CHAPTER 17

STORM SHADOW

We saw some time ago that JP233 didn’t get much use in Gulf War One. Its successor as Tornado’s primary heavy weapon was Storm Shadow, a stand-off missile. It offered more than stand-off, though; accuracies had come on in leaps and bounds in the meantime, and the idea of countering the opposition’s air effort by cratering his runways had long been superseded. Storm Shadow had the precision to strike more surgically, along with a penetrating warhead to deal with seriously hardened targets.

The weapon is still in front-line service, so readers will appreciate that we may not go into detail on its employment, but the story of its baptism of fire is nevertheless fascinating. To tell it I have called on David Robertson, who was the weapons leader on my squadron when I joined. In fact he is the second member of the pair mentioned earlier who I caught in a bar arguing over which of them taught me more about Tornado operations. David was taken prematurely from my squadron to look after Wing standardisation; although I acknowledged that the Wing needed the best, I was sorry to lose him. But I was delighted to see later that he was selected to command his own squadron, the famous 617 ‘Dambusters’.

To complete the connection, it was 617 that led on introducing Storm Shadow into service. We’ve already heard one take on Gulf War Two, but now let’s join David for another slant. In it he majors on Storm Shadow’s fascinating part – as an immature and unproven system – in that campaign.

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GROUP CAPTAIN DAVID ROBERTSON (RETD)

The introduction of Tornado GR4 in 2000 brought a whole range of new capabilities, with a plethora of new weapons systems able to be integrated into the aircraft. It was therefore decided that individual squadrons would be lead on assisting the introduction of nominated systems. 617 Squadron was charged with leading on Storm Shadow, a conventionally-armed stand-off missile born out of staff requirement 1236. For the first two years of our task, the squadron’s involvement was minimal, flight trials being conducted in the USA and warhead trials at Pendine Sands in Wales. 617’s responsibility was limited to developing standard operating procedures once information became available. I should emphasise right away that the missile wasn’t due to enter service with the RAF for at least another couple of years.

At the point in 2002 when it became clear that military action in Iraq was on the horizon, the squadron was in Kuwait on Operation Resinate South, policing the no-fly zone in southern Iraq. We returned to Lossiemouth at the end of September, leaving construction to begin at Ali al Salem of a hardened missile-storage area. Simultaneously a handful of our engineers were seconded to the Air Warfare Centre to assist with flight trials; this gave them valuable experience of loading and handling the weapon.

In the run-up to Christmas we received at Lossiemouth a new software load, together with two drill rounds, that would provide us with loading/unloading, ground and flight carriage training opportunities. We were told to train six aircrews and sufficient engineers to deploy a capability if required. Squadron Leader Andy Myers, our weapons leader, and Flight Lieutenants Andy ‘Turkey’ Turk and Bob Chevli, the squadron’s QWIs, set to work and, in short time, developed SOPs for weapon ground, flight and firing procedures. Chief Technician Paul Brown developed similar procedures for the engineers for ground handling, loading and unloading. All this was conducted in direct liaison with the AWC and with MBDA’ s weapons and planning experts.

Storm Shadow was a joint RAF/French air force project, the French version being called ‘Scalp’. Turkey and Bob were shown the planning system that MBDA had developed, and immediately spotted a problem. In FAF planning systems the aircraft turns ahead of a waypoint, with the aircraft setting off from the point on planned track. In RAF planning systems, the aircraft reaches a waypoint and then makes a turn onto its outbound track. If it were needed, this provided confirmation of why it makes sense for front-line users to be directly involved with manufacturers at an early development stage.

Squadron air and ground crews continued to train in all the disciplines that would be required if deployed. Unfortunately, different GR4 software loads were required for different weapons, plus aircraft had to be removed from the line to be converted to ‘operational standard’. This limited the training opportunities. However, we managed to get six crews trained up by the end of the first week in February, which was our initially scheduled deployment date. Subsequently, though, the UK air commander informed us that he wanted a demonstrated Storm Shadow capability by 15 February. Cutting it fine, we deployed on the fourteenth. The rest of our air and ground crews deployed a week or so later to Al Udeid, Qatar, as part of the Lossiemouth Tornado detachment there.

