6. The Cultural Revolution and the Riots of 1967

From 1966 to 1976

 

 

The 1967 riots were a critical event in the history of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong. They were the most radical and violent act challenging British rule since the labour strike-boycott of 1925–1926. While there was much social discontent over relative deprivation in Hong Kong, which erupted in April 1966 over a proposed rise in Star Ferry fares, the riots that then ensued lasted less than a week. The 1967 riots were different—they went on for eight months, at the end of which the CCP establishment was largely destroyed by the colonial administration, and the sympathy of Hong Kong people lost.

China’s Cultural Revolution can be said to have three stages. The first began in 1966 and ended in April 1969.1 This was the time when Hong Kong was most involved, as a result of the communist-inspired riots in 1967 and 1968 orchestrated by the CCP in Hong Kong. The second period, from April 1969 to October 1973, saw the rise and fall of Lin Biao and the consolidation of the power of the Gang of Four. After the riots, the Hong Kong government went through a period of reform in order to strengthen its credibility and legitimacy. The people also went through a period of reflection about their sense of identity in relation to Hong Kong. The third period of the Cultural Revolution ended with the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 followed by the arrest of the Gang of Four on 6 October.2 By then, Hong Kong people identified strongly with their city and increasingly less with the Mainland.

All the major events of this period of history have been documented, but there are still relatively few scholarly analyses, although more work can be expected as the British archives for that period are now open. This chapter looks at the 1967 riots and the activities of the CCP in Hong Kong.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

The disturbances in Hong Kong need to be seen within the context of what happened on the Mainland. The revolution was launched by Mao Zedong to reassert his authority, rid China of “liberal bourgeois” elements and continue “class struggle”. The first bell of the Cultural Revolution was rung on 1 June 1966, when the CCP’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily, stated that all “imperialists”, “people with affiliations with imperialists” and “imperialist intellectuals” must be purged. On 8 August, the party’s Central Committee passed a decision to push “a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a deeper and more extensive stage”.3 The decision stated that:

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticise and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic authorities and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.4 [author’s italics]

Mao Zedong concluded that the revolution had yet to eliminate the bourgeoisie in society. Even more troubling to Mao was his perception that the CCP had lost its revolutionary zeal and party leaders had gone soft. He feared China would go the way of the Soviet Union, as it was doing under Nikita Khrushchev, and become “revisionist”. He then began to lay the groundwork to eliminate the highest ranks of the party hierarchy. Over the next few years, apart from Zhou Enlai and a few others, the purge touched all the leading cadres, war heroes and veteran revolutionaries, including all those who had worked alongside Mao for decades. No one’s record was beyond question. The Cultural Revolution evolved into waves of purges, during which a very large number of party and government officials were denounced and removed from office.

In order to bring down the party hierarchy, Mao bypassed it to reach out to radicals to do his bidding, and to appeal to students and youths to root out exploitation and energetically “destroy the old and bring in the new”. Privilege, position and hierarchy must be denounced. He believed young people could best protect his revolutionary legacy and those who were disloyal to him must be got rid of. He encouraged the young to act on their instincts. Educational establishments were considered too elitist and were closed down. Cultural sophistication, scholarship, expertise and professionalism were devalued. Instead, the Little Red Book of Mao’s quotations, published in millions of copies, was all one needed to know. Culture and the arts should only serve the revolution. Art objects with no revolutionary value were considered useless. Many priceless cultural relics were destroyed, such as the Confucius Temple in Qufu in Shandong.

Groups of youths, who banded together into shock forces of Red Guard, encouraged others to criticise those deemed politically suspect.5 Family members, friends, colleagues, teachers and neighbours were not spared. Many people suffered the most heart-wrenching public humiliation. There was widespread looting and destruction of homes and properties. The Red Guards supported Mao’s call to create a classless society where no one was better than anyone else. The Red Guards also turned their anger on foreigners. Britain was a special case because of its presence on Chinese territory with the colony of Hong Kong. Red Guards burnt down the British Mission in Beijing in August 1967, which was the most serious incident to take place in foreign affairs that year.6 During the height of the Cultural Revolution, the normal functions of the organs of the government and the CCP on both central and local levels were paralysed.7 Indeed, between mid-1966 and 1971, the CCP had become dysfunctional. Revolution and governance can never be expected to sit well together.

The first sign that political upheaval was brewing on the Mainland reached Hong Kong in May 1966—travellers reported that the mayor of Beijing, Peng Zhen, one of China’s top cadres, had been dismissed. Wall-posters were also spotted proclaiming that the defence minister, Lin Biao, was Mao Zedong’s most loyal supporter. Rumours abounded that there was a power struggle between Mao and Lin on the one side, and Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai on the other side. By August 1966, the Cultural Revolution movement had broken out in Beijing and quickly spread throughout the country. The news of events in China caused concern in Hong Kong although life in the colony remained stable. Businessmen visiting the Canton Trade Fair in October and November that year reported doing little business, as negotiations were hampered by endless lectures from the hosts on Mao Zedong Thought. At about that time, news reached Hong Kong that Liu Shaoqi had been disgraced.8

Green Light for Red Riots

Zhou Enlai, through Liao Chengzhi, had initially conveyed a message to CCP Hong Kong that the Cultural Revolution would not spread to the colony, as the campaigns only targeted the bourgeoisie and anti-revolutionaries on the Mainland. It was also made clear that any revolutionary activities in Hong Kong would jeopardise the foundation and network established by the CCP there.9 In October 1966, when Hong Kong party members visited Beijing to celebrate National Day, Liao Chengzhi repeated the same message to them.10 However, there had already been an early sign that things might not remain calm for Hong Kong. In September, Red Guards in Guangdong had renamed Hong Kong as the “Expel-the-Imperialists City” and thought they won a propaganda victory when a Hong Kong official spokesman said that letters from the Mainland to Hong Kong using the new name would be delivered.11 While the renaming of Hong Kong bordered on the farcical it showed that British administration could not completely shield Hong Kong from revolutionary excesses.

Events moved quickly on the Mainland. Revolutionary fervour became increasingly intense. Hong Kong party members and supporters considered what they should do despite what Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi told them. They watched from afar purge after purge of high-ranking cadres and officials in Beijing. No one wanted to make an ideological mistake at what was obviously a risky time. Self-preservation was the priority.12 The local CCP leaders did not want to be recalled to the Mainland, which had been the fate of other cadres stationed overseas. Although there was no way for the party to force them to leave Hong Kong if they had not wanted to go, as their livelihood depended on the party, they had to be careful.13

There was also the example of Macao to take into account—should similar action be emulated in Hong Kong? In November 1966, leftists in Macao took advantage of a trivial dispute over an attempt by the police to demolish an illegal extension that had been built on the grounds of a leftist school to organise demonstrations. On 3 December, students tried to prevent the demolition and claimed they were beaten by the police. The next day, students joined with the Federation of Trade Unions in Macao to demonstrate against the Portuguese colonial government. Protesters read out the Thoughts of Mao Zedong and sang revolutionary songs before the governor’s house. On 5 December, as the rioters became unruly, Governor Nobre de Carvalho ordered Portuguese troops to fire on rioters killing several demonstrators. A curfew was imposed. The Chinese moved gunboats into Macao’s territorial waters and Beijing accused the Portuguese of practicing “fascist atrocities” against the Chinese people of Macao. Rioters stormed the governor’s residence. The Portuguese soon gave in. They accepted the leftists’ demands to make a public apology for killing protesters and to pay compensation.14

The CCP Hong Kong sent members to Macao to learn what happened there, and they returned keen to get into the act in Hong Kong, seemingly having forgotten the instructions from Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi.15 The British watched events closely. The British realised that the Portuguese Government in Macao not only lost control but “they never really got it back”.16 Having lost control, Portugal offered to hand Macao back to China but the Chinese refused it. The British would be unwilling to share power informally with China, as Portugal was willing to do. In 1974, Portugal made a second attempt to give Macao back, which was likewise refused. It was only in 1986 after the question of Hong Kong was settled that China was ready to negotiate the settlement of Macao.

By March 1967, the British felt trouble was brewing in Hong Kong—a string of labour disputes started to occur and the left-wing press began to accuse “agents of Taiwan and American imperialism” of oppressing Chinese workers in Hong Kong.17 Governor David Trench (1964–1971) said at an off-the-record press briefing in London that the Red Guards’ aim was “to Macao us”.18

To the leftists in Hong Kong, political developments in Beijing appeared to require them to take action. By May 1966, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, initially formed in Beijing with the endorsement of the Politburo to draft policy documents, became effectively Mao Zedong’s personal provider of alternative information. By August, it became the campaign headquarters of the Cultural Revolution and quickly grew into a large bureaucracy occupying several buildings at Diaoyutai. By February 1967, it replaced the Politburo and CCP Central Committee Secretariat for all their duties. By then, the party organisation had been shattered by the various purges.19 The ascendancy of radicals—led by Jiang Qing—and their control of the Central Cultural Revolution Group must have been noted by the leftists in Hong Kong.

Moreover, radicals in Beijing also left their mark on foreign affairs. The Central Cultural Revolution Group insisted on the global dissemination of Mao Zedong Thought. Chen Yi, the foreign minister, got into trouble for resisting and had eventually to make a self-criticism.20 Red Guard liaison stations were created within the ministry to oversee its work. During this turbulent period, the radicals also abolished the government’s State Council’s Foreign Affairs Staff Office, which had day-to-day responsibility for Hong Kong matters, and replaced it with a new Foreign Affairs Revolutionary Leading Small Group. The radicals attacked former Staff Office personnel and transferred them to various other departments. Liao Chengzhi, the Staff Office’s first deputy, was forced to step aside and eventually purged and thrown into prison in 1968. Most of the staff members who looked after Hong Kong and Macao affairs were transferred to the Western Europe Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.21 The Revolutionary Leading Group became the direct supervising organ of CCP Hong Kong.

While Zhou Enlai remained in office, the leftists in the colony were unclear whether he still had full control over Hong Kong affairs.22 In January 1967, the Foreign Affairs Revolutionary Leading Group issued a directive to CCP Hong Kong, asking members to “rectify” the “wrong rightist line”, which Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi had to endorse, and “go back to the revolutionary path again”.23 It became obvious that Zhou’s position was also at risk.24 That was the green light radical leftists in Hong Kong had been waiting for to launch revolution in the colony.

