By mid-August, Yamamoto began to assemble a force to move against the American lodgment on Guadalcanal. Since it was assumed that the land offensive would easily rout the Marines and retake the airfield, Yamamoto’s first objective was to destroy the American fleet. A small reinforcement convoy was included in the operation with the mission of landing 1,500 men on the island. Nagumo’s carriers departed Kure in Japan’s Inland Sea on August 16.
On August 20, Japanese flying boats spotted the escort carrier Long Island and a fleet carrier 250 miles southeast of Guadalcanal. This and subsequent reports of American aircraft operating from the island (ferried there by the escort carrier) begged the question of how the Japanese would provide air cover for the convoy. The Combined Fleet did not want to use Nagumo’s carriers to provide cover since this could disclose their presence to the Americans. The solution reached was not ideal – if the American carriers had not been spotted by August 23, the Japanese carriers would neutralize the airfield on the following day.
Meanwhile, Fletcher was operating in the waters some 300 miles southeast of Guadalcanal. On August 23, American PBY Catalina aircraft spotted the Japanese transport force; upon hearing this, Nagumo turned his carriers to the north to avoid detection. He planned to run north during the night until turning to the southeast on the morning of the 24th. The PBY sighting of the transports at 0950hrs approximately 250 miles north of Guadalcanal, prompted Fletcher to order Saratoga to launch a strike of 31 dive-bombers and six torpedo bombers. In the meantime though, the convoy had turned north, and, after running into bad weather, the American strike was unable to locate its target. It was forced to recover on Guadalcanal after dark. A small strike launched from Guadalcanal with nine dive-bombers and 12 fighters also failed to find the convoy.
Fletcher received updated intelligence that evening that the Japanese carriers were at Truk, but not headed to Guadalcanal. Based on this, and the fact that his scouts had found no carriers during the day, Fletcher dispatched the Wasp task force (TF-18) south to refuel. This meant she would miss the battle. Fletcher was still confident that the two carriers remaining (Saratoga and Enterprise) would be more than adequate to prevent the convoy from reaching Guadalcanal.
Nagumo headed north for the remainder of August 23 to remain out of American search range. Instead of deploying some 110–150 miles in front of the carriers as per the new doctrine, Kondo’s Advance Force was deployed to the east of the carriers reflecting concern that the American carriers were operating in that direction. The bulk of Nagumo’s escorts (known as the Vanguard Force) – two battleships, three heavy and a light cruiser and three destroyers – were deployed only 6 miles ahead of the carriers. At 0400hrs on August 24, Nagumo’s force was weakened with the detachment of the light carrier Ryujo, heavy cruiser Tone and two destroyers to transit to the south in order to be in position to conduct the strike on Henderson Field. Since this was in accordance with an order from Yamamoto to neutralize the airfield, it was not, as is commonly believed, a gambit to draw the attention of the American carriers from the main Japanese carrier force.
Reconnaissance is a key ingredient for success in a carrier battle, but search aircraft neither from American nor Japanese carriers had success on the morning of August 24. American PBYs did spot the Ryujo group at 0935hrs, which Fletcher learned of shortly thereafter at 0947hrs. Fletcher declined to mount an immediate strike on the light carrier, instead deciding to wait for word of the fleet carriers. At 1105hrs, the Saratoga strike group returned to its ship from Guadalcanal.
Though PBYs found parts of the Advance and Vanguard Forces, Nagumo’s fleet carriers were not detected. At 1239hrs, Enterprise launched 23 aircraft to conduct searches to the northwest and northeast. About the same time, two Japanese search aircraft were destroyed in close proximity to the American carriers, and Fletcher assumed he had been spotted.
Just after noon, Ryujo launched a strike of six carrier attack planes and 15 fighters to hit Henderson Field. The strike ended badly for the Japanese with three fighters and four carrier attack planes destroyed for three Wildcats shot down. By the time the surviving aircraft returned to Ryujo, she was no more.
A 550-pound Japanese bomb explodes alongside Enterprise. Of the 15 Shokaku and three Zuikaku dive-bombers which attacked the carrier, only three scored hits and these inflicted only moderate damage. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Just after 1800hrs, three B-17s from Espiritu Santo attacked the crippled Ryujo. No hits were scored, as is evident in this photo. Two destroyers are under way near the carrier and heavy cruiser Tone is visible at the top of the photo. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
A Type 99 carrier bomber shot down directly over Enterprise on August 24. Only eight of the 27 dive-bombers that attacked TF-16 during the battle returned to their carriers. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
The Japanese got their first major break of the battle when a scout aircraft from heavy cruiser Chikuma spotted the American carriers at 1400hrs. By 1455hrs, the first strike group of 18 carrier bombers and four fighters from Shokaku and nine carrier bombers and six fighters from Zuikaku was headed south. At 1600hrs, another group of 18 carrier bombers and six fighters from Zuikaku and another nine carrier bombers and three fighters from Shokaku was also in the air. Nagumo had committed 73 aircraft in all.
After some initial hesitation, and with no information available on Nagumo’s main carrier force, Fletcher decided to launch a strike from Saratoga of 29 Dauntlesses (after one abort) and seven Avengers (after another abort) against Ryujo at about 1340hrs. After this decision, reports began to filter in from Enterprise’s scouts. At 1410hrs, Ryujo was located; at 1440hrs, Dauntlesses spotted the Advance Force and bombed the heavy cruiser Maya. Most importantly, at 1500hrs, Saratoga received a post attack report by two Enterprise dive-bombers which had just unsuccessfully attacked Shokaku.
This development put Fletcher in an unenviable position. His main strike was en route to strike a secondary target, and now he had information on the location of the main Japanese carrier force. At 1550hrs, the attack by Saratoga’s strike group began. After successfully dodging the first ten or so bombs, Ryujo was struck by as many as three bombs and a torpedo hit starboard. She later sank at 2000hrs with the loss of 121 crewmen. The surviving aircraft from the Guadalcanal strike and her CAP fighters were forced to ditch alongside the destroyers and their aircrew rescued.
The Japanese riposte was not long in coming. At 1602hrs, Enterprise’s radar gained first contact on a large group of aircraft 88 miles to the northwest. Between his two carriers, Fletcher had 53 fighters on CAP.
The Japanese flight commander split his 27 dive-bombers into two groups and approached his target from the north at 16,000ft. This placed most of the defending fighters at the tactical disadvantage of being below the Japanese. The fighter direction circuit was quickly disabled with unnecessary transmissions, which made effective control impossible. All 53 fighters, their controller onboard Enterprise, and the returning reconnaissance aircraft were all on the same narrow frequency. Of the 53 Wildcats, only as many as seven were in position to attack the nine Zuikaku dive-bombers before they dove on their target and another ten Wildcats engaged the Japanese dive-bombers on their way down to the target. The Japanese intended to split their attack, with 18 dive-bombers attacking Enterprise and the other nine targeted against Saratoga, but in the aftermath of the confusing air battle all surviving dive-bombers attacked Enterprise.
Enterprise is hit by Japanese dive-bombers. The view is from heavy cruiser Portland. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
This spectacular shot is the third bomb to hit Enterprise during the battle of the Eastern Solomons. The bomb was a 532-pound high-explosive bomb which probably rendered only a low-order detonation. The bomber which scored this hit was shot down. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
The first bomb hit on Enterprise was scored at 1644hrs near the number three elevator where it penetrated several decks and exploded in a messroom killing 35 men. A second bomb exploded just seconds later within feet of the first hit, killing another 35 men. The third and final hit struck near the number two elevator but was only a low order detonation. At least seven dive-bombers attempted to bomb the battleship North Carolina trailing 2,500ft behind the carrier. No hits were scored on the battleship, but a couple of near misses caused superficial damage.
The attack cost the Japanese 17 dive-bombers and three Zeros; one other carrier bomber and three Zeros were forced to ditch before returning to their carriers. The Americans lost eight defending Wildcats. The Enterprise was wounded, but not seriously; personnel losses were significant with 75 dead and 95 wounded. Within an hour she was able to steam at 24 knots and recover aircraft.
The second Japanese strike seemed poised to finish off the wounded carrier after Enterprise suffered a steering casualty at 1821hrs which caused her to reduce speed and circle helplessly. Steering was not repaired until 1858hrs. In this time, the second Japanese strike group passed 50 miles south of Enterprise before turning northwest and then departing the area. This was possibly the last chance the Japanese had to finish off Enterprise since Nagumo decided not to launch any other strikes.
The American response against the Japanese carrier force was uncoordinated and ineffective. Just before the arrival of the first wave of Japanese attackers, Fletcher ordered all available and ready dive-bombers and torpedo bombers after the Japanese. From Enterprise, 11 dive-bombers and seven torpedo bombers took off with orders to attack Ryujo. Another two Dauntlesses and five Avengers took off from Saratoga with orders to join the Enterprise group. The rendezvous never occurred, and none of the Enterprise aircraft found a target. The Saratoga strike found the Advance Force at 1735hrs and attacked the largest ship present, the seaplane carrier Chitose. Two near misses were scored which caused flooding and a list, but the ship survived.
The fate of the Japanese reinforcement convoy was not decided on August 24. Not long after 2300hrs, it turned south again to head to Guadalcanal. The next day, the convoy was subjected to attack by dive-bombers from Guadalcanal. A light cruiser and one of the three transports were hit. Later that morning, B-17s from Espiritu Santo sank a destroyer alongside the now motionless transport. This was enough for Yamamoto who ordered the cancellation of the transport operation.
The third carrier clash of the war ended indecisively, but, overall, the battle of the Eastern Solomons was an American victory. The Japanese attempt to land reinforcements on Guadalcanal was thwarted and they had failed to destroy the American carriers. Japanese losses were higher with light carrier Ryujo, a destroyer and a transport sunk and 75 aircraft lost. The Americans lost a total of 25 aircraft and Enterprise was damaged enough to force her to return to Pearl Harbor for repairs.
The Americans could not have been satisfied with their performance. Mounting coordinated air strikes had again proved difficult. The Americans were fortunate that a communications failure had failed to vector the second Japanese strike onto the wounded Enterprise. Fighter direction continued to be a problem with only a third of the fighters committed to CAP being able to engage the enemy. There were still difficulties in conducting air searches and getting the information to the right command authority in a timely manner.
The Japanese also had cause for concern. They had done a good job with their air searches but when the critical moment came, the second attack wave received incorrect information that cost them a chance to finish off Enterprise. On a larger level, the battle showed the difficulty of fighting the primary threat of American carriers while still facing an unneutralized Henderson Field. This dilemma would persist into the next carrier battle. Heavy losses in aircrew were also a concern and continued the steady attrition of the highly trained prewar aircrew.
Following the Eastern Solomons, Enterprise was dispatched for Pearl Harbor on September 3 and arrived a week later going immediately into dry dock for repairs. On August 27, Saratoga and Wasp returned to the waters between San Cristobal and Santa Cruz. The same day, Ghormley issued new guidance to Fletcher. Concerned that the Japanese carriers could attempt to strike targets on Espiritu Santo, or even on Fiji and Samoa, he wanted his carriers positioned farther to the east to respond to this potential threat, while still being within supporting range of Guadalcanal. The new orders kept Fletcher further south of Guadalcanal unless an important target required him to move north. Fletcher received a replacement for Enterprise when Hornet rendezvoused with TF-61 on August 29.
Chitose in 1938. The Japanese Navy was alone in developing large seaplane carriers which carried a relatively large number of aircraft and several catapults. Once launched, the aircraft had to land in the water alongside the ship or recover at a land base. Chitose and her sister ship were later converted into light carriers with a conventional flight deck. (Yamato Museum)
Fletcher continued his pattern of running north during the night to be within strike range of Guadalcanal in the morning, then heading south during the day to remain out of range of Japanese search aircraft. This operational pattern was taking place in sub-infested waters and it was not difficult to predict eventual trouble. Early on August 31, the inevitable happened when fleet submarine I-26 succeeded in putting a torpedo into the slow-to-maneuver Saratoga. The single torpedo hit at 0748hrs brought her to a temporary halt and resulted in flooding. The damage to Saratoga had several important implications. Not only were the Americans now reduced to two operational carriers in the South Pacific (Wasp and Hornet), but the aircraft from the damaged carrier ended up on Guadalcanal greatly increasing the defensive and offensive power of Henderson Field. Saratoga arrived at Pearl Harbor on August 21 with Fletcher onboard. Fletcher left Oahu on September 27 for the US and never returned to the South Pacific.
