct propaganda targeting Taiwan. These newspapers were quite successful up until the Cultural Revolution. Their total circulation figures occupied about one-third of the overall local newspaper market75 but the local party’s propaganda work did run into conflict with the colonial administration from time to time, the most significant occasion being the 1 March Incident in 1952.

The prelude to the incident started on 21 November 1951 when a fire broke out in the squatter settlement of Tung Tau Village, immediately northeast of the Walled City of Kowloon. Some 5,000 huts were destroyed and the estimated number of people left homeless varied, ranging from about 12,000 to 25,000.76 In the aftermath of the fire, trade unionists joined the fire victims to organise relief for the victims but the unionists were subsequently deported in January 1952. In the meantime, various organisations in Guangzhou also started to collect money for the victims seeing the fire as a good publicity and propaganda opportunity. In February, the Guangzhou organisations inquired through Ko Cheuk Hung, the chairman of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, whether the Hong Kong government would allow a Comfort Mission from Guangzhou to visit the victims in Hong Kong to give them money. They did not seek the help of the FTU because it was too closely associated with the communists. The government refused permission. From the colonial authorities’ perspective, the outcome of the mission “was not difficult to foresee . . . fiery speeches would be made against imperialists, aid would have been promised from Mother China . . . Rioting would have broken out.”77 Through the intercession of Percy Chen, permission was granted on the basis that delegation members would not come as a mission, but only as representatives of donors and would not make any public political speeches. Ko and Chen wanted to help the victims, but they would not have wanted any incident because they could be deported for causing trouble.78

The delegation bringing HK$102,040.81 was scheduled to arrive on 1 March 1952. On the day, a serious disturbance broke out:

Thousands of Communist-led students and workers marching along Nathan Road . . . attacked police, servicemen and Europeans, overturned and burned vehicles, and smashed property in a roaring riot . . . The crowd had gathered at the Kowloon Railway Station in Tsimshatsui around noon in order to await the expected arrival of the Canton “comfort” mission to the Tung Tau Village fire victims. When the mission failed to arrive, having been denied entry into the Colony, the crowd started its parade, waving banners and shouting slogans. The mood of the paraders grew uglier as they marched, and disturbances broke out.79

The delegation was to have been met at the border on a special railway coach by a welcoming reception headed by Mok Ying Kwai, in his capacity as a senior member of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. The special coach did not cross the border on the morning of 1 March for reasons that were never clarified. The delegation informed the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce before noon that they would not be arriving and an announcement was made to the press. Nevertheless, the news obviously did not reach the 10,000 people gathered at Tsim Sha Tsui. The crowd was finally told at 3 pm that the train was not coming and people begun to disperse peacefully. It was only when a large group reached the Jordan Road junction, half a mile from the rail station that an incident occurred. Eyewitness accounts indicated that a police vehicle inadvertently ran into the crowd, injuring a girl. The police officers involved exchanged abusive shouts with the crowd and confusion ensued. Armed police arrived shortly thereafter, tear gas was used and rioting broke out. When the crowd reached Mong Kok, a policeman found himself surrounded by the crowd and he opened fire, killing one person and injuring two people. It took another two hours to restore order. By the end, more than a hundred people were arrested, and twelve people eventually deported.80

Ta Kung Pao, Wen Wei Po, and New Evening Post published articles supporting the protesters and criticising the colonial authorities. The government retaliated by arresting the publishers and prosecuted them for incitement. Ta Kung Pao reprinted an article from the People’s Daily (the CCP’s national newspaper) criticising the Hong Kong government. The colonial authorities got a court order to stop publication of the paper for six months. Eventually, Beijing was forced to intervene and the Foreign Ministry made a strong protest to the British government in May 1952. The British wanted to de-escalate matters and allowed Ta Kung Pao to publish again in June 1952. Charges against Wen Wei Po and New Evening Post were dropped.81

It is noteworthy that the top party leaders had given clear instructions that the left-wing newspapers in Hong Kong were to conduct “patriotic education” on Hong Kong people and they should be distinguished from those “socialist education” newspapers on the Mainland. Liao Chengzhi once said that:

We have two types of newspaper. One type conducts socialist education to serve the socialist building of the country. This is the Mainland’s type of newspaper. Another type is those we run in Hong Kong and overseas . . . our newspaper for overseas Chinese should adopt patriotism as its basic direction . . .

