Underground Front

British rule ended in Hong Kong at the stroke of midnight on 30 June 1997. The return of this lost territory marked the beginning of a new era of Chinese Communist Party activities. The party built the new regime and fashioned a new political order to support “one country, two systems”. While the party could begin to look directly at things from inside Hong Kong, interpreting events and the mood of the Hong Kong community would prove challenging. The Mainland’s roots of suspicion of the former colonial entity, where people had lived under foreign influence for so long, ran deep. As such, the CCP’s disposition to distrust Hong Kong people, especially those whom they saw as having British or other Western connections, remained high. The underlying assumptions of how Mainland cadres saw Hong Kong and the world, and how Hong Kong people saw themselves and their worldview remained far apart. Hong Kong people also needed to get used to the fact that the HKSAR is no longer a faraway colony of a foreign power. After 1997, Hong Kong became a part of the People’s Republic and is important in national politics. Understandably, the CCP takes an intense interest in the HKSAR as part of a national political experiment.

The CCP could never quite forgive the British for changing Hong Kong’s depoliticised governing formula at the eleventh hour before their departure by insisting on elections. From its perspective, Hong Kong’s elections had to be managed to reduce the risk of surprise (i.e., unacceptable results). After 1997, extremely complex sub-sector elections select the chief executive, and similarly complex functional elections elect half of the legislators. These methods supposedly produce “balanced participation” in the political affairs of Hong Kong. In fact, they have entrenched many vested interests directly into the political system. The problem of legitimacy and fairness continues to plague the politics of Hong Kong.

The two post-reunification decades may be divided into three periods—with the eras of the three chief executives as the dividing lines. Between 1997 and 2003, the CCP took a hands-off approach with Tung Chee Hwa as chief executive. The CCP realised that it had a political crisis on hand after the seminal 1 July 2003 protest over the attempt to legislate national security laws required by Article 23 of the Basic Law. Its chosen leader for Hong Kong had effectively been deposed by a show of people power. The people were demanding a faster pace of democratic reform in the belief that it would underpin good governance. In 2005, the new era with Donald Tsang as chief executive started with high hopes for both the party and Hong Kong. Surprisingly, his administration lost popularity within a short time. By 2008, the CCP had already changed its approach to Hong Kong; and by 2009, the Hong Kong community got wind that there was a “second governing team” functioning alongside the HKSAR government. The era of Leung Chun Ying that started in 2012 was marked by several troubling mass movements. The younger generations promoted “localism” and ignited a surge of demand for autonomy, the most radical among them calling for “self-determination” and “independence”. This era was also marked by political disorder in the Legislative Council.

Twenty years after the reunification, the CCP has effectively “come out” in Hong Kong. Officials from the second governing team are visibly active. While the CCP could claim a measure of success in promoting its values and outlook in Hong Kong, the people there are girded by a different set of norms and they remain wary of being “mainlandised”. This is especially true of the younger generations, who have yet to reconcile with Chinese rule. The change in leadership in Beijing after the 18th National Party Congress in 2012 also had an impact on party leaders’ view on Hong Kong, as regime and national security became the most important objective in a politically volatile world. When Xi Jinping visited Hong Kong for the twentieth anniversary of the reunification, he emphasised that Beijing’s commitment to “one country, two systems” had never wavered. However, he asked Hong Kong people to be guided by a sense of “one country” but conceded that the “two systems” would not be neglected. He also drew a clear red line—Hong Kong must not use its privileged autonomy and freedoms to challenge state sovereignty, security, and development interests. Similar sentiments were expressed in Xi’s political report at the opening of the 19th National Party Congress in October 2017.

Soon after the reunification, Lu Ping retired as head of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office and was replaced by Central Committee member Liao Hui, the son of Liao Chengzhi, whose previous job was head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. Its prime responsibility after 1997 was to be the liaison and coordination channel between the HKSAR government and Mainland authorities and to act as the gatekeeper to prevent ministries and regional chiefs from interfering with Hong Kong. Liao’s policy was referred to as the “three nos”—“don’t criticise the HKSAR; don’t criticise the policies of the HKSAR; and don’t harp on about the bureaucratic links between the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office and the HKSAR”.1

The CCP’s policy over Hong Kong was reassessed and changed after the 1 July 2003 demonstration. Cao Erbao, head of the research department at CCP Hong Kong, wrote in 2008 in Study Times, a Central Party School publication, of there being two “governing teams” working to implement “one country, two systems”. The first was the local administration made up of the chief executive, political appointees, the civil service, and judicial personnel responsible to actualise the promise of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong”. The second group was the Mainland team with responsibilities for Hong Kong affairs. This team was rather large and beyond the ambit of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. These included “central government departments specialising in or are responsible for Hong Kong affairs; representative offices of the central government; other central government ministries responsible for national affairs and policies; and officials specialising in Hong Kong–related issues in the government and party provincial committees, autonomous regions and municipalities that are related to Hong Kong”. Cao described this second team as an “important governing force” and an “important outward expression of the ‘one country’ principle”. He stated that there were “matters that concern China’s sovereignty or come within the responsibilities of the Central Authorities or relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR”. In other words, the second team supplements what the HKSAR government cannot deal with. Most notably, he argued that the Mainland team should operate legally and openly in Hong Kong, which would “reflect the significant historical change in the party’s role in Hong Kong”.2 His essay signalled that the CCP would be more explicit in its work in Hong Kong in the future. Cao’s description was not so different from Xu Jiatun’s idea of how the party might operate after 1997 (see “Introduction”). A commentary in a Macao newspaper noted that Cao’s essay spelled the “complete abandonment” of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office’s gatekeeping role and that under Hu Jintao’s leadership, the emphasis was on active engagement of the Mainland’s government and party functionaries in Hong Kong affairs rather than Jiang Zemin’s hands-off approach.3

Post-reunification, there are three organs of state in the HKSAR.4 Apart from the party organ (Xinhua Hong Kong), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People’s Liberation Army established themselves in Hong Kong after 1997. Though each is a separate body with no supervisory relationship, the party organ exercises de facto leadership over them. In July 1999, when President Hu Jintao visited Hong Kong to celebrate the second anniversary of the reunification, he spelt out their respective roles:

Xinhua Hong Kong has maintained a close relationship with Hong Kong, facilitated communication and cooperation between Hong Kong and the Mainland, and also effectively handled Taiwan-related matters and other matters assigned by the Central Government. The Commissioner’s Office of China’s Foreign Ministry assisted the HKSAR government in handling a large amount of foreign affairs matters, strengthened the connection and cooperation in economic and cultural areas between the HKSAR and foreign countries, regions, and international organisations. The Hong Kong Garrison of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has performed its duties in accordance with the law and established a good reputation. It has protected the national sovereignty and unity, territorial integrity, and the safety of Hong Kong.5

It was no secret that Lu Ping of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office and Zhou Nan, who headed Xinhua Hong Kong prior to 1997, had major disagreements over Hong Kong policy during the final years of the transition. Zhou was seen to be more intolerant than Lu, and the fact that the two institutions had overlapping functions made a turf battle inevitable, as it had been between Xu Jiatun and Ji Pengfei. As 1997 approached, the debate in Beijing was about the role of Xinhua Hong Kong post-reunification. Lu Ping and Tung Chee Hwa favoured a much smaller Xinhua presence; otherwise, it would be seen as the “hidden power” behind the HKSAR. After all, post-reunification, liaison and coordination between the Hong Kong and the Mainland authorities was supposed to be handled by the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office.6 The Central Authorities decided to scale down Xinhua gradually after 1997 by 60 percent.7

Zhou Nan retired in August 19978 and was succeeded by Jiang Enzhu, the Chinese representative in the Sino-British negotiations in 1993 and the Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom from December 1995. Jiang said Xinhua Hong Kong was not another power centre and would not interfere in affairs that were within the autonomy of the HKSAR. He also indicated that the responsibilities of Xinhua Hong Kong had to be adjusted and that it would cooperate with, and support, the HKSAR government.9 However, scaling down Xinhua Hong Kong substantially did not happen. Instead, Jiang gave it a new lease of life through reframing its responsibilities.10 Moreover, Xinhua Hong Kong still needed to provide support to the DAB, FTU, Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, and other patriotic bodies.11

The status of Xinhua Hong Kong was raised. In January 2000, Xinhua Hong Kong changed its name to the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the HKSAR and relocated from Happy Valley to a new site in the Western District. The change was to reflect its official status as Beijing’s representative organisation in Hong Kong. The inclusion of the central government in the new name served to bolster its status. By the end of 2000, the number of staff had been trimmed down from 600 to about 400, much less than the 60 percent originally envisaged.12 After restructuring, there were 22 departments dealing with a wide range of activities, including research, culture, media and propaganda, education, youth, law, finance, security, Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, the New Territories, Taiwan, etc.13

In 2002, Gao Ziren, the deputy director, succeeded Jiang Enzhu as the next director. A key task for the Liaison Office was to help Tung Chee Hwa pass the Article 23 legislation so that Hong Kong would have laws to prohibit treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and ties with foreign political bodies. The Liaison Office’s responsibilities involved mobilising supporters, neutralising the majority, and defeating the “small” number of opponents. When the HKSAR government put forward the legislative proposal, Gao described it as “very lenient”.14 Tung Chee Hwa framed the passing of the proposed legislation thus: “it is the common responsibility of you and me as Chinese citizens to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law”.15 Maria Tam even said that anyone who did not support the Article 23 legislation was not fit to be Chinese.16 The left-wing press mounted a propaganda campaign to denounce opponents as traitors. Business tycoons, such as Li Ka Shing, Stanley Ho, and Gordon Wu felt they had to publicly support the bill.17 Various leftist groups organised seminars and wrote supporting submissions to the government. Twenty-seven pro-government organisations formed the Grand Coalition to Support the Enactment of Legislation to Protect National Security. The convener of coalition was the FTU’s Cheng Yiu Tong, who had been appointed to the Executive Council by Tung Chee Hwa. Senior local patriotic figures like Xu Simin, Tsang Hin Chi, and Chan Wing Kee joined a mass assembly where the coalition claimed more than 40,000 people from 1,500 organisations participated.18

From 2 April 2003, Hong Kong’s attention was momentarily diverted by the arrival of a new infectious disease—severe acute respiratory syndrome. However, once it had begun to subside, public attention turned back to the Article 23 legislation. Those opposing it called for more time for public consultation and amendment of certain provisions. The HKSAR government did not give way since its assessment was that it had enough votes in the Legislative Council to pass the bill on the scheduled date of 9 July 2003. The government’s insistence provoked a massive public demonstration on 1 July when more than 500,000 people took part in the protest. This was the seminal event that would change the CCP’s policy on Hong Kong. Many scholars have explored the events leading up to the demonstration. It suffices to say here that the civil society and pro-democracy groups that organised the march made sure the focus was on Tung Chee Hwa and his officials and not the CCP or the Chinese government to avoid direct confrontation with Beijing.19

Zou Zekai, the deputy director of the Liaison Office, used the Cultural Revolution as an example and said that street protests and demonstrations would eventually lead to the complete collapse of Hong Kong’s economy.20 The Liaison Office apparently thought the demonstrators were paid to protest. It had reported internally that each demonstrator was paid HK$300 to march, while those who shouted slogans were paid HK$500 each. And to make the foreign connection clear, it had reported that the money was channelled through the American investment bank, Morgan Stanley.21 If such a report had indeed been made, it would have been blatantly untrue but it could have perpetuated the longstanding belief within the CCP that foreign forces were trying to destabilise Hong Kong.

Within days of 1 July, the Politburo convened an enlarged meeting and decided that Hong Kong should keep to the original schedule to pass the bill.22 Gao Siren echoed that there should be no delay; and Mainland enterprises issued an open letter opposing postponement.23 However, with the Liberal Party supporting a delay, Tung Chee Hwa had no choice but to abort passage of the bill as the HKSAR government would not have sufficient votes to push it through.24 Gao then changed his tone and said he respected Tung’s decision.25 He added that the Tung administration should reprioritise efforts to address economic issues instead.26

The 1 July demonstration was a serious setback for the Liaison Office. It had seriously underestimated feelings in Hong Kong and the number of protesters joining the march. People were unhappy not just because of the Article 23 legislation but the community had been through several years of a weak economy and deflation, and the public mood had turned negative. Beijing must have received conflicting information just prior to the protest ranging from a relatively low turnout to figures well over 200,000. Premier Wen Jiabao, who was in Hong Kong between 29 June and 1 July, left for Shenzhen after the official reunification anniversary celebrations that morning and watched what happened in the afternoon from Shenzhen. Wen was apparently enraged by the Liaison Office for not getting matters right.27 Even the veteran leftist Xu Simin criticised the Liaison Office for not having done enough united front work in Hong Kong. Moreover, Xu said that after the 1 July 2003, the Liaison Office “just disappeared after things went wrong”.28

Personnel and structural changes were made at the Liaison Office. In 2009, Gao Siren was succeeded by his deputy, Peng Qinghua, an experienced cadre who had once served in the CCP’s Organisation Department. He had already been made a member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 2007. In 2012, Zhang Xiaoming, deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, succeeded Peng. In the same year, he was made an alternate member of the Central Committee of the CCP, which is one rank lower than all previous directors of CCP Hong Kong—and one rank below Wang Guangya, the director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, who was his former boss. This signalled that decisions were made in Beijing and the Liaison Office was expected to implement them. Zhang was made the head of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office soon after the twentieth anniversary of the reunification and was also elevated to full membership of the Central Committee of the CCP at the 19th National Party Congress. His successor at the Liaison Office is Wang Zhimin, former head of the Liaison Office in Macao, who was also made a full member of the Central Committee. Wang used to be a deputy director at the Hong Kong Liaison Office (2005–2009) in charge of youth affairs. Their promotion to the Central Committee signalled the importance the party places on Hong Kong matters.

1. Liaising with the Commissioner’s Office of China’s Foreign Ministry in the HKSAR and the Hong Kong Garrison;

2. Liaising and assisting relevant Mainland authorities to manage the Chinese enterprises in Hong Kong;

3. Facilitating cooperation between Hong Kong and the Mainland on the economic, education, scientific, cultural and sports areas etc.

4. Connecting with local people from various sectors, facilitating communication between Hong Kong and the Mainland, and reflecting Hong Kong people’s views on Mainland affairs;

It is unclear how many people work at the Liaison Office today. The Office had bought many residential properties worth hundreds of millions of dollars,30 presumably for staff and visitors, indicating that increasing numbers of Mainland cadres and officials go to Hong Kong for work and visits. Rita Fan revealed in 2017 that all the staff at the Liaison Office were from the Mainland—mostly from Guangdong with the rest from Fujian and other places. She suggested that the Liaison Office should hire Hong Kong staff so that it could understand local culture better.31 Her statement was a sign that even among those who were closest to the CCP in Hong Kong, there were still sentiments that Mainland officials in Hong Kong did not understand how the local people think and thus were unable to reflect matters fully or accurately to Beijing.

The Office of the Commissioner of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a major presence in the HKSAR.32 The first commissioner was Ma Yuzhen, a diplomat, who was ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1991 to 1995, and vice-minister at the State Council Information Office prior to going to the HKSAR. Generally, the Commissioner’s Office operated in a low-profile manner. Nevertheless, occasional comments about local affairs were made. For example, Ma warned that Hong Kong should not be used as an “operation base” by the Falun Gong, which Beijing had declared an “evil cult”.33 In 2000, when Chris Patten (then a European Union commissioner) remarked on various local issues when visiting Hong Kong, the Commissioner’s Office issued a statement criticising Patten for commenting on China’s internal matters.34 Likewise, it criticised the United States government for interfering in Chinese affairs after the Department of State released its China Country Report on Human Rights Practices, which included sections on Hong Kong and Macao.35 The Commissioner’s Office also responded to foreign news articles to emphasise the Chinese government’s “zero tolerance” for “Hong Kong independence in whatever form”.36

The stationing of the Hong Kong Garrison in the HKSAR is provided for in Article 14 of the Basic Law, as well as the Mainland’s Law on the Garrison of the HKSAR. Advance Garrison personnel arrived in Hong Kong between April and May 1997 to prepare for the transfer of defence responsibility from the British, and 500 advance troops entered Hong Kong on 30 June 1997. A 4,000 contingent of ground, navy, and air personnel arrived on 1 July 1997. Its headquarters is at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Forces Hong Kong Building (previously known as the Prince of Wales Building) at Tamar and it also controls former British army sites. The Garrison is led by both a military commander and a political commissar. The cost of keeping the Garrison in Hong Kong is borne by the Central People’s Government. Its main responsibilities are to prepare against and resist aggression, safeguard the security of the HKSAR, carry out defence duties, control military facilities, and handle foreign-related military affairs. Upon the request of the HKSAR government, the Garrison may provide assistance in the maintenance of public order and disaster relief.37 In 2012, there were 15 squads in the Garrison, which had increased to 20 squads by 2017. The Garrison is part of a larger national army and has become a well-equipped combat-ready force. While it is under the direct leadership of the Central Military Commission, administrative control rests with the Southern Theatre Command (former known as the Guangzhou Military Region).38 The Garrison can also play a role in international affairs. For example, in November 2016, its officers took part in the first ever joint military exercise overseas with their Malaysian counterparts,39 and on 5 June 2017, it conducted an air and naval patrol off Hong Kong waters, likely to show China’s determination to protect what China regards to be Chinese waters in the South China Sea.40

The Garrison had initial difficulties adapting to Hong Kong. In 2002, Commander Xiong Ziren said that Hong Kong had “a variety of political groups, social organisations and factions. They have different political views and inclinations. Hostile forces inside and outside the country always tried to take every opportunity to corrupt, befriend and instigate the Garrison”, Xiong then provided a standard Mainland description of Hong Kong—that Hong Kong had been separated from the Mainland for a long time, people had a colonial education, and there were “anti-China and extreme rightist forces” both within the territory and on the outside. These characteristics resulted in Hong Kong people holding biases and misunderstanding about the CCP and Chinese government.41 It could equally be said that in perpetuating this line of thinking, the party sustained biases and misunderstandings about Hong Kong and its people.