This is a view of Enterprise’s starboard quarter 5in./38 gun battery after the explosion of a 532-pound high-explosive bomb. The bomb hit near the deck edge and the resulting flames engulfed the gun gallery which killed all 38 men of the gun crews and set off the ready 5in. ammunition lockers. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Ghormley was still concerned about a Japanese attempt to strike against the sea lines of communications to Australia. On September 3, he ordered TF-61 to move another 120 miles to the south and farther to the east to protect the Fijis and Samoa and to keep them out of waters known to contain Japanese submarines. This took the carriers out of direct support range of Guadalcanal, but they would return if suitable targets presented themselves. Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes took over command of TF-61.
On September 9, the Kido Butai with carriers Shokaku, Zuikaku and Zuiho departed Truk to support the latest Japanese land attempt to seize Henderson Field. Yamamoto planned for Kondo’s Support Force (composed of the Advance Force and Nagumo’s carriers) to move south to eliminate the American carriers after the airfield had been captured. The Japanese carrier air groups would not be committed to help neutralize Henderson Field – that was a job for the land-based aircraft operating from Rabaul. The carrier aircraft had to be preserved for the anticipated carrier battle.
Wasp afire and sinking after being torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-19 south of San Cristobal Island on September 15. With her loss, Hornet became the only operational carrier in the South Pacific. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
The Japanese ground offensive climaxed on the night of September 13, but was repulsed with heavy losses. During the offensive, the carriers Wasp and Hornet assumed a position northeast of the Santa Cruz Islands. American searches were unable to find the Japanese carriers which were also at sea. Japanese searches did locate TF-61, but Noyes moved it to the southeast before the Japanese could close the contact. The next day, PBYs spotted Kondo’s Advance Force and Noyes decided to attack, launching strikes from both his carriers. Yamamoto had ordered Kondo’s force to head north to refuel, so it was not spotted by the American strike. Had the American strike found and struck the Advance Force, Nagumo would have headed south to support Kondo, and a full carrier battle would have been set up for September 15.
Instead, the next day brought disaster for the Americans. While conducting routine flight operations, TF-61 blundered into a scouting line of Japanese submarines. One of these, I-19, fired a full salvo of six torpedoes. Two torpedoes struck Wasp with immediate and fatal effect. Fires erupted and subsequent gasoline vapor explosions doomed the ship. The ship was abandoned at about 1420hrs and later sank at 2000hrs. While the loss of Wasp was bad enough, the remaining torpedoes continued to the northeast toward TF-17 and Hornet some 7 miles away. One hit the battleship North Carolina and created a 32 by 15ft hole on her port bow, and another hit the destroyer O’Brien. The battleship survived though it was forced to Pearl Harbor for repairs, but the destroyer sank on her way to Pearl Harbor. It was the single most deadly torpedo salvo of the war. It also reduced the Americans to a single operational carrier in the Pacific. The Japanese had five, and three were positioned at Truk.
After two failed attempts to dislodge the Marines, Yamamoto changed his strategic focus from destroying the American fleet to supporting the land offensive to seize Henderson Field. He devised a combined sea and air operation to neutralize the airfield, thus allowing sufficient ground forces to be landed to seize the airfield successfully. After that had been accomplished, the Combined Fleet would close on Guadalcanal to destroy the American fleet as it rushed to the aid of the Marines.
On October 11, Yamamoto put his plan in motion. Two large seaplane carriers departed Shortland Island bound for Guadalcanal carrying heavy ground equipment. Supporting these was a force of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers tasked to bombard Henderson Field in the early hours of October 12. Also on this day, the Advance Force and the Main Body departed Truk. Yamamoto intensified land-based air attacks on Henderson Field with two-a-day attacks beginning on October 11. Late on the night of October 11, an American task force intercepted the Japanese cruiser force tasked to bombard Henderson Field. The resulting engagement, known as the battle of Cape Esperance, was the first American victory in a night battle during the campaign. The Japanese lost a heavy cruiser and a destroyer sunk, but the reinforcement group completed its mission.
As the Japanese offensive was put into motion, Ghormley had only a single operational carrier. On October 12, Japanese search aircraft spotted Hornet operating west of Rennell Island. The carrier was covering a convoy which moved the US Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment to Guadalcanal on October 13. Yamamoto also planned a large reinforcement convoy to Guadalcanal with six transports and eight destroyers. Onboard were seven infantry battalions and heavy weapons. To support the movement of the convoy, Yamamoto played a new card. On the night of October 13–14, two battleships bombarded Henderson Field with 918 14in. rounds destroying 40 aircraft and putting the airfield temporarily out of commission. The Japanese convoy arrived on the island on the night of October 14–15, proceeded by two heavy cruisers again shelling the airfield. Aircraft from carriers Junyo and Hiyo flew air cover over the transports. American aircraft from Henderson Field did succeed in sinking three of the six transports, but not until 4,500 men had been landed along with two-thirds of their supplies and equipment. Yamamoto kept up the pressure with another cruiser bombardment on the night of October 15–16 and more reinforcement destroyer runs.
The Japanese failed to find Hornet on October 15; the next day, Hornet closed to within 95 miles of Guadalcanal and launched four strikes against the beached Japanese transports. On October 17, Yamamoto ordered Carrier Division 2 to attack shipping in the Lunga anchorage. Kakuta launched 18 fighters and 18 carrier attack planes armed with bombs. They unsuccessfully attacked two destroyers off Guadalcanal and suffered heavily in return. Of the 18 carrier attack planes, only eight returned.
Heading into the next round of combat, Ghormley was pessimistic about whether Guadalcanal could be held. On October 15, he sent a message to Nimitz describing his forces as “totally inadequate” to meet the next Japanese offensive. When Nimitz had visited the South Pacific from September 30 to October 2, he found pessimism in control at Ghormley’s headquarters at Noumea, but that the commanders on Guadalcanal were confident they could hold if supported. Nimitz made the choice, approved by King, to replace Ghormley with Halsey who had departed Hawaii on October 14 to conduct an inspection of the South Pacific before assuming command of TF-16 and then taking over as commander of TF-61. Halsey’s assignment as Commander, South Pacific was undoubtedly the right move at the right time. The assignment of the aggressive Halsey indicated that Nimitz would do everything he could to support the Marines on Guadalcanal. With Halsey in charge, the American forces would be handled much more aggressively in the upcoming October battles.
Halsey confers with Major General Alexander Vandegrift, commander of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal. Halsey was determined to support Vandegrift with all available means, prompting his decision to use his carriers aggressively at Santa Cruz. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Halsey’s new assignment meant another shuffling of the American carrier commanders. Kinkaid retained command of TF-16 built around Enterprise, now returned from Hawaii after repair, and Murray remained in command of TF-17 built around Hornet. Since Kinkaid was senior, he assumed command of TF-61 as senior task force commander. The American situation by mid-October was serious. Attrition to the aircraft on Henderson Field was high and there were relatively few replacements in the Pacific that could be allocated to Guadalcanal. The role of Halsey’s two carriers was key.
On October 21, an engine room fire broke out on Hiyo. Repairs by her crew brought her speed back up to 16 knots, but this was insufficient for the carrier to continue operations. The next day, Kakuta sent the carrier to Truk with two destroyers. Before departing, Hiyo transferred three fighters, one carrier bomber and five carrier attack planes to Junyo. Nevertheless, the departure of Hiyo took 16 fighters and 17 carrier bombers out of the battle.
Problems getting forces into their pre-attack positions forced the Seventeenth Army to delay the attack on Henderson Field from the night of October 22 to the next night. This forced the Support Force to recalibrate its movements in order not to be discovered prematurely. Yamamoto ordered Kondo to move north until noon on the 22nd before again turning south. At midday, according to the new timeline, the Support Force again headed south. With the attack scheduled for the night of October 23, the airfield would be in Japanese hands the next morning. At this time, the Advance Force was planned to be 200 miles northeast of Henderson Field with the Japanese carriers another 100 miles behind.
Japanese searches were unsuccessful on October 23, but American PBYs spotted Nagumo’s Vanguard Force and one of his carriers. Halsey was now aware that strong Japanese forces were in the area. Nevertheless, he did not change his plan to send his two carriers north of the Santa Cruz Islands.
Owing to continuing problems getting the battalions of the 2nd Division into position south of Henderson Field, the IJA again delayed the start of the attack until the night of October 24. This forced the entire Support Force to head north again. Yamamoto again planned to have the Support Force in position north of Guadalcanal on the morning of the 25th after the expected capture of the airfield. He remained concerned about the lack of information about American carriers. Japanese air searches did reveal the movements of TF-64 (built around the battleship Washington) southeast of Guadalcanal as it headed back to Espiritu Santo, making Yamamoto wonder whether it was being used as bait to lure Japanese forces to the south, exposing their flank to the American carriers suspected to be operating to the east. Yamamoto warned Kondo and Nagumo to search for the American carriers which he suspected to be to the southeast of the Support Force.
After refueling at Espiritu Santo, TF-64 departed on October 23. The commander of the Marines on Guadalcanal flew to Noumea to meet with Halsey that same day. Halsey promised him he would do everything possible to support his Marines. He soon made good his promise.
On October 24, Enterprise rendezvoused with Hornet 250 miles northeast of Espiritu Santo. Kinkaid now took command of the reestablished TF-61. He decided to keep each carrier in its own formation and ordered TF-17 to operate 5 miles to the southeast of his flagship. In accordance with Halsey’s plan, Kinkaid ordered TF-61 to make 23 knots and move to the waters north of Santa Cruz.
Events on October 24 greatly disturbed Nagumo. American PBYs delivered an unsuccessful attack on his Vanguard Force during the early morning hours. This attack, and the fact that the Japanese carriers had been spotted the day before, created uncertainty and caution in Nagumo. At the urging of Kusaka, his chief of staff, Nagumo decided to continue his transit to the north beyond what Yamamoto had ordered. He continued to the northwest until the afternoon of the 24th, and did not even inform Kondo and Yamamoto of his new intent until that afternoon. Meanwhile, Kondo had already turned south according to the overall plan. Upon learning of Nagumo’s alteration, Kondo had to conform. This delay did not go down well with Yamamoto. At 2147hrs, he ordered Nagumo and Kondo to get back on schedule. Finally, at 2300hrs on October 24, Nagumo reversed course to the south and increased speed to 26 knots.
The Japanese ground attack finally got started on the night of October 24. The attack was chaotic and was defeated piecemeal by the Marines. In the confusion, at 0130hrs on October 25, the IJA passed the word to Yamamoto that the airfield had been taken. In fact, the airfield remained in American hands. Throughout the day, the Japanese attempted to keep fighters over Henderson Field, including a strike by 12 Junyo fighters and 12 carrier bombers from 200 miles north of Henderson at about 1600hrs. The robust American fighter response during the day left no doubt that the airfield was still in operation.
October 25 found both sides groping in the dark. Both Kondo and Nagumo had resumed movement to Guadalcanal late on the 24th. Kondo’s Advance Force was in position 120 miles southwest of Nagumo. The elation over the reported capture of Henderson Field was short lived. In response to the news that the airfield remained in American hands, Kondo and Nagumo both headed again to the north.
Throughout the day, long-range American search aircraft did excellent work. PBYs and B-17s from Espiritu Santo and from seaplane tender Ballard deployed to the southernmost of the Santa Cruz Islands were active and productive. At 0930hrs, a B-17 spotted the Advance Force. Within minutes, a PBY spotted the Vanguard Force. Another PBY began to shadow Nagumo’s Main Body beginning at 1000hrs. By 1103hrs, it had spotted all three of Nagumo’s carriers.
News of the PBY contacts reached Kinkaid at 1025hrs. The original report included mention of battleships and escorts, but no carriers. The Japanese were 375 miles to the northwest of TF-61 and this was far out of striking range. Enterprise was the duty carrier handling all searches and CAP while Hornet maintained a full strike on alert. At 1119hrs a Wildcat with an engine malfunction attempted to recover on Enterprise. The pilot forgot to deploy his tailhook, and he smashed through the wire barrier into the Dauntlesses parked forward. The accident destroyed the fighter and four dive-bombers and fouled the deck for an extended period. As the deck crew was clearing things up, Enterprise received one of the PBY spotting reports with information on two Japanese carriers. The Japanese were reported to be steaming at 25 knots headed toward TF-61. The contacts were 355 miles to the west of TF-61. As Kinkaid and his staff pondered possible actions, Halsey, who was in receipt of the same information, weighed in with new orders: “Strike, Repeat, Strike.”