Is it possible for us to run a socialist newspaper in Hong Kong? It is impossible and also unnecessary . . . the task of our newspapers in Hong Kong is to conduct patriotic education . . . the larger circulation the better . . . the newspapers should target the vast majority of population in Hong Kong and Macao . . . be what they love to read and what they could understand . . . our newspapers should not disengage from the majority of the Hong Kong people.82

To emphasise the point that Beijing did not want the Hong Kong left-wing newspapers to sound like party mouthpieces, Chen Yi also vividly stated that “if we want you to run a party newspaper in Hong Kong, we better do it by asking the People’s Daily to set up a new division to publish the People’s Daily in Hong Kong”.83 However, the CCP controlled newspapers in Hong Kong generally adopted a revolutionary approach in their editorial direction, probably because many of those involved were passionate about the anti-imperialist cause, but perhaps also to ensure that they could not be accused of having made ideological mistakes. As recalled by Liang Weilin, Zhou Enlai complained that the Hong Kong Xinhua News Agency almost turned Ta Kung Pao into the People’s Daily.84

Hong Kong’s unique geographic location and liberal environment made it a useful intelligence gathering centre for the West to find out about the CCP during the Cold War. Indeed, Hong Kong was the “best listening post” into “Red China”. Hong Kong was a base for agents from the Mainland and Taiwan, and served as “one of the few places where the two sides could rub elbows, and, if the situation called for it, pass on communications to each other’s governments”.85

In late 1949, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) set up a listening post within the United States Consulate. Shortly thereafter, when the embassy was closed in Beijing, American reporting work on China shifted entirely to Hong Kong and personnel was significantly increased in the 1950s. Hong Kong was an excellent place to debrief travellers or people returning from the Mainland for information about China.86 A United States declassified CIA report in 1960s showed that CIA agents infiltrated groups in Hong Kong with connections to the CCP and that Hong Kong was an important operation point along with Paris, Stockholm, Algiers, Dar es Salaam and Mexico.87 Infiltrated organisations included the Bank of China and the China Resources Corporation.88 The Chinese government frequently described Britain as a “stooge of the United States” by allowing Hong Kong to be used as a base for American imperialism to subvert China.89

At the same time, Hong Kong was also used by the CCP as its most important window to obtain intelligence about the West. As the CCP did not have a worldwide network of contacts, it depended heavily on intelligence gathered in Hong Kong to double-check information collected elsewhere in the world.90 According to Xu Jiatun, the director of Xinhua Hong Kong from 1983 to 1990, the CCP had already built a relative good intelligence network in Hong Kong by the 1960s. Secret agents were dispatched to Hong Kong from various Mainland authorities, including those involved in public security, national security and military affairs. Intelligence agents worked from Xinhua Hong Kong or used Mainland enterprises as cover. Xu disclosed that the CCP had successfully infiltrated the senior level of the colonial administration, as well as the Taiwan intelligence network, in Hong Kong. For example, in 1955, the CCP discovered that Taiwan secret agents planned to assassinate Zhou Enlai by planting a bomb on the Kashmir Princess, as discussed above. In 1961, Tsang Chui For, an assistant superintendent of police, was found to be a secret agent. After he was exposed, he was deported to the Mainland where he was given a provincial-level official post and appointed as deputy chairman of the Standing Committee of the Guangdong People’s Congress, as well as becoming a member of the national CPPCC.91 According to Xu, intelligence personnel were spread into all sectors of the community, and most of them were Cantonese. However, the CCP intelligence network in Hong Kong was basically wiped out by the colonial administration during the Cultural Revolution–inspired riots in 1967.

The local CCP members in Hong Kong at times failed strictly to observe the policies from Beijing designed to ensure they did not overreact and would always observe the limits of the law. For example, the 1 March Incident in 1952 was initiated by local CCP and not endorsed by Beijing.92 In the education sector, communist controlled schools adopted Mainland’s education methods, such as organising “study groups”, that forced the colonial administration to take suppressive measures. Another illuminating example happened in 1953 when the pro-Beijing businessmen in the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce demanded that the People’s Republic of China’s national flag be raised in the chamber’s premises on National Day. At the time, the chamber was made up mainly of politically moderate businessmen, with some radical members from both the communist as well as nationalist camps. The controversy over hoisting of the flag led to deep, open, division among the membership.