The MoD had not announced that Storm Shadow would be used, so everything needed to be kept as ‘need to know’. We were also informed that the media would record the missile at every opportunity; after the first wave, therefore, and provided that it had gone well, the UK would tell the world what had been achieved. Communication security proved a problem in the first few weeks, with a number of transmissions made over hand-held radios referring openly to the movement of Storm Shadow. Consequently, the weapons became referred to first as ‘RAPTOR 2’ and then as ‘combat marrows’.

Armourers work at Ali al Salem in Kuwait to prepare Storm Shadow for action in the Iraq Conflict. (Photo by permission of David Robertson)

The engineers, led by Warrant Officer Ian Winters, were well-versed in the Kuwait environment and settled in quickly, although as normal operations and training continued the team was split between the two-shift patterns that the resident engineers had running. This arrangement created a headache for Ian when missile loading or tasking was required, and needed copious amounts of his tact, subtlety, man-management and organisational skills to maintain a harmonious atmosphere amongst the engineering teams.

The Tornado GR4 used an advanced mission-planning aid to plan sorties and weapon profiles, although the Storm Shadow part of the system was still very immature. Consequently, it was agreed that missile mission planning (from target backwards to weapon release point) would be conducted at PJHQ, and that this information would be transmitted in a data file over satellite to our base. The data file with the missile release point would then be the start point for the aircraft mission plan, which would be from take-off to release point and return to base. This limited our flexibility to amend target data or timing of missions, but it was the only solution that provided an operational capability for a missile – remember this was still long before planned service entry.

I informed the chief of staff at air headquarters, Group Captain Bob McAlpine, that the squadron had demonstrated a capability up to a point, but that we were concerned that a live missile had not even been loaded to a Tornado GR4, let alone flown or fired from one. I also outlined the potential risks to the missiles from reverse thrust (they were not, of course, intended to be brought back for a landing), but suggested that, once authorisation to fly with the missile and software combined was issued, we should load two missiles and fly them up to a simulated ‘power on’ point. This would provide us with greater confidence in our procedures. He agreed, and I was pleased with his forward-leaning attitude. We necessarily involved PJHQ in the plan.

So on 25 February the authorisation arrived, two data files were received from PJHQ and two live missiles were loaded and checked by the engineers and QWIs. Squadron Leader ‘Noddy’ Knowles and Turkey planned and flew a simulated live sortie within Kuwait, and whilst all was good with the loading and ground operations, when the launch sequence was initiated only the left-hand weapon responded. The right-hand missile eventually came good – but it would have been too late for real.

Extensive debriefing and discussion took place over the following days to establish the reason for failure. There were two possible explanations; a loose connection or a pylon switch in the wrong position. The latter would have affected the missile loading, so I favoured the loose connection. As this was 617 Squadron’s most important task during my tenure in command, I wanted to make sure that the system would work on ‘night one’, and therefore asked for and received McAlps’s approval to fly the missiles again. This time, we loaded the same missiles, containing the same mission files, to the same aircraft, but on opposite pylons. The ground crew double and triple-checked all connections and switches and Andy and I got airborne. We flew two representative sortie profiles and initiated two simulated missile attacks, on each occasion with no problems. We now felt that we had done as much as we could to provide an operational capability.

On 14 March, details of our likely contribution to the first night indicated that four Tornado GR4s each loaded with two missiles would be required on the first wave, with another two aircraft on the second wave. This would continue for the first three nights. We planned to operate in pairs, with Andy Myers and me leading Noddy and Turkey in the first pair, Bob Chevli and Flight Lieutenant Andy ‘Ray’ Reardon leading Lieutenant (RN) Phil ‘Flea’ Lee and Squadron Leader Mike ‘Old Bloke’ Wood in the second pair, with Flight Lieutenants Kev Gambold and Toby Warren leading Flight Lieutenants Bobby Bethell and Al Reid in the third pair.

