The best-selling book in chess history (as yet unwritten) is likely to be called “Winning Really Fast!” Chess players have always had an insatiable appetite for the quick fix, as winning in the opening is much less work than actually playing a game, which requires a dangerous amount of thinking.
In bullet, the chances of scoring a quick knockout are greater than in normal chess because it is more likely that your opponent will overlook unexpected threats. In other words, trappy opening play is more likely to succeed in bullet than in normal chess. This doesn’t resolve the real question, though, which is whether it is a good idea to play for traps in the opening.
The cold-blooded way of answering this question is that if the opponent falls for a trap, it was a good idea to set it! Unfortunately, without a fully functional crystal ball, it’s impossible to know this in advance, so we have to look for other answers.
A more helpful answer is that traps, in the opening and elsewhere, are worth setting if the rewards outweigh the risks. As with pre-moves and other risky behavior, the risk must be assessed by looking at both the chances of success and the consequences of failure. A move which sets a trap that has a small chance of working, but which is otherwise good, or even playable, is usually worth playing. An “all-or-nothing” move, like some of the kamikaze pre-moves looked at earlier, would only be justified on psychological grounds, if for some reason the chance the move would work was great, as otherwise it would ruin your position.
Bullet is full of psychology, as was normal chess before the advent of computers. We shall devote an entire chapter to this subject, but it certainly has an impact on opening choices and the merits of trappy play. The psychology of both the potential victim (will your opponent fall for it?) and the player setting the trap (are you a gambler?) factor into the equation. It’s hard for us, from a distance, to say much more about this aspect of the issue, other than to recommend opening variations that contain Lasker’s “drop of poison” wherever possible. In bullet, “cheap threats” are perfectly acceptable, but each player must decide whether they are ready to play out the position which will arise if an alert opponent sees through the threat.
What makes the openings special is that traps can be prepared in advance. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are many factors to consider when putting together an opening repertoire, but in general it’s safe to say that a move order or variation which contains the possibility of a quick win is often worth playing.
Since we are discussing bullet chess, the time factor must be mentioned as well. From the point of view of what happens on the board, whether a trap succeeds or not is clear. For example, either you trap the opponent’s queen or not. But it may well be that the opponent spots the trap, but takes four or five seconds to avoid it and find the right answer. One then can’t really say that the trap has failed. Gaining a lead on the clock is as real as winning material or gaining some other advantage on the board
An unsuccessful trap or threat may also cause the opponent to start to see ghosts and play more slowly, because he is worrying about non-existent threats, or threats which you don’t even notice. Trappy play may therefore have benefits which are not easily quantified.
In this chapter we will confine ourselves to successful opening traps which illustrate the principles we have been discussing. The chapter itself is one of the shorter ones in this book, because the games, for some reason, are not that long!
White (2943) - Black (2451) [B11]
1.e4 c6 2.Nc3 d5 3.Nf3 d×e4 4.N×e4 Nf6
5.Neg5!? e6?
The obvious 5...h6! was much better, after which White has to retreat his g5-knight, leaving Black with a definite advantage. Does this mean White’s last move was a mistake? No, because if Black has to use three or four seconds to find 5...h6! this is a fair trade, as the resulting position is not outright losing for White.
Of course, there is always the possibility that Black might not play 5...h6!...
6.Ne5! 1-0
Suddenly disaster strikes on f7. Rather than prolong the knightmare, Black resigned, which is one of the pluses to bullet. You can always just play another game.
Coincidentally, the next example also arises out of the Caro Kann. We don’t intend to disparage this fine defense, which both authors have played and which should let Black last more than ten moves. At the very least it has one of the coolest names of any chess opening.
White (2951) – Black (2391) [B11]
1.e4 c6 2.Nc3 d5 3.Nf3 d×e4 4.N×e4 Bg4?!
5.Neg5!?
