The United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) fought five carrier battles during the course of the Pacific War. Three of these are well known – the first clash ever between carriers in the Coral Sea in May 1942, the dramatic and supposedly decisive battle of Midway in the following month, and the largest ever carrier battle between a total of 24 carriers fought in June 1944 in the Philippine Sea. The two other carrier battles are not as well known since they were part of the larger Guadalcanal campaign and were not as dramatic or decisive. This was certainly the case for the battle of the Eastern Solomons in which five carriers (three Japanese and two American) fought to a draw in August 1942. However, two months later, in one of the most important battles of the Guadalcanal campaign, two American carriers took on four Japanese carriers in a battle to decide command of the seas around Guadalcanal. This was the battle of Santa Cruz, the third-largest carrier battle of the war. It was also a Japanese victory, but a victory gained at great cost and one that the Japanese were unable to follow up. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, four months after Midway when the Japanese carrier force was supposedly smashed, it was able to defeat its American adversary.
Enterprise at the battle of Midway where her aircraft sank two Japanese carriers and shared in the destruction of a third. She would also play a pivotal role in the Guadalcanal campaign. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
This Japanese photo shows six battleships of the Pacific Fleet under attack on December 7, 1941. Four of the ships shown here would eventually be sunk. Among other things, the Pearl Harbor attack placed carriers at the forefront of naval power. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Neither the Americans nor Japanese foresaw that the Pacific War would be a war decided by air power. Neither foresaw that the principal naval unit would be the aircraft carrier. Carriers were seen as important, but still as supporting units to the battle lines. Both sides thought that the course of a future war would be decided by a clash of battle lines somewhere in the Central Pacific. This illusion was shattered on the opening day of the war. The commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, decided that Japan’s naval strategy of waiting for an American advance into the Central Pacific was too passive. He wanted to strike a blow at the opening of the war which would not only shatter American naval power in the Pacific, but also American morale. Having done this, Japan would be in a much better position to keep its wartime conquests through a negotiated peace.
Though he had difficulty getting his risky plan approved by his superiors, Yamamoto’s vision of an initial powerful blow was realized in December 1941. The target of his opening attack was the principal American naval base in the Pacific at Pearl Harbor. The attack was successful beyond even Yamamoto’s dreams and resulted in five American battleships destroyed or sunk in exchange for only minor Japanese losses. The agent of this destruction was the Japanese carrier force known as the Kido Butai (literally Mobile Force, but better rendered as Striking Force). The Japanese were the first to assemble multiple carriers into a single operational entity. The six carriers of the Kido Butai with its large numbers of modern aircraft and well-trained aircrew proved to be an irresistible force during the opening phase of the war. The Kido Butai ranged from Hawaii into the Indian Ocean laying waste to Allied defenses and supporting initial Japanese conquests which proceeded largely ahead of schedule and at remarkably low cost.
Japanese expansion in the Pacific was conducted under a joint plan agreed to by the IJN and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). This plan called for two “operational phases.” In the First Operational Phase, the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Rabaul would be occupied. As the Japanese moved to achieve their First Operational Phase objectives, Allied naval forces mounted ineffective resistance. The first large naval action of the war was fought in late February 1942 at the battle of the Java Sea. In this action, an Allied cruiser-destroyer force was defeated by a Japanese force of similar composition and size demonstrating the superiority of the IJN’s light forces. Meanwhile, the Kido Butai provided cover for the invasion of Rabaul in January, the invasion of the Dutch East Indies in February, and then conducted a large raid into the Indian Ocean from March 26 to April 18.
After the successful seizure of the First Operational Phase objectives, the Japanese began to debate where to strike next. The Second Operational Phase was planned to expand Japan’s strategic depth. Accordingly, eastern New Guinea, the Aleutians, Midway, the Fijis, Samoa, and “strategic points in the Australian area” were targeted. At this point, Yamamoto and the Navy General Staff began to have different priorities. The Navy General Staff, nominally the body responsible for the formulation of Japanese naval strategy, advocated for the seizure of key islands in the South Pacific to cut the sea lines of communications between the United States and Australia. Yamamoto preferred to give the priority to an advance into the Central Pacific. This, he believed, would have the added benefit of forcing the remaining units of the Pacific Fleet to give battle. In this decisive battle, Yamamoto was sure the superior numbers and experience of the Combined Fleet would ensure a Japanese victory.