We had a mix of missiles deployed in Kuwait; initial operating capability and full operating capability; the latter were more capable, so it was critical that missiles were allocated to appropriate targets. Therefore not only were we challenged if an aircraft became unserviceable, but when planning missions we also had a missile loser plot to consider.

The first planned mission our pair was due to fly concerned me greatly, as to reach the missile release point, which itself was within a SAM-3 MEZ, we would need to pass very close to two active fighter airfields. I emailed McAlps to let him know of my concern, and the following day received a response informing me that we would be accompanied by F-16CJ, EA-6B and F-15C aircraft, which made me feel much more comfortable.

On 17 March the detachment commander, Group Captain Simon Dobb, informed the squadron commanders and warlords at Ali al Salem that the first air offensive of the Iraq War would take place on the twenty-first – which just happened to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the formation of 617 Squadron. Propitious?

Only two days before the first launch we received a message from MBDA informing us that, at the UK missile storage facility, they had discovered safety pins still in place on missiles received from the French part of the company. If this were also the case on one of ours, it would mean that the wings would not deploy post-release and the missile would fall into the desert. These ‘safety pins’ turned out to be small grub screws that could be detected without having to dismantle the missile, so once each weapon had been taken out of its storage crate it would only take about fifteen minutes to conduct the check. Fortunately, all of ‘our’ grub screws had been removed.

The day before our first missions, Kuwait suffered its first attack when two SSMs were launched from Iraq. Patriot SAMs could be heard launching against them as we dashed for the bunker, which was a reinforced sewage drain. The ‘hostiles clear’ call came but, just as we had got out of our NBC suits and packed everything away, another attack was made and we reconvened inside the same drain, although this stay was shorter-lived. Eventually back in operations, we continued with our mission planning – and then PJHQ asked urgently whether we could bring our attack forward by twelve hours. This was not really possible, as we didn’t have the facility to make amendments to the missile data files.

An hour later another attack came in and we again ran for the shelter and threw on our NBC kit. Eventually, we finished our planning and went back to the mess for dinner. I had just picked up my plate when another air raid was called. Now the shelter was 400 yards away; running with a mask on was a big mistake, as the flow of air into the mask is not great. By the time I reached the shelter I was close to suffocating, but managed to control my breathing and eventually got dressed; I learned a good lesson from that.

21 March was memorable. Missile attacks on Kuwait continued and we ran to shelters at midnight, 1 am, 2.30 am, 3 am and 7.30 am. Consequently, there was little sleep, although I managed a couple of hours between the last two air raids and then two hours after the breakfast alarm. Most of the night was spent in NBC suits. We managed to have lunch before another shelter run at 1 pm. On the final raid, Patriots intercepted a missile overhead the base, with three detonations visible.

Once in the ops building we received another bombshell, as Andy and I were informed that we were overall mission commanders for that night. This was not ideal, not because of the extra pressure involved but because we didn’t have the communications available at Ali al Salem for communicating with all participants, in particular those on the aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, Andy worked hard at coordination issues with the participants whilst I worked with the combined air operations centre resolving a couple of issues regarding time on target. In the end the whole thing turned out to be a mistake; the real mission commander was an F-16 pilot. We didn’t find this out until he spoke to us half an hour before the mission briefing, so a lot of our time had been wasted.

Eventually, we briefed and walked for our first war mission. At the ‘outbrief’ we were informed that the second pair’s targets were a critical pre-requisite to USAF B-2s going downtown Baghdad – it was a bit late to find this out, but fortunately we had already allocated priority to those. Andy and I led Noddy and Turkey in the first pair on the northerly route with Bob and Ray leading Flea and Old Bloke in the second pair on the southerly route. The third pair, Kev and Toby plus Bobby and Al, planned to launch early the following morning.

