discussed in ch. 2.Rhetoric, in as far as this means the art of persuasion, i.e., of deceiving by a beautiful show . . . is a Dialectic, which borrows from poetry only as much as is needful to win minds to the side of the orator before they have formed a judgment, and to deprive them of their freedom . . . the art of the orator (ars oratoris), the art of availing oneself of the weaknesses of men for one’s own designs (whether these be well meant or actually good does not matter), is worthy of no respect.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment
THE DISCUSSION of how Sallust positions himself and his works in the prefaces to Bellum Catilinae and Bellum Iugurthinum in chapter 1 has highlighted one of the strategies available to an elite writer attempting to justify his choice of subject matter. Like Sallust, who compared the function of historiography to that of ancestor masks, he can connect his undertaking to a traditional area of Roman public life with which it shares some elements, especially if these elements are, or can be made to appear, significant. This practice is reminiscent of what Catharine Edwards has described as the procedure of the Roman moralists: “The practice of argument by analogy enabled Roman moralists to articulate concerns about one subject by treating it as parallel to another, more obviously threatening.”1 Sallust and Cicero apply the same basic principle, only in their case the goal is positive, not negative: they strive to mitigate the common perception of the problematic nature of their respective disciplines by connecting them to analogous activities that are not controversial. Thus, Sallust contends that history-writing is similar to other, more traditional means of creating and sustaining memoria, while any differences are only superficial. The purpose of establishing such a connection is to show the reader that what he may at first, based on the differences, take to be novel in fact shares important aspects with something that it is second nature for him to approve.
In the prefaces to the philosophica Cicero employs a similar strategy, and his chosen means of establishing a connection between his subject matter, philosophy, and traditional public life is oratory.2 This choice is not surprising—oratory, together with law, constitute the most intellectual aspects of Roman civic life, and it is only oratory that makes it onto Cicero’s own list of the liberal arts at the beginning of the Tusculans.3 Elite Romans studied rhetorical theory as a standard part of their education.4 Even if they did so primarily with a view to practical application, the discipline still stood out as the most theoretical branch within the realm of Roman civic practice. This allows for the connection to be established. The other advantage of using oratory as a point of reference for philosophy is that it is not simply a part of Roman public life: it is omnipresent.5 Speeches are given in the senate, in the assembly, in the courtroom, and in front of troops about to go into battle.6
It is also a natural strategy for Cicero to adopt, given the important place that public speech occupied in his career and his consistent interest in rhetorical theory, an interest that found expression in his first treatise, De Inventione. The connection between rhetoric and philosophy is in fact central to Cicero’s thought throughout his life, and plays an important part in the philosophica, both in terms of content and the manner of argumentation. My main focus in this chapter is on the role oratory plays in the presentation of philosophy and in Cicero’s authorial self-presentation in the prefaces. Philippa Smith’s paper “ ‘A Self-indulgent Misuse of Leisure and Writing’? How Not to Write Philosophy” provides an interesting counterpoint to the Romans’ own worries about the appropriateness of philosophy. She expresses and investigates concerns about Cicero’s emphasis on style over content and the intrusion of the rhetorical into the philosophical, seeing it as potentially damaging and dangerous to philosophy, a contemporary perspective that descends ultimately from Plato’s attacks on the sophists.7 Smith sees Cicero’s rhetorical presentation of philosophy as resulting in “non-rational” argumentation and appeal to the emotions that is transplanted from the “unscrupulous” usage of the Roman courtroom—her assumption being that these are inappropriate in a philosophical context. I hope in this chapter to respond to this philosophical concern by examining Cicero’s extra-philosophical, cultural and political, motivations for the use of oratory in the philosophica.8
