AT GIBRALTAR OUR HEADQUARTERS WAS established in the most dismal setting we occupied during the war. The subterranean passages under the Rock provided the sole available office space, and in them was located the signal equipment by which we expected to keep in touch with the commanders of the three assault forces. The eternal darkness of the tunnels was here and there partially pierced by feeble electric bulbs. Damp, cold air in block-long passages was heavy with a stagnation that did not noticeably respond to the clattering efforts of electric fans. Through the arched ceilings came a constant drip, drip, drip of surface water that faithfully but drearily ticked off the seconds of the interminable, almost unendurable, wait which occurs between completion of a military plan and the moment action begins.
There was no other place to use. In November 1942 the Allied nations possessed, except for the Gibraltar Fortress, not a single spot of ground in all the region of western Europe, and in the Mediterranean area, nothing west of Malta. Britain’s Gibraltar made possible the invasion of northwest Africa. Without it the vital air cover would not have been quickly established on the North African fields. In the early phases of the invasion the small airdrome there had necessarily to serve both as an operational field and as a staging point for aircraft making the passage from England to the African mainland. Even several weeks before D-day it became jammed with fighter craft. Every inch was taken up by either a Spitfire or a can of gasoline. All this was exposed to the enemy’s reconnaissance planes and not even an attempt at camouflage could be made. Worse, the airfield itself lay on the Spanish border, separated from Spanish territory only by a barbed-wire fence. Politically, Spain was leaning toward the Axis, and, almost physically, leaning against the barbed-wire fence were any number of Axis agents. Every day we expected a major attack by hostile bombers; as each day went by without such an attack we went to bed puzzled, even astonished.
The only explanation for it was that our measures for deceiving the enemy were working well. We knew that long before the attack could take place the Axis would learn of increased activity at Gibraltar. We hoped the enemy would conclude that we were making another, unusually ambitious attempt to reinforce Malta, which had been in dire straits for months.
Yet in spite of the certain consequences of any enemy air attack, of dreary surroundings, and of all the thousand and one things that could easily go wrong in the great venture about to be launched, within the headquarters there was a definite buoyancy. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen congregated there were stimulated by that feeling of exhilaration that invariably ensues when one leaves months of grinding preparation and irksome inaction behind and turns his eyes expectantly to the outcome of a bold venture.
True, there was tenseness—one could feel it in every little cave makeshifting for an office. It was natural. Within a matter of hours the Allies would know the initial fate of their first combined offensive gesture of the war. Aside from the seesaw campaigns of advance and retreat that had been going on in the Western Desert for two full years and the island battle of Guadalcanal, nowhere in the world had the Allies been capable of undertaking on the ground anything more than mere defense. Even our defensive record was tragically draped in defeats, of which Dunkirk, Bataan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sourabaya, and Tobruk were black reminders.
During those hours that we paced away among Gibraltar’s caverns, hundreds of Allied ships, in fast- and slow-moving convoys, were steaming across the North Atlantic toward a common center on the coast of northwest Africa. To attack Algiers and Oran, most of these ships would pass through the narrow Strait of Gibraltar, flanked by guns that might at any moment speak up in favor of the Nazis. Other ships, coming from America, were to proceed directly against Casablanca and port towns to its north and south.
The three main expeditions were plowing through seas infested with U-boats. At Gibraltar most of our separate convoys would enter an area where they would come under the threat of enemy bombers. Our troops had been only hastily trained for this complicated type of landing operation and, for the most part, had never participated in battle. Available shipping did not permit us to carry along all the forces and equipment necessary to assure success. Of course we were tense.
Even our flight to Gibraltar had been hazardous. It had been accomplished only after two previous attempts to make the passage from England had been frustrated by foul weather. Before we finally took off from England the officer commanding the six Fortresses assigned to take our party to Gibraltar deliberately placed before me, together with his technical advice against making the flight, the decision as to whether or not he should take off. It was the only time in my life I was faced with that situation because normally the air commander’s decision is final. It did not seem a propitious omen for the great adventure, but we had to go through. We flew at an average height of a hundred feet. When the great Rock of Gibraltar finally loomed out of its concealing haze my pilot remarked, “This is the first time I have ever had to climb to get into landing traffic at the end of a long trip!”
In spite of the inaction imposed upon us at Gibraltar, there was work we could do. Already we were planning steps to follow a successful landing, including the early transfer of headquarters to Algiers. There was no lack of future problems to attract our interest, but each could be solved, could even be undertaken, only if the initial attack proved successful. So back and back again to the immediate issue our minds and our talk inevitably came.
