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Wang Pu
Wang Pu [C.E. 906–959], whose courtesy name was Wenbo, was native to Dongping Commandery. He received the doctoral degree in youth to become editor at the palace library, where he bonded with Yang Bin, commissioner of military affairs. Tensions had surfaced between Bin and men like Wang Zhang and Shi Hongzhao. Pu further appraised Han rule as still in its infancy, its enfeebled Emperor Yin too prone to invest substantive powers in petty men. Tumult also seemed unavoidable owing to sour relations between Bin as senior statesman and commanders and ministers at court. Parting with Bin, Pu decided to return to the east. Li Ye and cohort later goaded Emperor Yin into executing his domineering courtiers, causing the deaths of Bin, Zhang, and Hongzhao—many a retainer of the three families included. Through absence, Pu singularly escaped.
Wang Pu served as administrative secretary under the future Shizong of Zhou, then governor of Chanzhou. He became right proofreader and judicial officer during Shizong’s tenure as metropolitan custodian of Kaifeng and director of disciplinary review after Shizong’s enthronement. Offering a “Plan to Expand the Border,” Pu wrote:
When the [Later] Tang strayed from the Way, it forfeited the regions of Wu and Shu; when the Jin strayed from the Way, it forfeited the prefectures of You and Bing. By observing the reasons for their errors, we can acquire the methods to neutralize the threats. Such mistakes coincide with governance unraveled by gullible rulers and people hard-pressed by arrogant armies, villainy perpetrated by confidantes at court and sedition committed by the disaffected in the districts. The failure to contain lesser threats culminated in usurpation while failure to contain major threats culminated in insurgency. The alienation of men’s hearts across the world caused actions to occur without proper mandate: overlords at Wu and Shu exploited the tumult to proclaim bogus titles, those at You and Bing exploited vacuums to usurp power at their districts.
The method for neutralizing these threats rests simply with recognizing the need to reverse the mistakes of the Tang and Jin dynasties. We must first elevate the worthy and eliminate the unworthy to purify the age, utilize the capable and eliminate the inept to identify talent, issue commands both charitable and credible to secure the loyalty of armies, reward merit and punish malefaction to maximize our might, embrace economy and reduce consumption to concentrate the country’s wealth, and confine labor service to necessary seasons so people may prosper. Only with filled storehouses and fully stockpiled arsenals can the people be deployed for military action. Then, the citizens of rival states will witness our imperium universally accepted, our populace united in purpose, our military mighty and resources plentiful, our people secure and commanders harmonious. The momentum for certain victory lies herein. Then, persons possessing military intelligence about our foes will gladly be our spies, while persons familiar with their geography will gladly lead the way. Once the hearts of their people and our people achieve harmony, a harmony with Heaven will be won as well—and harmony with Heaven will leave nothing beyond our reach.
The key to a conquest involves commencing with easy targets. At present, the Wu domain offers the only easy target: extending eastward to the sea and southward to the Yangzi River, it has two thousand li of border vulnerable to raid. We could begin by raiding the lesser-prepared sites: if fortifications lie to the east, we should raid the west; if fortifications lie to the west, we should raid the east. It will surely rush to relieve vulnerable areas, and based on its relief movements, we can know the state of its preparations and the strength of its armies. Then, by attacking locations vulnerable and armies weak, nothing will impede us, anywhere. We would need no major military movements, as raids by light cavalry will suffice. Its men being cowardly, Wu leaders will surely greet news of our army’s infiltration by rallying a vast force in confrontation. Repeated rallies, however, will drain personnel and exhaust the country, permitting us to seize the strategic advantage without a mass mobilization. With them tired and us enjoying the advantage, we will absorb the northern Yangzi region into our empire. Securing the northern Yangzi and absorbing their men will enable our own armies to expand, making pacification of even the southern Yangzi far from difficult. Our attainments will thereby be many, despite only modest effort.
After securing the Wu region, prefectures from Gui† to Guang‡ [in the far south] will all become our vassals, while Shu [to the west] can be summoned by a simple courier’s letter. If it fails to submit, a simultaneous assault from the four directions will pacify Shu with the effortless ease of rolling a floor mat. The pacification of Wu and Shu will cause political winds to shift, delivering Youzhou to our door. Only Bingzhou is certain to die as renegade, unresponsive to our overtures of charity and trust. It will be necessary to attack with hardened warriors. When its vigor is sapped and morale spent, such that it no longer presents a border menace, then we can intrigue against it. At present, with our warriors well trained and our weaponry in full supply, our subordinates accepting rules and our commanders obeying orders, we could pacify the border in merely a year.
Your Subject, a man of books, has no standing to address important affairs and may even lack appreciation of the broader objectives and timeliness of strategizing. Thus, I beg for Your Majesty’s indulgence.
Promoted to left master of admonitions and prefect of Kaifeng, he became left cavalier of palace remonstrance with concurrent standing as Duanming academician within a year.