That oratory permeates the life of a Roman is a given—a reality that needs no specific articulation. It is the theoretical aspect, oratory as ars rhetorica, that Cicero, downplaying its performative facets,9 emphasizes in his attempts to present philosophy to his audience.10 And he exploits the association to the fullest. Apart from the passages in the prefaces that I will be discussing in this chapter, in which the connection between philosophy and oratory is made more or less explicit, the very style of the treatises, which is consciously highly rhetorical, continuously works to suggest the connection to the reader. Even though the content of what Cicero is saying in these works may appear novel in the context of his other writings, he still sounds essentially just the same. The following discussion will take up three aspects of Cicero’s strategy. The first section examines how he leverages the connection between Academic Skepticism and rhetoric, in contrast to the alienating thought and style of the Stoics exemplified by the person of Cato the Younger. The second focuses on the continuity between Cicero the orator and Cicero the philosopher, a unity that is just as important to his attempt to convince his readers as is the explicit articulation of the connection between the two disciplines. A final section treats his explicit engagement with this issue of disciplinary relationship and its potential benefit to his project. As will become clear, throughout the prefaces Cicero uses himself as a fulcrum, drawing on the power of his previous career and reputation to justify, in the eyes of his readers, the validity and viability of his new undertaking.11
The preface to the Paradoxa Stoicorum uses the figure of Cato the Younger to work out the relationship between philosophy and active political practice. The focus on Cato carries special significance given the date of the work, some time in early 46 BC.12 Cato, seen in the preface taking an active part in political activity, was in fact at the time of writing further away from the life of the forum than even Cicero himself. Any potential reader would have known this. Engaged in civil war against Caesar, he was, even before his dramatic suicide in Utica, becoming a symbol of republican resistance to the dictatorship that Cicero so often decries as destroying the fabric of Roman civic life.13 Appeal to Cato’s example functions, therefore, as a justification of Cicero’s own, considerably less dramatic, form of resistance to tyranny; namely, the composition of philosophical works.14 At the same time, setting this example with which the work begins in the earlier period when the republic still functioned properly serves to present Cicero’s writing as an alternative15 more legitimate than the debased workings of republican institutions under Caesar. In effect, by tapping into the auctoritas of Cato on the one hand and that of traditional republican politics on the other, Cicero constructs the preface to the Paradoxa as a multi-level argument for the validity of his own philosophical project.
The starting point of the preface is the image of Cato incorporating philosophy into his presentation of his proposals before the senate:
animadverti, Brute, saepe Catonem avunculum tuum, cum in senatu sententiam diceret, locos graves ex philosophia tractare abhorrentes ab hoc usu forensi et publico, sed dicendo consequi tamen, ut illa etiam populo probabilia viderentur. (Parad. 1)
I often observed, Brutus, that Cato, your uncle, when he gave his opinion in the senate, dealt with serious points taken from the realm of philosophy, which are far removed from standard practice in the courts and in matters concerning the state, but that through his powers of speech he nevertheless managed to bring it about that those matters seemed acceptable even to the people.
Cicero first acknowledges that this kind of philosophical intrusion into the sessions of the senate was far from normal practice. It is, however, significant that he is not claiming that the use of philosophical examples or arguments is in itself unusual: the participle abhorrentes (“removed from”)16 modifies locos, referring to the particular points that Cato chose to make, not the employment of philosophy in the domain of public duties in general.17 Yet Cato was able, Cicero claims, to integrate his chosen Stoic loci, though more out-of-place than an average philosophical point, successfully into the context of public debate.18 The degree of his success is indicated by his ability to make his points probabilia to the people.
I have translated probabilia above as “acceptable,” but the meaning of this word here warrants further consideration. Probabilis has two basic meanings corresponding to the two main meanings of the verb probare, “consider good, approve” and “to make credible, prove.” Thus, the adjective can mean “good, fitting, worthy of approval” and “credible, plausible.” I suggest that both meanings are operative in this instance, and that both are important to the argument that follows. The meaning “credible” indicates Cato’s success in his use of philosophy on the basic level: his loci made sense and seemed credible to the least educated part of his audience and, therefore, fulfilled their task of supporting whatever argument he was making in the speeches in question. The second meaning, “worthy of approval,” points to a kind of meta-success: his use of philosophy, though quite unusual, did not alienate his audience, but seemed fitting. This second type of success, the fact that his audience accepted his use of philosophy in pursuing his goal of service to the republic, is obviously a relevant parallel to Cicero’s project, the production of a body of philosophical material designed to benefit his country and his countrymen. Another aspect of Cato’s accomplishment that is relevant to Cicero’s purpose is implied in the use of etiam (“even”). If the people, whom one would not expect to be very familiar with philosophy, were convinced by Cato’s use of philosophical material and approved it as a practice, so much the more must his social equals have approved, and they are Cicero’s target audience in this project.