During the first week of April, Yamamoto got his way, but only through compromise with the Navy General Staff. This compromise led to the Japanese attempting to conduct an advance into both the South and Central Pacific in the span of two months. In the first phase in May, an operation would be conducted in the South Pacific with the goal of seizing Port Moresby on New Guinea as the foundation for further expansion south. This would be supported by the Combined Fleet with the dispatch of one of the Kido Butai’s three carrier divisions into the South Pacific. After this operation, key units would return to the Central Pacific for a powerful operation against the American-held atoll of Midway in the Central Pacific only 1,300 miles from Hawaii and against selected points in the Aleutian Islands chain.
The Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Chester Nimitz, decided to contest both Japanese moves aggressively. Two American carriers were dispatched to the Coral Sea to counter the attack on Port Moresby. The Japanese assembled two invasion forces: one dedicated to Port Moresby and the other to the island of Tulagi in the Solomons. These invasion forces were protected by a covering force of four heavy cruisers and a light carrier, while the carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku from the Kido Butai provided cover against intervention by American carriers. The first target, Tulagi, was seized on May 3, but after this the tightly synchronized Japanese plan began to unravel. The two large Japanese carriers entered the Coral Sea from the east, but, in spite of the fact that this was totally unexpected by the Americans, the Japanese carriers failed to find the two American carriers present. When the opposing carrier forces did launch strikes on May 7, both sides miscarried. The Japanese strike found only an oiler and a destroyer, and sank both. The American effort fared better when it located and sank the light carrier Shoho.
On May 8, the main carrier forces finally clashed. In the first carrier battle of the war, both sides suffered heavily. The Japanese carrier strike found and hit both American carriers. One, Yorktown, suffered only moderate damage from a single bomb hit, but the other, Lexington, was hit by both aircraft bombs and torpedoes and sank later that day. In return, the American strike succeeded in putting three bombs into Shokaku, but she survived. Zuikaku was untouched, but losses to her air group were very heavy and the ship was not ready for operations the following month.
Shokaku under attack from Yorktown planes on May 8, 1942 during the battle of Coral Sea. Shokaku survived this pounding, but would again be heavily damaged at the battle of Santa Cruz. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Coral Sea was not only a strategic defeat for the Japanese, but it undermined Yamamoto’s upcoming Midway battle. All three of the Japanese carriers committed to the Coral Sea operation were unavailable for the Midway operation. This meant that the Kido Butai would go to Midway with only four of its six carriers.
American losses in the Coral Sea meant that Nimitz was left with only two fully operational carriers in the Pacific. These two carriers, Enterprise and Hornet, had barely missed the Coral Sea battle because they were conducting the Doolittle Raid against the Japanese home islands. The Pacific Fleet’s other carrier, Saratoga, was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine in January 1942, and was still under repair. Saratoga would not return to service until late May. Even with just two carriers, Nimitz was still determined to contest the Japanese operation at Midway. Bolstering Nimitz’s forces was Yorktown which was quickly repaired after she returned to Pearl Harbor following the Coral Sea battle.
Carrier Hiryu photographed from a Japanese aircraft on the morning of June 5 after being bombed by American Dauntless dive-bombers the preceding day. Hiryu was the last of four Japanese carriers lost during the battle. The catastrophic losses at Midway forced the Japanese to rebuild their carrier force. (Yamato Museum)
Midway was Yamamoto’s personal battle. He planned the battle, went to sea to lead it personally, and committed the bulk of the Combined Fleet to its execution. All eight of Japan’s operational carriers were committed, as well as 11 battleships, 14 heavy cruisers and the bulk of available light cruisers and destroyers. Once Midway had been taken and the Pacific Fleet destroyed, the Japanese would turn south to cut the sea lines of communications between the United States and Australia. Unfortunately for the Japanese, events at Midway did not turn out as expected. The plan devised by the Combined Fleet’s staff and approved by Yamamoto contained fatal flaws. The only planning assumption that was correct was that the Americans would fight for Midway, but not under the conditions the Japanese expected. Nimitz had advance notice of the Japanese operation and intended to ambush the Japanese carriers. Between his three available carriers and the aircraft on Midway, he actually outnumbered the Kido Butai in aircraft. None of the other Japanese forces could support the Kido Butai which was also outnumbered in ships by the Americans.