On crew-in Andy had problems synchronising the Have Quick jam-resistant radio, but we took off on time, avoided the TLAM/cruise missile lane and climbed towards Iraq. A cabin-conditioning caption illuminated, while the Skyshadow ECM pod failed to a reversionary mode. Both of these systems needed to be working properly for the mission; eventually they reset. Although we didn’t realise it at the time, Noddy had also lost his Have Quick and was only able to communicate on clear frequencies. Poor communications, a feature of the Tornado GR4 in 2003, was energy-sapping and extremely frustrating.

En route to the target, both aircraft in our pair were tracked and locked by radar systems on several occasions, although no missiles or AAA were directed at us. There were quite a lot of detonations visible on the ground – disconcerting, as it wasn’t clear whether they were part of the land battle or something coming for us. About halfway to target, Noddy and Turkey defended against a missile fired at them, which necessitated their jettisoning underwing tanks. As these still contained fuel they were now short and were forced to climb to height and route directly to the target. Andy and I no longer had visual cross cover, and Noddy and Turkey were now going to be ahead of us. They calculated that they had just enough fuel to get to the target, fire their missiles and then get home.

The AAA visible around every town was amplified by night-vision goggles, and as we approached Baghdad the sky seemed to be alight with explosions, AAA and missiles. Just prior to the start of the attack run, Andy spotted what he believed to be a SAM-2 missile launched at us. It must have been a ballistic launch, as there had been no radar-warner indications; we evaded its trajectory and headed for the target. As we had lost speed, Andy selected reheat, whereupon an engine surged. The sound, and the tail appearing to be on fire, suggested a missile strike – but the ‘fire’ proved only to be the reheat glow.

Approximately a minute out from our firing point Turkey called to say that his missile had shut down just prior to release but that he was pressing on to fire the other missile at his second target. All this way, all this effort, all this training, all this expectation – all for the missile not to work. What would happen to ours? We were committed and we would soon see.

Our run to the target went uneventfully and we released the first missile about twenty seconds before the planned release point, in case being too close had caused Noddy’s missile to shut down. The first launch was successful, to much relief, and we continued towards the second release point and fired the missile successfully.

Noddy and Turkey, tight on fuel already and now with a missile retained and causing extra drag, were in trouble. The ‘hung’ missile still indicated that it was OK, so once Andy and I were out of the release area they had another go at firing it – but without success. Now there was no way they could get back to base, so they headed off to find a tanker on an AAR towline, with the nearest approximately 200 miles south. They did locate a tanker but were unable to join it in time so, with fuel approaching the minimum, they diverted to a Saudi Arabian station. After refuelling, they were back at base some two hours later.

Our trip home was uneventful, although seeming to take ages, and about 100 miles from the Kuwaiti border we started to see our own troops, miles and miles of vehicles illuminated to NVGs by IR lights on top of each vehicle. Seeing so much firepower on its way north-westwards was quite something.

The other pair had a relatively quiet time, although Bob saw a SAM launch; it passed above their canopy but was no real threat. Back at Ali al Salem we were met by Ian Winters and his engineers, who were as keyed up for this as the aircrew were. At operations we spoke with the third formation, who were about to fly their mission, debriefed our sortie and then headed for the bunker again as another attack was inbound. We were able to watch TV pictures from Baghdad and it looked horrendous, much worse than it had appeared from the air. Mind you, at the time it had seemed that there was as much coming up at us as there was raining down on them.

The following day brought news of the loss of two RN Sea King helicopters, with seven lives lost. We looked at the battle damage assessment from the previous night. All designated points of impact had small holes (the warhead was designed not to detonate until deep inside) exactly or very close to where planned. Noddy then briefed us on what he expected for the night’s sortie. We would launch four aircraft, the first pair each with two missiles to fire and the second pair each to fire one, with one each available as backup.