The garrison had to flex its muscles from time to time to send signals to Hong Kong people. It held the biggest military parade outside Beijing on 1 August 2004 to mark China’s Armed Forces Day with 3,000 troops and armoured vehicles. On that occasion, Commander Wang Jitang stated his support for the then beleaguered Tung Chee Hwa.42 On 24 January 2014, the Garrison staged a first air-and-sea drill across Victoria Harbour, providing a warning sign after several activists had broken into the Tamar headquarters on 26 December 2013, waving a colonial-era flag and calling on the PLA to “get out”.43 On 1 July 2014, the garrison opened its doors to the public at three bases, as demonstrators gathered to stage their annual march for democracy.44 The garrison held a live-fire exercise at the Castle Peak Range on 4 July 2015.45 A major land-sea-air drill was staged on 31 October 2016, soon after two winners of the 2016 Legislative Council election used their oath swearing to promote independence.46

Over time, the garrison was also assigned united front work. An early example was in May 2005, when legislators from the democratic camp were invited to visit the military camp on the garrison’s Open Day. The invitation was widely seen as an attempt by Beijing at reconciliation with the democrats after Tung Chee Hwa stepped down.47 The garrison’s overall united front work had been extensive. Since 1997, it had allowed over 620,000 people to visit army sites, trained young people at military summer camps, planted tens of thousands of trees, donated blood, and assisted thousands of seniors and children in care homes. Its military marching band and artistic team also performed for local residents on many occasions.48 It was no small feat that the garrison developed a reasonable image in Hong Kong as could be seen from public opinion surveys in 2004 and 2015.49

A constant feature of post-reunification Hong Kong between 1997 and 2017 was disorder. While the CCP fashioned a new regime filled mainly by “patriots”, the post-1997 government faced many difficulties and Hong Kong people remained generally dissatisfied. The legitimacy and authority of the chief executives and their governing teams came under repeated challenge. The Hong Kong community saw the electoral system as manifestly unfair. There was a chance in 2015 to take a step forward but it was lost due to miscalculations by the democrats. Civil servants were also thought to be insufficiently supportive of the chief executives.

“Elections” was one of the very last points agreed between Britain and China and the British knew that the Chinese never bought into Western-style free elections. The bicultural nature of the Sino-British Joint Declaration meant that the word “elections” reflected the values, meanings, and understandings of two very different political systems (Chapter 8). The Basic Law, finalised after the trauma of 4 June 1989, spelt out the post-1997 framework on elections. The CCP’s concern has always been that political power in Hong Kong must rest with “patriots” (Chapter 9). The compromises in the Basic Law did not mean the inherent contradiction in how “elections” is understood had been resolved—only that they would come to the fore after 1997.

The Basic Law provides that the “ultimate aim” is the election of the chief executive and all legislators by universal suffrage with the proviso that the pace of change would depend on “the actual situation” and that “the principle of gradual and orderly progress” had to be taken into account. The Basic Law provides that the methods for elections could change after 2007 but the drafters ensured that the bar is set high—it would need the support of a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Council, the chief executive’s consent, and the “approval” of the SCNPC in the case of change of electoral method for the chief executive, and “reporting for the record” in the electoral method of the legislature.

For Hong Kong, Beijing promised universal suffrage but the goal posts kept being moved. Democrats wanted universal suffrage to be achieved in 2007 for the chief executive election and in 2008 for the whole legislature. For Beijing, it was too soon. Another opportunity arose for the chief executive election in 2017 to be by universal suffrage. When discussion started in 2013, the Central Authorities were willing to allow Hong Kong voters to directly elect the chief executive, but there would need to be a nomination process to screen out candidates unacceptable to Beijing. For the CCP, this was a major concession. A screening device was essential because who becomes chief executive is a matter of national security. The pro-democracy camp wanted a nomination process without filter. The eventual proposal was voted down in 2015 to the disappointment of many people. Almost immediately, the pro-democracy camp asked for talks on electoral reform to start again. It may be assumed that if the timing and details of reform could not be agreed between Beijing and Hong Kong, Beijing would simply not allow election by universal suffrage to take place.50 It is inconceivable to the CCP that the position of chief executive is not filled by a trusted person. From time to time, Chinese officials repeat Deng Xiaoping’s explanation from the mid-1980s—the post-1997 political model would be an “executive-led system” and not a Western model with “separation of powers”.51 What it means is that the Central People’s Government governs the HKSAR via the chief executive.

The election of the Legislative Council is a balancing exercise between direct election on a geographical basis and election through functional constituencies. The CCP’s approach is to ensure that patriots win a majority of the seats. The assumption was that the patriotic majority would ensure smooth conduct of government business through the legislature. That assumption proved to be wrong.

Between 1984 and 2004, the CCP used various occasions to describe what it took to pass the patriotism test. It included loving China and Hong Kong, respecting the Chinese nation, supporting the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, not impairing Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability, not subverting the authority of the Central Authorities, not supporting Taiwan and Tibet independence, not colluding with foreign powers to interfere with China’s internal affairs, and not endangering state security by opposing the Article 23 legislation.52 In 2013, in discussing the nomination process for selecting chief executive candidates for the 2017 election, Qiao Xiaoyang, chairman of the NPCs Law Committee, said that no person who “confronts” Beijing could lead the HKSAR;53 and Zhang Xiaoming said politically undesirable candidates should be excluded.54 In June 2014, the State Council made it absolutely clear why being patriotic is important:

Hong Kong must be governed by Hong Kong people with patriots in the mainstay, as loyalty to one’s country is the minimum political ethic for political figures . . . [otherwise] the practice of “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR will deviate from its right direction, making it difficult to uphold the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and putting Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity and the wellbeing of its people in serious jeopardy.55

To the CCP, democracy is not the end goal but a means to choose safe hands—“patriots”—to run Hong Kong. The electoral systems for the chief executive and half the legislators have a congenital design flaw, however. They are dominated by various vested interests for which Hong Kong pays a heavy price in efficiency, innovation, and competitiveness. Moreover, the public see the electoral systems as grossly unfair, as vested interests take precedence over the public interest; and here lies a crucial part of the people’s discontent.

Among Hong Kong voters, there is a hardcore group that supports the opposition. The 2010 by-election showed the size of this group, as well as the strategising capability of the CCP. The League of Social Democrats floated the idea in July 2009 that the democrats should provoke a by-election and use it as a de facto referendum of public desire for universal suffrage to be achieved at the 2012 elections for both the chief executive and the legislature. The League of Social Democrats and the Civic Party joined hands in this enterprise. Five legislators from the two parties resigned in January 2010 to trigger the by-election, which was held on 16 May 2010. The CCP’s counter-strategy was not to field candidates thereby minimising voter turnout so that the by-election could not be considered a referendum. Beijing adopted this strategy because it was unsure whether the pro-government side would do well enough to make a direct punch-up worthwhile. Moreover, a full-scale battle ran the risk of allowing the democrats to claim the by-election was effectively a referendum. Tactically, the pro-government camp questioned whether the by-election violated the Basic Law and attacked the perpetrators for destabilising Hong Kong and wasting time and resources. With no credible opponents, the one-sided by-election returned the five legislators who resigned. The turnout rate was 17.19 percent representing 579,795 voters, the bulk of whom may be said to be hardcore opposition voters.56

Members of the chief executive Election Committee are made up of ex officio members from political bodies and representatives from business, community, and the professions. Except for the ex officio members, Election Committee members are chosen from various sub-sectors, which are both corporate and personal in nature. Corporate sub-sectors include such bodies as chambers of commerce, employers’ federation, manufacturers’ association, enterprises association, banks, and associations made up of property-related companies and even transport-related bodies. The nature of corporate voting is that those who control a member corporation effectively control its vote. Those sub-sectors that are personal in nature are tied to specified professions. For example, the accountancy sub-sector is made up of certified public accountants. Likewise, the legal, engineering, medical, and education sub-sectors are made up of members of those professions. The idea for functional elections was the creation of the pre-1997 colonial administration, designed to co-opt the then pro-establishment business and professional elites when election to the Legislative Council was first introduced in the 1980s.

Over the course of the post-1997 years, more political bodies and sub-sectors were added to expand the size of registered electors and members of the Election Committee. By the 2017 chief executive election, there were 38 sub-sectors, and the number of registered electors grew from under 132,000 to over 230,000. The size of the Election Committee expanded from 800 members in 2002 to 1,200 members in 2012. The HKSAR government worked out all the eligibility details. In the eyes of the CCP, the election of the chief executive became increasingly democratic because “such a composition is an expression of equal participation and broad representativeness”.57 Along this line of thinking, having the overwhelming support from the Election Committee is the proxy for having the support of Hong Kong society. Thus, the driving force for the CCP in chief executive elections is to ensure its candidate has the overwhelming support of the Election Committee.

In the case of Tung Chee Hwa’s re-election in 2002, while it was unchallenged, the party had to show that Tung had strong support. While a candidate only needed 100 nominations, Tung got over 700 nominations. Party officials made it clear that to maintain “stability and continuity” it was best that Tung served a second term.5858 Hong Kong NPC and CPPCC members, business tycoons, and leftist leaders were mobilised to show support, some of whom felt pressured, fearing that non-cooperation would be reported to the Liaison Office.59 In gratitude, Tung later described the Liaison Office as the “HKSAR government’s best friend”.60 After Tung stepped down in 2005, an election had to be organised. Beijing decided that Donald Tsang, the then chief secretary, should be the successor. Tsang was the only valid candidate and got 674 nominations.

Donald Tsang’s re-election in 2007 was more challenging. The pro-democracy camp participated in sub-sector elections to win seats to the Election Committee by relying on sub-sectors for the professions. The democrats fielded Alan Leong of the Civic Party. Donald Tsang secured 641 nominations. Alan Leong got 132—enough to get to the starting line. Even though Tsang would win, the CCP knew some Election Committee members had reservations. The party wanted to minimise blank votes since it would show internal division. A good occasion to wheel out “big guns” to lobby for Tsang was in March 2007 in Beijing, when many of the Election Committee members were there for the annual meetings of the NPC and CPPCC. The head of the United Front Department, Liu Yandong, hosted meetings to consolidate votes.61 In the end, Donald Tsang got 649 votes and Alan Leong got 123 votes. There were 11 blank votes and six Election Committee members did not vote. The most memorable aspect of the 2007 election was two widely watched televised debates, where the sure winner had to justify his policies and governance style—a welcomed experience for Hong Kong.

The 2012 chief executive election was more gripping. The punch-up was between two high-profile patriots—Henry Tang, a second-generation tycoon, who was Donald Tsang’s chief secretary—and Leung Chun Ying, who had been the secretary of the Basic Law Consultative Committee in the 1980s and served on the Executive Council under Tung Chee Hwa and Donald Tsang. In July 2011, Wang Guangya articulated Beijing’s criteria for the next chief executive: the person should be patriotic and love Hong Kong, be able to govern, and be broadly acceptable to the people.62 Unlike before, Beijing did not express a preference. As the size of the Election Committee had been increased to 1,200 members, candidates had to obtain 150 nominations to get to the starting line. Henry Tang got 390 nominations and Leung Chun Ying got 305. The democrats fought for seats to the Election Committee, like they did in 2007, and fielded legislator Albert Ho of the Democratic Party. Ho garnered 188 nominations but was a side show. There was no clear indication of preference from Beijing even by the annual meetings of the NPC and CPPCC. There was much speculation about why Beijing did not indicate a preference, and why Wang added public acceptability as a criterion. One line of thinking was that leaders had different preferences, or that either was acceptable. Another line of thinking was that the public acceptability criterion was put forward because Leung Chun Ying’s supporters in Beijing thought he was the more popular candidate and it was an indirect way of showing support early in the race without articulating a preference. Tang and Leung fought a bruising battle. The media revealed Tang’s marital infidelities and that he had an unauthorised underground extension in his home. Tang claimed at a televised debate that Leung had suggested at a confidential meeting to use the riot police and tear gas against protesters in 2003, which Leung denied. Tang’s claim could not be substantiated and he breached the confidentiality of high-level government meetings. The CCP threw its weight behind Leung after that debate. Leung reaped 689 votes, Henry Tang got 286 votes, and Albert Ho received 76 votes.

The 2017 chief executive election had many surprises. Veteran DAB member Tsang Yok Sing sought but failed to get Beijing’s support to run.63 Long-time patriot, Regina Ip, failed to get to the starting line but Woo Kwok Hing, a retired judge, did.64 Leung Chun Ying did not seek re-election.65 John Tsang, the financial secretary, said a reason he sought the top job was that he had an unexpected handshake with Xi Jinping in 2015.66 The democrats managed to grab 325 Election Committee seats and decided to back Tsang.67 A Wen Wei Po commentary described Tsang as the proxy of the opposition.68 Lo Man Tuen, the vice-chairman of the CPPCCs foreign affairs sub-committee, added two further reasons why Tsang was unacceptable to Beijing: he “lacked principle on major issues”—referring to his non-committal attitude to mass protests and he ignored signals from Beijing urging him not to run.69 Carrie Lam, the chief secretary, who was preparing for retirement, became Beijing’s candidate. She received 579 nominations. Woo Kwok Hing and John Tsang garnered 179 and 160 nominations respectively. The televised debate on 14 March 2017 did not have the high drama of 2012. The most notable aspect of the other televised debate organised by the Election Committee on 19 March 2017 was how few Election Committee members bothered to show up. Only 507 members attended. With more than 200 from the opposition camp targeting Lam, she had a tough ride.70 In the end, she got 777 votes. John Tsang received 365 votes and Woo Kwok Hing got 21 votes.

Bernard Chan, executive councillor and the campaign director for Carrie Lam, noted what it was like to run in Hong Kong’s chief executive election. It provides a window into how the vested interests lobby for their causes:

We needed to win over a majority – and preferably a sizable one – of the . . . Election Committee . . . In theory, it should not be too difficult to lobby for votes . . . In practice, it is impossible to address the committee as a single group. It is a small body, so every individual vote counts. Yet the body is splintered into 38 subsectors, many of which are fairly narrow constituencies. Every candidate must visit all of them, listen to their concerns and give them reasons why they should back him or her. This electorate is not simply split into two or three broad factions. Many of these groups have very specific positions on issues to do with their industries or professions. Quite a few have very detailed demands. In some cases, the demands are impossible to meet. And some are contradictory.71

The CCP has been successful in mobilising the united front forces at elections and strategising for the best outcomes through optimising the placement of candidates in constituencies. Its success has been built upon investing time and resources to turn the DAB into the dominant party, assisting other pro-government parties, and maintaining alliances among patriotic bodies to turn out the vote. In other words, Xinhua Hong Kong and its successor body, the Liaison Office, is the mastermind behind elections for the pro-government camp.

The DAB was established in 1992 with 56 members. Even by the 1999 District Councils election, it was already the best organised political party in Hong Kong. By 2005, it had absorbed the moribund Hong Kong Progressive Alliance. By 2017, the DAB had over 32,000 members, including 117 district councillors, 12 legislators, as well as 7 NPC and 25 CPPCC deputies.72 Just how close the DAB is to the Liaison Office could be seen from its biannual fundraising event. In 2014, the event raised nearly HK$70 million. Zhang Xiaoming donated a piece of his own calligraphy that sold for HK$13.8 million. In 2016, the DAB raised HK$60 million that included another piece of Zhang’s calligraphy that fetched HK$18.8 million. Pro-Beijing business people were extremely generous in opening their wallets.73

Overlapping memberships among the DAB, FTU, and key united front bodies result in a “triple alliance” among them to count on each other for campaigning support.74 The Liaison Office also supported “independent” candidates to win seats at district and legislative elections. For example, in the 2015 District Council elections, out of 943 candidates, 384 of them declared themselves to be independent or non-affiliated candidates but 88 of them were found to be active members of pro-government political groups.75

In 1999, a part of the electoral landscape was changed to disadvantage the opposition. The elected Urban Council and Regional Council were dissolved. These bodies had executive power and budgets to run sanitation services, fresh food markets, and sports and cultural events. Doing away with them not only centralised power within the HKSAR government but also removed the electoral bases of many opposition councillors. At the same time, the advisory District Boards (Chapter 7) were transformed into the District Councils. Tung Chee Hwa brought back a number of appointed seats to the District Councils between 1999 and 2015 (appointed seats were eliminated before 1997), which was another way to dilute the influence of the opposition. There are 18 District Councils with 458 elected seats for the 2016–2019 term of office. District Councils election are on a first-past-the-post basis.

When sacrifices had to be made, it was clear who had priority. In the 2008 Legislative Council election, the Liaison Office’s last minute “get out the vote” effort went to the DAB–Heung Yee Kuk alliance over the Liberal Party.77 Extra effort also went to the DAB instead of the FTU in the 2016 election, which veteran unionist Wong Kwok Hing believed led to his defeat.78 Favouritism at election no doubt hurt the feelings of those who felt they did not get sufficient help.

