APPENDIX 1

Letter of April 5, 1970, from Major General Elvy Roberts to General Creighton Abrams.

5/April 1970

General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

APO 96222

Dear General Abrams:

You asked me to take a good, hard look at the contacts we have had in the Dog’s Head area of Western War Zone *C* to see what can be derived as “lessons learned” for the benefit of others. We have conducted a study of the action in the form of detailed critiques with participation by all units involved. From these critiques I have gleaned some points which I think may be worthwhile to pass on.

As so often is the case we have not come up with very many new lessons, but there are several old ones that deserve reemphasis. I have taken the liberty to briefly recap the character of the action as a backdrop for the experiences gained.

During the first week in March the 9th Division, along with some COSVN elements, began to slip down toward Base Area 354 northwest of Tay Ninh City. The 1st Cavalry Division moved units to cut off the main routes between the 9th Division’s former area and Base Area 354. The (first) major contact occurred at mid point of the route system, in the center of the Dog’s Head, on 26 March. The results of this fight were 88 enemy KIA from the 3d Battalion, 95 C Regiment. Also identified very close to that contact was the 66th COSVN Security Guard Regiment and the proselyting section of COSVN Headquarters. US losses were three killed.

The fight at Fire Support Base Jay on the morning of 29 March was the second major contact of the operation, resulting in 74 enemy killed, three FIT’s, and 12 AK-47’s captured. The enemy units were the 1st and 3d Battalion of the 271st Regiment. Thirteen US soldiers were killed.

The attack on Fire Support Base Illingworth early on 1 April was the third major contact, with 71 enemy KIA, 28 AK-47’s and three crew-served weapons captured. Documents on the enemy dead indicated that the unit making the attack was the 1st Battalion, 272d Regiment. Twenty-four US soldiers were killed in this contact. Other fighting in the same area included the engagements of A and B Troops, 1st Squadron, llth ACR, in which 42 enemy from the same 272d Regiment were killed and 17 captured. The enemy loss total now stands at 662 KIA and 21 PW’s. 1ACD losses have been 50 killed and 203 wounded. ARVN Airborne losses have been two killed and 25 wounded. The enemy obviously decided to move sizeable forces into or through the Dog’s Head and back into Base Area 354. It is now apparent that he is determined to carry this out, regardless of the cost. Our actions I think have set back his time schedules and probably disrupted his plans to some degree.

In the attack on Jay, the performance of the US infantry and artillery troops was magnificent. Major Gordon Frank, the S-3, took over when the battalion commander (LTC Robert Hannas) was hit, losing both legs. Although wounded himself, Major Frank led the defense in a manner that can only be described as brilliant. One of the first enemy rounds struck the command bunker and swept away all antennas, cutting off communications except between Jay and Illingworth, but artillery defensive targets were fired from Illingworth and Camp Hazard immediately, since it was known from these locations that Jay was under attack. Communications came up within three minutes and the fires were adjusted.

Jay was a small fire base, and with six 105’s and six 155’s the personnel and materiel density was greater than usual. Incoming fires were 107mm rockets, 122mm rockets, B-20’s, B-40’s, 120mm mortars, 82mm mortars, and 75mm recoilless rifles. A ground probe of company size on the south side was driven back, leaving four enemy killed just inside the berm. The balance of the enemy force committed to the attack never got out of the wood line. The 105 ammo dump was hit and exploded. In addition to the artillery ammo, 3000 pounds of composition “C” which was to be used for clearing trees the next day also went up. The dump was well dug in and little damage resulted from this explosion. Shadow, Nighthawk, ARA, and flare ships supported the defense in addition to the artillery, which fired 3518 rounds. . The firing became sporadic by 0600, and ceased altogether by 0650. Artillery and air support by this time was shifted to withdrawal routes.

The attack against Illingworth on 1 April was expected, and the defenders all were ready and waiting. In fact, as the first enemy rounds were landing in the area, the battalion S-3’s alarm clock signaled the time for the practice alert. The battalion commander, LTC Michael Conrad, and his S-3, Major Michael Moore, did an absolutely outstanding job during this attack, and not enough can be said in praise of the conduct of the troops on this fire base. The first enemy volley, again as at Jay, cut down the antenna array and reduced commo capability. The Air Force FAC immediately began to operate as a relay and did such a fine job bridging over the communications gap plus directing all fires in the difficult environment he was in that I have put him in for the DFC. The incoming rounds caused a heavy curtain of dust, making observation and the employment of night observation devices very difficult. This had also happened at Jay.