There is an additional dimension to Cicero’s emphasis on probare and probabilia in this short preface (the adjective occurs twice; the verb three times). On the one hand, the rhetorical reference of these words goes beyond the immediate context, calling to mind the most basic function of rhetoric, identified by Cicero himself in the Orator: probare necessitatis est.19 On the other hand, the same words are used by Cicero to express, in Latin, concepts central to the philosophical school he follows on most issues and the only one to which he proclaims allegiance (as he does in this preface), Academic skepticism. The crucial epistemological tenets of the New Academy, expounded by Cicero in the Academica, have to do with the skeptic’s ability to function in practical everyday terms while withholding assent. The particular formulation by Carneades is a response to Stoic criticisms of the Academic position, and relies on the idea that the skeptic can act based on what is likely, not what is necessarily true. This is Carneades’ pithanon, the concept Cicero renders into Latin with probabile and related words.20
Cicero’s use of probabile thus functions simultaneously on several levels. In the more obvious sense it refers to rhetorical persuasion, an arena in which Cicero, by writing the Paradoxa, is demonstrating his superiority to Cato and the Stoic school in general, however playfully.21 The mention of particular occasions on which Cato spoke brings into play the practical aspects of oratory, while the word itself invokes rhetorical theory. At the same time, for those who know more about the two schools and the epistemological debate between them, the reference to the Academics’ relationship to the probabile will call to mind their assertion against Stoic objections of their school’s ability to guide practical everyday conduct.22 This is an area of importance to Cicero in justifying his allegiance to Academic skepticism and that school’s general appropriateness to the Roman context, with its strong bias towards the practical.23
The goal of the sentence that follows is, on the face of it, to further emphasize Cato’s accomplishment in using philosophical material by underlining the difficulty of making his particular brand of philosophy palatable to the general public. Cicero indicates that the views that Stoicism, Cato’s philosophical school, advocates, are significantly different from what one normally encounters in a public context in both their content and their form. Stoic opinions non sane probantur in vulgus, “are certainly not held very widely,” and the standard manner of presenting them deliberately avoids rhetorical ornamentation (nullum sequitur florem orationis) and strives for brevity (Parad. 2).
Praise for Cato in overcoming these difficulties is then used by Cicero to build up his own work, which he is about to introduce. This short work, Paradoxa Stoicorum, is a highly rhetorical presentation of what Cicero believes to be some of the most difficult and most counterintuitive views held by the Stoics (admirabilia contraque opinionem omnium, Parad. 3).24 As such, it is largely an exercise meant to demonstrate the limits (or, rather, the lack thereof) to rhetoric’s ability to make difficult things palatable to audiences: temptare volui possentne proferri in lucem, id est in forum, “I wanted to try and see whether [these views] could be brought forth into the light, that is, into the forum” (Parad. 4). Thus, what Cicero is about to present is an accomplishment greater than Cato’s: feci etiam audacius quam ille ipse, “what I have done is even more daring than what he himself did” (Parad. 3). For Cato’s daring, Cicero implies, had limits. As Cicero tells the reader, he expressed Stoic views in rather uncontroversial areas, where Stoic opinions did not differ significantly from the “commonsense” traditional views that the majority of Romans found comfortable (de magnitudine animi, de continentia, de morte, de omni laude virtutis, de dis inmortalibus, de caritate patriae).