Ideologically, the FTU represents grassroots and blue-collar workers’ interests while the DAB represents lower-middle and middle-income interests. The Liberal Party is pro-business and aligns with upper economic circles. Internal strive caused the Liberal Party to split after the 2008 election. Over time, through reorganisation and rebranding among pro-business patriotic politicians, the Business and Professional Alliance for Hong Kong was formally created as a political party in 2012. The New People’s Party, founded by Regina Ip in January 2011, is also part of the pro-government camp. Michael Tien left the New People’s Party in 2017 to form the Roundtable Pragmatism.

The Legislative Council is made up of geographical and functional members in equal proportion. To ensure the DAB could win more seats in the geographical constituencies, the pre-1997 first-past-the-post election system was replaced by proportional representation using the Largest Remainder Formula from the 1998 election. This kind of system favours weaker parties, which was what the DAB needed at the time. Functional elections are like sub-sector elections described above for the chief executive election.79 A mark of functional constituencies is the high frequency of there being just one candidate who is automatically elected in the business-related seats. In other words, these are seats that are spoken for, where the vested interests agree who should represent them, such as in real estate.80 While functional seats are mainly held by pro-government lawmakers, the opposition has been able to hold on to various constituencies with individual voting, such as for teachers and lawyers.

The combination of the proportional representation method for geographical election and functional elections has enabled the patriotic forces to win a majority of the legislative seats from election to election but the same system is also limiting the advance of both the pro-government and pro-democracy forces. What cannot grow tends to fragment.81 Proportional representation enables even small groups to have a chance to win. On the pro-democracy side, small parties have grabbed seats, such as the League of Social Democrats and People Power. In the 2016 election, new opposition groups—Demosistō, Democracy Groundwork, Land Justice League, and Civic Passion—each won a seat, and Youngspiration won two seats. They have also split the pro-democracy camp between the traditional democrats and a radical faction. A further observation can be made: despite the fierce battle for seats, the overall result between the pro-government and pro-democracy camps is about winning or losing at the margins that affect a very small number of seats.

The opposition’s ability to retain one-third of the seats enabled the democrats to veto government proposals to change the electoral system, as the Basic Law requires a two-thirds majority in such cases. On 18 June 2015, the Legislative Council voted down the HKSAR government’s electoral proposal for the chief executive to be elected by universal suffrage in 2017. It was expected that the package would not pass as there was insufficient support for the two-thirds majority needed. What will not be forgotten in Hong Kong’s legislative history is the bungling of the vote by the pro-government camp. Only eight pro-government legislators voted for the proposal, as the others walked out in the mistaken belief that the vote would be adjourned while they waited for Lau Wong Fat of the Heung Yee Kuk to arrive. Confusion was caused by the spur-of-the-moment request from Jeffrey Lam of the Business and Professional Alliance to the president of the Legislative Council to adjourn the vote, which prompted the DAB’s Ip Kwok Him to signal to pro-government lawmakers to leave the chamber. In fact, the voting process had already been initiated.82 Not only was the pro-government camp unable to blame the opposition for rejecting reform, they were widely ridiculed for getting things so wrong. There were tears and apologies.83 Beijing was surprised by the walkout. A Mainland official admitted what happened was “embarrassing”.84

The bungling of the crucial vote on 18 June 2015 illustrated a recurrent problem with the pro-government camp. Like the pro-democracy camp, it is also fragmented and pluralised. While it is common for parliamentarians to time their presence in the chamber to when they expect to speak or cast their vote, opposition lawmakers in Hong Kong had exploited the lack of resolve of pro-government lawmakers to stay in their seats by using the filibuster to delay or stop legislative proceedings. The pro-government lawmakers could have minimised the filibuster by being present during legislative meetings to discourage time-wasting quorum, division, and adjournment calls. The efforts of just a handful of the more radical lawmakers to sustain tedious filibustering proved most effective. Through perfecting the art of filibustering during the Leung Chun Ying administration, the opposition substantially affected government business.85 From the HKSAR government’s perspective, the cost to effective governance was enormous:

This is already the fourth year in which Members put forward loads of amendments to the Appropriation Bills and made incessant quorum calls . . . driving the Government to the verge of a “fiscal cliff” . . . [Other] meetings . . . have also been affected by individual Members’ filibusters from time to time. The objective result is a serious congestion of agenda items.86

The financial secretary made a point of noting on 26 April 2017 in relation to the 2017–2018 Budget that:

In the past four fiscal years . . . on average, over 16 meeting days are required each year for the passage [of the Budget] . . . which is six times the average time needed for scrutinising the same bill . . . since 1997.87

The pro-government camp is in fact just a mixed bag and motley crew with different interests. Its deficiencies were colourfully described by the head of the Central Policy Unit, Shiu Sin Por, in March 2016. He criticised its lawmakers for “messing around” with their own agendas and failed to fulfil their duties, while still collecting a decent pay cheque every month. He highlighted their poor communication, inability to work together, and unwillingness to sit through meetings to prevent filibustering.88 Tung Chee Hwa suggested in June 2016 that the HKSAR government might work more closely with the pro-government camp to solve the problem of lack of unity. He lamented that all three chief executives could not run an “executive-led” government:

As a result, past administrations have been unable to achieve what they aspired to. The problem is that . . . the chief executive does not lead any political parties, while the lawmakers are popularly elected. Of the lawmakers, some are non-affiliated while even more are attached to different political parties. They represent different interest groups, and have thus constantly disputed with one another and the SAR government. Therefore, the chief executives found it difficult to effectively execute the executive-led governance model as stipulated under the Basic Law, resulting in even greater friction . . . The government should work even closer with the pro-establishment camp, build a closer partnership relationship with them, and allow them to get more involved in the implementation and discussion of government policies. At the same time, the pro-establishment camp not only should consider the interests of their voters, but also should think about the interests of the whole of Hong Kong.89

The CCP’s assumption was that with Tung Chee Hwa as chief executive, supported essentially by the senior ranks of pre-1997 civil servants, the administration of the HKSAR would function effectively from day to day. Yet, this did not happen. There were two sets of circumstances which casted doubts about the competence of the first post-1997 government. Firstly, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and its aftermath drained confidence, as stock and property markets collapsed. The HKSAR government took aggressive and courageous actions to defend the Hong Kong dollar against speculative attack and bought stocks to support the market. The many opinions at the time on whether the HKSAR government took appropriate actions created doubts in the minds of the public about the competence of the governing team.90 Secondly, Tung and the civil servants had their differences. He was seen by the seasoned bureaucrats as an inexperienced politician. The civil servants felt Tung did not always listen to them and Tung felt he was not supported. The government appeared poorly joined up and the public blamed Tung Chee Hwa.91 Mainland officials, from Hu Jintao to officers of the Liaison Office, had to repeatedly voice support for him. As Tung’s popularity did not improve, the Liaison Office was asked by Beijing to investigate the reasons for the widespread discontent. The Liaison Office reported that Tung’s problems were mainly caused by the chief secretary, Anson Chan, who had not been fully supportive of him.92 Chan was the quintessential successful “administrative officer”—a generalist class of bureaucrats under the colonial system groomed for the senior ranks. In September 2000, Chan was asked to visit Beijing where Qian Qichen gave her a dressing-down. He emphasised that Chan and the civil service should do better to support the chief executive.93 Anson Chan announced in January 2001 that she had decided to step down and left in April. She later revealed that there had been considerable disagreement between her and Tung:

If you are not able to influence the course of events, particularly events that you very much disagreed with, you must make your choice. So I decided to step down and not be forced out. Mr. Tung and I may not have agreed on how to tackle particular issues. The difficulties were compounded by the introduction of the political appointee system.94

Tung Chee Hwa established a new ministerial system in 2002, where the chief executive would appoint ministers to support his policy direction. Civil servants would then be politically neutral rather than be politicians and administrators at the same time. As with any new system, there were many teething problems with the ministers and how the system functioned. Its implementation did not make governing easier for Tung.95 After Donald Tsang was re-elected in 2007, he appointed mainly civil servants to be ministers and added deputy ministers and political assistants. Questions arose about the need for having yet more layers of inexperienced appointees, how they worked as a team, and their division of responsibility with the civil servants. Tsang also expanded and embedded more administrative officers in the bureaucracy since he believed the supposedly multi-skilled administrators—part of the colonial governing structure—were the ones who would know how to solve problems. Leung Chun Ying relied on both civil servants and external appointees to make up his team. Carrie Lam too had to rely mostly on civil servants as ministers. It was difficult to attract external talent at a time when the political environment was highly charged with officials being frequently vilified and pilloried. While a ministerial system could not solve the problems of legitimacy for the post-1997 chief executives, it did show that the CCP had to accept people from outside the traditional patriotic camp in the creation of ministerial teams. Some of the appointees served more than one term and some were promoted from deputy ministers to ministers. New systems take time to take root and Hong Kong’s ministerial system will no doubt continue to evolve.

There has been little attempt to reform the civil service, led by administrative officers, for Hong Kong to stay competitive and cope with a fast-changing world, including technological, financial, managerial, and communication developments. The highly segmented and stratified bureaucratic structure of the Hong Kong civil service made working across disciplines and departments difficult. The lack of legitimacy and toxic political environment discouraged initiatives that are considered politically “risky”. The speed of getting things done was not helped by extended filibusters in the legislature. Moreover, dealing with the Mainland did not come naturally to the Hong Kong civil service. Speaking Putonghua remains a challenge for many bureaucrats. Not only is the Mainland a very different system, but the People’s Republic of China is also a rising world power with a large and expanding economy with significant research, policy, military, scientific, technology, and innovation capabilities. Beijing has strategies and plans to play an increasingly significant part in global affairs and Mainland officials are ambitious. The HKSAR civil service’s outlook of Hong Kong and its role within the nation and the world seems parochial by comparison.

Another area of discomfort for civil servants is that Beijing takes an intense interest in the HKSAR because it is a part of the nation. In the past, Hong Kong was a faraway afterthought for the British. The attitude of senior civil servants in supporting the chief executive became an issue for Beijing. In May 2017, Politburo member Zhang Dejiang emphasised that Beijing’s “implicit powers” includes “supervising whether [Hong Kong’s civil servants] uphold the Basic Law, and whether they pledge allegiance to the country and [Hong Kong]”.96 This means Beijing has a say in not only the appointment of ministers but also the most senior civil servants in terms of their suitability. In his speech on 1 July 2017 in Hong Kong, Xi Jinping specifically stated that the “awareness of the constitution and the Basic Law” needed to be raised “among civil servants”; and he called upon the Carrie Lam administration, which included the senior bureaucrats, to “advance with the times, actively perform your duties, and continue to improve government performance”.97

The CCP’s mobilisation of united front groups when needed has become a part of Hong Kong’s post-1997 politics, such as when the HKSAR government consulted the public or the Legislative Council called deputations on public order or electoral reform issues. The language used and positions adopted were highly similar, which pointed to the likelihood that the CCP machinery played a coordination role. The united front forces include the Hong Kong Island Federation, Kowloon Federation of Associations, New Territories Association of Societies, and the Federation of Hong Kong, as well as a wide range of bodies, such as the Shaukeiwan and Chaiwan Residents Fraternal Association, Hong Kong Federation of Women, Fukien Athletic Club, Youth Executive Subcommittee of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong Federation of Students, Hong Kong Swatow Merchants Association, Hong Kong Clerical Grades Civil Servants General Union, Personal Care Workers and Home Helpers Association, Kowloon Elderly Progressive Association, and Hong Kong Overseas Chinese General Association.98 Scholars estimated that the united front machinery covers more than 600 organisations,99 and it has cultivated as many as 4,000 to 6,000 civic groups over the years.100

Since 2012, the united front legions became more muscular. An early example was the Hong Kong Youth Care Association that went head-to-head with the Falun Gong. For many years, the Falun Gong put up banners and exhibits at street sides frequented by Mainland tourists. In 2013, the Hong Kong Youth Care Association put up anti–Falun Gong banners at the same locations with slogans like “Boycott Falun Gong evil cult”, “Build a harmonious Hong Kong”, and “Taiwan Falun Gong get out of Hong Kong”.101 A recent development was the appearance of a range of new groups to counter the actions of the opposition, including Caring Hong Kong Power, Voice of Loving Hong Kong, Hong Kong Youth Care Association, Hong Kong Justice League, Defend Hong Kong Campaign, Silent Majority for Hong Kong, and Alliance for Peace and Democracy.102 For example, Voice of Loving Hong Kong organised the Love Hong Kong, Support Government rally on New Year Day in 2013 to counter anti-government demonstration organised by Civil Human Rights Front. Silent Majority for Hong Kong was formed in 2013 to oppose the Occupy Movement. The Alliance for Peace and Democracy formed in 2014, which included Silent Majority for Hong Kong, countered the Occupy and Umbrella Movements. The alliance organised signature campaigns, a run for democracy, and a parade. Patriotic groups also got together to denounce the two Youngspiration legislators-elect, Leung Chung Hang and Yau Wai Ching, for their insulting oath swearing in October 2016. The groups called their alliance the Anti-China-Insulting, Anti-Hong Kong Independence Alliance.103 On 29 November 2016, Zhang Dejiang received Silent Majority for Hong Kong in Beijing and praised its efforts.104

Mass movements in Hong Kong since the reunification have changed Beijing–Hong Kong relations from the initial hands-off attitude to a hands-on approach. Two high-level edicts from Beijing sought to stress what the CCP wanted Hong Kong people to mull over. In effect, the protests and edicts were head-on collisions between Beijing and Hong Kong. Prior to 1997, there was a buffer provided by the British presence. After reunification, there was no intermediary to absorb the impact. Despite the long transition period from British to Chinese sovereignty, the real transition only really started in 1997.

After the 1 July 2003 demonstration, the CCP sent many foot soldiers to Hong Kong to understand the situation. Party leaders had to show support for Tung Chee Hwa and buy time to figure out what to do. By mid-July, a reassessment process was in place with Politburo member Zeng Qinghong leading the review. Heads of the various CCP departments, relevant ministries, the judiciary and military, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, and the Liaison Office were all involved.105 By 16 September, Zeng had toured South China to explore ways to deepen the economic interdependence of Hong Kong and Guangdong, after which he summoned Tung Chee Hwa for a discussion in Hangzhou.106 The rising tide of public support resulted in strong wins for the democrats at the November District Council elections, which worried the CCP—the clamour for “double universal suffrage” to be achieved in 2007 and 2008 had to be stopped. A plan emerged. On 3 December 2003, when Tung Chee Hwa went to Beijing to brief leaders on his work, Hu Jintao used the occasion to send a special message couched in a seemingly innocuous news report:

the president and the central government is very much concerned with the development of the Hong Kong political system with a clear-cut but position of principle . . . The central government holds the view that the political system of the HKSAR must proceed . . . in line with the Basic Law.107

In party-speak, the reference to “principle” means the Central Authorities would not give way. Beijing had worked out a chain of actions. The first step was for Tung Chee Hwa to repeat and stress Beijing’s concern in his annual policy address on 7 January 2004.108 He announced at the same time the formation of a Task Force on Constitutional Development with Chief Secretary Donald Tsang as the head. Tsang explained on the same day that:

[t]aking into consideration our duty to uphold the Basic Law, as well as political reality, we believe that we need to first initiate discussions with the Central Authorities before determining the appropriate arrangements for the constitutional review. At the most basic level, this will avoid the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong community reaching different understandings of those Basic Law provisions regarding constitutional development. Such a scenario could cause serious confrontation between the Hong Kong community and our sovereign government. Obviously, we do not want to precipitate such a situation.109

In other words, Beijing had to be consulted first. The Task Force met officials in Beijing from 8 to 10 February 2004 and upon its return to Hong Kong, repeated all the issues once more.110 On 25 February, the propaganda machinery ratcheted up the debate with Wen Wei Po in Hong Kong providing a refresher course on patriotism, as noted earlier in this chapter. Just as the patriotism debate was subsiding, the final piece of the jigsaw was dropped into place. On 26 March, another innocuous-sounding Xinhua news report stated that the agenda of the next SCNPC meeting on 2–6 April was discussed and it would include a draft interpretation of two specified sections of the Basic Law.111 No one had expected such a move. An interpretation was provided on 6 April 2004. The CCP had delivered the final knock-out punch.

