The Philosopher’s lengthy commentary on tyranny is found in the general presentation of the forms of government in the Politics.1 There are essentially three quite distinct types of statements: definitive or categorical statements of fact, historical examples, and very brief statements of fact that have virtually no specific context. An example of the latter is “It is a habit of tyrants never to like a man with a spirit of dignity and independence.”2
The first general definition of tyranny states that it is simply the opposite of the three good forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy, and politeia . There is an eagerness about going deeper into history than Plato. For example, there is at once attention to the internal dynamics of historical kingship and tyranny, both of which are mono-archies, that is, “one arch.” Aristotle offers much advice about how tyrannies may be modified in order to increase their chances of survival. Indeed, the policies and actions that a tyrant must do in order to survive take him toward kingship.
The second general definition emphasizes the personal: “A tyrant should appear to his subjects not as a despot, but as a steward and king of his people. He should show himself a trustee for the public interest, not a man intent on his own; he should make moderation [the key principle of monarchy], and not harsh excess, the aim and end of his life; he should seek the society of the notables, and yet court the favor of the masses.”3 The result will be “a nobler and a more enviable rule: his subjects will be men of a better stamp.”4 Present in tyranny are the vices of both oligarchy and democracy, with the former aiming to amass wealth, and the latter showing a hostility toward nobles.
Powerful threats to the tyrant’s power may come from external sources, namely neighboring powers who seek to undermine the tyrant by plotting or by war. The internal dangers are noble-inspired plots born of fear or contempt or a desire to be free from someone’s absolute authority. There are also attacks for sexual and homosexual reasons, the details of which E. Barker does not translate!
Among the historical examples mentioned are events affecting some people from Syracuse: the Gelo family and Dionysius the Younger. Since the fates of both Dionysius and Dion are mentioned so often in commentaries on tyranny, I shall include what Aristotle says about them.5
Dion, Dionysius’s relative, “led an expedition against him, succeeded in winning popular support, and expelled him—only to perish himself.”6 There is a comment to the effect that few men of “high spirit” are willing to risk their lives to bring down a tyrant; but in this instance, the men “must have in their hearts the resolve of Dion—a resolve to which only a few can rise—when he sailed on his expedition against Dionysius the Younger with his little band of followers.”7
Hate and contempt are the two most frequent causes of attack. Hate is a passion all tyrants are bound to arouse; but contempt is often the cause by which tyrannies are actually overthrown.8
Living luxurious lives, they make themselves contemptible, and offer their assistants plenty of opportunities.9
Kings cease to be kings when their subjects cease to be willing subjects; though tyrants can continue to be tyrants whether their subjects are willing or not.10 As tending to the preservation of tyranny (so far as it can be preserved): it includes, for instance, the lopping off of outstanding men and the removal of men of spirit.11
The forbidding of common meals, clubs, education; and anything of a like character.12
To prohibit societies for cultural purposes, and any gathering of a similar character: in a word, the adoption of every means for making every subject as much of a stranger as is possible to every other.13
To require every resident in the city to be constantly appearing in public, and always hanging about the palace gates.14
Endeavoring to get regular information about every man’s sayings and doings. This entails a secret police, like the female spies employed at Syracuse.15
Still another line of policy is to sow mutual distrust and to foster discord between friend and friend; between people and notables, between one section of the rich and another.16
A policy pursued by tyrants is that of impoverishing their subjects, partly to prevent them from having the means for maintaining a civic guard.17 The imposition of taxes produces a similar result.18
The tyrant should always show a particular zeal in the cult of the gods. Men are less afraid of being treated unjustly by a ruler, when they think that he is god-fearing.19
Kings are maintained and secured by their friends; tyrants, going on the principle “All men want my overthrow, but my friends have most power to effect it,” distrust them above all others. The methods applied in extreme democracies are thus all to be found in tyrannies. They both encourage feminine influence in the family, in the hope that wives will tell tales of their husbands; and for a similar reason they are both indulgent to slaves. Slaves and women are not likely to plot against tyrants: indeed, as they prosper under them, they are bound to favor their rule—as they will also favor democracies, where the people like to play the sovereign as much as any tyrant. This is the reason why courtiers attain a position of honor under both these forms of government. Democracies are fond of demagogues, who may be called “the courtiers of democracy,” and tyrants like obsequious associates—which it is the business of courtiers to be. Tyranny is thus a system which chooses bad men or its friends. Tyrants love to be flattered, and nobody with the soul of a freeman can ever stoop to that; a good man may be a friend, but at any rate he will not be a flatterer.20
Tyranny in the Constitution of Athens
The first part of the Constitution of Athens,21 which presented the period of monarchical government, is lost, and the rest is written as if it were a rough draft. Aristotle’s main theme is the change of regimes (constitutions), and the principal reasons for those changes. There is some anecdotal or story-telling material, but in general the aim is to confront theories about forms of government that are analyzed in the Politics, and the historical record of Athenian government, indeed governmental or regime instability. The narrative continues right down to the Philosopher’s own times, concluding with a count of just how many regime changes the Athenians had experienced since the end of the monarchy.
There are minor references to tyranny before the rise of Pisistratus and his sons, but the aspect of tyranny that attracted Aristotle’s attention the most was the tyrant’s way of gaining power, losing it, regaining it, and losing it again.
Somewhat earlier, Solon could have set himself up as a tyrant, given the political and social conditions of the city-state; but after being the great Athenian law-giver, he set off for Egypt, not to return for many years.
Not long after that, Pisistratus, a figure who is already familiar to us, became the champion of “the common people.” Before Solon’s departure, Pisistratus had requested a guard, but the request was refused. Not long after that, Pisistratus usurped power and was granted a guard. Aristotle characterized him as a tyrant, yet admitted that the man did not rule like one.22
Twelve years later, Lycurgus and Megacles joined to oust Pisistratus; but sometime later, Megacles sought an arranged marriage between his daughter and Pisistratus. This led to the latter’s return to power. Megacles first circulated a rumor that Athena was bringing Pisistratus back. A tall, beautiful young woman was dressed to look like Athena, and she and Pisistratus rode into the city together in a chariot. The citizens fell down in worship and received him in awe!23
Sensing the danger posed by parties who opposed him, in part because of his refusal to consummate his marriage to the daughter of Megacles, the tyrant fled. Soon he was raising money to hire a mercenary army that would secure his rule by confiscating “the weapons of the people.” To do this, he held a military review and began a long speech. The difficulty in hearing him, led to moving the event to the gateway of the Acropolis. During this lengthy speech, Pisistratus’s clients went through the city gathering weapons and locking them up.
Despite this usurpation, Pisistratus continued to rule with moderation; he advanced money to the poor so that they could make a living by farming. “The majority of the nobles and the people were in his favor.”24 After thirty-three years of being in and out of power, Pisistratus died and his sons assumed power. Two of them were legitimate, two were not. The older legitimate son, Hippias, carried on his father’s moderate rule; his sibling spent his time on love affairs, poetry, and music. The two illegitimate sons eventually provoked disorder, harsh rule, and war with Sparta. The whole lot ruled for seventeen years with no clear rules of succession. The Pisistratus family failed to become a monarchy, despite the inheriting by sons. This partly confirmed the observation that sons of tyrants rule harshly. The shift from an interest in politics to a preoccupation with sex and culture is also associated with the sons of tyrants.
The Athenian historical experience, as Aristotle analyzed it, is not confirmed by the theories about politics in the Politics. Tyrants govern with moderation and according to the laws—not unlike the tyrant who is “more of a steward than a tyrant.”25 Pisistratus came to power as a tyrant, but he governed with moderation.