We had three days to wait. Finally the leading ships steamed in at night through the narrow strait and we stood on the dark headlands to watch them pass. Still no news of air or submarine attack! We became more hopeful that the enemy, following his tactics of the past against Malta convoys, would keep his air, submarine, and surface forces concentrated to the eastward around Sicily, in anticipation of making a devastating attack as ships approached the narrow passage between that island and the African mainland.
In the original planning the probability of encountering impossible conditions at Casablanca was one of the factors that made me reluctant to commit the largest of our contingents to this particular operation.1 The danger of last-minute postponement at Casablanca was a lively one, and if this should happen there were only two alternatives.
The first was merely to direct that great convoy to delay its landing and to steam in circles through the adjacent sea areas, awaiting a favorable moment. The disadvantages of this scheme were several. All surprise in the western attack would be lost; secondly, the ships would remain exposed to the attacks of hostile submarines which swarmed in the Bay of Biscay and southward; thirdly, the appearance of overwhelming power resulting from simultaneous assault of all three ports would be greatly diminished. Finally, there is a limit to the fuel capacity of ships.
The alternative was to bring the entire western convoy inside the Mediterranean to cluster about the already crowded port of Gibraltar. Here it could save fuel and be ready to return to Casablanca for the landing as originally planned, or the troops could follow in the assault at Oran and push backward down the railway toward the northwest coast. Neither alternative was attractive, since each required hasty revision and adjustment of plans already in execution. But the law of probabilities indicated that we would have to adopt one of them.
Even as late as the afternoon before the attack the weather reports from one of our submarines in the Casablanca region were gloomy, and I tentatively decided, unless conditions should improve, to divert the expedition into Gibraltar. All our plans would thus be badly upset, but this seemed better than to steam aimlessly around the ocean, dodging submarines.
At no time during the war did I experience a greater sense of relief than when, upon the following morning, I received a meager report to the effect that beach conditions were not too bad and the Casablanca landing was proceeding as planned.2 I said a prayer of thanksgiving; my greatest fear had been dissipated.
An unexpected difficulty involved radio communication. In the early stages of the campaign the Allied Headquarters would have to depend exclusively upon the radio for communication with the several expeditions, and it was little short of dismaying to find that our radios constantly functioned poorly, sometimes not at all. The trouble was attributed largely to the overloading of the naval channels on our headquarters ships and of the signal center at Gibraltar. But whatever the cause, the result was that I determined to move headquarters to the mainland as quickly as possible.
Our first battle contact report was disappointing. The USS Thomas Stone, proceeding in convoy toward Algiers and carrying a reinforced battalion of American troops, was torpedoed on November 7, only one hundred and fifty miles from its destination.3 Details were lacking and there existed the possibility of a very considerable loss of life. Though our good fortune to this point had been amazing, this did not lessen our anxiety for the men aboard. We could get no further information of their fate that evening but later we learned that the incident had a happy outcome so far as the honor of American arms was concerned. Casualties were few and the ship itself was not badly damaged. There was no danger of sinking. Yet officers and men, unwilling to wait quietly until the ship could be towed to a convenient port, cheered the decision of the commander4 to take to the boats in an attempt to reach, on time, the assault beach to which they were assigned. Heavy weather, making up during the afternoon, foiled their gallant purpose and they had to be taken aboard destroyers and other escort vessels, but they were finally placed ashore some twenty hours behind schedule.5 Fortunately the absence of these troops had no appreciable effect upon our plans.
That same afternoon, November 7, brought to me one of my most distressing interviews of the war.
Because of the earnest conviction held in both London and Washington that General Giraud could lead the French of North Africa into the Allied camp, we had started negotiations in October, through Mr. Murphy, to rescue the general from virtual imprisonment in southern France. An elaborate plan was devised by some of our French friends and Mr. Murphy, who had returned to Africa after his visit to London. General Giraud was kept informed of developments through trusted intermediaries and at the appointed time reached the coast line in spite of the watchfulness of the Germans and the Vichyites. There he embarked in a small boat, in the dark of night, to keep a rendezvous with one of our submarines, lying just offshore. A British submarine, commanded for this one trip by Captain Jerauld Wright of the United States Navy, made a most difficult contact with General Giraud and put out to sea. At another appointed place the submarine met one of our flying boats, and the general, with but three personal aides and staff officers, flew to my headquarters during the afternoon of November 7. The incident, related thus briefly, was an exciting story of extraordinary daring and resolution.6
General Giraud, though dressed in civilian clothes, looked very much a soldier. He was well over six feet, erect, almost stiff in carriage, and abrupt in speech and mannerisms. He was a gallant if bedraggled figure, and his experiences of the war, including a long term of imprisonment and a dramatic escape, had not daunted his fighting spirit.