A newly enthroned Shizong, keen to launch a campaign, now circumvented objections from his senior staff. After personally vanquishing Liu Min at Gaoping, he returned to begin augmenting the armed forces in a thoroughgoing commitment to unify the world. Repeatedly, he probed senior officials on the proper ways to govern, while selecting Xu Taifu, among twenty men of literary background, to compose the “Discussion of the Challenges to Ruler and to Subject” and the “Plan to Pacify the Border.” Wang Pu was among that twenty.
Civilian literati at the time counseled the Monarch against a rush to arms: cultivating literary virtues should receive priority, they argued, before tumult and treachery could be arrested. The only courtiers to advance offensive strategies were Hanlin academicians Tao Gu and Dou Yi, deputy censor Yang Zhaojian, and Pu himself, who advocated initial conquest of the Huai and Yangzi regions. Shizong had frequently heard of Pu, but came to cherish him as a rare talent upon witnessing his heroic stand on policy issues. His consultations with Pu on world affairs yielded such total agreement that Shizong resolved to employ him. With the Emperor campaigning against the Huai region, in the third year of Xiande [C.E. 956], Pu was named interim deputy custodian of the eastern capital. He became vice minister of revenues and deputy commissioner of military affairs upon Shizong’s return. Elevation to military commissioner ensued, Pu serving as the capital’s interim custodian during the Huai campaigns of the fourth year.
Under Shizong, military campaigns occurred at large while laws and institutions were reformed at court. Wang Pu’s sharp intellect and multiple proficiencies were not only relevant to the affairs of his times, but included a comprehensive command of geomancy and calendar making. In the second year of Xiande, he prepared a definitive calendar under court auspices known as the Qintian Calendar, purging the “heavenly complements” popular in recent times that lacked classical foundation. Instead, he applied the three astronomical measures to calculate the timing for new and full moons each year and divination numbers for related events, casting horoscopes based on the sun, moon, and five stars. The court further charged Pu, in the sixth year [C.E. 959], with a critical review of ritual music. When the twelve pitch pipes are played together, he found, producing the right tones proved difficult; he restored harmony by adopting the pitch standards of Jing Fang and employing thirteen chords that were each nine feet long, with posts placed one inch apart and the seven tones employed in equal portions.
Enjoying the confidences of Shizong, a stubbornly determined Wang Pu refused to be challenged in any endeavor nor consider the demands of others. During Shizong’s campaigns against the Huai, he remained in the capital to extend city walls and connect its roadways, lending an imposing dignity and ample space. Many a configuration in our capital today was designed by him. Similarly, his musical arrangements can still be employed without modification. Even the strategies delineated by him for military movements are far from relevant to his day alone. In predicting the sequence by which rival states would succumb, he asserted, “The Southern Huai can be conquered first, but Bingzhou is certain to die as renegade holdout and perish last.” Our own Song dynasty later emerged to pacify the four corners, and precisely as Pu predicted, Bingzhou [Northern Han] was the last holdout.
Shizong had Wang Pu inspect the mouth of the Bian River for the building of a sluice, in the spring of the sixth year [C.E. 959]. He stopped off at the home of former minister Li Gu, where he slumped into his chair on account of illness. Carried home on a stretcher, he died afterward at fifty-four sui. Shizong appeared at his funeral and struck his jade halberd against the floor in anguish, greatly moved to tears four times in succession. Posthumous rank as director of the Chancellery was conferred.
Zheng Renhui
His courtesy name Rixin, Zheng Renhui [d. C.E. 955] was native to Jinyang, Taiyuan. He initially served under the Tang commander Chen Shaoguang, a man martially daring and fond of heavy drink, who once vented anger against Renhui when inebriated and drew his sword, intending to kill him. As terrified attendants all scattered, Renhui stood erect with no movement and no expression of fear. Shaoguang now tossed his sword to the floor and patted Renhui on the back, declaring, “With your natural gifts, you will surely achieve an eminence exceeding my own.” Renhui subsequently parted with Shaoguang to return to his village, where people say he served his mother with filial devotion.
When the future Gaozu of Han was governor of Hedong, the future Taizu of Zhou regularly visited with Renhui, their conversations leaving him extremely light of heart. He invariably solicited Renhui’s counsel when uncertain about matters, his responses never entailing flattery such that Taizu valued him even more. Taizu became commissioner of military affairs under a newly inaugurated Han dynasty and summoned Renhui for office, his appointments culminating in palace master for diplomatic accommodations. Many of the military strategies adopted by Taizu to rout Li Shouzhen of Hezhong involved consultation with Renhui.
After acceding to the Zhou throne, Taizu named Renhui inspector-general of the imperial precincts, military training commissioner for Enzhou, deputy commissioner of military affairs, and later commissioner of the northern court of palace armies before a local assignment as governor of the Zhenning command. Named military commissioner in the inaugural year of Xiande [C.E. 954], he served as interim custodian of the eastern capital during Shizong’s offensive against Hedong, only to die of illness a year later, in winter. Shizong prepared to attend his funeral when court authorities reported that attending a funeral that year would be inauspicious. He refused to be swayed, but chose to attend preceded by a broom made of peach-tree branches [as protection against demons].