The small entry hole belies the damage done down below by a Storm Shadow attack. (Crown Copyright)

This second mission was as different as chalk and cheese from the first. Communications were good, no threats were encountered and everything in our pair ran on rails. It wasn’t quite the same for the other pair. After power had been applied on the ground to Old Bloke’s weapons, the left one failed. He could fire his second missile at the target, which was not a problem, although it meant that we had another ‘failed’ missile. Then when Ray in the second aircraft initiated his missile launch, the air intake cover blew off as planned but the missile’s engine failed to light, so the weapon was not released. Although they could have fired their second missile, the crew weren’t positive that this would have been a good option and rightly decided not to. So, we returned that night having launched five of the planned six and brought back two ‘bad’ missiles.

Just as I was leaving to go back to my accommodation, Derek Watson, OC IX Squadron, radioed that a SAM had been launched at them in northern Kuwait. On waking up the following morning, I heard on the radio news that a US missile had shot down an RAF aircraft in a ‘friendly fire’ incident. I rushed down the corridor to find out whether we were all accounted for, to be told that Flight Lieutenants Kev Main and Dave Williams had not returned. It was a heck of a shock. The missile launch that OC IX Squadron had reported the previous night had been a US Patriot inbound to his wingman. Kev had left the Dambusters only two months earlier and my air and ground crews were all most terribly shocked and upset at the loss of this popular man – although none of us let the tragedy interfere with our task.

When we went in to plan our third mission, there turned out to be no suitable targets available. For the next few days, therefore, we switched to conventional attack tasking. Generally we’d be loaded with LGBs, with tasking received once airborne. On my first no-fly day I was asked to telephone the chief of the air staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire, back in the UK. As I waited for him to respond to my call, the defence secretary was on TV saying how impressive our Storm Shadow results had been. The chief was also really pleased with our efforts and asked me to pass on his congratulations and thanks to all my team for their hard work and effort, particularly while under air attack, and in the light of the Wing’s tragic loss. He went on to say that he recalled his time commanding Number 1 Squadron during the Falklands Conflict, when he and his pilots had felt invincible until they’d lost the first Harrier. I could certainly identify with his sentiment. He also mentioned that firing the first Storm Shadow was a great way to mark our sixtieth anniversary. We still had eight missiles and expected three more that week; I asked him to find some additional targets for us.

More targets requiring Storm Shadow’s weapon effects soon appeared, and we launched a pair to fire three missiles. That left us with six, sufficient for a four-ship, and this mission went off uneventfully. Now, having fired twenty-four of our twenty-seven Storm Shadows, we awaited a further three to arrive over the next few days. If we could ‘repair’ the three that had failed, we’d be able to up our ‘fired’ total to thirty.

In the event we got three missiles airborne on 4 April for our last Storm Shadow mission, albeit one weapon had to be moved to the other shoulder pylon having initially failed its checks. The sortie was relatively uneventful, although Patriot systems were now covering most of southern Iraq and were constantly illuminating and locking us up electronically, which was somewhat disconcerting. We took appropriate action in the cockpit to let them know who we were, but we couldn’t help but see the Patriots now as our greatest threat – and one to which we had no counter.

This was our first Storm Shadow mission in daylight and, as soon as we could after missile launch, Andy rolled the aircraft over to have a look at our ‘bird’. It was a fantastic sight, its wings fully deployed, turning away from the aircraft and diving on towards its initial navigation point to begin its target attack. A surreal experience, and I remember being surprised at how fast it flew.

So we had now run out of serviceable missiles, having successfully fired twenty-seven. Three missile failures out of thirty – very creditable for a system given its operational baptism before the beginning of its service life. We had demonstrated that the Tornado GR4 force now had an operational Storm Shadow capability – one which would be developed and would next be employed during 2011’s Libya campaign.