It was quickly apparent that he had come out of France laboring under the grave misapprehension that he was immediately to assume command of the whole Allied expedition. Upon entering my dungeon he offered himself to me in that capacity. I could not accept his services in such a role. I wanted him to proceed to Africa, as soon as we could guarantee his safety, and there take over command of such French forces as would voluntarily rally to him. Above all things, we were anxious to have him on our side because of the constant fear at the back of our minds of becoming engaged in a prolonged and serious battle against Frenchmen, not only to our own sorrow and loss, but to the detriment of our campaign against the German.
General Giraud was adamant; he believed that the honor of himself and his country was involved and that he could not possibly accept any position in the venture lower than that of complete command. This, on the face of it, was impossible. The naming of an Allied commander in chief is an involved process, requiring the co-ordinated agreement of military and political leaders of the responsible governments. No subordinate commander in the expedition could legally have accepted an order from General Giraud. Moreover, at that moment there was not a single Frenchman in the Allied command; on the contrary, the enemy, if any, was French.
All this was laboriously explained to the general. He was shaken, disappointed, and after many hours of conference felt it necessary to decline to have any part in the scheme. He said, “General Giraud cannot accept a subordinate position in this command; his countrymen would not understand and his honor as a soldier would be tarnished.” It was pitiful, because he had left his whole family in France as potential hostages to German fury and had himself undergone great personal risks in order to join up with us.
My political advisers at that time were Mr. H. Freeman Matthews of the American State Department and Mr. William H. B. Mack of the British Foreign Office.7 So concerned were they over this development that they suggested placing General Giraud in nominal command, while reserving to myself the actual power of directing operations. They felt that the difference between public association and non-association of the Giraud name with the operation might well mean the difference between success and disaster. To such a subterfuge I would not agree, and adhered to my decision that, unless General Giraud could content himself with taking charge of such French forces in North Africa as might come over to our side in the fight against Germany, we would proceed with the campaign exactly as if we had never met or conferred with him. The conversation with General Giraud lasted, intermittently, until after midnight. Though I could understand General Giraud’s French fairly well, I insisted on using an interpreter, to avoid any chance of misunderstanding. When we had worn out more expert ones, General Clark volunteered to act in this capacity, and though he is far from fluent in the language, we made out fairly well. One reason for this was that after the first hour of talk each of us merely repeated, over and over again, the arguments he had first presented. When, finally, General Giraud went off to bed there was no sign of his modifying, in any degree, his original demands. His good-night statement was, “Giraud will be a spectator in this affair.” He agreed, however, to meet me at the governor general’s house the next morning. The political faces in our headquarters that night were long.
Before stopping work for the night I sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a detailed account of the conference and was grateful to receive prompt word from them that they fully supported my position.8 The ending of the message was garbled but we could make out, “Our only regret is that you have been forced to devote so much of your time to this purpose during a period …” How fortunate I was that I could not foresee just how much of my time in ensuing weeks would be taken up with irritating and frustrating conferences on North African political affairs!
Fortunately a night’s sleep did something to change General Giraud’s mind and at the next morning’s meeting he decided to participate on the basis we desired.9 I promised that if he were successful in winning French support I would deal with him as the administrator of that region, pending eventual opportunity for civil authorities to determine the will of the population.
In further talks with General Giraud it developed that there was a radical difference between his conception and mine of what, at that moment, should be done strategically. He was in favor of turning immediately to the attack on southern France, paying no attention to northern Africa. I showed him that even as he spoke the troops were landing on their selected beaches; that there was no possibility of providing air support for the landing he proposed; and that the Allied shipping then in existence would not provide a build-up for an invasion of southern France that could withstand the force the Germans would assuredly bring against it. Finally, I explained that the campaign on which we were embarking was backed up by such intricate and detailed maintenance arrangements that the change he proposed was completely impossible.
He could not see the need of North Africa as a base—the need for establishing ourselves firmly and strongly in that region before we could successfully invade the southern portion of Europe.