The ground attack at Illingworth, consisting of about two enemy companies, began at 0235 and reached the edge of the berm but not a single enemy soldier got inside the position. Most of the enemy bodies were strung out from 50 to 100 meters from the berm and extending back into the wood line. Here the attack foundered. At 0318, as the attack began to slacken, the 8-inch ammo dump, which had been on fire, exploded with tremendous force, blowing a large crater and covering everything with dirt. The immediate effect of this was to stun the defenders in the bunkers on the southwestern quadrant of the fire base and the crews on the 8-inch and 105 Howitzers in that sector. Although it could not be positively determined, certainly a major portion of our casualties came from this explosion and the rounds which intermittently “cooked off” for the next hour. The 155’s which were located in another sector of the fire base continued operational. It was fortunate that Illingworth was a relatively large base with less density of personnel and materiel than there was at Jay.

Contact ceased and pursuit fires began at 0515. Forces were committed along possible withdrawal routes at first light. An armored Cav troop had been moved in earlier to sweep around the fire base. Support such as artillery, air, scouts, flares, and Shadow was “across the “board” as it had been at Jay. Preemptive fires early in the evening probably weakened the enemy ground probe, but the indirect fire against Illingworth was significantly more intense and of longer duration.

The most significant points that come out of this which I believe may be useful in the experience bank are as follows:

OBSERVATION: The enemy in the Dog’s Head area, because of his location close to large cache areas in Cambodia, has an increased capability to mass fire in support of his attacks.

LESSON LEARNED: The enemy has great capability to mass artillery fires in this particular area. Being close to the border, he has more ammunition and of heavier caliber than is generally expected. Therefore fire bases either have to be exceptionally hard (and I doubt if any fire base can be hardened sufficiently to withstand without unacceptable casualties a standoff attack of the magnitude as occurred at Illingworth) or else they must be relocated more often than we did here. The problem with either course becomes, as always, a matter of blade time and continuity of operations. In the case of Illingworth we tried to compromise between a medium heavy base and a longer term occupancy. This base stayed too long for this area. I think we will have to go for an even lighter base with occupancy no longer than five days. Even five days, however, does not carry with it any guaranteed immunity from heavy standoff attacks by fire in this area. To remain in position longer must be recognized as an obvious tactical risk, and any advantages to be gained by remaining on site longer than five days must be carefully weighed against the increased possibility of attack. If the enemy can be forced to attack without the necessary time for a proper reconnaissance, his chances for a strong and well coordinated operation are lessened. This can be achieved by continuous movement of fire bases. Mutual support between these rapidly-moving bases remains an essential requirement.

OBSERVATION: Ammunition storage and level of ammunition in the fire base require special attention.

LESSON LEARNED: Ammunition and explosives must be dug in and overhead provided. This of course will be a real problem in the wet season in this area. Our ammunition at both fire bases, while largely below ground, was not well protected. In particular the 8-inch Howitzer ammunition was not dug in deep enough at Illingworth, and there was too much of it in one place. I believe several smaller dumps dug in at different quadrants in the fire base should be the pattern.

OBSERVATION: At any given time, the enemy can knock out generators and destroy antenna systems, thus hindering rapid and effective response to an attack.

LESSON LEARNED: The retention of at least four spare AN/P-RC 25 or 77 radios in the TOC is a necessity. These radios, equipped with fresh batteries, backpacks, and both long and short whip antennas, can provide adequate communications with support agencies and base defense. Battalion must communicate with brigade, the base defense company, and units in the field. There should be standby radio relay aircraft at brigade which can be put up immediately to bridge the communication gap in the initial onslaught and to make it possible to communicate over long ranges with the standby PRC 77’s. Backup generators and 292 antennas should also be retained in the fire base to reconstitute normal communications once the attack has abated. When planning fire base defense, the assumption must be that in the initial stages of an attack the antennas will be swept away and generators will be put out of commission. Plans should be made accordingly.

OBSERVATION: The dust thrown up by incoming rounds on a fire support base in dry weather obscures vision to a significant degree and makes the defense of the fire base more difficult.

LESSON LEARNED: Night vision devices may prove unusable during the attack. Employment of defensive fires based on sectors and primary direction as an alternate means should be prepared, using the old stake and marker method. Units should be ordered to cover assigned sectors with fire if their area becomes obscured.

A final comment on the lessons we learned:

The situation in the Dog’s Head is a special one in which the enemy is strong and has very short lines of communication plus the ability to slide back into sanctuaries in Cambodia: the observations and lessons learned apply to such a situation but may not apply elsewhere.

We shall continue to review our techniques and procedures in the light of the experiences from these two attacks, and I am certain we shall profit from our experience.

 

Sincerely,

E. B. ROBERTS

Major General USA

Commanding