Undeniably, suppression by the colonial government easily provoked the local CCP into adopting a radical course of action. The radical left inclination was also partly due to its lack of the international strategic vision that the CCP top leaders had, and that made them fail to appreciate the importance of not destabilising Hong Kong. Their radical approach did not advance their work in Hong Kong and at times bothered Beijing. In 1959, in a meeting of the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Staff Office, Chen Yi expressed his disapproval towards the CCP in Hong Kong and tactfully commended their “radical left” behaviour as “pathetic and lovely”.93 Chen’s worries about the radical left approach of local CCP were subsequently proved to be correct during the riots in Hong Kong in 1967.

Zhou Enlai and those party leaders responsible for Hong Kong and foreign policies were extraordinary men with cool heads and steady hands. They had a clear view of the greater cause that would serve the party’s interest with Hong Kong left in British hands, and so, as long as the British understood the limits of China’s tolerance, life in the colony could continue. Despite the restraint on party activities in Hong Kong, just across the border in Guangdong life had turned upside down from 1949, first with the implementation of land reform that marked China as a communist state. The Hong Kong community always had a sense of unease about the new regime as a steady flow of escapees found their way to the colony. The people living in Hong Kong knew that life on the Mainland was not what propaganda made it out to be. Their relatives in Guangdong asked for food parcels to be sent, and on trips back to their ancestral villages, Hong Kong people could see for themselves the dire conditions in communist China.

Mao Zedong’s vision of the New China was the total transformation of society. He was impatient for its realisation. Bourgeois thinking had to be eliminated through re-educating the people, and once communism was firmly established, proletarian ideology would dominate.94 The new state used ideology and “correct thinking” to justify policies and behaviour. Everyone had to go through “thought reform”. Intellectuals in particular were required to confess their “wrong” views and accept CCP ideology as the correct thinking. The people were compelled to meet regularly in their places of work or neighbourhoods to study correct thinking. Moreover, Mao’s social transformation required new battle lines to be drawn to eliminate those who were seen to be standing in the way. Despite the hopeful beginning, the new nation would soon be embroiled in political campaign after political campaign causing enormous suffering. Fortunately, Hong Kong was shielded from the devastating consequences by its colonial status. Indeed, the colony became a sanctuary for the torrents of refugees from the Mainland. The early land reform campaign wiped out the landlord-gentry tradition of rural China. Landlords had their land confiscated and redistributed. They had to stand summary trails and many were executed. The new socialist rural order was made up of party cadres supported by middle peasants, who could own their own land to operate small family farms.95 A number of party members with Hong Kong links were prominent officials in Guangdong during the land reform period. Ye Jianying was appointed Guangdong’s first party secretary, Fang Fang was made one of three vice-chairmen, and many others, such as Zeng Sheng, who fought as guerrillas, were given important positions. Fang Fang was also the director of the provincial land reform committee in the party. Their view was that there was a need to take the unique circumstances of Guangdong into account in implementing land reform.

The Pearl River Delta was highly commercialised, with smaller landholdings than was the case in northern China. Many of the landlords in fact owned small plots of land, which they farmed themselves. Furthermore, as most of the overseas Chinese came from Guangdong, many of them bought land so they could return for retirement. Moreover, all those people who had fought as guerrillas or supported the fighters during the war and civil war needed to be protected. Ye and Fang did not want to turn on them. Ye Jianying insisted that the aim of land reform was to eliminate landowners as a class, but not eliminate the landowners as individuals. How land reform should proceed in Guangdong became a point of contention with Mao Zedong. In June 1952, Mao accused those responsible in Guangdong for the unsatisfactory pace in implementing land reform. Fang Fang was replaced and Ye Jianying was transferred to work in Beijing. Fang’s successor, Tao Zhu proved much more efficient, some would say ruthlessly so. Tao and Deng Xiaoping had a good working relationship during the 1950s and early 1960s. Deng also got to know the young cadre from Henan, Zhao Ziyang, who worked under Tao, and who helped to direct land reform at the time. When Tao was promoted in 1965, Zhao was put in charge of Guangdong. One day Zhao would become premier overseeing the Sino-British negotiations for the return of Hong Kong working closely with Deng Xiaoping.96

The brutal Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries Campaign in 1950–1951 targeted former KMT elements, “imperialists” and “reactionaries”. It involved mass trials and public executions.97 The Three Antis and Five Antis campaigns of 1951 and 1952, supposedly anti-corruption drives, also targeted capitalists and those whose loyalty to the CCP was felt to be suspect.98 While the Thought Reform Campaign, a psychological coercion campaign, aimed at professors, sought to remould intellectual discourse along Marxist-Leninist lines.99 There were also continuous efforts to “liberate” the masses from the influence of “bourgeois ideology and raise their socialist consciousness” through using united front strategies.100