He was not aware of the lessons the war had brought out as to the effect of land-based aviation upon unprotected seaborne craft. He had probably never assessed, in terms of tactical meaning, the loss in the Southwest Pacific of the two great British ships, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, when they were heedlessly exposed to attack by land-based aviation. He assumed, moreover, that if the Allies chose to do so they could place 500,000 men in the south of France in a matter of two or three weeks. It was difficult for him to understand that we had undertaken an operation that stretched our resources to the limit, and that because of the paucity of these resources our initial strategic objectives had to be carefully calculated.
During the course of the night and in the early morning hours of November 8 operational reports began to come in that were encouraging in tone. As anticipated, the landings at Algiers met almost no opposition and the area was quickly occupied.10 This was largely due to the prior accomplishments of Mr. Murphy, working through General Mast of the French Army, and to the sympathy, even if cloaked in official antagonism, of General Alphonse Pierre Juin.
Always in the back of our minds was the need for haste in getting on to the Tunis area. On the night of the eighth I scrawled a penciled memorandum which I still have. In it appears the notation, “We arc slowed up in eastern sector when we should be getting toward Bône Bizerte at once.”
At Oran we got ashore, but the French forces in that region, particularly the naval elements, resisted bitterly.11 Some hard fighting ensued and the U. S. 1st Division, which was later to travel such a long battle road in this war, got its first taste of conflict. In spite of incomplete training, the 1st Division, supported by elements of the 1st Armored Division, made progress and on November 9 we knew we would soon be able to report victory in that area. On the tenth all fighting ceased at Oran.12 Generals Fredendall and Terry de la M. Allen met their initial battle tests in good fashion.
We knew that the attack on the west coast was launched, but there was no news of its progress. Actually at certain points, notably Port Lyautey, fierce fighting developed.13 The treacherous sea had given us the one quiet day in the month necessary to make the landing feasible, but the period of calm lasted only a short time and later reinforcing was most difficult. I tried every possible means to get in communication with the western commanders, Rear Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Navy and General Patton of the Army. The radio again failed and gave us nothing but unintelligible signals. Thereupon we tried sending light bomber craft to Casablanca to gain contact, but after French fighters had shot down several of them we knew that this method was futile. In desperation I asked Admiral Cunningham if he had a fast ship in port. By good fortune one of the speediest afloat was then at Gibraltar getting up steam to rush some vital supplies into Malta, and without hesitation the admiral offered her to me for the necessary time to make contact with the Western Task Force. I chose Rear Admiral Bernhard H. Bieri of the United States Navy to head a staff group, and they took off within the hour.14
On the morning of November 9, General Clark and General Giraud went by air to Algiers in an effort to make some kind of agreement with the highest French authorities. Their mission was to end the fighting and to secure French assistance in projected operations against the Germans.15
General Giraud’s cold reception by the French in Africa was a terrific blow to our expectations. He was completely ignored. He made a broadcast, announcing assumption of leadership of French North Africa and directing French forces to cease fighting against the Allies, but his speech had no effect whatsoever. I was doubtful that it was even heard by significant numbers. Radio communications with Algiers were very difficult but eventually a message came through that confirmed an earlier report: Admiral Darlan was in Algiers!
We discounted at once the possibility that he had come into the area with a prior knowledge of our intentions or in order to assist us in our purpose. Already we had evidence, gathered in Oran and Algiers, that our invasion was a complete and astonishing surprise to every soldier and every inhabitant of North Africa, except for those very few who were actively assisting us. Even these had not been told the actual date of the attack until the last minute. There was no question that Darlan’s presence was entirely accidental, occasioned by the critical illness of his son, to whom he was extremely devoted.
In Darlan we had the commander in chief of the French fighting forces! A simple and easy answer would have been to jail him. But with Darlan in a position to give the necessary orders to the very considerable French fleet, then in Toulon and Dakar, there was hope of reducing at once the potential naval threat in the Mediterranean and of gaining welcome additions to our own surface craft. Just before I left England, Mr. Churchill had earnestly remarked, “If I could meet Darlan, much as I hate him, I would cheerfully crawl on my hands and knees for a mile if by doing so I could get him to bring that fleet of his into the circle of Allied forces.”
But we had another and more pressing reason for attempting to utilize Darlan’s position. In dealing with French soldiers and officials General Clark quickly ran afoul of the traditional French demand for a cloak of legality over any action they might take. This was a fetish with the military; their surrender in 1940, they asserted, had been merely the act of loyal soldiers obeying the legal orders of their civil superiors.