When Hu Jintao visited Hong Kong for the tenth anniversary of the reunification in 2007, he stressed the need to put more emphasis on national education. Donald Tsang pledged to do so and announced the development of moral and national education as an independent, standalone subject in his 2010 policy address.112 It would be introduced progressively from the 2012–2013 school year and would become compulsory in primary schools in 2015–2016 and in secondary schools the following year. Tsang’s term ended on 30 June 2012. Leung Chun Ying inherited the launch of the new subject. Three days after Leung assumed office, news broke that a teaching handbook, called The China Model, created by authors with close ties to the Mainland, lauded the CCP as a progressive, selfless, and united ruling party but described the American election system in derogatory terms. The handbook was condemned as political brainwashing. This led to the first mass protest during the Leung Chun Ying era.113

The protest started on 29 July where 90,000 people participated. This was a campaign led by students, parents, and teachers—not the pan-democrats. The organisers did not want their movement to be hijacked by politicians. Large crowds continued to besiege government headquarters for days. The HKSAR government eventually backed down—moral and national education would not be compulsory. The most significant outcome from this period was the emergence of post-90s activists, one of whom, Joshua Wong, became an international celebrity, and another, Nathan Law, ran for legislative election in 2016 and won. Their group, Scholarism, attracted many young members and it was a major force during the subsequent mass movements. By 2014, the youngsters had become seasoned activists. On 10 April 2016, Scholarism transformed itself into the political party, Demosistō, with Nathan Law as its chairman.114 The party promoted self-determination and proposed Hong Kong to hold a referendum in a decade’s time so that Hong Kong people could decide their own fate beyond 2047.115 Leung Chun Ying responded that the HKSAR was an inalienable part of the country with no time limit. He said the phrase in the Basic Law that the HKSAR would “remain unchanged for 50 years” referred to the capitalist system and way of life of Hong Kong—it did not mean that the sovereignty could be changed.116

The young had an irresistible quality and media-attractiveness lacking in tired politicians. They were energetic, fearless, creative, stubborn, self-righteous, and disrespectful of authority. They hated being belittled as ignorant kids. The young, their parents, and teachers were also furious at being labelled as “black hands” of political forces. The energy released from their campaign captured the attention of students, setting the stage for more activism. The national education debate also brought out the fear of political indoctrination of the education system.117 Another strand was mixing political values with “China”. Disapproval of the CCP’s outlook became associated with “China”, “Mainland”, and even “Mainlanders”. Horace Chin captured the mood of the young through his writings. He argued that Hong Kong should become an autonomous city-state.118 The CCP saw these developments in Hong Kong as a dangerous “political duel” between national identity and Hong Kong independence with foreign interference lurking in the background.119 Hu Jintao highlighted the Politburo’s concern at the 18th CCP Congress in November 2012:

The underlying goal of the principles and policies adopted by the central government concerning Hong Kong and Macao is to uphold China’s sovereignty, security and development interests and maintain long-term prosperity and stability of the two regions . . . The central government will also firmly support the chief executives and governments of the two special administrative regions in promoting the unity of our compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao under the banner of loving both the motherland and their respective regions and in guarding against and forestalling external intervention in the affairs of Hong Kong and Macao.120

Xi Jinping repeated that China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests must be upheld when he gave his address on 1 July 2017 at the twentieth anniversary of the reunification. He also emphasised the importance “to raise awareness and enhance guidance, especially to step up patriotic education of the young people”.121 The contrasting attitude between Chinese leaders and Hong Kong parents and students was stark.

Beijing issued The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, a White Paper published by the State Council on 10 June 2014. The paper states that Beijing has “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the HKSAR and can “directly exercises” that jurisdiction. Hong Kong’s autonomy is “not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorisation by the central leadership”. In other words, “a high degree of autonomy” never meant full autonomy and not even decentralised power. It means that Hong Kong only has “the power to run local affairs as authorised” by Beijing.122

Lawyers were particularly sensitive and upset by references in the White Paper to describe judges as “administrators” and having to be patriotic. Some 1,800 lawyers wore black and marched in silence. Judges too had to make sense of the White Paper. Chief Justice, Geoffrey Ma, stressed that judges in Hong Kong acted independently: “and the reality matches this”.123 Judge Joseph Fok noted that the “administration” in generic terms included judges but the judicial oath was clear that judges “administer justice without fear or favour”. Furthermore, he stressed that “the oath of allegiance taken by judges . . . in Hong Kong is not inconsistent with judicial independence”.124

The White Paper was the prelude to another SCNPC decision on electoral reform—Hong Kong could achieve universal suffrage for the election of the chief executive in 2017 with “corresponding institutional safeguards”—a nominating committee to ensure candidates were patriotic.125 Legal scholar Benny Tai at the University of Hong Kong proposed using civil disobedience to pressurise Beijing and the HKSAR government to give way. He named the campaign Occupy Central with Love and Peace.126 University students and Scholarism staged coordinated class boycotts and organised public events, which eventually morphed into the Occupy and Umbrella Movements.127

Since the 1 July 2003 demonstration, the subsequent wave after wave of protests had both toughened the resolve of the Central Authorities, as well as politicised the younger generations in Hong Kong. The moral and national education debate in 2012 penetrated primary and secondary schools. University students and young graduates were the main participants in the Occupy and Umbrella Movements in 2014. Teachers were squeezed between a rock and a hard place since the HKSAR government did not wish to see pro-independence activities at schools while students pushed to be allowed to do what they wanted. Some schools issued internal guidelines to help principals and teachers navigate the minefield. Wang Zhenmin of the Liaison Office said independence debates should not take place in schools because it would “poison” students’ minds.128

Over time, a generational change had taken place in Hong Kong, which affected the community’s attitude on many issues. This was evidenced by the heightened public interest in a range of new demands. An important factor that riled the young was the unfairness in Hong Kong society, where income inequality had risen sharply over the course of two decades. Popular causes also related to lifestyle, such as expanding open spaces, walking and cycling, protecting the environment, supporting local culture, and reviving farming. The contours of the “post-80s”, “post-90s”, and “millennial” generations as a political force became clearer after 2007. Generally, they lean towards liberal ideas and are savvy with e-mobilisation methods. For example, they took part in the Anti-High Speed Rail Movement against the Hong Kong-Shenzhen-Guangzhou Express Rail Link. On 18 December 2009, thousands of protesters gathered outside the Legislative Council while legislators debated the funding for the project. The debate had to be adjourned. Protestors gathered at the Legislative Council on 15 January as the debate resumed. The protesters used social media means, such as chat rooms, SMS, Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook, to spread their message and rally people. They used simple but eye-catching means to get media attention, such as doing the prostrating walk (苦行). Funding was approved after 25 hours. Protestors blocked government officials and lawmakers from leaving and delayed their departure for many hours.129 Such activities fertilised young people’s consciousness and gave birth to “localism”.

It was bound to happen. The two very different political and legal systems of the Mainland and Hong Kong would clash. The Basic Law was promulgated by China under its constitution. Elsie Leung said, “from 1 July 1997 . . . a page has turned in our legal history. The common law must now operate under the Basic Law.”130 The Hong Kong Police Force had to deal with constant protests, and yet Hong Kong remained one of the safest cities in the world. The Occupy and Umbrella Movements in 2014 and the Mong Kok Riots of 2016 left so much frustration among rank-and-file policemen that they too had to let off steam in March 2017, while judges looked philosophically at their challenges.

A case that the CCP could not have expected was Jiang Enzhu being sued by legislator Emily Lau. In 1996, Lau took advantage of the new Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance to seek information from Zhou Nan on whether Xinhua Hong Kong held information on her and if so to provide it. It was widely believed in Hong Kong that the CCP had files on many people. The law requires organisations being asked for information to respond within 40 days or it commits an offence. Lau did not receive a timely response, which prompted her to lodge a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner, as she was entitled to do under the ordinance. After the Privacy Commission contacted Xinhua Hong Kong, Lau received an unsigned response that it did not have a file on her. By then, ten months had elapsed. Since a prima facie breach of the law had been established the Privacy Commission passed the case to the secretary of justice, Elsie Leung, for her to decide whether to prosecute. Leung decided not to do so.131 Lau then brought a private prosecution against Jiang. He sought a judicial review to have the case thrown out. The court found Jiang had not committed the offence as he was not in Hong Kong at the time. The ruling provided for Lau to pay Jiang’s costs.132 The CCP no doubt found the case annoying. The interest in the case was its attempt to test the status of Xinhua Hong Kong on the applicability of laws to state organs in the HKSAR, which remains a complex and evolving legal issue.133

Prior to reunification, Hong Kong’s highest court was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain, which hears appeals from overseas territories and colonies. After 1997, the highest appellate court is the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong but the SCNPC has the final power of interpretation of the Basic Law. While the full NPC meets once a year in March, the SCNPC is a permanent body that convenes usually every other month. The Chinese Constitution provides that the NPC has the power to amend the constitution and enact and amend basic laws; and its Standing Committee has power to interpret the constitution, enact and amend laws other than those that must be enacted by the full NPC, and supplement and amend laws enacted by the NPC.134 In the case of Hong Kong’s Basic Law—a national law—before giving an interpretation, the Standing Committee is required to consult the Committee of the Basic Law of the HKSAR, a subcommittee of the SCNPC. The Mainland system considers constitutional and legal interpretation to be a legislative, not judicial, function. The chairman of the NPC is usually the third-ranking Politburo member, who also oversees the work of the SCNPC. There was concern in Hong Kong prior to 1997 about how the SCNPC would function in playing its Basic Law interpretation role. This issue came “alive” after reunification. There were five interpretations in the 20 years since 1997.

The first case had to do with the right of abode. The Court of Final Appeal decided in 1999 that according to the Basic Law, all children born of Hong Kong permanent residents, no matter where they were born, had the right of abode in Hong Kong. The HKSAR government estimated that 1.6 million Mainlanders could immigrate to Hong Kong over a ten-year period. Tung Chee Hwa wrote to the State Council requesting an interpretation of the relevant Basic Law provisions. This was unexpected because the plain reading of the Basic Law provided that the court, not the executive, could request an interpretation. The SCNPC’s interpretation was that the court’s ruling was “inconsistent with the legislative intent” of the Basic Law—a contrived reason—but it was clear that the HKSAR government wanted to close a potential immigration floodgate. Lawyers were concerned that in future the chief executive could trigger the interpretation process to overturn an inconvenient court ruling. However, the interpretation was popular with the Hong Kong public, as it reduced the number of possible Mainland immigrants to around 170,000 people.135

Without being requested by either the court or the HKSAR government, the SCNPC announced its second interpretation of the Basic Law on 6 April 2004 on electoral reform. The interpretation made new law by spelling out a five-step process for electoral methods to be changed. The chief executive must provide a report to the SCNPC about whether there is a need for change, and the SCNPC would then decide “in light of the actual situation” and in accordance with the “principle of gradual and orderly progress”.136 The interpretation was widely condemned in Hong Kong.

The third and fourth interpretations did not attract much public attention. The third interpretation in 2005 arose when Tung Chee Hwa stepped down. The then acting chief executive, Donald Tsang, sought an interpretation to clarify whether the term of the re-election would be for the remainder of the term or for a fresh five years. The plain reading of the Basic Law indicated a fresh five years. The SCNPC’s interpretation was for the remainder of the term only.137 The fourth interpretation was sought by the Court of Final Appeal in 2011 to clarify whether a sovereign nation was immune to prosecution in Hong Kong. The SCNPC ruled that Hong Kong should follow China’s law on state immunity as the issue related to foreign affairs.138

The fifth interpretation arose after two pro-independence legislators-elect, Leung Chung Hang and Yau Wai Ching, used the occasion of their oath taking to assume office on 12 October 2016 to throw insults about, including racial slur against China. They also had a banner bearing the words “Hong Kong is not China”. While on previous occasions, some pro-democracy legislators had also been theatrical when they swore their oaths, no one had gone so far. The theatrics were such that the secretary-general of the Legislative Council, who had to administer the oath for all legislators, held that the oaths from Leung and Yau were invalid. The president of the legislature then decided to allow the two to retake the oaths the following week. However, the HKSAR chief executive and secretary of justice filed a judicial review application to stop them from doing so. While Leung and Yau were widely condemned for their behaviour, arguments arose as to whether the government could intervene in the affairs of the Legislative Council. The government’s case against Leung and Yau was that they had in effect declined to take the oath and that the president of the legislature could not allow them to retake it because they had already vacated their seats. On 7 November, the SCNPC delivered an interpretation of Article 104 of the Basic Law on swearing allegiance when assuming public office. Alongside the interpretation, the SCNPC issued an explanation to show the gravity of the matter:

In recent years, some people of Hong Kong society openly advocate the notion of “Hong Kong independence” or notions of the same nature, such as “the independence of Hong Kong”, “Hong Kong national self-determination”, etc. which have caused grave concern, anxiety and anger among people of the whole country, including the vast majority of Hong Kong residents. The inherent nature of “Hong Kong Independence” is secession. Words and conduct advocating “Hong Kong Independence” seriously contravene the policy of “one country, two systems”, seriously contravene the Constitution of the country, the Basic Law . . . and the relevant legal provisions of the HKSAR, seriously undermine national unity, territorial integrity and national security, and also have a serious impact on the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.139

On 15 November 2016, the High Court ruled that the chief executive could bring proceedings as he had a constitutional duty under the Basic Law to see to its proper implementation; and that the circumstances showed that Leung Chung Hang and Yau Wai Ching had automatically vacated their office as they had effectively declined to take the oath. The president of the legislature could not allow the retaking of the oath where it had already been declined and the office vacated. The court also noted that the outcome of the case would be the same with or without referring to the SCNPC’s interpretation, as the court’s decision was based on interpreting local laws.140 Leung and Yau appealed but failed to overturn the decision. That was not the end. In December 2016, the chief executive and the secretary for justice lodged another legal bid to disqualify four more legislators in how they took their oaths. The High Court stripped Leung Kwok Hung of League of Social Democrats, Lau Siu Lai of Democracy Groundwork, Nathan Law of Demosistō, and Edward Yiu, the functional member for surveying, planning, and landscaping, of their seats on 14 July 2017.141 By-elections would have to be organised.142

The Liaison Office’s Wang Zhenmin and Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office’s former deputy director Chen Zuo’er thought there were as many as 15 lawmakers who had taken their oaths in manners that were insincere or insulting. Wang said they used the occasion as opportunity for performance and not to pledge loyalty and support to the nation. At a seminar in Shenzhen on 9 November 2016, Chen listed the acts he thought were unacceptable—adding words, tearing up constitutional documents, chanting self-determination, raising an umbrella, taking too long to finish reading the oath, pronouncing the People’s Republic of China in wrong tones, hitting a tambourine, and turning the national and HKSAR flags upside down.143 Politicians will no doubt be careful to observe their oath swearing in the future.

The CCP had been concerned about anti-Mainland feeling brewing in Hong Kong. The economic rise of the Mainland had created a sense of anxiety that Mainlanders were buying up property, using up maternity ward facilities, and even amassing infant milk powder in Hong Kong to the detriment of local people. Mainlanders were referred to as “locusts” for sucking up Hong Kong’s resources.144 High-profile incidents, including activists unfurling the colonial flag and demonstrating outside the PLA’s barracks at Tamar (noted above), as well as Hong Kong soccer fans jeering the Mainland team in during qualifying rounds of the World Cup in 2015 and showing disrespect when the national anthem was played,145 gave vent to the frustration of Hong Kong being overwhelmed by the Mainland. At the same time, Mainlanders felt unhappy about Hong Kong people’s behaviour too.

Anti-Mainland sentiments led Hong Kong people, especially the young, to assert and cultivate their own identity but it was the surprise rebuke by Leung Chun Ying in his policy address in January 2014 that made it a public matter:

The 2014 February issue of “Undergrad”, the official magazine of the Hong Kong University Students’ Union, featured a cover story entitled “Hong Kong people deciding their own fate”. In 2013, a book named “Hong Kong Nationalism” was published by “Undergrad”. It advocates that Hong Kong should find a way to self-reliance and self-determination. “Undergrad” and other students, including student leaders of the occupy movement, has misstated some facts. We must stay alert. We also asked political figures with close ties to the leaders of the student movement to advise them against putting forward such fallacies.146

The Hong Kong National Party was formed in March 2016 with mainly student activists and recent graduates explicitly to build an independent Hong Kong. The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Liaison Office, and HKSAR government issued statements asserting that the Hong Kong National Party had touched the “bottom-line” of “one country, two systems”; that independence advocacy was against the Basic Law; that such suggestions would not be conducive to the overall interest of Hong Kong; and that it would not be tolerated.147147 The birth of the Hong Kong National Party ignited a debate about the limits of free speech. The HKSAR government’s view was that:

Article 1 of the Basic Law clearly points out that the HKSAR is an inalienable part of the PRC . . . any views that advocate the independence of Hong Kong . . . are wrong, and are in themselves in contravention of “one country, two systems” and the Basic Law, and in complete disregard of the well-being of seven million Hong Kong people . . . The Secretary of Justice has also made it clear that any action to advocate “Hong Kong independence” is in breach of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and incompatible with the legal status and the overall interests of the HKSAR. Just as all acts that contravene the Basic Law or those that may constitute criminal offences, the Department of Justice will keep a close watch and maintain close contact with the relevant law enforcement agencies, and the HKSAR Government will take appropriate action when necessary.148

News broke in mid-April that Zhang Dejiang would visit Hong Kong. He arrived on 17 May for a three-day visit. In a high-profile speech, he defined “localism” as fondness for one’s hometown and its lifestyle but separatism was dangerous.149 Despite top-level warning from Beijing leaders, and the HKSAR government’s attempt to bar pro-independence candidates from standing in the 2016 Legislative Council election through requiring candidates to pledge to uphold the HKSAR as an inalienable part of China, Leung Chung Hang and Yau Wai Ching slipped through the net.150 When they stepped over the mark during their oath taking, the HKSAR government and the SCNPC took action. The gravity of the case from the Central Authorities’ perspective cannot be overemphasised. At the NPC and CPPCC meetings in Beijing in March 2017, Zhang Dejiang, in his position as NPC chairman, and Yu Zhengsheng, the fourth-ranking Politburo member in his position as chairman of the CPPCC, listed the SCNPC interpretation and the CPPCC’s support for it among their major achievements in the past year. Likewise at the opening of the NPC session, Li Keqiang, the premier and second-ranking Politburo member, made a point of saying in his annual government work report that the “one country, two systems” policy would be applied “without being bent or distorted”, and that “separatism is never an option in Hong Kong”.151 In April 2017, the CCP Central Committee’s influential Qiushi Journal identified separatist activities in Hong Kong (and Taiwan) were eroding the foundation of the party’s rule and that it would be a focus of China’s national security strategy.152

Meshed into the complexity of Basic Law interpretations, Beijing–Hong Kong relations and the rising political consciousness of the young were several incidents that made Hong Kong jittery. These were cases embroiled in the politics of the Mainland. To Hong Kong people, they illustrated the nature of the Mainland’s system that they most feared—extended detention, forced confession, or even extraterritorial abduction.