Those campaigns generated substantial resentment within the party and among the people. The brief Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956–1957 was designed to ameliorate the negative impact by allowing people to speak out about the policies of the government and the party. Initially, Mao displayed open support for it, saying: “Our society cannot back down, it could only progress . . . criticism of the bureaucracy is pushing the government towards the better.” People were encouraged to voice their criticisms as long as they were “constructive” (“among the people”) rather than “hateful and destructive” (“between the enemy and ourselves”).101 By July 1957, Mao decided the complaints were non-constructive and had reached an uncontrollable level, as they not only showed widespread resentment against the regime, but also raised fundamental questions about communism. A halt had to be called.102 Those who voiced criticisms came under suspicion and were eventually rounded up during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and accused of being counter-revolutionaries.103 Future premier, Zhu Rongji (premier, 1998–2003) was one of the many people who were purged for his criticisms of Mao’s policies. To boost agricultural and industrial production, Mao pushed yet another campaign—the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) that was supposed to allow China to industrialise rapidly and catch up with the West, but led to widespread famine instead. By the end of 1962, millions of people had perished.104 At the same time, a programme of agricultural collectivisation started. Farming families were organised into communes so that the country could become a truly communist nation. Collectivisation was expedited in 1955, and by the end of 1958 almost all of China’s rural population had been reorganised into communes.105

Between 1949 and 1965, large numbers of refugees from China found their way to Hong Kong, including those with previous KMT connections, businessmen—the “capitalists”—and ordinary folks—the “bourgeoisie”. Many people from Shanghai fled to the colony too and re-established their lives and businesses there, which gave an additional boost to the economic capacity of Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s population at the end of 1949 stood at 1.86 million. By the end of 1952, the colony’s population had risen to 2.18 million as a result of high local birth rate as well as people coming from the Mainland. The border between Hong Kong and the Mainland was closed in 1956, but many refugees still made it through. By the end of 1957, the population had increased to nearly 2.8 million. The border had to be better sealed in 1968, making it harder to cross. Nevertheless, by the end of 1960, Hong Kong’s population had risen to 3.128 million. By the end of 1965, Hong Kong had 3.625 million people.

Hong Kong survived the disruptions suffered during the Korean War. Entrepôt trade was supplanted by new export manufacturing industries fuelled by both entrepreneurs and workers from the Mainland, who found refuge in the colony. The 1950s and 1960s were characterised by strong motivation of Hong Kong people to advance. Social mobility was high and people worked extremely hard to rebuild their lives.106

On the Mainland, Mao Zedong stepped down as chairman of the People’s Republic of China in 1959, taking responsibility for the disastrous Great Leap Forward, although he retained the position as the chairman of the CCP. Liu Shaoqi, who assumed Mao’s position as head of state, and Deng Xiaoping, who was party secretary of the CCP, were charged to adopt emergency measures to revive the economy. In the 1960s, de-collectivisation started and by the summer of 1962, there were signs of economic recovery. Liu, Deng and other leaders, such as Chen Yun and Peng Dehuai advocated well thought-out policies over political campaigns to advance development—communism could not be achieved in one go. Mao feared that economic rehabilitation would steer China away from revolution. In his mind, it was necessary to attack the internal enemies with revisionist tendencies to keep the revolution alive. Mao did not like what he had seen in the Soviet Union and feared China would go the same way if nothing was done to stay on the revolutionary path. In his view, Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) had veered away from communism in the Soviet Union through dismantling Stalin’s policies. Mao also did not like how Soviet-US relations were developing. He believed Khrushchev no longer viewed the imperialist United States as “evil” but only as a rival.107 Mao begun to criticise Soviet revisionism, raising the drumbeat that China must stick to its communist ideological commitment. Mao had backing from his wife Jiang Qing and Lin Biao in pushing his line of thinking. The stage was set for another major campaign to ensure China stayed on the revolutionary course. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was about to begin.

1. FO371/75779, Enclosure from Heathcote-Smith to Lamb, 2 December 1948.

2. Foreign Office, Minute by Mr. Burgess on Communist documents captured in Hong Kong, F9267/1016/10, 25 June 1949. The CCP’s official history notes the PLA in Shenzhen could have recovered Hong Kong if the CCP had wanted to do so in 1949 but it was the party’s policy not to do so at the time,《中共黨史重大事件述評》，p. 351.