Without exception every French commander with whom General Clark held exhaustive conversation declined to make any move toward bringing his forces to the side of the Allies unless he could get a legal order to do so. Each of them had sworn an oath of personal fealty to Marshal Pétain, a name that at that moment was more profound in its influence on North African thinking and acting than any other factor. None of these men felt that he could be absolved from that oath or could give any order to cease firing unless the necessary instructions were given by Darlan as their legal commander, to whom they looked as the direct and personal representative of Marshal Pétain.
It was useless then, and for many days thereafter, to talk to a Frenchman, civilian or soldier, unless one first recognized the Marshal’s overriding influence. His picture appeared prominently in every private dwelling, while in public buildings his likeness was frequently displayed in company with extracts from his speeches and statements. Any proposal was acceptable only if “the Marshal would wish it.”
General Clark radioed that without Darlan no conciliation was possible, and in this view he was supported by General Giraud, who was then in hiding in Algiers. Clark kept me informed of developments as much as he possibly could but it was obvious that he was having a difficult time in his attempt to persuade the French to stop fighting our troops.16 While preoccupied with all these matters, I received a message from my chief of staff, who had temporarily remained in London, which stated that, in view of the initial successes and apparently certain outcome of Torch, a high-level suggestion had come to him that we cut down our planned build-up for Torch, so as to proceed with other strategic purposes. Before the war was over I became accustomed to this tendency of individuals far in the rear to overevaluate early success and to discount future difficulty. But at that moment receipt of the message irritated me and I dashed off a prompt reply, from which the following is extracted:
“Unalterably opposed to reducing contemplated Torch strength. The situation is not crystallized. On the contrary, in Tunisia, it is touch and go. Country is not pacified completely, communications are a problem of first magnitude, and two principal ports in North Africa are seriously blocked. Every effort to secure organized and effective French co-operation runs into a maze of political and personal intrigue and the definite impression exists that none really wants to fight or to co-operate wholeheartedly.
“Rather than talk of possible reduction we should be seeking ways and means of speeding up the build-up to clean out North Africa. We should plan ahead in orderly fashion on strategic matters but for God’s sake let’s get one job done at a time. We have lost a lot of shipping in the past three days and provision of air cover for convoys is most difficult. The danger of German intervention through Spain has not ceased. I am not growing fearful of shadows nor am I crying wolf. I merely insist that if our beginning looks hopeful, then this is the time to push rather than to slacken our efforts. We are just started working on a great venture. A good beginning must not be destroyed by any unwarranted assumptions.”17
That day, the twelfth, General Clark reported that apparently Darlan was the only Frenchman who could achieve co-operation for us in North Africa.18 I realized that the matter was one that had to be handled expeditiously and locally. To have referred it back to Washington and London would have meant inevitable delays in prolonged discussions. So much time would have been consumed as to have cost much blood and bitterness and left no chance of an amicable arrangement for absorbing the French forces into our own expedition.
Already we had our written orders from our governments to co-operate with any French government we should find existing at the moment of our entry into Africa.19 Moreover, the matter at the moment was completely military. If resulting political repercussions became so serious as to call for a sacrifice, logic and tradition demanded that the man in the field should take complete responsibility for the matter, with his later relief from command becoming the symbol of correction. I might be fired, but only by making a quick decision could the essential unity of effort throughout both nations be preserved and the immediate military requirements met.
We discussed these possibilities very soberly and earnestly, always remembering that our basic orders required us to go into Africa in the attempt to win an ally—not to kill Frenchmen.
I well knew that any dealing with a Vichyite would create great revulsion among those in England and America who did not know the harsh realities of war; therefore I determined to confine my judgment in the matter to the local military aspects. Taking Admiral Cunningham with me, I flew to Algiers on November 13, and upon reaching there went into conference with General Clark and Mr. Murphy, the American consul general in the area.20 This was the first time I had seen Murphy since his visit to London some weeks before.
They first gave me a full account of events to date. On November 10, Darlan had sent orders to all French commanders to cease fighting.21 Pétain, in Vichy, immediately disavowed the act and declared Darlan dismissed. Darlan then tried to rescind the order, but this Clark would not allow. Next the news was received in Algiers that the Germans were invading southern France, and now Darlan said that because the Germans had violated the 1940 armistice he was ready to co-operate freely with the Americans. In the meantime General Giraud, at first shocked to discover that the local French would not follow him, had become convinced that Darlan was the only French official in the region who could lead North Africa to the side of the Allies. When the Germans entered southern France Giraud went to Darlan to offer co-operation. The fighting at Casablanca had ceased because of Darlan’s order; at other places the fighting was over before the order was received. The French officers who had openly assisted us, including Generals Bethouart and Mast, were in temporary disgrace; they were helpless to do anything.
