Notes
INTRODUCTION
1. Hooke, Micrographia, 6.
2. Ibid., 1.
3. Sprat, History, 342–43.
4. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 244–45; Advancement II, WFB, 3: 437; “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 20. In quoting Bacon’s Latin texts, I will use the Latin titles but will give the volume and page of the English translations, with the addition of the volume and page of the Latin versions (in parentheses) where relevant.
5. Bacon, “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 23 (1: 135); Novum Organum I.ii, WFB, 4: 47 (1: 157); II.x, WFB, 4: 127 (1: 235).
6. Boyle, Things Above Reason, WRB, 9: 382; Locke, Conduct §12, 47.
7. Boyle, Things Above Reason, WRB, 9: 371; Locke, Essay IV.xiv.2, 652. This is possibly an echo of Matthew 5:48 (“Be ye therefore perfect”), as well as of ancient philosophical and religious sources talking of the “perfecting” of man through the exercise of reason (e.g., Seneca, Ep. CXXIV, Workes, 491–92) or through religious exercise (e.g., Augustine, City of God X.iii, 3: 263).
8. I will use the term paideia with reference to the ancient Greek-Roman “education of the soul,” famously investigated in Jaeger, Paideia.
9. Haakonssen, “Idea of Early Modern Philosophy,” 112–14. For other critiques of the “epistemological paradigm,” see James, Action and Passion, 20; Hatfield, “Epistemology and Science”; Schneewind “Globalization,” 174; Condren et al., “Introduction”; Harrison, Fall of Man, 8–9, 86–87.
10. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life; What Is Ancient Philosophy?
11. For Descartes and his Meditations, see Hatfield, “Senses and the Fleshless Eye”; Vendler, “Descartes’ Exercises”; Rubidge, “Descartes’s Meditations”; Sepper, “Texture of Thought.” For the mathematical and natural philosophical projects of Descartes, Pascal, and Leibniz, see Jones, Good Life. For the German metaphysical and civil philosophies, see I. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments.
12. See Gaukorger, Francis Bacon and “Persona”; Daston and Sibum, “Scientific Personae”; Condren et al., “Introduction”; Condren and I. Hunter, “Persona.”
13. Gaukroger, Francis Bacon; I. Hunter, “University Philosopher”; Cottingham, Philosophy and the Good Life and “Descartes as Sage.”
14. Cottingham, “Descartes as Sage.” See also Davies, Descartes.
15. Harrison, “Natural Philosopher” and Fall of Man. See also Painter, Depravity of Wisdom.
16. Anstey, “Experimental versus Speculative Natural Philosophy.”
17. Vickers, “Bacon’s So-Called Utilitarianism”; Condren, “Persona,” 82.
18. I discuss the relevant literature in chapter 3.
19. The loose, nonformalized nature of Locke’s and Boyle’s rules has been discussed in Shapin, Social History of Truth, chap. 5; Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, chap. 5 and Conclusions.
20. Harrison, “Natural Philosopher,” 219–26; Gaukroger, Emergence of a Scientific Culture, 243.
21. Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump; Daston, “Moral Economy of Science.” More recently, Daston and Galison (Objectivity) have suggested that modern objectivity may be seen as an epistemic virtue. I discuss this matter in chapter 3.
22. Shapin, Social History of Truth.
23. Elias, Civilizing Process, chap. 1; Miller, Peiresc’s Europe, 70.
24. The dimensions of early modern “enthusiasm”—which, besides the religious type, included speculative philosophy, but also, for its enemies, the experimental philosophy itself—are treated in Heyd, “Be Sober and Reasonable.” On Locke’s critique of enthusiasm, both religious and philosophical, see Jolley, “Reason’s Dim Candle.”
25. Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 332.
CHAPTER ONE
1. Bacon, “Letter to Savill,” WFB, 7: 97. The “Letter” was written sometime between 1595 and 1604 and published posthumously in 1657.
2. Ibid., 99.
3. Ibid., 101–3.
4. Ibid., 98.
5. I will be using this unusual phrase in order to render Bacon’s notion of the operation upon the mind, which—as will be seen—covers all the senses of the verb “to temper”: adjust (the pitch of an instrument), moderate (dispositions), and strengthen (materials).
6. Cf. a “rhetorical-legal model of knowledge”: Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, chap. 2; Emergence of a Scientific Culture, chaps. 5 and 6.
7. Gaukroger, “Persona,” 28; Emergence of a Scientific Culture, 208.
8. Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, 127, 131; Emergence of a Scientific Culture, 206.
9. Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, 2.
10. Harrison, “Natural Philosopher,” 219–26.
11. Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, 127.
12. Bacon sometimes discusses the operations of the mental faculties in terms of motions of the mind, e.g., when referring to the planned natural histories of such motibus mentalibus as memory, judgment, or composition and division in Novum Organum I.cxxvii, WFB, 4: 112 (1: 220). Whether such motions are to be attributed, in Bacon’s scheme, to the rational or to the sensible (corporeal) soul is still a matter of debate: see the discussion and literature cited in Tonelli Olivieri, “Galen and Francis Bacon.”
13. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 394–95.
14. Ibid., 437.
15. Bacon, De Augmentis V, WFB, 4: 405.
16. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 409–10.
17. James, Action and Passion, provides an illuminating account of the relevance of seventeenth-century reflections on the passions not only to the moral philosophy but also to the metaphysics and epistemology of the time. See also Gaukroger, Soft Underbelly of Reason.
18. Bacon, Meditationes Sacrae, WFB, 7: 244. On Bacon’s early critique of Puritan zeal, see Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, 68–70.
19. Bacon, Meditationes Sacrae, WFB, 7: 247, 248.
20. Bacon, “In Praise of Knowledge,” WFB, 8: 123.
21. Bacon, “Of Truth,” Essays, WFB, 6: 377–78.
22. Bacon, “Proemium,” Instauratio Magna: “the primary notions of things” (notiones rerum primae) are “false, confused, and overhastily abstracted from the facts” (WFB, 4: 7 [1: 121]); “Praefatio,” Novum Organum: “unsound doctrines and . . . vain imaginations” (doctrinis inquinatis . . . et vanissimis idolis) (WFB, 4: 40 [1: 152]); Novum Organum I.xxiii: “empty dogmas” (placita quaedam inania) (WFB, 4: 51 [1: 160]). For the previous history of this term, see the comments in OFB, 11: 506–8; McCaskey, “Regula Socratis,” 203–7.
23. Bacon, “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 27 (1: 139); De Augmentis V, WFB, 4: 431 (1: 643).
24. Instructive discussions of the Baconian doctrine of the idols can be found in Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, 122–27; Zagorin, Francis Bacon, 79–89; Urbach, Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, 83–106. Urbach argues for the closeness of Bacon’s and Popper’s conceptions of good and bad science, despite Popper’s criticism of Bacon.
25. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 292.
26. E.g., Redargutio, in Fundamental Texts, 120; Novum Organum I.ix, WFB, 4: 48; “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 27.
27. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 250; Advancement I, WFB, 3: 292.
28. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 284; Novum Organum I.lxxxi, WFB, 4: 80.
29. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 244–45.
30. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 282–85.
31. Ibid., 285, 292; Novum Organum I.lxxxii, WFB, 4: 80.
32. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 241; Novum Organum I.xli, WFB, 4: 54 (1: 163–64).
33. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 292–93.
34. Bacon, Novum Organum I.liv, WFB, 4: 59 (1: 169).
35. Ibid., I.xlvi–xlvii, WFB, 4: 56–57 (1: 166).
36. Ibid., I.xlix, WFB, 4: 57–58 (1: 167–68).
37. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 293.
38. Bacon, Novum Organum I.lxvii, WFB, 4: 68–69.
39. Ibid., I.xix, WFB, 4: 50.
40. For discussions of Bacon in the context of late Renaissance debates on methods of discovery versus methods of presentation, see Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, 37–44; Jardine, Francis Bacon, chaps. 2 and 3. On the various conceptions of “method” in the early modern period, see Dear, “Method and the Study of Nature.”
41. Bacon, Novum Organum I.xx, WFB, 4: 50 (1: 160). Cf. also Advancement II, WFB, 3: 392.
42. Bacon, Novum Organum I.li, WFB, 4: 58.
43. Ibid., I.lx, WFB, 4: 61–62 (1: 171–72).
44. Ibid., I.xxviii, WFB, 4: 51–52.
45. Ibid., I.lxxvii, WFB, 4: 76–77 (1: 185–86).
46. Ibid., I.xlv, I.xlviii, I.lv, I.lvii, WFB, 4: 55, 57, 59, 60 (1: 165, 166–67, 169, 170).
47. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 288.
48. Ibid., 290–91; Novum Organum I.lvi, I.lxxvii, WFB, 4: 59–60, 76–77.
49. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 292; Novum Organum I.lxxxvi, WFB, 4: 85.
50. Bacon, De Augmentis V, WFB, 4: 432.
51. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 432–43.
52. Cf. also “Of Friendship,” Essays, WFB, vol. 6.
53. Cf. also “Advice to Rutland, WFB, 9: 13; “Of Studies”, Essays, WFB, vol. 6; “Colours of Good and Evil”, WFB, 7: 77; and the sections on reading and studying placed as appendices to the Art of Tradition in both the Advancement and De Augmentis.
54. Cf. also “Of Nature in Men,” “Of Custom and Education,” Essays, WFB, vol. 6.
55. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 441.
56. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 246.
57. Bacon, Novum Organum I.lxix, WFB, 4: 70. In De Augmentis VII, the investigation of the tempers and distempers of the mind is recommended as the “groundwork of the doctrine of remedies” (WFB, 5: 20). See also Box, “Bacon’s Moral Philosophy,” 272–73; Jalobeanu, “Experimental Philosophers.”
58. Bacon, Temporis Partus Masculus, in Fundamental Texts, 72.
59. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 444–45; De Augmentis VII, WFB, 5: 30.
60. Bacon, “Advice to Rutland,” WFB, 9: 8.
61. Ibid., 15.
62. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 423.
63. Ibid., 427.
64. Bacon, “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 27; De Augmentis V, WFB, 4: 431.
65. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 245.
66. Bacon, “Prometheus,” De Sapientia Veterum, WFB, 6: 752.
67. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 445.
68. Ibid., 428.
69. These are two of the “benefits” of learning listed in Advancement I, WFB, 3: 302, 315.
70. Ibid., WFB, 3: 315.
71. E.g. in evaluating novelty, or death; ibid., 314–15.
72. Ibid., 314.
73. Bacon, “Advice to Rutland,” WFB, 9: 15.
74. Bacon, “In Praise of Knowledge,” WFB, 8: 123.
75. Ibid., 125, 126.
76. Bacon, “Proemium,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 7; “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 32; Novum Organum I.i, WFB, 4: 47.
77. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 21.
78. Vickers, “Bacon’s So-Called Utilitarianism.” See also Sargent, “Francis Bacon,” 128–29; Condren, “Persona,” 82. For an account of the “operative” nature of Baconian “utility,” see Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science, 135–49.
79. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 20; Advancement II, WFB, 3: 443.
80. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 220. Cf. Advancement I, WFB, 3: 265.
81. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 221.
82. Bacon, Confession of Faith, WFB, 7: 224. Divine wisdom and order as pattern for the human natural philosophical endeavors is the theme of Novum Organum I.lxx, WFB, 4: 71 and Advancement I, WFB, 3: 300–301. For the doctrine of sacred history that is the context of these claims, see Matthews, Theology and Science, 41–50. For an interpretation of the mythical-Scriptural background to Bacon’s account of the constancy of matter, see Manzo, “Holy Writ.” For the relationship between these views and Calvinist doctrines, see the divergent interpretations in Milner, “Francis Bacon,” and Matthews, Theology and Science, 62–68, 71–77, 108–10.
83. Bacon, Novum Organum I.xli, WFB, 4: 54.
84. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 18.
85. Bacon, Novum Organum I.x, I.xxiv, WFB, 4: 48, 51. See Rees, “Atomism and ‘Subtlety,’” 567–71, for an analysis of Bacon’s notion of “subtlety” and its key role in a cluster of ideas that also includes the notion of “dissecting” nature and thus of discovering its invisible “configurations” and latent “processes”—all central to his speculative (pneumatic) theory of matter.
86. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 20.
87. Bacon, “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 23.
88. Bacon, “In Praise of Knowledge,” WFB, 8: 125.
89. Bacon, “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 27.
90. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 222; Novum Organum I.cxvi, I.cxxix, WFB, 4: 104, 115. See Harrison, Fall of Man, chap. 1.
91. Bacon, “Proemium,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 7. Cf. “Of Truth,” Essays, WFB, 6: 378.
92. Bacon, Novum Organum I.cxxiv, WFB, 4: 110. In Valerius Terminus, operation is seen as the very test of truth (WFB, 3: 242). See the discussion in Gaukorger, Francis Bacon, 155–59.
93. The necessity for human progress to come with labor, or with the “sweat of the brows,” is a consequence of the Fall; such labor will be of “the working and discursion of spirits in the brain”: Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 223.
94. Ibid., 224; “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 19, 21.
95. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 294.
96. Bacon Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 232.
97. Ibid., 235.
98. On Bacon’s speculative system, see Rees, “Bacon’s Speculative Philosophy.” In “Unpublished Manuscript” and “Bacon’s Philosophy,” Rees argues that this system informs Bacon’s program of natural historical inquiry. For the legacy of Bacon’s methodology as divorced from the speculative system, see Henry, Knowledge Is Power, 66; Sargent, “Virtue,” 73.
99. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 294–95.
100. Bacon, Temporis Partus Masculus, in Fundamental Texts, 64, 68.
101. Bacon, Cogitata et Visa, in ibid., 82.
102. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 224, 242.
103. On early modern notions of “experience,” see Daston, “Baconian Facts”; Dear, “Meanings of Experience.”
104. Bacon, Redargutio, in Fundamental Texts, 130; Novum Organum I.lxiii, WFB, 4: 64–65.
105. Bacon, Novum Organum I.lxii–lxv, WFB, 4: 63–66.
106. Bacon, Phaenomena Universi, WFB, 5: 131.
107. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 250; Redargutio, in Fundamental Texts, 118–19; “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 17; Novum Organum I.lxi, WFB, 4: 62–63.
108. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 19.
109. Bacon, Redargutio, in Fundamental Texts, 119 (and note 1); Novum Organum I.civ, WFB, 4: 97.
110. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Novum Organum, WFB, 4: 40.