The battle ended in complete defeat for the Kido Butai and the destruction of its four carriers. This was the result of inadequate staff planning, an inability to orchestrate defensive air cover, and a good amount of bad luck. The Japanese did succeed in sinking Yorktown, but their offensive power in the Pacific had been blunted.
After Midway, the initiative in the Pacific was up for grabs. Though the Combined Fleet still outnumbered the Pacific Fleet in every combatant category except submarines, Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief US Fleet, was determined to move more quickly than the Japanese. King had been focused on the South Pacific since the beginning of the war, and now, with the Japanese threat in the Central Pacific removed, he was free to turn his defensive strategy of guarding the sea line of communications between the United States and Australia into a limited offensive. As early as March 1942, King admitted that he had no intention of remaining strictly defensive but envisioned an offensive up through the Solomons to retake Rabaul.
Events would soon give King’s intentions more urgency. On May 3, the Japanese seized Tulagi in the Solomons during their Coral Sea operation. On June 13, the Japanese decided to place an airfield on Guadalcanal, the large island directly across from Tulagi. On July 6, a 12-ship Japanese convoy arrived on Guadalcanal with two construction units to complete the airfield. By this time, King was already working with Nimitz to retake “Tulagi and adjacent positions.” Once command arrangements were created to placate General Douglas MacArthur, in whose area of responsibility Tulagi actually was, planning proceeded with a target date of August 1. Guadalcanal was added as an objective on July 5 when American intelligence provided an assessment that Japanese construction troops were on the island. The required invasion force was rapidly assembled and planning accelerated. Delays in loading the assault force in Wellington, New Zealand, forced a delay in the landings until August 7. Finally, on July 22, the Marines departed Wellington en route to Guadalcanal.
Yorktown pictured after being abandoned on June 4 at the battle of Midway. The ship did not succumb until she took four torpedo hits and three bomb hits. Hornet took even more damage at Santa Cruz before sinking. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
On August 8, 1942, the first American offensive of World War II began when US Marines landed in the Solomons. Here, Marines land on Tulagi to expel the Japanese garrison. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
The landings on August 7 gained complete surprise. The fight for Tulagi and neighboring Gavutu-Tanambogo was short and intense and both islands were soon secured. The Japanese construction troops on Guadalcanal offered little resistance, and, by the end of the second day, the Marines had seized the incomplete airfield. The Japanese air and naval response was immediate. Japanese air attacks arrived over Guadalcanal on August 7 and 8, but suffered heavy losses in exchange for a single American transport and destroyer sunk. The most effective response was mounted by the Japanese surface forces from the Rabaul area. By the evening of August 7, the Japanese had assembled a counterattack force, formulated a plan and departed to attack the Allied landing force. Despite being spotted by Allied reconnaissance aircraft, they fell upon the Allied covering force on the morning of August 9 with complete surprise. Using their intensively practiced night combat tactics, the Japanese sank four Allied heavy cruisers with no loss to themselves.
On August 20, the first Marine aircraft arrived at the just-completed airfield named Henderson Field after a Marine aviator lost at Midway. On the following day, the first Japanese attempt to retake the airfield with a ground attack failed. By this time, Yamamoto had assembled a large portion of the Combined Fleet, including the rebuilt Kido Butai, to support further reinforcement of the island and to destroy the American fleet providing support to the Marines. With three American carriers standing by to defeat such an attempt, the third carrier battle of the war was imminent.