The first case was that of veteran reporter Ching Cheong, who was detained on 22 April 2005 in Shenzhen. Hong Kong people recalled the case of Xi Yang, a Mainland reporter working for Ming Pao, who was arrested in 1993, prosecuted and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for trafficking financial state secrets.153 In Ching’s case, for 1,020 days, he experienced residential surveillance, detention, and imprisonment. Ching was considered an “insider” although not a CCP member, having been deputy editorial manager at Wen Wei Po. He was working for Singapore’s The Straits Times when he was detained for leaking state secrets. He was later charged and convicted of the more serious charge of espionage and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Like in Xi’s case, Ching’s plight became a cause celebre. Both incidents touched Hong Kong people’s fear about Article 23 and the nebulous crime of theft of state secrets. Ching had wide friendships in Hong Kong and many people, including Donald Tsang, pleaded his case to Beijing. On 5 February 2008, Ching was released on parole. He wrote:

throughout the course of my interrogation, I was never asked about the state secrets that I was suspected of stealing or leaking. Since the legal reasons—that is, reasons that can be brought out into the open and debated—are not the true reasons for my arrest, I can only look for the real reasons in the political realm . . . I have come to believe that I had become embroiled in the power struggle in the upper echelons of the CCP. I had been used by one faction to deal a blow to another.154

The second case had to do with five employees of Mighty Current Publishing House that published, distributed, and sold books critical of the CCP and its leaders, many of which were “quickie” books that were gossipy and salacious but popular with tourists from the Mainland. Each of the five people went missing between October and December 2015, which had the effect of shutting down the market for these books. Ching Cheong thought the CCP leadership was concerned that the book market in Hong Kong had become an extension of elite party politics where political factions regularly leaked information to embarrass their rivals.155

The first person to go missing was Gui Minghai, who disappeared from his home in Thailand. Three others then went missing in Guangdong, followed by Lee Bo, the fifth person. They all turned up in detention on the Mainland. The case of greatest concern in Hong Kong was that of Lee Bo. He appeared in a video saying that he left Hong Kong voluntarily to assist an investigation. The question was whether he was in fact kidnapped by Mainland agents. Article 22 of the Basic Law is clear that no part of any authority on the Mainland may interfere in the affairs of the HKSAR. Four of the people eventually returned to Hong Kong at different times. The last to return was Lam Wing Kee—the founder of Mighty Current Publishing House—on 14 June 2016. He held a press conference two days later stating that he was detained by Mainland security agents and was interrogated for months about the identities of the authors and buyers of books, and his televised confession was forced. Lam spoke out because “[t]his is not just about me. This is about the freedom of Hong Kong people.”156 On 17 June, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Lam was a Chinese national and that he had violated Mainland law on the Mainland.157 In response to widespread condemnation that these cases had jeopardised “one country two systems”, Wang Guangya said:

the books published aren’t about Hong Kong affairs . . . but about the Mainland’s affairs. [Lam Wing Kee] publishes . . . books in Hong Kong and brings them back to sell on the Mainland. This is his understanding of ‘one country, two systems’—this ‘one country, two systems’, we’d rather not have it.158

On 22 February 2017, more than 33,000 policemen and their families gathered at the Police Sports and Recreation Club to show support for seven police officers who were sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for assaulting an activist in 2014 during the Occupy and Umbrella Movements. Policemen thought the sentences were too heavy and rank-and-file officers used the occasion to let off steam about having to endure insults from protesters as part of their job.159 The assault in question took place on 15 October after the activist was arrested for pouring liquid onto police officers.

Hong Kong has been described as the “City of Protests”. Police data from 2007 to 2016 showed that the number of public processions and public meetings increased from 3,824 to 13,158.160 Between 2012 and 2016, the police had to deal with a chain of mass movements. The moral and national education protests were relatively mild and short. The Occupy Movement started as a civil disobedience movement but morphed into the Umbrella Movement on 28 September 2014 when the police used teargas to warn and disperse a growing crowd of protesters. The Umbrella Movement lasted 79 days and blocked much of Admiralty, eventually spilling over to Causeway Bay and Mong Kok. The movement became a global sensation and is well documented.161 The protests petered out when injunctions were ordered by the court arising out of private law suits based on public nuisance initiated by nearby building owners and bus and taxi operators. Some protesters argued that they did not need to obey the law as they were engaged in civil disobedience. Some ignored the injunctions and waited until the bailiffs enforced the court orders before vacating the roads. By then public sentiments was clear—defiance of the court injunctions was eroding the rule of law. The roads were finally cleared and normal life resumed.

Hong Kong’s protest culture up until then was peaceful. Nevertheless, the Occupy and Umbrella Movements were long and draining for the entire police force. However, the short but riotous incident in Mong Kok during Lunar New Year on 8 and 9 February 2016 was violent. Sympathisers claimed that hawker control officers wanted to clear unlicensed hawkers; activists sought to protect them because the food they sold, such as fish balls, were seen to be a part of local culture. In other words, the rise of “localism” and the unhappiness of young people with what they saw as “unfair” government policy was the trigger. Hong Kong Indigenous and Civic Passion, militant groups established respectively in 2012 and 2015, participated in the riot. The HKSAR government saw things quite differently:

[T]he Mong Kok riot . . . was an incident of serious criminal violence by rioters with a collective intention to break the law, involving offences such as riot, unlawful assembly, arson, criminal damage, assaulting police officers and possession of offensive weapon etc. . . . The rioters . . . claimed to defend . . . “localism” . . . violence is not a solution to problems, but only a trigger for more violence.162

Hong Kong’s political disorder spilled over to the courts. Those who did not like the outcome of judicial rulings complained about acquittals and sentences that were too light or too heavy. There have also been complaints from the pro-government side about the frequent use of judicial review by opposition lawmakers and community groups to challenge public projects and pro-government efforts to end filibustering in the Legislative Council. The chief justice, Geoffrey Ma, stressed that one should not just look at the outcome of cases:

whenever the government loses a case, it is said that the rule of law is alive and well; the opposite when the government wins . . . what is really meant is that the outcome of the cases has not been to certain people’s liking. And yet, if one is analysing cases determined by the courts, the more pertinent question must of course surely be whether the court has applied the law and acted in accordance with the law, as opposed to applying extraneous factors (meaning non-legal matters such as political consideration).163

Controlling and influencing the media is second nature to the CCP (Chapter 2) but it has to navigate a very different media culture in Hong Kong. It had to launch campaigns “to regain the Hong Kong media” in 1989 after Tiananmen and again at critical times, such as after the 1 July 2003 demonstration, and the various mass movements from 2012. Prior to 1997, the party sought to influence Hong Kong media through binding media owners to the Mainland political system. After 1997, it became easier to expand Mainland-owned media outlets. Mainland interests have also bought into Hong Kong’s traditional media outlets, as well as three major bookstores—Chung Hwa Book Co, the Commercial Press, and Joint Publishing Hong Kong, which together control a sizable portion of the book publishing, distribution, and retail businesses.164

The Mainland and Hong Kong media exist in very different cultures. A good example that illustrates the difference was on 27 October 2000, after a Hong Kong reporter asked Jiang Zemin if Tung Chee Hwa was the “emperor’s choice” to serve a second term. Jiang said:

I’m addressing you as an elder. I’m not a reporter. But I have seen too much and it’s necessary to tell you. In reporting, if there are errors you must be responsible. You ask me whether we support Mr. Tung? If we don’t support him, how could he be chief executive?165

Following the outburst, Jiang Zemin turned his back on the reporters and muttered that they were “naïve”. The incident illustrated the cultural gulf between the Mainland and Hong Kong. It was no doubt “naïve” to ask the powerful general secretary such a question but Hong Kong reporters often ask obvious questions to elucidate the obvious answer so that there is an acknowledgment and public record of a particular state of affairs.

Hong Kong used to have a variety of media organisations with different sympathies, including pro–Hong Kong government, pro-Beijing, pro-Taiwan, independent, and irreverent tabloids. From the mid-1990s, the pro-Taiwan newspapers pulled out as 1997 drew near while Mainland-owned media outlets expanded. The CCP-controlled Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po merged in February 2016 to become the Ta Kung Wen Wei Media Group although the two daily papers continue to be published separately. China Daily, another state-owned organisation, publishes an English edition in Hong Kong; the Hong Kong Commercial Daily is owned by the Shenzhen Press. Over the years, non-government Mainland business had also invested in Hong Kong media organisations and the assumption is that the owners keep friendly relations with the Mainland authorities. These include Sing Pao, South China Morning Post, and Phoenix Satellite Television. A stake in Television Broadcast (TVB) was sold in 2011 to a Hong Kong company that had a shareholding agreement with a Mainland investor who could control the company, the arrangement for which came to light in May 2017.166

Another common feature among the owners of Hong Kong’s major media organisations was their appointments to Mainland political bodies—an effective way to integrate them into the Mainland political system.167 For example, the previous and current owners (respectively Sally Aw Sian and Charles Ho) of the Sing Tao Holdings Limited, which publishes Sing Tao Daily and the English-language The Standard, were appointed to the CPPCC. Other media owners who were made members of Mainland political bodies included Ma Ching Kwan of the Oriental Press Group; Peter Woo, whose family controls Wharf (Holdings) Limited, which in turn controlled iCable Communications Limited (which held Cable TV); Victor Li, the elder son of Li Ka Shing and the Li empire owns Metro Broadcast Corporation; Richard Li, the younger son who has built PCCW, controls NOW Broadband TV, and also owns the Hong Kong Economic Journal.168

Some of the tycoons were even willing to buy loss-making media businesses that made little commercial sense. Sing Tao Holdings Limited and Asia Television (ATV) stood out. The previous chairman of Sing Tao Holdings was Sally Aw Sian, then a CPPCC member. When three of the group’s senior executives were charged with conspiracy to defraud by falsifying circulation figures in 1998, the group’s business was already in bad shape. Aw was named as a co-conspirator but was not charged.169 In June 1999, the business was sold to the investment bank Lazard Asia, where Charles Ho of Hong Kong Tobacco played a crucial part. He was Sally Aw Sian’s biggest creditor and as part of the deal, she would get a loan from Lazard Asia to repay her debts and he dropped bankruptcy proceedings against her.170 The ownership history of ATV is truly fascinating. ATV used to be called Rediffusion (RTV) prior to 1981 with British and Australian ownership. In July 1982, the Far East Group, owned by tycoon Deacon Chiu, took a stake in the company and the company was renamed ATV. The business was not a financial success, but in 1984 the Chiu family bought all the shares in the company. In 1987, Chiu put the shares up for sale, which were sold in 1989. The buyers were tycoons Lim Por Yen, Cheng Yu Tung, and Stanley Ho. The new ownership consisted of the Lim family with one-third of the shares, his company Lai Sun with a sixth, Cheng Yu Tung’s New World group owning half, and Stanley Ho’s Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau joining as a minority shareholder. In 2002, Lai Sun sold its shares to the industrialist, Chan Wing Kee. In 2007, together with Liu Changle, chairman of Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings Limited, they bought most of ATV’s shares, after which Cha Chi Min’s family took a 58 percent stake in the company and the Mainland’s CITIC group took 15 percent, leaving Chan and Liu still holding 27 percent. During this whole period, ATV remained a loss-making business. The company was seriously bleeding at the rate of HK$1 million a day. The Cha family tried to improve day-to-day management.171 From the time of Deacon Chiu, all the major Hong Kong owners were appointed to important pre-reunification bodies and/or the NPC or CPPCC. Chiu was a member of the CPPCC. Lim Por Yen, Cheng Yu Tung, and Chan Wing Kee were all Hong Kong affairs advisers and Preparatory Committee and Selection Committee members, and Chan Wing Kee was also an NPC member. In 2008, he was appointed to the CPPCC and its prestigious Standing Committee. Cha Chi Min was a BLDC member, Hong Kong affairs adviser, Preliminary Working Committee member, and Preparatory Committee and Selection Committee member. As Joseph Wong, a former senior civil servant noted, there was a “force behind [ATV] that does not want it to close down”.172 The saga continued for years. Taiwanese and Mainland businessmen invested in ATV and there were many arguments among them over management. All the while, the quality of the station declined. ATV finally stopped transmission on 1 April 2016 but the story of tycoons taking up loss-making media outlets did not end there. Peter Woo’s Wharf (Holdings) announced in March 2017 that it would close the unprofitable cable business (that included the iCable News Channel), but a rescuer stepped in a month later. The “white knight” is a consortium made up of David Chiu and Henry Cheng—the sons of Deacon Chu and Cheng Yu Tung.173

Among the major media businesses in Hong Kong, Jimmy Lai of the Next Media Group, which published the high circulation Apple Daily, is the bête noire as far as Beijing is concerned and is considered “unfriendly”. His publications do not receive advertising from Mainland businesses, Beijing-friendly tycoons’ companies, and even other companies have pulled advertising.174

Prior to 1997, Lu Ping told a group of Hong Kong journalists that “I don’t want to create any illusion for you. After 1997, it will not be possible for you to advocate two Chinas, or one China and one Taiwan, or Hong Kong independence, or Taiwan independence, or Tibet independence. The press will not be allowed to do so.”175 On 12 April 2000, the Liaison Office commented on how Hong Kong needed to deal with Taiwan-related issues, in light of Chan Shui-bian of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party having won the presidential election the month before. Wang Fengchao, the deputy director, warned journalists that the media should not handle Taiwanese independence in the same way as ordinary news stories. He urged that news reports should be beneficial to the cause of national unification. His remarks came in response to a Hong Kong media interview carrying statements by the then Taiwan vice president, Annette Lu, on Taiwan independence.176 Taiwan’s Sunflower Student Movement, which lasted 23 days between March and April 2014, inspired student activists in Hong Kong during the Umbrella Movement. By early 2016, Scholarism and Federation of Hong Kong Students went as far as suggesting that Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s newly elected president from the Democratic Progressive Party, should see Hong Kong as a partner so that the two places could face the Mainland together.177 More galling still to the CCP was in June 2017 when three Hong Kong legislators—Raymond Chan of People Power, Nathan Law of Demosistō, and Eddie Chu of Land Justice League, as well as activists Joshua Wong and Alex Chow—went to Taiwan to attend the launch press conference of the Taiwan Congressional Hong Kong Caucus, formed by 18 pro-independence lawmakers to foster closer ties with the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong. Their action provoked a strong statement from Beijing opposing collusion between pro-independence forces from Taiwan and Hong Kong.178

The media landscape since 1997 has changed enormously all over the world. Globalisation, new technologies, fierce competition, ownership changes, and financial pressure have created conditions that challenge the traditional media outlets to find new business models. People are constantly online and they are able to seek, receive, and send information through a large variety of means. The difference between the Mainland and Hong Kong is that in the HKSAR, people have full media and information access from around the world while many overseas websites are blocked on the Mainland as part of the country’s censorship policy.