111. Bacon, “Praefatio” and “Distributio Operis,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 18, 23 (1: 130, 135). For a comparable reading of Bacon’s “machine” image, see Zagorin, “Francis Bacon’s Concept of Objectivity.”
112. Bacon, Novum Organum I.xcv, WFB, 4: 92–93 Cf. also Cogitata et Visa and Redargutio, in Fundamental Texts, 97, 131.
113. Bacon, De Augmentis II, WFB, 4: 325 (1: 528). Quoted and discussed in Lewis, “Kind of Sagacity,” 170–71.
114. Bacon, De Augmentis V, WFB, 4: 428.
115. Ibid., 411–13. The “incompetency of the senses” did feature as one of the causes of the idols in the Novum Organum I.l, WFB, 4: 58. There, the help lay in instruments and wise experimentation; here, in better methods of reasoning. These are actually interrelated parts of the art of direction.
116. Bacon, Parasceve, WFB, 4: 251. Cf. “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 28.
117. He calls the former “narrative history,” the latter, “inductive history”: De Augmentis II, WFB, 4: 298.
118. Ibid., 297–98. On the Proteus image and the relation art-nature, see Weeks, “Francis Bacon”; on Proteus and the conception of a decoding struggle that is expected to purify both nature and mind, see Pesic, “Wrestling with Proteus”; Briggs, Francis Bacon, chap. 1.
119. See Jalobeanu, “Fascination of Solomon’s House,” for an interpretation of the Baconianism of early modern English natural philosophy as indebted primarily to Bacon’s natural histories rather than to his method of induction.
120. Bacon, Parasceve, WFB, 4: 261–62.
121. E.g., Historia Densi et Rari, Historia Vitae et Mortis, Historia Ventorum. Cf. Jalobeanu, “Natural History”; see also Manzo, “Probability,” 126–27.
122. Bacon, De Augmentis V, WFB, 4: 413.
123. Ibid., 423.
124. Ibid., 420, 423 (1: 632, 635).
125. Bacon, Novum Organum II.xi–xiii, WFB, 4: 127–45; cf. the three types of tables exemplified in an analysis of the nature of heat, with an additional example of exclusion or rejection (147–48).
126. Ibid., II.x, 127; De Augmentis V, WFB, 4: 435. See Lewis, “Kind of Sagacity,” 171–72; Box, “Bacon’s Moral Philosophy,” 280.
127. Bacon, Novum Organum II.xix, WFB, 4: 149.
128. Bacon, “Distributio Operis,” WFB, 4: 32.
129. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Novum Organum, WFB, 4: 40.
130. Bacon, Novum Organum I.cxxvi, WFB, 4: 111–12. For Bacon’s attitude to skepticism and probability, interpreted, contrary to the traditional view of Bacon, as a precursor to the mitigated skepticism of later English experimental philosophy, see Cohen, “Some Historical Remarks”; Manzo, “Probability.”
131. Bacon, Novum Organum II.xix, WFB, 4: 246.
132. Ibid., II.xxxii, 173.
133. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 387; De Augmentis V, WFB, 4: 410.
134. See Newman, Promethean Ambitions, 256–71; Weeks, “Francis Bacon”; Lewis, “Kind of Sagacity,” 169.
135. Bacon, Novum Organum I.cxxx, WFB, 4: 115.
136. Bacon, Phaenomena Universi, WFB, 5: 132.
137. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 18–19. It is relevant in this sense that Bacon accompanies the personal story of his own engagement with the interpretation of nature with a prayer—the marked sign of personal commitment (20).
138. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Novum Organum, WFB, 4: 43.
139. Bacon, Temporis Partus Masculus, Redargutio, in Fundamental Texts, 72, 107. For the “sons” of science or knowledge, see Redargutio, 104; “Praefatio,” Novum Organum, WFB, 4: 42; De Augmentis VI, WFB, 4: 449.
140. Bacon, Valerius Terminus, WFB, 3: 226–27; Novum Organum I.lxxxvi, WFB, 4: 85.
141. Bacon, Cogitata et Visa, in Fundamental Texts, 75; Novum Organum I.viii, I.lxxxvi, WFB, 4: 48, 85; De Augmentis VI, WFB, 4: 450–51. For Bacon’s doctrine of the communication of knowledge, with a discussion of the sources of the Baconian “brotherhood” of learning, see Jalobeanu, “Bacon’s Brotherhood.”
142. Bacon, Temporis Partus Masculus, Redargutio, in Fundamental Texts, 62, 126–27; “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 14; Novum Organum I.lxxiv, WFB, 4: 74–75.
143. See Jalobeanu, “Bacon’s Brotherhood.”
144. See Sargent, “Virtue.”
145. Bacon, Advancement II, WFB, 3: 432.
CHAPTER TWO
1. Burton, Anatomy, 109. See Gowland, “Problem of Early Modern Melancholy,” 117–20.
2. Wright, Passions, 13–14.
3. Burton, Anatomy, 109: “that so men might acknowledge their imperfections, and seeke to reforme what is amisse.”
4. Ibid., 22: the cure of melancholy is the task of both the divine and the physician; but “a good Divine either is or ought to be a good Physitian, a Spirituall Physitian at least.” On Burton’s combination of medical and moral philosophical advice, see Schmidt, Melancholy, 27–38.
5. Burton, Anatomy 2.3.1.1, 125.
6. Ibid., 1.2.3.1, 249.
7. Wright, Passions, 2–6.
8. See, e.g., Charmides 165a, d, Alcibiades 132c, Gorgias 464a–c, in Complete Works, 651–52, 591, 808.
9. Plato, Phaedo 107d, in Complete Works, 92.
10. Plato, Republic 585b, in Complete Works, 1193. Cf. Timaeus 90c: “constantly caring for this divine part as he does, keeping well-ordered the guiding spirit that lives within him, he must indeed be supremely happy” (Complete Works, 1289).
11. Plato, Republic 444d–e, 518d–e, in Complete Works, 1076, 1136. In the Phaedo, the “Platonic virtues” are said to be “with wisdom” and are described in terms of a “purging” of the passions (69b–c, in Complete Works, 60). On Plato’s dialogues as an investigation of paideia, see Rorty, “Plato’s Counsel”; on his use of medicine as a model for moral philosophy, see Moes, “Plato’s Conception.”
12. The early modern period saw a wealth of editions of these authors, a comprehensive survey of which is in Monsarrat, Light from the Porch, chap. 2. Besides Seneca, Cicero, and Plutarch, other sources of ancient philosophical thought included Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations, Epictetus’s Manual, Aulus Gellius’s Attic Nights, and Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of the Philosophers. For the early modern revival of the ancient philosophical schools, see also Kraye, “Moral Philosophy” and “Conceptions of Moral Philosophy”; Osler, Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity; Strange and Zupko, Stoicism.
13. Cicero, Tusculum II.v, 101.
14. Ibid., III.iii, 152. The Latin quotes are from Tusculan Disputations.
15. Ibid., III.i., 149. Horowitz, Seeds, analyzes the epistemology related to the “seeds” and “sparks” metaphors in Stoic thought and traces their recuperation in medieval and early modern times.
16. Cicero, Tusculum III.iv, 153.
17. Ibid., III.iv, 154 (tranquillitate quadam constantiaque), III.v, 154 (sanitas animi), IV.xv, 230 (adfectio animi constans conveniensque).
18. Ibid., IV.ix, 224.
19. Passions consist of opinio et iudicium and of voluntate. Ibid., III.xxv, 192, III.xxviii, 196. Cf. also Seneca, On Anger: anger is a “voluntary vice of the mind” that is formed starting from an “appearance” to which is added the mind’s “approbation” or “consent” (II.ii, Workes, 528–29). On the Stoic view of emotions as voluntary value judgments, with the consequent framing of therapy as rectification of opinion, see especially Sorabji, Emotions and Peace of Mind, parts 1 and 2.
20. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 83.
21. Ibid., 267.
22. Doman´ski, La philosophie, 11.
23. Sellars, Art of Living, 46, 107. See also Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire; Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject; Pigeaud, La maladie de l’âme.
24. Cicero, Tusculum IV.iii, 213 (amplissimam omnium artium, bene vivendi disciplinam): an art expressed in the manner of life, rather than in written doctrine.
25. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 128. See also Sellars, Art of Living, 112.
26. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, chap. 4. See also Doman´ski, La philoso-phie, 25–29; Knuuttila, Emotions, chap. 2.
27. Augustine, City of God XXII.xxii, 7: 315.
28. Ibid., XIV.xi, 4: 325 (mala vero voluntas prima), XIV.xiii, 4: 337 (inclinatus ad se ipsum). To be turned toward oneself is the mark of the proud self-pleasers (sibi placentis) (339). For the aspects of the doctrine of the Fall emphasized in early modern Augustinianism, see Harrison, Fall of Man, chaps. 1 and 2.
29. Augustine, City of God XIV.xxviii, vol. 4.
30. Ibid., XIV.iii, 4: 271; XIV.v, 4: 283, 285.
31. Ibid., XIV.vi–ix, vol. 4.
32. Augustine, Confessions X.iv, 2: 81 (pondere meo); X.iii, 2: 77, 79 (tu, medice meus intime).
33. On the Augustinian cultivation of emotions, see Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, chap. 11. The way I have described it, this is one among several Augustinian legacies in the early modern period; for comments and bibliography, see Harrison, Fall of Man, 8. For a similar account of the two sources of the early modern care of souls, see Schmidt, Melancholy, chap. 1.
34. Bouwsma, “Two Faces of Humanism,” and Monsarrat, Light from the Porch, chap. 3, comment both on the incompatibility of the two anthropologies and on the early modern efforts at reconciling them. For the cross-fertilization of Calvinism and Roman Stoicism in late sixteenth-and early seventeenth-centuries social, educational, and ethical thought, see Todd, “Seneca and the Protestant Mind” and Christian Humanism; Strohm, “Ethics in Early Calvinism.”
35. Stroud, “Father Thomas Wright.”
36. On Renaissance psychology, based on the natural philosophical study of the soul in the wake of Aristotle’s De anima and Parva naturalia, but also indebted to the humanist discoveries of Neoplatonism, Stoicism, and skepticism, see Park and Kessler, “Concept of Psychology.” For the late scholastic and early modern psychologies, see Des Chene, Life’s Form; Vidal, Les sciences de l’âme.
37. Spellman, John Locke, 67.
38. Brown, Descartes, 30.
39. Reynolds, Treatise, 10–11: “For we commonly observe, that the Culture of the Minde, as of the Earth, doth many times deliver it from the barennesse of its owne Nature.”
40. Sir John Davies, Nosce Teipsum; Davies of Hereford, Microcosmos. See also Rogers, Anatomie; Woolton, Newe Anatomie. For this literature, see Soellner, Shakespeare’s Patterns, 13–14, 19, 27.
41. Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, 131. On the ethical function of Renaissance rhetoric, see Vickers, “Introduction” and “Philosophy and Humanistic Disciplines.” On Puritan eloquent preaching, see Morgan, Godly Learning, chap. 7. In Holy Court, Caussin draws on Coeffeteau’s scholastic account of the passions in Humane Passions, but adds a more voluminous practical part on the “manuring” of human nature (preface, n.p.).
42. Schmidt, Melancholy; Gowland, Worlds of Renaissance Melancholy.
43. See Schmidt, Melancholy, chaps. 3 and 4. Jalobeanu, “Experimental Philosophers,” 61, notes that Abernethy’s Treatise was grouped with Bacon’s Advancement in a list of representatives of the discipline of medicina animorum by Vincentius Placcius, a late seventeenth-century bibliophile and polymath, in his De Morali Scientia (1677). Hall emphasizes the Christian peace of mind in Meditations and Vows, a work known to Boyle. A similar approach is in Senault, Use of Passions; Ayloffe, Government.
44. Schmidt, Melancholy, 87–88, 90–92.
45. Patrick, Hearts Ease, 71–75.
46. Spurr, Restoration Church, especially chap. 6. For the Tew Circle and the Restoration Latitudinarians, see also Trevor-Roper, Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans, chap. 4; Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, chap. 2. For a discussion of the appropriateness of the term “Latitudinarian,” see Spurr, “‘Latitudinarianism.’”
47. For Bacon, see Matthews, Theology and Science, chap. 2; for Boyle, see M. Hunter, Robert Boyle (1627–1691), chap. 4; Anstey, “Christian Virtuoso”; for Locke, see Spellman, John Locke; Marshall, “John Locke and Latitudinarian-ism”; Nuovo, “Introduction,” xviii–xxi. Nuovo comments on the “unofficial yet formative tradition” of Christian humanism informing Locke’s theology, which includes early Fathers and early modern religious thinkers, and which can be seen as “the product of the incorporation of Greek paideia into Christianity” (xviii). For the moderate Anglicans’ influence on the methodological thought of the English experimental philosophers, see B. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, chap. 3; Henry, “Scientific Revolution.” In “Early Modern Intellectual Life,” Shapiro argues that this is ultimately an Erasmian inheritance.
48. M. Hunter comments on Boyle’s Christian-Stoic frame of mind in his early moral writings (Boyle: Between God and Science, chap. 4). Charron, Du Vair, and Lipsius feature among the titles in Locke’s library (Harrison and Laslett, Library, nos. 674, 1003d, 1763), as do Cicero, Plutarch, and Seneca (nos. 711–21, 2356–58, 2612). See also Nuovo, “Aspects of Stoicism,” for an inventory of the Stoic sources available to Locke (3) and for a discussion of Stoic themes in Locke’s work.
49. See Levi, French Moralists; Monsarrat, Light from the Porch; Miller, Peiresc’s Europe; Baldwin, “Individual and Self.”
50. Epictetus’s Manual was usually printed together with Simplicius’s Neoplatonist commentary (cf. Levi, French Moralists, 85) and had been used as a “handbook for monastic asceticism” by the early Fathers (cf. Monsarrat, Light from the Porch, 51).
51. Du Vair, Morall Philosophy: “Philosophy our Physitian” (15), God our “Physitian” (89). In his later Buckler against Adversitie, Du Vair insists on the pious Christian’s total dependence on God.
52. Lipsius, Manuductio II.vii, Physiologia III.iii, quoted in Lagrée, Juste Lipse, 38, 72.
53. Charron, Of Wisdome, 425.
54. Charron, Of Wisdome, 285; Du Vair, Morall Philosophy, 91; Lipsius, Of Constancie II.iv, 69. Cf. also Augustine, City of God X.iii, 3: 261: the inward service to God involves a turning of the whole inner man into a sacrificial templum.
