Introduction

This book was conceived as a tribute to all those who took part in and contributed to the success of Operation ‘Corporate’, in particular those of the naval services – the Royal Navy, Royal Fleet Auxiliary, Royal Marine Auxiliary Service, the Merchant Navy, the Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service and the Royal Marines, as well as all the men of the Army and Royal Air Force who found themselves attached to naval and Marines units. Behind the men ‘at the sharp end’, there were the legions of the staffs and organizations which kept the ships at sea and maintained the Commando Brigade on the far shore – condemned in time of peace as the excessive ‘tail’, in war they showed that they were none too numerous. As might have been expected, British industry provided wholehearted and unstinted support, rising to a new challenge every day, as it seemed, during the two and a half months of active hostilities. With the parts played by the other Services and their contributors, teeth and tail were united to form the body corporate which succeeded in restoring British rule in the Falkland Islands and South Georgia.

Although many might feel that their contribution is not fully reflected in the following pages, only in one area is this intentional. For reasons which they well know, the doings of the submariners must remain discreetly unreported for the time being and it must suffice to say that all those who served in the South Atlantic are in the debt of the men of the six submarines which provided the advanced guard and then the first line of defence against the Argentine Navy. That the Fleet did not venture forth after the example of the General Belgrano does not detract from the dangers and discomforts of long patrols, often in shallow and inadequately charted waters, right up to the time of the Argentine Government’s acceptance that the campaign was over.

I am grateful for the ready assistance and guidance of many officers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines who took part in the various aspects of the campaign. Without their help it would not have been possible to piece together, and in some instances reconcile, the various accounts, semi-official, private and published, British and Argentine, which have been used to compile this narrative. I am also indebted to Admiral Sir Peter Stanford KCB MVO, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff from 1982 to 1984, and to Mr Alistair Jaffray CB, the Deputy Undersecretary of State for the Royal Navy until 1984, for their permission and encouragement to undertake this work.

David Brown
June, 1984

Although what follows is published by permission of the Ministry of Defence, any opinions which may be expressed are my own and do not represent those of the Ministry, the Navy Department or the Naval Service as a whole.

DB
September, 1986