Another point to note was that, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing had been weakened by the radicals with the result that it paid less attention to Hong Kong, the Guangdong Provincial Military Management Committee had become more involved in the colony’s affairs. The Committee’s No. 2 Small Group became responsible for providing assistance to local cadres and chaperoned visitors—mainly from unions, schools and other leftist organisations—from Hong Kong and Macao. Some scholars believe the No. 2 Small Group must have played a key role in the organised disturbances during the Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong.25

Both Sides Prepared for Trouble

The ensuing riots of 1967 were orchestrated by CCP Hong Kong working from the Xinhua Hong Kong office. The director of Xinhua Hong Kong at the time was Liang Weilin and his deputy was Qi Feng—both of whom would have great longevity at Xinhua Hong Kong serving for another decade, as will be seen in Chapter 7. It should be noted that Xinhua Hong Kong was not immune from running into trouble with the radicals in Beijing. Two of its deputy directors, Zhu Wanping and Liang Shangyuan were purged and dismissed. For example, Liang, who worked on overseas Chinese affairs, was accused of having connections with Taiwan. Their posts in Hong Kong were not filled until 1973, which probably weakened communication between Beijing and Hong Kong during those years.26

As the CCP members and supporters got ready for action in the colony, the Hong Kong administration was well prepared to meet trouble, although senior officials did not think there was imminent serious danger in early 1967. They only became concern in early April after street riots broke out.27 In terms of preparedness, the colonial authorities benefited from police reforms introduced after the riots of October 1956. With the Star Ferry riots in 1966, the authorities were just beginning to realise the extent of social frustration and alienation among the underprivileged class.28 The toll from the 1956 riots—59 deaths, 443 people hospitalised, and 1,740 court convictions for a week of trouble—was high. Nevertheless, the authorities had a chance to test police preparedness and, taking lessons from those riots, made further improvements. Police officers received regular anti-riot training, the police had three companies of anti-riot officers on stand-by at any one time, and further reinforcements could be brought in quickly. The authorities also observed what happened in Macao in December 1966 and took lessons from it. When the confrontation started in 1967, the Hong Kong government “had in place an organised, equipped, well-trained and efficient anti-riot police”.29 Indeed, the toll from the 1967 was low compared to that from the previous year. Despite eight months of protracted clashes between police and protestors and almost 1,200 bomb incidents during 1967, total casualties in Hong Kong were 51 deaths, 848 people injured, and 2,077 convicted by the courts.30

Early conflicts

There had been a string of seven major labour disputes in March and April 1967 in shipping, taxi, textile, and cement companies, which the Hong Kong authorities noted, but did not think indicated that there was imminent danger. The prelude to the riots was a particular industrial dispute over work conditions at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works in late April 1967. Condition in the factory was Dickensian, like many others—no better but no worse.31 Scuffles only occurred after factory management responded with a lockout and wholesale dismissal of workers. While the origin of the dispute did not appear to have been perpetrated by the CCP-dominated leftist unions, poor handling by factory management provided the CCP with the opportunity to politicise matters.32 Attempts to settle the disputes were deliberately frustrated. Rowdy demonstrations then ensued, designed to intimate the management.33 It was at that time that the secretary for defence, Jack Cater, was made deputy colonial secretary (special duties) to tackle the mobilisations. This unit met every day in 1967 to brief the governor. Cater would one day become chief secretary of Hong Kong.

Disturbances started on May Day—1 May 1967, also referred to as International Labour Day—in the large factory in San Po Kong, where there were 686 workers. The dispute was still ongoing after a week, and on 6 May:

A group of dismissed workers from the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works . . . were picketing the factory premises and, ignoring repeated warnings from the police, they persisted in illegally trying to prevent the removal of goods by the management. The police finally intervened and arrested 21 men. It was a minor incident; there was little or no violence and no one was seriously injured. It was, however, enough to provoke an immediate reaction; headlines appeared in the communist newspapers denouncing the government and accusing the police, in the most violent terms, of persecution and of brutally attacking unarmed workers.34

The FTU defined the 6 May incident as a “planned, organised and premeditated suppression of the patriotic workers and compatriots” by the police.35 On 11 May, the conflict escalated. Leftist supporters were mobilised to go to the factory to express support for the workers there, and they tried to break into the factory. The police were called in again. Indeed, all policemen were called to duty that day as thing got more unruly. By evening, the crowd had grown substantially and some rioters started to pelt the police with stones and bottles. The police responded with clubs, wooden bullets and tear gas. The unrest spread to the nearby Tung Tau Resettlement Estate, and the entire East Kowloon area was placed under curfew that evening. More than 100 people were arrested. On 12 May, Liao Chengzhi chaired a meeting in Beijing to discuss what was happening in Hong Kong. The vice foreign minister, Luo Guibo, was also present. They both had reservations about promoting confrontation in the colony but a decision was made to assist the struggle.36 In the meantime, on 12 and 13 May, the leftist groups in the colony organised a series of demonstrations in both Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, and violent clashes between the demonstrators and the police continued. Buses were set alight, government offices were looted, buildings were burnt and property damaged. More arrests were made. Order was only restored on 14 May.

The editorial of Ta Kung Pao labelled the violent conflict as an aggressive act committed by the colonial administration against the local Chinese.37 Other CCP-controlled newspapers likewise fiercely condemned the action of the Hong Kong authorities. The colonial authorities looked at the CCP’s efforts this way:

In May the communists had under their control all the machinery required for a full-scale propaganda campaign. Their three newspapers, Ta Kung Pao, Wen Wei Po and the New Evening Post, were well established and had a good circulation and they were backed up by about six other papers which not only followed their lead but at times ran to excesses of wild invention of their own. They had ample printing facilities for other propaganda material and the men and equipment for newsreel production. They also enjoyed considerable encouragement and assistance from . . . [Xinhua Hong Kong] . . . This agency was largely responsible for directing the propaganda campaign . . . as could be seen from the identical reports of incidents that regularly appeared in communist papers . . . It was also responsible for producing distorted accounts of the events in Hong Kong for the consumption of the authorities in Peking. Its highly-coloured and wildly exaggerated reports undoubtedly played a large part in inflaming opinion in China against the Government of the Colony. In their campaign the communists employed every theme and every weapon, from deliberate distortion of facts and falsification of photographs to the spreading of rumour and the fabrication of non-existent incidents. Rumours put about ranged from the possible but untrue—rice shortages, power or water stoppages—to the widely improbable—as for example the stories which appeared in minor communist newspaper, complete with photographs and maps, of Chinese gunboats approaching the Colony. Communist reporters and photographers were present at every incident to produce their versions of events; and in many cases demonstrations were organised solely for publicity purposes . . . [Another] propaganda medium was posters. These appeared from the start of the confrontation . . . reaching their height at the end of May and the beginning of June. Posters and slogans appeared everywhere, both ashore and afloat.38

The colonial authorities saw the rising propaganda efforts were aimed at enlisting active support from Beijing.39 The “workers” demanded that all the protesters arrested at the San Po Kong disturbances should be released; compensation should be paid; responsible parties should be punished; and a written apology should be made to all the Chinese people living in Hong Kong.40 On 15 May, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement demanding that the British government instruct the Hong Kong administration to stop all “fascist atrocities”, free those who had been arrested, and demanded that the authorities immediately accept all the workers’ demands. The People’s Daily published a commentary warning the colonial authorities that they had to “stop before it is too late”.41 Luo Guibo also presented the British charge d’affaires in Beijing with a formal protest. CCP Hong Kong received a message from Yao Dengshan, the head of the Foreign Affairs Revolutionary Leading Small Group, that it had Beijing’s full support in continuing the struggle in Hong Kong.42 The message was a significant morale booster, which induced the leftists to step up action.

The British tried to assess China’s real intention on Hong Kong so as to be able to interpret the verbal support for the disturbances from the ministry and Mainland media. There was confusion over whether there was about to be intervention from the Mainland. Cater’s impression was that “it was quite obvious that Beijing, especially Zhou Enlai, did not like the trouble made by the leftists in Hong Kong” and that the struggle campaign was a local effort.43

On 16 May 1967, various leftist organisations from business, education, labour, film and other sectors banded together to form the Hong Kong–Kowloon All Sectors Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee. It was created to give a semblance of widespread unity among people from all walks of life—a standard united front tactic. The Committee was supposed to be the command centre for planning, organising and commanding the people’s struggle but in reality it was CCP Hong Kong that made all the important decisions and orchestrated the struggle behind the scene.44 The Committee had seventeen members with Yeung Kwong, the FTU leader at the time, as chairman.45 When the Committee was launched, Yeung’s speech on the occasion referred to the colonial authorities oppressing the Chinese and urged the people to find inspiration in Mao Zedong Thought to “escalate the struggle to a higher level until victory is achieved against the British imperialist capitalists”.46 The Committee issued similar demands to those made by the Foreign Ministry.47

With Beijing’s message of support, the leaders of CCP Hong Kong mobilised hundreds of supporters from various leftist organisations to demonstrate outside Government House, where the governor lived and worked. For several days after 16 May, there were large crowds on Upper Albert Road in front of Government House. The demonstrators chanted communist slogans, sang revolutionary songs, waved placards, made speeches and plastered the gates of Government House with posters of quotes from Mao Zedong.

Large loudspeakers were also placed on the roof of the Bank of China Building in Central, broadcasting communist propaganda. The police proved quite creative in countering the noise by setting up on the roof of the Information Services Department across the road even more powerful loudspeakers playing popular music and Cantonese opera to drown out the propaganda.48 The resulting din made the area of Statue Square unbearable for the three days that the contest between left-wing forces and the Hong Kong authorities lasted.49 The use of loudspeakers for broadcasting was eventually banned in late May.

According to contemporary reports, the protesters at Government House behaved in a surprisingly orderly fashion:

As it was already lunch time, the demonstrators knocked-off and returned an hour later to resume chanting until five o’clock, when they all went home. The only casualty was the governor’s pet poodle, which went frantic with indignation and had to be removed from the scene.50

A deal had in fact been made. There had been secret communication between the police and left-wing leaders that there could be demonstrations in front of Government House if protesters remained peaceful.51 However, a request to meet the governor on 17 May was turned down.