Tactical factors made this order hard to execute. Kinkaid did not receive the spotting report on the carriers until 1150hrs, and at 355 miles distant from TF-61, the Japanese were well beyond his striking range. Adding to the problem, the wind was coming from the southeast meaning that Kinkaid would have to turn away from the Japanese force to conduct flight operations. This would make it hard for him to close the contact. Kinkaid increased speed to 27 knots to reduce the distance to the reported position. Kinkaid’s staff calculated that it would be possible to make an afternoon strike if the Japanese maintained their course and TF-61 continued to close the range. At this point, Kinkaid inexplicably designated Enterprise’s inexperienced air group for the afternoon strike instead of using the Hornet strike already on alert.
Kinkaid decided to launch an afternoon search of 12 Dauntlesses in six pairs to search to the northwest out to 200 miles. An hour later, Enterprise planned to launch a strike of 16 fighters, 12 dive-bombers and seven torpedo bombers to fly 150 miles to the northwest awaiting information from the search aircraft. The operation by the inexperienced Enterprise air group did not proceed as planned. The 12 search aircraft took off at about 1330hrs. The launch of the 35-aircraft strike began after 1400hrs, but when the strike departed at 1425hrs, only eight fighters, five dive-bombers and six torpedo planes were in the group. After the departure of the strike, Kinkaid learned at 1510hrs that a group of B-17s had just bombed the Vanguard Force which was headed north at 25 knots. It was now obvious that the airborne strike would never be able to contact the retreating Japanese. Despite Kinkaid’s orders that the strike proceed only 150 miles outbound in order to recover before night, the strike commander took his aircraft out to 200 miles and then proceeded to take another 80-mile dog-leg to the north. This made the aircraft short on fuel and required a night recovery. The result was a disaster. One fighter, four dive-bombers and three torpedo planes were lost or damaged beyond repair.
On the night of October 25, both sides took steps that guaranteed that the carrier showdown would occur the next day. Kinkaid’s order to move north of the Santa Cruz Islands had not been altered by Halsey. This was the most controversial decision of the battle. Though his original plan called for the sweep north of the Santa Cruz Islands to be executed only in the absence of enemy carriers, Halsey did not cancel the movement now that he had solid information that Nagumo was in the area. Instead of keeping the carriers south of Guadalcanal able to react to direct threats to the Marines, Halsey sent them into an operation at the edge of land-based air support. The reasons for this remain unclear. Halsey was confident, perhaps overconfident, of the capabilities of the American carriers to handle their Japanese counterparts. As he demonstrated throughout the war, he would never pass up an opportunity to engage the Japanese carrier force. He had promised the Marines on Guadalcanal that he would fight, and the Japanese force north of Guadalcanal posed a direct threat to the Marines. All of these factors made Halsey send his carriers into harm’s way.
Kinkaid made all preparations for the impending clash. The performance of Enterprise’s air group on October 25 was not promising. A total of two fighters, seven dive-bombers, and three torpedo planes had been lost to all causes. This reduced CAG-10’s operational air strength to 31 fighters, 23 dive-bombers, and ten torpedo planes. Kinkaid designated Enterprise as the duty carrier for October 26 meaning she would handle all search and CAP duties. This kept Hornet’s air group as the designated strike group. Together, Enterprise and Hornet would bring 137 operational aircraft into the battle.
Supporting air operations from Espiritu Santo included an evening PBY sortie for search and five more armed Catalinas departing at 1730hrs. Ten more PBYs and six B-17s were scheduled to depart at 0330hrs on October 26 to re-establish contact with the Japanese.
At 1900hrs, Kondo’s Advance Force headed south, followed an hour later by Nagumo’s carriers. The Vanguard Force took station 60 miles ahead of the carriers. Yamamoto was tiring of the many delays and, since the Support Force had been at sea since October 11, fuel was becoming an issue. At 2218hrs the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet sent a message to Kondo and Nagumo spurring them to greater efforts the next day. Nagumo prepared his three carriers for the next day with initial search, CAP and strike aircraft arrayed on the flight decks and a second strike fueled and armed on the hangar decks. On the three flight decks, and on Junyo in the Advance Force, the Japanese brought to bear 194 operational aircraft. In the impending battle, the Japanese would therefore outnumber the Americans in every important category.
The largest carrier clash of the Guadalcanal campaign was actually initiated by lumbering PBYs. Two of these found elements of Nagumo’s fleet. The first sighting report of a Japanese force about 300 miles northwest of TF-61 was issued at 0022hrs. Minutes later, the same PBY reported attacking a Japanese “heavy cruiser” with a torpedo. This was actually a destroyer in the Vanguard Force. At 0250hrs, another PBY spotted the carrier Zuikaku and executed a glide bombing run to drop its four 500-pound bombs. These landed some 300 yards off the big carrier’s starboard side.
Zuiho in October 1942 conducting flight operations. One aircraft has just launched, another is climbing forward of the ship, and the remainder of the launch is spotted aft. During the reorganization of the Kido Butai following Midway, Zuiho became a dedicated carrier for fighters. (Yamato Museum)
These unsuccessful attacks reinforced Nagumo’s fears of an ambush by unlocated American carriers he thought to be operating out to his east. In response to the surprise PBY attack, he ordered his force to reverse course to the north at 0330hrs and that all the aircraft on the hangar bay be defueled and de-armed. At 0445hrs, the Japanese launched 14 carrier attack planes to search the sectors from 050 to 230 degrees out to 300 miles. For the search, Shokaku and Zuikaku each contributed four aircraft and Zuiho six. At 0520hrs, Zuiho launched the first CAP mission of the day with three fighters. An additional 22 fighters were on deck standby and a total of 70 aircraft were spotted for the first strike. This included 20 aircraft from Shokaku’s carrier attack plane squadron and 22 dive-bombers from Zuikaku.
Flight deck crews on the American carriers were also busy. At about 0500hrs, TF-61 reversed course from the northwest to the southeast to execute flight operations. Enterprise flew off seven fighters for CAP and 16 Dauntlesses to conduct a search in pairs out to 200 miles to the west. At sunrise, Hornet added another seven fighters to the overhead CAP.
The potential advantages gained by the night PBY operations were largely wasted by communications problems. These meant that any chance Kinkaid had of attacking the Japanese carriers with their strike aircraft still on deck was wasted. He did not learn of the PBY attack on Zuikaku until 0512hrs, though other ships in TF-61 learned of it an hour earlier but did not pass the information to Kinkaid’s flagship. Had the information reached him earlier, Kinkaid would not have had to devote 16 dive-bombers to search missions. When his staff learned of the PBY sighting report, they urged Kinkaid to send Hornet’s ready aircraft on a search-strike mission. Kinkaid deferred, no doubt because of the previous day’s experience which cost him heavily.
Enterprise’s scout planes soon ran across the Japanese. At 0617hrs, two Dauntlesses spotted the Vanguard Force 170 miles to the west of TF-61. The Japanese were heading north at 20 knots. After being spotted, Abe increased speed to 30 knots and changed direction heading to the northwest. At 0645hrs, two Dauntlesses attacked heavy cruiser Tone. The bombs missed, and one American aircraft was lost to antiaircraft fire.
Also at 0645hrs, another pair of Dauntlesses spotted one of Nagumo’s carriers, and by 0700hrs had sighted all three. At 0650hrs, the Japanese finally spotted the intruding American aircraft and launched a total of 17 fighters from Shokaku and Zuikaku. The CAP was able to thwart an attack by the original pair of Dauntlesses and another pair nearby.
The sighting of the Japanese carriers put them 185–200 miles to the northwest of TF-61. Kinkaid ordered an immediate strike by both carriers. This was already at the edge of his strike range, and to make things more uncertain, the Japanese were headed north and Kinkaid would have to turn away actually to launch the strike. He changed course to the northwest and increased speed to 27 knots to close the range as much as possible.
Hornet, with her strike already spotted on deck, was the first to launch. Eight fighters, 15 Dauntlesses and six torpedo planes were launched between 0732 and 0743hrs. A second wave of eight fighters (only seven proceeded), nine Dauntlesses (armed with 1,000-pound bombs), and ten Avengers (all armed with 500-pound bombs instead of more powerful torpedoes and also including the unarmed air group commander’s aircraft) was brought up to the flight deck and launched within ten minutes of the departure of the first group. Each group proceeded separately to the target.
At 0747hrs, Enterprise launched 11 fighters for CAP. The launch of her strike was a hurried affair and reflected poor planning. The strike force was nine torpedo planes (only eight launched) and three dive-bombers escorted by eight fighters. Accompanying the strike was the unarmed aircraft of the air group commander. Despite Kinkaid’s desire that the carriers strike together, the Enterprise aircraft were ordered not to proceed with Hornet’s aircraft. The effect was that three different American strike groups proceeded to the attack area independently.
While the Americans were preparing their strike, Nagumo received crucial information. One of Shokaku’s carrier attack planes spotted an American carrier to the east-south south only 210 miles away. The pilot of the aircraft first made the discovery at 0612hrs, but it took him a while to confirm the presence of carriers, and when he sent the report, he used an incorrect call sign. Nevertheless, when Nagumo received the report at 0658hrs stating that carriers were present, he did not hesitate. He ordered the first attack wave launched immediately. He also sent the single Yokosuka D4Y1-C Type 2 carrier reconnaissance plane (later code-named “Judy” by the Allies) to confirm the sighting. The Japanese strike began its launch at 0710hrs. The strike was under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Murata Shigeharu from Shokaku; Murata was the most accomplished torpedo bomber pilot in the IJN and had commanded the 40 torpedo bombers at Pearl Harbor which had laid waste to Battleship Row. From Shokaku came four fighters and 20 carrier attack planes with torpedoes. From Zuikaku, beginning at 0725hrs, were launched eight fighters, 21 carrier bombers (another was forced to abort) and a carrier attack plane without a torpedo tasked to track the American carrier force. Light carrier Zuiho contributed nine fighters and another carrier attack plane serving as a shadow aircraft. By 0730hrs, Murata headed to the southeast. The total Japanese strike force included 21 fighters, 21 carrier bombers with 550-pound bombs, and 22 carrier attack planes (only 20 carried torpedoes).
A strike poised to launch off Zuikaku on May 5, 1942 during the preliminaries of the battle of Coral Sea. Visible are 12 Zeros and 17 Type 99 carrier bombers. The scene on Zuikaku on the morning of October 26 with her strike spotted on deck must have been very similar. (Yamato Museum)
After the launch of the first wave, Shokaku and Zuikaku began the process of moving the second attack wave up from the hangar deck to the flight deck. During this process, at 0740hrs, two Dauntless dive-bombers responding to the original report of Japanese carriers arrived over Nagumo’s force and achieved complete surprise. Undetected by the radar on Shokaku and unmolested by the 21 Japanese fighters aloft on CAP, the two Dauntlesses picked what they thought was a Shokaku-class carrier and attacked. Both pilots claimed hits with their 500-pound bombs. Despite being chased by fighters for 45 miles, both Dauntlesses escaped, shooting down a Zero in the process. Their remarkable attack was actually against Zuiho. A single bomb hit aft started a fire and wrecked her arresting gear. Unable to recover aircraft, Zuiho was out of the battle.
The Japanese were fortunate that the surprise attack was not against the two larger carriers preparing to arm and fuel aircraft for launch. To Nagumo, it seemed another disaster like Midway was in the offing. Both carriers began frenzied efforts to get the second-wave aircraft in the air before any further attacks. The aircraft on the hangar deck had been disarmed and defueled during the night after the PBY attack, and now flight deck crews on both carriers worked feverishly to prepare the aircraft for launch. The carrier bomber squadron on Shokaku needed less time to prepare than the carrier attack plane squadron on Zuikaku where all available personnel were still loading the heavy torpedoes. Nagumo ordered that the Shokaku attack group be launched as soon as possible without waiting for the aircraft from Zuikaku. The first aircraft took off from Shokaku at 0810hrs and by 0818hrs, the strike of five Zero fighters and 20 carrier bombers were headed towards the American carriers. One of the dive-bombers later aborted. Zuikaku launched 17 torpedo planes (one without a torpedo to act as a shadow plane) and four fighters following behind the Shokaku dive-bombers. The strike departed at 0900hrs.
ATTACK ON ZUIHO (pp. 56-57)
The first blow of the battle was delivered by a pair of Enterprise Dauntless dive-bombers (1) on a search mission. Alerted by the initial report of enemy carriers by another pair of Enterprise dive-bombers, Lieutenant Stockton Strong and Ensign Charles Irvine headed southwest to the Japanese carriers and avoided detection by Japanese radar and CAP to dive on what they identified as a Shokaku-class carrier at 0740hrs. The pair gained complete surprise and began their dive from 14,000ft. Their actual target was light carrier Zuiho (2) which was steaming several miles to the port of Shokaku. Strong placed his 500-pound bomb on the aft portion of Zuiho’s flight deck (3). The two Dauntlesses survived attacks by three Zuikaku Zeros (4) for 45 miles beyond the Japanese task force and one of the Dauntless rear gunners shot down one of the Zeros. Zuiho would survive the resulting fires, but she was out of the battle. Enterprise’s commanding officer was so impressed with this feat that he recommended Strong for a Medal of Honor.
