1. Dillon Beresford, “Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs,” a paper prepared for Black Hat USA+2011, 8 July 2011, http://bitly.com/OtcuJx+
1. Jean Giraudoux, Tiger at the Gates (La guerre de Troie n’aura pas lieu), translated by Christopher Fry, New York: Oxford University Press, 1955.
2. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy, vol. 12, 2 (1993), pp. 141–65.
3. William J. Lynn, “Defending a New Domain,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, 5 (2010), pp. 97–108, p. 101.
4. Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War, New York: Ecco, 2010, p. 261.
5. Lisa Daniel, “Panetta: Intelligence Community Needs to Predict Uprisings,” American Forces Press Service, 11 Feb. 2011.
6. Paul Taylor, “Former US Spy Chief Warns on Cybersecurity,” Financial Times, 2 Dec. 2012.
7. Michael Joseph Gross, “A Declaration of Cyber-War,” Vanity Fair, Apr. 2011.
8. Several critical contributions have helped improve the debate since 2010. Among the most important are the security technologist Bruce Schneier, Obama’s former cybersecurity coordinator Howard Schmidt, and the scholar Sean Lawson, see: Bruce Schneier, “The Threat of Cyberwar Has Been Grossly Exaggerated,” Schneier on Security, 7 July 2010; Ryan Singel, “White House Cyber Czar: ‘There Is No Cyberwar’,” Wired, 4 Mar. 2010; Sean Lawson, “Beyond Cyber Doom,” Working Paper, Washington, DC: George Mason University, Jan. 2011.
1. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Berlin: Ullstein, 1832 (1980), p. 27.
2. One of the most creative and important theoreticians of deterrence, Jack Gibbs, once pointed out that fear and the threat of force are integral ingredients of deterrence, “Unless threat and fear are stressed, deterrence is a hodgepodge notion.” Jack P. Gibbs, “Deterrence Theory and Research,” in Gary Melton, Laura Nader, and Richard A. Dienstbier (eds), Law as a Behavioral Instrument, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986, p. 87.
3. Thomas Mahnken, in a useful conceptual appraisal of cyber war, also uses Clausewitz’s definition of war as violent, political, and “interactive,” and argues that the basic nature of war was not fundamentally altered by the advent of nuclear weapons or by cyber attack. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Cyber War and Cyber Warfare,” in Kristin Lord and Travis Sharp (eds), America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age, vol. 2, pp. 53–62, Washington, DC: CNAS, 2011.
4. Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, p. 29.
5. “[Der Gegner] gibt mir das Gesetz, wie ich es ihm gebe,” ibid., p. 30.
6. Ibid., p. 35.
7. In Vom Kriege Clausewitz uses similar phrases a few times. This quote is a translation of the heading of Book 1, Chapter 24, “Der Krieg ist einer bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln,” ibid., p. 44.
8. For a sophisticated critique of this argument, see John Stone, “Cyber War Will Take Place!,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 36, 1 (Feb. 2013).
9. This is not a statement about the different levels of war: connecting between the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels always remains a challenge.
10. This problem has also been extensively discussed among legal scholars. For an excellent recent overview, see Matthew C. Waxman, “Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force,” The Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 36 (2011), pp. 421–59.
11. For a particularly vividly told scenario, see the opening scene of Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War, New York: Ecco, 2010.
12. See, for instance, Yoram Dinstein, “Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense,” International Legal Studies, vol. 76 (2002), p. 103.
13. For more on this argument, see Waxman, “Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force,” p. 436.
14. Michael V. Hayden, “The Future of Things ‘Cyber’,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 5, 1 (2011), pp. 3–7.
15. Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss, New York: Random House, 2004, pp. 268–9.
16. Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, p. 93.
17. Anatoly Medetsky, “KGB Veteran Denies CIA Caused ’82 Blast,” The Moscow Times, 18 Mar. 2004.
18. Nikolai Brusnitsin, Openness and Espionage, Moscow: Military Pub. House, USSR Ministry of Defense, 1990, pp. 28–9. I would like to thank Mike Warner for pointing out this source to me.
19. I would like to thank Richard Chirgwin for pointing out and explaining this part of technological history to me.
20. Richard Chirgwin, email exchange with the author, 23 Mar. 2012.
21. Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents, Tallinn: CCDCOE, 2010, p. 17.
22. These disruptions were the worst of the entire “cyber war,” according to ibid., p. 20.
23. “Estonia Has No Evidence of Kremlin Involvement in Cyber Attacks,” Ria Novosti, 6 Sep. 2007. It should also be noted that Russian activists and even a State Duma deputy (although perhaps jokingly) have claimed to be behind the attacks, see Gadi Evron, “Authoritatively, Who Was Behind the Estonian Attacks?” Darkreading, 17 Mar. 2009. See also, Gadi Evron, “Battling Botnets and Online Mobs,” Science & Technology, Winter/Spring 2008, pp. 121–8.
24. Tim Espiner, “Estonia’s Cyberattacks: Lessons Learned, a Year On,” ZDNet UK, 1 May 2008.
25. Andrei Zlobin and Kseniya Boletskaya, “Elektronnaya bomba,” Vedomosti, 28 May 2007, http://bitly.com/g1M9Si+
26. Ron Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski, and Masashi Crete-Nishihata, “Cyclones in Cyberspace: Information Shaping and Denial in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War,” Security Dialogue, vol. 43, 1 (2012), pp. 3–24.
27. The intensity of the attacks was high, with traffic reaching 211.66 Mbps on average, peaking at 814.33 Mbps, see Jose Nazario, “Georgia DDoS Attacks—A Quick Summary of Observations,” Security to the Core (Arbor Networks), 12 Aug. 2008.
28. Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Rünnimeri, Mari Kert, Anna-Maria Talihärm, and Liis Vihul, Cyber Attacks Against Georgia, Tallinn: CCDCOE, 2008, p. 12. Jeffrey Carr, a cyber security expert, published a report which concluded that Russia’s Foreign Military Intelligence Agency (GRU) and Federal Security Service (FSB) probably helped coordinate the attacks, rather than independent patriotic hackers. Yet, to date, this has neither been proven nor admitted.
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B Griffith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 141.
2. Jürgen Kraus, “Selbstreproduktion bei Programmen,” Dortmund: Universität Dortmund, 1980, p. 160.
3. John Roberts, “Exclusive: Drones Vulnerable to Terrorist Hijacking, Researchers Say,” Fox News, 25 June 2012.
4. Scott Peterson and Payam Faramarzi, “Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says Iranian Engineer,” Christian Science Monitor, 15 Dec. 2011.
5. Catherine Herridge, “US Data in Iranian Hands After Downed Drone?” Fox News, 10 Feb. 2012.
6. So reads the opening paragraph of Chapter 13, “Of the natural condition of mankind, as concerning the felicity, and misery,” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London: Penguin, 1651 (1996), p. 86.
