BY JUNE 1941 THE BRITISH were just hanging on to their position in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Egypt remaining the fulcrum of this position; Cairo had already gone through two crises when it braced itself for the imminent arrival of Axis forces and the British prepared to evacuate. Even at this low point the British intelligence services are often portrayed in histories of the period as being far ahead of the Axis services. In one aspect they were: code breaking.
On 22 May 1941 the British code breakers, recently relocated to Bletchley Park, broke the Luftwaffe version of the Enigma machine cipher, the Enigma being an electro-mechanical rotary machine that generated codes to encrypt messages. From this time on they were able to read German traffic almost without a break for the remainder of the war. Churchill called his cryptanalysts ‘the geese who laid the golden eggs and never cackled.’1
From June 1941 the term ‘Ultra Secret’ was used by the British for intelligence resulting from this decryption; the codename ‘Ultra’ is said to have been the idea of Commander Geoffrey Colpays. It was taken from the fact that the code breaking success was considered more important than the highest security classification at the time (Most Secret) and so was regarded as being Ultra Secret.2
Yet these advantages had really only borne fruit at the naval battle of Matapan in March 1941. Indeed the Ultra decodes may have made the British over-confident in their defence of Crete. On 6 May the Bletchley Park code breakers identified the probable date of completion of German preparations as 17 May and had the complete final operation orders for the execution of the assault. Churchill could hardly contain himself, believing the information to be priceless.
The British Chiefs of Staff certainly did discuss the Ultra Enigma evidence. All would have known about the part Ultra had played in Admiral A.B.C. Cunningham’s victory at Matapan, but things were not so clear cut with regards to Crete. There were also concerns about Iraq, Cyprus and Syria.3
Wavell had been well aware of the adverse effect on the Western Desert Force of the requirement to support Greece, but even he was appalled by what he found on his first visit to the area on 16 March 1941. He found the escarpment running south from Benghazi and parallel to the coast to be a poor defensive line; nothing resembling the cliff-like position his subordinate generals had led him to believe. It was merely a line of sloping hills, no real obstacle to the enemy. Also the troops were too widely scattered, unable to give mutual support if attacked. The armoured forces on which the defence relied were in a poor state. The 2nd Armoured Division consisted of only one brigade of cruiser tanks, the other having gone to Greece, and of its 52 tanks, half were in the workshops, having exceeded both their track and engine mileages. Indeed, the men of the 6th RTR were better off with their captured M13 Italian tanks, which were more reliable.4
Lieutenant-General Philip Neame VC had become commander of the Western Desert Force as it was whittled away. Wavell found Neame ‘pessimistic and asking for all kinds of reinforcements which I hadn’t got. And his tactical dispositions were just crazy …’5 He ordered Neame to pull his forces back to the highest positions and to tighten his defences.
I came back anxious and depressed from this visit, but there was nothing much I could do about it. The movement to Greece was in full swing and I had nothing left in the bag. But I had foreboding and my confidence in Neame was shaken.6
Returning to his HQ in Cairo, Wavell had time to reflect on what faced his opponent Erwin Rommel. He felt, especially in view of the ever-increasing volume of Ultra decodes arriving daily from Bletchley Park, that he knew pretty much what German units and formations had arrived in North Africa. He concluded it would take until May for the main German force – the 15th Panzer Division – to arrive, a force for which Rommel would surely have to wait before making his move. Wavell felt that time was on his side; he hoped to send substantial reinforcements to Neame by then. He knew of Rommel’s reputation for swift action, but even he ‘could not ignore the iron laws of logistics. But Wavell did not yet know Rommel.’7
Wavell was not alone in misjudging Rommel, for his own Commander-in-Chief, Von Brauchitsch, and Hitler, took much the same view. Rommel was one of the most energetic of commanders. He spent hundreds of hours in the air over the desert on personnel reconnaissance. On the ground he could often be found near the front of fluid battles, narrowly avoiding capture or death on several occasions.