After exhaustive review of the whole situation Mr. Murphy said, “The whole matter has now become a military one. You will have to give the answer.”
While we were reaching a final decision he stepped entirely aside except to act upon occasion as interpreter. It was squarely up to me to decide whether or not the procurement of an armistice, the saving of time and lives, and the early development of workable arrangements with the French were worth more to the Allied forces than the arbitrary arrest of Darlan, an action certain to be accompanied by continued fighting and cumulative bitterness. Local French officials were still officially members of a neutral country, and unless our governments were ready formally to declare war against France we had no legal or other right arbitrarily to establish, in the Nazi style, a puppet government of our own choosing.
The arrangement reached was set forth in a document that outlined the methods by which the French authorities engaged to assist the Allied forces.22 It accorded to the Allied commander in chief, in a friendly, not an occupied, territory, all the necessary legal rights and privileges that were required in the administration of his forces and in the conduct of military operations. We were guaranteed the use of ports, railways, and other facilities.
The Allies merely stated that, provided the French forces and the civil population would obey Darlan’s orders to co-operate militarily with us, we would not disturb the French administrative control of North Africa. On the contrary, we affirmed our intention of co-operating with them in preserving order. There was no commitment to engage our governments in any political recognition of any kind and Darlan was simply authorized, by the voluntary action of the local officials, and with our consent, to take charge of the French affairs of North Africa while we were clearing the Germans out of that continent. He agreed also to place our friend General Giraud in command of all French military forces in northwest Africa.
An important point was that we could not afford a military occupation, unless we chose to halt all action against the Axis. The Arab population was then sympathetic to the Vichy French regime, which had effectively eliminated Jewish rights in the region, and an Arab uprising against us, which the Germans were definitely trying to foment, would have been disastrous. It was our intention to win North Africa only for use as a base from which to carry on the war against Hitler. Legally our position in Africa differed from our subsequent status in Sicily, just as the latter differed from our status in Italy and, later, in Germany. Theoretically we were in the country of an ally. The actual effect of Darlan’s commitment was to recognize and give effect to our position of dominating influence—but we would have to use this position skillfully if we were to avoid trouble.
Darlan’s orders to the French Army were obeyed, in contrast to the disdain with which the earlier Giraud pronouncement had been received. Darlan stopped the fighting on the western coast, where the United States forces had just been concentrated against the defenses of Casablanca and were preparing to deliver a general assault. General Patton’s earlier experiences in Morocco indicated that this would have been a bloody affair.
Final agreement with the French Army, Navy, and Air officials, headed by Darlan, was reached at Algiers on November 13.23 Flying back that night, Admiral Cunningham and I had a nasty experience with bad weather and poor landing conditions at Gibraltar. We flew around the Rock in complete blackness, making futile passes at the field. I saw no way out of a bad predicament and still think the young lieutenant pilot must have depended more upon a rabbit’s foot than upon his controls to accomplish the skillful landing that finally brought us safely down. This experience strengthened my previously formed intention to shift headquarters to Algiers quickly, a decision that threw the Signal Corps into a panic. The signal officer said he could provide no communications at Algiers before the first of the year. But we moved on November 23.24
Official reports of all political problems had of course been periodically submitted to our two governments. Nevertheless, the instant criticism in the press of the two countries became so strong as to impel both the President and the Prime Minister to ask for fuller explanation. They got it in the form of a long telegram, which was given wide circulation among government officials in Washington and London. Even after long retrospective study of the situation I can think of little to add to the telegraphic explanation. I quote it here, paraphrased to comply with regulations designed to preserve the security of codes:
“November 14
“Completely understand the bewilderment in London and Washington because of the turn that negotiations with French North Africans have taken. Existing French sentiment here does not remotely agree with prior calculations. The following facts are pertinent and it is important that no precipitate action at home upset the equilibrium we have been able to establish.
“The name of Marshal Pétain is something to conjure with here. Everyone attempts to create the impression that he lives and acts under the shadow of the Marshal’s figure. Civil governors, military leaders, and naval commanders agree that only one man has an obvious right to assume the Marshal’s mantle in North Africa. He is Darlan. Even Giraud, who has been our trusted adviser and staunch friend since early conferences succeeded in bringing him down to earth, recognizes this overriding consideration and has modified his own intentions accordingly.