7. Ibid., Chapter 13, paragraph 9.
8. Hobbes did not use the word monopolize; Max Weber introduced the expression to describe a well-established idea. Max Weber, Politik als Beruf, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1968 (1919).
9. See for instance John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Plaistow: Curwen Press, 1832 (1954), Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Second Edition), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves, The Notion of the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
10. Sofsky’s work, despite its quality, is not sufficiently referenced. Wolfgang Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1996
11. Heinrich Popitz, Phänomene der Macht, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004, p. 68, also p. 24; Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt, p. 31.
12. Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt, p. 82.
13. Ibid., p. 19.
14. For a superb analysis of the similarities between early airpower enthusiasts and proponents of cyberpower, and for stunning quotes from that debate, see David Betz and Tim Stevens, Cyberspace and the State, Adelphi Series, London: IISS/Routledge, 2011, “Airpower Redux,” pp. 82–8.
15. See for instance Lamia Joreige’s video installation documenting the trauma caused by the 2006 Israeli air campaign, “Objects of War No. 4,” 2006, Tate Modern, Reference T13250, purchased 2011.
16. On 5 Dec. 2005 the US Air Force expanded its mission accordingly. See mission statement, as of 9 Aug. 2012, http://www.airforce.com/learn-about/our-mission. Also, Sebastian M. II Convertino, Lou Anne DeMattei, and Tammy M. Knierim, “Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace,” Air War College Maxwell Paper, 40 (2007), Michael Wynne, “Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace,” Air & Space Power Journal (2007), pp. 5–9.
17. For a more detailed critique of the “fifth domain” see the concluding chapter of this book.
18. A patrol may have several functions next to displaying force, including gathering intelligence and maintaining readiness and morale.
19. For a more specific discussion on the notion of cyber attack, see the following chapter on cyber weapons.
20. See for instance J. David Lewis and Andrew J. Weigert, “Social Atomism, Holism, and Trust,” The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 26, 4 (1985), pp. 455–71, p. 455, “In a word, society is possible only through trust in its members, institutions, and forms.” For an insightful study of trust in the context of computer security, see Bruce Schneier, Liars and Outliers, Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2012.
21. For an influential yet exceedingly narrow view of trust, see Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002.
22. See J. David Lewis and Andrew J. Weigert, “Trust as a Social Reality,” Social Forces, vol. 63, 4 (1985), pp. 967–85, p. 986.
23. Under conditions of civil war, even trust within families is likely to erode. See Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 178, 226. For a radically different (and implausible) argument, namely that anarchy, and not government, generates cohesion and trust, see Ernest Gellner, “Trust, Cohesion, and the Social Order,” in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1990, pp. 142–57.
24. One of the foundational classic texts is Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Second Edition), especially Chapter 1.
25. Passerin d’Entrèves, The Notion of the State, p. 2.
26. Hobbes, Leviathan, second paragraph, Chapter 17, in context, “And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, … if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.”
27. Ibid., opening line of Chapter 30.
28. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1689 (1988), §171, “An essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government,” see also §136, “To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of Nature.”
29. See Hannah Arendt’s discussion of Passerin d’Entrèves’s contribution, Hannah Arendt, On Violence, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970, p. 37.
30. Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Reflections, New York: Schocken Books, 1978, p. 277.
31. Ibid., p. 278.
32. Ibid., p. 284.
33. The invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003 offers one of the most illustrative case studies. For a detailed analysis, see Thomas Rid, War and Media Operations: The U.S. Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq, London: Routledge, 2007.
34. One example is the Westboro Baptist Church, an extreme independent group known for anti-gay militancy, picketing funerals of American soldiers, and desecrating the US flag. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westboro_Baptist_Church
35. On this day, to be more precise, the first fraudulent certificate was issued. The attack may have started even earlier. See J.R. Prins, DigiNotar Certificate Authority Breach ‘Operation Black Tulip’, Delft: Fox-IT, 2011, p. 8.
36. The fake Google certificate is archived at Pastebin, “Gmail.com SSL MITM ATTACK BY Iranian Government,” 27 Aug. 2011, http://bitly.com/qGTf0a+
37. Jochem Binst, “DigiNotar Reports Security Incident,” Vasco Press Release, 30 Aug. 2011, http://bitly.com/vasco-diginotar+; see also Prins, Op Black Tulip, p. 5.
38. Seth Schoen and Eva Galperin, “Iranian Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against Google Demonstrates Dangerous Weakness of Certificate Authorities,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, 29 Aug. 2011.
39. “Is This MITM Attack to Gmail’s SSL?” Google Product Forums, http://bitly.com/alibo-mitm+
40. Schoen and Galperin, “Iranian Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against Google Demonstrates Dangerous Weakness of Certificate Authorities.”
41. Heather Adkins, “An Updated on Attempted Man-in-the-Middle Attacks,” Google Online Security Blog, 29 Aug. 2011. See also Prins, Op Black Tulip.
42. Charles Arthur, “Rogue Web Certificate Could Have Been Used to Attack Iran Dissidents,” The Guardian, 30 Aug. 2011.
43. Prins, Op Black Tulip, p. 8, also p. 13.
44. See especially the alleged hacker’s 7 Sep. 2011 post on Pastebin, http://pastebin.com/u/ComodoHacker
45. Somini Sengupta, “Hacker Rattles Security Circles,” The New York Times, 11 Sep. 2011.
46. Comodo Hacker, “Striking Back …,” Pastebin, 5 Sep. 2011, http://pastebin.com/1AxH30em
47. Mikko Hypponen, “DigiNotar Hacked by Black.Spook and Iranian Hackers,” F-Secure, 30 Aug. 2011.
48. Ibid.
49. Ian Traynor, “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” The Guardian, 6 Sep. 2007.
50. Tim Espiner, “Estonia’s Cyberattacks: Lessons Learned, a Year On,” ZDNet UK, 1 May 2008.
51. “Statement by the Foreign Minister Urmas Paet,” Eesti Päevaleht, 1 May 2007, http://bitly.com/QoC9FE+
52. Andrei Zlobin and Kseniya Boletskaya, “Elektronnaya bomba,” Vedomosti, 28 May 2007, http://bitly.com/g1M9Si+
53. Joshua Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,” Wired, 21 Aug. 2007.
54. Ralph Peters, “Washington Ignores Cyberattack Threats, Putting Us All at Peril,” Wired, 23 Aug. 2007.
55. For a more detailed description, see the next chapter.
56. David Sanger, Confront and Conceal, New York: Crown, 2012, p. 199.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 200.
59. Mikko Hypponen, “Emails from Iran,” F-Secure, 23 July 2012.
60. Ibid., see also Ladane Nasseri, “Iran Nuclear Plants Hit By Virus Playing AC/DC, Website Says,” Bloomberg News, 25 July 2012.