Evidence of his character can be found in the huge number of letters he wrote to his wife. He had first met Lucie Maria Mollin in 1911; they were engaged in 1915 and married a year later. He was happiest with her and their son. When separated he endeavoured, even in the heat of battle, to write to her every day. These letters show just how much he took upon himself.
5 March 1941
Dearest Lu,
Just back from a two-day journey – or rather flight – to the front, which is now 450 miles away to the east. Everything going fine.
A lot to do. Can’t leave here for the moment as I couldn’t be answerable for my absence. Too much depends on my own person and driving power. I hope you have some post from me.8
Rommel was also deeply interested in all forms of intelligence. The Radio Monitoring Platoon (Horchzug) Africa arrived on 25 February, 3rd Company, 56th Signals Battalion. It was fully deployed by 24 April and operating near the front line at Tobruk and the Egyptian border. The Germans enjoyed superiority in radio interception for a good part of the North African Campaign.
The Horchzug’s CO was Lieutenant Alfred Seebohm. His evaluation work would become legendary in the Afrika Korps, garnering the esteem of Rommel himself, as well as his operations staff. The value placed on the work of this company commander is shown by an order issued by the G-2 Intelligence Officer and Operations Staff in January 1942.
Radio monitoring will be carried out by German and Italian intercept troops.
The assignment of German intercept troops to be organised by Lieutenant Seebohm, CO 3/N56.
The assignment of Italian intercept troops is to be organised by the Information Officer (SIM) of Supercommando of the Italian Forces in North Africa.
The assignment of German intercept section and platoons as well as the evaluation of their results to be controlled by Lieutenant Seebohm only.
The use of the Italian and German Signals units to intercept enemy messages is to be confined to enemy combat reports.
All ciphers and wireless documents captured from the enemy are of the utmost importance and are to be handed over as quickly as possible to headquarters Panzergruppe Afrika
For the Commander of the Panzergruppe
The Chief of the General Staff
Signed Colonel Westphal9
Apart from radio monitoring, Rommel was also keen to recruit agents to bolster his intelligence resources. But in the uninhabited wastes of Libya these were not available. The reports of Arab nomads were of dubious value and the inhabitants of the coastal areas hated the Italians, a dislike that extended to their German allies. They were more inclined to help the British, although they had a general contempt for all the mad foreigners.
Therefore in March 1941 Rommel had to rely almost exclusively on his own reconnaissance flights for information on the enemy. What he saw was the British pulling back to the escarpment and digging in. This convinced him that the British were not about to interfere with the deployment of the Afrika Korps. He was well aware of the diversity of Wavell’s command. The initiative was his, which he was quick to seize. On 3 April he wrote to his wife:
Dearest Lu
We’ve been attacking since the 31st with dazzling success. There’ll be consternation amongst our masters in Tripoli and Rome, perhaps in Berlin too. I took the risk against all orders and instructions because the opportunity seemed favourable …10
Wavell flew up to Barce on 2 April, having realised that Rommel was not acting as predicted, but doubting Neame’s messages of doom. He did not think Rommel could have organised a force capable of occupying the whole of Cyrenaica; perhaps he was conducting a large raid. He found chaos and the next day ordered General O’Connor up to assist Neame.
On 6 April Germany invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. In the Western Desert that night, after two days of fruitless efforts trying to coordinate the army, Neame and O’Connor decided to pull their headquarters back from Maraua. Even the experienced O’Connor could do little to stem the tide. The 2nd Armoured Division was falling apart.
They set off in Neame’s white Cadillac staff car, the General at the wheel as his driver was exhausted. They got lost well after midnight and headed north toward Derna instead of heading east. With O’Connor and Colonel John Combe asleep in the back, they ran into a German force that had just cut the Derna road. For them the war was over. The capture of Sir Richard O’Connor, a talented officer, was a disaster for the Western Desert Force.11 Command devolved to Brigadier John Harding who had been travelling a little in front of Neame’s car and had passed the point on the Derna road minutes before the Germans arrived.