Another report showed an amusing side to the protest:

Government House was plastered with posters. The governor had to use the back gate. But the Hong Kong Government was brilliant. They did things like putting up special notices for those who were coming to protest. A number of leading pro-communists were also fat-cat communists and would turn up in their expensive Mercedes cars. So a notice was put out saying: “Petitioners’ car park this way.”52

Less amusing, a million protesters marched past the British Mission in Beijing on 17 May calling upon the British to leave Hong Kong. A mass rally held the next day at a sports stadium in Beijing drew 100,000 people including senior leaders, such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi. In Shanghai, rioters broke into and destroyed the home of the British diplomatic representative.53 Soon thereafter, Zhou Enlai called a meeting to discuss Hong Kong. Chen Yi, Liao Chengzhi, and Luo Guibo were present. Zhou complained about the methods used by the leftists in Hong Kong. Their actions represented provocation to the British and Zhou questioned whether the colonial authorities would tolerate them. To continue the struggle appropriately, he ordered that a special Hong Kong–Macao office be created to provide leadership for Hong Kong and Macao matters. He probably also saw this as a counterweight to the radical Revolutionary Leading Group. Luo was made head of this unit, which was staffed by people with foreign affairs experience.54 Zhou Enlai’s role during the riots was the most interesting and enigmatic of all, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Increased fervour

Apparently, there were some concerns expressed within the leftist camp that the daily protests at Government House could easily turn violent. The voices of caution were criticised by Liang Weilin and Qi Feng as “rightist”—there was no need to be “afraid to struggle, afraid to win”.55 Indeed, things took a violent turn on 22 May, as thousands of protestors headed towards Government House for what had become their daily vigil. The protesters were asked by the police to split up into smaller groups before continuing on. They refused and clashed with the police. The leftists then sparked riots in various parts of the territory. The police used tear gas and wooden bullets in retaliation and arrested 167 of the rioters. The left-wing press reported several hundred injuries and called what happened the Bloody May 22 Incident. The editorial of Wen Wei Po accused the colonial administration of having carried out bloody suppression that resulted in a massacre.56 Xinhua Hong Kong alleged that 200 people had been killed or injured.57

CCP Hong Kong sent a ten man delegation to Beijing to meet the new Hong Kong–Macao unit. In discussion about how to continue the struggle, Beijing cadres thought it unrealistic to demand the British surrender unconditionally. It would require exerting comprehensive pressure on the British, and ideas on how to do that were considered unworkable. For example, cutting off or reducing food and water supplies to Hong Kong would only harm the compatriots, and anything involving the army to cause problems at the border was inappropriate. A consensus emerged that the struggle in the colony had to be waged mainly by the Hong Kong people against the colonial authorities. In meetings on 24 and 27 May, Zhou Enlai warned against using an “overly leftist” approach in handling the struggle in Hong Kong. He maintained that any struggle against the colonial authorities must be done within the limit of established policy—it must be “reasonable, advantageous and restrained”.58 In another meeting on 30 May, Zhou Enlai rejected the idea from the Hong Kong delegation to attack and kill some Hong Kong police officers because the police were corrupt and unpopular in the colony. Other plans included organising three rounds of strikes. The first would be from 10 June involving 80,000 to 100,000 workers, with transport workers forming the backbone so that they could bring transport and traffic to a standstill. The second wave of strikes could then be expanded to include 300,000 to 400,000 workers to put pressure on the authorities, with a third and final general strike aimed at paralysing Hong Kong as during the Strike-Boycott in 1925–1926 (Chapter 3). Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi were doubtful the leftists could involve such large numbers of strikers and pull things off. Zhou thought that in the worst case, Beijing could be forced to take back Hong Kong prematurely and that would not serve China’s interest. While the plans were to be revised by the leaders in Beijing, the Hong Kong delegation was sent back to the colony and told that they could act on their ideas first while Beijing considered revisions.59

Thus, starting from the end of May, leftists began to organise a series of stoppages and strikes in different trades trying to cause a breakdown of the city’s public transport, as well as water and electricity supplies.60 Another problem for Hong Kong in 1966 and 1967 was that below average rainfall led to a shortage of water. So Hong Kong wanted to buy more water from Guangdong, but a request for an additional supply from Guangdong went unanswered. To save water, ever tighter rationing was implemented: supply in Hong Kong had to be limited to four hours every four days in the summer of 1967. Heavy rains in August and September eased the situation.61 The water issue would not be resolved until on 1 October 1967, when the contract came up for renewal and when Zhou Enlai got back full control of foreign affairs, which also signalled the easing of confrontation in Hong Kong.62 Much would happen before then.

On 3 June, the editorial of the People’s Daily in Beijing condemned the British in very harsh terms and encouraged compatriots in Hong Kong to mobilise the masses to fight imperialism:

Hong Kong is ruled by thoroughly appalling British imperialism, it is the enemy of four million Hong Kong compatriots, it is the enemy of . . . the Chinese . . . in the past 100 years or so, British imperialism committed every crime in Hong Kong, and should be held accountable for the monstrous sins! . . . At present, the task placed before the patriotic Hong Kong compatriots is to press ahead and persevere in the struggle against British violence so as to win a great victory. To achieve this, it is necessary to boldly arouse the masses. With the working class as the nucleus, all patriotic and anti-imperialist forces in Hong Kong that can be united should be united and the ranks for struggle against British violence continuously consolidated and expanded.63

The editorial was “one the strongest condemnations of Hong Kong by the PRC in the 17 years of its existence and was seen as a veiled threat which had the intention of unsettling the authorities in the Colony”.64 The effect of the editorial was that it further stirred up the anti-British fervour of the leftists in Hong Kong. They believed that the party leaders in Beijing must have abandoned the previously cautious policy, and that China was ready to take back Hong Kong very soon. The revolutionary passion in the leftist camp surged to a high level.65 Their hope was not so much to defeat the authorities in the street but to show that the British might no longer have the stamina to hold on since Britain had an overall policy of decolonisation.66

The colonial authorities stepped up efforts to deal with the disturbances. Emergency regulations were introduced to prohibit the display of inflammatory posters that had slogans like “Hang David Trench”. Police carried out searches of leftist bookshops, banks, department stores and cinemas, and confiscated weapons and inflammatory materials. Violent conflicts frequently occurred during these searches and seizures. On two occasions, three leftists were killed. They became “martyrs” and the leftists declared that the “blood debts can only be repaid by blood”.67 In protest, Liang Weilin, the head of CCP Hong Kong, sent a message to the governor that if the colonial administration did not apologise, it “would be destined to be beaten to death by Hong Kong patriotic compatriots and the Chinese people”.68

In June 1967, CCP Hong Kong rolled out a new campaign to initiate a labour strike, business boycott, and school strike. At the time, the Chinese government owned more than 50 department stores, a number of other smaller shops, publishing houses, restaurants, the Bank of China and eight smaller banks, two insurance companies and three financial syndicates.69 The aim of the campaign was to turn Hong Kong into a “dead port”, shake the foundation of colonial rule and undermine it enough so that the British would surrender.70 Agitators tried to persuade food sellers to stop selling food but it was hardly practical since everyone, including the leftists, had to eat. On 13 June, the Guangdong authorities staged a token one-day stoppage of food supply to Hong Kong.71 On 24 June, 60,000 workers from more than 20 trades including marine and land transport, docks, textile industry and public services answered the appeal of the leftist camp to go on a general strike. Some of the workers were government employees or employees of British-owned enterprises. On 27 June, 20,000 students from 32 left-wing schools boycotted classes. On 28 June, while the food strike was supposed to start, Guangdong ignored it and kept sending food to the border. As businesses with close Mainland connection started a four-day boycott the next day, the food importers among them would not receive the food from Guangdong leaving provisions piling up at the border. The Hong Kong government’s assessment was that the leftist actions in the colony were the result of local initiatives and not the product of a well thought-out policy from Beijing. The disposition of the People’s Liberation Army in Guangdong, and the intelligence that the British had, supported such a view.72 Indeed, enormous efforts were made on the Mainland side to maintain food supplies to Hong Kong throughout the trouble period despite transport difficulties as a result of the disruptions by the Red Guards. This shows the various forces that were at play behind the scene on the Mainland.73

The leftist press claimed that more than 200,000 people had joined the boycott.74 The campaign was declared a victory. At a meeting on 1 July, Yeung Kwong said that it had caused the colonial authorities to suffer “dizziness and headaches”, and its “power and prestige had been significantly discredited”.75 However, the truth was the campaign neither created the expected effect of paralysing Hong Kong nor unsettling the ruling basis of the colonial government. The campaign failed to garner wide support. In comparison to Hong Kong’s total working population then of 1.5 million, the impact brought about by 60,000 strikers was relatively minor. Thoughtful people in the leftist camp had questioned whether the strike-boycott was wise, as it would have the most serious impact on the working class and small businesses. In fact, by the end of June, the strike-boycott began to run out of steam. On 2 July, the food embargo was lifted.