A deck scene on either Shokaku or Zuikaku with a strike preparing to take off. Zero fighters are spotted forward since they needed less deck from which to take off and the heavier Type 99 carrier bombers are in the rear. This scene is believed to have been taken during the battle of Santa Cruz. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
In addition to throwing all available strike aircraft at the American carrier force, the Japanese made plans for a surface engagement. Between the Advance Force and the Vanguard Force, the Japanese possessed a considerable advantage in gunnery and torpedo power. These ships could destroy any American ships damaged by air attack. Kondo ordered his Advance Force to increase speed and head to the east-northeast to join with Nagumo. This also closed the range to the reported location of the American carriers so that Junyo’s aircraft could launch a strike. Kondo also ordered the Vanguard Force to head to the contact, and by 0925hrs it was also heading east at 26 knots. The Vanguard Force was now operating in two groups; one had the two battleships and a heavy cruiser and a light cruiser and four destroyers, the second comprised cruisers Tone and Chikuma and two destroyers.
Since the American and Japanese strike groups were headed on reciprocal bearings, many spotted each other heading in opposite directions. One of Hornet’s fighters spotted Shokaku’s carrier attack planes headed to the southwest at about 0830hrs and radioed a warning to its base but received no acknowledgment. Likewise, Shokaku’s strike group saw part of the Hornet strike and warned their mother ship.
At about 0835hrs, the escort of the Shokaku strike, which included the nine Zero fighters from Zuiho, spotted another group of American aircraft. This was the 20-strong Enterprise group. The leader of Zuiho’s fighters could not resist this target and dove down from 14,000ft to conduct a swift attack to break up the unsuspecting American formation before rejoining Murata’s vulnerable carrier attack planes. Coming out of the sun from directly ahead, the Japanese fighters gained complete surprise. In their first pass, the Zeros sent two Avengers into the sea and a third limping home. One of the slashing Zeros was destroyed by the ball turret gunners of the Avengers. Another Zero was shot down by a section of American fighters which belatedly came to the aid of the torpedo bombers, and a third was later destroyed while conducting another attack on the Avengers. The resulting dogfight between the six surviving Zeros and the four Wildcats resulted in another three American fighters shot down and the last forced to return. At the end of the engagement, the Americans had lost three fighters and two Avengers, with another two Avengers and a fighter forced to return to their carrier. The cost to the Japanese was also high with four Zeros shot down and a fifth heavily damaged.
In the first attack of the battle US aircraft critically damage the Japanese carrier.
AMERICAN FORCES
Hornet Air Group
A VS-8/VB-8 (15 SBD-3 Dauntlesses)
B VT-6 (6 TBF-1 Avengers)
C VF-72 (8 F4F-4 Wildcats)
JAPANESE FORCES
1 Shokaku
2 Zuikaku
3 Zuiho
4 Kumano
5 Yukikaze
6 Amatsukaze
7 Maikaze
8 Hamakaze
9 Teruzuki
10 Arashi
11 Tokitsukaze
12 Hatsukaze
13 Zuiho CAP (4 Type 0 Fighters)
14 Zuikaku CAP (7 Type 0) Fighters)
15 Shokaku CAP (9 Type 0 Fighters)
EVENTS
1 0850hrs – Twenty Zeros are on CAP over the Main Body. They are deployed near the carriers at various altitudes to defend from both a dive-bombing and a torpedo attack.
2 0910hrs – The Hornet strike sights the Vanguard Force and is attacked by three Zuiho Zeros which disperse the Wildcat escort and separate the dive-bombers from the torpedo bombers. The six Avengers never sight the Japanese carriers.
3 Approximately 0913hrs – The leader of the Hornet dive-bombers, Lieutenant-Commander William Widhelm, spots Shokaku and orders an attack.
4 0918–0925hrs – Widhelm’s 15 Dauntlesses run a gauntlet of Zeros. Four Shokaku Zeros are encountered first, then two Zuiho Zeros. Finally, five Zuikaku Zeros join the fray. Four Dauntlesses, including Widhelm’s, do not reach the dive point.
5 0927hrs – Ten surviving Dauntlesses reach their pushover point and dive on Shokaku from astern. The first three or four 1,000-pound bombs miss the wildly maneuvering carrier, but the next four, and possibly as many as six, hit the ship and cause heavy damage.
6 Approximately 0930hrs – The last Dauntless attacks destroyer Teruzuki and misses.
7 Many of the dive-bombers are attacked exiting the area, but none is shot down. Thirteen of 15 Dauntlesses eventually reach TF-61. The Japanese lose two Zeros shot down and another forced to ditch.
The effect of this aerial skirmish was major. Enterprise’s small strike was reduced to five Avengers (including the carrier air group commander’s unarmed aircraft), three Dauntlesses and only four fighters. The five surviving Japanese fighters did not rejoin Murata’s torpedo aircraft, but were forced to return to their ship. The decision of the Japanese fighter leader was ill-considered. His mission was to escort the vulnerable torpedo bombers to kill an American carrier, not to engage in a duel with American strike aircraft. The fate of Murata’s torpedo bombers proved the foolishness of his decision.
At 0840hrs, Shokaku’s radar reported a group of American aircraft to the southwest at 78 miles. This was Hornet’s first strike group. By this time, 23 Zeros were aloft on CAP. Three had been sent south to cover the Vanguard Force, leaving 20 to defend the carriers. The Japanese deployed them at various altitudes to defend from both a dive-bombing and a torpedo attack. Unlike American fighters which were vectored out some distance from the carrier to meet attacking aircraft as far as possible away from the ship, the Japanese CAP was kept near the carriers. This was probably required because of the inadequate range of the radios installed in the Zeros.
The dive-bombers from Hornet’s first wave were the first to attack. At 0850hrs, the strike leader spotted the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma from the Vanguard Force about 150 miles northwest of TF-61. He did not attack, but continued to the northwest where he spotted the rest of the Vanguard Force at about 0910hrs. Over the Vanguard Force, the Hornet aircraft were attacked by the three Zuiho Zeros covering the Japanese formation. In a single attack, one of the escorting Wildcats was shot down and two others badly damaged and forced to return. In return, a single Zero was shot down. The two remaining Zeros sighted and proceeded to attack the other section of four Wildcats cruising at some 3,000ft above the Avengers. They blasted the leader of the Wildcat section, but lost another Zero. The double ambush by a single section of Zeros stripped all the fighter cover from Hornet’s strike. It also separated the 15 Dauntlesses from the six Avengers.
The leader of the Hornet dive-bombers, Lieutenant-Commander William Widhelm, commander of VS-8, delivered the most powerful American blow of the battle. In response to the Zero attack over the Vanguard Force, he turned his formation to the right into some clouds. Within minutes, he spotted ships 25 miles ahead which he later confirmed as a large carrier and a smaller one issuing black smoke. This was Shokaku and the previously damaged Zuiho. Zuikaku was under cloud cover and was not spotted. Widhelm unsuccessfully tried to vector on the second wave of Hornet aircraft.
After running the gauntlet of Zeros, which accounted for Widhelm’s Dauntless and three others, at 0927hrs the ten surviving Dauntlesses reached their pushover point. Below them was Shokaku maneuvering wildly and throwing up heavy antiaircraft fire. The dive-bombers attacked from astern, but Captain Arima was successful in avoiding the first three or four of the 1,000-pound bombs. The remaining aircraft inflicted heavy damage scoring at least four and possibly as many as six hits.
Whatever the total number of hits, the damage caused proved calamitous. One bomb hit aft of the island on the starboard side and the rest hit around the center and aft elevators. The flight deck was buckled and the center elevator destroyed. The gun positions on the starboard quarter were destroyed with heavy loss of life. Though the damage was extensive, it was not fatal. There were no aircraft in the hangar bay and the fuel lines had been secured. Only two aircraft were aboard – two carrier attack planes parked on the flight deck. One was consumed by fire but the other positioned on the fantail survived. A large fire was started, but after five hours the damage control teams were able to extinguish it. Most importantly, no damage was suffered below the hangar deck level and the ship was able to maintain full speed. Total casualties were heavy with about 130 killed.
The last Dauntless attacked the destroyer Teruzuki. Many of the dive-bombers were damaged exiting the area, but none were shot down. Of the 15 Dauntlesses that attacked, 13 eventually made it back to TF-61. In return, the Japanese lost two Zeros shot down and another forced to ditch.
The six Hornet Avengers never saw Nagumo’s carriers since they were too far south and west. They missed the turn north by Widhelm and were unable to copy his radio reports of the location of the Japanese carriers. The commander of the six Avengers decided to attack the battleships of the Vanguard Force he had previously flown over.
Escorted by seven Wildcats, nine Dauntlesses and ten Avengers all armed with bombs flew over Tone and Chikuma at about 0920hrs. This group did not receive Widhelm’s reports of the Japanese carrier so was unaware that the Japanese carriers were to the north. With no better targets in sight, the leader of the dive-bombers decided to attack the two cruisers. The actual target selected was Chikuma and the attack took only five minutes from 0926 to 0931hrs. One 1,000-pound bomb hit the cruiser on the port side of the bridge at 0926hrs and later in the attack a second bomb hit the starboard side of the forward superstructure. Though heavily damaged, and having suffered serious casualties, the ship was in no danger of sinking.
Chikuma under attack from American carrier aircraft on October 26. The heavy cruiser is at high speed with all her forward 8in. gun turrets trained to port. An aerial recognition mark is on the second turret and both catapults appear to be swung out. Smoke from the bomb hit on the forward superstructure is evident. Despite heavy damage, the ship survived. This shot was taken from Commander Rodee’s TBF. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Hornet’s second wave was fragmented. The Avengers and their two remaining Wildcat escorts were attacked by two Zeros, but the Wildcats shot one down and the other withdrew. Eventually, the Avengers turned back the way they came which soon brought them over Tone and Chikuma. The nine Avengers armed with four 500-pound bombs all selected the unfortunate Chikuma for their attacks. The aircraft conducted a glide-bomb approach from astern of the frantically maneuvering cruiser, but results were meager. Five hits were claimed, but only one was confirmed. It hit the starboard torpedo mount aft, starting another fire and destroying a reconnaissance aircraft on the starboard catapult. Total casualties aboard Chikuma were 192 dead and 95 wounded from a crew of about 900. One of the Avengers attacked one of the two escorting destroyers after its bombs failed to release on the first run, but missed. No American aircraft were lost.
Just as the Avengers from the second wave arrived over the Japanese cruisers, the six torpedo-armed Avengers from the first wave arrived in the area of the Tone and Chikuma. These aircraft spotted the same cruisers one hour earlier, and now decided to attack since no other targets were available. The aircraft attacked Tone and claimed three torpedo hits. Only five torpedoes were released, and these all missed.
The attack by the Zuiho Zeros left the Enterprise strike leader with a small group of three Dauntlesses and five Avengers escorted by four Wildcats. Though the Enterprise group heard Widhelm’s reports of a Japanese carrier, they did not realize that he had turned north instead of proceeding to the northwest. Flying to the northwest, the strike leader soon saw Tone and Chikuma and later the main body of the Vanguard Group. A search beyond the Vanguard Group turned up nothing, so the Enterprise group turned back to attack Abe’s force. At 0930hrs, the Avengers attacked the nearest large ship, the heavy cruiser Suzuya. The four torpedo bombers came in on the cruiser’s port side and on the first run launched two torpedoes, but both missed. Another aircraft conducted a second run to release its torpedo, but it also missed. The final aircraft had to dump its torpedo. The three Dauntlesses from VS-10 became separated from the Avengers. They searched briefly in the area for larger targets, but turned back to attack the Tone and Chikuma group. At 0939hrs, they attacked Chikuma just minutes after Hornet’s second-wave Dauntlesses had bombed her. The three Enterprise dive-bombers placed two near misses on Chikuma’s starboard side which opened a hole and let water into the starboard fireroom, reducing the cruiser’s speed.