61. “Iran Denies its Nuclear Computer Systems Hit by New Virus,” Haaretz (DPA), 1 Aug. 2012.
62. See Dexter Filkins, The Forever War, New York: Knopf, 2008, p. 3.
1. Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Cyberweapons had Been Considered to Disrupt Gaddafi’s Air Defenses,” The Washington Post, 18 Oct. 2011.
2. William J. Lynn, “The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, One Year Later,” Foreign Affairs, 28 (Sep. 2011).
3. Department of Defense, “Defense Strategic Guidance,” Washington, D.C., Jan. 2012, p. 4.
4. JP 1–02, as amended through 15 Sep. 2011, p. 365.
5. Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, 1 (2012).
6. Department of Defense, “Cyberspace Policy Report,” Nov. 2011, p. 2.
7. For a related distinction combined with a rather wide definition, see Lior Tabansky, “Basic Concepts in Cyber Warfare,” Military and Strategic Affairs, vol. 3, 1 (2011), pp. 75–92.
8. Keith Alexander, “Cybersecurity Symposium Keynote Address,” University of Rhode Island, 11 Apr. 2011, http://bitly.com/tNyDmX+
9. US Department of Energy, “Russian Hydroelectric Plant Accident: Lessons to be Learned,” Office of Health, Safety and Security, 4 Aug. 2011, http://bitly.com/t4LDzy+
10. Steve Gutterman, “Negligence Factor in Russian Power Plant Accident,” Associated Press, 3 Oct. 2009.
11. For a detailed discussion, see Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, New York: Free Press, 1973, pp. 35–56.
12. An example of a definition that is too narrow is: “A cyber weapon is an information technology-based system that is designed to damage the structure or operations of some other information technology-based system.” Peeter Lorents and Rain Ottis, “Knowledge Based Framework for Cyber Weapons and Conflict,” Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings, 2010, pp. 129–42.
13. Anatoly Medetsky, “KGB Veteran Denies CIA Caused ’82 Blast,” The MoscowTimes, 18 Mar. 2004.
14. David A Fulghum, Robert Wall, and Amy Butler, “Israel Shows Electronic Prowess,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 168, 25 Nov. 2007; David A Fulghum, Robert Wall, and Amy Butler, “Cyber-Combat’s First Shot,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 167, 16 Nov. 2007, pp. 28–31.
15. John Markoff, “A Silent Attack, But Not a Subtle One,” The New York Times, 26 Sep. 2010.
16. Sally Adee, “The Hunt for the Kill Switch,” IEEE Spectrum, May 2008.
17. Geoff McDonald et al, “Stuxnet 0.5: The Missing Link,” Symantec, 2013, p. 2.
18. Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, and Eric Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Version 1.4, Symantec, 2011, p. 3.
19. Ibid.
20. For more details on Stuxnet’s infection mechanisms, see the chapter on espionage.
21. This is Ralph Langner’s target theory. The question of whether Stuxnet’s code 417 “warhead” was disabled or not is controversial among engineers. See ibid., p. 45 as well as Ralph Langner, “Matching Langner’s Stuxnet Analysis and Symantec’s Dossier Update,” The Last Line of Cyber Defense, 21 Feb. 2011.
22. Ralph Langner, “Cracking Stuxnet,” TED Talk, Mar. 2011.
23. William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay,” The New York Times, 16 Jan. 2011, p. A1.
24. Falliere, Murchu, and Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Version 1.4, p. 3.
25. See Gary McGraw’s discussion with Ralph Langner on Cigital’s Silver Bullet, 25 Feb. 2011, http://www.cigital.com/silverbullet/show-059/
26. Falliere, Murchu, and Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Version 1.4
27. See for instance John Markoff, “A Silent Attack, But Not a Subtle One,” p. A6.
28. David Fulghum, “Cyber Attack Turns Physical,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, vol. 235, 61 (2010), p. 3.
29. A CBS news segment of the experiment is at http://youtu.be/rTkXgqK1l9A
30. Samuel M. Katz, The Hunt for the Engineer, New York: Fromm International, 1999, p. 260.
31. “Hezbollah Got Inside MI’s Inner Sanctum,” Ynet, 13 Sep. 2009.
32. It remained unclear how the work affected air-gapped secure systems, see “Virus Hits Secret Pentagon Network,” BBC, 6 May 2000.
33. Tom Raum, “More CIA Employees May Be Disciplined in Computer Case,” Associated Press, 6 May 2000.
34. D. Moore, V. Paxson, S. Savage, C. Shannon, S. Staniford, and N. Weaver, “Inside the Slammer Worm,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 1, 4 (2003), pp. 33–9.
35. Ibid., p. 33.
36. Kevin Poulsen, “Slammer Worm Crashed Ohio Nuke Plant Net,” The Register, 20 Aug. 2003.
37. See ibid.
38. Letter from Edward J Markey to Nils Diaz, 20 Oct. 2003, http://bitly.com/PrRvow+
39. Dale Peterson, “Offensive Cyber Weapons: Construction, Development, and Employment,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 36, 1 (2012).
40. For an introduction into agent technology, see M. Luck, P. McBurney, and C. Preist, “A Manifesto for Agent Technology: Towards Next Generation Computing,” Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol. 9, 3 (2004), pp. 203–52.
41. David Sanger, “America’s Deadly Dynamics with Iran,” The New York Times, 6 Nov. 2011, p. SR1.
1. John Leyden, “Hack on Saudi Aramco Hit 30,000 Workstations, Oil Firm Admits,” The Register, 29 Aug. 2012.
2. “Saudi-Aramco Emerges Stronger from Cyber Attack,” Arab News, 1 Sep. 2012.
3. William J. Donovan, Simple Sabotage Field Manual, Washington, D.C.: Office of Strategic Services, 1944, p. 1.
4. Émile Pouget, Le sabotage, Paris: M. Rivière, 1910, p. 3.
5. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Sabotage, Cleveland, Ohio: IWW Publishing Bureau, 1916, p. 5, quoted in Ralph Darlington, Syndicalism and the Transition to Communism, Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008, p. 34.
6. Cited in Pouget, Le sabotage, p. 34, “Si vous êtes mécanicien, disait cet article, il vous est très facile avec deux sous d’une poudre quelconque, ou même seulement avec du sable, d’enrayer votre machine, d’occasionner une perte de temps et une réparation fort coûteuse à votre employeur. Si vous êtes menuisier ou ébéniste, quoi de plus facile que de détériorer un meuble sans que le patron s’en aperçoive et lui faire perdre ainsi des clients?” translation by Ralph Darlington.
7. Émile Pouget and Arturo M. Giovannitti, Sabotage, Chicago: C.H. Kerr & Co., 1913, p. 6.