The peak of violence

On 8 July 1967, armed militia crossed the border from the Mainland side to Sha Tau Kok and shot up the police post there, killing five policemen. With continuous shootings, the police officers needed reinforcement, as there were still many of them holed up in their post. In fact, gangs had already swarmed across the border and caused trouble on 24 June. On that earlier occasion, the District Office and the Gurkha commander tried to negotiate and had to sign an apology to end the incident. On the second occasion however, things were much more worrying:

There was no knowing whether this was a local initiative or the beginning of a proper invasion . . . A decision to send in the army to retake the police post . . . required approval in London over a weekend. It took the whole day to get it, during which time the Gurkhas were formed up just short of the border. When approval eventually arrived, the militia were found to have retreated. From that time, the army took over control of the border until shortly before the handover of Hong Kong to China when the police returned.76

Jack Cater believed Zhou Enlai had not approved the incident at Sha Tau Kok. According to Cater:

Beijing told us to “hold on” and that they would help. But then they were also in chaos. There were also riots and most of the provinces in China had serious problems. They could not do anything for us at that time.77

The Hong Kong government concluded that the incident, though serious, was not an attempt at armed invasion of the colony as no regular People’s Liberation Army unit was involved. The incident was likely organised and executed locally by radical elements in the immediate vicinity across the border.78 However, the leftist press depicted the Sha Tau Kok incident as a show of support from Beijing for the anti-imperialist struggle in Hong Kong. Moreover, a veteran leftist claimed that a large number of Red Guards in Guangdong were in fact prepared to rush over the border to liberate Hong Kong. They were only stopped by a just-in-time telephone call from Zhou Enlai.79

As the impact of the strike campaigns had been disappointing, the leftists became increasingly militant, perhaps out of desperation. On 9 July, 150 leftists clashed with the police in the Western District during which one rioter and one policeman were killed. The death of the policeman, who was stabbed, was hailed by Jing Pao as “butchering live a yellow skin dog”. On the same day, another crowd of 300 leftists was engaged in a serious violent conflict with the police in North Point. They destroyed a tram station, attacked public vehicles passing by and set fire to a public bus. The police retaliated by firing tear gas and raiding several leftist strongholds in North Point. The riot lasted until midnight. Over the next few days, there were more riots and attacks on the police by the leftists, usually by hurling stones and splashing acidic liquids. Some leftists also attempted to persuade the Chinese serving in the police force to join their cause. The Anti-Persecution Committee praised the violent acts of the leftists and encouraged them to continue, and “to point the knife towards the British-Hong Kong fascists and their followers, and attack them without mercy”.80

In face of the increasing use of violence, the Hong Kong government was determined to crack down hard on the leftists. On 12 July 1967, the acting colonial secretary stated in the Legislative Council that:

we are now entering a new phase of violence and perhaps terrorism, for there is nothing so degraded that these men will not stoop to . . . We are convinced and determined now that the [time has] come to grasp and retain the initiative in this contest, we have no [doubt] that in doing so we shall have the whole-hearted support of the vast majority of the community, and we have no doubt of the final outcome. Meanwhile it is a time to be alert and resolute and steadfast.81

That night, the government imposed a curfew on Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. At the same time, Governor David Trench had decided he needed to replace the then Police Commissioner Edward Tyrer, whom he found not tough enough to deal with the confrontation. Tyrer was retired the next day.82 The police, with the back-up of the British Army, carried out a series of raids on known or suspected leftists’ strongholds. For the next three weeks, the police continued to raid the premises of left-wing unions, schools, stores and theatres, clocking up over 60 places. The police found and seized a large number of weapons and illegal materials. In one particularly dramatic operation, which involved more than a thousand policemen and soldiers, helicopters from a British aircraft carrier were used to land police officers and soldiers on the roof of a 27-storey building, while more officers and soldiers attacked at ground level at the same time. After that, the leftists covered the roof of the Bank of China Building with barricades to prevent it from also being used as a helicopter landing platform.83 There was resistance to most of the raids, which resulted in five deaths and 1,500 arrests according to leftist sources.84

The Hong Kong government also started to arrest well-known and influential leftist leaders in the territory. For example, Tang Bingda, a key committee member of the Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee and treasurer of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, was apprehended. Famous leftist movie stars Fu Qi and Shi Hui were detained and Ling Wanyan, headmaster of the left-wing Sai Kung Public School, was removed.

On 20 July, the Hong Kong government brought in sweeping additional emergency powers while continuing to raid left-wing premises. New regulations made it an offence to spread “false reports or false statements either verbally or in writing likely to cause public alarm or despondency”. Courts were empowered to hold criminal trials from which the public could be excluded so as to prevent witness intimidation. Other emergency regulations dealt with the power to seize weapons, oblige people to provide names and addresses to police officers on demand, disperse assemblies, prevent obstruction of the armed forces in the course of performing their duties, prohibit unlawful meetings, and protect official vehicles. On 28 July, another three emergency regulations were passed authorising the police to arrest and detain “conspirators and instigators” who took care to remain in the background, and using others to do their work for them.85

The totality of the Hong Kong government’s action hit the leftists hard but they were not about to give up yet. Under the direction of CCP Hong Kong, they decided to retaliate by planting bombs throughout the city. There was a sense that they had to escalate the level of violence. In any event, they had no better idea at the time according to Liang Shangyuan, the former deputy director of the Xinhua Hong Kong.86 Planting bombs was something the leftists had already done. The bombs were homemade devices using gunpowder extracted from firecrackers.87 On 12 July, two bombs they planted had exploded in the New Territories and Kowloon respectively but no one was hurt on those occasions. On 20 July, the Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee called on its supporters to be “bolder” and “ignite a few more flares” and “open up a few more battlegrounds”.88 On 26 July, nine bombing incidents happened in various places causing numerous injuries. The Committee applauded that bombs “blossomed everywhere” and that they “seriously disturbed, exhausted and highly embarrassed” the authorities.89 More bombs, mixed with hoaxes, were planted by the leftists until the end of 1967. According to government statistics, the police defused some 8,000 bombs or suspected explosive devices, in which more than 1,100 bombs were real, during the riots. As students from leftist schools became involved in the disturbances, the Hong Kong government saw the communist-dominated schools as “centres for storage and disseminations of inflammatory literature and even for the manufacture of bombs, both simulated and real”.90 On 27 November 1967, a student from the Chung Wah Middle School was injured in an explosion that happened in his school laboratory while, as alleged by the police, he was making bombs. For this reason, the police raided and closed the school afterwards, evoking a protest from Beijing. Tung Chee Hwa, the first chief executive of the HKSAR, studied at Chung Wah Middle School in the early 1950s. The school principal, Wong Jo Fun, was arrested and detained by the police during the 1967 riots.91 Bombs were also sent in parcels to recipients in British companies like the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and Jardine Matheson.92

The bombs were a serious concern for both the authorities and the Hong Kong public. The bombs had killed, maimed and injured many innocent people including children. As bombing persisted, the government banned all firecrackers so that bombs could not be made using the gunpowder. The bombings were seen as inexcusable terrorist acts by the community. Communist sympathisers were referred to in derogatory terms, like “lefties” or “leftist jackass” by ordinary folk.93 The extremists among the leftist camp used assassination as the means to continue their campaign. On 24 August, Lam Bun, a popular radio talk show host on Commercial Radio, noted for his condemnation of the leftists, was killed as he was driving to work. A death squad pretending to be road maintenance workers poured gasoline over Lam’s car and set it, and Lam, on fire. He was burned to death. Lam’s cousin who was also in the car was seriously burnt and died in hospital several days later.94 The killers have never been caught. After the killing, a leftist newspaper, the New Evening Daily, published an article that afternoon listing the “crimes” Lam had supposedly committed.95 It was also reported that a number of prominent figures who had voiced opposition against the riots, for example, Kan Yuet Keung (senior member of the Legislative Council and member of the Executive Council), Louis Cha (chairman of Ming Pao), Chung Sze Yuen (chairman of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries) and Henry Luk Hoi On (editor of the rightwing newspaper Chun Pao) were on a death list.96 A direct legacy of the murder of Lam Bun is the still running radio drama 18th Floor Block C on Commercial Radio. The show was launched in the wake of the riots but the programme became inseparable from what happened to Lam and continues to commemorate the spirit of speaking out against what is wrong in society.97

The end of violence

On 19 July, Hsueh Ping, supposedly a reporter at the Xinhua News Agency, was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment by a Hong Kong court in connection with rioting.98 On 19 August 1967, the police raided three left-wing newspapers and arrested the publishers, editors-in-chief, and printers for publishing false and seditious materials.99

[T]he arrest of the publishers and the banning of the three newspapers, the Tin Fung Yat Po, the Hong Kong Evening News and the Afternoon News were not simply because they were leftwing press, but because they told people to plant bombs in the streets. They were acting the violence, and were much more extreme.100

Wen Wei Po criticised the police action as “thoroughly fascist, thoroughly persecutory” and demanded the immediate release of the editors. The arrests incited the radicals in Beijing. On 20 August 1967, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an ultimatum to the British government demanding the lifting of the ban on the newspapers and release of those arrested in Hong Kong within 48 hours, which the British refused to do. To the British, meeting the demands would amount to a total surrender. At the same time, the People’s Daily issued commentaries on two consecutive days attacking British colonialism in Hong Kong. On 22 August, the Red Guards demonstrated in front of the British Mission in Beijing and then set it on fire.101 British diplomatic personnel were beaten when they escaped from the building, which was almost completely burned down. One of those beaten was Percy Cradock,102 who would one day return to Beijing as ambassador (1978–1984), where he would open and lead the negotiations on the future of Hong Kong.

Although Zhou Enlai no longer had full control over foreign affairs, he was furious at what happened and condemned the radicals as “uneducated” and “anarchistic”. As the incident was a serious diplomatic violation, Zhou sought and got the consent of Mao Zedong to make an official apology to the British government and undertook that China would rebuild the mission building. Mao was taken aback by what happened, which sparked an important turning point in the events of the Cultural Revolution.103 Mao also realised that by then the Mainland economy was reaching crisis point—industrial output fell 14 percent and foreign trade contracted by about 10 percent. China needed Hong Kong for its ability to generate foreign currency to help overcome its economic problems brought on by the political upheavals,104 and could not pour funds into sustaining the riots there. In this light, it can be seen that the hard currency obtained by China through exports to Hong Kong was extremely valuable. The revolution caused acute disruption to China’s domestic economy. If it were not for the financial connection with Hong Kong, the CCP’s supply of money would have been seriously reduced.