3. 黃文放，《解讀北京思維》，p. 47.

4. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，pp. 30–32.

5. Ibid., pp. 33–34. 金堯如 noted that “香港的政策是東西方鬥爭全局的戰略部署……不能用狹隘的領土主權原則來衡量的”.

6. Leo F. Goodstadt, Profits, Politics and Panics, p. 82.

7. Ibid., p. 87.

8. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 124–25.

9. Ibid., p. 136.

10. Li Hou became the deputy director of the State Council Hong Kong and Macao Office in 1980.

11. 國世平、錢學君，《九七後中港新關係》，p. 49.

12. 鍾仕梅，〈中共如何管理香港〉，《當代雜誌》，p. 20.

13. Peter Wesley-Smith, “Chinese Consular Representation in British Hong Kong”, Pacific Affairs, p. 370. See also Richard Hughes, Borrowed Place Borrowed Time, p. 39.

14. Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong, p. 27.

15. Gary Catron, “Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955–60”, China Quarterly, p. 410.

16. 黃文放，《中國對香港恢復行使主權的決策歷程與執行》，p. 34.

17. See 鍾仕梅，〈工委遷港統一領導〉，《當代雜誌》，p. 20.

18. For background, see John P. Burns, “The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong”, Asian Surveys, pp. 749–51; and Cindy Yik-Yi Chu, “Overt and Covert Functions of the Hong Kong Branch of the Xinhua News Agency, 1947–1984”, The Historian, pp. 31–37.

19. The Cold War was the term used to describe a state of hostility between the Soviet Union and the US (and their respective allies) between 1945 and the early 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed. The Korean War was the first armed conflict of the Cold War. After the Second World War, the Korean peninsula had been divided into Soviet and American spheres of influence with the 38th parallel as the demarcation line between North and South Korea. On 25 June 1950, Kim Il-Sung of North Korea attacked South Korea, which resulted in the United Nations sending in a US-led force to aid South Korea. The UN force commander, General Douglas MacArthur, indicated that he wanted to unify the Korean peninsula, and perhaps even take the fight into China. In 1951, President Truman dismissed MacArthur for his impetuosity. As troops came close to the border with China, Beijing warned that it would intervene. By the end of November, China sent 300,000 “volunteers” into Korea and pushed the United Nations forces to retreat beyond Seoul. Over time, more troops had to be sent. Fighting eased by the end of 1951 but it took another two years before an armistice was signed, see Graham Hutchings, Modern China, pp. 254–55.

20. Dean Acheson, US secretary of state to the British foreign secretary, quoted in Margaret Macmillan, Seize the Hour, p. 103. Macmillan provides a good summary of US-China relations between 1949 and 1972, pp. 95–110.

21. Leo F. Goodstadt, Profits, Politics and Panics, p. 88.

22. Margaret Macmillan, Seize the Hour, pp. 106–7.

23. Alexander Grantham, Via Ports, p. 169.

24. Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 451–52.

25. Cheung Yan Lung, a leader among the New Territories indigenous villagers, in Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, Hong Kong Remembers, p. 38. In The Times, the London Newspaper, Zhao Guanji, a State Council official, described Hong Kong as providing a “lifeline” to China during the Korean War, 17 November 1980, noted in Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong, p. 27.

26. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，pp. 33–34. He noted that“香港留在英國人手上，我們反而主動……使英國不能也不敢對美國的對華政策和遠東部署跟得太緊……可以擴大和利用英美在遠東問題上的對華政策的矛盾……香港對我們大有好處，大有用處……最大限度地發展最廣泛的愛國統一戰線工作……突破以美國為首的西方陣營對我國實行封鎖禁運的前沿陣地。”

27. Ibid.,“重大的戰略意義”and“要維護香港的現狀和地位，包括英國的殖民地主義經濟和資本主義制度”，p. 34.

28. 齊鵬飛，“長期打算，充分利用：1949年至1978年新中國對於香港問題和香港的特殊政策”，《中共黨史研究》；《中共黨史重大事件述評》，p. 353.

29. Leo F. Goodstadt, Profits, Politics and Panics, pp. 90–94.

30. 黃文放，《解讀北京思維》，p. 47.