Kinkaid committed 75 aircraft in the attack on the Japanese carriers, not including the 16 Dauntless scouts sent earlier. The results from this were disappointing. Of the 75 aircraft sent to attack a Japanese flight deck, only ten actually did so and this was almost an accidental result of Widhelm’s decision to head to the north. The American attacks suffered from the same problem as in earlier battles – a lack of attack group cohesion. At Santa Cruz, the attacks were conducted in a piecemeal fashion, verging on haphazard. Making this problem worse was an appalling lack of communications. The performance of the Wildcat in its escort role was also ineffective. Japanese CAP performance was much better than at Midway with fighters layered at different altitudes. Better damage control meant that Shokaku survived a fearful beating. Direct losses from battle were four Wildcats, two Dauntlesses and two Avengers; many others were forced to ditch. The Japanese lost five fighters from the CAP, one that was later forced to ditch and the four Zuiho fighters which decimated the Enterprise group.
The Americans braced themselves for the Japanese attack they knew was coming. The key to the defense was getting the Wildcats on CAP to intercept the attacking formations well away from the carriers. The Enterprise FDO, Lieutenant-Commander John Griffin, was designated as senior FDO for TF-61. Griffin had 11 fighters aloft; he placed seven at 10,000ft over TF-16 and the other four between TF-16 and TF-17. Hornet, operating 10 miles to the southwest, had eight fighters at 10,000ft. Griffin placed the Wildcats at 10,000ft to conserve fuel and oxygen, believing that radar would give him plenty of warning to move the fighters higher if required and, remarkably, he was unaware that TF-16 had even been sighted. The altitude decision was Griffin’s most important of the battle, and it turned out to be disastrous.
At 0830hrs, Hornet’s outgoing strike warned of Japanese aircraft inbound. Both carriers prepared to launch all ready aircraft to empty the flight decks before the arrival of the Japanese. Task-Force 16’s CAP was reinforced to 22 fighters, half at 10,000ft and the other half headed up to that altitude. Hornet added another seven, for a total of 15; a total of 37 fighters were airborne.
As the Japanese strike continued inbound, neither the radar on Enterprise nor on Hornet detected anything. The CXAM radar on cruiser Northampton did detect the incoming strike at 0841hrs to the northwest at 70 miles and the information was passed by flag signal to Hornet, but reached its FDO late and never reached Griffin on Enterprise.
At 0853hrs, Murata’s carrier attack plane squadron from Shokaku spotted ships which were soon confirmed as a carrier, two cruisers, and four destroyers. This was Hornet and TF-17; clouds covered TF-16. Murata ordered an immediate attack. He had two groups: at 17,000ft were 21 carrier bombers from Zuikaku with eight escorting Zeros at 21,000ft in a trail position; the second group consisted of 20 Shokaku torpedo-armed carrier attack planes at 14,000ft with an escort of four Zeros.
TF-17 maneuvering to avoid air attack. Hornet is visible to the left. This shot was taken by one of Hornet’s returning aircraft. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
The Japanese assault destroys the US carrier.
JAPANESE FORCES
1 Zuikaku Carrier Bomber Squadron (7 Type 99 carrier bombers)
2 Zuikaku Carrier Bomber Squadron (7 Type 99 carrier bombers)
3 Zuikaku Carrier Bomber Squadron (7 Type 99 carrier bombers)
4 Zuikaku Fighter Squadron (8 A6M Type 0 fighters)
5 Shokaku Carrier Attack Squadron (11 Type 97 carrier attack planes)
6 Shokaku Carrier Attack Squadron (9 Type 97 carrier attack planes)
7 Shokaku Carrier Fighter Squadron (4 A6M Type 0 fighters)
AMERICAN FORCES
A Hornet
B Juneau
C Barton
D Pensacola
E Russell
F Anderson
G Northampton
H Mustin
I Hughes
J San Diego
K Morris
L VF-72 CAP at 10,000ft (8 F4F)
M VF-72 CAP at lower altitudes (7 F4F)
N VF-10 CAP sent from TF-16 (8 F4F)
EVENTS
1 0830hrs – Hornet’s outgoing strike warns of Japanese aircraft inbound. Hornet adds another seven Wildcats on CAP to augment the eight already at 10,000ft.
2 0853hrs – Strike commander Lt. Cdr. Murata Shigeharu spots TF-17 and orders an immediate attack. He has two groups: 21 carrier bombers from Zuikaku with eight escorting Zeros and 20 Shokaku torpedo-armed carrier attack planes with an escort of four Zeros.
3 0855hrs – Hornet’s radar finally detects Japanese aircraft 35 miles to the west-southwest. TF-16 moves eight fighters to the west to assist TF-17.
4 0859hrs – Hornet’s fighters spot the Japanese, but cannot react in time. Murata deploys his torpedo aircraft in two groups to attack in an anvil formation from both bows of Hornet. He leads 11 torpedo planes with the four fighters to the south diving to gain speed; the remaining nine torpedo planes head in from the north.
5 0858hrs – Dive-bombers under Lt. Takahashi Sadamu spot TF-17 and attack first. His squadron is deployed in three groups of seven aircraft with eight escort Zeros above and to the rear. Eight Hornet Wildcats gain enough altitude to conduct a head-on attack and destroy three dive-bombers and severely damage three others. The Zeros shoot down three Wildcats. The Hornet fighters at lower altitudes are able only to down a single dive-bomber.
6 0910hrs – The first group of carrier bombers begin their dives astern of Hornet. Of the seven carrier bombers, three score hits on the carrier and four survive.
7 0915hrs – The first group of torpedo planes attack led by Murata. The escorting Zeros intervene against intercepting Wildcats and shoot down two for the loss of a single Zero. Murata’s plan of executing an anvil attack from ahead of Hornet is thwarted when the carrier changes course to the northeast. This forces Murata’s group to conduct a tactically disadvantageous stern attack. The first section to attack is Murata’s which approaches Hornet from her starboard quarter. It does not launch from a good angle, but the attack is devastating. The first torpedo strikes Hornet amidships and, within seconds, the next torpedo strikes aft in the engineering spaces. The next section of three torpedo bombers misses with its torpedoes to starboard. The attack angle for the final five aircraft is even worse. Three attack Hornet and miss, and the final two attack heavy cruiser Pensacola with no success. The Japanese lose five aircraft.
8 0914hrs – The second group of Zuikaku carrier bombers moving to the north run into TF-16 fighters coming south to assist Hornet. Of the six carrier bombers, one is destroyed. Five attack Hornet just as Murata’s torpedo bombers are attacking. Four attack Hornet, but all miss. The last aircraft crashes on the carrier.
9 0914hrs – Final group of carrier bombers is intercepted by Enterprise fighters. Three survive to attack Hornet, but all miss. Only one survives subsequent Wildcat attacks while leaving the area of TF-17.
10 0914hrs – Nine Shokaku carrier attack planes coming in from the north without escort are attacked by Wildcats. Three are shot down; one attempts to crash light cruiser Juneau, but is shot down in the attempt. Five approach the screen and one is shot down by destroyer Morris. The remaining four close to within 300–800 yards of Hornet before releasing their torpedoes, but all miss.
11 0917hrs – A single carrier bomber drops its bomb 50 yards off Hornet’s bow, then returns to crash into the ship forward on the port side. One minute later, a carrier attack plane from the second group which had previously jettisoned its torpedo attempts to crash onto Hornet, but hits the water forward of the ship.
12 0925hrs – Last air combat between the CAP and the retreating Japanese. Hornet is crippled and is dead in the water from two torpedo hits, three bomb hits, and two crashed aircraft. The Japanese lose a total of five fighters, 17 carrier bombers, and 16 carrier attack planes. Six Wildcats are lost.
At 0855hrs, Hornet’s radar finally detected a group of bogeys 35 miles to the west-southwest. Enterprise also picked up the same contact at 45 miles. Griffin moved eight fighters to the west, and the pilots decided to climb above 10,000ft. At 0859hrs, Hornet’s fighters spotted the Japanese, but it was already too late. Murata deployed his torpedo aircraft in two groups to attack in an anvil formation from both bows of the carrier. He led 11 torpedo planes with the four fighters to the south diving to gain speed; the remaining nine torpedo planes came in from the north. The dive-bombers spotted Hornet at 0858hrs. The Japanese had achieved a fully coordinated attack.
The dive-bombers under Lt. Takahashi Sadamu attacked first. His squadron was deployed on three groups of seven aircraft with the eight Zeros above them and to the rear. Eight Hornet Wildcats had gained enough altitude to conduct a head-on attack on the approaching carrier bombers and the Japanese formation was shattered by the attack with only a single seven-aircraft group not suffering heavily. The Zeros flying cover managed to shoot down three Wildcats and chase the others off, but not before the American fighters had shot down at least three dive-bombers and severely damaged three others. The second group of Hornet fighters was able only to shoot down a single dive-bomber. By 0910hrs, the Japanese were beginning their attack runs on Hornet. Griffin sent his part of TF-16’s CAP south to help defend Hornet.
As the Japanese prepared to attack, TF-17 increased speed to 28 knots and, at 0903hrs, changed course to the northeast. Hornet was positioned with a ring of escorts deployed in a circle 2,000 yards from the carrier. At 0905hrs, Hornet spotted the first Japanese aircraft, seven dive-bombers, coming in from the west. Minutes later, the ship’s 5in. guns opened fire at 10,500 yards. The effectiveness of the antiaircraft fire was much reduced by the beautifully executed attack which split up the antiaircraft defenses.
The first group of carrier bombers began their dives at 0910hrs, emerging at 5,000ft astern of Hornet through a cloud. The first aircraft dropped its bomb but missed to starboard. The second placed a 550-pound semi-armor-piercing bomb in the center of the flight deck abeam the island which penetrated three decks. The third carrier bomber was destroyed by antiaircraft fire before it could release its bomb and landed in the water 30ft from Hornet’s starboard bow. The next aircraft made a successful attack with a high-explosive bomb which hit the flight deck aft, only 20ft from the starboard edge. The blast created an 11ft hole in the flight deck and caused heavy casualties to nearby gun crews. The aircraft was hit by 20mm gunfire and crashed but not before the rear crewmen bailed out by parachute. He lived and remarkably was picked up by a Japanese destroyer the next day. The fifth carrier bomber circled ahead to approach Hornet from her port bow. This aircraft also scored a hit with a semi-armor-piercing bomb which struck near the second hit and passed through four decks causing a heavy loss of life. The next aircraft also circled around to attack from the bow, but missed. The seventh and final aircraft was already crippled by Wildcats and never reached Hornet. Its bomb hit in the carrier’s wake soon followed by the aircraft itself. By any measure, the results of the first dive-bombing attack were impressive. Of the seven carrier bombers to attack, three scored hits and four survived.
One of Murata’s Type 97 carrier attack planes during its attack run against Hornet. The aircraft has yet to drop its torpedo. The photo was taken from heavy cruiser Pensacola with heavy cruiser Northampton in the background. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
A Zuikaku Type 99 carrier bomber about to crash into Hornet. A Shokaku Type 97 carrier attack plane is in the background after launching its weapon at Hornet. This remarkable shot was taken from heavy cruiser Pensacola. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Now the torpedo planes commenced their attack. Their escort intervened against intercepting Wildcats, shooting down two for the loss of a single Zero. Murata’s plan of executing an anvil attack from ahead of Hornet was upset when TF-17 changed course to the northeast. This forced Murata’s group into a tactically disadvantageous stern attack. The 11 torpedo planes increased speed to at least get a beam shot while Hornet’s captain attempted to keep his stern to the attackers to give them as small a target as possible. The first group to attack consisted of the three planes led by Murata. Flying at 300ft, they approached Hornet from her starboard quarter. The first Type 97 carrier attack plane dropped its torpedo from 1,500 yards and then was shot down. The next two closed to within 1,000 yards before dropping their weapons. After banking away, Murata’s aircraft was hit and crashed off Hornet’s starboard side. The third aircraft survived.
Though they did not launch from a good angle, the attack was devastating. At 0915hrs, the first torpedo struck Hornet amidships just aft of the island. Within seconds, the next torpedo struck aft in the engineering spaces. The third torpedo just missed ahead. The results were immediate. The forward engine room and two firerooms were knocked out by flooding, causing the ship to lose power and come to a stop and the ship took a 10-degree starboard list. The next group of three torpedo bombers followed a minute later. The first aircraft was shot down after jettisoning its torpedo, and the other two missed with their torpedoes to starboard. As Hornet continued its turn to the northwest, the attack angle for the final five aircraft became even worse. The next group of three passed through the screen to attack Hornet. One aircraft jettisoned its torpedo and was shot down exiting the formation; the other two missed with their torpedoes but survived. The final two aircraft decided to attack heavy cruiser Pensacola. One launched its torpedo and missed, and the other, after catching fire from antiaircraft fire, attempted to crash into the cruiser. It missed Pensacola’s bow by only a few feet before hitting the water. Murata’s torpedo bombers had delivered the most important blows of the entire battle. From his 11 aircraft, eight torpedoes were launched at Hornet and two struck. Five carrier attack planes were shot down.