Thus, by early September 1967, the tone in Beijing changed, even though the leftists in Hong Kong had wanted to continue using bombs, expand the strike campaign and launch a fishing boat demonstration off the coast of Hong Kong.105 Zhou Enlai regained control over foreign affairs, and the leaders of the revolutionary faction involved in the British Mission burning were either punished or removed from office.106 From the perspective of the Hong Kong government, Beijing was not about to resume Hong Kong hastily, or support the leftists unreservedly. For the local leftists, this incident gave them a clear message that they would not have full backing from Beijing to unseat the colonial government. In fact, when the news of Zhou’s apology reached CCP Hong Kong, they found it hard to swallow, as it in effect rejected their struggle to topple the colonial authorities. They disseminated the news in a low-key manner.107 Sino-British relations showed an improvement. By the end of September, the British ambassador to the United Nations made clear that Britain supported China’s admission to the international body.108

In any event, the leftists’ efforts in Hong Kong were not getting anywhere, but the visit of Lord Shepherd (1918–2001, minister of state, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1967–1970) on 13 October prompted another wave of violence. The police paid informers for information about where bombs were being made and the identities of those who would plant bombs. The number of bomb incidents dropped. The authorities continued to raid the leftists’ premises, which was highly disruptive. Funds for sustaining strikes were running out. Many striking workers, who had been dismissed by their employers, were dissatisfied with the strike pay they were receiving. Allegedly, some of the most loyal strikers were given free theatre tickets instead of strike pay.109 Some of the strikers had become so hard-up that they were forced to appeal to the government for assistance. Mainland-controlled banks and department stores started to remove propaganda posters from their premises, as they were eager to win back lost business and customers.110

At the end of October 1967, Zhou Enlai reportedly summoned the senior cadres from Hong Kong, including Liang Weilin and Qi Feng, to Beijing and criticised them severely that they had committed a mistake of “extreme leftism”. They were ordered to stop agitation in Hong Kong.111 Indeed, their stay in Beijing for two months was Zhou Enlai’s way to have “their heads cool down”.112 The struggle thus petered out by January 1968. Indeed, the immediate result of the riots was the exact opposite of its intended purpose—the disturbances had increased the legitimacy of the colonial authorities. It is worth noting that Liang and Qi were not made accountable beyond Zhou’s reprimand. Liang continued as the director of Xinhua Hong Kong until December 1977. Qi also remained as the deputy director until the mid-1980s when he retired.

The bravery and steadfastness of the police force in Hong Kong was rewarded with many commendations and the right to add the word “Royal” to the name of the force was granted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1969, in recognition of its distinguished service during the riots.

Impacts of the 1967 Riots

Eight months of disturbances had caused anxiety, distress, inconvenience and economic loss to the Hong Kong community. During 1967, there was a net decrease in total bank deposits amounting to HK$243 million. At the end of the year, total deposits stood at HK$8,162 million, compared to HK$8,405 million at the end of 1966.113 Trading at the Hong Kong stock market had to be temporarily suspended twice during the turbulent period. Stock prices declined across the board and started to recover only in January 1968.114 Despite the disturbances, Hong Kong still managed a 17 percent increase in the value of domestic exports and 14 percent in re-exports.115

The vast majority of the Hong Kong community did not rally behind the leftists’ cause to unseat British administration. They could see that if the Red Guards ran Hong Kong, they would have to adhere to Maoist ideology and living standards would drop. However, the riots of 1966 and 1967 made blindingly obvious the existence of many unattended social problems in Hong Kong, in particular, in the areas of labour, housing and education. This prompted the colonial government to carry out a series of social reforms to improve the quality of administration and the living conditions of the working class. Hong Kong had grey industrial slums, where workers laboured very long hours in unsafe and unhealthy conditions, in which the young, uneducated, workers felt frustrated by their limited prospects. While the government had made substantial efforts to resettle refugees and squatters with a massive public housing programme since the Shek Kip Mei fire in December 1953—the next major fire after the Tung Tau fire in 1951 discussed in Chapter 5—social and educational amenities had not kept up with the huge post-war population growth. Jack Cater acknowledged that “if not for the riots, I do not think that the government will carry out any reforms”.116 The appointed political elites that populated the Executive and Legislative Councils and the government’s various advisory committees did very little to push social reform. They preferred to keep taxes low and social welfare minimal.117 Thus, the recommendations from the government-appointed Commission of Inquiry to create social insurance and benefits programmes were rejected by both the colonial officials and their appointees.118

The succeeding five years after the riots was a time when political, social and economic conditions in Hong Kong had to be re-examined and the riots strengthened the hand of those who called for reform, which included professionals in social, medical and educational work. On the political side, the Hong Kong government placed the problem on the “serious lack of communication between the government and ordinary people in town”,119 not the distribution of power. Thus, the political solution was to create a mediating local-level structure between the government and the community in the urban areas in order to improve public relations. This mirrored the District Offices in the New Territories. Ten District Offices were set up in mid-1968:

They will be as accessible as possible to those living in their Districts, and they will keep in touch with all local organisations. They will be required to assess the overall impact of government policies on the people of their districts and to explain these policies, as well as the difficulties and the achievements of the government to ordinary people. Although they will not at first be required to carry out many executive functions they will be responsible for advising on the co-ordination of public services. They will consider whether there should be any variation in emphasis in government policies in the Districts and they may initiate proposals for changes in policies or for new policies when the need for these becomes apparent from the feeling of the public. They will be expected to get to know the problems and conflicts and trends of public thinking in their districts before attitudes have been struck. We hope that their work will strengthen the ability of the Government to give all the people who live here a fair share of those services which the community can afford.120

In its political aim, the City District Office scheme proved quite effective in extending the government’s communication network into the lower strata of Hong Kong society.121 It was subsequently supplemented by the establishment of many more consultative and advisory bodies, which involved “the administrative absorption of politics” designed to co-opt the elites to shore up support for the colonial authorities,122 as well as to make Chinese an official language alongside the use of English. Another minor reform of a political nature was to give the office of the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council slightly greater leeway to redress grievances after rejecting the establishment of an Ombudsman.123

The riots also exposed the poor employment conditions of the local work force. In the 1960s, many Hong Kong workers worked a 12-hour day, seven days per week. They had low job security and little bargaining power. Working conditions were basic. On 14 February 1968, the commissioner of labour announced a series of legislative proposals to be implemented in phases concerning a long list of items in the areas of labour’s welfare, health and safety.124 Two labour advisers from Britain were invited to go to Hong Kong to assist in setting up a labour tribunal and improving the laws regulating trade unions. Nevertheless, it took until 1973 before all the various labour legislative proposals were enacted into laws.125

The riots also forced the colonial government to review the poor education situation in Hong Kong. In 1967, more than 150,000 children of primary school age were unable to attend school and only 39 percent of the 10 to 14-year-old group and 13 percent of the 15 to 19-year-old group could attend secondary schools. By 1971, it was estimated that there would be 2 million people in Hong Kong below the age of 19, which would create even greater strains on the already inadequate education system.126 In 1971, the government undertook to provide free primary education for all eligible children, and in 1979, nine years of free and compulsory education was provided so that children must stay in school until the age of 15.

The riots of 1967 made the Hong Kong community reflect upon their sense of identity. The elites were not about to support the leftists but neither did most other groups. No one wanted Hong Kong to be run by the Red Guards. In mid-May 1967, 98 local organisations pledged their support for the Hong Kong government to suppress the rioters. These ranged from business and trade associations to professional bodies, schools, and kaifong (neighbourhood) associations. Several days later, more than 300 social organisations published a joint statement in two Chinese newspapers to support efforts of the colonial government in restoring law and order. The people even suggested tougher action than the government wanted against the leftists “because they were really frightened about the Communists”.127 The Heung Yee Kuk, a traditional rural organisation representing the interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the New Territories, also made a public statement against the actions of the leftists.128

A local consciousness also began to emerge in the rest of Hong Kong society. From late 1947 to the end of 1965, the population of Hong Kong had increased from 1.80 million to 3.625 million as a result of a high local birth rate and migrants from the Mainland. The new arrivals were mainly poor refugees with no sense of belonging to Hong Kong and yet most of them were not about to return across the border. Even between the two years of 1966 and 1967, Hong Kong’s population increased by some 135,000 people. Between 1968 and 1976, when Mao Zedong died and the Gang of Four lost power, the population increased to over 4.55 million.

Impact of the Riots on the Local CCP

Undoubtedly, the leftists were the biggest loser after the riots. A large number of underground CCP members and party sympathisers were arrested and imprisoned during the riots. A vast majority of the underground network of the CCP was exposed and destroyed by the Hong Kong government. The intelligence efforts built up by the CCP inside the colonial government and various social sectors almost completely disintegrated. Further, the CCP’s intelligence efforts towards Taiwan in Hong Kong were seriously damaged and did not fully recover until the 1980s.129

In terms of financial loss, the riots were expensive for the CCP. Reports noted that the Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, acting on behalf of the party, paid a subsidy of HK$480 a month to strikers. Those who planted hoax bombs received HK$40 and those who planted a real bomb received HK$200 per planting.130 The Committee did not have unlimited funds to keep shelling out. Contemporaneous news reports noted that by the end of July 1967, the riots had cost the CCP at least HK$260 million, including HK$200 million in lost trade, HK$40 million in loss of local business and HK$20 million dollars in providing an advance to the Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee to whip up trouble.131 A contemporaneous report noted that:

(the local leftists) had made wrong decisions in the struggle campaign, misused the “struggle fund” remitted to them from Peking, badly miscalculated the extent of popular support, caused heavy losses to China trade and business in Hong Kong, supplied Peking with poor intelligence, failed in their propaganda work in Hong Kong for the past seventeen years and put stories in the leftwing newspapers from the rest of the press in Hong Kong.132

The riots also changed the course of life for many of the leftists. Many strikers remained unemployed for a long time as they were dismissed by employers. Their enthusiasm for the communist cause turned into frustration. Many severed their ties with the leftist camp. Morale in the camp, especially among the workers, hit rock bottom.133 The leftist trade unions lost significant ground in Hong Kong. They turned inward and seldom involved themselves in social affairs. The self-imposed isolation from Hong Kong society remained unchanged up until the mid-1980s.134

For many youngsters, who were inspired by the communist cause, their lives were changed forever. Florence Leung Mo Han, who was a CCP member and president of the Hok Yau Club—a peripheral party organisation established in 1949 in Hong Kong to recruit young people—regretted that their futures were ruined.135 The Tsang family provides a vivid example and there are many such cases. Tsang Tak Shing, the secretary for home affairs (2007–2015), was a high school student at the time of the riots. In September 1967, he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for distributing seditious materials at school. He lost the opportunity to go to university and, after he was released from jail, he worked at Ta Kung Pao up until the 1990s, when he was appointed into the Central Policy Unit in 1998 by Tung Chee Hwa. His younger sister, Tsang Lai Yu, aged 15 then was jailed for a month for participating in the riots. She later worked in a leftist newspaper as a public relations manager.136 Elder brother, Tsang Yok Shing, the founding chairman the DAB, and president of the Legislative Council (2008–2016), although he graduated with a first class honours from the University of Hong Kong in 1968, decided to give up further studies and taught at a leftist school for almost three decades.

