Notes
Mobutu Sese Seko quote, p. vi: “Mwalimu Nyerere: ‘How I Weep for Arusha Declaration!’” Arusha Times, October 8, 2005, 390.
Introduction
3 The coach of Army’s football team makes substantially more than the president despite Army’s up and down record on the football field in recent years!
6 They, in turn, could target benefits to their essential voters. We can only wonder whether the people receiving housing grants, for example, made up the bulk of the city council’s supporting voters. With a secret ballot there is no way to know, although if Bell’s votes were reported by neighborhood we probably could come close to seeing the pairing of electoral support and the prospects of receiving special rewards, like housing grants.
7 Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (New York: Cambridge University Press,1996 [1651]), 131.
8 Nicoló Machiavelli,
The Prince and the Discourses, ed. Max Learner (New York: The Modern Library, 1950 [1532]), 256.
9 James Madison, “Federalist 10,” in
The Federalist, ed. Jacob Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 62.
10 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat,
The Spirit of Laws, ed. Edward Wallace Carrithers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977 [1748]), 176.
11 Robert Woodward,
Obama’s War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010); Robert F. Kennedy,
Thirteen Days (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).
12 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow,
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
Chapter 1: The Rules of Politics
1 Those interested in seeing rigorous proofs for the logic behind the claims made here should see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow,
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), and subsequent works cited throughout this volume.
3 The sources for the fate of Castro’s close allies are Volker Skierka,
Fidel Castro: A Biography (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2004), 68–91; Georgie Anne Geyer,
Guerrilla Prince (Kansas City: Little Brown and Co., 1991), 191–315; Frank Fernandez,
Cuban Anarchism: The History of a Movement, translated by Charles Bufe (Tucson, AZ: Sharp Press, 2001), 75–93; George Dominguez, “Cuba Since 1959,” in
Cuba: A Short History, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 95–149; and PBS
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/castro/filmmore/fr.html.
4 Emma Larkin,
Everything is Broken: A Tale of Catastrophe in Burma (New York: Penguin Press, 2010).
5 Alexandros Tegos, “To Leave or Not to Leave? On the Assumption of Political Survival,” Working Paper, Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy, New York University Department of Politics, April 15, 2008.
Chapter 2: Coming to Power
2 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, talk given to a large investment group’s portfolio committee, May 5, 2010, New York, New York.
3 Lawrence K. Altman, “The Shah’s Health: A Political Gamble,”
New York Times Magazine, May 17, 1981, pp. 5–17.
4 Meredith,
The Fate of Africa, 150.
5 S. E. Finer,
The History of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
6 Sources for the analysis of Pope Damasus I include Michael Walsh,
Butler’s Lives of the Saints (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 413; Edward Gibbon,
The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1 (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), 866, n84; “Pope St. Damasus I,”
Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1913), Letter of Jerome to Pope Damasus, vol. 2, 376; Henry Chadwick,
The Pelican History of the Church—1: The Early Church (London: Penguin Press, 1978); Williston Walker,
A History of the Christian Church (New York: General Books, 2010); Diarmaid McCulloch,
History of Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years (London: Viking, 2009).
7 Averil Cameron and Peter Garnsey, eds.,
The Cambridge Ancient History: The Late Empire, A.D. 337–425 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 103.
8 Ryszard Kapuscinski,
The Soccer War (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 113–114.
9 The discussion of Gorbachev’s fall and Yeltsin’s rise is based on the analysis in Kiron Skinner, Serhiy Kudelia, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Condoleezza Rice,
The Strategy of Campaigning (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007).
10 See Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, and Jason Snyder, “Political Dynasties,”
Review of Economic Studies 76, no. 1 (January 2009): 115–142.
11 The champion for winning the presidency with little popular support was John Quincy Adams, who received less than 31 percent of the popular vote. He won in a multiparty race by clever maneuvering in America’s odd system, in which popular votes, especially in the country’s early days, did not translate directly into support in the electoral college or, when no one wins there, in the House of Representatives.
Chapter 3: Staying in Power
1 Italo Calvino,
Under the Jaguar Sun (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986), 36.
2 See, for instance, Andrew Ward, Karen Bishop, and Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, “Pyrrhic Victories: The Cost to the Board of Ousting the CEO,”
Journal of Organizational Behavior 20 (1999): 767–781; see also Joann Lublin, “CEO Tenure, Stock Gains Often Go Hand-in-Hand,”
Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2010. Accessed at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703900004575325172681419254.html.