31. 周恩來，〈關於香港問題〉，《周恩來統一戰綫文選》，pp. 353–55. Zhou noted:“香港要完全按資本主義制度辦事，才能存在和發展，這對我們是有利的。……香港應該化為經濟上對我們有用的港口……要進行社會主義建設，香港可作為我們同國外進行經濟聯繫的基地。可以通過他吸收外資，爭取外匯。”See also 人民網，周恩來著作選：http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/75843/75874/75992/5181257.html.

32. 黃文放，《中國對香港恢復行使主權的決策歷程與執行》，p. 49.

33. Sir Robert Black to Duncan Sandys, secretary of state for the colonies, 16 March 1964, CO1030/1590, quoted in David Faure, Colonialism and the Hong Kong Mentality, pp. 191–94.

34. Ibid., p. 194.

35. The three unequal treaties were the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 (ceding of Hong Kong Island to Britain); the Convention of Peking in 1860 (ceding of Kowloon); and the Second Convention of Beijing in 1898 (New Territories 99-year lease). For a discussion, see Kevin P. Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo, pp. 1–29 and 61–67.

36. 齊鵬飛，〈長期打算，充分利用：1949年至1978年新中國對於香港問題和香港的特殊政策〉，《中共黨史研究》，p. 27.

37. Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong, p. 27. See also Chi-Kwan Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, p. 29.

38. Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong, p. 27.

39. Zhou Enlai described Taiwan as a “great wound” to Henry Kissinger in July 1971, see Margaret Macmillan, Seize the Hour, p. 240.

40. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, p. 132.

41. Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 447–49, and John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, pp. 142–43.

42. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, p. 175.

43. Steve Tsang believed Zhou Enlai knew about the attempt on his life and he did not in fact have an operation: “Target Zhou Enlai: The Kashmir Princess Incident of 1955”, China Quarterly, pp. 776–82. According to Xu Jiatun, Taiwan’s action was known to China, and the US was informed. The British apparently did not believe it, see Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 52. China Daily reported on 21 July 2004 that declassified documents showed “Zhou, who was the main target, did not board the plane. His travel plans had been kept secret . . . The secrecy surrounded Zhou’s travel plans saved his life and doomed the Kashmir Princess.”

44. Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 52.

45. Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 456–58, and Kevin P. Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo, pp. 72–73.

46. Kevin P. Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo, pp. 73–74.

47. The statement reads:“不要設想對香港群眾進行社會主義教育。把國內的一套搬出去是不妥當的……同英國的鬥爭要有理，有利，有節。”It was said by Liao Chengzhi to Liang Weilin in November 1958. See 劉子健、彭建新、梁威林，〈談香港工作20年體會〉，《廣東黨史》，p. 7.

48. 劉子健、彭建新、梁威林，〈談香港工作20年體會〉，《廣東黨史》，p. 7. The statement reads:“要區別國內和香港的環境。你們的工作任務不是為了收回香港，而是充份利用香港。在10年內不考慮這個問題，除非它在香港乒乓乒乓打起來。因此，你們的工作要從長遠打算，不要搞得過份緊張，過份暴露，對英是要鬥爭的，但鬥了之後，要適可而止，頭腦始終要保持冷靜，不要發熱。”It was said by Liao Chengzhi to Liang Weilin in December 1958.

49. 廖承志，〈港澳和海外出版工要因地制宜〉， May 1956. 《廖承志文集（上冊）》，p. 324. The statement reads:“在內容方面應注意不要觸犯當地的政策，法令，不要出版當地禁止出版的東西，也要照顧華僑的政治和文化水平。”

50. 李子誦，〈教我如何不想他：廖公〉，《當代雜誌》，p. 18.

51. Chi-Kwan Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, p. 15.

52. 劉子健、彭建新、梁威林，〈談香港工作20年體會〉，《廣東黨史》，p. 6（“平時要團結各種各樣朋友，到需要時使用”and“各項工作的立足點和出發點”）.

53. “Marco Polo’s Mixer”, Time, 10 January 1972.

54. Richard Charles Lee was a member of the prominent Hysan Lee (利希慎) family involved in real estate and other businesses.

55. From 1870, the Mok family had served as comprador for Butterfield and Swire until 1931. See Christine Loh, A Preferred Future, pp. 19–39. Mok Ying Kwai was deported to Guangdong in 1952, where he was appointed to the Guangdong CPPCC.