At the same time as it validates and magnifies Cicero’s particular undertaking in the Paradoxa, Cato’s example and the projected success of the Paradoxa themselves fulfill, in a less explicit way, a similar function for the larger Ciceronian project of writing a body of philosophical work (eclectic in its choice of sources and schools, but written using the position of an Academic skeptic as its default25). In describing Cato’s (and by extension his own) difficulty in rhetorically expressing Stoic ideas, Cicero contrasts the Stoic situation vis-à-vis rhetoric with that of the philosophical school that he follows: nos ea philosophia plus utimur quae peperit dicendi copiam et in qua dicuntur ea quae non multum discrepent ab opinione populari, “we practice more that school of philosophy which gave birth to eloquence and in which the kinds of opinions are posited that do not differ much from the common view.”26 The unstated implication of this contrast is that Cicero’s brand of philosophy is (better) suited for presentation to a wider audience, because it is intimately connected with rhetoric in a fundamental way and because its views are not as shockingly counterintuitive as those of the Stoics. Furthermore, given that presenting philosophy to a Roman audience is not an easy undertaking, if, with the help of oratory, it could be done for the Stoic paradoxa, some of the most extreme philosophical views imaginable, it follows that it should be much easier and more natural to present the philosophical ideas of the Academics, which are closer to “common sense.”27
It is significant that Cicero claims that the purpose of the Paradoxa is to bring the recondite ideas of the Stoics in lucem, id est in forum, “into the light, that is, into the forum.”28 The facile equation made by id est is in fact covering up a significant leap. Proferri in lucem is a fairly general expression that can be justifiably used to characterize any kind of publication, and as such is perfectly applicable in this case.29 In forum, on the other hand, implies a very specific kind of publication, one that brings into play all the public and civic association of the forum. If a hypothetical reader is expected to classify the work as resulting from and intended for either the sphere of otium or negotium, locating it in the forum places it squarely in the realm of negotium, and more specifically, the kind of business that is conducted in the forum in the service of the republic. The transformation that Cicero is attempting here is all the more radical as he explicitly identifies the Stoic material that he is working with as located in the sphere of Greek-tinged otium: quae vix in gymnasiis et in otio Stoici probant, “things which the Stoics deem credible with difficulty when relaxing in the gymnasia” (Parad. 3).
Thus, in the course of this short preface, Cicero has taken the reader through a kind of rhetorical chiasmus. Starting from an instance of the use of philosophy in the public arena by a Stoic, which he asserts is unusual, but impressive, he has ended by placing his own, largely Academic, philosophical work in the forum by virtue of its organic rhetorical components.
In the preface to the Paradoxa Stoicorum, we saw Cicero first construct an implicit apology for his philosophical undertaking by displacing the potential conflict onto the figure of Cato the Younger, and then use the latter’s actions as a basis for justifying his own. In contexts where the criticism and the self-justification are more explicit, no such displacement can take place, and Cicero attempts to convince his readers that philosophical activity is a natural extension of the standard Roman public activities, notably oratory, that marked his earlier career.
Book one of De Natura Deorum contains Cicero’s most explicit point-by-point response to his critics. One issue that Cicero claims occasioned comment was the unexpectedness of his turn to philosophy and writing: sermonem . . . admirantium unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium extitisset . . . ., “the talk of those wondering from what source this sudden zeal for philosophizing arose in us . . . .” (N.D. 1.6). The amazement of the unidentified critics, coupled with the use of subito, “suddenly,” of course implies that in their opinion this new activity of Cicero’s has no connection to his previous duties as a statesman and an advocate. His response rests on proving that such surprise is unwarranted, which he will do by establishing a solid link between, on the one hand, the activities his critics, though hostile to philosophy, would recognize as natural for him (and, by implication, more generally for a man in his social position) and his new occupation on the other:
nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore aetatis in eo studio operam curamque consumpsimus, et cum minime videbamur, tum maxime philosophabamur; quod et orationes declarant refertae philosophorum sententiis et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi Diodotus Philo Antiochus Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus. (N.D. 1.6)
Furthermore, I began to engage in philosophy not suddenly and have spent not trivial amounts of effort and care in this pursuit from an early age, and I was most involved in practicing philosophy at the times when I appeared to be doing so the least; which point also my speeches demonstrate given that they are filled with opinions of philosophers and my close relationships with most learned men, with which my house always blossomed, and those teachers, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, by whom I was taught.