“The resistance we first met was offered because all ranks believed this to be the Marshal’s wish. For this reason Giraud is deemed to have been guilty of at least a touch of insubordination in urging non-resistance to our landing. General Giraud understands and appears to have some sympathy for this universal attitude. All concerned say they are ready to help us provided Darlan tells them to do so, but they are not willing to follow anyone else. Admiral Esteva in Tunis says he will take orders from Darlan. Noguès stopped fighting in Morocco by Darlan’s order. Recognition of Darlan’s position in this regard cannot be escaped.
“The gist of the agreement is that the French will do what they can to assist us in taking Tunisia. The group will organize for effective co-operation and will begin, under Giraud, reorganization of selected military forces for participation in the war. The group will exhaust every expedient in an effort to get the Toulon fleet. We will support the group in controlling and pacifying country and in equipping selected units. Details still under discussion.
“Our hope of quick conquest of Tunisia and of gaining here a supporting population cannot be realized unless there is accepted a general agreement along the lines which we have just made with Darlan and the other officials who control the administrative machinery of the region and the tribes in Morocco. Giraud is now aware of his inability to do anything by himself, even with Allied support. He has cheerfully accepted the post of military chief in the Darlan group. He agrees that his own name should not be mentioned until a period of several days has elapsed. Without a strong French government we would be forced to undertake military occupation. The cost in time and resources would be tremendous. In Morocco alone General Patton believes that it would require 60,000 Allied troops to keep the tribes pacified. In view of the effect that tribal disturbance would have on Spain, you see what a problem we have.”25
At no time in the long negotiations did Darlan state confidently that he could bring the French fleet over to our side. He thought that possibly, owing to lack of fuel oil and also to the confusion and uncertainty that were sure to prevail in southern France, the fleet commander would not actually attempt to bring the ships out to sea and join us, but he did say with complete conviction that the French admiral in Toulon would never allow his ships to fall into the hands of the Germans. He repeated this time and again, and later events proved him to be completely correct.26
On the other hand, Darlan felt sure that Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva, commanding in Tunis, would join with the rest of the French officials of North Africa in observing any orders he might issue. The first thing that defeated this great hope was the length of time consumed in the negotiations at Algiers. This created uncertainty on the part of Admiral Esteva, who, while informed of the nature of the conversations then going on in Algiers, was also in receipt of orders from Vichy to resist the Allies and, we were told, to admit the Germans into his area.27 Military commanders in that region, Generals Louis Marie Koeltz at Algiers and Louis Jacques Barre at Tunis, were in a similar state of indecision and we were informed that General Koeltz was definitely opposed to making any agreement with the Allies.
In this state of doubt and indecision, the Germans began to make landings in the Tunisia area. The first German contingent reached the area by air on the afternoon of November 9. From that moment onward they reinforced as rapidly as possible28 and by the time a tentative agreement was reached with Darlan in Algiers it was no longer possible for Admiral Esteva to act independently. In a final telephone conversation between him and a French official in Algiers he said, “I now have a guardian.” This we took to mean that the Germans were really holding him as a hostage. On the other hand, both Generals Koeltz and Barre obeyed Darlan’s orders without question, and the former, particularly, eventually became a fine fighting leader in the Allied forces.
After the receipt of my telegram in London and Washington both governments assured our headquarters of their complete understanding of the matter. They informed me that they would back up the arrangement so long as its terms were faithfully carried out by the French and until hostilities in Africa should draw to a close.29
This arrangement was of course wholly different from that we had anticipated, back in London. But it was not only with respect to personalities and their influence in North Africa that our governments had miscalculated. They had believed that the French population in the region was bitterly resentful of Vichy-Nazi domination and would eagerly embrace as deliverers any Allied force that succeeded in establishing itself in the country. The first German bombing of Algiers—and there were many—proved the fallacy of this assumption. Of course there were many patriots, and after the Tunisian victory was assured their number increased, but in the early days of touch and go and nightly bombing the undercurrent of sentiment constantly transmitted to me was, “Why did you bring this war to us? We were satisfied before you came to get us all killed.” In his final dispatch, written after the completion of the campaign, General Anderson had this to say about the early attitude of the inhabitants:
… Many mayors, station- and post-masters and other key officials with whom we had dealings as we advanced (for instance, the civil telephone was, at first, my chief means of communicating with my forward units and with Allied Force Headquarters) were lukewarm in their sympathies and hesitant to commit themselves openly, while a few were hostile. I can safely generalize by saying that at first, in the Army, the senior officers were hesitant and afraid to commit themselves, the junior officers were mainly in favour of aiding the Allies, the men would obey orders; amongst the people, the Arabs were indifferent or inclined to be hostile, the French were in our favour but apathetic, the civil authorities were antagonistic as a whole. The resulting impression on my mind was not one of much confidence as to the safety of my small isolated force should I suffer a severe setback.30
This was a far cry from the governmental hope that the people of North Africa would, upon our entry, blaze into spontaneous revolt against control by Nazi-dominated Vichy!