8. Ibid.
9. Quoted in Darlington, Syndicalism and the Transition to Communism, p. 36.
10. Jim Finkle, “Exclusive: Insiders Suspected in Saudi Cyber Attack,” Reuters, 7 Sep. 2012.
11. “The Shamoon Attacks,” Symantec, 16 Aug. 2012.
12. “Shamoon/DistTrack Malware,” US-CERT, 29 Aug. 2012, http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/JSAR-12–241–01.pdf
13. A Guest, “Untitled,” Pastebin, 15 Aug. 2012, http://pastebin.com/HqAga QRj
14. A Guest, “Untitled,” Pastebin, 17 Aug. 2012, http://pastebin.com/tztn RLQG
15. Nicole Perlroth, “Among Digital Crumbs from Saudi Aramco Cyberattack, Image of Burning U.S. Flag,” The New York Times Bits, 24 Aug. 2012.
16. Dmitry Tarakanov, “Shamoon the Wiper in Details,” Securelist, 21 Aug. 2012.
17. “Hackers Fail to Access Iranian Oil Ministry’s Sensitive Data,” Fars, 27 Apr. 2012.
18. “What Was That Wiper Thing?” Securelist, 29 Aug. 2012.
19. Camilla Hall and Javier Blas, “Aramco Cyber Attack Targeted Production,” Financial Times, 10 Dec. 2012.
20. For an overview of SCADA networks, see Vinay M. Igure, Sean A. Laughter, and Ronald D. Williams, “Security Issues in SCADA Networks,” Computers & Security, vol. 25 (2006), pp. 498–506.
21. Éireann P. Leverett, “Quantitatively Assessing and Visualising Industrial System Attack Surfaces,” Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2011.
22. Igure, Laughter, and Williams, “Security Issues in SCADA Networks,” p. 500.
23. Brian Krebs, “Chinese Hackers Blamed for Intrusion at Energy Industry Giant Telvent,” Krebs on Security, 26 Sep. 2012.
24. The US Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) reportedly established the link between the Comment Group and the PLA. The former US government codename is “Byzantine Candor,” see the leaked cable: Secretary of State, “Diplomatic Security Detail,” Reference ID 08STATE 116943, 30 Oct. 2008. See also Michael Riley and Dune Lawrence, “Hackers Linked to China’s Army Seen from EU to DC,” Bloomberg, 27 June 2012.
25. Shodan’s URL is http://www.shodanhq.com
26. ICS-CERT, “Control System Internet Accessibility,” Alert 10–301–01, 20 Oct. 2010.
27. Kim Zetter, “10K Reasons to Worry About Critical Infrastructure,” Wired, 24 Jan. 2012.
28. Rubén Santamarta, “Reversing Industrial Firmware for Fun and Backdoors,” Reversemode, 12 Dec. 2011, http://bitly.com/OsFWPI+
29. ICS-CERT, “Schneider Electric Quantum Ethernet Module Multiple Vulnerabilities,” ICS-Alert 11–346–01, 12 Dec. 2011.
30. See Dillon Beresford, “Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs,” a paper prepared for Black Hat USA+2011, 8 July 2011, http://bitly.com/OtcuJx+
31. Elinor Mills, “SCADA Hack Talk Canceled after U.S., Siemens Request,” CNet, 18 May 2011.
32. ICS-CERT, “Key Management Errors in RuggedCom’s Rugged Operating System,” ICS-Alert 11–346–01, 12 Dec. 2011.
33. See Dale Peterson, “Construction, Deployment and Use of Offensive Cyber Weapons,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2013, forthcoming.
34. For instance: Ralph Langner, “Enumerating Stuxnet’s Exploits,” Langner. com, 7 June 2011.
35. For instance: Dale Peterson, “Langner’s Stuxnet Deep Dive S4 Video,” Digital Bond, 31 Jan. 2012.
36. Dale Peterson, interview with author, by telephone, 11 Sep. 2012.
37. For a contrarian view, see Dusko Pavlovic, “Gaming Security by Obscurity,” arXiv 1109.5542, 9, 2011.
38. For a more detailed discussion, see Bruce Schneier, “Secrecy, Security, and Obscurity,” Crypto-Gram Newsletter, 15 May 2002.
39. See Eric Byres, and Justin Lowe, “The Myths and Facts Behind Cyber Security Risks for Industrial Control Systems,” paper read at Proceedings of the VDE Congress, at VDE Association for Electrical Electronic & Information Technologies, Oct. 2004, p. 1.
40. Paul Quinn-Judge, “Cracks in the System,” Time, 9 June 2002.
41. Jill Slay and Michael Miller, “Lessons Learned from the Maroochy Water Breach,” in E. Goetz and S. Shenoi (eds), Critical Infrastructure Protection, vol. 253, pp. 73–82, Boston: Springer, 2008.
42. Garry Barker, “Cyber Terrorism a Mouse-Click Away,” The Age, 8 July 2002.
43. Tony Smith, “Hacker Jailed for Revenge Sewage Attacks,” The Register, 31 Oct. 2001.
44. “Arlington Security Guard Arrested on Federal Charges for Hacking into Hospital’s Computer System,” FBI, Dallas Office, 30 June 2009.
45. A screenshot is at Dan Goodin “Feds: Hospital Hacker’s ‘Massive’ DDoS Averted,” The Register, 1 July 2009.
46. United States Attorney James T. Jacks, “Press Release,” US Department of Justice, Northern District of Texas, 18 Mar. 2011.
47. Joe Weiss, “Water System Hack—The System Is Broken,” ControlGlobal. com, 17 Nov. 2011.
48. Ellen Nakashima, “Water-Pump Failure in Illinois Wasn’t Cyberattack After All,” The Washington Post, 25 Nov. 2011.
49. Ellen Nakashima, “Foreign Hackers Targeted U.S. Water Plant in Apparent Malicious Cyber Attack, Expert Says,” The Washington Post, 18 Nov. 2011.
50. Byres and Lowe, “The Myths and Facts behind Cyber Security Risks for Industrial Control Systems,” p. 2.
51. Dan Goodin, “Water Utility Hackers Destroy Pump, Expert Says,” The Register, 17 Nov. 2011.
52. A Guest, “loldhs pr0f,” Pastebin, 18 Nov. 2011, http://pastebin.com/Wx90LLum
53. Personal information on pr0f was reported by The Washington Post.
54. Robert O’Harrow Jr, “Cyber Search Engine Shodan Exposes Industrial Control Systems to New Risks,” The Washington Post, 4 June 2012.