55. See M. Hunter, Boyle: Between God and Science, 97. At some point Boyle asked Du Moulin to give an English translation of François Perraud’s Devil of Mascon (1658). In their exchange, Boyle calls him “my reverend and learned friend” and apologizes for requesting a work of mere translation from someone who has proven to be able to “write excellent [works] of his own” (Boyle, WRB, 1: 14–16). It is possible that Du Moulin’s consolation tract was among those “excellent works” that Boyle knew.
56. Cf. Casaubon, Letter: Du Moulin had recommended Glanvill’s manifesto of virtuoso philosophy, Plus Ultra, but Casaubon, a defender of traditional learning, was not convinced.
57. E.g. Sidney, Defence, 347–48: “well-doing” rather than simply “well-knowing” is the end of learning, and it consists in a “perfection [of] our degenerate souls,” achieved by “purifying of wit, enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and enlarging of conceit.” Poetry serves the end of learning thus defined. On rhetorical “utility” against scholastic “sterility” in the humanist polemics, see Vickers, “Philosophy and Humanistic Disciplines.”
58. Flacius, Clavis scripturae sacrae, quoted in Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, 132. On similar conceptions in Erasmus, see Herdt, Putting on Virtue, chap. 4.
59. Morgan, Godly Learning, 71.
60. Ibid., 69–70, 76–77. Morgan (65–66) also notes the influential appearance of the notion of “curious speculation” in the glosses to the Puritan Geneva Bible, esp. to 1 Corinthians 3:15, and the Tomson Geneva gloss to Colossians 2:8. Harrison, “Experimental Religion,” has an illuminating discussion on the use of the “speculative” versus “experimental” contrast (which subsumes the “utility” question) in early modern religious discourse—a contrast that, the author suggests, may have influenced the use of the same dichotomy in natural philosophical discourse. On the latter, see Anstey, “Experimental versus Speculative Natural Philosophy.” I thank Peter Harrison for allowing me to read his article in advance of publication.
61. Quoted in Spurr, Restoration Church, 281.
62. Ibid., 284, 304.
63. Cicero, Tusculum I.i, 1.
64. Ibid., II.iv, 99–100.
65. Lipsius, Of Constancie II.iv, 68–69.
66. Charron, Of Wisdome, preface, n.p.
67. Ibid., 216, 473, 467.
68. This division is of course different from Aristotle’s division of knowledge into theoretical, practical, and productive. But echoes of the sense of “practical” as knowledge turned into a guide to right living did feature within medieval Aristotelian classifications of knowledge: see Evans, Philosophy and Theology, 125–26, note 12. Kelley, “Problem of Knowledge,” usefully comments on the meanings of “discipline” in the early modern period, which included both the sense of a branch of knowledge, and that of pedagogical mathesis, understood as working toward the perfecting of the intellect through well-directed instruction.
69. Subtitle of the first part of Boyle’s Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy (1663).
70. Charron, Of Wisdome, 58–59.
71. Ibid., 59, 64.
72. Ibid., 65, 229.
73. Ibid., 157–60.
74. Ibid., 229–30.
75. Ibid., preface, n.p.: the soul that lacks “culture and instruction.”
76. Plato, Laws V, 731d–e Complete Works, 1414: the love of self is called “the most serious vice innate in most men’s souls,” since it is “a love which blinds us to the faults of the beloved and makes us bad judges of goodness and beauty and justice.” Aristotle, NE IX.8, 1168b15–1169a15: the bad or vicious person should not be a self-lover since thus “he will harm both himself and those around him through following worthless attractions.” Both sources are cited by Wright, Passions, 14.
77. Wright, Passions, 345.
78. Ibid., 77–81. Wright’s exercises include bending the inclinations to the other extreme; moderation; fleeing the occasion; playing one passion against another; resisting the beginning of the passion; mortifying the body; daily examination of conscience.
79. Du Moulin, Peace and Contentment, 170–171.
80. Ibid., 265.
81. Ibid., 341.
82. Ibid., 332.
83. Mornay’s “ecumenical, moderate, cosmopolitan Christianity” and its impact on Sidney are discussed in Stillman, Philip Sidney, 125–40. Sidney began a translation of De la vérité but never finished it. A first complete translation was due to Arthur Golding in 1587. Boyle listed Mornay’s De la vérité together with Vives’s and Grotius’s works of the same title in his “Introduction to my loose notes theological.” See a reproduction of this list, together with commentaries, in Anstey, “Christian Virtuoso.” The work also features in Locke’s library catalogue (Harrison and Laslett, Library, no. 2054b).
84. Mornay, De la vérité: “asservir la raison par raison à la foy.” Reason’s role is to discover its own limits, to let itself become illuminated by the revealed truth, and to ascertain the credibility of revelation (Préface au lecteur, n.p.).
85. Ibid., 297–302.
86. Ibid., 308.
87. Ibid., 332–35, 347. Stillman comments on the inadequacy of grouping Mornay with the strict Calvinists, despite his theology of the Fall (Philip Sidney, 136–37, 142). The cooperation of “natural light and saving Word” is a tenet that Mornay rather shares with Melanchthon and the “Philippists” (146–54).
88. Reynolds, Treatise, 457–58.
89. Ibid., preface, n.p.
90. Ibid., 2–3. The quoted phrase is a variant of Seneca’s words in De beneficiis VI.xxiii (Workes, 127).
91. Reynolds, Treatise, 429–30, 437–40.
92. I borrow the phrase from Spurr, Restoration Church, 324.
93. On Jansenist “inscrutability” of self and of the operation of grace, see Moriarty, Fallen Nature, chaps. 6 and 10. On Jansenist “self-love” as concupiscence radically opposed to the love of God, see ibid., chap. 3, and Levi, French Moralists, 225–33. On Luther’s, Pascal’s and Nicole’s views on human agency with reference to their reaction against (Aristotelian) habituation and virtue, see Herdt, Putting on Virtue, chap. 6 and 235–461. On the Restoration Anglican divines’ conception of a “husbandry” of the soul, both human and spiritual, see Spurr, Restoration Church, 281–311. Against the “utilitarian” reading of Anglican ethics, Spurr emphasizes the serious theological load of their piety and the severe ascetics it presupposed (310).
94. Lipsius, Of Constancie I.vi, 9–10.
95. Charron, Of Wisdome, 67–68.
96. Lipsius, Of Constancie I.v, 11.
97. See the commentary in Lagrée, Juste Lipse, 102–3, 119.
98. Charron, Of Wisdome, 227; Du Vair, Morall Philosophy, 4.
99. Cicero, Tusculum IV.xv, 230.
100. Ibid., III.iv, 154, IV.xxxvii, 262.
101. Ibid., III.viii, 160–61.
102. Lipsius, Of Constancie I.iv, 9.
103. Lagrée, “Constancy and Coherence,” 150, 151. The case of “prudence” (cf. Du Vair or Charron) is interesting: it is sometimes meant as an equivalent of the Stoic disposition of a healthy mind but does not lose the Aristotelian-Thomistic echoes of phronēsis-prudentia. On prudence with this double reference, see Lories, Le sens commun, chaps. 2 and 6.
104. The term has a long history, and in one important development, following Saint Augustine, assent becomes the operation of the (separate) faculty of the will. This development leads to a medieval tradition of making degrees of sin dependent on degrees and stages of assent. See Knuuttila, Emotions, chap. 3.
105. Cicero, Tusculum IV.vii, 220.
106. Ibid. IV.xxxvii, 262.
107. Galen, Passions and Errors I.ii.2, I.ii.6, in Selected Works, 129, 145.
108. Ibid., I.ii.6, 146.
109. On Stoic assent as part of a theory of knowledge and opinion, see Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, 253–59; Frede, “Stoic Epistemology”; and as part of the psychology of action, Sorabji, Emotions and Peace of Mind, 61–72.
110. The early Stoic notion of assent (sunkatathesis) informs the terms of the later Stoics’ accounts of the discipline of the mind as well. According to Inwood, Epictetus’s prohairesis and Seneca’s iudicium are both “a form of assent and a stable disposition that constitutes the locus of happiness” (“Moral Judgment,” 90).
111. Wright, Passions, 52.
112. Ibid., 294–95.
113. Ibid., 295–97.
114. Ibid., 300–311.
115. Ibid., 298.
116. Ibid., 312.
117. Ibid., 317–18.
118. Reynolds, Treatise, 64–68.
119. Ibid., 463–64, 466.
120. Ibid., 483–95.
121. John Yolton and Jean Yolton, “Introduction,” 10–11.
122. Walker, Of Education, 71–96.
123. Ibid., 173–91.
124. E.g., in Sancto Paulo’s Compendium, widely used as a textbook in the first half of the seventeenth century. In the first part (dedicated to dialectic or logic), the author defines judgment as the operation by which the mind either assents to or dissents from apprehensions (71).
125. Nicole’s “Of the weakness of man” was one of the three essays Locke translated into English in 1675–77. See Locke, Locke as Translator, essay 2, especially chap. 2. For a Locke-Nicole parallel, see Marshall, John Locke, 131–38. But, as will be seen in chapter 5 below, Locke himself did not think that the function of self-knowledge terminates in humiliation.
126. Cicero, Tusculum III.iii, 152.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., IV.xxvii, 248.
129. On the Socratic figure as emblematic of the idea of philosophy as an art of living, see Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, chap. 5; Nehamas, Art of Living, chaps. 1–3.
130. Galen, Passions and Errors I.i.10, in Selected Works, 125–26
131. Wright, Passions, 79–80, 95.
132. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, chap. 2.
133. Walker, Of Education, 25–29 (the virtues of the educator), 93 (the educator as a “Physitian”), 189 (the educator as “faithfull monitor”); Locke, STE §§76, 78, 90, 93, 94, 100 (the tutor’s virtues), 101, 102 (the tutor’s task of discriminating the peculiar “complexion” of each individual child’s mind).
134. Wright, Passions, 79, 89.
135. Galen, Passions and Errors I.ii.6, in Selected Works, 145–46.
136. Wright, Passions, 94, 99.
137. Reynolds, Treatise, 481.
138. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 293.
139. On Stoic and the two varieties of skeptic assent, see Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, 236–66, 438–66; Frede, Essays, chaps. 9–11.
140. Charron, Of Wisdome, 227, 230–31.
141. Ibid., 231, 238. See also the importance of “study” as a guide to wisdom for Lipsius, preface to Of Constancie, and Lagrée’s comment (Juste Lipse, 115–16).
142. Reynolds, Treatise, 50.
143. Walker, Of Education, 190.
144. Du Moulin, Peace and Contentment, 181.
145. Ibid., 184.
146. Ibid., 341–42.
147. Charron, Of Wisdome, 230, 231.
148. Walker, Of Education, 187–88.
149. Aristotle, NE II.1, 1103a15–20. For Aquinas’s understanding of the relation between the intellectual and the moral virtues, see ST IaIIae, q. 58. On the variety of Renaissance positions relative to this issue, see Kraye, “Moral Philosophy,” 333–39.
150. Cicero, Tusculum IV.ix, 223.
151. Galen, Passions and Errors I.i.5, in Selected Works, 111.
152. Ibid., I.ii.6, 145.
153. Sellars, Art of Living, 121, 119. Note 53 at 119 explains the meaning of “habituation” as related etymologically both to “habit” or “custom” (ethos) and to “character” (ēthos). Sellars also notes that habituation should be understood “not as an unthinking habit but rather as a conscious learning process.”
154. Ibid., 120–22. Sellars quotes Marcus Aurelius on “dyeing,” Epictetus and Seneca on “digestion.” The metaphors make perfect sense within the framework of the early Stoic conception of a material soul: the transformation wrought in the soul by its judgments is at the same time a transformation of the “tension” (tonos) of the pneuma of the rational soul (ibid., 125–26).
155. Charron, Of Wisdome, preface and 264.
156. Principe, Aspiring Adept, 83. Principe demonstrates Boyle’s familiarity with the practice and vocabulary of alchemy. “Tincture” with these connotations features in his Sceptical Chymist, WRB, 2: 280; Origin of Forms and Qualities, WRB, 5: 420–21. Bacon, too, used “tincture” in the context of discussing the transmutation of metals (and specifically the making of gold), e.g., Sylva Sylvarum, experiment 328, WFB, 2: 450; Physiological remains, “Questions touching minerals,” WFB, 3: 813.
157. Plutarch, “Of Meekenes, or How a man should refraine choler,” Morals, 119. The moral life is a matter of imprinting ethos on the soul by exercise and “long continuance of time” (“Of Moral Vertue,” 65–67). Walker, Of Education, 190: good counsel will work “not as Physick, but as nourishment,” which is to say, it has to be “continually received, ruminated and digested.”
158. Cf. the “transformation” of the self in Lipsius, Of Constancie I.iii, 7; the self “transfigured and reformed” in Seneca, Ep. VI, Workes, 169; the idea of “becoming another man” in Ep. CIV, 433.
159. See Seneca, Ep. LXXV, on “ascending by degrees” to a healthy mind, speaking of three groups/stages of those who are “proficient” (Workes, 306–7).
160. Critiques of the Royal Society virtuosi appeared early on, especially on account of the futility, the irreligion, or even the “enthusiasm” of their endeavors; see Spiller, Casaubon and the Royal Society, chap. 2; Heyd, “Be Sober and Reasonable,” chap. 5. Casaubon’s Letter is especially relevant here: the association of anatomical dissection and religious morality—of which Casaubon learns from Peiresc’s life narrated by Gassendi in Mirrour—appears to him patently absurd and in no position to replace the primer of moral philosophy, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
CHAPTER THREE
1. Charleton, Immortality, 42. See Booth, “Subtle and Mysterious Machine,” 22–24. The tide turned for Charleton and after the Restoration he became one of the first fellows of the Royal Society in 1662 and later a fellow of the College of Physicians in 1676.
2. Charleton, Immortality, 12–13.
3. See Sarasohn, Gassendi’s Ethics, 171; Osler, Divine Will, 77. The chapter on Epicurus in Stanley’s History of Philosophy also closely follows Gassendi.
4. Booth, “Subtle and Mysterious Machine,” 54. On the Epicurean revival in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Kraye, “Moral Philosophy”; Joy, “Epicureanism”; Osler, Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity and “Early Modern Uses of Hellenistic Philosophy”; Wilson, Epicureanism.