The Hong Kong Journalists Association sees cyberspace as the new battleground over press freedom but the most basic challenge is survival. Producing quality journalism and constantly updating reports is expensive. Finding a business model where that can be done has thus proved difficult, as online media outlets open and close. A notable case was the saga of House News, a content aggregator and blog launched in 2012, modelled along the lines of Huffington Post in the United States. Co-founder, Tony Choi, backed the Occupy Movement. He was also the chief executive officer of an electronics company with manufacturing on the Mainland. The popular site, reputedly had over 100,000 readers, was closed in July 2014. Choi issued a statement blaming the closure on fear and political pressure. Nevertheless, he created The Stand News in December 2014 using a public donation model, but it was less successful than its predecessor. Hong Kong Free Press, an English online newspaper, established in late 2015, also used the non-profit model. These and other sites like them survive on small donations, a few paid staff, and volunteer writers. Citizens News was launched in early 2017 by several veteran local journalists, well-known for their commitment to professional journalism. The site uses crowdfunding to cover its operational costs of HK$5 million per year. HK01 was an exception. Launched in January 2016, its investors had set aside HK$300 million to get it up and running and seemed ready to use profits from other businesses to subsidise the media business.179

The otherwise pro-Beijing and little-read Sing Pao caused a surprising stir in Hong Kong. The chairman of Sing Pao Media Enterprises, Gu Zhuoheng, a businessman, bought the paper when it ran into financial trouble in 2015. The paper published inflammatory articles between 30 August 2016 and late March 2017. The first bombshell was a front-page commentary that described Leung Chun Ying as the true inciter of Hong Kong independence. It claimed that raising the subject was a plot and that under the Liaison Office’s orchestration, the “ultra-left camp and leftist media” exaggerated the independence phenomenon.180 Mainland media described Gu as a “fugitive” wanted for his involvement in illegal money lending.181 Undeterred, Sing Pao ran another commentary saying that the “Gang of Four”, made up of Zhang Xiaoming, head of the Ta Kung Wen Wei Media Group, Jiang Zaizhong, Leung Chung Ying, and an unnamed individual (subsequently intimated to be Tung Chee Hwa) was destabilising Hong Kong.182

Sing Pao also made many accusations related to the 2017 chief executive election, including bribery. Articles in September 2016 claimed that assistance and resources were provided to Youngspiration to run against Scholarism, and that Leung Chun Ying and the Liaison Office were behind it.183 There was a court case in July 2016 when it came to light that a man called Cheng Wing Kin offered money to localists to run in District Council elections in 2015. Cheng and two others were convicted in October for offering bribes to candidates to stand in specified constituencies. Among those offered money was Leung Chung Hang of Youngspiration (which he did not accept). The court heard that Cheng believed he was instructed by someone he believed to be an official from the United Front Work Department who wanted to investigate election conspiracies between localists and pan-democrats.184 After Leung Chun Ying announced on 9 December 2016 that he would not seek re-election, Sing Pao claimed the Liaison Office would back Regina Ip (which did not happen).185

Sing Pao claimed that Zhang Dejiang had let the Liaison Office run amuck and that the Liaison Office engaged in corrupt practices. The paper urged the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to investigate.186 It turned out that Li Gang, a former deputy director of the Liaison Office (2003–2014), who went on to head the Macao Liaison Office (2014–2016), was being investigated for corruption and subsequently removed from a recently appointed post at the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (2016–2017).187 Moreover, Sing Pao likely knew that the commission had already inspected the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office back in July and August 2016 and that it was about to issue a report. On 14 October, a report was indeed issued that criticised the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office for weak leadership, poor implementation of decisions from higher-up, lax management, and a list of other deficiencies, including the need to pay more attention to the “corruption risks” in its leadership and subordinates, as well as step up monitoring on the use of funds.188 Furthermore, in November 2016, the Central Authorities had already approved the setting up of a special team to investigate suspected corruption involving CPPCC delegates, including deals in securing Hong Kong delegates to the CPPCC; and the number of Hong Kong CPPCC delegates to various provinces and municipalities would be reduced from over 2,000 to some 700 after a revamp.189 In June 2017, Pan Shengzhou became a deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, representing the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which likely meant corruption prevention became a high priority.190 The general feeling in Hong Kong was that Sing Pao’s commentaries were part of a power struggle among different factions in Beijing and that they used Hong Kong to attack their enemies. The commentaries provided an interesting peep into the Mainland’s political machination.

The CCP has achieved what it set out to do. A historical injustice was settled with Hong Kong’s reunification with China in 1997. British and international assessments tend to focus on the characteristics of Hong Kong before the transition but the Chinese focus on its view of colonial history. Xi Jinping made a point of saying on 1 July 2017 that the people of Hong Kong “enjoy more extensive democratic rights and freedoms than at any other time”.191 For the CCP, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was the diplomatic tool to transfer sovereignty and it stated that Hong Kong “will be directly under the authority of the Central People’s Government”. As unpalatable as it may be for Hong Kong, Beijing has “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the HKSAR. China considers the treaty to have served its purpose and that Britain has no further role.192 The Basic Law is what matters post-1997. Nevertheless, Beijing finds it necessary to repeat again and again what Deng Xiaoping said in the 1980s because that was when the CCP’s vision and structure for the HKSAR was decided and China had made it clear that it did not envisage a liberal democracy for Hong Kong. If there was perhaps a time in the 1990s when CCP leaders saw democratisation as a possible option for China, that time had passed. Chinese leaders today do not see free elections as the default option for all jurisdictions even as their economies develop and advance. Previous talk in the world about the inevitability of Western-style liberal democracy—the “end of history” thesis193—has been replaced by a much more sceptical one. China argues that its regime is legitimate because it is effective in improving people’s lives. The CCP has also hardened its position since the 18th National Party Congress, which was re-emphasised at the 19th National Party Congress. Cadres are expected to reject “universal values” such as free speech, democracy, and separation of powers that could undermine one-party rule, and therefore threaten regime and national security.194 Under such an atmosphere, the insistence that Hong Kong deserves a Western-style political system is unpersuasive to CCP leaders.

Even if Hong Kong people concede that it is not unreasonable for Beijing to move cautiously towards universal suffrage in Hong Kong, there is another serious problem for the CCP—the people of Hong Kong want a political system that can solve longstanding socio-economic problems. If their political leaders cannot be fully legitimised through the ballot box so that voters take the responsibility for those they voted in, leaders are still expected to deliver a government that can gain performance legitimacy. Xi Jinping acknowledged that Hong Kong “faces quite a few challenges”, that “Hong Kong’s traditional strengths start to lose the edge while new drivers of growth are yet to emerge”, and “housing and other issues that affect the daily life of the people have become more serious”.195 The problem for Beijing is the united front strategy that it successfully used to co-opt the capitalist class and to keep the “previous system” has become a barrier to change and societal advancement. Sub-sectors and functional elections prevent the HKSAR government from solving many problems, such as land use, small houses, rich public housing tenants, low wages, retirement protection, working hours, medical reform, and taxi services, because of the strong vested interest lobbies directly entrenched in the political system. The privileged interests can make demands of the chief executive, legislators, and political parties to favour them. This system makes Hong Kong less efficient, less innovative, and uncompetitive because it is hard to budge the vested interests. The privileged folks may be regarded as politically “safe” from the party’s perspective but it sacrifices the public interest. The incessant demand for fairness and democracy arises from this design flaw in the post-1997 political system.

A longstanding concern is whether Mainland officials understand Hong Kong people’s sense of identity, outlook, and thinking. The justification for having a second team is the need for management of the relationship between Mainland authorities and the HKSAR, but if they cannot truly understand Hong Kong, their reporting and analysis would be deficient. United front activities and the more muscular counter-actions against mass movements are often clumsy and unappetising, adding to the sense that Beijing wants to press its views without understanding Hong Kong people’s sensitivities and sensibilities. The CCP should be concerned that its counter-actions have not only failed to bridge differences but also widened contention. Another challenge is to convince parents and students that national education is not “brainwashing”.

No doubt the second team can help to deal with Hong Kong issues related to the Mainland, but since it works hard to help patriots win elections, it is not unreasonable that the people see the CCP as having responsibility for the unfair electoral system. It may be that the vote share of the pro-democracy camp has dropped from a height of 60 percent in 1998 to 55 percent in 2016 for various reasons,196 and that there may be a subtle identity shift of increased “Chineseness” in the population (Chapter 9), but an unfair election system that cannot solve glaring problems will continue to cause contention. The pro-government camp has so far not been able to play a leadership role. They have tended to play the role of “explaining” the Mainland’s position but parroting is not what is needed. United front work 20 years after reunification cannot be about keeping the capitalists and vested interests on side to the detriment of the public interest. The HKSAR government—the first team—is responsible for running the day-to-day affairs within its autonomy, but it has one hand tied behind its back arising from the sub-sectors and functional election systems, and the talent-deficient pro-government establishment.

The CCP sees its creation of the HKSAR as a great experiment, which is indeed the case. There are many aspects of the experiment that are truly unique. While neither the CCP nor the people of Hong Kong want the experiment to fail, their perspectives on autonomy versus control are different. Seen from Beijing, not holding the line on control when activities threaten regime and national security would be seen as failure. Seen from Hong Kong, clamping down on freedom of expression would likewise be seen as failure. Nevertheless, Beijing’s sensitivity to the fuzzy line between what it can tolerate as free speech versus advocacy challenging sovereignty and security is not something Hong Kong should ignore.

Young activists’ promotion of “self-determination” and “independence”, if persisted, will not be tolerated by Beijing, especially if they get too friendly with Taiwan’s pro-independence advocates. The defence that it is free speech in Hong Kong will not be able to withstand the primacy of “national security”. The warning has been made at the very highest level—Hong Kong must not use its autonomy and freedoms to promote separatism. Xi Jinping said on 1 July 2017 in Hong Kong that “any attempt to endanger China’s sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the central government . . . or use Hong Kong to carry out infiltration and sabotage activities against the Mainland is an act that crosses the red line, and is absolutely impermissible”.197 Xi repeated the party’s warning when he delivered his political report at the opening of the 19th National Party Congress: “We will never allow anyone, any organisation, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China.”198

Moreover, patience is wearing thin in Beijing that Hong Kong still needs to pass Article 23 legislation. Treason and sedition are crimes already on Hong Kong’s statute book so it should be possible to start a discussion about how to update them sooner rather than later. As for secession and subversion, Hong Kong could start a discussion on what activities to criminalise while still respecting freedom of expression conducted peacefully. As for theft of state secrets, Hong Kong’s existing laws governing official secrets should suffice. The legal community could play a useful role to promote dispassionate discussion. No one would want to see the Central Authorities apply national security laws to the HKSAR but it is not beyond the realm of possibility as Beijing loses patience. There is also the issue of legal cooperation between Hong Kong and the Mainland. Article 95 of the Basic Law enables law enforcement bodies to “render assistance to each other” but arrangements remain informal. The Mainland does not want to see people suspected or convicted of crimes to use Hong Kong as a refuge. Recent cases of the booksellers and Mainland businessman Xiao Jianhua199 show that the Mainland could use irregular means to pursue Chinese nationals whom it sees as having contravened its laws outside Mainland territory as a part of its anti-corruption drive. This is one of the toughest issues for Hong Kong to deal with. Nevertheless, the HKSAR government has the duty to sort out structured mutual assistance arrangements, and the legal community can also help to promote discussion in a difficult area.

Discussing such matters is hard, which is why it has been avoided. While many Hong Kong people do not deny that the Mainland has made tremendous strides since the 1980s, and they may even support Mainland policies in many areas, it is a tough sell to get Hong Kong’s younger generations to see a one-party authoritarian state in a favourable light. Their identity is tied to liberal values, which is why they emphasise the “two systems” against “one country”, or Hong Kong versus the Mainland, or “Hongkongers” versus “Mainlanders”. The traditional united front voices and methods are repugnant to many people in Hong Kong and they are ineffective to solve the “them and us” problem. The younger generations want to improve Hong Kong and they are the most strident in demanding fairness and democracy. Independence is not the answer. But, as long as the CCP and the HKSAR government cannot bring about a fairer society in Hong Kong, where the economic gains are shared widely, it will be hard to persuade young people that they should reconcile themselves with “one country”.

1. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Government: Beijing’s Hong Kong Policy in the First Year of Transition”, in Chris Yeung, Hong Kong China, pp. 30–31.

2. 曹二寶，〈一國兩制條件下香港的管治力量〉，《學習時報》（第422期），1 January 2008.

3. 永逸，〈中聯辦正積極發揮澳門第二支管治力量作用〉，《新華澳報》，5 February 2008.

4. The term “state organ” is defined as those that carry out functions of the Central People’s Government (CPG) or functions for which the CPG has responsibility for under the Basic Law; it does not carry out commercial functions, and it is acting within the scope of authority and functions delegated to it by the CPG or the Central Authorities, see LC Paper No. CB(2) 629/98–99(02) Panel of Constitutional Affairs, Legislative Council.

5. 〈胡錦濤讚董建華港人治港做得好〉，Ming Pao, 1 July 1999. Hu Jintao said: “新華社與香港保持密切的聯繫，促進了香港與內地的交流與合作，並且有效地處理了涉台事務和中央交辦的其他事務。外交部駐港特派員公署協助特區政府處理了大量的對外事務，有力地促進了特區在經濟，文化等領域與世界各國，各地區和國際組織的聯繫與合作。中國人民解放軍駐港部隊在依法履行職責，以威武文明之師的良好形象，維護了國家的主權，統一，領土完整和香港的安全。”

6. LC Paper No. CB(2) 629/98–99(02) Panel of Constitutional Affairs, Legislative Council.

7. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Government: Beijing’s Hong Kong Policy in the First Year of Transition”, in Chris Yeung, Hong Kong China, p. 32.

8. He was diagnosed with stomach cancer. See 宗道一等編著，周南修訂，《周南口述：身在疾風驟雨中》，p. 395.

9. Jiang Enzhu said, “新華社香港分社不干預香港特別行政區高度自治範圍內的事務……香港回歸祖國後，新華社香港分社的職能將作出適當的，必要的調整……對特區政府的工作給予配合和支持”。宗道一，〈香江之水通海牙—記新華社香港分社社長姜恩柱與他的夫人朱曼黎〉，《黨史博覽》，pp. 13–17.

10. “姜恩柱社長接受中通社記者訪問時指出香港新華社乃中央授權工作機構重申該社不干預香港特區自治範圍內事務”, Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong, 31 October 1997.

11. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Government: Beijing’s Hong Kong Policy in the First Year of Transition”, in Chris Yeung, Hong Kong China, pp. 31–33.

12. 〈新華社今正名「中聯辦」　姜恩柱：不干預港事務〉，Ming Pao, 18 January 2000.

13. The 22 departments were 辦公廳，研究部，人事部，宣傳文體部，協調部，社團聯絡部，青年工作部，經濟部，社會工作部，教育科技部，台灣事務部，行政財務部，監察室，信息咨詢室，保安部，警務聯絡部，港島工作部，九龍工作部，新界工作部，北京辦事處，廣東聯絡部，深圳辦事處. Two more departments were added after the 1 July 2003 demonstration to deal with police liaison and social affairs. See official website of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government: http://www.locpg.gov.cn.

14. 〈中聯辦主任高祀仁：燒國旗應檢控議員炮轟斥予港府政治壓力〉，Ming Pao, 2 October 2002; and〈高祀仁曾憲梓力撐「不說就是偷」推論〉，Ming Pao, 19 October 2002.

15. Tung Chee Hwa, Hansard, 10 October 2002, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/counmtg/hansard/cm1010ti-translate-e.pdf, p. 270.

16. Jimmy Cheung, “Anson Chan Provokes Outcry after Her Latest Veiled Attack”, South China Morning Post, 30 December 2002.

17. Gary Cheung, “Six Tycoons Weigh in with Support for the Administration’s Proposals”, The Standard, 23 January 2003.

18. 〈四萬人集會挺廿三條　76輛旅巴接送否認威迫利誘〉，Ming Pao, 23 December 2002.

19. In particular, see the many essays in Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), The July 1 Protest Rally, and Sonny Lo, “Hong Kong, 1 July 2003—Half a Million Protestors: The Security Law, Identify Politics, Democracy, and China”, Behind the Headlines. For a contemporaneous report, see Q/A with Christine Loh, Uncharted Territory, CLSA Emerging Markets, 7 July 2003, http://www.civic-exchange.org/eng/upload/files/200307_HKPolitics.pdf.

20. 〈籲以文革為鑑莫「整天上街遊行」中聯辦：港勿變動亂之都〉, Ming Pao, 7 August 2003.

21. Frank Ching, “Self-Deceit”, South China Morning Post, 10 February 2004.

22. Zheng Hanliang, China Times, 7 July 2003.

23. 〈高祀仁：不容再拖　鄔維庸：恐得寸進尺〉, Ming Pao, 6 July 2003.

24. The events leading up to the Liberal Party backing the public call for a delay was the result of its chairman, James Tien, who was an Executive Councillor, going to Beijing to meet Liao Hui, where he got the mistaken impression that Beijing was willing to delay passage of the bill. When he returned to Hong Kong he told the public that a delay was possible. When it became clear to Tien that Tung Chee Hwa planned to push ahead Tien had no choice but to resign from the Executive Council. With the Liberal Party’s votes uncertain, Tung announced that he would delay passage, Q/A with Christine Loh, Uncharted Territory, CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, 7 July 2003, http://www.civic-exchange.org/eng/upload/files/200307_HKPolitics.pdf.

25. Gao Siren said: “中聯辦尊重董建華的特區政府押後二讀的決定，並說這段時間政府要加強與市民溝通”。〈尊重押後二讀〉，Ming Pao, 8 July 2003.

26. Gao Siren said: “押後二讀國安條例草案，不會影響政府管治威信。香港現時經濟不景氣，市民受到失業，負資產所困擾，特區政府現階段應該制訂有利經濟發展的措施，以及改善民生，紓解民困”。陳冬，〈解讀中聯辦的救港藥方〉，Ming Pao, 7 July 2003.

27. 〈疑洩江澤民去年訪港行程　中聯辦：蔡小洪案屬冰山一角〉，Ming Pao, 20 December 2003.

28. Xu Simin said:“出問題便不見了人”。〈訪京團「補中聯辦不足」〉，Ming Pao, 28 October 2003.

29. See the official website of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government: http://www.locpg.gov.cn.

30. Staff reporter, “Liaison Office Buys Block in Sai Ying Pun for HK$480m”, South China Morning Post, 17 February 2015; and〈中聯辦半年4000萬購高樂德福8伙　近兩年共6億買71伙港住宅〉, Ming Pao, 12 August 2016.

31. Phila Su, “Beijing’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong Should Recruit Locals Who Understand City, Political Heavyweight Says”, South China Morning Post, 10 March 2017.