3 The chairman and CEO in 1999 was Lewis Platt. His board included Philip M. Condit, Patricia C. Dunn, Thomas E. Everhart, John B. Fery, Jean-Paul G. Gimon, Sam Ginn, Richard A. Hackborn, Walter B. Hewlett, George A. Keyworth II, David M. Lawrence, Susan P. Orr, David W. Packard, and Robert P. Wayman.
4 Carly Fiorina, “The Case for the Merger,” Speech at the Goldman Sachs Technology Conference, Palm Springs, California, February 4, 2002.
7 See Patrick Cockburn, “Chemical Ali: The End of an Overlord,”
The Independent, June 25, 2007. Archived at
http://www.webcitation.org/5n4hnapFg. Part of Saddam Hussein’s mercifulness was manifested in his allowing al-Bakr to resign rather that executing him, probably seen by Chemical Ali as a show of weakness.
9 S. E. Finer,
The History of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 643.
10 Martin Meredith,
The Fate of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs Press, 2005), 546.
11 Martin Meredith,
Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002).
13 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Report on Tanzania’s Economic and Political Performance: Helping Tanzania Do Better,” Study prepared for the World Bank, April 20, 2009.
14 Alastair Smith and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Contingent Prize Allocation and Pivotal Voting,”
British Journal of Political Science, 2012, forthcoming.
15 See Richard L. Park and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,
India’s Political System, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,
Strategy, Risk and Personality in Coalition Politics: The Case of India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
16 See Bueno de Mesquita,
Strategy, Risk and Personality, 75.
17 Milton K. Rakove,
Don’t Make No Waves, Don’t Back No Losers: An Insider’s Analysis of the Daley Machine (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), 16.
18 Waikeung Tam, “Clientelist Politics in Singapore: Selective Provision of Housing Services as an Electoral Mobilization Strategy,” University of Chicago, 2003, typescript.
19 The figure is based on leader time in office from Archigos. Winning coalition measure is based on Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow,
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), with large coalitions coded as 1, the highest category.
Chapter 4: Steal from the Poor, Give to the Rich
1 Several scholars have examined how institutions affect transparency and the availability of data. See, for instance, James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland,
Democracy and Transparency, Working paper, 2010; also see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow,
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
2 Quoted in Meredith Martin,
Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002), 17.
3 Robert H. Bates,
Prosperity and Violence: the Political Economy of Development (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001), 74.
4 Gerard Padró i Miquel, “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear,”
Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007): 1259–1274.
6 These tax estimates are based, in the case of China, on the tax brackets for that country identified at
www.worldwide-tax.com/china/china_tax.asp and for the United States by filling out US tax form 1040 using H&R Block’s 2010 Tax Cut program, with only the itemized deduction for our hypothetical American family of three.
7 Implicit taxation is the value associated with an activity that is lost to its producer as a result of government policy. High inflation, for instance, implicitly taxes wealth by diminishing its value.
9 William Shakespeare,
Merchant of Venice, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine. Folger Shakespeare Library (New York: Washington Square Press, 2009), Act 4, scene 1, 157.
10 Anita L. Allen and Michael R. Seidl, “Cross-Cultural Commerce in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice,”
American University Journal of International Law and Politics 10 (1995): 843.
11 Calculations based upon SOI Tax Stats-Internal Revenue Service Collections, Costs, Personnel, and US Population, by Fiscal Year-IRS Data Book Table 29 for 2009.
12 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “Inefficient Redistribution,”
American Political Science Review 95, no. 3 (September 2001): 649–661.
13 Quote attributed to Elizabeth Ohene, “Words, Deeds and Cocoa,”
West Africa 31 (August 1982), 2104, cited in Jeffrey Herbst,
The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982–1991 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 111.
14 S. E. Finer,
The History of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 663–727.
15 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change,”
Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 2 (2009): 167–197. A. H. Gelb,
Windfall Gains: Blessing or Curse? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Michael Ross, “Political Economy of Resource Curse,”
World Politics 51 (1999): 297–322; Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” Working Paper 5398, 1995.
16 Xavier Sala-i-Martin Arvind Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria,” Working Paper 9804, NBER Working Paper series (Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003). Available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9804.
Chapter 5: Getting and Spending
1 See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “The Rise of Sustainable Autocracy,”
Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 77–86. For contrary views, see Robert J. Barro,
Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvares, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi,
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
4 See Kiron Skinner, Serhiy Kudelia, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Condoleezza Rice,
The Strategy of Campaigning (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007).
5 For a comparison of leadership by one person in both a small- and large-coalition setting see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation,”
Historical Social Research [Historische Sozialforschung] 32, no. 4 (2007): 203–221.
6 See Jorge Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978); Jorge Dominguez, “The Batista Regime in Cuba,” in
Sultanistic Regimes, eds. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 113–131.