By now Rommel had been officially let off the leash. Hitler had countermanded the German High Command’s order for a ‘limited offensive’, giving Rommel the fullest freedom of action. However, Tobruk held. The town had been fortified by the Italians and the Australian defenders had had a little time to catch their breath and organise themselves. The Germans got involved in a difficult infantry fight; Blitzkrieg tactics were no good and even Rommel’s energy was not enough. For nine days he tried to take the city until sandstorms, heavy tank losses and the death of two of his most effective commanders obliged him to think again. The defenders of Tobruk did much to restore British morale by their stoic display. A month later the soldier’s magazine Parade was dedicated to ‘The Spirit of Tobruk’.12
Rommel had to leave the best harbour in Cyrenaica to the British, a thorn in his side, compounding the strain on his overextended supply lines. But he was loath to give up the initiative. Leaving a besieging force behind, by mid-May Sollum had fallen and he had reached the Halfaya Pass, the gateway to Egypt.
All the while Wavell had to deal with the retreat from Greece, the defence of Crete and revolutions in Iraq and Syria. For once, Churchill sympathised with his commander. There was no nagging or recriminations; practical aid was the order of the day. He stripped the home defence, sending 300 tanks and 50 Hurricane fighters by fast convoy to Alexandria, which they reached on 12 May.13
On 27 April General Friedrich Paulus, who would later gain immortality at Stalingrad, arrived at Rommel’s desert HQ. He had been dispatched by a concerned General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff (OKH), to find out just what Rommel was up to as he ‘has not sent in a single clear report, and I have the feeling that things are in a mess …’14
On his arrival Paulus cancelled an attack on Tobruk scheduled for 30 April but later relented and let it go ahead. The attack failed and Paulus advised that no further attacks should be made. He reported to OKH on 12 May ‘that the D.A.K. was in difficulties tactically, and that the supply situation was most unsatisfactory. Strong action was necessary, he thought, if a serious crisis was to be avoided.’15
Within hours Bletchley Park had decoded the Paulus report. Churchill’s and to a lesser extent Wavell’s reaction was positive. There could be an opportunity here; pressure could be applied to bring the ‘crisis’ to fruition and Tobruk could be relieved. Thus Operation Brevity was born. It began on 15 May and lasted some 36 hours, but failed. The trouble was that Rommel and his army did not quite see it the way Paulus did, and by the end of the fighting the British had achieved little. Moreover the Afrika Korps had begun to learn the value of using the 88mm anti-aircraft gun in an anti-tank role, as demonstrated by the burnt out British tanks littering the area around the Halfaya Pass.
The 88mm gun was even more effective during the British offensive Operation Battleaxe, which began on 15 June, utilising the reinforcements Churchill had hurried to what he called ‘The Nile Army’. British command could not comprehend the fast-moving battle and within two days, in fighting around Sollum, had lost hundreds of tanks for no gain.
It was down to the Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Smith to deliver a telegram to Wavell on 22 June, telling him that he was to exchange appointments with Auchinleck. The General agreed with Churchill that the job needed ‘a new head and a new hand’. He hoped for some leave, but the Prime Minister wanted him in New Delhi to take up his post as Commander-in-Chief India, where, as he put it, he could rest ‘sitting under the pagoda tree’.16
See here for a list of abbreviations used in the below notes
1 Andrew, p.449
2 Simmons, M., The Battle of Matapan 1941 p.30
3 ibid, p.148–149
4 Pitt, p.249
5 Connell, J., Wavell Supreme Commander p.385–386
6 ibid, p.386
7 Pitt, p.252
8 Liddell Hart, B.H., The Rommel Papers p.104
9 Behrendt, H.O., Rommel’s Intelligence in the Desert Campaign p.52–53
10 Liddell Hart, p.111
11 Playfair (Volume 2), p.29
12 Cooper, p.67
13 Pitt, p.275
14 Playfair (Volume 2), p.41
15 ibid, p.156
16 Connell, p.20