Key ideas of this discourse
Epictetus directed this Discourse primarily against the Sceptics – Academics and Pyrrhonists – who maintained that we cannot know anything for certain. In broader terms, this discourse argues against sticking to one’s views, even when facts show otherwise. CC
Denying reality
If a person denies what is obviously true, no argument would change his mind. We cannot reason with him. This is not because he is strong, or his teacher is week. But when a person contradicts himself in an argument, and becomes hard as a stone, how any can anyone argue with him?
Rigidity can come about in two ways: Either one's intellect is frozen, or one's sense of honour is. Such a person neither agrees to what is true nor leaves the argument altogether. Most of us will go to great lengths to avoid deadening the body; our souls, not so much.
Knowingly denying reality is worse
When a person does not see the contradiction in his thinking and is incapable of following an argument, we think he is in a bad way. But when someone sees the contradiction but still does not acknowledge it, when he has no sense of shame, we call it strength of character. In reality, it is even worse.
“Do you recognize you are awake?”
“No. No more than when I think in my dreams that I am awake.”
“Is there no difference at all between the two?”
“No, none.”
How can you argue with a person like this? What fire, what steel can I apply to make him realize that he has become deadened? When he knows and yet pretends not to, he is worse than a corpse. His sense of shame and moral feelings are gone, or brutalized in any case. He is in a worse state than one who does not see the contradiction at all. Should I call this strength of character? Not unless I say the same about the character of lewd people who do and say in public anything that comes to their mind.
Think about this
One man does not notice the contradiction – he is in a bad way. Another man notices it, indeed, but is not moved and does not improve; he is in a still worse state. Discourses I.5.8. Epictetus [WO]
Discourse 6