Through Darlan’s assumption of the French administration post in North Africa and his influence in French West Africa, the great center of Dakar soon fell to Allied hands.31 The governor of that section was Pierre Boisson, an old soldier who had lost a leg and his hearing in the first World War and who was obviously honest in his hatred of everything German. He had a fanatical devotion to France and conceived his single duty to be the preservation of French West Africa for the French Empire. He had earlier in the war driven off from the shores of Dakar an attempted invasion by British and Free French forces32 and announced that he would fight anyone who might challenge his sphere of responsibility. However, with the invasion of southern France by the Germans, he announced himself ready to take military orders from me, through Admiral Darlan, but from no one else.
Because Dakar was not then within the territorial limits of my theater, where I was busy enough with my own problems of fighting a campaign, and also because the press of both Britain and America was seriously disturbed by the military arrangements I had made with Darlan, I reminded my superiors that I had no responsibility to secure Boisson’s adherence to the general capitulation and would take no part in it unless ordered. I did report to them, however, that I could have Dakar for the asking, and reported to them what Boisson had said.33 My return orders were speedily received; they were to the effect that I was to proceed toward securing the West African region for the use of the Allies exactly as I had the North African.34
My decisive conference with Governor Boisson verged on the dramatic. There were many important details to be settled. Then interned in West Africa were numbers of British sailors who had been landed there from ships sunk earlier in the war. The British insisted upon instant release of these men, while, as a counterdemand, Boisson insisted that Free French radio propaganda from areas bordering upon West Africa should cease at once. He said that this propaganda was constantly charging him and his government with every kind of crime and was causing him trouble with the natives. He said the British Government should order this stopped immediately. Similar points arose, none of which was specifically covered in the document to be signed. Admiral Darlan and other French officials were present, as were Mr. Murphy and additional members of my staff. As the conversations progressed the participants grew excited and the French seemed all to be talking at once. Finally I took Governor Boisson, who could understand some English, to a corner to talk to him personally. The substance of what I said was:
“Governor, there is no possibility that I can tell you in detail exactly what the British Government will do, just as I cannot tell you in detail what the American Government will do. But this I can say with confidence: my two governments have directed me to make an agreement with you on the general basis that French West Africa is to join with North Africa in the war against the Axis. They have stated that they would not interfere in the local governmental arrangements. They will expect the co-operation from you that they would from any other friendly region, and this will involve the prompt release of any of our citizens who may now be interned in your area. They will attempt to stop whatever propaganda may be directed against you and your regime and they will unquestionably use their good offices to get other co-operating organizations, including the Free French forces under General de Gaulle, likewise to cease such practices. However, they obviously cannot give General de Gaulle orders in this matter. We want to use the air routes through your area and we want you on our side, and we want these things quickly. It would take weeks to get every one of these little details ironed out and we cannot waste the time. You sign the agreement and I assure you on my honor as a soldier that I will do everything humanly possible to see that the general arrangements between us are carried out on the co-operative basis that my governments intend, just as we are doing in North Africa. As long as I am kept in my present position by my two governments you may be certain that the spirit of our agreement will never be violated by the Allies.”
Without another word he walked over to my desk and, while the chatter was still going on in other parts of the room, sat down and affixed his name to the agreement.35 As soon as he had signed I said to him: “Governor, when can our airplanes start using the airfield at Dakar?” He looked at me and instantly replied in French, “But now.” In his further remarks Boisson emphasized the importance he placed on my pledge as a soldier to avoid unnecessary disturbances of French institutions in West Africa and to assist in the task of reorganizing a French army to participate in the war on our side. It was easy to oversimplify the French problem as it then existed. Only patience and persistence could bring us valuable and, eventually, democratic allies. On the other hand, violence and disregard of the sense of humiliation felt by the French would have produced nothing but discord and a fair charge that we were Nazis.
Therefore, because of the power of our own arms and the acceptance of a temporary French administration in North Africa, all fighting in the entire area, west of Algiers inclusive, had ceased by November 12.
In the eastern sector, Tunisia, it was different.