Normally 4...Bg4?! is avoided because of such unpleasant variations. 5.h3!? is also good.
5...B×f3?!
A dubious move. 5...Nf6 works because 6.N×f7 drops a piece to 6...B×f3! However, in bullet positions of this sort can get very tricky if one does not know them well.
6.Q×f3! Nf6?
Falling for White’s trap. 6...Qd5! would have left Black with only a slight disadvantage.
7.Qb3!
Just like that, Black’s position collapses.
7...Qd5?! 8.Q×b7 c5 9.Bb5+ Nbd7 10.B×d7+ Kd8 11.Q×d5 1-0
In the next few examples, we see how early aggression can pay off in the opening. It’s a bit misleading to describe such play as “trappy,” as the intentions of the attacker are hardly concealed. It’s more accurate to characterize this type of play as an application of the more general principle that in bullet the initiative is even more important than in normal chess.
White (2147) – Black (2228) [A00]
1.g3 d6 2.Bg2 c6 3.d3 g6 4.Nc3 Bg7
5.h4!?
This type of sudden attack often works well in bullet, as the opponent may have already committed to his next move, both psychologically and with his mouse. Objectively, Black would be fine after 5...Nf6, but Black instead allows the further advance of White’s h4-pawn. Black might have feared 5...Nf6 6.h5?! N×h5 7.R×h5?!, but he shouldn’t have.
In any case, Black ignores White’s last move, and continues to play instantaneously, having taken less than a second for his first five moves.
5...Qb6!? 6.h5!? Nd7 7.h6 Bf6 8.Ne4
This is White’s opening idea – to get rid of Black’s dark-squared bishop and then somehow exploit the resulting weaknesses in Black’s position.
Objectively, Black has little reason to fear this plan, although from White’s point of view it’s a plan that lets him find moves relatively quickly. But now White gets a bonus, because Black overreacts, thinking that White has blundered.
8...B×b2?
Black thought for three seconds on this move, but it’s bad. The next few moves are forced.
9.Rb1! Qa5+ 10.Bd2 Q×a2 11.R×b2!
Black missed this move, which initiates a small combination.
11...Q×b2 12.Bc3 Qa3 13.B×h8 f6
With two pawns for a piece, Black is not that far behind in material, but White’s position is much easier to play. Black has a two-second lead in time at this point, but White still has 47 seconds left, so time isn’t yet an issue.
14.Bg7 d5 15.Nd2 Kf7 16.Ngf3 e5 17.g4!?
White plays to undermine Black’s pawn wall and succeeds in spectacular fashion.
17...Ne7?! 18.g5 Nf5 19.g×f6 Qd6 20.Ng5+ Kg8 21.f7 mate 1-0
The next example features another quick attack with h2-h4-h5 against a kingside fianchetto. Such attacks are hardly fatal, but they can be if the defender doesn’t react properly.
White (2918) – Black (2297) [B06]
1.e4 g6 2.Nc3 Bg7 3.d4 d6 4.f4 Nf6 5.Nf3 0-0 6.e5 Ne8?!
A bit passive. 6...Nfd7 is normal. White attacks.
7.h4
7...c6?
A blunder or a mouse slip? 7...Bg4!? is better, but the natural move is 7...c5, in order to create counterplay in the center while White goes for broke on the kingside.
8.h5 d×e5 9.f×e5 f6?
An extremely ugly move which completely ruins Black’s kingside. However, Black played this move very calmly, using less than a second. Perhaps beauty is in the eye of the beholder, but more likely Black was already starting to worry about his king.
10.h×g6 h×g6 11.Bc4+ e6 12.Qd3! f5 13.Ng5 (D)
13...Rf7?
Up to this point, Black has only used seven seconds, while White has used six seconds, but here Black spends an amazing 20 seconds on his move. It’s hard to find anything better because there isn’t anything better, but giving White a near-decisive lead in time puts Black’s position past the point of no return.