32. The Commissioner’s Office of China’s Foreign Ministry was established on 1 July 1997 in accordance with Article 13 of the Basic Law. Its official functions include: (1) upholding state sovereignty and the supreme interests of the nation; (2) supporting and assisting the HKSAR in its exchanges and cooperation with other parts of the world to enhance its international status and influence; (3) protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the overseas Hong Kong compatriots; and (4) promoting long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. There are five departments in the office: (1) General Affairs Department responsible for office administration and protocol. It also handles applications for flights to Hong Kong by foreign aircraft, visits to Hong Kong by foreign military vessels and the use of radio frequencies; (2) Policy Research Department for studying foreign policies relating to Hong Kong and putting forward policy proposals to assist and support Hong Kong in conducting overseas cooperation. It also follows trends in economic and financial development and regional cooperation in the Asia Pacific; (3) Department of International Organisations and Conferences coordinates matters concerning Hong Kong’s relations with international organisations, including its participation in or hosting of international conferences, joining international organisations and the setting up of offices in Hong Kong by international organisations; (4) Department of Treaties and Law responsible for handling matters relating to bilateral and multilateral treaties and other legal issues concerning Hong Kong; (5) Consular Department handles matters relating to the setting up of foreign consular missions in Hong Kong and the application of consular treaties between China and foreign countries in Hong Kong and provides consular protection and other services for Chinese nationals from Hong Kong in foreign countries; (6) Department of Media and Public Relations in charge of information releases as well as public relations and media issues, see Commission’s official website: http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/eng/gywm/tpy/default.htm. In 1998, there were about 130 personnel working in the office.〈馬毓真特派員在香港美國商會午餐會上的演講〉，Ta Kung Pao, 29 April 1998.

33. Ma said: “不能把香港作為一個基地”。〈難解何以「獨厚」法輪功〉，Ming Pao, 15 December 1999.

34. 〈港事務與臺問題屬中國內政　外交部責彭定康說三道四〉，Ta Kung Pao, 20 October 2000.

35. 〈外交部駐港公署：美人權報告對港人權狀況的指責毫無道理〉，中國新聞社，1 March 2000.

36. Office of the Commissioner of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Office Spokesperson Submits Letter to Wall Street Journal Refuting Self-Determination”, 17 November 2016.

37. See Article 14, Basic Law and Articles 2, 3, 5, and 9 of the Law of the PRC on the Garrisoning of the HKSAR. See also Research Division Information Note, “The Hong Kong Garrison of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army”, Legislative Council Secretariat, 17 January 2011.

38. Minnie Chan, Stuart Lau, and Naomi Ng, “Xi Jinping Inspects 20 Squads at Garrison in Biggest Military Parade since City’s Handover”, South China Morning Post, 1 July 2017.

39. Ibid.

40. Nectar Gan and Tony Cheung, “Hong Kong’s PLA Garrison No Longer Just Symbolic, Top Brass Says”, South China Morning Post, 16 June 2017.

41. Xiong Ziren said: “香港的各種政治團體，社會組織和黨派林立，政治觀點和傾向各異，國內外各種敵對勢力時刻伺機對駐軍人員進行腐蝕，拉攏，策反活動等等……由於香港與祖國大陸政治分離百多年，長期接受英國殖民主義教育，加上境內外反華和極右勢力的造謠中傷，使香港居民對我軍普遍不了解，甚至存有不同程度的偏見和隔閡，影響了對我們黨和政府形象的看法”，〈港政團腐蝕駐港解放軍〉，Ming Pao, 21 June 2002.

42. 〈駐港部隊首度閱兵挺董施政〉，《都市日報》，2 August 2004; and Tonny Chan, “Hong Kong Cheers First Garrison Parade”, China Daily, 2 August 2004.

43. Jeffie Lam and Minnie Chan, “PLA Drill in Victoria Harbour Seen as Warning to Hong Kong Protesters”, South China Morning Post, 25 January 2014.

44. Nikki Sun and Adam Rose, “On Day of Hong Kong Mass Protests, China’s Army Open Barracks to Public”, Reuters, 1 July 2014.

45. “PLA holds Military Drill in HK, Locals Invited to Observe”, Xinhua, 4 July 2015.

46. Shirley Zhao, “People’s Liberation Army Holds Military Drill in Hong Kong’s New Territories”, South China Morning Post, 31 October 2016.

47. 〈民主派8議員訪軍營　盼與中方更多交流〉，Ming Pao, 2 May 2005.

48. LegCo Question No. 4, Involvement of the Hong Kong Garrison of the People’s Liberation Army in training youngsters, Legislative Council, 4 February 2015; and “PLA HK Garrison Wins Hearts and Minds”, China Daily, www.ecns.cn, 21 June 2017.

49. 〈逾六成市民滿意駐港部隊〉，Wen Wei Po, 1 August 2001. In August 2004, according to a poll done by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme, 60% of the respondents were satisfied with the performance of the garrison in Hong Kong. See also Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme, “Popularity Survey of Hong Kong Disciplinary Forces and the PLA Hong Kong Garrison”, 8 December 2015, http://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1309.htm.47.

50. Kimmy Chung, “No Chance Beijing Will Reform Hong Kong Electoral Frame work in Next Five Years”, South China Morning Post, 3 May 2017 and updated on 4 May 2017.

51. Zhang Xiaoming, “A Correct Understanding of the Characteristics of the Political System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”, speech on 12 September 2016 at a seminar on the 25th anniversary of the promulgation of the Basic Law, English translation, South China Morning Post, 16 September 2016.

52. For a useful summary about patriots and patriotism, see “Looking into the Past to Ensure the Future”, China Daily, 23 February 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/23/content_308316.htm.

53. Gary Cheung and Joshua But, “Qiao Xiaoyang says Beijing Forced into Universal Suffrage Debate”, South China Morning Post, 26 March 2013.

54. 〈張曉明以「筲箕」論特首篩選　堅決反對佔中〉, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 16 July 2013.

55. Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, June 2014, pp. 46–47.

56. For details of the by-election, see the Electoral Affairs Commission report, http://www.eac.gov.hk/en/legco/2010lcbe_detailreport.htm.

57. Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, June 2014, p. 22.

58. 〈知名人士紛挺董〉, Ming Pao, 11 December 2001; and〈高祀仁：家和萬事興〉, Ming Pao, 22 October 2001.

59. 〈人大政協擬聯署挺董〉, Ming Pao, 12 December 2001; and〈知名人士紛挺董〉, Ming Pao, 11 December 2001.

60. 〈董讚中聯辦政府摯友〉, Ming Pao, 17 September 2002.

61. Ambrose Leung, “Tell All to Get on to the Tsang Bandwagon”, South China Morning Post, 15 March 2007.

62. Andrea Deng, “Beijing States Priorities for HKSAR’s Next CE”, China Daily, 11 July 2011.

63. Kimmy Chung, “Beijing Did Not Want Me in Hong Kong Leadership Race, Jaspar Tsang Reveals”, South China Morning Post, 15 March 2017. Tsang said he wanted to ensure there would be competition against the unpopular Leung Chun Ying.

64. Regina Ip wanted to run in the 2012 chief executive election but did not have sufficient support among the patriotic camp. She was the secretary for security under Tung Chee Hwa’s administration with responsibility for the Article 23 legislation, and she was a member of Leung Chun Ying’s Executive Council. Her consolation prize was to be invited on Carrie Lam’s Executive Council, which she accepted.

65. Jeffie Lam and Joyce Ng, “Hong Kong Chief Executive CY Leung Will Not Seek Reelection Due To Family Reasons”, South China Morning Post, 9 December 2016. Leung said he wanted to spare his family from suffering the pressure arising from electioneering. He dismissed speculations that his decision was due to Beijing not supporting his re-election bid.

66. Ng Kang Chung and Jeffie Lam, “Handshake with Chinese President Xi Jinping among Reasons John Tsang Decided to Run for Hong Kong Leadership”, South China Morning Post, 3 February 2017.

67. Joyce Ng, Jeffie Lam, Tong Leung, and Stuart Lau, “Pro-democracy Camp Takes Record Quarter of Seats on Election Committee That Will Choose Chief Executive”, South China Morning Post, 12 December 2016.

68. 〈反對派為「造王」扭曲選委意願〉, Editorial, Wen Wei Po, 16 March 2017.

69. Kimmy Chung and Joyce Ng, “Beijing ‘Doesn’t Trust John Tsang Because He Ignored Its Warning Not to Run’ in Hong Kong Chief Executive Election”, South China Morning Post, 24 March 2017, updated on 25 March 2017.

70. Ng Kang Chung, “Pro-establishment no-shows at Hong Kong CE race debate caused Lam to feel the heat”, South China Morning Post, 20 March 2017.

71. Bernard Chan, “Can Carrie Wow with Style and Substance?”, South China Morning Post, 31 March 2017.

72. The DAB’s website, http://www.dab.org.hk. For a discussion about the DAB, see also Shiu-hing Sonny Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions: Hong Kong vs. Beijing on Democracy, pp. 176–89.

73. Fanny Fung, “HK$13.8 Million Buys ‘Successful Future’ Calligraphy by Beijing’s Top Representative in Hong Kong”, South China Morning Post, 16 April 2014; and Ng Kang Chung, “Hong Kong Businessman Bids HK$18.8 Million for Calligraphy by Beijing Official at DAB Fundraiser”, South China Morning Post, 22 November 2016.

74. Shiu-hing Sonny Lo, Wing-yat Yu, and Kwok-fai Wan, “The 1999 District Council Elections”, in Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong, pp. 139–65, especially pp. 154–55.

75. Brian C. H. Fong, “In-between Liberal Authoritarianism and Electoral Authoritarianism: Hong Kong’s Democratization under Chinese Sovereignty, 1997–2016”, Democratization, 2016, pp. 7–10, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1232249.

76. Shiu-hing Sonny Lo, Wing-yat Yu, and Kwok-fai Wan, “The 1999 District Council Elections”, in Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong, pp. 139–65; the chart is adapted from the one on p. 155.

77. 〈『懲戒』自由黨誤中田北俊〉, Ming Pao, 12 September 2008. For a discussion about the Liberal Party, see Shiu-hing Sonny Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions: Hong Kong vs. Beijing on Democracy, pp. 191–200.

78. Tony Cheung, “Trade Union Veteran Wong Kwok-hing Blames Legco Defeat on ‘Rumours’ and Dishonest Tactics”, South China Morning Post, 11 September 2016 and updated on 12 September 2016.

79. For a detail discussion about subsectors elections, see Simon N. M. Young and Richard Cullen, The Chief Executive Election in the HKSAR; and for functional constituencies, see Christine Loh and Civic Exchange, Functional Constituencies: A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council.

80. In 1998, 10 seats were unchallenged; in 2000, there were 9 such seats; in 2004, there were 11; in 2008 there were 14; in 2012, there were 16; and in 2016, there were 10 uncontested seats. Some lawmakers in these constituencies were unchallenged for several elections in a row. For the details, see the Electoral Affairs Commission’s website, http://www.eac.gov.hk.

81. For a discussion on proportional representation, see Ngok Ma, “Increased Pluralization and Fragmentation: Party System and Electoral Politics in the 2012 Elections”, in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, pp. 185–209.

82. What happened was recorded in the Official Record of Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 18 June 2015, pp. 13464–67, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/counmtg/hansard/cm20150618-translate-e.pdf.

83. Tony Cheung, “Key Figure in Botched Hong Kong Reform Vote Walkout Apologises for Fiasco”, and Tony Cheung and Lai Ying-kit, “We’re Sorry: Hong Kong Pro-establishment Lawmakers Apologise for Reform Vote Walkout”, South China Morning Post, 19 June 2015.

84. Staff reporters, “Hong Kong Reform Package Rejected as Pro-Beijing Camp Walk out in ‘Miscommunication’”, South China Morning Post, 18 June 2015 and updated on 19 June 2015.

85. Owen Fung and Ng Kang Chung, “‘A Colossal Waste of Money’: Legco Quorum Calls Cost Hongkongers HK$45.6 Million”, South China Morning Post, 15 July 2016.

86. LegCo Question No. 6, Impacts of filibusters on Government’s implementation of policies and HK society, Legislative Council, 18 May 2016.

87. Financial Secretary, 26 April 20017, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201704/26/P2017042600635.htm.

88. 〈邵善波評暴亂：政治鬥爭無關管治　年輕人看不見前景　非換特首可解決〉, Sing Tao Daily, 14 March 2016; and interview with〈邵善波：社會困局換特首不能解決〉, Hong Kong Economic Times, 14 March 2016.

89. Tung Chee Hwa’s speech to the Our Hong Kong Foundation, 13 June 2016, http://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1974752/extracts-former-hong-kong-chief-executive-tung-chee-hwas.

90. Zhou Xin, “How Beijing and Hong Kong Sent Billionaire George Soros Packing the Last Time He Attacked Asian Markets”, South China Morning Post, 27 January 2016 and updated on 30 May 2016.

91. There are scholarly publications on the relationship between Tung Chee Hwa and the civil service, see Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event; Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade; and Yue-man Yeung, The First Decade: The Hong Kong SAR in Retrospective and Introspective Perspectives.

92. 〈北京不滿助董不力〉, Ming Pao, 13 January 2001.

93. Qian Qichen supposedly said: “陳方安生司長和特區政府全體公務員一起，更好地支持行政長官的工作”。〈北京促陳太更好地挺董　陳方安生主動澄清不和傳言〉, Ming Pao, 27 September 2000.

94. Anson Chan, “Ten Years on Eyewitness”, South China Morning Post, 1 July 2007. On 27 November 2007, Chan also said on RTHK’s Backchat: “I resigned chiefly (there were a number of other concerns) because I was not able to go along with CH’s proposal to introduce the accountability system. I thought in the absence of universal suffrage to introduce a layer of political appointees would not be efficient, would affect the operation of the civil service. I thought there were other ways of grooming political talents. I spent a year trying to persuade CH not to go down this road. But as I did not succeed and I felt I could not defend this package, I chose to leave.”

95. For discussions about the Principle Officials Accountability System, see Christine Loh and Richard Cullen, Accountability Without Democracy, http://www.civic-exchange.org/publications/2002/POASE.pdf; Christine Loh and Carine Lai, Reflections of Leadership, pp. 78–84; and Brian C. H. Fong, “Ten Years of Political Appointments in Hong Kong: The Challenges and Prospects of Developing a Political Appointment System under a Semi-Democratic Regime, 2002–12”, New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, pp. 67–103.

96. Stuart Lau, “State Leaders Zhang Dejiang Declares Beijing’s Power to ‘Supervise’ Hong Kong Civil Servants’ Allegiance”, South China Morning Post, 27 May 2017; and Stuart Lau, “Beijing Signals Tighter Grip”, South China Morning Post, 28 May 2017.

97. Translation of Xi Jinping’s full speech in Hong Kong on 1 July 2017, South China Morning Post, 2 July 2017.

98. For typical submissions to the Legislative Council, see the website of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, Security Panel Papers Year 2001–2011; and for a discussion, see Shiu-hing Sonny Lo, Governing Hong Kong, pp. 241–42.

99. Brian C. H. Fong, “One Country, Two Nationalisms: Center-Periphery Relations between Mainland China and Hong Kong, 1997–2016”, Modern China, p. 9, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0097700417691470.

100. Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong: A Participant’s View”, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, p. 690.

101. “Row over Anti-Falun Gong Banners”, South China Morning Post, 9 January 2013; and Hong Kong Journalists Association, “Dark Clouds on the Horizon: Hong Kong’s Freedom of Express Faces New Threats”, Annual Report 2013, p. 3.

102. Brian C. H. Fong, “In-between Liberal Authoritarianism and Electoral Authoritarianism: Hong Kong’s Democratization under Chinese Sovereignty, 1997–2016”, Democratization, 2016, pp. 10–12, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1232249.

103. Ng Kang Chung, Naomi Ng, Raymond Cheng, Peace Chiu, and Raymond Yeung, “Angry Crowd Demands Youngspiration Oath Pair to Quit Hong Kong Legco”, South China Morning Post, 26 October 2016 and updated on 30 November 2016.

104. Alex Lo, “Silent Majority Have Ears in High Places”, South China Morning Post”, 1 December 2016.

105. Ching Cheong, “Beijing May Shelve New HK Law”, The Straits Times, 15 August 2003.

106. “Chinese Vice-President Calls for Further Cooperation between Mainland, HK and Macao”, 17 September 2003, http://www.chinaembassy.at/det/xwdt/t104837.htm.

107. China Daily, 4 December 2003.

108. Policy Address 2004–2005, paragraph 77.

109. Press Release, HKSAR government, Task Force on Constitutional Review, 7 January 2004, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ca/papers/ca0216cb2-920-1e.pdf.

110. Press Release, HKSAR government, Chief Secretary concludes Beijing visit, 10 February 2004, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200402/10/0210205.htm.

111. “China’s Top Legislature Will Deliberate a Draft Interpretation of Clause 7 of Annex I and Clause 3 of Annex II of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) in Its Next Meeting from April 2 to 6”, Xinhuanet, 26 March 2004, archived at http://www.article23.org.hk/english/newsupdate/mar04/0326e3.htm.

112. Policy Address 2010–2011, paragraph 161.

113. For details of this episode, see Steven C. G. Fung, “Political Participation of Students in Hong Kong: A Historical Account of Transformation”, Joseph Y. S. Cheng, New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, pp. 270–73.

114. For a discussion about Scholarism and students’ activism, see Benson Wai-Kwok Wong and Sanho Chung, “Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students: Comparative Analysis of Their Development after the Umbrella Movement”, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, pp. 865–84; and Ben Bland’s Generation HK is also useful.