9 Quoted in James A. Robinson, “When Is a State Predatory?” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1999.
10 We have measured these distances wherever we could. If you want to estimate these distances yourself just use Google maps and associated tools for measuring shortest distance.
11 See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow,
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
12 A recent study that examines the protection of property rights finds that larger coalition governments are significantly more attentive to protecting property rights than are governments that rely on smaller coalitions. See Mogens K. Justesen, “Making and Breaking Property Rights: Coalitions, Veto Players, and the Institutional Foundation of Markets,”
Journal of Politics, forthcoming.
13 See David S. Brown and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, “The Transforming Power of Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of Electricity,”
American Political Science Review 103 (2009): 193–213; and Brian Min, “Who Gets Public Goods? Efficiency, Equity, and the Politics of Electrification,” paper presented at the 2008 Meeting of the Working Group on Wealth and Power in the Post-Industrial Age, UCLA, February 8–9, 2008.
15 Edward Luce,
In Spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 139–140.
Chapter 6: If Corruption Empowers, Then Absolute Corruption Empowers Absolutely
1 Henry (1387–1422) is much admired for his victory at Agincourt during the Hundred Years War. Unlike Genghis Khan, however, Henry V died young. He was only forty-five, but then he did not fall at the hand of some political foe; he died of dysentery while fighting in France.
2 William Shakespeare,
Folger Shakespeare Library: Henry V, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (New York: Washington Square Press, 1995), Act 3, scene 3, 97.
3 Having lost his fortune, he hankered to return to Haiti, thinking he might once again assume power and extract wealth. He finally bit the bullet and went back to Haiti in January 2011, where he was immediately charged with corruption and other crimes. The urge for power is great—maybe even so great as to induce Baby Doc to undertake a most imprudent decision. Time will tell.
7 We amassed World Bank data on vouchers and district-by-district levels of economic productivity and poverty to see whether vouchers are given to help the needy maize growers or are given as political rewards to the smallest coalition electoral districts. In keeping with Tanzanian practices, we assessed productivity as the amount of maize produced on average across the long and short rainy seasons. The extent of district poverty was evaluated as the percentage of the population in each district identified by the World Bank as below the poverty line. Tanzania says the voucher program is to alleviate poverty; our rules to rule by say the voucher program is a private reward to loyal supporters in small coalition settings.
8 All quotations about the Dymovsky affair are from Clifford J. Levy, “Videos Rouse Russian Anger Toward Police,”
New York Times, July 28, 2010, p. A1.
9 See Martin Meredith,
The Fate of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs Press, 2005), 556.
12 “The Greatest Sideshow on Earth,”
The Economist, July 22, 2010.
13 For background on Castellano see Selwyn Raab,
Five Families (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005); Peter Maas,
Underboss: Sammy the Bull Gravano’s Story of Life in the Mafia (New York: Harper Torch, 1997).
14 M. Cary and H. H. Scallard,
A History of Rome: Down to the Reign of Constantine , 3rd edn. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1976), chapters 20 and 27.
15 See Beatriz Magaloni,
Voting for Autocracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 47.
16 See Michela Wrong:
In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), 4.
17 See S. E. Finer,
The History of Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 724.
19 See William Taubman,
Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York : W. W. Norton & Co., 2003), 519–523.
20 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “The Political Economy of Corporate Fraud: A Theory and Empirical Tests,” Paper presented at NYU’s Stern Business School, September 2004.
Chapter 7: Foreign Aid
1 Ryszard Kapuscinski,
The Emperor (Boston: Harcourt, 1983), 118 and 111.
2 See Martin Meredith,
The Fate of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), chapter 19.
3 David Rieff, “Cruel to Be Kind?”
The Guardian, Friday, June 24, 2005.
6 “Dirt Out, Cash In: Kenya’s Anti-corruption Campaign Is Wooing Back Donors,”
Economist, November 27, 2003.
7 Jomo Kenyatta,
Suffering without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), 215.
8 Statement attributed to a senior US policy maker. Meredith,
The Fate of Africa, 555.
11 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “A Political Economy of Aid,”
International Organization 63 (Spring 2009): 309–40; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 (2007): 251–284.
13 See Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,”
World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 294–323.
14 Data from USAID’s Greenbook. Reported in constant 2008 US dollars.
15 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 5 (2010): 667–686.
16 For instance, Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,”
Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5 (2006): 905–930; Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Vreeland, “Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes in the United Nations Security Council,”
European Economic Review 53, no. 7 (2009): 742–757. Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Vreeland, “Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?”
Journal of Development Economics 88 (2009):1–18.
18 William Easterly,
The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); and William Easterly,
The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (London: Penguin Press, 2006).