5. The first book of Gassendi’s Syntagma Philosophicum, included in his Opera Omnia (1658); cf. Bernier, Abrégé, vol. 1, “De la Philosophie en general.”
6. Sprat, History, part 3, title of section 13.
7. Ibid., 341–42. A paean to the pleasures of the study of nature follows at 343, recalling Bacon’s defense of the pleasures of learning modeled on Lucretius’s De rerum natura (Advancement I, WFB, 3: 317–18).
8. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 48.
9. Charleton, Immortality, 15.
10. Ibid., 16.
11. Glanvill, Plus Ultra, 7; “Anti-fanatical Religion,” Essays, 6, 11.
12. Sprat, History, 32–34.
13. Charleton, Immortality, 18.
14. Tellingly, the divines that rescued Bensalem from the wars of enthusiasm had been inspired by the works of such early modern promoters of “rational religion” as Henry Hammond, Jeremy Taylor, and Hugo Grotius: Glanvill, “Anti-fanatical Religion,” Essays, 6.
15. Ibid., 14.
16. Ibid., 13; the discussion of human nature is at 11.
17. Ibid., 25. Cf. also Philosophia Pia: “plain Christianity” is “an imitation of Christ in Charity, Humility, Justice, and Purity; in the exercise of all vertue, and command of our selves” (66).
18. Glanvill, “Anti-fanatical Religion,” Essays, 51.
19. Ibid., 54. Bacon had found a similar use for mathematics (“Of Studies,” Essays, WFB, 6: 498). See Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, 25–27.
20. Glanvill, “Anti-fanatical Religion,” Essays, 47.
21. Ibid., 48.
22. Ibid., 49, 50–51. For the “camps” of the Cartesians and the Gassendists in the seventeenth century, see Lennon, Battle of Gods and Giants.
23. Sprat, History, 82.
24. Charleton, Natural History, Epistle Prefatory, n.p.
25. On Boyle’s appreciation in the late 1650s of Descartes’s Passions both for its challenge to Aristotelianism and for its consolatory moral purpose, see M. Hunter, Boyle: Between God and Science, 106. Locke read the Meditations and the Passions in the very early 1660s: Milton, “Locke at Oxford,” 15.
26. Descartes, Meditations IV, CSM, 2: 39–40; AT, 9a: 45–46.
27. Menn, Descartes and Augustine, chap. 7; Janowski, Cartesian Theodicy, chap. 4.
28. Descartes, Passions I.27–28, 45, CSM, 1: 338–39, 345; AT, 11: 349, 362.
29. Charleton, Natural History, Epistle Prefatory, n.p.
30. Ibid., 172.
31. Ibid., 181.
32. Ibid., 175–86.
33. Descartes, Meditations IV, CSM, 2: 40–41; AT, 9a: 46–47. The liberty of indifference versus the liberty of spontaneity were terms of a debate over the freedom of the will between the Jesuits and the Oratorians; see Caton, “Will and Reason,” 94; Sarasohn, Gassendi’s Ethics, chap. 4.
34. Descartes, Meditations IV, CSM, 2: 42; AT, 9a: 48.
35. Ibid., CSM, 2: 42–43; AT, 9a: 49. See Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 321. For Charleton, the Cartesian “art of rectifying the will” by suspension of assent must be supplemented by a (non-Cartesian) invocation of divine assistance: Darknes of Atheism, 276–77.
36. Descartes, Passions III.152–53, CSM, 1: 384; AT, 9: 445–46.
37. Ibid., I.48, CSM, 1: 347; AT, 11: 367.
38. Ibid., III.211, CSM, 1: 403; AT, 11: 486.
39. Ibid., III.161, CSM, 1: 387; AT, 11: 453. On the mechanism and significance of rehabituation in Descartes’s theory of the passions from the point of view of a moral psychology, see Williston, “Akrasia and the Passions,” 51–54, and from the point of view of a “machine psychology,” Hatfield, “Passions of the Soul,” 21–28. For the relevance of the Cartesian discipline of the passions to the Meditator’s progress in the Meditations, see L. Shapiro, “Cartesian Generosity” and “What Are the Passions Doing in the Meditations?”; Brown, Descartes, chap. 6. Pereboom, “Stoic Psychotherapy,” analyzes the relevance of the Stoic theory of assent to the “psychotherapy” of Descartes’s Passions and Meditations.
40. Charleton himself explained the “liberty of election” in his earlier Darknes of Atheism as the act of assent of the rational faculty, which is only subsequently followed by the will. He signals the Stoic framing of his account of assent by quoting the Greek technical term sunkatathesis (260–62). Assent or judgment as an operation of the intellect is also a Thomistic doctrine: Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 309–10; Janowski, Cartesian Theodicy, 123.
41. Menn argues that although Descartes does not explicitly place his view of the human propensity to error in an Augustinian framework, since he avoids theology, he nevertheless “adopts Augustine’s view of the results [of original sin], and uses it to describe the disease he is intending to cure” (Descartes and Augustine, 318). Even on this view, though, the difference in emphasis and in the complexity of the charts of distempers between Descartes’s account and that in the treatises of the passions of the “Augustinian-Socratic” sort is conspicuous.
42. Arnauld and Nicole, Logic III.xx, 338 (Logique, 237).
43. Ibid., 341 (Logique, 239).
44. Ibid., 339 (Logique, 237).
45. Ibid., 340–78 (Logique, 237–64).
46. Malebranche, Recherche I.1, 1. Locke purchased the Logique and Male-branche’s Recherche among other logical works during his French travels: Milton, “Locke, Medicine and Mechanical Philosophy,” 302.
47. Michael, “Why Logic Became Epistemology.”
48. Gassendi, Institutio Logica, canons 11–14 of part 1 (on “apprehension” or ideas) and canon 21 of part 3 (on “inference” or syllogism), 93–96, 152–55 (and 12–15, 67–69 for the Latin version).
49. Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, 2–3 (Logique, 3–4).
50. Ibid., 8 (Logique, 7).
51. Cf. Gaukroger, Cartesian Logic, 34–47; Buickerood, “Natural History of the Understanding”; Nuchelmans, “Logic,” 105–7; Schuurman, Ideas, Mental Faculties and Method, 11–15. For Keckermann’s and Alsted’s conception of logic as an art of healing the mind of postlapsarian corruption, see Hotson, Alsted, 66–73.
52. Descartes, Discourse II, CSM, 1: 119–20; AT, 6: 18–19.
53. Garber, “Descartes, or the Cultivation of the Intellect,” 130. This is a development of Descartes’s Rules for the Direction of the Mind, and the notion of a new logic thus understood reappears in the preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy. On Cartesian logic, see also Gaukroger, Cartesian Logic.
54. Descartes, Discourse II, CSM, 1: 120–1; AT, 6: 19, 21.
55. Besides the already cited literature, see also Hatfield, “Cognitive Faculties,” 965–68; Dawson, Locke, 21–23.
56. The Vanity of Dogmatizing knew two more variants in the following years: the Scepsis Scientifica (1665) and the essay “Against Confidence in Philosophizing” included in his Essays (1676). Bacon’s idols and Browne’s analysis of the “sources of common errors” in Pseudodoxia are among Glanvill’s explicit debts relevant here.
57. Glanvill, Vanity, 62–63.
58. Ibid., 92, 93. Glanvill produces an Epicurean defense of the senses in the manner of Gassendi, on which see LoLordo, Pierre Gassendi, 61 and chap. 3.
59. Glanvill, Vanity, 70. This is an explicit debt to Descartes’s depiction of the errors imbibed in early childhood in the first part of the Discourse and of the Principles.
60. Glanvill, Vanity, 104. This is an explicit debt to More’s Enthusiasmus Triumphatus. On More’s account of the imagination as serving his attack on enthusiasm, see Vermeir, “Imagination.”
61. Glanvill, Vanity, 106–7.
62. On Descartes’s debt for the first rule of his method in Discourse II to “precipitation” (aproptōsia, propeteia)—a technical term related to the Stoic notion of assent, see Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy? 265.
63. Glanvill, Vanity, 107.
64. Ibid., 113.
65. Charleton, Physiologia, 6, 7.
66. Glanvill, Vanity, 119–20.
67. Ibid., 193–94. The reference is to Bacon, Novum Organum I.xli, WFB, 4: 54.
68. Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, 5–6 (Logique, 5–6).
69. Sprat, History, 103. Similarly, Sprat describes the process of “conjecturing on causes” as a passionate, greedy “hunt” for a treasure, which fails not really by missing some logical or methodological step but owing to the propensity of “catching at it too soon, with too greedy, and rash a hand” (101).
70. Glanvill, Vanity, 120.
71. Ibid., 135.
72. Ibid., 136.
73. Hooke, General Scheme, 7. The list of imperfections follows at 8–10.
74. Glanvill, Vanity, 15.
75. Glanvill, “Against Confidence in Philosophizing,” Essays, 30.
76. Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, 6–7 (Logique, 6).
77. Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, 8–10 (Logique, 7).
78. Sprat, History, 101.
79. Ibid., 106.
80. Ibid.
81. Van Leeuwen, Problem of Certainty; Osler, “John Locke and the Changing Ideal”; Hacking, Emergence of Probability; B. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty; Patey, Probability; Henry, “Scientific Revolution”; Daston, “Probability and Evidence”; Serjeantson, “Testimony and Proof”; Franklin, Science of Conjecture; Popkin, History of Scepticism.
82. Popkin, History of Scepticism, 15.
83. Ibid., 112. But see Ayers, “Theories of Knowledge and Belief,” who argues that the new philosophers’ epistemological positions can be seen as following two lines of criticisms against the Aristotelian account of the progress from observation to science (1003–8).
84. B. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 64–65. Cf. also Van Leeuwen, Problem of Certainty; Henry, “Scientific Revolution”; Franklin, Science of Conjecture.
85. Shapin, Social History of Truth, 118 and chap. 3.
86. Harrison, Fall of Man, 6. The three types of methods are distinguished by their respective emphases on experiment, theoretical reason, and divine inspiration as grounds of knowledge.
87. Ibid., 50–51, 138. For a critique of Popkin’s thesis from this perspective, see 84–88. Harrison seems more inclined toward the idea of inner reformation in his earlier “Original Sin.”
88. For analyses of English antidogmatism from the cultural-social perspective on the problem of knowledge, see, e.g., B. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 17; Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 24, 136; Shapin, Social History of Truth, 117, 335.
89. Glanvill, Vanity, 225–34.
90. Glanvill, “Of Scepticism and Certainty,” Essays, 51.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., 44.
93. Osler, Divine Will, chap. 4; LoLordo, Pierre Gassendi, chap. 3.
94. Descartes, Principles IV.204–6, CSM, 1: 289–90; AT, 9b: 322–24.
95. Ariew, “Cartesian Empiricism” and “New Matter Theory.” See also Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, chap. 4; Garber, Descartes Embodied, chap. 6.
96. Descartes to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643, CSMK, 228; AT, 3: 695.
97. Wilkins, Principles and Duties, 7–8.
98. Wilkins, New World, 18.
99. Glanvill, Vanity, 108–9.
100. Ibid., 64–66.
101. Ibid., 64.
102. “Opinion” featured in the late scholastic discussions of the forms of knowledge (science, opinion, and faith). Opinion was obtained by probable reasoning, in contrast with certainty (which came in three degrees: metaphysical, physical, and moral). See Ariew, “New Matter Theory,” discussing Roderigo Arriaga’s Cursus Philosophicus (1632). Opinion had thus the lowest epistemic status, which it also preserved for Wilkins or Glanvill. But the reference to the state of the mind associated with opinion is a distinct matter, specific to the cultura animi context. Locke will also use “opinion” both as a neutral equivalent of “belief” (as distinct from certain knowledge) and in the sense of the harvest of an untrained mind; for the latter sense, see Conduct §34, 107: “I am not enquiring the easy way to Opinion, but the right way to Truth; which they must follow who will deal fairly with their own Understandings and their own Souls.”
103. Glanvill, “Against Confidence in Philosophizing,” Essays, 28–29.
104. Thus, e.g., Glanvill: “Thus, then, to the knowledge of the most contemptible effect in nature, ’tis necessary to know the whole Syntax of Causes, and their particular circumstances, and modes of action. . . . So then, every Science borrows from all the rest; and we cannot attain any single one, without the Encyclopaedy” (Vanity, 217–28). Cf. also Sprat, History, 110.
105. Glanvill, “Of Scepticism and Certainty,” Essays, 42–44.
106. Ibid., 46.
107. Glanvill, Vanity, 229.
108. Sprat, History, 107.
109. Ibid., 116; “questions and directions” at 155.
110. Ibid., 32, 33.
111. Anstey, “Experimental versus Speculative Natural Philosophy.” Sprat, for instance, sets in opposition “the formal” (the speculative philosophers), “the prudent” (the experimental philosophers), and “the crafty” (the empirical philosophers) (History, 340).
112. Sprat, History, 340, 341.
113. Mulligan, “Robert Hooke’s ‘Memoranda’” and “Self-Scrutiny.”
114. Hooke, General Scheme, 9–10.
115. Ibid., 11.
116. Ibid., 5. On Hooke’s method and Baconian legacy, as well as on his general profile as a natural philosopher, see M. Hunter, “Hooke the Natural Philosopher.”
117. Hooke, General Scheme, 20.
118. Ibid., 19.
119. Charleton, Immortality, 16.
120. Wilkins, New Planet, 23. Chillingworth tells us that this notion is due to Epictetus: “And he that is otherwise affected, and has not a Travellers indifferencie, which Epictetus requires in all that would find the truth, but much desires in respect of his ease, or pleasure, or profit, or advancement, or satisfaction of friends, or any human consideration, that one way should be true rather than another; it is odds but he will take his desire that it should be so, for an assurance that it is so” (Religion of Protestants, 2). Cf. also Gassendi, Institutio Logica, canon 12 of part 1, 94 and 13: prejudices need to be eradicated and the mind kept “free and neutral [indifferens ac libera] in examining and determining what idea it will hold to be true.”
121. Glanvill, Vanity, 15
122. Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump; Dear, “Totius in verba” and Discipline and Experience; Daston, “Baconian Facts”; B. Shapiro, Culture of Fact; Pomata and Siraisi, Historia.
123. Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 22–25, 69, 77–78, chap. 8, and passim. On a similar conception in Gassendi and in the project of the Paris Académie royale des sciences (founded 1666), see Joy, Gassendi the Atomist, 210–11.