55. “Vulnerabilities in Tridium Niagara Framework Result in Unauthorized Access to a New Jersey Company’s Industrial Control System”, SIR-00000003417, FBI Newark Division, 23 July 2012, http://bit.ly/TULK6j+
56. Dan Goodin, “Intruders Hack Industrial Heating System Using Backdoor Posted Online,” Ars Technica, 13 Dec. 2012.
57. A Guest, “#US #SCADA #IDIOTS part-II,” 23 Jan. 2012, http://pastebin.com/eL9j3SE1
58. A Guest, “#US #SCADA #IDIOTS part-II,” 23 Jan. 2012, http://pastebin.com/eL9j3SE1
59. A Guest, “#US #SCADA #IDIOTS part-II,” 23 Jan. 2012, http://pastebin.com/eL9j3SE1
1. Michael Polanyi’s key book Personal Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
2. At the time of writing, the book had almost 28,000 citations on Google Scholar, almost double the number of Karl Popper’s classic The Logic of Scientific Discovery, for instance. See Ikujiro Nonaka, The Knowledge-Creating Company, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, also Ikujiro Nonaka, “A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation,” Organization Science, vol. 5, 1 (1994), pp. 14–37.
3. For more details, see Justin Scheck and Evan Perez, “FBI Traces Trail of Spy Ring to China,” The Wall Street Journal, 10 Mar. 2012.
4. Ben Elgin, Dune Lawrence, Michael Riley, “Coke Gets Hacked And Doesn’t Tell Anyone,” Bloomberg, 4 November 2012.
5. Tom Whitehead, “Cyber crime a global threat, MI5 head warns,” The Telegraph, 26 Jun. 2012.
6. Siobhan Gorman, “Chinese Hackers Suspected In Long-Term Nortel Breach,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 Feb. 2012.
7. Bradley Graham, “Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites,” The Washington Post, 25 Aug. 2005.
8. Dawn Onley and Patience Wait, “Red Storm Rising,” Government Computer News, 17 Aug. 2006.
9. Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable, New York: Penguin Press, 2011, p. 80.
10. Lynn, “Defending a New Domain,” p. 97. Clarke says the spyware was of Russian origin, see the next footnote.
11. Richard A. Clarke and Robert A. Knake, CyberWar, New York: Ecco, 2010, p. 171.
12. A redacted version of the email can be found at Hon Lau, “The Truth Behind the Shady RAT,” Symantec Blog, 4 Aug. 2011.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Dmitri Alperovitch, Revealed: Operation Shady RAT, Santa Clara, CA: McAfee, 2 Aug. 2011
16. Ibid., p. 4.
17. Greg Keizer, “‘Shady RAT’ Hacking Claims Overblown, Say Security Firms,” Computerworld, 5 Aug. 2011.
18. Hon Lau, “The Truth Behind the Shady RAT.”
19. Aliya Sternstein, “Attach on Energy Lab Computers was Isolated and Limited, Officials Say,” Nextgov, 22 Apr. 2011.
20. Jack Date et al., “Hackers Launch Cyberattack on Federal Labs,” ABC News, 7 Dec. 2007.
21. Symantec, “W32.Duqu,” Oct. 2011, p. 1.
22. Ibid.
23. Dan Goodin, “Duqu Targeted Each Victim with Unique Files and Servers,” The Register, 12 Nov. 2011.
24. Aleks Gostev, “The Duqu Saga Continues,” Securelist, 11 Nov. 2011.
25. Symantec, “W32.Duqu,” Oct. 2011, annex, p. 15.
26. Sean Sullivan, “Duqu: Questions and Answers,” F-Secure, 3 Nov. 2011.
27. “sKyWIper: A Complex Malware for Targeted Attacks,” Budapest University of Technology and Economics, 28 May 2012.
28. Alexander Gostev, “The Flame: Questions and Answers,” Securelist, 28 May 2012, http://bitly.com/KnQYX5+
29. Ellen Nakashima, Greg Miller, and Julie Tate, “U.S., Israel Developed Flame Computer Virus to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, 19 June 2012.
30. “Flamer: Urgent Suicide,” Symantec Connect, 6 June 2012.
31. “Resource 207: Kaspersky Lab Research Proves that Stuxnet and Flame Developers are Connected,” Kaspersky Lab, 11 June 2012, http://bitly.com/Mzpv15+
32. “Full Analysis of Flame’s Command & Control Servers,” Securelist, 17 Sep. 2012.
33. Nakashima, Miller, and Tate, “U.S., Israel Developed Flame Computer Virus to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say.”
34. “Computer Virus Briefly Hits Iran’s Oil Industry,” Associated Press, 30 May 2012.
35. Kaspersky Lab, “Gauss: Abnormal Distribution,” 9 Aug. 2012, p. 5.
36. Ibid., p. 39.
37. Ibid., p. 4.
38. Ibid., p. 48.
39. Osama Habib, “No Proof Lebanese Banks Linked to Terrorist Financing: Sader,” The Daily Star, 4 July 2012. See also Jeffrey Carr, “Was Flame’s Gauss Malware Used to Uncover Hezbollah Money Laundering via Lebanese Banks?” Digital Dao, 9 Aug. 2012.
40. In English the malware is called R2D2, see Sean Sullivan, “More Info on German State Backdoor: Case R2S2,” F-Secure, 11 Oct. 2011.
41. Chaos Computer Club, “Analyse einer Regierungs-Malware,” Berlin, 8 Oct. 2011.
42. Lily Kuo, “Cyber Attacks Grow Increasingly ‘Reckless,’ U.S. Official Says,” Reuters, 7 Sep. 2012.
43. Eli Lake, “Israel’s Secret Iran Attack Plan: Electronic Warfare,” The Daily Beast, 16 Nov. 2011. For an image of the dropper’s copy, see http://bitly.com/NO4DdJ+
44. “The Madi Campaign—Part I,” Securelist, 17 July 2012.
45. See “Mahdi—The Cyberwar Savior?” Seculert, 17 July 2012.
46. Dan Senor and Saul Singer, Start-up Nation, New York: Twelve, 2009, p. 11.
47. http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/israel, statistics as of 18 Apr. 2011.
48. “Hezbollah Using Facebook to Kidnap Israeli Soldiers,” Ya Libnan, 7 Sep. 2008.
49. Sarah Stricker, “Die schöne Facebook-Freundin der Elitesoldaten,” Spiegel, 17 May 2010.
50. “Soldiers From ‘Secretive’ Israeli Base Set Up Facebook Group,” The Jerusalem Post, 8 July 2010.
51. Peter Behr, “Chinese Company Accused of Economic Espionage in Wind Turbine Case,” Environment & Energy Publishing, 26 Jan. 2012.
52. Eliza Strickland, “A Test Case for Intellectual Property in China,” IEEE Spectrum, Mar. 2012.
53. Kid Möchel and Stefan Melichar, “Strafprozess gegen ‘China-Spion’,” Wiener Zeitung, 20 Sep. 2009.
54. Erin Ailworth and Eugen Freund, “Engineer Guilty in Software Theft,” The Boston Globe, 24 Sep. 2011.
55. Ibid.
56. David Sanger, Confront and Conceal, New York: Crown, 2012, p. 196.
57. Ibid.
58. Information is taken from Siemens’s now defunct Iran website, http://siemens.ir. An archived version of the “About us” section, dated 27 June 2009, is archived at the Wayback Machine, see http://bitly.com/Q79tBs+
59. Sanger, Confront and Conceal, p. 196.
60. Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Spies Against Armageddon, Sea Cliff, NY: Levant Books, 2012, p. 10.