Since his days of obscurity, Zheng Renhui often strategized with Taizu, but there is no indication of contribution after Renhui achieved eminence. Esteemed and trusted by both Taizu and Shizong, Renhui nonetheless had a capacity for circumspection and humility, while extending courtesies to others without self-adulation—behavior praised by scholar-officials. Posthumously ranked as Palace Secretary, he was ennobled Duke of Han and conferred the title of Loyal and Upright, Zhongzheng.
Hu Zai
Hu Zai was native to northern Yanc, his courtesy name Zhongxi. With an affinity for learning and a knack for composition, he passed with high honors the doctoral examination of the early Guangshun reign, becoming editor at the palace library and auxiliary at the History Bureau before assignment as investigating censor. He relished in the flair of his own compositions, composing an “Ode on the Origins of Dynastic Fortunes” to enumerate in some detail the historic rise and fall, order and chaos of empires. Once strolling through the Xiangguo monastery [of Kaifeng] and inspired by some bamboo in a courtyard, he composed an “Ode to Virgin Green” for inscription on a monastery wall. Shizong learned of the ode and sent a eunuch attendant to the wall to copy it, praising the piece upon reading it. He now appointed Zai as assistant director of waterways and irrigation and drafter of proclamations. Promoted to Hanlin academician and conferred the silk sash in purple, illness prevented Zai’s appearance at court for the protocol of acknowledgement. A hundred days later, he still had to exert himself to appear at the office for auxiliary academicians. Shizong directed him to return to his official residence out of concern, dispatching an imperial doctor to examine him.
Before this, Hu Zai was celebrated among contemporaries for literary skills, talents especially esteemed by military commissioner Wang Pu, who recommended him to chief minister Li Gu. After a long wait for appointment, Pu inquired of Gu, “Why has Hu Zai failed to become secretary?” Gu confided, “The problem lies not in failure to appreciate his talents, but rather, in the destiny of his days to be short—a fate not to be overcome, I fear.” “Your responsibility, as minister,” Pu insisted, “is to elevate the worthy and eliminate the inept. Why speak of destiny?” Zai was already serving as drafter of proclamations, and within a year of becoming academician, died of illness at thirty-six sui. Observers consequently noted that Gu’s gift lay in knowing people and Pu’s in advancing officials.
The Son of Heaven in those days, with his heroically martial character, relished in embracing the exceptionally gifted from across the world and treated literati with special courtesy. Those advanced by him included Hu Zai, Zhang Zhao, Dou Yan, Tao Gu, and Xu Taifu. Among these, Gu emerged as the most inferior in literary finesse and most deficient in deportment. Zhao and Yan repeatedly addressed policy issues employing exquisite prose, but Gu’s allies could anticipate their ruler’s inclinations and offer flattering words to suit his whim. In this way, events both momentous and trivial invariably inspired fawning praise such that accolades attended even such events as the expansion of the capital’s walls, the commissioning of wooden manikins of farmers, and the sighting of purple stalk or white rabbits—their expressions generally akin to a comedy act. Zai had the misfortune to die prematurely. His policy positions, although no match for Zhao and Yan, were at least not of the obsequious sort produced by Gu.
WE LAMENT. A builder can have skilled artisans but lack quality raw materials, while an aspiring dynast may make an able ruler but lack able officials. Just as raw materials await the right artisans for construction, official subjects await the right ruler for utilization. There is a saying, “Governing a country is like playing weiqi checkers.” Victory occurs when the player appreciates how to utilize the pieces and positions them correctly; loss occurs when the player does not know the function of the pieces and positions them incorrectly. The loser will approach the board with eyes fixed on the checkers and agonize to day’s end, causing the skilled player to survey things and occupy the opponent’s positions to win the game. The victor utilizes the pieces of the loser, just as an ascending empire uses the subjects of the vanquished.
In terms of raw talent, Wang Pu truly seems capable. If not for encountering Shizong, however, what could he have done? At large, military campaigns were claiming victory at every turn, while the court reformed institutions, deliberated penal codes, regularized laws and calendars, and probed extant texts on rites and music—all in the age of Shizong! For officials employed during the Five Dynasties period, we should scarcely assume that all were stupid and spineless under Jin and Han rule, whereas all were able and astute under the Zhou. The issue is simply facility in using them.
Rulers who preside over tumultuous empires will commonly place the stupid and the inept in high positions, imposing duties beyond their abilities only to expose their deficiencies and despicableness. Such rulers will place the wise and gifted beneath them and squander their talents, causing superior and inferior men to lose their proper places and imperil the ruler himself. Rulers of ordered empires will keep the wise and gifted in close proximity, while keeping the stupid and inept at a distance, consigning superior and inferior men to their appropriate places, as the ruler revels in peace and glory. The chasm between orderly rule and tumult can be vast, but few factors affect them like assigning men to the wrong places.
WE LAMENT. Since ancient times, rulers presiding over order are few, while those presiding over tumult are many. We can hardly expect better of the Five Dynasties! Whether officials do or do not happen upon the right ruler is a matter of amazement.