124. Hooke, General Scheme, 10.
125. Sprat, History, 85.
126. Ibid., 96.
127. Hooke, General Scheme, 19. Cf. Bacon, Parasceve: the review of received opinions is a way to “touch and rouse the intellect and no more,” and it requires a mind capable of freedom from imposition and credulity (WFB, 4: 262).
128. Sprat, History, 97.
129. Ibid., 98, 99. Bacon’s remark is in Sylva Sylvarum, experiment 988, WFB, 2: 667–68.
130. Sprat, History, 102.
131. Garber, Descartes Embodied, chap. 14.
132. On the Baconian methodology of the Early Royal Society, see Hunter and Wood, “Towards Solomon’s House”; Lynch, Solomon’s Child, chap. 1.
133. Daston, “Objectivity,” “Baconian Facts,” “Moral Economy of Science”; Daston and Galison, “Image of Objectivity” and Objectivity.
134. Daston, “Moral Economy of Science.”
135. Shapin, Scientific Life, 1; see also Porter, Trust in Numbers.
136. Explicit or implicit theses about personal knowledge are in Daston, “Objectivity”; Zagorin, “Francis Bacon’s Concept of Objectivity”; and of impersonal knowledge in Dear, “From Truth to Disinterestedness”; Solomon, Objectivity in the Making; B. Shapiro, Culture of Fact. Cf. the apparent wavering in Gaukroger, Emergence of a Scientific Culture, between statements in favor of and against the relevance of the character of the observer to the notion of objectivity: at 245, impartiality and lack of bias are features stemming from “a concern with the character of the natural philosopher”; but at 243, objective inquiry is such that it “does not depend upon any features of the particular subject who studies it.”
137. B. Shapiro, Culture of Fact, 132; Gaukroger, Emergence of a Scientific Culture, 244.
138. Saunders, “Judicial Persona,” 140, 143.
139. See Shapin, Scientific Life, 15, 22–23.
140. Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 36–39.
141. Ibid., 32–35. The authors note that this is a post-Kantian development, which does not apply to Bacon.
142. Glanvill, Philosophia Pia, 45.
143. Ibid., 45–46.
144. Ibid., 43–44.
145. Ibid., 7–16. The “sacrifice of praise” is a biblical phrase Glanvill quotes from Hebrews 13:15. Cf. also Sprat, History, 349.
CHAPTER FOUR
1. Glanvill, Vanity, 15. The survey is in chaps. 3–6.
2. Ibid., 61.
3. See Holden, “Robert Boyle,” 293. This is different, Holden explains, from equating things above reason with the matter of revelation, i.e., with things that reason alone cannot discover. On the theological debate over the role of reason in judging revelation as background to Boyle’s approach, see Wojcik, Robert Boyle, part 1.
4. Boyle, Things Above Reason and Advices, WRB, 9: 361–424, entirely dedicated to the topic; see also Appendix, WRB, 12: 396–98.
5. Wojcik, Robert Boyle, 7–9.
6. Ibid., 214. See also Harrison, Fall of Man, 217–19.
7. Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 115.
8. Ibid., 124–28 and passim.
9. Boyle, Things Above Reason, WRB, 9: 370, 373.
10. Ibid., 371.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 371, 380. Cf. also 383, 386, 387, 392 (all instances of the vocabulary of “proportion” and “disproportion”).
13. Ibid., 382.
14. In the “Praeface Introductory” to his Sceptical Chymist, Boyle explains the framing of his own persona in that dialogue on the mold of Carneades (WRB, 2: 211–12). See Condren, “Persona,” 82, for comments on Boyle’s antidogmatic Carneades figure.
15. Boyle, “Doctrine of Thinking,” in Early Essays, 185. The 1640s was the period of Boyle’s close contacts with the Baconian Puritan reformers of the Hartlib circle. See Webster, Great Instauration, part 2; Oster, “Biography”; M. Hunter, Boyle: Between God and Science, 65–67.
16. Boyle, “Doctrine of Thinking,” in Early Essays, 185–202. In his notes, Harwood draws attention to the common language Boyle’s “Doctrine of Thinking” shares with such contemporaneous works as Burton’s or Wright’s (187 n. 5, 192 n. 16). M. Hunter suggests that Boyle’s “raving,” together with “scruples” and “diffidence,” forms part of the early modern vocabulary of casuistry and points to a quasi-medical mental condition that Boyle suffered from (Boyle: Between God and Science, 35, 48, 60, 101, 207). For a reading of Boyle’s personality as “dysfunctional” and for his obsession with casuistry, see M. Hunter, Robert Boyle (1627–1691), chaps. 3 and 4. My reading emphasizes the wider circulation of this vocabulary and its inscription in a cultura animi, rather than psychoanalytical, perspective.
17. Boyle, Occasional Reflections, WRB, 5: 16.
18. Ibid., 24–25.
19. Ibid., 32, 33.
20. Boyle, “Doctrine of Thinking,” in Early Essays, 185.
21. Boyle, Occasional Reflections, WRB, 5: 49.
22. Boyle, Aretology, in Early Essays, 8, 50, 55–56. See also Shapin, Social History of Truth, 171–72.
23. Boyle, Occasional Reflections, WRB, 5: 54.
24. Ibid., 26.
25. The world is seen as a great “Conclave Mnemonicum, and a well furnished Promptuary, for the service of Piety and Vertue” (ibid., 19).
26. Seneca, Natural Questions II.lix, Workes, 803. The marginal gloss in this edition explains that such is the “true use of this part of naturall Philosophie which intreateth of lightnings, consisting in the contempt of death.” Boyle’s enthusiastic encounter with Seneca’s work in the early 1640s is described in M. Hunter, Boyle: Between God and Science, 49. The religious use of the experimental study of nature is a theme Boyle already explores in two texts of 1649, “Of the Study of the Booke of Nature” and “Essay of the Holy Scriptures” (WRB, vol. 13, and M. Hunter, ibid., chap. 5).
27. The passage from Natural Questions is reprised in a vindication of the “preaching” tone of the discourse in Usefulness, on the model of Seneca, who also chose to “season his Natural Speculations with Moral Documents and Reflections” (Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 275).
28. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 199.
29. Boyle, Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 255.
30. Ibid., 256.
31. Ibid., 257.
32. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 59.
33. Boyle, Things Above Reason, WRB, 9: 373.
34. Boyle, Notion of Nature, WRB, 10: 439–42.
35. Boyle, Things Above Reason, WRB, 9: 371.
36. Boyle, Advices, WRB, 9: 398.
37. Ibid., 400.
38. Ibid., 401.
39. Ibid., 406.
40. Ibid., 413f.
41. Ibid., 421f.
42. Boyle, Things Above Reason, WRB, 9: 396.
43. Ibid., 395.
44. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 291.
45. Du Moulin, Peace and Contentment, 341.
46. Sprat, History, 33–34.
47. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 304–5.
48. Ibid., 322.
49. Ibid., 305.
50. Ibid., 306.
51. Boyle, Occasional Reflections, WRB, 5: 32–33.
52. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 200.
53. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 285.
54. Ibid., 322.
55. Ibid., 323.
56. Boyle, Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 255.
57. See Greene, “Synderesis” and “Whichcote.” The notions and principles inscribed in man’s soul on this view included the existence of a God, the distinction between good and evil, and some basic moral precepts.
58. Greene, “Synderesis.”
59. Spurr, “‘Rational Religion,’” 575–80.
60. Holden, “Robert Boyle,” 289–90.
61. Mulligan, “Robert Boyle,” 237, 250. See also Mulligan, “‘Reason,’” for similar arguments related to the first half of the century.
62. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 415.
63. Ibid., 405. In this sense, there is a philosophical sect that comes closest to the true title of philosophy, i.e., the “Potamonian” or “Eclectic” sect, whose aim was “selecting and picking out of each [sect] that which seemed most consonant to truth and reason, and leaving the rest to their particular authors and abettors.” On eclecticism in early modern philosophy, see Kelley, “Eclecticism”; Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, 28–36.
64. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 424.
65. Ibid., 422.
66. Boyle, Advices, WRB, 9: 411.
67. Ibid., 412.
68. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 417.
69. Ibid., 419–20. The examples of “intuitive truths,” of “absolute truths,” and of “primary dictates of reason” are similar, except that the instances of sense experience appear only among the “intuitive truths.”
70. Boyle, Advices, WRB, 9: 412.
71. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 66; cf. also Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 281–82. See Sargent, “Scientific Experiment” and Diffident Naturalist.
72. See Popkin, History of Scepticism, 216–18.
73. Boyle, Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 257.
74. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 382.
75. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 322–23.
76. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 422. To see reason as informed by either philosophy or revelation is to see it “organically” (i.e., as using “organs” or instruments), whereas to see it as acting on its own axioms is to take it “essentially.” In Reason and Religion, there is a similar division of “ways of informing the Understanding”: reason can be furnished with “its inbred Notions and the more common Observations,” or it can be informed by “some Philosophical Theory,” by “Experiments purposely devis’d,” or by “Testimony Humane or Divine” (WRB, 8: 278).
77. Boyle, Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 255. On reason in abstracto versus reason in concreto, see also Holden, “Robert Boyle,” 289.
78. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 323.
79. Ibid., 326. See also Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 278: correct judgment, whereby an opinion is “judg’d most agreeable to right Reason,” depends on the best “information” reason gathers from the relevant sources of experience, and ought not to be decided by abstracted reason or “the Faculty furnish’d only with such and such Notions, whether vulgar or borrow’d from this or that Sect of Philosophers.”
80. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 307.
81. Ibid., 307–9.
82. Ibid., 327.
83. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 423.
84. Boyle, Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 278.
85. Holden, “Robert Boyle,” 290 n. 28. See for instance Boyle, Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 292.
86. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 323–24. Shapin, Social History of Truth, chap. 7, comments on Boyle’s rejection of mathematical “dogmatism” in favor of experimental “modesty” (335) from the perspective of the concern with the “moral order of the experimental community” (313). I am interested here in the same issue from the perspective of the concern with the inner order of the inquirer’s mind.
87. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 325.
88. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 33.
89. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 326–27.
90. Boyle, Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 292.
91. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 42.
92. Ibid., 44.
93. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 424.
94. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 218, 234.
95. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 44; cf. Final Causes, WRB, 11: 93.
96. Shapin, Social History of Truth, 182, and “Personal Development,” 339.
97. Shapin, Social History of Truth, chap. 4. See also Shapin, “Scholar and a Gentleman.”
98. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 288.
99. See Augustine, Confessions X.iv, 2: 81–83.
100. Bacon, “Praefatio,” Instauratio Magna, WFB, 4: 18–19.
101. Condren, Argument and Authority, chap. 6.
CHAPTER FIVE
1. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 419–20.
2. See Woolhouse, Locke, 89.
3. Locke, “Anatomie” (1668) and “De Arte Medica” (1669); cf. Woolhouse, Locke, 86–87, 92–94.
4. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 420. Similar thoughts are expressed in another essay of the same year, “Knowledge its extent and measure” (or “Understanding”), in Political Essays, 260–65.
5. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 407–10.
6. Locke’s views on this topic have been seen as indebted to various contemporary developments. Popkin, History of Scepticism, places them within the line of “mitigated scepticism.” Van Leeuwen, Problem of Certainty, and B. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, discuss them against the wide natural philosophical and theological background to this problem. Other authors argue for the influence of Boyle and Sydenham (Osler, “John Locke and the Changing Ideal”; Rogers, “Boyle, Locke, and Reason”) or of Gassendi (Kroll, “Question of Locke’s Relation to Gassendi”); but see Milton, “Locke and Gassendi,” for a case against Gassendi’s influence on Locke.
7. Yeo, “John Locke and Polite Philosophy,” 265. See also Marshall, John Locke, 170.
8. On their collaboration, see Stewart, “Locke’s Professional Contacts.”
9. Locke, Essay IV.ii, 530–38; IV.iii.18, 549; IV.iii.21, 553.
10. Locke, Essay IV.iii.29, 559–60.
11. Locke, Essay I.i.6, 46. Cf. also I.i.4, 44–45; I.i.5, 45–46; IV.xi.8, 634; IV.xii.11, 646.
12. Locke, Essay IV.xiv.2, 652.
13. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 421. Cf. also the occurrence of “self-knowledge,” together with “mastery of the passions,” “search for counsel,” and “directing of minds,” among the means to prudence, leading to both heavenly happiness and earthly tranquility, by the side of physical, economic, and political well-being, in Locke’s Adversaria of 1670 and 1681, in Political Essays, 215, 289.
14. Previous reflections on the influence of passions and heated imagination on men’s judgments are, e.g., in an early letter to Thomas Westrowe (October 1659) (in Locke, Corr., 1: 123), or in a 1682 short essay called “Enthusiasm” (in Political Essays, 289–91); on the mismanagement of assent, announcing Essay IV.xx, in the First Draft (in Drafts, 66–74), or in a couple of essays of 1679, “Justitia” and “Opinion” (in Political Essays, 273–74).
15. Locke, Conduct §12, 47. Locke uses medical vocabulary, e.g., his talk of “remedies” and “cure,” §2, 6; §12, 47. For a general assessment of this text, see Schuurman, “John Locke.”
16. The opening lines include an explicit reference to the Baconian idea of the adoration of the idols of men’s minds: Conduct §1, 3–4.
17. Locke, Essay IV.xvii.14, 683.
18. Locke, Conduct §4, 16.
19. Locke, Essay I.i.5–6, 46–47.
20. For the latter, more recent view on Locke, see especially Spellman, John Locke; Harrison, Fall of Man, 221–33. Marshall, “John Locke’s Religious, Educational and Moral Thought,” describes the evolution of Locke’s thought between the poles of Augustinianism and Socinianism.
21. Locke, Essay I.i.2, 44.
22. Locke, Essay II.ii–xi; IV.xvii.2.
23. The reception of Locke’s Essay as a logic, and the logical background to this work, have been illuminated in important recent scholarship: see, e.g., Buickerood, “Natural History of the Understanding”; Schuurman, “Locke’s Way of Ideas” and Ideas, Mental Faculties and Method; Winkler, “Lockean Logic”; Dawson, Locke; and, for an instructive summary of this literature, with doubts as to the pertinence of many aspects of the logical connection, Serjeantson, “Human Understanding.”
24. Locke, Essay, I.i.3, 44.
25. Locke, Essay I.i.6, 46.
26. Locke, Essay IV.xvi.1, 657–58. Locke believes that “there are very few lovers of Truth for Truths sake” (Essay IV.xix.1, 697) and that this is a condition very hard to attain.