61. See also Ralph Langner, “The Third Man Wears Black, Red, and Gold,” Langner.com, 30 July 2012.
62. This author also endorsed that assumption, see Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, “Cyber Weapons,” The RUSI Journal, vol. 157, 1 (2012), pp. 6–13.
63. For a thoughtful historical essay on technology and intelligence, see Michael Warner, “Reflections on Technology and Intelligence Systems,” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 27, 1 (2012), pp. 133–53.
64. Nigel Inkster, “Intelligence Agencies and the Cyber World,” in Strategic Survey, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012.
65. Jonathan Evans, The Threat to National Security, London: The Worshipful Company of Security Professionals, 16 Sep. 2010.
66. Rhys Blakely, Jonathan Richards, James Rossiter, and Richard Beeston, “MI5 Alert on China’s Cyberspace Spy Threat,” The Times, 1 Dec. 2007, p. 1.
67. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, Washington, D.C., October 2011.
68. Brenner, America the Vulnerable, p. 9.
69. Evans, “Worshipful Company of Security Professionals Speech,” Sep. 2010.
70. See also Nigel Inkster, “Intelligence Agencies and the Cyber World,” in Strategic Survey, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012.
71. Iain Lobban, Iain Lobban Address, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 12 Oct. 2010.
1. The Internet had yet to affect Islamic extremism significantly in 2001, but that drastically changed over the course of the decade. An entry point into the vast debate on online radicalization is Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age, Westport: Praeger, 2009, Chapter 9, as well as Thomas Rid, “Cracks in the Jihad,” The Wilson Quarterly, vol. 34, 1 (2010), pp. 40–8.
2. The curves reflect the frequency of the use of the word “subversion” in printed books and periodicals in the English language from 1750 to 2008.
3. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, London: J. Dodsley, 1790, p. 243.
4. Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language, Dublin: G Jones, 1768.
5. James Leslie, Dictionary of the Synonymous Words and Technical Terms in the English Language, Edinburgh: John Moir, 1806.
6. William Belsham, Memoirs of the Reign of George III to the Session of Parliament Ending A.D. 1793, vol. I, London: J. Robinson, 1795, p. 123, see also p. 221; p. 303.
7. Charles James, Military Dictionary, In French and English, London: Egerton, 1810.
8. Quoted in Tim Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI, New York: Random House, 2012, Chapter 2.
9. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping, London: Faber and Faber, 2010, p. 3.
10. Ibid., pp. 82–3.
11. Carl von Clausewitz’s may be the prime example of a military writer highlighting political aspects of war yet failing to analyze them in detail, see Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Berlin: Ullstein, 1832 (1980), Book 1, Chapter 1.
12. One of Agnoli’s students turned these lectures into a book, see Johannes Agnoli, Subversive Theorie, Freiburg: Ça ira, 1996.
13. Ibid., p. 29. Another example of an author with a positive notion of subversion was Diedrich Diederichsen, a leading German-language pop theorist and art historian who described subversion as an artistic method with political goals. Diedrich Diederichsen, “Subversion—Kalte Strategie und heiße Differenz,” in Diedrich Diederichsen (ed.), Freiheit macht arm: das Leben nach Rock’n’Roll 1990–1993, pp. 33–52, Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1993, p. 35.
14. “Doch die Verhältnisse, sie sind nicht so” is Brecht’s refrain from the Dreigroschenoper, Act 1, “Über die Unsicherheit menschlicher Verhältnisse.”
15. Agnoli, Subversive Theorie, p. 12.
16. Consider Agnoli’s haughty German, “Wer stattdessen das Ende der Utopie verkündet und nebenbei das Subversive kriminalisiert, will genau der Möglichkeit neuer Aufbrüche wehren,” ibid., p. 13.
17. Ibid.
18. Hegel’s original formulation, not quoted by Agnoli, is truly remarkable, “Das Tiefe, das der Geist von innen heraus, aber nur bis in sein vorstellendes Bewußtsein treibt und es in diesem stehen läßt,—und die Unwissenheit dieses Bewußtseins, was das ist, was es sagt, ist dieselbe Verknüpfung des Hohen und Niedrigen, welche an dem Lebendigen die Natur in der Verknüpfung des Organs seiner höchsten Vollendung, des Organs der Zeugung,—und des Organs des Pissens naiv ausdrückt.—Das unendliche Urteil als unendliches wäre die Vollendung des sich selbst erfassenden Lebens, das in der Vorstellung bleibende Bewußtsein desselben aber verhält sich als Pissen.” G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1832, p. 263.
19. William Rosenau, Subversion and Insurgency, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007, p. 5.
20. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping, p. 3.
21. Clutterbuck and Rosenau develop a similar thought: “subversion needs to be conceptualized as one facet of a broader campaign that employs in a non-linear fashion a range of violent, less-violent, and non-violent instruments that serve to reinforce each other,” Lindsay Clutterbuck and William Rosenau, “Subversion as a Facet of Terrorism and Insurgency,” Strategic Insights, vol. 8, 3 (2009).
22. See Steven Best and Anthony J. Nocella, Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth, Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2006.
23. Stefan H. Leader and Peter Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 15, 4 (2003), pp. 37–58, p. 37.
24. Ibid.
25. http://earthliberationfront.org, 29 Apr. 2011.
26. Ibid.
27. The government’s reaction to “more than 20 acts of domestic terrorism” was Operation Backfire. The nine-year joint investigation was sometimes referred to as the “Green Scare,” and run by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in several states, including Oregon, Colorado, Washington, and California, culminating in more than a dozen arrests starting in Dec. 2005 and continuing throughout 2006. US Department of Justice, National Security Division, “Progress Report,” 2008, p. 48.
28. From the ELF’s Frequently Asked Questions, reprinted in Leslie James Pickering, The Earth Liberation Front, 1997–2002, Portland, OR: Arissa Media Group, 2007, p. 61.
29. Leader and Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” p. 37.
30. For a good overview, see Sean Parson, “Understanding the Ideology of the Earth Liberation Front,” Green Theory & Praxis, vol. 4, 2 (2009), pp. 50–66.
31. “Die Energie des Handels drückt die Stärke des Motivs aus, wodurch das Handel hervorgerufen wird, das Motiv mag nun in einer Verstandesüberzeugung oder einer Gemütserregung seinen Grund haben. Die letztere darf aber schwerlich fehlen, wo sich eine große Kraft zeigen soll.” Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, p. 69.
32. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 71.
33. For a historical discussion of ideology’s role in guerrilla war, see Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study, vol. 4, Boston: Little, Brown, 1976.
34. See John Jordan, “Our Resistance is as Transnational as Capital,” in David B. Solnit (ed.), Globalize Liberation, San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 2004, pp. 9–17.
35. Pope, quoted in Kirn et al., “The New Radicals,” Time, 24 Apr. 2000, p. 21.
36. Mitch Frank, “Organized Chaos,” Time, 24 Apr. 2000.
37. “Anti-Globalization—A Spreading Phenomenon,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, 22 Aug. 2000.
38. “Charter of Principles,” World Social Forum Organizing Committee, São Paulo, 9 Apr. 2001, later approved with modifications by the World Social Forum International Council on 10 June 2001.
39. “The Anarchogeek Interview,” Reader-List, http://bitly.com/SkUXCC+
40. For an overview of the literature, see R. Kelly Garrett, “Protest in an Information Society,” Information, Communication & Society, vol. 9, 2 (2006), pp. 202–24.
41. Peter Van Aelst and Stefaan Walgrave, “New Media, New Movements? The Role of the Internet in Shaping the ‘Anti-Globalization’ Movement,” ibid., vol. 5, 4 (2002), p. 466.
42. Ibid., p. 487.
43. For a balanced view, see W. Lance Bennett, “Communicating Global Activism,” ibid., vol. 6, 2 (2003), pp. 143–68.
44. John D. Clark and Nuno S. Themudo, “Linking the Web and the Street: Internet-Based ‘Dotcauses’ and the ‘Anti-Globalization’ Movement,” World Development, vol. 34, 1 (2005), pp. 50–74.
45. Clay Shirky, Cognitive Surplus, New York: Penguin Press, 2010.
46. An explanation and a good introduction into the sense of humor of that subculture is at http://ohinternet.com/lulz
47. Siobhan Courtney, “Pornographic Videos Flood YouTube,” BBC News, 21 May 2009.
48. For some eye-popping examples, see Parmy Olson, We Are Anonymous, Little Brown & Co, 2012, pp. 371–8.
49. The video has since been viewed nearly 5 million times: “Message to Scientology,” 21 Jan. 2008, http://youtu.be/JCbKv9yiLiQ
50. By far the best and most detailed book on Anonymous to date is Olson, We Are Anonymous.
51. For an overview of DDoS attack tools, see Curt Wilson, “Attack of the Shuriken: Many Hands, Many Weapons,” Arbor Networks, 7 Feb. 2012.
52. The episode is masterly described by Parmy Olson, see Olson, We Are Anonymous, Chapter 7, “FIRE FIRE FIRE FIRE,” pp. 101–24.
53. Gabriella Coleman, “Our Weirdness is Free,” May, vol. 9, 6 (2012), pp. 83–95, p. 84.
54. Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012.
55. See for instance ibid., p. 176.
56. Ibid., p. 184.
57. Kitson’s and Rosenau’s works, cited above, are examples of such a narrow conceptualization of subversion.
58. I would like to thank Josh Welensky for pointing out the relevance of time in this context.
59. For an excellent historical overview of this trend, see Barton L. Ingraham, Political Crime in Europe, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
60. Thomas Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962.
61. The author in a series of discussions with senior literary scholars, Konstanz, spring and summer 2011. See also, Thomas Ernst, “Subversion. Eine kleine Diskursanalyse eines vielfältigen Begriffs,” Psychologie & Gesellschaftskritik, vol. 42, 4 (2009), pp. 9–34, pp. 26–7 and Thomas Ernst, Literatur und Subversion: Politisches Schreiben in der Gegenwart, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012.
62. Irene Rima Makaryk, Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, p. 636.
63. “Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem Gebrauch einem Volke fest, kanonisch und verbindlich dünken: die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, daß sie welche sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen, in Betracht kommen,” Friedrich Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, Leipzig: Alfred Kröner, 1873 (1921), p. 10.
64. Geoffrey Galt Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 218.
65. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 20 (1) Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat. (2) Alle Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus. Sie wird vom Volke in Wahlen und Abstimmungen und durch besondere Organe der Gesetzgebung, der vollziehenden Gewalt und der Rechtsprechung ausgeübt. (3) Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende Gewalt und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden. (4) Gegen jeden, der es unternimmt, diese Ordnung zu beseitigen, haben alle Deutschen das Recht zum Widerstand, wenn andere Abhilfe nicht möglich ist.
66. “[D]ie Restauration der Ordnung [stellt] eine ständige Drohung dar, weil immer neue Götter und Götzen auftauchen. Und insofern wird die theoretische und praktische Arbeit der Subversion nie beendet sein.” Agnoli, Subversive Theorie, p. 25.
1. Mike McConnell, “Mike McConnell on How to Win the Cyberwar We’re Losing,” The Washington Post, 28 Feb. 2010.
2. Leon Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security,” New York City, 11 Oct. 2012.
3. For a similar argument, see David D. Clark and Susan Landau, “Untangling Attribution,” in Committee on Deterring Cyberattacks (ed.), Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks, Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2011, p. 26.
4. Bruce Hoffman, “Why Terrorists Don’t Claim Credit,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, 1 (1997), pp. 1–6.
5. A more detailed study of the attribution problem and the use of force has not been written, to the knowledge of the author.
6. Ron Deibert and Rafal Rohozinsky, Tracking GhostNet, Toronto: Munc Centre for International Studies, 2009, p. 47.
7. A sample email is at ibid., p. 20.
8. Shishir Nagaraja and Ross Anderson, The Snooping Dragon, Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Mar. 2009, p. 6.
9. Kim Zetter, “Electronic Spy Network Focused on Dalai Lama and Embassy Computers,” Wired, 28 Mar. 2009.
10. For more details, including webcam shots of unsuspecting computer users, see Mikko Hypponen, “Behind GhostNet,” F-Secure, 30 Mar. 2009.
11. Deibert and Rohozinsky, Tracking GhostNet, p. 48.
12. Nagaraja and Anderson, The Snooping Dragon, p. 3.
13. For a more detailed discussion, see W. Earl Boebert, “A Survey of Challenges in Attribution,” in Committee on Deterring Cyberattacks (ed.), Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks, pp. 41–54, also Clark and Landau, “Untangling Attribution.”
14. Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006
15. http://www.whois.net/ip-address-lookup, as queried on 5 Sep. 2012.
16. For a detailed description of a number of Anonymous cases, see Olson, We Are Anonymous.
17. Richard Clayton, Anonymity and Traceability in Cyberspace, vol. 653, Technical Report, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, 2005, p. 3.