19 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,”
American Economic Review 90, no. 4 (2000): 847–868.
24 Martin Meredith,
The Fate of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 102.
25 See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,”
International Organization 60, no. 3 (July 2006): 627–649.
Chapter 8: The People in Revolt
1 Portions of this chapter are drawn from several of our academic undertakings, including Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change,”
Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 2 (February 2009): 167–197; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,
Principles of International Politics, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow,
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
2 Translated by Yung Wei in personal correspondence, drawn from Hong-she Zhong-gui (Red China), December 1, 1931. We are most grateful to Yung Wei for bringing this quotation to our attention.
3 Frank D. Cornfield,
The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau: An Historical Survey, Sessional Paper number 5 of 1959/60 of Kenya LegCo (Nairobi: Government of Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1960), 301–308.
4 Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon,
Opening Mexico. The Making of a Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
5 Emma Larkin,
Everything Is Broken: A Tale of Catastrophe in Burma (New York: Penguin Press, 2010). We draw extensively on her account of Burmese politics.
7 Eyes of the Storm: Turning Points in Burmese History. PBS wide-angle documentary series,
WNET.org, August 19, 2009.
8 Alejandro Quiroz Flores and Alastair Smith, “Surviving Disasters,” Working Paper, NYU, 2010.
9 This is true despite earthquakes being more likely to strike democracies than autocracies.
10 Economist, July 21, 2005.
11 Julien Levesque, “Lords of Jade: Mismanagement of Myanmar’s Natural Resources,”
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Issue Brief No. 60 (March 2008).
13 Andrejs Plakans,
The Latvians: A Short History (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1995).
15 Data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, per capita GDP reported in constant 2000 $US.
16 Albert Adu Boahen,
The Ghanaian Sphinx: Reflections on the Contemporary History of Ghana, 1972–1987, The J. B. Danquah Memorial Lectures, Series 21, February 1988, (Accra, Ghana: Ghana Academy of Arts and Science, 1989), 51.
17 Naomi Chazan, “The Political Transformation of Ghana under the PNDC,” in Donald Rothchild (ed.),
The Political Economy of Ghana (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 27.
18 Interview by Alastair Smith with Nat Nuno-Amarteifio, former Mayor of Accra, May 2008.
19 Nicolas Van de Walle,
African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 241–242.
Chapter 9: War, Peace, and World Order
1 Much of this section is based on Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M., Siverson, and James D. Morrow,
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), chapter 6; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,”
World Politics 56 (April 2004): 363–388. Those interested in the logical, mathematical proofs of the claims made here should refer to these and other publications cited throughout.
2 Sun Tzu,
The Art of War, ed. James Clavell (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), 9–14.
5 Anna Getmansky, “Protecting the Protectors: A Cross-National Study of Domestic Regimes and Protection of Soldiers,” Working Paper, Department of Politics, New York University, 2008.
6 Martin Meredith,
The Soccer War (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 201–202.
7 In Europe in the 1980s it was a popular joke that Ronald Reagan was America’s apology for being late for the first two World Wars, by being really punctual for the next.
8 Graph is generated using military expenditure from the Correlate of War Project’s National Material Capabilities Data. We do not have data for Austria in 1919 as Austria-Hungary ceased to exist.
9 For a more detailed and rigorous account of how our perspective explains the incentive to create puppet regimes see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al.,
Logic of Political Survival, especially chapter 9; and Carmela Lutmar, “Belligerent Occupations,” in
ISA Compendium of International Law, Robert J. Beck and Henry F. Carey, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009).
10 See Michela Wrong,
I Didn’t Do It for You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 328.
12 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, “War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability,”
American Political Science Review (December 1995); and Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph Siverson, and Gary Woller, “War and the Fate of Regimes: A Cross-National Analysis,”
American Political Science Review (September 1992): 638–646.
13 G. M. Gilbert,
Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947), 278–279.
14 Quoted in David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar,
Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987).
15 Wrong,
I Didn’t Do It for You, 336.
16 In fact there are numerous cases of violent conflicts between pairs of democracies in the Correlates of War Project’s militarized disputes data. None become wars because while one side used force, the other side backed down rather than fight back.
17 See Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam,
Democracies at War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
Chapter 10: What Is To Be Done?
2 Robert Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,”
Yale Law Journal 114 (May 2005): 1521–1611.
3 Jeffrey L. Jensen “Initial Institutions, Institutional Persistence, and the Promotion of Economic Development by the Original 13 States,” Working Paper, NYU Department of Politics, 2007.
4 Akhil Reed Amar,
America’s Constitution: A Biography (New York: Random House, 2006).