27. Locke, Conduct §6, 26–27.
28. Here I disagree with Serjeantson, who argues that there is no “directive” dimension to the natural historical method of the Essay (“Human Understanding,” 169).
29. Locke, Conduct §12, 47.
30. Locke, Essay IV.xvii.2–4, 668–71. See Schuurman, “Locke’s Way of Ideas,” on Locke’s “logic of ideas” as an alternative to syllogistic logic, and his account of error in conformity with this new logic (47–50).
31. Locke, Essay IV.xvii.17, 685.
32. Locke, Essay IV.xvii.9–13, 682–3. Cf. IV.iii.22, 553.
33. Locke, Essay IV.xx.2–3, 707–8.
34. Locke, Essay IV.xx.4, 708–9.
35. Locke’s writings on toleration strongly delimit the province of the magistrate from that of the “care of souls,” which should be the person’s concern (Epistola, 67, 91).
36. Locke, Essay IV.xx.6, 710.
37. Locke, Essay IV.xx.17, 718.
38. Locke, Essay IV.xx.18, 719. Cf. Conduct §3, 7, on the “implicit Faith” of “those who seldom reason at all”—one of the general “miscarriages” of the understanding, by the side of passions and partial views.
39. Locke, Essay IV.xx.8–10, 712–13. Scott, Recollection and Experience, chap. 10, offers an insightful analysis of Locke’s critique of “blind credulity” in the context of his attack on the (moral) dangers of innatism. The deep concern “to fight off laziness, in particular that of borrowing one’s principles from others” (253) is a measure of Locke’s commitment to Socratic examination.
40. E.g., Locke, Essay IV.iii.6, 540; IV.iii.20, 552; IV.xii.5–6, 642; IV.xvi.3, 659; Conduct §6, 20–21; §23, 75; §33, 103; §34, 105.
41. Locke, Essay IV.xx.11–12, 713–15.
42. Locke, Conduct §3, 7; cf. §13 bis, 50–51. See also “Of Study”: the Catholic belief in the infallibility of the church is with “implicit faith or fear or interest” (in Educational Writings, 417). Two instructive contextual discussions of Locke on error, Wood, “Baconian Character,” and Schuurman, “Locke’s Way of Ideas,” focus on custom and habit as sources of error but mention the passions only in passing. They do not treat the other distempers of the mind.
43. Locke, Essay IV.xix.7–8, 699–700.
44. Locke, Essay IV.iii.18, 549.
45. Locke, Essay II.xxix.12, 368.
46. Locke, Essay IV.xii.6, 642. The reference to “names” echoes Locke’s analysis of the “abuse of words” in III.x. Indeed, the confusion of ideas “carries with it a secret reference to Names” (II.xxix.12, 367). See Dawson, Locke, for an analysis of Locke’s approach to language in book III of the Essay, including the “semantic sins” the use of words propagates (275). Locke’s educational project included the “metamorphosis of speakers” (300)—a project about which Locke professed both skepticism and hope.
47. For Locke, the association of ideas is a malady of the mind—a notion that is lost in some eighteenth-century developments in associationism. See Buckle, “British Sceptical Realism,” 22.
48. Locke, Essay II.xxxiii.4–5, 395.
49. My analysis thus goes against Schuurman’s interpretation of habit as Locke’s principal source of error, and of the association of ideas as the privileged instance of habit (“Locke’s Way of Ideas,” 51–54). Locke acknowledges “education” as that to which this “madness” is usually and rightfully imputed; yet, he says, to rest in that explanation is to fail to get to the “bottom of the Disease” (Essay II.xxxiii.3, 395).
50. Locke, Essay II.xxxiii.17–18, 400–401.
51. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 415.
52. Ibid., 416–17.
53. Locke, Conduct §18, 58.
54. Locke, Conduct §23, 67; cf. §3, 8–10. The “partial views” thus developed are a distorted effect of the natural limitations of human beings in this life: “we see but in part, and we know but in part” (a rephrasing of 1 Corinthians 13:12).
55. Locke, Conduct §§16–17, 55–56.
56. Locke, Conduct §§37–38, 109–10.
57. Locke, Conduct §10, 41.
58. Ibid., 42.
59. Locke, Conduct §25, 81–82.
60. Locke, Conduct §26, 82.
61. Locke, Essay IV.xvii.4, 672.
62. Locke, Conduct §24, 77, 79. Significantly, the epigraph of the Conduct is a passage from the opening section of Cicero’s De Natura Deorum (I.1), which condemns “rashness” (temeritate)—which is “either to hold a false opinion or to defend without hesitation propositions inadequately examined and grasped”—as “unworthy of the gravity and constancy of the wise” (sapientis gravitate atque constantia). Translation from Cicero, Nature of the Gods, 3.
63. Locke, Conduct §15, 55. Cf. also §19, 61, where the same tendency of the mind is explained by its “backwardness”: “the Mind is backward in it self to be at the pains to trace every Argument to its Original, and to see upon what Basis it stands, and how firmly.”
64. Locke, Conduct §6, 22.
65. Ibid., 22–24.
66. Locke, Conduct §43, 128–29. Cf. “Of Study”: the mind’s “restiness” covers both its stiffness and its precipitation (in Educational Writings, 414).
67. Locke, Conduct §13, 48–49.
68. Locke, Conduct §15, 54. Cf. also Essay IV.xiv.3, 653: the mind sometimes exercises judgment where demonstrative proof should be sought because of its “Laziness, Unskilfulness, or Haste.”
69. Locke, Conduct §§14–15, 51–54; §7, 31. “Disputes” are also signaled as instances of the abuse of words, of the ill use of maxims, and of trifling propositions in the Essay (III.x.9, 495; IV.vii.11, 600; IV.viii.13, 617). On scholastic disputation as one of Locke’s targets, see Yeo, “John Locke and Polite Philosophy.”
70. Locke, Essay IV.ii.4, 532. Even the identity and distinction of ideas—which for Locke are perceived by intuition—require, in order to compel assent, a “mind with attention” (IV.vii.4, 592).
71. Locke, Essay IV.xiv.3, 653.
72. Locke, Conduct §6, 26; §7, 30.
73. Locke, Essay IV.xv.5, 656.
74. Locke, Essay IV.xv.4, 656; IV.xvi.5, 661; IV.xvi.12, 665.
75. Locke, Essay IV.xv.2, 655; detailed at IV.xvi.6–9, 661–63. At IV.xvi.13–14, 667–68, Locke adds considerations on the special cases of miracles and of revelation, which, once attested by reason as truly being such, are accepted with an “assurance” equivalent to that of knowledge. See Wolterstorff, “Assurance of Faith.”
76. Locke, Essay IV.xvi.1, 658.
77. Locke, Essay IV.xvi.9, 663. Shapin has commented on the looseness of Locke’s rules for assessing testimony and argued that, rather than formalized “rules,” they are rather to be seen as prudential “maxims” for the use of the gentlemanly practitioners of epistemological decorum (Social History of Truth, 211–42). I will here look at the question of the regulation of assent, not as founded on socially validated practical skills, but as a practical exercise involved in the virtuous training of the mind.
78. Locke, Essay II.xix, 226–28.
79. Locke, Conduct §29, 89–90.
80. Locke, Conduct §43, 128. When achieved, it provides one of the types of intellectual pleasure; cf. Essay II.xxi.18, 233: the pleasure of “well directed study in the search and discovery of Truth.”
81. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 417 (“all our force and all our sincerity”); Essay IV.xx.10, 713 (“candid and ingenuous”); IV.xx.11, 714 (courage—implicit in Locke’s rhetorical question whether the “learned Professor” would ever be able to “disrobe himself” of his old opinions and “turn himself out stark naked, in quest a-fresh of new Notions”—as opposed to being “afraid to question those Principles” imbibed in early childhood, I.iii.25, 83).
82. Locke, Conduct §12, 45.
83. Locke, Conduct §10, 39 (“every one impartially to examine himself”); §39, 119 (“observe the very quick, and almost imperceptible Motions of the Mind in its habitual Actions” in the case of the association of ideas); §43, 135 (the art of governing the passions is “to be got by Study, and acquaintance with the Passions”).
84. Locke, Conduct §32, 99.
85. Locke, Conduct §4, 19.
86. Locke, Conduct §3, 12.
87. Locke, Conduct §32, 100.
88. Locke, Essay IV.iii.20, 552.
89. Locke, Conduct §3, 12.
90. Locke, Conduct §12, 44. Cf. also §32, 99: the eyes (i.e., the discerning faculty) are “dimn’d or dazl’d” by interest, passion, or the habit of disputation.
91. Locke, Conduct §27, 84.
92. Locke, Conduct §§3–4, 15–16.
93. Locke, Conduct §4, 17.
94. Locke, Conduct §6, 26. Cf. STE §107, 167: minds, like bodies, can be “made vigorous, easie, and strong” by education. See also Wolterstorff, John Locke, 152–54.
95. Locke, Conduct §19, 60. The “chewing” and “digesting” of what one reads is a well-known topos of humanist literature: see, e.g., Bacon, “Of Studies,” WFB, 6: 497–98; Montaigne, “On schoolmasters’ learning” and “On educating children,” Essays, 159–99. Among the ancient sources are Seneca’s “On gathering ideas” (Ep. II.lxxxiv) and Plutarch’s “How a young man ought to hear poets,” chapter 2 of his Morals.
96. Locke, STE §177, 234.
97. Locke, STE §180, 236.
98. Locke, STE §31, 103.
99. Locke, STE §122, 186.
100. Locke, STE §46, 112. For a convincing argument in favor of the compatibility of habituation and autonomy in Locke’s educational thought, see Neill, “Locke on Habituation.”
101. Locke, STE §98, 161.
102. Locke, STE §195, 249. Locke similarly includes the cultivation of a “love” and “true relish” for virtue among the tasks of education: §58, 117; §70, 132.
103. Locke, Essay IV.xix.1, 697.
104. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 415.
105. Locke, Conduct §32, 99; Essay IV.vii.11, 601. There is a delicate moment of the meeting of mind and truth—the moment of “persuasion” or “conviction”—and Locke warns against tinkering with it: “’Tis not safe to play with Error” (Conduct §32, 100).
106. Conduct §40, 120. Cf. the warning in the Essay: disputation turns young men away from “the sincere Search and Love of Truth” and makes them “doubt whether there is any such thing, or at least worth the adhering to” (IV.vii.11, 601).
107. Locke, Essay IV.xix.1, 697.
108. Locke, Essay II.vii.3, 129. Compare Locke’s account of the determination of the will by the master passion of uneasiness at II.xxi.37, 255: until uneasiness activates the will, the idea of the good remains in the mind as simply the object of “bare unactive speculation.”
109. If this picture of Locke’s views on the pursuit of truth is correct, it is very much in tune with Locke’s views on the pursuit of happiness as John Colman has reconstructed them. Colman argues that the “desire for happiness,” which, on Locke’s account, motivates human behavior and practical reasoning, is a general orienting aim that in its best form, i.e., the form most suitable to a rational being, is a desire for the Christian supreme happiness of heaven. Yet it may well, and most of the time does, take the form of the pursuit of private ends, which is actually a less than fully rational pursuit of imperfect happiness in this world. To educate rationality in this case is to learn to pass from the latter to the former kind of desire for happiness, which is also to learn how to love virtue (John Locke’s Moral Philosophy, 215–34).
110. Locke, Conduct §12, 44–45.
111. It goes against love of opinion, or of prejudice (§11, 42). See also Nuovo, “Introduction,” xxiii.
112. Locke, Conduct §10, 42.
113. Locke, Conduct §33, 101.
114. Locke, Conduct §21, 65; §18, 58. Locke adds that such a “universal taste” is not for purposes of building encyclopedic minds, but for exercising the strength and suppleness of the judging capacity and for freeing the mind (ibid., 59). On Locke’s rejection of the encyclopedic ideal, see Yeo, “John Locke’s ‘Of Study’” and “John Locke and Polite Philosophy.” On Locke’s proposal of managing “universal” information by means of commonplace books, see Yeo “John Locke’s ‘New Method’”; Dacome, “Noting the Mind.”
115. Locke, Conduct §10, 42.
116. Locke, Conduct §12, 45.
117. Locke, Conduct §10, 42.
118. For an interpretation of Locke on reasoning that also goes against the justification of belief approach, see also Owen, “Locke on Reasoning,” 213, 217.
119. E.g., Locke, Essay I.ii.1, 48, addressing “those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace Truth, where-ever they find it.”
120. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 3. For a survey of the rise of virtue epistemology in the 1980s, see Axtell, “Introduction.” But for a skeptical view, see Annas, “Structure of Virtue.”
121. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 137–62.
122. Ibid., 112. See also Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 8, 60, 71, 97.
123. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 21, 26. I thank Peter Anstey for bringing this book to my attention.
124. Ibid., 22.
125. Wolterstorff, John Locke, xviii; cf. 148–58.
126. Ibid., 94–104.
127. See also Passmore, “Locke,” the first proponent of this issue in his important article of the 1970s. But see Nuovo, “Introduction,” xxvi, for a brief but forceful criticism of the ethics-of-belief approach to Locke.
128. Losonsky, “John Locke,” against Passmore, “Locke,” and Ayers, Locke, 1: 104–12. See also Losonsky, Enlightenment and Action, for a more general thesis regarding the interweaving of thought, passion, and action in a number of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century thinkers; Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 120, 162–63 for a discussion of Locke’s love of truth and “indifference” as virtues of the epistemic will; and 40, 61–64, 112 for a defense of the importance of the will to the intellectual virtues.
129. Passmore, “Locke,” 283, 299; Wolterstorff, John Locke, 94, 96; cf. also Tully, “Governing Conduct,” 192, 199.
130. Passmore, “Locke,” 298; Wolterstorff, John Locke, 94, 96, 97.
131. The “rational man” “having carefully enquired” and “done his utmost to inform himself,” “has weighed [the proofs],” “upon full Examination” (Essay IV.xx.15–16, 716–17). I think that the two sections lend themselves to an analysis from the ethics-of-belief perspective on the voluntariness of belief only if considered in isolation from the rest of Locke’s work.