Tsang Yok Sing remembered the riots thus:

The Government handled the riots in a very high-handed, colonial manner. I felt that it was protecting the interests of the capitalists, and, in doing so, suppressing the workers. I personally knew many of the people, the workers and trade unionists, involved in the violence, and they were very good people . . . The prevailing view now is that the police acted with a great deal of restraint at the time, and that people in the leftist camp were just a violent mob . . . This is not true, and the Government’s firm action was neither necessary nor justified . . . The greatest shock during that time was the imprisonment of my siblings. My brother . . . was a Form 6 student at St Paul’s, and was a timid boy . . . He was sent to Stanley Prison which was then full of trade unionists and non-violent workers . . . A couple of months later, my fifteen-year-old sister was also arrested. She was a Form 3 girl at Belilios Public School. She was in the playground with thirteen other girls, and when the school bell rang they refused to go back to the classroom. I cannot quite remember what they were asking for, but anyway the headmistress decided they were making trouble. She called the police, and all fourteen were tried, found guilty of breaching the emergency legislation in force during 1967, and sent to the women’s prison at Lai Chi Kok for one month . . . It was also a very difficult period for me. After my brother’s arrest, I was shunned at university . . . My experience drove me more to the other side. I worshipped Mao Zedong and he became my idol.137

Tsang Yok Sing’s views were echoed by Andrew Li Kwok Nang, a young reporter then, and Chief Justice (1997–2010). He had interviewed many of those arrested during the disturbances and examined the reports of about a hundred of them. Li also traced the roots of the unrest to social inequality. He also found Hong Kong youngsters then to be disillusioned about their future prospects. Li quoted from one interview that he felt was representative:

If the labour dispute had been dealt with fairly and justly by the Labour Department, everything would have been fine. Instead the Hong Kong British sent in the police to deal with a labour dispute, and they beat fellow Chinese. The Hilton or Garden Road incident marked a turning point. Fellow Chinese went to stage an orderly demonstration but they were beaten up by the cunning police. After this, it became a radical and political struggle.138

The most serious impact on CCP Hong Kong was on its united front work. The violence used during the riots turned Hong Kong people off many things associated with communist China for a generation. There was a distinct leftist phobia after the riots. For example, Xinhua Hong Kong employees were uncomfortable with disclosing who they worked for fearing they would be ostracised. There was a time when Hong Kong people referred to Xinhua workers as all born in the Year of the Tiger with “man eating” instincts.139 Many of the Xinhua Hong Kong staff up until the early 1980s were underground party members who lost their normal jobs during the riots.140 The party’s united front work remained stagnant until Liang Weilin stepped down as director of the Xinhua Hong Kong in December 1977 and Liao Chengzhi regained power in Beijing over Hong Kong affairs in 1978. Liao Chengzhi had been purged but was released from detention in 1972.

Various indicators show the loss of credibility of the leftist cause. The circulation rate of the major leftist newspapers dropped drastically after the riots. For example, the circulation of Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po fell from more than 100,000 to just 10,000 per day each.141 For a time, many shoppers did not want to patronise the Mainland department stores. People could not even tolerate the extension of a leftist school in their district, as can be seen from the open letter to the authorities written by the villagers at Yuen Long opposing the extension of the Hon Wah Middle School:

The facts are that illegal weapons were found by the police in the school and its students were instructed to throw bombs . . . these acts angered both God and Man and are not permissible in the world . . . after the struggle failed, Hon Wah Middle School immediately changed its appearance with evil hidden intent and tried to ignite the fire again . . . our villagers are used to peaceful living for generations, if troublemakers were allowed to study here and spread wicked “struggle” beliefs . . . they will for sure create a lot of noise and disturbances, and causing villagers to be afraid and feel uneasy when sleeping and eating, and endanger the safety of our district.142

As Tsang Yok Sing noted, the leftists felt ostracised from mainstream society:

They read patriotic newspapers, went to cinemas that showed patriotic pictures, shopped at patriotic stores that sold only Chinese products, joined patriotic unions, and sent their children to patriotic schools . . . these loyalists felt obliged to spring to the defence of the PRC whenever she was under attack. They would stand by their motherland for better or for worse . . . like any relatively closed community, they had a subculture of their own . . . Members of this leftist community were strictly excluded from the British colonial establishment.143

Interesting disclosures

A central figure during the 1967 riots was Zhou Enlai. He has been described as the “perfect revolutionary” because he “almost never made a mistake. This was the key to his ongoing success over many decades and throughout turbulent times.” When he was caught between titanic political forces, Zhou would try to “find the middle way”, resort to absurd “rhetorical babble” whenever necessary, and he “took Mao Zedong’s political temperature at every opportunity to make sure that he had found the middle ground”, taking pains not to antagonise people from different camps.144

In May 1967, Zhou faced a serious threat to his political survival when there was an attempt to drag him down.145 Conscious of the danger, Zhou felt he had to act extremely carefully. He could not condemn the leftists in Hong Kong. He sought to both encourage and restrain the riots at the same time. He ordered that an ad hoc office on Hong Kong affairs at the Foreign Ministry be set up so that he could watch and influence decisions. He approved or supported all the key actions mentioned in this chapter—the Foreign Ministry statement, attended the mass rally at the sports stadium, and the mass rally in front of the British mission in Beijing. Zhou did not stop the plans for the strikes that were supposed to paralyse the colony. In July, he told the commander of the Guangzhou Military Region in a private conversation that it was not in China’s interest to use force. On 17 August, the radicals wanted to attack Chen Yi, which was in effect an attack on Zhou. Zhou was so enraged that day that he suffered a heart attack. With him indisposed, China’s foreign affairs spun out of control. On 22 August, when demonstrators sought to take over the British Mission in Beijing, Zhou made sure security forces from the Beijing Garrison were sent to protect the mission and its staff, but to no avail. It was after the burning of the mission that Zhou showed his fury by summoning all concerned for a dressing down. When Mao Zedong showed how upset he was over what happened, Zhou seized the opportunity to change the course of political direction, marking an important turning point in the Cultural Revolution.146

Disclosures by people with CCP connections are also illuminating. According to Liang Shangyuan, shortly after the 22 May Bloody Incident, Zhu Wanping, the other deputy director at the time, visited Beijing to ask for instructions from Zhou Enlai. Zhou told him that what the leftists were doing in Hong Kong was forcing the Central Government “to ride the horse”. Furthermore, during the riots, Zhou prohibited the People’s Liberation Army from crossing the border to Hong Kong and no weapons and bombs were allowed to be sent. Thus, Zhou had no intention to change the “making full use of Hong Kong in the interest of long-term planning” policy, let alone use violent means to recover Hong Kong. In Liang’s view, the CCP Hong Kong had to take responsibility for the riots of 1967. While they knew Zhou’s views, the local leftists wanted to create an irreversible situation in Hong Kong so that Beijing would be forced to accept it.147 Zhu and Liang were both labelled as anti-revolutionary subsequently and purged. In Liang’s case, when he returned to the Mainland in 1968, an unnamed source in Hong Kong informed Beijing that he was a spy for Taiwan. He was imprisoned and only released in 1973 when Zhou Enlai asked to review his case.148

A party official, who was responsible for party propaganda work in Hong Kong during the riots, shared Liang Shangyuan’s interpretation of events. According to him, the riots were initiated by the local leftists egged on by radicals in Beijing. Zhou Enlai approved the activities but he was never really supportive of the struggle in Hong Kong. When Zhou met Liang Weilin and Qi Feng at the end of 1967, Zhou made it clear that the leftist confrontation was contradictory to the Central Government’s policy towards Hong Kong.149 Some leftists wished that by adopting increasingly violent means, the struggle in Hong Kong could be escalated to a power struggle on the international level between China and the United States and Britain.150

In reflecting upon the 1967 riots afterwards, some veteran leftists described the struggle as a farce and a power struggle.151 They felt they had been used and they regretted what they did.152 Others were disappointed that their “patriotic behaviour” was never officially recognised and felt that they were owed an explanation from the local CCP and the Central Government in Beijing.153 Their voicing of their sense of injustice probably resulted in Tung Chee Hwa’s extending to several of the activists during the riots an invitation to the Mid-Autumn Festival party held in Government House in September 1997. In 1999, several prominent local leftists were awarded medals or appointed as Justice of the Peace for their contribution to the society. In 2001, upon the nomination of the FTU, Yeung Kwong, the chairman of the Anti-Persecution Committee, was awarded the Grand Bauhinia Medal. Yeung’s award created substantial controversy in Hong Kong, as he was considered to have been one of the key personalities of the 1967 riots.

Resolution on CCP History

How should the CCP explain the maelstrom of the Cultural Revolution when so very many people suffered so terribly and the country experienced a severe setback? Overall, the Cultural Revolution remains a frightful memory because it left so many enduring physical, emotional and psychological scars. Issued on the CCP’s 60th anniversary in 1981, the Resolution on Party History stated that the Cultural Revolution was initiated and led by Mao Zedong, and that it was an episode in party history that was “comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration”. The Cultural Revolution did not conform to Marxism-Leninism or China’s reality. Mao was “a leader labouring under a misapprehension”. The party claimed that Lin Biao and Jiang Qing took advantage of Mao’s errors and committed many crimes “behind his back”. The party’s Central Committee also admitted that:

The theories and practices of the Cultural Revolution were totally erroneous. The Cultural Revolution did not constitute a revolution or social progress in any sense, nor could it possibly have done so . . . The Cultural Revolution was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic.154

Leading scholars of this period of Chinese history continue to ask why party leaders of considerable ability, experience, toughness, and prestige failed to restrain Mao when he ran amok. There is as yet no thoroughly researched answer.155

No wonder Chief Executive Donald Tsang aroused so much controversy from all quarters on 12 October 2007, when he described the Cultural Revolution as an “extreme form of democracy” on a radio show when discussing Hong Kong’s constitutional development.156 Tsang was taken to task for two reasons. Firstly, he dared to suggest that an inevitable result of democracy would be extremism; and secondly he ignored the fact that during the Cultural Revolution, and especially in 1967, Hong Kong people had refused the invitation to join in the riots. He had to make a public apology the following day to stop further public condemnation.157

On the fiftieth anniversary of the 1967 riots in 2017, more than a hundred leftist workers and their families went to the Wo Hop Shek Public Cemetery to commemorate “heroes” who died during the riots and were buried there. An FTU representative was present at the fiftieth anniversary memorial. The 67 Synergy Group has been organising the annual memorial since 2011.158 Thinking about the past remain painful for those who suffered. Yet, this period of time in Hong Kong’s history is one that deserves much more research so as to enable the community to develop an interpretation of the events of that era and what significance they hold for Hong Kong to reflect on its present and future.