In the next shot of the sequence from Pensacola, the carrier bomber has just struck Hornet’s signal bridge. Two withdrawing Type 97 carrier attack planes can be seen at right. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Hornet’s signal bridge after the crash of Shokaku’s Type 99 carrier bomber. Burning fuel from the aircraft sprayed the signal bridge killing seven men. The fuselage of the aircraft penetrated the flight deck and almost reached a ready room in the level below. However, the aircraft’s bomb failed to explode, greatly minimizing damage. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
The second group of Zuikaku carrier bombers moved to the north to attack Hornet where they ran into the Enterprise fighters coming south to assist Hornet. Of the six carrier bombers, one aircraft was destroyed before it entered a dive while the other five attacked just as Murata’s torpedo bombers were doing their deadly work. The remaining dive-bombers attacked from 12,000ft from Hornet’s port side. Four attacked Hornet, but none scored a hit. The last carrier bomber was already in flames when it appeared over Hornet at 0914hrs. The pilot (if still alive) decided to crash his aircraft onto the carrier and the plane’s starboard wing hit the edge of the ship’s stack while the fuselage bounced off the island and penetrated the flight deck. The resulting fires burned for two hours.
The final group of carrier bombers was the least successful. Three aircraft were lost in the initial Wildcat interception, and the remaining aircraft turned south. At 0914hrs, they were intercepted by Enterprise fighters at 13,000ft. One dive-bomber was shot down in its dive, but three more pressed the attack. All missed Hornet, but only one survived subsequent Wildcat attacks while leaving the area of TF-17.
The last group to attack consisted of the nine Shokaku carrier attack planes coming in from the north. These had no Zero escort and were assailed by Wildcats. Three were shot down, and one attempted to crash into the light cruiser Juneau, but was shot down in the attempt. The remaining five approached the screen, and another was shot down by destroyer Morris. The surviving four closed to within 300–800 yards of Hornet’s bows before releasing their torpedoes, but scored no hits.
Hornet seen during the attack from Shokaku’s torpedo planes and Zuikaku’s dive-bombers. The carrier is already listing to starboard because of two torpedo hits and a fire is burning aft as a result of one of the bomb hits. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
The last attacks on Hornet were from two aircraft crippled by the Wildcats. The first appeared at 0917hrs off the carrier’s stern. Already smoking, the carrier bomber attempted to drop its bomb from a shallow dive, but it landed off the bow by some 50 yards. Then the Japanese pilot pulled up off his dive, reversed course over Northampton, and headed back to Hornet with the obvious intent of crashing onto the ship. The pilot skillfully passed ahead of the bow and then crashed into the ship forward on the port side. The body of the plane penetrated through the gallery deck and landed in the forward elevator pit starting a fire. Only a minute later, a carrier attack plane from the northern group which had previously jettisoned its torpedo returned to crash into the carrier. It approached Hornet from dead ahead, but the wounded aircraft crashed in the water before reaching the ship.
As the last air combat took place between the American CAP and the retreating Japanese, it was possible to take account. The attack represented the finest, and certainly the last, coordinated strike by Japanese aircraft on an American carrier. The result was serious damage to Hornet – she was left dead in the water from two torpedoes, three bomb hits, and two crashed aircraft. Hornet was without power to fight fires or conduct flight operations, though counter-flooding reduced the list to only two degrees. The price paid for this success was very high. The Japanese delivered 53 attack aircraft over TF-17. Of these, only a fraction was recovered safely. Of the 12 fighters, seven returned; of 21 carrier bombers, a mere four returned; and of the 20 carrier attack planes, again only four returned. In exchange, the Americans lost six Wildcats, though two pilots were later rescued.
| Japanese losses in the attack on TF-17, by cause | |||
| Zero fighters | Carrier bombers | Carrier attack planes | |
| Starting | 12 | 21 | 20 |
| Lost to CAP | 3 | 7 | 2 |
| Lost to AA fire | 0 | 4 | 8 |
| Ditched on return | 2 | 6 | 6 |
| Survived | 7 | 4 | 4 |
The second Japanese wave had an opportunity to convert a promising beginning to the battle into a decisive victory. By 0945hrs, Enterprise’s CAP numbered only 11 fighters. Kinkaid turned TF-16 to the southeast at 27 knots and headed into some rain squalls. By 1000hrs, the CAP was down to only eight fighters and a strike of ten unescorted Dauntlesses from VB-10 was being refueled and re-armed on the carrier’s deck.
Enterprise’s movements were already known to the Japanese. Japanese monitoring of American radio circuits, in particular the FDO circuit which kept referring to REAPER (Enterprise) and BLUE (Hornet) Bases, confirmed there were at least two carriers active. This was confirmed by the 0920hrs sighting report of Enterprise from the first attack wave and updated when the tracking plane from Zuikaku radioed a 0937hrs report of Enterprise’s location.
Unlike the first wave, the second Japanese wave approached in two groups. The first consisted of 19 carrier bombers from Shokaku escorted by five Zeros. These approached Enterprise at 16,140ft. Forty-five minutes behind these were 17 carrier attack planes with torpedoes from Zuikaku escorted by four Zeros. The first American detection of the incoming second wave was by heavy cruiser Northampton’s radar at about 0930hrs when the Shokaku dive-bombers were detected to the northwest at 76 miles. At about 0945hrs, the first ship in TF-16 gained contact at 55 miles when South Dakota raised the alarm. Again, the radar on Enterprise proved deficient and did not gain contact on the large group of bogeys until they were only 45 miles out.
The leader of the Shokaku carrier bombers, Lieutenant-Commander Seki Mamoru spotted Hornet first but quickly discerned she was heavily damaged. He led his group to the east and soon spotted TF-16 20 miles beyond. At 1008hrs, he ordered his group to attack. As the Japanese aircraft approached, Kinkaid brought TF-16 into a starboard turn and headed to the southwest. Enterprise’s CAP was not well positioned. Eight fighters were overhead at 10,000ft while another 13 circled at lower altitudes. Potentially most damaging, the strike of ten Dauntlesses was still in various stages of being fueled and armed on the carrier’s flight and hangar decks.
After the initial Japanese attack, Hornet was left dead in the water and listing to starboard. A destroyer is alongside and Northampton is standing by. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
JUNYO ATTACKS (pp. 74-75)
Following the attack of Carrier Division 1, Junyo’s strike of 17 carrier bombers approached TF-16. At 1120hrs, the leader of the strike spotted Enterprise and ordered an immediate attack. The dive-bombers were not intercepted by Enterprise’s CAP, but encountered clouds over the carrier which prevented the formation from gaining good dive positions and prevented all the attackers from tracking Enterprise. A group of eight dive-bombers (1) dove on Enterprise (2) from astern but their shallow 45-degree dives made them vulnerable to antiaircraft fire (3). Each of the Type 99 Carrier Bombers was engaged in sequence as it attacked Enterprise. Four of the dive-bombers were shot down in exchange for a single near miss (4) on the carrier.
The height of the dive-bombing attack from Shokaku’s aircraft against Enterprise. This photo shows the intensity of the antiaircraft fire. Enterprise is at left and South Dakota is at right. At least two of the Type 99 carrier bombers are visible over Enterprise. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
At 1020hrs, one of the last of Shokaku’s Type 99 carrier bombers placed its weapon only 10ft off Enterprise’s starboard quarter. In addition to opening submerged hull plates, a VB-10 Dauntless ended up precariously balanced on the starboard 20mm gallery. Deck crews tried to push the aircraft over the side which was finally accomplished when Captain Hardison aided their efforts by putting the carrier into a hard port turn. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
The initial orders from the FDO were ineffective. Griffin sent most of the fighters to the northeast to intercept, but since he had no information on the altitude of the Japanese, he did not order the Wildcats to climb. Seki formed his 19 carrier bombers into three groups which he deployed in line astern to attack out of the sun. They headed toward TF-16 almost from due north and approached Enterprise from her starboard side. Because the American fighters were at a lower altitude, Seki’s dive-bombers reached their pushover point largely unmolested. Only two American fighters engaged the Japanese aircraft before they began their dive, and only a single Japanese aircraft was shot down at 1014hrs. Though the American CAP was ineffective in defending TF-16, the antiaircraft fire of the American ships proved deadly. When the attack began at 1015hrs, the heavy antiaircraft batteries on Enterprise and South Dakota, trailing the carrier by 2,500 yards, engaged each dive-bomber in succession as it conducted its attack.
Seki and three other carrier bombers were shot down, and none of the aircraft scored a hit on Enterprise. Two minutes later, the next group of seven aircraft attacked the carrier from astern. The lead bomber in this group dove through the heavy antiaircraft fire to place a 550-pound high-explosive bomb in the middle of the flight deck only 20ft from the bow at 1017hrs. Damage was light since it went through the flight deck, through the forecastle and then exploded in air off the port bow. One Dauntless on the bow was blown over the side and another pushed over deliberately to put out a small fire. A minute later, a second hit, this one with a semi-armor-piercing bomb, landed 10ft abaft of the forward elevator in the center of the flight deck. An explosion in the hangar deck created a fire that resulted in six Dauntlesses being tossed over the side to avoid feeding it. The bomb continued to the second deck where a repair party was killed and a fire started in the well of the forward elevator. Another near miss very close aboard the starboard quarter was recorded at 1020hrs. This opened underwater seams and resulted in another Wildcat being blown overboard and a Dauntless being pushed overboard. The aircraft which scored the near miss was engaged by fighters on the way out and destroyed.
Of the 12 carrier bombers from the second and third groups, only one bombed accurately enough to gain a damaging near miss. Losses were extremely high with six aircraft shot down, including two destroyed by fighters before they could attack, another by fighters after it had dropped its bomb, and another three by antiaircraft fire. Overall, the Japanese lost ten of 19 carrier bombers with three destroyed by fighters and seven from antiaircraft fire. Damage to Enterprise was not serious. However, 44 crewmen were dead and ten aircraft (one fighter and nine Dauntlesses) destroyed. The Japanese claimed six hits and radioed at 1030hrs that the carrier was burning and listing to starboard.
Aircraft from the Zuikaku and Shokaku attempt to disable the US fleet carrier.
JAPANESE FORCES
1 Shokaku Carrier Bomber Squadron (7 Type 99 carrier bombers)
2 Shokaku Carrier Bomber Squadron (7 Type 99 carrier bombers)
3 Shokaku Carrier Bomber Squadron (5 Type 99 carrier bombers)
4 Shokaku Fighter Unit (5 A6M Type 0 fighters)
5 Zuikaku Carrier Attack Squadron (8 Type 97 carrier attack planes)
6 Zuikaku Carrier Attack Squadron (8 Type 97 carrier attack planes)
7 Zuikaku Carrier Fighter Squadron (4 A6M Type 0 fighters
AMERICAN FORCES
A Enterprise
B South Dakota
C Smith
D Mahan
E Portland
F Cushing
G Maury
H San Juan
I Preston
J Conygham
K VF-10 CAP at 10,000ft (8 F4F)
L VF-10 CAP at lower altitudes (13 F4F)
EVENTS
1 1008hrs – Lieutenant-Commander Seki Mamoru orders his Carrier Bomber Squadron to attack Enterprise. He divides his 19 carrier bombers into three groups and approaches Enterprise from the north.
2 1014hrs – Seki’s seven dive-bombers reach their pushover point unmolested by Wildcats.
3 1015hrs – Dive-bombing attack begins from Enterprise’s starboard quarter. Four aircraft are shot down by antiaircraft fire and no hits are scored.
4 1017hrs – Next group of seven aircraft attack from astern. The lead bomber hits Enterprise in the forward section of the flight deck but damage is light. At 1018hrs a second bomb hit causes an explosion in the hangar deck creating a fire.
5 1020hrs – Third group of dive-bombers gains a near miss very close aboard the starboard quarter which opens underwater seams.
6 1035hrs – Radar aboard Enterprise detects a large group of aircraft to the northwest. CAP is now 11 Wildcats at altitude and an additional 14 at low altitude.
7 1038hrs – Leader of Zuikaku Carrier Attack Squadron, Lieutenant Imajuku Shigeichiro, makes visual contact with TF-16 and orders an attack. He divides his force into two 8-plane groups to attack Enterprise from each bow. The first group heads south through a bank of clouds while the second group continues to the southeast with all four escorting Zeros.