132. Losonsky, “John Locke,” 269.
133. Locke, Essay IV.xvi.4, 660.
134. Ibid., 659. Cf. the “peace, equity and friendship” advocated in Epistola, 81. Salvation cannot rest on blind (coerced) belief (held with a caeca mente) but must rest on beliefs into which one has put one’s “reflection, study, judgment, and meditation” (ibid., 71, 93–95). See Mendus, “Locke,” for a defense of Locke’s notion of “genuine” (religious) belief in his writings on toleration as opposed to “blind” (even if “sincere”) belief. Mendus responds thus to Waldron, “Locke,” who denies Locke the distinction, in a paper that approaches the matter from the voluntariness-of-belief perspective. For discussions of Locke on toleration and belief, see also Marshall, John Locke, 360–64; Vernon, Career of Toleration, chap. 1.
135. Marshall, John Locke, 164, 300 for amicitia and chaps. 5 and 7 for the Ciceronian virtues embraced by Locke. Locke’s friendships (among which those with the first Earl of Shaftesbury, Nicholas Toinard, Damaris Cudworth, Philipp van Limborch, and William Molyneux) are evoked in Woolhouse, Locke. For an account of the circles of virtuosi friends in which Locke took part or that he helped create in London, Paris, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, or at Oates, see Simonutti, “Circles of Virtuosi.”
136. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 417.
137. Locke to William Molyneux, April 1695, in Locke, Corr., 5: 351.
138. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 422.
139. Colie, “Essayist in his Essay,” 251.
140. Walmsley, Locke’s Essay, 126 and chap. 5.
141. Locke, STE §90, 148. Cf. also §§76, 78, 90, 93, 94.
142. Locke, STE §100, 162.
143. Locke, STE §§81–82, 142–43; §98, 161; §108, 118–22; §166, 218–19.
144. Locke, STE §90, 148. Several of these “wrong Inclinations” mirror the moral-cum-intel lectual “defects” of the mind charted in the Conduct, e.g., the unruly appetites, the idleness, the forwardness, the self-love, the cowardice, the carelessness, the wandering of thoughts, the obstinacy, or the narrowness of the mind: STE §39, 108; §94, 156; §107, 166; §110, 170; §115, 174; §123, 186; §167, 221–23.
145. Locke, STE §105, 164.
CHAPTER SIX
1. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 193–94 (to the two practical disciplines is added the discipline of inclinations, a “lived ethics,” as expressed in the doctrine of duties); cf. also 87, 97–99, 197–98. See also Osler, Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity, 3.
2. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 199, 200.
3. The idea is pervasive in Usefulness, part 1, and Christian Virtuoso, part 1. Cf. also Glanvill, Philosophia Pia, 133.
4. Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 300–301.
5. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 271. The reference is to Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 267–68.
6. Locke, Essay IV.xii.12, 647.
7. Wilkins, Beauty of Providence, 66, 91–119.
8. Du Moulin, Peace and Contentment, 164–65.
9. Power, Experimental Philosophy, 183.
10. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 222, 225, quoting Psalms 104:24 (“How manifold are thy works, O Lord; in Wisdom hast thou made them all”), Ephesians 3:10 (“the manifold Wisdom of God”).
11. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 255, 253.
12. Boyle, Notion of Nature, WRB, 10: 469–70.
13. Ibid., 469; cf. Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 248.
14. See Anstey, Philosophy of Robert Boyle, part 1, for an extended analysis of Boyle’s corpuscularian philosophy.
15. Boyle, Notion of Nature, WRB, 10: 469. For my understanding of Boyle’s conception of nature as a system of interrelations I am indebted to Sargent’s fine work, Diffident Naturalist. The relations of the natural mechanism are the expression of the “Art of God”; for commentaries on this notion, see Cook, “Divine Artifice”; Newman, Promethean Ambitions, 271–83.
16. Boyle, Forms and Qualities, WRB, 5: 313 and the whole section “An Excursion about the Relative Nature of Physical Qualities,” 309–22.
17. Boyle, Cosmical Qualities, WRB, 6: 287–88. Such qualities most probably depend on the “mechanical affections”; but there are, Boyle suggests in this text, qualities that depend on the general fabric of the “system” of the world itself and that may have a nonmechanical explanation. See Henry, “Boyle and Cosmical Qualities.”
18. Locke, Essay IV.vi.11, 587.
19. Ibid., 586. For a comment in the context of Locke’s conception of secondary qualities, see Alexander, Ideas, Qualities, and Corpuscles, 178–81.
20. Locke, Essay IV.vi.11, 585.
21. Locke, Essay IV.iii.16, 548.
22. Locke, Essay IV.iii.17, 548. Cf. also III.vi.3, 440 (knowledge of real essences is denied to man but available to God and angels). For the references to Locke’s Essay in this section, I have found Nuovo’s “List of Theological Places” extremely useful.
23. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 257.
24. Osler, “Robert Boyle on Knowledge of Nature,” 46.
25. Henry, “Boyle and Cosmical Qualities,” 132; Wojcik, Robert Boyle, chap. 8. Cf. Oakley, Omnipotence; Osler, “Intellectual Sources” and Divine Will; and the literature discussed in Harrison, “Voluntarism and Early Modern Science.”
26. Henry, “Voluntarist Theology”; Harrison, “Voluntarism and the Origins of Modern Science.”
27. Boyle, Notion of Nature, WRB, 10: 469.
28. For accounts of Boyle’s conception of God’s relation with the created world that emphasize the “concourse” rather than the arbitrary power, see Shanahan, “God and Nature”; Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 99–103; Anstey, “Boyle on Occasionalism” and Philosophy of Robert Boyle, chap. 7.
29. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 257.
30. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 40.
31. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 203.
32. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 300.
33. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 496.
34. Boyle, Final Causes, WRB, 11: 144, cf. also 103. See also Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 483; “Of the Study of the Book of Nature,” WRB, 13: 149.
35. Locke, ELN, essay 4, 147.
36. Ibid., 157. Paralleling the distinction between a voluntarist and an intel-lectualist conception of God is a similar dichotomy with reference to the nature of obligation within a natural law theory. Oakley, “Locke, Natural Law and God,” argues that Locke was a committed voluntarist. Von Leyden thinks he tried to keep an uneasy balance between the two perspectives (“Introduction,” 43–60). Ward, “Divine Will,” Tuckness, “Coherence of a Mind,” and Colman, “Locke’s Empiricist Theory,” have persuasively argued in favor of the coherent balance of Locke’s views on this question.
37. Locke, “Understanding,” in Political Essays, 260, 264.
38. Ibid., 264–65.
39. Locke, Essay I.i.5, 45.
40. Locke, Essay I.ii.1, 48; I.iv.9, 89; I.iv.12, 91; I.iv.22, 100.
41. Pascal, “Man’s disproportion,” in Pensées, 58–64. For commentaries on this theme, see Carraud, Pascal, 393–422; Alexandrescu, Le paradoxe, 193–202; Jones, Good Life, chap. 4.
42. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 484. Sargent usefully elaborates on this theme, on its theological grounding, and on its methodological consequences (Diffident Naturalist, chaps. 4 and 5).
43. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 487. For a Boyle-Cusanus connection in terms of the theme of the limits of reason, see Wojcik, Robert Boyle, 34.
44. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 419.
45. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 57; Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 530. On Boyle’s engagement with the genre of romances, see Principe, “Virtuous Romance.”
46. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 397.
47. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 281. Similarly, in the same work, Boyle writes of an appetite inscribed in our minds by God himself as an impetus toward the quest for the truth of nature (237). Cf. also Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 57.
48. Locke, Essay IV.vi.11, 587.
49. Locke, Essay II.xxiii.12, 302–3. For discussions of this passage in relation to the question of the (non)observability of the corpuscles, see Alexander, Ideas, Qualities, and Corpuscles, 184–86; and to the question of the relative endowments of men and angels, John Yolton, Two Intellectual Worlds, 74–77.
50. Locke, Essay II.xxiii.13, 304.
51. Locke, Essay IV.xii.10, 645.
52. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 262.
53. Ibid., 206.
54. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 57–58.
55. Boyle, “Proemial Essay,” WRB, 2: 17.
56. Boyle, Forms and Qualities, WRB, 5: 299.
57. Anstey, “Locke, Bacon, and Natural History.”
58. Locke’s “Advertisement” in Boyle’s General History of the Air, WRB, 12: 6.
59. Boyle, Corr., 3: 170; Anstey and Hunter, “Robert Boyle’s ‘Designe.’”
60. Boyle, Forms and Qualities, WRB, 5: 302.
61. Knight and Hunter, “Robert Boyle’s Memoirs.”
62. Boyle, “Proemial Essay,” WRB, 2: 10–11; Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 82–89.
63. Boyle, Forms and Qualities, WRB, 5: 381.
64. For “queries” and “heads,” see M. Hunter, “Robert Boyle and the Early Royal Society”; for nature vexed, Anstey and M. Hunter, “Robert Boyle’s ‘Designe,’” 110–13.
65. Boyle, Corr., 3: 171.
66. Anstey and M. Hunter, “Robert Boyle’s ‘Designe,’” 107.
67. Sargent, “Robert Boyle’s Baconian Inheritance,” 484. Cf. Sargent, “Scientific Experiment,” 39.
68. Boyle, “Requisites of a Good Hypothesis” and “Qualities & Conditions of an Excellent Hypothesis.”
69. The “Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis,” appended to the 1674 edition of the Excellency of Theology (WRB, vol. 8), was intended as an illustration of the “good hypothesis”: M. Hunter, Boyle: Between God and Science, 176.
70. Boyle, “Proemial Essay,” WRB, 2: 21–23.
71. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 326.
72. Boyle, “Proemial Essay,” WRB, 2: 14; Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 324; Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 281. See Sargent, “Scientific Experiment” and “Learning from Experience.”
73. Boyle, “Proemial Essay,” WRB, 2: 14. See also Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 89: we should consider how difficult it is to build an “Accurate Hypothesis upon an Incompleat History of the Phaenomena ’tis to be fitted to,” particularly in view of the prerequisites of a “good hypothesis.”
74. Boyle, Corr., 3: 173. It is precisely such a “probationary” nature of the titles of inquiry that Locke also recommends in his “Advertisement” to the General History of the Air, while at the same time signaling its Baconian pedigree (WRB, 12: 6).
75. John Yolton, Locke; Anstey, “Locke, Bacon, and Natural History” and “Locke on Method.” For the hypothetico-deductive interpretation, see Laudan, Science and Hypothesis; Osler, “John Locke and the Changing Ideal”; Farr, “Way of Hypotheses”; and the literature cited in Anstey, “Locke, Bacon, and Natural History.”
76. John Yolton, Locke, 68.
77. Locke, Essay IV.ii.14, 537; IV.iii.9, 544; IV.iii.29, 560. Anstey, “Locke on Method,” 27, 28. Cf. John Yolton, Locke, 90.
78. Cf. the description of the use of hypotheses at Essay IV.xii.13, 648: if well made, they are “at least great helps to the Memory, and often direct us to new discoveries.” The passage ends with a warning against letting one’s hypothesis domineer one’s mind by taking it as a dogmatic “principle,” and with the quasi-dismissal of “most (I had almost said all) of the Hypotheses in natural Philosophy” as “very doubtful conjecture(s).” Anstey, “Locke on Method,” 28.
79. Anstey, “Locke on Method,” 33. In Two Intellectual Worlds, John Yolton dwells at greater length on Locke’s speculative “conjectures.” But these do not have a role in discovery; rather, they are “echoes of that a priori, deductive science of nature which he detailed but denied to man” (74). Locke’s commitment to an idea of natural philosophy as unattainable scientia is also underlined in Ayers, “Foundations of Knowledge”; Downing, ‘”Status of Mechanism.”
80. Locke, Essay IV.xii.7, 643.
81. Locke, Essay, IV.xii.9, 644.
82. Locke, Essay, IV.xii.10, 645.
83. Locke, Essay II.xxiii.23–24, 308–9.
84. Locke, Essay II.xxvii.25, 345.
85. Locke, Essay IV.vii.12–14, 604–5.
86. Locke, Essay IV.vii.15, 606.
87. Locke, Essay IV.xii.4, 642.
88. Locke, Essay IV.xii.12, 647.
89. Boyle, “Proemial Essay,” WRB, 2: 14.
90. Ibid., 12.
91. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 88.
92. Boyle, Final Causes, Proposition 4, WRB, 11: 145.
93. Locke, Conduct §6, 22.
94. Locke, Essay IV.xii.13, 648.
95. Locke and Sydenham as quoted in Meynell, “John Locke,” 97. Cf. also Essay I.iii.24, 82. Anstey and Burrows, “Two Medical Essays,” have settled the question of Locke as author of “De Arte Medica” and “Anatomia.” Romanell, John Locke and Medicine, makes a strong case for the crucial influence Locke’s medical interests had on his natural historical method. For the relation between Locke’s medical inquiries and his growing allegiance to mechanical philosophy, see Milton, “Locke, Medicine, and Mechanical Philosophy”; Walmsley, “Development.” For the medical collaboration between Boyle, Sydenham, and Locke, see Cunningham, “Thomas Sydenham”; Kaplan, Medical Agenda, 146–52.
96. See Anstey and Harris, “Locke and Botany.” The authors point out the links between Locke’s hitherto little appreciated interest in botany and his commitment to the natural historical method (167).
97. Boyle, “Proemial Essay,” WRB, 2: 24–25.
98. Boyle, Things Above Reason, WRB, 9: 373.
99. See also Kaplan, Medical Agenda, 49–56, who argues that for Boyle the use of well-formed provisional hypotheses was to direct the study of the phenomena and spur further investigation in a spirit of humility and charity; see Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, 121–28, for comments on the value of this method as a fight against “prejudice.”
100. Locke, Essay III.x.14, 497.
101. Locke, “Understanding,” in Political Essays, 262.
102. Locke, STE §190, 245.
103. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 237–39. Cf. also “Of the Study of the Book of Nature,” WRB, 13: 150–53; Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 40, quoting Psalms 50:23; Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 490. Glanvill also uses the phrase in his Philosophia Pia, 6, 12, quoting Hebrews 13:15, Psalms 47:7. For commentaries on this image, see Fisch, “Scientist as Priest,” and Ben-Chaim, Experimental Philosophy, chap. 7, who argue for Boyle’s indebtedness to the Hermetic tradition and to a Christian humanist conception, respectively.
104. For the theme of “science and religion” in general in the seventeenth century, see, e.g., Kroll, “Introduction.” See also the debate between Grant, “God and Natural Philosophy,” and Cunningham, “Identity of Natural Philosophy,” around the latter’s thesis that natural philosophy was always a theological discipline.