The first thing Cicero needs to do is to deny the element of suddenness with its implications of a break with the past, and thus nec subito is a very strong litotes here, expanded by a primo tempore aetatis:30 his involvement with philosophy certainly should not be seen as a departure from the immediately preceding portion of his career, since philosophy has been a constant presence in his life from his early youth.31 A further implied assumption of the critics has to do with the otium/negotium provenance of activities: it is Cicero’s attempt to shift philosophy from the sphere of otium to that of negotium, i.e., to treat it as a serious occupation on a par with political and legal activity, that is surprising and potentially objectionable.
To disarm such an objection Cicero needs to show that philosophical activity exhibits inherent characteristics of negotium. The fact that philosophy has always required operam curamque (“effort and care”), for example, definitely locates it within the sphere of negotium.32 Moreover, since he claims that it was not previously separated from his other public activities—witness the philosophical views he expressed in his speeches—it cannot be taken to represent a real break with them. The example of Cicero’s speeches provides a perfect parallel to his starting point in the Paradoxa, Cato’s use of Stoic philosophical views in his speeches. Oratory, the sphere where philosophy and an active public life meet, stands as a strong argument against those skeptics who doubt the value of philosophy to the Roman political world, and as such it will play a critical role in Cicero’s self-presentation in the philosophica.
The connection between Cicero’s past and present is further established through a rather striking paradoxical observation: cum minime videbamur, tum maxime philosophabamur. The phrase implies that a man of Cicero’s stature routinely engages in philosophy; indeed his everyday activities can be construed as prime examples of its practice. That this fact has escaped the notice of his critics establishes Cicero as a real authority on the subject, and his opponents as men capable only of superficial interpretation. The actual examples of this phenomenon that he provides are inconsistent with the grandness of the initial claim. The presence of philosophers in his immediate circle and among his teachers, in particular, is hard to construe as an instance of minime (philosophari) videbamur, since, on the one hand, it is not an unexpected or covert (minime) way of showing that one is connected with philosophy, and, on the other hand, a house philosopher is often nothing more than a status symbol, a luxury item that says little about the patron’s real commitment to philosophy or his ability to practice it.
This disconnect between the claim and the supporting evidence, which amounts to a step back for the argument, results from Cicero’s wish that his proof not depend entirely on evidence that had not been accessible to the reading public. In light of this example, it is all the more significant that oratorical practice once again emerges as the area of public life that lends itself to convincing “unbelievers” that philosophy has a place in demonstrably approved Roman activities. Philosophy’s contribution is in the use of sententiae in speeches. This is again parallel to the example of Cato in the Paradoxa: the orators are different and adhere to different philosophical schools, but they share a reliance on philosophy. It emerges that oratory—good and effective oratory—almost requires philosophy. The interpenetration of the two shows conclusively that philosophy is not separable from public life, let alone a threat to it.33 This is made explicit in the following section:
et si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse quae ratio et doctrina praescripserit. (N. D. 7)
And if all teachings of philosophy are relevant to life, I think that I have exhibited, in both private and public affairs, those things that my understanding and learning had prescribed.
The main thrust of this summing up is the even distribution of Cicero’s prior philosophy-based conduct between the public and the private spheres of his life. The catch is that to agree with this conclusion (and therefore to accept writing philosophy as an occupation) the potential opponent must be willing to accept the content of the si clause, a rather broad—and by no means uncontroversial—statement of philosophy’s direct bearing on practical life. But the way the sentence is constructed presents this condition rather casually, as if self-evident, with the typical Ciceronian hope of sweeping the reader along to agreement, leaving him no leisure to linger over the precise meaning of the premise.