1. There is scholarly debate about when the Cultural Revolution started. The earliest date was in September 1965 with a speech made by Lin Biao, or on 16 May 1966 when senior party leaders were criticised by Mao Zedong.

2. On that day, Hua Guofeng, who was Mao Zedong’s anointed successor, with Ye Jianying, moved with lightning speed. With the help of Mao’s long-time bodyguard and the guard unit, they arrested the members of the Gang of Four and several of their principal supporters. The struggle between the Gang of Four and the moderates that everyone had expected was suddenly precluded.

3. Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, adopted 8 August 1966 by the Central Committee of the CCP.

4. Ibid.

5. The first Red Guard organisation was formed on 29 May 1966 by students at the middle school attached to Tsinghua University, Robert MacFarquar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 87.

6. Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, p. 469.

7. For a definitive account of the Cultural Revolution, see Robert MacFarquar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution; and also Laszlo Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism, pp. 289–350.

8. David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997, pp. 33–36.

9. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 123.

10. 冉隆勃、馬繼森，《周恩來與香港「六七暴動」內幕》，pp. 63–64.

11. Robert MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 115.

12. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 95.

13. For example, 司馬文森, a cultural counsellor stationed in France, was persecuted and imprisoned after returning to China. See 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，pp. 216–17. Cheung’s book is also available in English, Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Riots.

14. Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong Kong, p. 28.

15. See the comments made by Liang Shangyuan (梁上苑)，the former deputy director of Hong Kong Xinhua News Agency in 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 19. Some commentators noted CCP members and supporters from grassroots backgrounds were keen to emulate Red Guard—like activities in Hong Kong, 梁慕嫻，〈六七暴動惡花今結果〉，《開放雜誌》，http://www.open.com.hk/0708p53.html. See also Gary Ka-wai Cheung, Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Riots, pp. 16–20.

16. David Wilson, interview, 19 September 2003, p. 18, http://chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Wilson.pdf. David Wilson worked at the Foreign Office in London at the time of the 1967 riots, and was governor of Hong Kong, 1987–1992.

17. David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997, pp. 36–37.

18. Quoted in Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, p. 97. For a scholarly analysis of the impact that Macao had on Hong Kong, see Robert Bickers, “On Not Being Macao (ed) in Hong Kong: British Official Minds and Actions in 1967”, in May Days in Hong Kong, pp. 54–67.

19. The group’s full name in English is the Cultural Revolution Group of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee. The Central Committee consisted of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, as well as the Secretariat. In 1964, Mao Zedong had a group formed to carry out the rectification campaign in the arts and literary circles and to prepare reports and policy documents. In May 1966, the group was renamed the Central Cultural Revolution Group directly under the Politburo’s Standing Committee. In August 1966, the Group became the authority responsible for the Cultural Revolution. By January 1967, as a result of various purges, the Secretariat of the Central Committee ceased to function, and by the following month the Group also replaced the Politburo. The Group shared power with the CCP Central Committee, State Council and Central Military Commission. Jiang Qing and her supporters became the centre for power, and they controlled the Group. The Group was dissolved in 1969, see Kwok-sing Li, A Glossary of Political Terms, pp. 583–85. See also Robert MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, pp. 80, 99–101; and Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, pp. 115–16 and 153–55.

20. David Wilson, interview, pp. 19–21, http://chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Wilson.pdf, 19 September 2003. Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Zhou Enlai, pp. 252–58 on Chen Yi and pp. 258–60 on foreign affairs; and Gao Wenqian on Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, Zhou Enlai, pp. 170–79.

21. John P. Burns, “The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong”, Asian Survey, p. 751.

22. One view is that Zhou Enlai was still in control of the Hong Kong matters during the Cultural Revolution and the revolution by the CCP in Hong Kong was in fact orchestrated by him, see 余長更，〈周恩來遙控「反英抗暴」內幕〉，載冉隆勃、馬繼森，《周恩來與香港「六七暴動」內幕》，pp. 2–55. Another view was that Zhou had lost control by August 1967 when he was denounced by Wang Li of the Central Cultural Revolution Small Group, see Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, pp. 184–85.

23. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 128, the Hong Kong CCP was told to“重新走上革命道路”。

24. Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Zhou Enlai, p. 225.

25. John P. Burns, “The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong”, Asian Survey, p. 751.

26. Cindy Yik-Yi Chu, “Overt and Covert Functions of the Hong Kong Branch of the Xinhua News Agency, 1947–1984”, The Historian, p. 38.

27. Jack Cater, who was secretary for defence, thought “[t]here was nothing happening in Hong Kong in early 1967”; Wong Cheuk Yin, “The 1967 Leftists Riots and Regime Legitimacy in Hong Kong”, http://www.hku.hk/hkcsp/ccex/ehkcss01/issue3_ar_lawrence_wong.htm.

28. Kowloon Disturbances, 1966, Report of Commission of Inquiry. For a summary of the report, see Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, pp. 82–96.

29. Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, p. 186.

30. Robert Bickers and Ray Yep, May Days in Hong Kong, p. 7.

31. Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, pp. 173 and 184.

32. Gary Ka-wai Cheung, Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Riots, pp. 28–29.

33. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, p. 100; and Gary Ka-wai Cheung, Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Riots, pp. 29–42.

34. Hong Kong Government, The Face of Confrontation, February 1968.

35. 張家偉，香港六七暴動內情《香港六七暴動內情》，“有計劃，有組織，有預謀的對我國愛國工人和愛國同胞進行瘋狂的迫害”，p. 34.

36. Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, pp. 179–80.

37. Editorial, Ta Kung Pao, 12 May 1967.

38. Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong Disturbances, 1967, pp. 48–52.

39. Ibid.

40. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 62.

41. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，pp. 42–43.

42. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，pp. 132–33.

43. Wong Cheuk Yin, “The 1967 Leftists Riots and Regime Legitimacy in Hong Kong”, http://www.hku.hk/hkcsp/ccex/ehkcss01/issue3_ar_lawrence_wong.htm. Wong’s thesis gives the impression that Jack Cater contacted Zhou Enlai in Beijing to ascertain China’s intention. That would have been unlikely since it was uncommon for Hong Kong officials to contact Mainland officials directly, but there would have been messages being carried back and forth from various go-between, such as the senior representatives of Bank of China.

44. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 47.

45. The HKSAR Government awarded Yeung Kwong a Grand Bauhinia Medal in 2001, which aroused much controversy.

46. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，pp. 45–46，“港英當局對中國同胞還在進行瘋狂的民族迫害，這場反迫害鬥爭就是一場民族鬥爭。用毛澤東思想武裝起來的各業工人和各界同胞一定要把反迫害鬥爭升級一定要粉碎港英的迫害陰謀，不獲全勝，誓不收兵。”

47. Ibid., pp. 46–47.

48. Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong Yearbook 1967, p. 12. See also Denis Bray, Hong Kong Metamorphosis, p. 125. The Information Services Department was housed in a low-rise building on the other side of Queen’s Road, where the Cheung Kong Centre is today.

49. Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong Disturbances, 1967, pp. 48–52.

50. David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997, p. 39.

51. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 47.

52. David Wilson, interview, p. 18, http://chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Wilson.pdf.

53. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, pp. 224–27; Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Zhou Enlai, p. 261; and Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, p. 180.

54. Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, p. 181.

55. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 134,“不敢鬥爭，不敢勝利”.

56. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 61.

57. Hong Kong Government, The Face of Confrontation, February 1968.

58. 劉武生，《文革中的周恩來》，p. 330. Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, noted the Hong Kong delegation only arrived in Beijing on 25 May (p. 181) but 劉武生 noted meetings took place on 24 and 27 May.

59. Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, pp. 181–83.

60. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 63.

61. Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong: Report for the Year 1967, p. 18.

62. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 156.

63. The People’s Daily editorial on 3 June 1967 was entitled “Strike Back Resolutely at the Provocation of British Imperialism”（堅決反擊英帝國主義的挑釁）。The original Chinese text reads:“英帝國主義是香港萬惡的殖民統治者，是香港四百萬中國同胞的敵人，七億中國人民的敵人……一百多年來，英帝國主義在香港幹盡了壞事，血債累累，罪惡滔天，必須清算！……目前，擺在香港愛國同胞面前的任務，就是再接再厲，把這場反英抗爭堅持下去，奪取偉大的勝利。為了實現這個目標，就應該放手地發動群眾，以工人階級為核心，團結香港，一切可以團結的反帝愛國力量，不斷鞏固和壯大反英抗暴鬥爭的隊伍。”

64. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 82.

65. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 61; and Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, pp. 183–84.

66. Maynard Parker, “Reports: Hong Kong”, The Atlantic, November 1967, www.theatlantic.com/issues/67nov/hk1167.htm.

67. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，ibid., p. 71.

68. Ibid., p. 71.“除了被港九愛國同胞和中國人民打得粉身碎骨之外，絕不會有別的下場。”

69. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 176.

70. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 153.

71. David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997, p. 41.

72. Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, p. 186.

73. Leo F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners, p. 77.

74. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，pp. 74–75.

75. Ibid., p. 81.“頭昏腦脹，大滅敵人的威風。”

76. Denis Bray, Hong Kong Metamorphosis, pp. 126–28. See also John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 105; David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997, p. 43; and Wong Cheuk Yin, “The 1967 Riots and Regime Legitimacy in Hong Kong”. According to Ma Jisen, Zhou Enlai was very unhappy about the incident, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, p. 186.