115. Jeffie Lam, “Self-Determination, Elections on Agenda for New Party”, South China Morning Post, 11 April 2016.

116. Joseph Li, “Leung, Most HK People Support ‘One Country’”, China Daily Asia, 15 September 2016.

117. For a scholarly discussion on the moral and national education mass movement, see Karita Kan, “Lessons in Patriotism”, China Perspectives, no. 2012/4, pp. 63–69.

118. Horace Chin (陳雲根), a.k.a. Wan Chin (陳雲), is the author of On the Hong Kong City State published in 2011. Chin advocates Hong Kong to be a polity with total autonomy and only be affiliated with the Mainland in name. For a discussion about Chin’s work, see Che-po Chan, “Post-Umbrella Movement: Localism and Radicalism of the Hong Kong Student Movement”, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 2016, pp. 885–908.

119. Keung Kai-hing, “HK Independence Attempt a Display of Political Naiveté”, China Daily, 18 October 2012.

120. Hu Jintao’s report at the 18th Party Congress, 17 November 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259.htm.

121. Translation of Xi Jinping’s full speech in Hong Kong on 1 July 2017, South China Morning Post, 2 July 2017.

122. Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, June 2014, Section V.

123. Geoffrey Ma, “Strength and Fragility in Tandem: The Rule of Law in Hong Kong”, Annual International Rule of Law Lecture 2015, The Bar Council of England and Wales, http://www.hkcfa.hk/filemanager/speech/en/upload/130/Strength%20and%20Fragility%20in%20tandem%20-%20The%20Rule%20of%20Law%20in%20Hong%20Kong.pdf.

124. Joseph Fok, “Demonstrating Judicial Independence in Increasingly Politicized Times”, Commonwealth Law Conference 2017, 21 March 2017, http://www.hkcfa.hk/filemanager/speech/en/upload/183/C2%20Independence%20of%20the%20Judiciary%20and%20Legal%20Profession.pdf.

125. Decision of the SCNPC adopted on 31 August 2014.

126. Occupy Central with Love and Peace Manifesto, see http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/book_detail&book_id=11.

127. For details of the events, see Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “The Occupation Campaign in Hong Kong: A Participant’s View”, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 2016, pp. 699–734; and Jermain T. M. Lam, “The Occupy Central Movement and Political Reform in Hong Kong”, in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, pp. 450–81.

128. Flora Chung, “School Off-limits to Independence ‘Poison’”, The Standard, 17 August 2016.

129. For discussions about the evolution of civil society activities in Hong Kong, see Eliza Wing-yee Lee, “Civic Society Organisations and Local Governance in Hong Kong”, in Stephen Wing-kai Chu and Siu-lun Wong, Repositioning the Hong Kong Government: Social Foundations and Political Challenges, pp. 147–64; Daniel Garrett and Wing-chung Ho, “Hong Kong at the Brink: Emerging Forms of Political Participation in the New Social Movement”, in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, pp. 347–83; and Calvin H. M. Lau, “Political Participation of the Post-80s Generation: Their Protest Activities and Social Movements in Recent Years in Hong Kong”, in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, pp. 387–415.

130. Elsie Leung, “Why the Government Must Seek an Interpretation of BL53(2) from the NPCSC”, http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/archive/pdf/sj20050419e.pdf, 15 April 2005.

131. To be fair, there were several other cases where the secretary for justice had also decided not to prosecute. For a longer discussion, see Christine Loh, “Human Rights in the First Year—Genuine Restraint, or Buying Time?”, in Nyaw Mee-kay and Li Si Ming, The Other Hong Kong Report 1998, pp. 65–67.

132. Jiang Enzhu vs. Emily Lau Wai-Hing, HCAL27/98, 8 June 1999, https://www.hongkongcaselaw.com/jiang-enzhu-v-lau-wai-hing-emily/.

133. On 7 April 1998, the Provisional Legislature passed the Adaptation of Laws Ordinance, which exempted state organs from the application of a number of Hong Kong laws, similar to the immunity enjoyed by the Crown prior to 1997. Crown immunity is a judicial doctrine stemming from the concept that “the monarch can do no wrong”. Like for Crown immunity prior to the transition, state immunity post-transition confers on state organs immunity from suit and execution in the Hong Kong courts. The common law had extended the meaning of the Crown from the monarch to all bodies and persons acting as servants and agents of the Crown. In resuming the debate on the bill, the issue of the status of Xinhua Hong Kong was discussed, see http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr97-98/english/counmtg/general/yr9798.htm. The issue of state immunity and the circumstances that it could be claimed by a state organ was discussed in Intraline Resources SDN BHD vs. The Owners of the Ship or Vessel ‘Hua Tian Long’ (2010) 3 HKLRD. 67.

134. Functions and Powers of the SCNPC, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/2007-11/15/content_1373018.htm.

135. Decision of the SCNPC, 26 June 1999. For a discussion of the case, see Albert H. Y. Chen, “The Court of Final Appeal’s Ruling in the ‘Illegal Migrant’ Children Case: Congressional Supremacy and Judicial Review”, Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation, edited by Johannes M. M. Chan et al., pp. 73–96.

136. Decision of the SCNPC, 26 April 2004. For a discussion, see Albert H. Y. Chen, “The Constitutional Controversy of Spring 2004”, Hong Kong Law Journal, 2004, pp. 215–26, https://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/74855/1/content.pdf?accept=1.

137. Decision of the SCNPC, 27 April, 2005. See also Elsie Leung, “Why the Government Must Seek an Interpretation of BL53(2) from the NPCSC”, 19 April 2005, http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/archive/pdf/sj20050419e.pdf.

138. Decision of the SCNPC, 26 August 2011.

139. Explanations on the draft interpretation of Article 104 of Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR, 7 November 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-11/08/c_135812367.htm.

140. Judgment HCSL185-2016, 15 November 2016, http://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=106799&currpage=T.

141. High Court judgment, 14 July 2017, http://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2016/HCAL000223_2016_files/HCAL000223_2016ES.htm.

142. The first set of by-elections was held on 11 March 2018. Another two seats still had to be dealt with.

143. Tony Cheung, “First Two, Now 15 Hong Kong Lawmakers Face Prospect of Being Expelled from Legislative Council”, South China Morning Post, 9 November 2016 and updated on 10 November 2016.

144. “Hong Kong Advert Calls Chinese Mainlanders ‘Locusts’”, BBC News, 1 February 2012. For an interesting essay, see Feng Chi-shun, “I’m Proud to Be a ‘Locust’”, China Daily Asia, 8 July 2015.

145. For a discussion, see Brian Bridges, “Booking the National Anthem: Hong Kong’s Identities through the Mirror of Sport”, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 2016, pp. 819–43.

146. Policy Address, 14 January 2015, paragraph 10. See also Tong Cheung and Peter So, “Hong Kong Nationalism Flies off the Shelves Following Leung Chun Ying’s Policy Address Criticism”, South China Morning Post, 21 January 2015.

147. Phila Siu, “Beijing Slams Creation of Hong Kong Independence Party, Saying It Endangers National Security”, South China Morning Post, 30 March 2016 and updated on 31 March 2016; and Kenneth Lau, “Party Ideas ‘Cannot Be Tolerated’”, The Standard, 1 April 2016.

148. LegCo Question No. 4: Views and acts advocating independence of Hong Kong, 20 April 2016, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201604/20/P201604200307.htm.

149. Luis Liu and Shadow Li, “Top Legislator Zhang Hails ‘One Country, Two Systems”, China Daily Asia, 19 May 2016.

150. Candidates already had to declare in the nomination form to uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the HKSAR. On 14 July 2016, the Electoral Affairs Commission announced that an extra confirmation was needed to declare acceptance that Hong Kong was an inalienable part of China. The HKSAR government explained that the new requirement was to help candidates better understand the law, their legal liability and consequences of breach, as well as help voters to understand the candidates. Returning officers were given the responsibility to invalidate non-compliant candidates. It was widely discussed in the media that the requirement was aimed at pro-independence Edward Leung of Hong Kong Indigenous who got some 60,000 votes in the New Territories East by-election in February and was likely to win. Despite this controversial requirement, Leung Chung Hang and Lau Wai Ching of Youngspiration and Cheng Chung Tai of Civic Passion had their nominations validated and got elected even though Edward Leung was barred. See Press Release, HKSAR government, 30 July 2016, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201607/30/P2016073000700.htm.

151. Li Keqiang’s Work Report, 15 March 2017, http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/politics/11/20170316/1585.html.

152. 鍾國安，〈以習近平總書記總體國家安全觀為指引　譜寫國家安全新篇章〉，《求是》, 2017/8, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2017-04/15/c_1120788993.htm. See also Frank Tang, “Party Points to HK Separatist Threat”, South China Morning Post, 16 April 2017.

153. For a detailed discussion of the Xi Yang’s case, see Carol P. Lai, Media in Hong Kong, pp. 50–77. Xi was released back to Hong Kong on parole, see Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 4 March 2008, http://www.duihua.org/hrjournal/2008_03_01_archive.html.

154. Ching Cheong, My 1,000 Days Ordeal: A Patriot’s Torture, pp. 38–39.

155. Juliana Liu, “Hong Kong’s Missing Booksellers and ‘Banned’ Xi Jinping Book”, BBC News, 4 February 2016.

156. Transcript of Lam Wing Kee’s opening statement at the press conference, 17 June 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/1976598/full-transcript-lam-wing-kees-opening-statement-his-hong.

157. Phila Siu and Tony Cheung, “Bookseller Is a Chinese National Who Broke Mainland Law and Beijing Has the Right to Deal with Him, Ministry Declares”, South China Morning Post, 17 June 2016.

158. Jennifer Ngo and Jeffie Lam, “Beijing Official Accuses Bookseller of ‘Destroying’ Hong Kong’s Governing Policy”, South China Morning Post, 2 July 2016.

159. Niall Fraser and Danny Mok, “33,000 Gather in Support of Hong Kong Officers Jailed for Beating up Occupy Protester Ken Tsang”, South China Morning Post, 22 February 2017 and updated on 23 February 2017.

160. Public order events and statistics, Hong Kong Police, http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/09_statistics/poes.html.

161. Jason Y. Ng, Umbrellas in Bloom: Hong Kong Occupy Movement Uncovered; and Joseph Y. S. Cheng, and Emile K. K. Yeoh (eds.), “From Handover to Occupy Campaign: Democracy, Identity and the Umbrella Movement”, Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, August/September 2016.

162. LCQ5: Mongkok Riots, 2 March 2017, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201603/02/P201603020594.htm.

163. Geoffrey Ma, “Strength and Fragility in Tandem: The Rule of Law in Hong Kong”, Annual International Rule of Law Lecture 2015, The Bar Council of England and Wales, http://www.hkcfa.hk/filemanager/speech/en/upload/130/Strength%20and%20Fragility%20in%20tandem%20-%20The%20Rule%20of%20Law%20in%20Hong%20Kong.pdf.

164. Hong Kong Journalists Association, “Dark Clouds on the Horizon: Hong Kong’s Freedom of Expression Faces New Threats”, Annual Report 2013, and “Two Systems Under Siege: Beijing Turns the Screws on Hong Kong”, Annual Report 2017, provide useful background information on issues raised in this paragraph.

165. 〈訓斥記者四分鐘　指提問天真「I am angry」江：支持連任不等同欽點〉，Ming Pao, 28 October 2000.

166. Shirley Yam, “Behind the TVB Façade Lies the True Identity of Its Owner”, South China Morning Post, Business Section, 17 May 2017. The owner, Li Ruigang, responded in Peggy Sito and Eric Ng, “Media Chief Questions HK’s Shares System”, South China Morning Post, 24 June 2017.

167. For a discussion on integrating media owners to the Mainland’s political system, see Hong Kong Journalists Association, Rising Nationalism, 2008, p. 10; Dark Clouds on the Horizon, 2013, pp. 15–16; and One Country, Two Nightmares, 2016, pp. 5–7.

168. Hong Kong Journalists Association, Rising Nationalism, p. 10.

169. Speech by the secretary for justice explaining the decision not to prosecute, 24 May 1999, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199903/24/0324147.htm. It might have been that the decision not to prosecute was taken at a higher level.

170. Hong Kong Journalists Association and Article 19, The Ground Rules Change, pp. 20–21.

171. “Wong Exit Shows No Two Tigers Can Co-exist”, South China Morning Post, 24 December 2008.

172. Joseph Wong (王永平),〈中央，亞視，政治，生意〉, Economic Journal, 31 December 2008.

173. Eric Ng, “i-Cable shareholders accept white knight, vote for rights issue to be raised funds, continue operations”, South China Morning Post, 29 May 2017.

174. Michael Forsythe and Neil Gough, “Hong Kong Media Worries Over China’s Reach as Ads Disappears”, New York Times, 11 June 2014.

175. Carol Lai and Andy Ho, “Press: How Free Is the Press?”, in Chris Yeung, Hong Kong China, p. 200.

176. Wang Fengchiao said: “報道台獨觀點不能作為一般新聞處理後”，〈「傳媒有責任維護家統一和領土完整」王鳳超為報道台獨言論設限〉，Ming Pao, 13 April 2000.

177. Students in Taiwan occupied the Legislative Yuan in the spring of 2014 and created the Sunflower Student Movement. They sought to delay implementation of a trade in services agreement with the Mainland. See Tony Cheung, “The Sunflower and the Umbrella: Hong Kong Activists Travel to Taiwan, Call for Closer Ties, New Policies for Incoming Government”, South China Morning Post, 17 January 2016.

178. Kimmy Chung, “Pro-independence Taiwanese lawmakers launch support group for Hong Kong democracy”, South China Morning Post, 12 June 2017.

179. For a discussion about online media, see Hong Kong Journalists Association, “Dark Clouds on the Horizon”, Annual Report (2013), pp. 16–17; “Grave Threats to Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong”, Annual Report (2014), pp. 21–24; and “One Country, Two Nightmares,” Annual Report (2016), pp. 11–14.

180. 〈煽風點火「港獨」鬧劇　梁振英播「獨」〉, Sing Pao, 30 August 2016.

181. Ernest Kao, “Red notice issued for Sing Pao’s chief’s arrest on behalf of Shenzhen authorities”, South China Morning Post, 9 March 2017 and updated on 10 March 2017.

182. 〈「亂港四人幫」　薄熙來追隨者等搞局　香港之亂始於2012年〉, Sing Pao, 12 September 2016.

183. 〈炮製激進政團鞏固利益　中聯辦梁振英禍港捧青年新政扮港獨〉, Sing Pao, 3 September 2016.

184. See HKSAR Government vs. 鄭永健, 顧家豪, 陳建隆, 24 October 2016, http://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=107097&QS=%2B&TP=RV.

185. 〈瓦解「西環寶藥黨」　小明不見了　太陽如常升起　中聯辦換班在望〉, Sing Pao, 11 December 2016.

186. 〈張德江巴結中聯辦用「錢」買權　打造全國人大貪腐之路〉, Sing Pao, 3 October 2016.

187. Choi Chi-yuk, Kimmy Chung, and Tong Cheung, “Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Deputy Li Gang Removed from His Post”, South China Morning Post, 1 September 2017.

188. Joyce Ng and Gary Cheung, “HK Affairs Office in the Cross Hairs”, South China Morning Post, 16 October 2016.

189. 〈中聯辦被爆黑幕　查政協買賣　大削港區委員〉, Oriental Daily, 18 November 2016.

190. Joyce Ng, “Cadre from Xi’s Reform Body Joins Beijing’s HK Office”, South China Morning Post, 9 June 2017.

191. Translation of Xi Jinping’s full speech in Hong Kong on 1 July 2017, South China Morning Post, 2 July 2017.

192. According to Richard Ottaway, the chairman of the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Ni Jian, deputy Chinese ambassador to Britain, conveyed to him the message that the Sino-British Joint Declaration “is now void and only covered the period from the signing in 1984 until the handover in 1997. Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, echoed that: “Britain has no sovereignty over Hong Kong that has returned to China, no authority and no right to oversight”. See Danny Lee and Gary Cheung, “Beijing tells Britain it has no ‘moral responsibility’ for Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 31 December 2016 and updated on 12 September 2015. On 30 June 2017, the Foreign Ministry stated that the Sino-British Joint Declaration was a “historical document that no longer has any realistic meaning”. It stated that: “It also does not have any binding power on how the Chinese central government administer Hong Kong. Britain has . . . no supervising power over Hong Kong”. See Joyce Ng, “Joint declaration ‘no longer has meaning’, China says”, South China Morning Post, 1 July 2017, and Joyce Ng, “1984 treaty ‘still binding, but UK cannot meddle’”, South China Morning Post, 9 July 2017.

193. Francis Fukuyama proposed that what the world was witnessing in the 1990s was “the end of history . . . the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”; The End of History and the Last Man, 1992.

194. “Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere”, Central Committee of the CCP’s General Office, 22 April 2013, see translation http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation#start.

195. Translation of Xi Jinping’s full speech in Hong Kong on 1 July 2017, South China Morning Post, 2 July 2017.

196. Joyce Ng, “Pan-democrat Vote Share Slides”, South China Morning Post, 3 July 2017.

197. Translation of Xi Jinping’s full speech in Hong Kong on 1 July 2017, South China Morning Post, 2 July 2017.

198. The reference is Xi Jinping’s Political Report, 19th National Party Congress, 18 October 2017.

199. Julia Hollingsworth, “The Hong Kong Luxury Hotel Turned Tycoon Hideout Away from Prying Mainland Chinese Eyes”, South China Morning Post, 2 February 2017.

10. Reunification, Patriotism, and Political Disorder

From 1997 to 2017