8 1046hrs – Imajuku’s aircraft is shot down by Wildcats, but the remainder of his group is not attacked by CAP. The first torpedo is launched from Enterprise’s starboard beam and misses. Enterprise makes a sharp turn to starboard and evades the next three. The last aircraft of the first group attacks Enterprise from dead ahead and misses. Five of the eight aircraft are shot down.
9 1048hrs – Two aircraft from the first group attack South Dakota with no success.
10 1047hrs – Second group commences attack. Wildcats destroy one and force another to abort. One crippled aircraft crashes into destroyer Smith.
11 1052hrs – Five aircraft drop on Enterprise from astern and all miss. Three aircraft from the second group are shot down. All told, nine Type 97 carrier attack planes attack Enterprise, but all torpedoes miss.
A Zuikaku Type 97 carrier attack plane after dropping its torpedo against Enterprise heads toward battleship South Dakota to exit the formation of TF-16. This remarkable view was taken from the port side of Enterprise’s island. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
At the conclusion of the dive-bomber attacks, Griffin instructed 11 Wildcats to gain altitude in expectation of a follow-up attack. An additional 14 fighters were circling at low altitude. The first indication of another attack was gained at 1035hrs when the radar aboard Enterprise detected a large group of bogies to the northwest. Griffin was able to position his CAP better for this round. He warned his airborne fighters at 1044hrs that the enemy was to the northwest at 15 miles and was composed of torpedo bombers.
This was the carrier attack plane squadron from Zuikaku approaching TF-16 at about 13,000ft. At 1035hrs, the flight leader, Lieutenant Imajuku Shigeichiro made visual contact with TF-17. Minutes later, he saw the TF-16 steaming to the southwest. He chose the seemingly undamaged carrier for attack. His plan was to divide his force into two eight-plane groups to attack the carrier from each bow. The first group headed south through a bank of clouds while the second group with all four fighters continued heading to the southeast through the same bank of clouds.
Imajuku’s eight aircraft attacked first. Since they were unescorted, Imajuku moved to wave-top level some distance from TF-16. Only a single aircraft was engaged by fighters before reaching TF-16; this was Imajuku’s aircraft shot down at about 1046hrs. His wingman launched his torpedo from Enterprise’s starboard beam and missed. The next section came in from Enterprise’s starboard bow and launched its torpedoes. Enterprise made a sharp turn to starboard and was successful in evading all three. The final section of two aircraft was unable to get a proper attack position on Enterprise so went after South Dakota trailing astern. The first aircraft released its torpedo and missed, but the second aircraft was set afire by antiaircraft fire and continued to approach the massive battleship. The pilot got close enough actually to launch its torpedo over South Dakota’s stern so that it entered the water 20 yards off her port quarter. The aircraft crashed 200 yards farther away.
The last aircraft from Imajuku’s section conducted his attack run from dead ahead of Enterprise. The torpedo was not sighted until it was 800 yards away, and a sharp turn made it miss only 100 yards off the starboard side. The aircraft was shot down by the quadruple 1.1in. antiaircraft gun mounted on the carrier’s bow.
The second group of eight aircraft was roughly handled as it dropped through the clouds. Two Wildcats caught the Japanese aircraft in their descent and were able to destroy one, heavily damage another, make another abort, and damage several others. The Zero escorts were unable to intervene. When the six remaining aircraft (including the heavily damaged one) emerged from the clouds, they were astern of TF-16. While moving through the escort screen, one carrier attack plane which had been set afire either by a pursuing Wildcat or by antiaircraft fire decided it could not attack the carrier and instead chose to dive on the destroyer Smith. The aircraft struck the destroyer at 1047hrs on 5in. mount number two, just forward of the bridge. The entire forward section of the destroyer was soon in flames from the fuel aboard the aircraft and then from the aircraft’s torpedo exploding.
The remaining five torpedo planes attempted to get a launch position off the carrier’s port bow. The carrier attempted to keep its stern to the approaching Japanese in order to present as small a target as possible. One of the five launched its torpedo from dead astern and was shot down by antiaircraft fire. The torpedo missed. The last four launched torpedoes from the carrier’s port quarter, but only one even came close. The attack was over at 1052hrs. Wildcats shot down two more carrier attack planes on their way out of the battle area.
The torpedo plane attack against Enterprise was the key point in the battle. If even a single torpedo had hit Enterprise, it could have meant disaster. In the three previous carrier battles, any time that a Japanese air-launched torpedo hit a carrier, it was enough to start a chain of events leading to the loss of the ship. The same fate awaited Hornet at Santa Cruz. Of the 16 torpedo planes which began the attack, nine launched their weapons at Enterprise. On this occasion, the CAP had done a credible job by savaging one of the two groups of torpedo planes and disrupting the coordination between the two groups. A single Wildcat pilot was credited with five torpedo planes shot down. The escape of Enterprise was certainly a close-run thing.
Destroyer Smith on fire after being crashed into by a Shokaku Type 97 carrier attack plane. This view is from South Dakota. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
THE END OF HORNET (pp. 82-83)
The Advance Force observed flashes from the gunfire of destroyers Mustin and Anderson at 2035hrs as the American ships carried out their orders to scuttle Hornet. Kondo ordered several destroyers to pursue and destroy the American ships. At 2214hrs lead elements of the Advance Force arrived in the vicinity of Hornet. The carrier was listing 45 degrees to port and was consumed by flame (1). After Kondo broke off the pursuit of the Americans, destroyers Akigumo and Makigumo returned to Hornet at 2200hrs to determine if the ship could be salvaged. The Japanese investigated the wreck and determined salvage was impossible and determined Hornet’s identity from the small “8” hull numbers (she carried no number on her flight deck). Akigumo and Makigumo (2) each fired two torpedoes (3) to finish off the carrier. All four were seen to hit, and the carrier finally sank at 0135hrs.
One of Junyo’s dive-bombers places a bomb near Enterprise’s starboard side during the 1100hrs attack. None of the eight Junyo dive-bombers which attacked Enterprise gained a direct hit. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Heavy cruiser Northampton was assigned the mission of towing Hornet out of the battle area. The attempt was ultimately unsuccessful since there was no air cover to prevent additional attacks on the crippled carrier. After a third torpedo hit on Hornet, the effort was abandoned. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
In a bizarre set of events, TF-16 suffered another loss just before the arrival of Seki’s dive-bombers. Two Enterprise Avengers returned just before 1000hrs. One still had its torpedo aboard. Since the Enterprise could not land them at that time, the pilot of the damaged Avenger ditched his aircraft near destroyer Porter. Soon after the aircraft entered the water, one of Porter’s lookouts spotted a torpedo to port. It was the Mark XIII torpedo from the ditched Avenger now running in circles. At 1004hrs, it struck Porter amidships in her engineering spaces, bringing the ship to a halt. The unfortunate destroyer was scuttled by Kinkaid’s command just after noon.
The last Japanese carrier was also preparing to strike. The Advance Force was moving to close the range to the American carriers. Kakuta planned for his strike to be launched at 0905hrs from an estimated 280 miles from TF-61. The first wave consisted of 12 Zeros and 17 carrier bombers, followed by a second strike of seven carrier attack planes. After the launch of this strike, Kondo detached Junyo and two destroyers to operate with Nagumo and took the rest of the Advance Force to the southeast in search of the American task forces.
As Junyo’s strike approached TF-16, the radar on Enterprise ceased working. While the incoming strike was detected by the SC radar aboard South Dakota to the west at 45 miles, this information never got to the FDO. When Enterprise’s radar came back on line at 1115hrs, it detected a large group of unknown aircraft at 20 miles. The airborne CAP had no time to react to this information and was not helped by Griffin’s vague directions. At 1121hrs, the first of Junyo’s dive-bombers appeared out of the clouds above Enterprise. The leader of the Junyo dive-bombers had sighted Hornet dead in the water at 1040hrs, but continued on in search of more important prey after officers on Junyo countermanded his intention to attack Hornet’s cruiser escort. At 1120hrs, he spotted TF-16 through a break in the clouds and ordered an immediate attack. They were not intercepted by fighters, but the clouds prevented them from getting the best attack position. Consequently, the dive-bombers dove on Enterprise from astern but in a shallow 45-degree dive which made them vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. A group of eight carrier bombers was the first to attack. The first three all missed and all were destroyed by antiaircraft fire. The lead aircraft in the next section of three aircraft dropped his bomb less than 10ft off the port bow which opened plating to the sea and knocked out the mechanism controlling the jammed forward elevator. The next four aircraft all missed.
The other group of nine dive-bombers lost contact with Enterprise in the low clouds. As a result, they ended up conducting disjointed attacks against the now spread-out TF-16 beginning at 1129hrs. Four broke out of the clouds above South Dakota and dove on the battleship. The first three bombs missed, but the last hit the heavily armored top of the forward 16in. turret. The turret was undamaged, but the shrapnel wounded several, including the ship’s captain. The remaining five carrier bombers attacked the antiaircraft cruiser San Juan off Enterprise’s port bow. The first three bombers missed at 1132hrs, while the fourth scored a damaging near miss on the port side. The last aircraft placed an armor-piercing bomb on the cruiser’s stern which passed all the way through the thinly armored ship before exploding under the hull. This resulted in flooding in several compartments and temporarily jammed the rudder. None of the nine aircraft was hit by antiaircraft fire, but four were destroyed by fighters and Dauntlesses while exiting the battle area. Of the five carrier bombers surviving from the first group, American aircraft accounted for another carrier bomber destroyed and another heavily damaged. The 12 escorting Junyo fighters suffered no losses, and probably accounted for two Wildcats and an Avenger.
The full exchange of carrier strikes from TF-61 and the four Japanese carriers had resulted in heavy damage to both sides. Two of the four Japanese carriers were out of action. Hornet remained dead in the water and Enterprise was damaged, but still in action. Nevertheless, the Japanese had gained the upper hand and sought to finish off the surviving American flight deck.
Nagumo and his staff tried to make sense of the morning’s action and decided that three American carriers were in action. One was the cripple often sighted during the morning and the other two were operating to the north and northwest of the cripple. At 1132hrs, Nagumo radioed this assessment. Since the actual position of Enterprise was now south of Hornet, this erroneous assessment had the effect of leading later Japanese attacks off Enterprise’s trail.
Nagumo’s means to conduct additional attacks were limited by the heavy losses from the morning attacks. The surviving aircraft from the first wave started to recover on Zuikaku at 1140hrs and some were directed to Junyo located to the southwest. The recovery was completed by 1230hrs, but the total haul was only ten fighters, eight carrier attack planes and one carrier bomber aboard Zuikaku and two fighters, four carrier bombers and one carrier attack plane on Junyo. Thirteen aircraft from the first wave were forced to ditch – two fighters, six carrier bombers and five carrier attack planes. During the recovery, Junyo steamed close to Zuikaku and Nagumo detached his last surviving carrier and five destroyers to operate with Junyo. Nagumo and his staff were stuck onboard his flagship Shokaku now heading out of the combat area at 31 knots. Meanwhile, Kondo had ordered the Vanguard Force to break off its northwesterly heading and steam toward the Support Force which was heading toward the last known position of the Americans.
As the Japanese prepared to mount additional strikes, Kinkaid faced a very different situation. Hornet was dead in the water and attempts by heavy cruiser Northampton to begin towing the carrier were only partially unsuccessful. Enterprise was damaged, and Kinkaid faced the prospect of landing all aloft aircraft on a single deck with no functioning forward elevator. He was certain that one or two undamaged Japanese carriers remained, and was unable to provide CAP over the crippled Hornet. To remain in the battle only risked losing Enterprise, which would have been calamitous. With all this in mind, Kinkaid made the correct decision to withdraw. At 1135hrs, he informed Halsey of his decision.
It was critical that Enterprise recovered the aircraft from the two strikes and from CAP duty. As many as 73 aircraft were aloft – 28 Wildcats, 24 Dauntlesses and 21 Avengers. In the first phase of the recovery, 23 Wildcats and all 24 Dauntlesses were brought on board until the deck was unable to handle any more. Five fighters were forced to ditch. At 1235hrs, with the Avengers still aloft and while Enterprise respotted the deck and moved aircraft into the hangar bay, TF-16 changed course to the southeast and increased speed to 27 knots to exit the area. As soon as aircraft could be fueled and re-armed, 25 Wildcats were sent back into the air beginning at 1251hrs. Finally, ten of the Avengers were recovered and another decided to go to Espiritu Santo. Afterwards 13 Dauntlesses were sent to Espiritu Santo to ease the congestion. Enterprise still had 84 aircraft onboard (41 fighters, 33 dive-bombers, and ten Avengers). The disaster of losing the bulk of the aircraft from two air groups had been averted.
