RITTER AND ALMÁSY DID NOT dwell on the El Masri fiasco. On 27 May Ritter’s little force reported to Abwehr HQ in Hamburg that ‘Imminent success in sight.’ This was picked up by the British Radio Security Service.1 The Ritter Commando was largely in the dark. Yet there was an efficient Italian network of spies in Cairo led by an officer called ‘Nani’. The Abwehr had introduced ‘Roberto’ from their Athens branch into this cell and from May 1941 to January 1942 profited from his information. But somehow they did not quite trust the Italians; they were not ‘reliable’. Canaris was keen to help Rommel; ‘His strategy is based on ruse and surprise. Any information that helps him is worth more than 20 tanks, which, by the way, he is not getting anyway because they are being sent to Russia.’2
Ritter flew to Berlin in early June to arrange the next mission and to collect two spies named Muhlenbruch (codename Pat) and Klein (codename Patachon), nicknamed after two Danish comedians, one fat, one thin. Both agents were fluent in Arabic, having lived in Arab countries for years, Muhlenbruch in Haifa and Klein in Alexandria. They were to return to these cities to install secret transmitters and build up spy cells.
The plan was for the agents to be flown to a remote spot, from where they could make their way to their appointed cities without raising suspicion. Almásy planned a caravan route that led from the Farafrah Oasis to Deirut on the Nile. Some 60 miles from the river was a prominent hill, a good landmark. To the south of this the ground was firm, a perfect place for the aircraft to land. However, that left the agents with 60 miles of desert to cover. Neither man was young, one being 40 and the other close to 50. Again, Almásy came up with the solution, in the shape of a motorcycle, a light machine of Italian origin.
On 17 June two Heinkel bombers were at Derna, ready to transport the agents to the desert. One carried Ritter, the two spies and a motorcycle, the other was to fly escort. Things did not start well; the aircraft that was to carry the agents had a burst tyre.3 Ritter ordered the agents and motorcycle to be swapped to the covering aircraft, while the damaged plane would cover. Almásy objected to this, worried that the pilot Guenther Raydt was not experienced in desert flying, and suggested that the pilots be changed, but Ritter would hear of no further delays. Almásy felt the whole thing was too risky and refused to take part. He was left behind.4
They took off and maintained a low altitude but crossing the border into Egypt they had to climb to 12,000 feet to avoid a sandstorm. Meanwhile Klein and Muhlenbruch slept in the bomb bay. After five hours the landmark hill chosen by Almásy was spotted and the aircraft descended to a few hundred feet. The sun was already low in the west. The escort aircraft circled above at 3000 feet but Raydt hesitated to land the other plane, which was carrying the agents. Captain Leicht, the observer, urged him to put the machine down. Still the pilot hesitated; the light was fading fast. Eventually they laid a smoke bomb to gauge the wind direction and Raydt came into land but pulled up at the last minute. He had spotted a British scout car on the horizon, revealed by its trail of dust.5
This meant another sweep of the area and landing approach. More delay. Again they approached the landing area. But the fading light was casting long shadows and Raydt would not risk it, saying that the ground was too bumpy. Leicht ordered him to try again but by this time the sun had gone down and the ground was invisible. By now Ritter was on the flight deck; he and Leicht urged the young pilot to land but he would not, saying that he was responsible for the safety of the aircraft and the people on it.
Leicht suggested that the agents jump, but this was out of the question. Ritter decided to postpone the mission, hoping that the 10th Air Corps – who had provided the aircraft and crews – would do so again. Ritter was bitterly disappointed, and no doubt reflected on Almásy’s objections.
The two aircraft turned back for Derna. By this time Muhlenbruch had come up to the flight deck, wondering what was happening, only to hear that the mission was off for the time being. Then there was more bad news. ‘No permission to land at Derna. Enemy Attack. Fly to alternative field,’ reported the radio operator.
They had been flying over eight hours; did they have enough fuel to reach Benghazi 200 miles away? Shortly after this the port engine of the main aircraft began to misfire and they lost the variable pitch. They had no choice but to land at Derna. Then they were amongst the British aircraft and friendly flak. Evasive action was necessary but there was no news from Derna. There was an emergency landing strip on the coast but they could not find it and their fuel was almost gone. It was decided that they would have to ditch in the sea; Leicht told the pilot, ‘Don’t forget to keep your tail down when you land in the water.’6
They sent out an SOS, then hit the water. ‘All we could hear was the howl of the wind over the wings,’ says Ritter. ‘The motors had stopped altogether. Suddenly there was a blow as hard as steel.’7 The Heinkel III floated at first, her empty fuel tanks giving some buoyancy. Inside the aircraft, Ritter had a broken right arm, Leicht had broken ribs and Klein a badly bruised arm and shoulder. The pilot, radio operator and flight engineer were uninjured. Muhlenbruch was dead. The radio operator tried to get him out of the sinking aircraft, but found that he had been crushed to death by a crate.
The injured men, although in great pain, managed to swim away from the cockpit, which was steadily filling with water. The others had made the rubber dinghy seaworthy and quickly got Leicht and Ritter on board. Meanwhile the plane sank nose first, taking Muhlenbruch with it.
The survivors spent twelve hours in the water. Four men sat in the dinghy, the uninjured men paddling the craft as best they could, while two of the fitter men hung onto the safety lines in the water. They tried to steer due south. About midday the next day they came ashore between Barce and Derna.
They set off across the desert, suffering terribly from thirst for another 24 hours until they stumbled across an Arab village. There they were picked up by a Feiseler Storch light aircraft of the Desert Rescue Squadron.8
Meanwhile the escort Heinkel had managed to land at Benina, very low on fuel. Almásy reported this to Abwehr HQ, a message which was read by the British.9
Ritter was soon in the field hospital at Derna where his right arm was put in a cast – much to his relief, as the doctors had considered amputating the badly mangled limb.
I felt that to a great extent I had myself to blame for the failure. Initially, for switching the planes, and then for not having ordered Almásy to take my place. He might have been able to persuade the timid pilot to land. We had lost a valuable plane … not to speak of the loss of [Muhlenbruch] … It seemed that my lucky star had deserted me.10
Ritter and Leicht were soon flown to Athens in a Red Cross plane. Before leaving, Ritter handed over the leadership of the commando to Almásy. He promised that he would do as much for him as he could once he got back to Berlin, and advised, ‘Now you must proceed with our alternate plan to take the next pair of agents by car across the desert.’11
Once in Berlin, Ritter, although still recovering, did not waste time, instructing Almásy to report ‘to TirpitzFührer 80’ – a message which was intercepted by the British RSS – where the next operation would be reviewed.12
When Ritter had recovered he wanted to lead the desert operation himself, but Canaris seemed to have lost confidence in him and declined, preferring to give Almásy sole command of what was to be called Operation Salam.13 Almásy’s abilities were not going unnoticed by the Allies either. British Intelligence MI6 had already identified him as a likely leader of a German LRDG using ‘captured British Bren carriers and Ford V8 lorries’.14
See here for a list of abbreviations used in the below notes
1 GCCS No 5798 Ritter to Hamburg 27/5/1941
2 Carell, p.207
3 ibid, p.208
4 Bierman, p.156
5 Carell, p.209
6 ibid, p.208–210
7 Whiting, C., Hitler’s Secret War p.71
8 Carell, p.210–211
9 GCCS No 6801 Cyrenaica to Berlin 20/6/1941
10 Whiting, p.71
11 Ritter, p.450
12 GCCS No 8920 Berlin to Cyrenaica 27/6/1941
13 KV/2/1467 So/I/0842
14 KV/2/1467 Ford V8 Lorries