77. Wong Cheuk Yin, “The 1967 Riots and Regime Legitimacy in Hong Kong”. Wong’s thesis gives the impression Cater had talked directly with Zhou Enlai, which was unlikely, see footnote 43 above.

78. Ibid., and 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 89.

79. The veteran leftist is Xu Simin (徐四民). See 李谷城，《香港新華社的功能與角色》，http://202.76.36.61/vol%2018/vol18Doc1_2.htm.

80. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 92.“把刀鋒對準港英法西斯強盜及其走狗，窮追猛打，決不留情。”

81. Official Report of Proceedings of the Meeting of Legislative Council on 12 July 1967, pp. 367–68. The acting colonial secretary was Michael David Irving Gass. The records show typographical mistakes where square brackets are used in the quotation, but it is clear what the right words should be.

82. FCO 40/112, Hong Kong Confrontation, 12 July 1967. The author wishes to thank Ray Yep for pointing out the existence of this reference. For an analysis of how the governor saw matters, see Ray Yep, “The 1967 Riots in Hong Kong: The Domestic and Diplomatic Fronts of the Governor”, May Days in Hong Kong, pp. 22–36, especially p. 185, footnote 33.

83. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 156.

84. These are the statistics claimed by the Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee. See 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 96. For details of the raids, see John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, Chapter 10.

85. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 158.

86. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 270.

87. Denis Bray, Hong Kong Metamorphosis, p. 128.

88. Ta Kung Pao, 21 July 1967, referred to in 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 98.

89. Ibid., p. 99.

90. Hong Kong Government, Report of the Year 1967, p. 16.

91. Ibid., p. 176.

92. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 176.

93. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 100.

94. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 183; and John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 156.

95. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 104.

96. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 183; Denis Bray, Hong Kong Metamorphosis, p. 130; and “Hong Kong 1967 Leftist Riots”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong_1967_riots.

97. Lau Kit-wai, “Vocal Support”, South China Morning Post, Section C, front page, 2 July 2008.

98. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 156; and Roderick MacFarquar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 225. A month later, in retaliation, the Chinese authorities arrested Reuter’s correspondent in Beijing, Anthony Grey.

99. The three newspapers were the Tin Fung Yat Pao (田豐日報), Afternoon News (新午報), and Hong Kong Evening News (香港夜報); see also Roderick MacFarquar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 225.

100. Interview with Denis Bray in Wong Cheuk Yin, “The 1967 Riots and Regime Legitimacy in Hong Kong”.

101. Britain recognised the People’s Republic of China in 1950. The two sides reached an agreement to exchange charges d’affaires on 17 June 1954, after which Britain set up its mission in Beijing. A full embassy was only set up after the Sino-British Joint Communiqué on the Agreement on the Exchange of Ambassadors was signed on 13 March 1972.

102. Percy Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 64.

103. Barbara Benouin and Yu Changgen, Zhou Enlai, p. 263.

104. Leo F. Goodstadt, Profits, Politics and Panic, p. 78. Laszlo Ladany noted that in the first half of 1967, the economy was still functioning, but by the second half, when the Cultural Revolution reached the workers, there were nationwide strikes and clashes between workers and Red Guards with many factories shutting because there was no coal and therefore no power to keep production running, The Communist Party of China and Marxism, p. 315.

105. Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, p. 188.

106. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 190.

107. Ibid., p. 166.

108. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 156.

109. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 229; and John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 157.

110. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 222.

111. 金堯如，〈香港反英抗暴的內幕〉，載於冉隆勃、馬繼森，《周恩來與香港「六七暴動」內幕》，p. 73.

112. Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, p. 189.

113. Hong Kong Government, Report of the Year 1967, p. 44.

114. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 275.

115. Hong Kong Government, Report of the Year 1967, p. 53. For more details, see Catherine R. Schenk, “The Banking and Financial Impact of the 1967 Riots in Hong Kong”, May Days in Hong Kong, pp. 105–26.

116. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 6.

117. For a discussion on the failure of the colonial political system including its appointment system, see Christine Loh, “Government and Business Alliance: Hong Kong’s Functional Constituencies”, in Functional Constituencies, pp. 29–30.

118. The Commission of Inquiry set up to look into the causes of the 1966 riots reported that the rioters were male, young, low-paid, under-privileged, uneducated or poorly educated with little outlet for their energy, and frustrated with their working and living conditions, Hong Kong Commission of Inquiry, Kowloon Disturbances, 1966, Report of Commission of Inquiry. While this was a government-appointed body, its recommendations were not all accepted by the government, such as putting in place a social insurance and benefits programmes, as had been created in some colonies, for example, Singapore.

119. Denis Bray, Hong Kong Metamorphosis, p. 133. The City District Office scheme was a copy of the District Offices in the New Territories introduced in 1910. The New Territories was relatively quiet during the 1967 riots the reason for which was attributed to better communications between the government and indigenous villagers; see pp. 133–40.

120. Official Report of Proceedings on 14 February 1967, Hong Kong Legislative Council, p. 20.

121. For a discussion of the City District Office scheme, see Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, pp. 107–10; and Steve Tsang, Governing Hong Kong, pp. 94–99.

122. The phrase was coined by Ambrose King in “Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots Levels”, Asian Survey, pp. 422–39.

123. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, pp. 113–17.

124. Official Report of Proceedings on 14 February 1967, Hong Kong Legislative Council, pp. 34–38.

125. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, pp. 121–26.

126. Leo F. Goodstadt, “Red Guards in Hong Kong?”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 1967, referred in William Heaton, “Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism: The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong”, Asian Survey, p. 844.

127. Wong Cheuk Yin, “The 1967 Riots and Regime Legitimacy in Hong Kong”.

128. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，pp. 85–86.

129. Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 52.

130. Wong Cheuk Yin, “The 1967 Riots and Regime Legitimacy in Hong Kong”.

131. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 155.

132. Ibid.

133. Comments by 廖一原，member of the Standing Committee of the Anti-Persecution Committee. See 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 218.

134. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 105.

135. Florence Leung Mo Han, My Time in Hong Kong’s Underground Communist Party, 2012.

136. 〈六七暴動派反殖傳單入獄〉，《明報》，14 June 2007. http://www.mingpaovan.com/htm/News/20070614/HK-gaa2.htm.

137. Tsang Yok Sing remembers in Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, Hong Kong Remembers, pp. 95–98.

138. Andrew Li, “Red Sun over Stanley”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 July 1968, pp. 207–11. For an analysis of social conditions in Hong Kong then, see David Clayton, “The Riots and Labour Laws: The Struggle for an Eight-Hour Day for Women Factory Workers, 1967–71”, May Days in Hong Kong, pp. 127–44.

139. Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 40.

140. Ibid., pp. 75–76.

141. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 184.

142. 《工商日報》，10 September 1968,“該校曾被警方搜出非法武器，以及指派學生投擲炸彈等事實……實人神之所共嫉，天地之所不容……漢華中學經過鬥爭失敗之餘，即改頭換面，包藏禍心，企圖死灰復燃……本區鄉民世代過慣寧靜生活，如一旦有此搗亂份子，在此設校授徒，鼓吹鬥爭邪說……勢必喧擾不堪，使鄉民驚心動魄，寢食不安，危害地方。”

143. Tsang Yok Sing, “The Leftist Community”, Tsang Yok Sing Straight Talk, pp. 157–58.

144. Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, pp. 3, 110, 138, and 143.

145. Roderick MacFarquar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, pp. 221–22; and Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, pp. 167–70.

146. Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Zhou Enlai, pp. 260–63; and Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, pp. 174–79.

147. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 259.

148. 梁上苑，《中共在香港》，p. 164.

149. 金堯如，〈香港反英抗暴的內幕〉，載於冉隆勃、馬繼森，《周恩來與香港「六七暴動」內幕》，p. 74.

150. 金堯如，《香港五十年憶往》，p. 184.

151. See interviews with Hu Dizhou (胡棣周) and Luo Fu (羅孚). Hu was member of the Anti-Persecution Committee and publisher of the leftist press Hong Kong Evening Post (香港夜報). He was arrested in August 1967 and that caused the burning of British Diplomatic Mission in Beijing by the Red Guards. Luo was an editor of a leftist press and was responsible for the CCP united front work in the literature area in Hong Kong. See 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，pp. 197 and 252.

152. See interviews with Liao Yiyuan (廖一原) and Luo Fu, 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，pp. 217 and 253.

153. 張家偉，《香港六七暴動內情》，p. 9.

154. In Relation to the Party’s Resolution on Historical Issues since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, passed by the 11th CCP Central Committee on 27 June 1981.

155. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, pp. 456–58.

156. The interview was in English on RTHK:

—Host: I was struck by one phrase at the end of the policy address, towards the end of the conclusion, you say, we promote democratic development without compromising social stability or government efficiency, that kind of implies that democratic development does compromise social stability or government efficiency?

—Donald Tsang: It can, it can, if we go to the extreme, people go to the extreme, and you have a Cultural Revolution, for instance, in China. When people take everything into their hands, then you cannot govern the place . . .

—Host: But the Cultural Revolution wasn’t really an extreme example of democracy.

—Donald Tsang: What is it? People taking power into their own hands! Now, this is what it means by democracy, if you take it to the full swing. In other democracies, even if you have an elected person, then you overturn the policy in California, for instance, you have initiative number, number, number what, then you overturn policy taken by the government, that’s not necessarily conducive to efficient government.

See Ming Pao website: http://www.mpinews.com/htm/INews/20071012/gb52236a.htm for the full text.

157. “I am very sorry that I made an inappropriate remark concerning the Cultural Revolution during a radio interview yesterday, and I wish to retract that remark. Hong Kong people treasure democracy and hope to implement universal suffrage as soon as possible. I share the same aspirations. I reiterate that I will honour my pledge in the Policy Address to do my utmost in resolving the question of universal suffrage in Hong Kong during my current term.” See Government Information Service, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200710/13/P200710130147.htm.

158. Raymond Yeung, “Give Justice to Those Killed in the 1969 Riots, Leftist Workers Say”, South China Morning Post, 8 May 2017.