56. Ho Yin was the father of Edmund Ho, the first chief executive of Macao (1999–2009).

57. Henry Fok was possibly the most influential businessmen with China in his time. He reportedly smuggled arms into China during the Korean War, which he denied, but he admitted to violating the embargo by smuggling steel, rubber and other raw materials to China, see Jonathan Cheng, “A life that reflected change”, The Standard, 30 October 2006. Fok was appointed a vice-chairman of the CPPCC in 1993, had served as a Standing Committee member of the NPC, and also served as a member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Preparatory Committee.

58. 劉子健、彭建新、梁威林，〈談香港工作20年體會〉，《廣東黨史》，pp. 7–8.

59. Ibid., p. 8.

60. This figure was referred to in Yiu Yan Nang, “Trade Union Policy and Trade Union Movement in Hong Kong”, p. 76.

61. HKSAR Government, Archive, Document CO1030/1107. An undated secret report.

62. See《香港工人運動簡史》，http://www.hkctu.org.hk/1aboutctu/1/1.htm.

63. HKSAR Government, Archive, Document CO1030/1106, Hong Kong Local Intelligence Committee Intelligence Report, December 1960.

64. HKSAR Government Archive, Document CO1030/1106, Hong Kong Police Special Branch Report, November 1960. The information was obtained by agents who had infiltrated the unions.

65. Chan Lau Kit-ching, From Nothing to Nothing, pp. 11–12.

66. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, p. 133.

67. HKSAR Government Archive, Document CO 1030/1107, an undated confidential memo entitled “the Communist Controlled Schools”.

68. HKSAR Government Archive, Document CO 1030/1107, Letter from the governor of Hong Kong to the secretary of state for the colonies, August 1960.

69. Huang Wenfang, “Former Party Man Recalls Xinhua’s Early Days and Zhou Enlai’s Role”, Eastern Express, 15 June 1994.

70. HKSAR Government Archive, Document CO 1030/1107. Hong Kong Police Special Branch Report, February 1960.

71. Heung To Middle School, allegedly a communist hardcore school, applied for exemption from building restrictions in 1961 in order to expand. The colonial government refused the application on town planning grounds, but at the same time stated “the requirements of town planning thus supported the political argument against facilitating expansion of a Communist school”. See HKSAR Government Archive, Document CO 1030/1107, Hong Kong Local Intelligence Committee Monthly Intelligence Report, January 1961.

72. 周奕，《香港左派鬥爭史》，pp. 178–79.

73. Ibid., pp. 173–76.

74. HKSAR Government Archive, Document CO 1030/1107, Hong Kong Local Intelligence Committee Monthly Intelligence Report, February 1962.

75. According to Huang Wenfang, in the early 1960s, the daily circulation figures of Hong Kong Commercial Daily, Ching Pao Daily, and New Evening Post reached 50,000–60,000 and the sales of Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao were also quite respectable and stable. See 文灼非，〈香港新華社如何透過左報做宣傳工作（1949–1982）〉，《信報財經月刊》，p. 13.

76. For a detail account of the Tung Tau Village incident, see Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth, pp. 73–94. See also John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 137; Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 454–55; and Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 177–78.

77. Alexander Grantham, Via Ports, p. 159.

78. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 177–78.

79. Hong Kong Standard, 2 March 1952.

80. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 137; Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, pp. 454–55; and Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, pp. 178–79.

81. 劉蜀永，〈英國對香港的政策與中國的態度（1948–52）年〉，《中國社會科學》，pp. 185–86.

82. 廖承志，〈堅持愛國主義的辦報方針〉，5 December 1959.《廖承志文集》，pp. 396–97.“我們辦的報紙有兩類。主要的一類是進行社會主義教育，為社會主義建設服務，這是國內的報紙……另一類報紙，是我們在香港和海外辦的報紙……在華僑中辦的報紙，是以愛國主義為方針的……能不能在香港辦一家社會主義的報紙？不可能，也不必要……香港報紙的任務就是要對大多數同胞進行愛國主義教育……銷路愈多愈好……要面對港澳大多數群眾，為他們所愛看，為他們所懂……我們的報紙不要脫離香港大多數人的覺悟程度。”

83. “若要你們在香港辦黨報，倒不如叫人民日報去搞一個分社，乾脆把人民日報拿到香港去印發”，金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 47.

84. 劉子健、彭建新、梁威林，〈談香港工作20年體會〉，pp. 7–8.

85. James Lilley, China Hands, p. 84.

86. Ibid., p. 86.

87. Barclay Crawford, “CIA Agents Saw HK as Window on Communist Party”, South China Morning Post, 28 June 2007.

88. James Lilley, China Hands, p. 95.

89. Alexander Grantham, Via Ports, p. 169.

90. Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved, p. 134.

91. Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, pp. 52–53. The senior police officer mentioned by Xu was Ceng Zhaohe (曾昭科), an assistant superintendent of the Hong Kong Police in 1961. See〈前高級警官被指中國間諜逐出境　曾昭科盼董特首昭雪〉，《星島日報》，6 March 2002.

92. 鍾仕梅，〈工委政策偏離中央方針〉，《當代雜誌》，6 January 1990, pp. 34–35.

93. Ibid., pp. 34–35.

94. Mao Zedong’s view of remoulding Chinese society was laid out in his essay On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, 30 June 1949. In Mao’s words, “democratic dictatorship” means democracy is practised by the “people” (led by the party), not the “reactionaries” so that “democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries is the people’s democratic dictatorship”. Mao also said that if things were not done that way the revolution would fail. Read essay from http://www.marxist.org/reference/archive/mao.

95. The CCP saw the land reform programme as a success because the landlord class and its power was destroyed and replaced by cadres and middle peasants, who benefited the most from the reform. Middle peasants were those who were not the poorest or the richest peasants.

96. According to party history, by the spring of 1953, land reform had basically been accomplished throughout the country. Nationwide, more than 300 million peasants had been allotted land: “Ownership by the landlord class, the foundation of the feudal system that had continued for several thousand years in China, was by that time thoroughly eliminated. This meant a great, historic victory”; Hu Sheng, A Concise History of the Communist Party of China, pp. 417–18. Chan Sui-jeung discussed Guangdong’s land reform implementation in considerable detail, and includes the role of Fang Fang and Ye Jianying, East River Column, pp. 136–54.

97. The Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries is considered in CCP history as one of the party’s “great movements” in the early period of the founding of the PRC. It targeted those with KMT connections, religious leaders, as well as secret society members. By October 1951, party history records that the counter-revolutionaries had been “basically wiped out”, Hu Sheng, A Concise History of the Communist Party of China, pp. 420–21.

98. According to party history, problems included the “lawless elements among the capitalists, not satisfied with ordinary profits gained by normal methods, tried hard to grab high spoils by illegal means such as bribing state functionaries”, capitalists evading taxes, and stealing of economic information. The campaign supposedly enabled the party “to gain complete political and economic initiative and bring about rapid economic restoration and development”; Hu Sheng, A Concise History of the Communist Party of China, pp. 430–32.

99. A leading work on the Thought Reform Campaign is that of psychologist Robert Jay Lifton’s Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, published in 1961, where he described in detail various methods used to change people’s minds coercively, see Chapter 22.

100. Party history notes the party’s “policy of uniting and remoulding intellectuals”; Hu Sheng, A Concise History of the Communist Party of China, p. 460.

101. Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of the Contradiction among the People”, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 27 February 1957.

102. According to party history, the Hundred Flower Campaign resulted in criticisms and comments, “some of which were erroneous”, but the party sought to rectify “contradictions” by listening to criticisms, “well over 90 percent” were beneficial in helping the party improve its work. However, “a few bourgeois Rightists” launched attacks of the party and the socialist system, which led to the anti-Rightist movement; Hu Sheng, A Concise History of the Communist Party of China, pp. 520–27.

103. There are two schools of thought about Mao’s true intention in calling the Hundred Flower Campaign. One view, including that of the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, suspected Mao called for open criticism to induce dissenters to reveal themselves so he could identify and eliminate them (this is also the view of Jung Chang and Jon Halliday in Mao); whereas the other view is that Mao was genuinely surprised by the intensity of the dissent, see Lucian W. Pye, China, p. 235.

104. For a short account of the Great Leap Forward, see Graham Hutchings, Modern China, pp. 164–66.

105. For an account of the collectivisation of the countryside, see Justin Yifu Lin, “Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis 1959–1961”, Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1228–52.

106. See John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 150, and David Faure, Society, pp. 274–80.

107. Nikita Khrushchev served as the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in 1953 and until 1964. From 1958 until 1964, he was also the premier (chairman of the Council of Ministers). Khrushchev had attacked Stalin and his cult of personality in 1956, and revised Leninist doctrine by proclaiming that the war between communism and imperialism was not inevitable. These and other Soviet actions eventually led to the cooling of relations between China and the Soviet Union, see Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, pp. 3–13.

5. Hong Kong to the Chinese Communist Party

From 1949 to 1965