18. Ibid., pp. 151–2.
19. One of the best sources on the case is Gary Cartwright, “Search and Destroy,” Texas Monthly, Mar. 1989, pp. 122–71.
20. Richard E Overill, “Trends in Computer Crime,” Journal of Financial Crime, vol. 2, 6 (1998), pp. 157–62.
21. Cartwright, “Search and Destroy,” p. 171.
22. “Programmer Convicted After Planting a ‘Virus’,” The New York Times, 21 Sep. 1988, p. 15.
23. David Drummond, “A New Approach to China,” Google Official Blog, 12 Jan. 2012.
24. McAfee, “Protecting Your Critical Assets. Lessons Learned from ‘Operation Aurora’,” White Paper, 3 Mar. 2010.
25. Ariana Eunjung Cha and Ellen Nakashima, “Google China Cyberattack Part of Vast Espionage Campaign, Experts Say,” The Washington Post, 14 Jan. 2010.
26. John Markoff and David Barboza, “2 China Schools Said to Be Tied to Online Attacks,” The New York Times, 18 Feb. 2010.
27. Ibid.
28. US Embassy Beijing, “Google Update: PRC Role in Attacks and Response Strategy,” Cable reference ID #10BEIJING207, 26 Jan. 2010.
29. Gavin O’Gorman and Geoff McDonald, “The Elderwood Project,” Symantec, 7 Sep. 2012.
30. Jeremy Kirk, “Irked by cyberspying, Georgia outs Russia-based hacker—with photos,” IT World, 30 Oct. 2012. See also
31. See a blog post by Alexander Klink, “Evading AVs using the XML Data Package (XDP) format,” Shift or Die, 9 Feb. 2011.
32. “Georbot Botnet,” Ministry of Justice of Georgia, October 2012, http://bitly.com/Wp3E64+
33. Mandiant, “APT1. Exposing one of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Alexandria, Virginia, 19 February 2013, p. 52.
34. Mandiant, “APT1,” p. 54.
35. The original source, with my emphasis: “(61398 Unit). The Second Bureau appears to function as the Third Department’s premier entity targeting the United States and Canada, most likely focusing on political, economic, and military-related intelligence,” Mark A. Stokes, Jenny Lin, L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Project 2049 Institute, 11 Nov. 2011, p. 8.
36. Mandiant, “APT1,” p. 59–60.
37. Mandiant, “APT1,” p. 60.
38. For a more detailed critical analysis of the report which points out other errors, see Jeffrey Carr, “More on Mandiant’s APT1 Report,” Digital Dao, 22 Feb. 2013
39. For a detailed discussion see the Butler Report, Lord Butler of Brockwell, “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” House of Commons, London, 14 Jul. 2004.
40. The classic text is Sherman Kent, “Words of Estimative Probability,” Studies in Intelligence, 1964, vol 8, iss 4, 49–65.
41. See McAfee, “Global Energy Cyberattacks: ‘Night Dragon’,” White Paper, 11 Feb. 2011, p. 4.
42. Joseph Menn, “Chinese Hackers Hit Energy Groups,” Financial Times, 11 Feb. 2011.
43. Ibid.
44. McAfee, “Global Energy Cyberattacks: ‘Night Dragon’,” White Paper, 11 Feb. 2011, p. 18, emphasis in original.
45. Ed Crooks, “Hackers Target US Natural Gas Pipelines,” Financial Times, 8 May 2012.
46. Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyber war, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009, p. 44.
47. Eli Jellenc, “Cyber Deterrence,” iDefense Weekly Threat Report, Verisign, Apr. 2011.
48. Mohamad Saleh, “Al Qaeda Claims Responsibility for Power Blackout in US,” Dar Al Hayat, 18 Aug. 2003, http://bitly.com/Q3jV9f+
49. Herbert Lin calls using all sources, not merely technical sources, at the scene of an attack, “all-source attribution.” See Herbert Lin, “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (2012), pp. 46–70, p. 49.
1. I would like to thank David Betz for this reference. The article, which used cyberspace only once and without exploring it, was originally published in Omni magazine, July 1982. On the use of analogies, see David Betz and Tim Stevens, “Analogical Reasoning and Cyber Security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 44, No. 1, Apr. (2013).
2. William Gibson, Neuromancer, New York: Ace Books, 1984, pp. 10–11.
3. William Gibson, as quoted in Betz and Stevens, Cyberspace and the State, p. 36.
4. This three-step is inspired by W.H. Murray, “The Application of Epidemiology to Computer Viruses,” Computers & Security, vol. 7 (1988), pp. 139–50.
5. “War in the Fifth Domain,” The Economist, 1 July 2010.
6. The assertion was first made in 1996 and has since become part of the debate’s standard lore, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, Santa Monica: RAND, 1996, p. 94.
7. Department of Defense, “Cyberspace Policy Report,” Nov. 2011, p. 2.
8. See for instance, Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, pp. 32–3.
9. Dale Peterson, interview with author, by telephone, 11 Sep. 2012.
10. Ralph Langner, “A Declaration of Bankruptcy for US Critical Infrastructure Protection,” The Last Line of Cyber Defense, 3 June 2011.
11. An ongoing move towards open standards may affect the potential for generic attacks as well as the potential to gather target intelligence remotely, see Igure, Laughter, and Williams, “Security issues in SCADA networks,” p. 500. Also Byres and Lowe, “The Myths and Facts behind Cyber Security Risks for Industrial Control Systems.”
12. For a comparison between malware and car manufacturing, see Symantec, “W32.Duqu,” Oct. 2011, p. 1.
13. Karl Frederick Rauscher and Andrey Korotkov, “Working Towards Rules for Governing Cyber Conflict,” East West Institute, 4 Feb. 2011, p. 27.
14. Brent Scowcroft, “Cyber Security Issues Like Cold War,” Georgetown University, 29 Mar. 2011.
15. Two useful articles are Joseph S. Nye, “Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security?” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2011), pp. 18–38, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cyber Warfare: A Nuclear Option? Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2012.
16. An early and detailed example is Michael N. Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 37 (1998), pp. 885–937. More recently, see Waxman, “Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force,” Marco Roscini, “World Wide Warfare-’Jus Ad Bellum’ and the Use of Cyber Force,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 14 (2010), pp. 85–130.
17. For a pithy discussion of this problem, see Noah Shachtman and Peter W. Singer, “The Wrong War,” The Brookings Institution, 15 Aug. 2011. See also Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins, “Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” Harvard National Security Journal (2011).
18. I would like to thank Ron Tira for raising this point with me.
19. Ironically, Air Force General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was one of the most vocal opponents of this doctrine because it did not provide enough forces; he wanted a “shield,” not a trip-wire. Howard D. Belote, Once in a Blue Moon, Maxwell, AL: Air University Press, 2000, p. 18.
20. See Ron Deibert, “Tracking the Emerging Arms Race in Cyberspace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 67, 1 (2011), pp. 1–8.
21. Lynn, “The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, One Year Later.”