At 1300hrs, Yamamoto issued orders to Kondo to pursue and destroy the retreating Americans. This would be accomplished in one of two ways. The Japanese still retained two operating flight decks. Admiral Kakuta on Junyo and Captain Nomoto on Zuikaku both prepared to launch follow-up strikes with their remaining aircraft. Meanwhile, both Kondo’s Advance Force and the heavy units from the Vanguard Force were attempting to close on the Americans.
The first follow-up strike from Junyo was sent off at 1313hrs to fly to the southeast out to a distance of 260 miles. It consisted of eight Zeros (from three different parent carriers) and seven carrier attack planes (only six carried torpedoes). At the same time, Zuikaku was also putting together what was available for her third strike of the day. This one included five fighters (from two different carriers), two carrier bombers, and seven carrier attack planes (six armed with 800kg bombs and the last to act as a tracker aircraft). The flight was commanded by a lieutenant; the junior status of the flight commander and the small numbers of strike aircraft indicated how savagely the morning strikes had been treated by American defenses.
Between 1320 and 1400hrs, Zuikaku and Junyo recovered all remaining aircraft, but the Japanese were clearly down to a small number of strike aircraft. Zuikaku recovered five Zeros (four from Junyo), seven carrier bombers from Shokaku, and seven carrier attack planes (six from Zuikaku and one from Shokaku). Junyo landed another nine fighters (one from Zuikaku) and six carrier bombers from her first strike. During this time, another two fighters, four carrier bombers and a carrier attack plane were forced to ditch. The recovering aircraft were damaged in many cases and the crews physically exhausted and emotionally drained after their experiences. Nomoto decided that he would not mount a fourth strike. Kakuta pushed his men harder, and ordered another strike before dusk with whatever aircraft could be readied. The best that Junyo could do was a strike of six Zeros and four carrier bombers launched at 1535hrs.
Enterprise was able to maintain a CAP over TF-16 which did not really matter since TF-16 had moved beyond Japanese striking range. However, it was impossible to maintain any air cover over TF-17. As TF-16 retreated, Hornet and her escorts were left to fend for themselves. After the first attempt to tow Hornet was interrupted by a Japanese aircraft feigning a dive-bomb attack, heavy cruiser Northampton returned to rig a new towing line. By 1330hrs, the line was rigged and a speed of three knots achieved. Later, a speed of six knots was reached and Murray headed the crippled carrier to the east.
Hornet after being abandoned. Some of the crew members are visible in life rafts to the right. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
This is the scene as Shokaku’s 19 carrier bombers attack Enterprise beginning at 1015hrs. Enterprise is in the center of the frame and appears to have just been subjected to several near misses. The bulk of the antiaircraft barrage over the carrier is from South Dakota deployed 2,500 yards astern. In this scene, one dive-bomber is flying forward of Enterprise after dropping its weapon and another is above the carrier to the left of center. (Samuel Morison Collection courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command)
The Japanese had no intention of letting Hornet escape. Throughout the morning, Japanese aircraft monitored the progress of American attempts to salvage the carrier. Since TF-17 had no CAP, Hornet remained terribly vulnerable. At 1345hrs, the radar aboard Northampton picked up a group of aircraft to the northwest at 103 miles. This was the Junyo strike, which continued to linger to the northwest according to the radar track on Northampton. Later, at 1400hrs, the cruiser detected another group of aircraft to the northwest at 110 miles. This was the Zuikaku strike; both Japanese groups were attempting to find the undamaged American carrier operating to the north of Hornet as assessed by Nagumo’s staff. Finally, the Junyo strike abandoned this fruitless search and headed south. At 1513hrs, the strike leader spotted the damaged Hornet and with no other targets in the offing, decided to attack her. With the Japanese aircraft inbound, Northampton again cast off her tow line to Hornet and prepared to defend the crippled carrier. The six carrier attack planes armed with torpedoes all attacked from the Hornet’s starboard side. The strike leader skillfully placed his torpedo just aft of the two previous torpedo hits. The other five torpedoes failed to score, but the one hit was sufficient to increase the list to some 14 degrees and make any successful salvage operation unlikely. The successful torpedo pilot was shot down after his drop, as was another of the Type 97 aircraft. Five Zeros also did not return to Junyo. Next to find Hornet were the two carrier bombers from Zuikaku. These attacked at 1541hrs and scored a near miss.
With the list increasing to 20 degrees, Captain Mason ordered his crew to abandon ship just after the dive-bombing attack. During the early process of abandoning ship, the six Zuikaku carrier attack planes operating as level bombers with large 1,760-pound bombs executed an attack run at 1555hrs from 8,000ft off Hornet’s port quarter. One of the bombs hit aft on the flight deck but caused little damage. The rest missed astern. The final attack of the day occurred at 1650hrs when Junyo’s four carrier bombers arrived on the scene. One of the aircraft scored a hit forward of the island which penetrated the flight deck and exploded on the hangar deck causing a fire.
Hornet’s fate was decided. Mason was the last to leave the ship at 1627hrs. After the final air attack, Murray assigned the destroyer Mustin the task of sinking Hornet while the remaining ships of TF-17 steamed east at 27 knots. Mustin fired eight torpedoes into the carrier and four exploded. This did not have the immediate desired effect, so Murray sent destroyer Anderson to finish the carrier. She also fired her full load of eight torpedoes, and this time six were seen to explode. Still the carrier would not go down. Now the two destroyers pumped 430 rounds of 5in. shells into the carrier; this caused a fire throughout her length, but the ship still refused to sink. The two American destroyers departed at 2030hrs. At about 2100hrs, Japanese destroyers Makigumo and Akigumo arrived in the vicinity of Hornet. They confirmed her identity and determined the ship was obviously beyond salvage. They fired four more torpedoes into the blazing hulk. Hornet finally sank the next day at 0130hrs.
The battle had gone well for the Japanese, but Kondo was determined to capitalize on the success of the day and pursue the Americans throughout the night. At 1804hrs, he ordered his forces to prepare for a night battle and form a scouting line to catch any fleeing or crippled American ships. By this point, Abe’s Vanguard Force and Kondo’s Advance Force were only a dozen miles apart. Destroyers from the Vanguard Force quickly located the burning Hornet. Kondo decided to break off the pursuit at 2300hrs if nothing else was detected. The two remaining Japanese carriers were sent north in preparation for a morning search; results of the search would dictate whether the battle continued or not. The night allowed the Japanese to take stock of their remaining air strength. Losses had been extremely heavy, but 97 aircraft remained aboard the two operational carriers. Aboard Zuikaku were 67 aircraft – 38 fighters, ten carrier bombers and 19 carrier attack planes. Junyo boasted 12 fighters, 12 carrier bombers and six carrier attack planes.
For the Japanese, the number of American carriers involved in the battle remained unclear. The early consensus was three, though no Japanese aviator had seen three separate American carriers. Nomoto discerned this after personally debriefing the crews of returning scout planes. Kakuta thought there were three, and reported at about 1830hrs that all were sunk or badly damaged. Yamamoto weighed in at 1950hrs with an assessment that four carriers had been attacked and that one had sunk and the other three were badly damaged. This was also Nagumo’s view. All were sure that the “Naval Battle of the South Pacific” was a great victory.
The air searches on the morning of October 27 revealed nothing, so after conducting a search for downed aviators in the area of the attacks on Hornet and Enterprise, Kondo headed his forces north. The wounded Shokaku and Zuiho returned to Truk on October 28, and the rest of the Japanese fleet arrived on October 30. The American forces were already in port when the Japanese dropped anchor at Truk. By the morning of October 27, TF-16 was northeast of Espiritu Santo with TF-17 close astern. On the afternoon of the next day, TF-61 arrived in the waters of Noumea.
The Japanese claimed a great victory with three carriers, one battleship, one cruiser, one destroyer, and one unidentified large warship sunk and 79 American aircraft destroyed (plus those that went down with the sunken carriers). This was obviously excessive, but the real losses were severe enough. Hornet was sunk along with the destroyer Porter. Enterprise was damaged, as was the battleship South Dakota, light cruiser San Juan, and destroyers Smith and Mahan (damaged in a collision with South Dakota while exiting the battle area on October 27). Of the 175 aircraft at the start of the battle on the two carriers, 80 were lost to all causes (33 fighters, 28 dive-bombers and 19 Avengers).
The intensity of the barrage above Enterprise grows as the Japanese dive-bombing attack continues. The carrier is executing a sharp port turn and is heeling to starboard. A dive-bomber has been hit and is in flames above the Enterprise. Ten of the 19 Type 99 carrier bombers were shot down over TF-16. (Samuel Morison Collection courtesy of Naval History and Heritage Command)
Japanese losses were also heavy. Three ships were badly damaged and would require extensive repairs in Japan – carriers Shokaku and Zuiho and heavy cruiser Chikuma. The real loss to the Japanese was in aircraft, and even more importantly, in aircrew. Of the 203 aircraft that they began the battle with, almost half (99) were destroyed. Losses were particularly heavy in strike aircraft with 41 of 63 carrier bombers and 30 of 57 carrier attack planes destroyed. The primary agent of destruction was for the first time in a carrier battle evenly split between American CAP (26) and antiaircraft fire (25). The balance of Japanese bomber losses was from ditching and operational losses (18) and one destroyed when Shokaku was bombed.
Aircraft were relatively easy to replace, but trained aircrews were another matter. The Japanese lost 145 aircrew – 68 pilots and 77 observers during the battle. To show the severity of these losses, it should be kept in mind that total aircrew loss at Midway was only 110. An additional aspect of the Santa Cruz losses was that among the 145 aircrew lost were 23 section, squadron, or air group leaders (in the IJN, leaders could be either pilots or observers). This had obvious short-term and long-term implications for the state of Japanese carrier aviation. In return, the Americans lost only a total of 22 aircrew.
Santa Cruz featured the finest Japanese carrier air attack on an American carrier task force of the war. Overall, the Japanese clearly demonstrated that they remained the masters of massing carrier air power. A total of 138 aircraft were committed (42 Zeros, 57 carrier bombers, 36 carrier attack planes and three contact planes) in the initial assault on TF-61. All of these attacked an American carrier formation, though not all attacked the carrier itself. The combination of the Type 97 carrier attack plane with the Type 91 air-launched torpedo was proven again to be a formidable ship-killer. Zeros performed well in the escort role.
The Japanese had taken the lessons from Midway and applied them well. Attention to damage control and improved damage control procedures were far superior as shown by the survival of Shokaku. CAP performance was also much better since aircraft were positioned at various altitudes and were actually given advance notice of incoming American strike aircraft. However, it’s important to note that the Japanese CAP was unable to stop or even seriously disrupt the one strike group which found the Japanese carriers. A critical mistake at Midway was the sloppy planning given to searches. At Santa Cruz, much greater attention was paid to scouting and even the Americans admitted that the performance of Japanese scout aircraft was superior. The Japanese tactic of using the Vanguard Force as an advanced screen to the carriers proved successful, and was commented favorably upon by several after-action American reports.
The Americans still showed an inability to coordinate air strikes and successfully mass carrier air power. This was the result of flawed doctrine and persistent communications problems. Added to this was the poor level of training shown by CAG-10. The result was a series of piecemeal attacks, most against secondary targets. Most damning was the fact that of the two strikes launched, only ten aircraft out of 75 managed to attack their primary target, the flight deck of a Japanese carrier. American torpedo aircraft remained ineffective.
American fighter defense was the most controversial aspect of the battle. The performance of TF-61’s FDO was viewed as ineffective from Halsey on down. The reasons for this were many. A major factor was inadequate warning owing primarily to radar problems on the carriers. Accordingly, the Wildcats were positioned at 10,000ft to save fuel and oxygen. This was seen as a mistake after the battle, especially given the Wildcat’s inability to climb quickly. After-action reports also commented that the air battles were taking place too close to the carriers. Instead of the desired 20 miles away, air engagements at Santa Cruz were occurring only a few miles from the carriers which meant there was insufficient distance to complete the destruction of approaching Japanese formations. Overarching all these problems was a continuing issue with communications. All these lessons were digested and put to good effect later in war. Eventually, American fast carrier task forces gained a high measure of protection from conventional massed Japanese air attack. Santa Cruz was the last time in the war that skillful Japanese carrier aviators could press home their attacks in a determined manner and cause serious damage to an American carrier task force.