105. See Gaukroger, Emergence of a Scientific Culture, chap. 4: the idea of natural history as revelatory of divine purposes in creation was crucial to the legitimation of experimental philosophy in the latter half of the seventeenth century as an enterprise of “quasi-religious standing” (133). The way experimental and natural historical investigations were thought to reveal divine purposes (or final causes) is documented in Harrison, Bible, 161–76; Ogilvie, “Natural History,” 93–96. For the type of explanation involving final causes in the seventeenth century, see Osler, “From Immanent Natures to Nature as Artifice”; Nadler, “Doctrines of Explanation.”
106. Harrison, “Physico-Theology.”
107. Harrison, Bible, 168. But see Daston, “Attention,” for an interpretation of the eighteenth-century naturalists’ “discipline of attention” as related to a natural theology understood less as argument than as a mode of cultivated experience.
108. Boyle, Final Causes, WRB, 11: 119. An example of the former is: from the use of eyes in vision to the intelligent designer and his end of furnishing the creature with such a useful organ. An example of the latter is: from the designed usefulness of the eye’s vision to the structure and function of its parts.
109. Ibid., 87
110. Ibid., 95.
111. Ibid., 145: Boyle’s writing itself (an eloquent illustration) would have this effect. See also Shanahan, “Teleological Reasoning,” 189–90.
112. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 483.
113. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 295. Cf. also Glanvill, Philosophia Pia, 13.
114. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 296. Cf. also Glanvill, Philosophia Pia, 16, 23.
115. Boyle Christian Virtuoso, part 1, WRB, 12: 297.
116. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 236. Cf. the same wording in “Of the Study of the Book of Nature,” WRB, 13: 161–62.
117. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 270. Glanvill calls the same condition of mind “Philosophick passion” (Vanity, 245).
118. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 433, 481, 490.
119. Boyle Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 237. Cf. the same wording in “Of the Study of the Book of Nature,” WRB, 13: 156.
120. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 58–59.
121. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 483.
122. See Ben-Chaim, Experimental Philosophy, 157; M. Hunter, Boyle: Between God and Science, 201.
123. Locke, ELN, essay 4, 151.
124. Ibid., 153.
125. Locke, ELN, essay 2, 135.
126. Locke, ELN, essays 2, 3, and 5. For Pascal’s rejection of the metaphysical proofs for the existence of God in relation to his doctrine of disproportion, see Carraud, Pascal, 347–61, 393–403.
127. Locke, Essay IV.xii.12, 647.
128. Locke, Essay II.xxiii.12, 302.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1. For the search for a thorough overlap in the late Renaissance, see Blair, “Mosaic Physics”; for the transfer of hermeneutic method from biblical to natural philosophical interpretation, see Harrison, Bible; for the crisis in the search for at least a parallel reading of the two books in the late seventeenth century, see Mandelbrote, “Isaac Newton and Thomas Burnet.”
2. Boyle, Resurrection (appended to Reason and Religion, 1675), WRB, vol. 8. See Harrison, “Physico-Theology.”
3. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 44–45.
4. Ibid., 47–48.
5. Ibid., 50–51.
6. Locke, Conduct §22, 66. For Locke on the status of theology, see also Nuovo, “Introduction,” xxii.
7. Locke, Essay II.vii.6, 131.
8. Locke, Essay II.xxiii.12, 302; IV.xii.11, 646; cf. also “Knowledge A” (1676), in Political Essays, 251.
9. Locke, Conduct §22, 66–67.
10. Locke, Paraphrase, 2: 648; Boyle, Style of Scriptures, WRB, 2: 432. See Nuovo, “Introduction,” xvii.
11. Locke, Essay IV.xviii.10, 695; IV.xix.14, 704; IV.xix.4, 698. See Nuovo, “Aspects of Stoicism,” section “Reason enlarged.”
12. Locke, Paraphrase, 1: 152–53. See Wainwright, “Introduction,” 31–33.
13. Locke, Paraphrase, 2: 582–84.
14. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 32.
15. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 424.
16. Locke, “Of Study,” in Educational Writings, 412.
17. Ibid., 415.
18. Locke, Essay IV.xvii.24, 688. On Locke’s views about the cognitive state of humans in the afterlife, see Nuovo, “Aspects of Stoicism,” 24, and “Reflections on Locke’s Platonism,” 209. On Boyle’s, see Osler, “Robert Boyle on Knowledge of Nature,” whose emphasis on Boyle’s “theological voluntarism” does not accommodate, however, the idea of the “growth” of the faculties.
19. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 506. Among the motives for an individual to love God is the consideration of “the rectitude, the improvement, and the enlargement of his faculties, understanding, will, and affections,” as well as of the “great discoveries” about both God’s and the creatures’ natures to be acquired in the afterlife (ibid., 507).
20. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 520; Appendix, WRB, 12: 425. Cf. also Reason and Religion, WRB, 8: 280.
21. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 32–33.
22. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 510–20.
23. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 412.
24. Boyle Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 479.
25. Ibid., 474.
26. Ibid., 502.
27. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 33.
28. Boyle, High Veneration, WRB, 10: 161. This is due to the “Foecundity of the Divine Nature” and to the fact that the Scriptures do not disclose the “whole Nature of God” (161–62). There are, moreover, attributes that are known by experience alone (e.g., his goodness, mercy, justice), as opposed to those that may be grasped by speculation alone (e.g., his self-existence, eternity, simplicity, and independence) (182). The “speculation” versus “experience” dichotomy surfaces here again.
29. Ibid., 172.
30. Ibid., 178.
31. Ibid., 179.
32. Ibid., 179–81.
33. Boyle, Appendix, WRB, 12: 413.
34. Locke, Essay III.vi.12, 446.
35. Ibid., 447.
36. John Yolton, Two Intellectual Worlds, 64 and chaps. 2 and 3. Nuovo explains that, starting with Draft C, the Essay assumes a more marked theological framework, with large room allotted to natural theology (“Introduction,” xxv).
37. Locke, STE §190, 245.
38. Locke, Essay IV.xxi.2, 720.
39. Adversaria A (c. 1670), in Political Essays, 215.
40. Adversaria B (1677), in ibid., 266.
41. Cf. Nuovo, “Introduction,” xxx.
42. Locke, Conduct §22, 66.
43. Boyle, High Veneration, WRB, 10: 177; cf. also 168, 172, 184–85. The notion that God’s wisdom is “manifold” is based on Ephesians 3:10 and Psalms 104:24; the angels’ desire to look into divine things, on 1 Peter 1:12.
44. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 487; cf. also 449, 490, 518. See also Glanvill’s Philosophia Pia, which makes an explicit comparison between the student of nature and the “glorified Spirits” (141–42).
45. On Adam as representative of unspoiled encyclopedic knowledge, see Harrison, Fall of Man, 82 and chap. 1. In High Veneration, Boyle notes that angels, just like men, have a “freedom of acting”; they are thus not determined in their actions, including the “prying” and the adoration (WRB, 10: 176).
46. Locke, Essay IV.iii.23, 554; cf. also the “extravagant conjecture” that angels fitted with organs of sense might see into the essences of things, II.xxiii.13, 304. See the comments on this topic in John Yolton, Two Intellectual Worlds, chap. 3, section 2.
47. Locke, Essay III.vi.3, 440.
48. Locke, Conduct §3, 9.
49. Locke, Essay II.x.9, 154.
50. Locke, Essay II.xxiii.36, 316.
51. Locke, Essay II.xxi.49, 265.
52. Locke, Essay II.ii.3, 120. Cf. IV.iii.27, 557.
53. Locke, Essay II.x.9, 154.
54. Locke, STE §190, 245; §192, 246.
55. Locke, “Additions to the Essay,” in King, Life and Letters, 362. The fragment would have been added to the Essay chapter on the “abuse of words” (III.x.13).
56. Boyle, “Essay of the Holy Scriptures,” WRB, 13: 175–223. The “Essay” deals with many issues that will become the subject matter not only of Boyle’s later Style of Scriptures but also of his writings on “things above reason.” For the theological and biblical hermeneutic context of this text, see Wojcik, Robert Boyle, 55–58; Anstey, “Christian Virtuoso,” 19–25.
57. Milton, “Locke at Oxford,” 18–19, surveys Locke’s theological studies in the 1660s. See also Wainwright’s overview of the impressive list of sources Locke consulted in writing the Paraphrase, including authors from all confessional quarters (“Introduction,” 11–18, 25–28).
58. Eden, Hermeneutics, 58, 100.
59. Ibid., chaps. 1 and 2.
60. Ibid., 57, 58, and chap. 3. Eden comments that the distinction between scriptum and voluntas should not be mistaken for the distinction between the “literal” (propria) and the “figurative” (translata, figurata), which is a stylistic rather than legal distinction. The literal may very well produce a spiritual interpretation and is to be preferred over the figurative when it does (59).
61. Boyle, Usefulness, part 1, WRB, 3: 271: knowledge of both books should be applied to charity, not to “swelling” (this is an approximate quote from Bacon, Advancement I, WFB, 3: 268, with reference to 1 Corinthians 8:1); Locke, Conduct §22, 67.
62. Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, part 2, WRB, 12: 518.
63. On glosses in Protestant practice, see Gilmont, “Protestant Reformations and Reading.” On the (diminishing) role of the glosses in the several English editions of the Bible from 1525 to the Authorized Version of 1611, see Slights, Managing Readers, chap. 3.
64. Boyle, Style of Scriptures, WRB, 2: 409.
65. Ibid., 393, 398.
66. Ibid., 402.
67. Ibid., 409–12.
68. On the division in chapters and verses of the scriptural text in the early modern period, see Stallybrass, “Books and Scrolls.” Despite the principle of a “continuall course of the readyng of the Scripture,” advocated in the 1549 Book of Common Prayer, the discontinuous manner of reading continued (48–51). For a history of the practice, see also Wainwright (“Introduction,” 20–21).
69. Boyle, Style of Scriptures, WRB, 2: 412.
70. Ibid., 413.
71. Ibid.
72. Beal, “Notions in Garrison,” interprets the early modern commonplace books as personal florilegia. For the Protestant “spiritual commonplace book” designed to help devotional practices, see Jagodzinski, Privacy and Print, 40–41.
73. Boyle, Style of Scriptures, WRB, 2: 419.
74. Ibid., 420.
75. Ibid., 440–41. Recall the equally “concern’d” disposition of the pious student of nature.
76. The “agricultural” metaphor is often accompanied by a “digestive” one. Boyle argues for the nourishing richness of Scripture (“food for the soul”) in his answer to the objection of “barrenness.” Sharpe and Zwicker comment on the cross-fertilization of humanist and Christian metaphors in the Protestant conception of “reading and understanding as physiologies of imbibing and digesting, mastication and absorption” (“Discovering the Renaissance Reader,” 14). See also Irimia, Rise of Modern Evaluation, 179–201.
77. Boyle, Style of Scriptures, WRB, 2: 420–21.
78. An excellent discussion of Boyle’s biblical hermeneutics as a parallel to his method for the interpretation of nature is in Sargent, Diffident Naturalist, chap. 5, who notes that the two studies need not be seen as “influencing” one another in any precise way; they are parallel elaborations of the same “dynamic approach to knowledge” (115).
79. In an early essay of 1661, Locke argues against the Catholic principle of the infallibility of the church on the Protestant ground that Scripture speaks for itself better than does any human interpretation. While difficulties abound, and human “blindness” is considerable, it is nevertheless possible to advance in self-instruction, at least in those areas of Scripture teaching that are meant to be observed in this life (“Essay on Infallibility,” 323).
80. Locke, Paraphrase, 1: 181.
81. Locke, “Preface” to Paraphrase, 1: 104–5.
82. Ibid., 112–13.
83. Ibid., 110. Locke’s own practice in paraphrasing the Pauline epistles (Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians) is guided by this principle: his cross-references, explanatory notes, and summarizing synopses are aimed at unraveling the coherence of the texts. See Wainwright, “Introduction,” 18–25. A good example is Locke’s cross-referencing in his notes among the places relative to the “renewing of the mind” (Galatians 5:16–17, Ephesians 3:16, 4:17–24, Romans 12:2, 2 Corinthians 4:16).
84. Locke, “Preface” to Paraphrase, 1: 104.
85. E.g., Kuehne, “Reinventing Paul.” Neither Schouls, Imposition of Method, who presents Locke’s hermeneutics as continuous with his philosophical method nor the more historically sensitive introductions to Locke’s Paraphrase by Wainwright or Nuovo pay any attention to this topic.
86. Locke, “Preface” to Paraphrase, 1: 105–7.
87. Ibid., 108.
88. Ibid., 110.
89. Ibid., 115–16.
90. Boyle, Style of Scriptures, WRB, 2: 395; Locke, “Preface” to Paraphrase, 1: 115–16.
91. Locke, “Pacifick Christians,” in Political Essays, 305. Locke’s views seem thus to look back to what Furey has described as the “spiritual community of friends” that Erasmus and More envisioned in the late Renaissance (Religious Republic of Letters, chap. 1).
92. Locke, “Error,” in King, Life and Letters, 282. Cf. also Essay IV.xvii.24, 688.
93. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, WRB, 8: 52.
CONCLUSION
1. For Boyle’s use of the “lover of truth” figure, see, e.g., “Proemial Essay,” WRB, 2: 27; Things Above Reason, WRB, 9: 373.
2. See, e.g., Glanvill’s panegyric to Boyle in Plus Ultra, 93. Cf. M. Hunter, Robert Boyle (1627–1691), 11–14.
3. M. Hunter, Boyle: Between God and Science, 255; Robert Boyle (1627–1691).
4. Condren, Argument and Authority, 18.
5. Harrison, Fall of Man.
6. Wojcik, Robert Boyle.
7. Glanvill, Philosophia Pia, 48.
8. Harrison, Fall of Man, 241.
9. Shapin, Scientific Life, 25.
10. Ibid., 32.
11. Ibid., 33.
12. For the increasingly psychological and anthropological orientation of the new configurations of learning in the eighteenth century, see Vidal, Les sciences de l’âme; for an eighteenth-century view of the care of the embodied soul lying at the intersection of philosophy and medicine, see Zammito, “Médecin-Philosoph”; for the pedagogical thrust of Enlightenment philosophy, see Schwegman, “Etienne Bonnot de Condillac.”
13. For this line of development in eighteenth-century logical thought, see Buickerood, “Natural History of the Understanding”; Winkler, “Lockean Logic.”
14. Daston and Galison, Objectivity, chap. 1.
15. Shapin, Social History of Truth, 170 n. 135.
16. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 206.