The question mark is therefore for the time Black spent on 13...Rf7?, not for the move itself.
14.N×e6!
Better than the more obvious 14.N×f7, which is also winning. Apart from being objectively superior, 14.N×e6! keeps plenty of tactical threats alive, which is preferable to resolving the position, since Black is short of time.
14...B×e6 15.B×e6 Qe7 16.Qc4 b5 17.Qb3 a5 18.Bg5! Qc7 19.a4 b4 20.Ne2 Na6 21.Nf4 c5 22.Nd5
22.Qh3! mates, but sideways moves are often hard to see.
22...Qb7 23.Ne7+ Kf8 24.N×g6+ Kg8 (D)
25.Be7
Prettier than 25.Qh3.
25...c×d4 26.B×f7 mate 1-0
The initiative may come at a price, but that price is very often worth paying.
White (3008) – Black (2577) [B87]
1.e4 c5 2.Nc3 d6 3.Nf3 a6 4.d4 c×d4 5.N×d4 e6 6.Bc4 b5 7.Bb3 Nf6 8.Qf3 Bb7 9.0-0 b4 10.Nd5!
The most aggressive try. 10.Nd5! leads to a complicated position which is objectively about equal. However, in bullet such sacrifices tend to be significantly stronger than in normal chess, because they result in unclear positions in which it is difficult to find an obvious defensive plan.
10...e×d5 11.e×d5 Be7 12.Re1 0-0 13.Nf5 Re8 14.Bg5 Nbd7 15.Qg3
At this point, White has 51 seconds remaining, while Black has 49 seconds. Here Black uses four seconds trying to find the right defense. He fails.
Black would have been better off taking more time, as getting mated didn’t help his cause. If he loses on time later on, that’s too bad, but losing later is always better than losing right away, because while there’s life, there’s hope.
15...Bf8?
Both 15...g6 and 15...Ne5 were approximately equal, but Black didn’t take enough time to either see that 15...Bf8? lost or to find the right defense(s). Now White’s sacrifice pays off.
16.Nh6+! g×h6 17.B×f6+ 1-0
It’s mate, and time no longer matters.
Just to avoid leaving a misleading impression, our final example demonstrates that aggression doesn’t always pay off automatically, as an early attack can open a player up to a devastating counterattack.
Curiously, our example features yet another h2-h4 attack against a kingside fianchetto, but this time Black reacts alertly and the attack blows out in dramatic fashion.
White (2525) – Black (3019) [B08]
1.d4 d6 2.Nf3 Nf6 3.Nc3 g6 4.e4 Bg7 5.Be3 0-0 6.Qd2 c6 7.Bh6 b5
8.h4?
White begins a kingside attack, applying the bullet principle that attacking is always the best choice. But things are not always that simple.
The problem is that 8.h4? starts an attack, but by Black! 8.B×g7 K×g7 9.Bd3 would have been roughly equal, but in bullet many players have little interest in playing such seemingly dull positions, although somehow they often have a way of getting interesting.
8...b4! 9.B×g7 b×c3! 10.Qh6
This is not nearly as dangerous as it looks.
10...c×b2 11.Rb1
11...Ng4
11...Qa5+ was also good.
12.B×f8 N×h6 13.B×h6 Qa5+ 14.Bd2
14.Nd2 was better, but it wouldn’t bring back White’s queen.
14...Q×a2 0-1
White resigned, as massive material losses are unavoidable.
As can be seen from these examples, and there could have been many more, bullet games can often be won in the opening, before time can really be said to be the determining factor. Of course, in bullet time is always a factor to some extent, because when players are not actually short of time, they are usually playing quickly in order to either avoid getting short of time or to cause their opponents to have time troubles.
Either way, sharp opening traps and unexpected threats early in the game can pay big dividends in bullet. Unfamiliar and unexpected play can catch players unawares. In the next chapter, we examine the results when this approach is taken to extremes.