The theme of continuity in Cicero’s career serves to integrate philosophy into the fabric of Roman public life. The combination of oratory’s undeniable importance to an elite Roman conducting his accustomed business in the assembly, the senate, and the courts, along with its as apparent closeness to the discipline of philosophy, allows Cicero to construct a plausible refutation of the charge that his turn to philosophical writing constitutes a break with his earlier career and thus removes his activity from the public sphere and the service of the state.
The connection between philosophy and oratory is also essential to the setup of the Tusculan Disputations. The preface to book one contains a disquisition on the many artes in which the Greeks are held to be superior to the Romans. Cicero singles out oratory (by implication putting it on the same level as the other arts he discusses) as the one exception, adopted so early and practiced so successfully in Rome that in this field equality with the Greeks was reached. From oratory he moves to philosophy, which is also presented as an exception, though of the opposite type. Philosophy is the only area in which the Romans are said to have exerted no serious efforts. This conjunction of the two exceptional arts, the one where Roman achievement is the greatest and the other that the Romans left untouched, is used by Cicero to construct a role for himself. His oratorical success qualifies him to introduce philosophy to Rome:
quare si aliquid oratoriae laudis nostra attulimus industria, multo studiosius philosophiae fontis aperiemus, e quibus etiam illa manabant. (Tusc. 1.6)
Therefore, if I have attained anything of oratorical praise through my diligence, with all the more zeal I will open up the sources of philosophy from which [my oratorical accomplishments] also flowed.
By using the litotes aliquid laudis Cicero is laying claim to an important contribution in the one art where the Romans have been most successful, possibly implying that his contribution is the crucial one that put the Romans on a par with the Greeks. Against this background of prior diligentia he establishes a connection we have seen in the other prefaces: his oratorical achievement is based on philosophy. Though similar in its general outline to Cicero’s other statements of this relationship, this assertion is by far the strongest. In earlier instances the influence of philosophy was confined to a well-defined, and somewhat peripheral segment of oratorical endeavor, the use of sententiae in speeches. This interpretation of the interaction between the two disciplines is sufficient to establish a connection and indicate a certain level of natural affinity that allows for interpenetration, but it by no means implies that philosophy is essential to oratory. The brief statement in this passage, on the other hand, makes a far more ambitious claim: it identifies philosophy as the fontes, sources, thus ascribing complete dependence and subordinate status to oratory.34
This account of the origins of oratory creates a paradox when put alongside his preceding account of Roman involvement with the Greek arts. That account established that of all the arts the Romans were best suited for oratory. But oratory, we have just learned, is derived from philosophy. And yet philosophy is the very art that the Romans have never properly explored. The reader is led to infer that the Romans must have a natural predisposition to philosophy, oratory’s progenitor. Cicero’s presentation of the relationship between oratory and philosophy also implies that it would be logical for the Romans, who regard the former highly, to value the latter as well. In short, philosophy emerges as an area in which the Romans are predisposed to succeed and to which they ought to apply themselves. At the same time, the argument sets up Cicero’s own role in this future application. He has contributed to the glory of Roman oratory; he is the one who established the connection with philosophy; his continuous engagement with philosophy is one of the most frequent themes of the prefaces. That he is perfectly placed to shepherd the Romans into the field of philosophical practice is not open to doubt. He then introduces a Greek parallel for a productive orator-philosopher combination, choosing as his model a figure no less than Aristotle:
sed ut Aristoteles, vir summo ingenio, scientia, copia, cum motus esset Isocratis rhetoris gloria, dicere docere etiam coepit adulescentes et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere, sic nobis placet nec pristinum dicendi studium deponere et in hac maiore et uberiore arte versari. hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere. (Tusc. 1.7)
But just as Aristotle, a man of greatest talent, knowledge, fullness of expression, after he was bestirred by the glory of the orator Isocrates, he also began to teach the youth how to speak and to unite knowledge with eloquence, thus I have decided not to put aside my old pursuit of speaking and to engage in this greater and more fertile art. For I have often judged that kind of philosophy most accomplished which was able to speak about the most significant issues with fullness and elegance.
Aristotle is described here as the perfect man for the job of combining rhetoric and philosophy. He not only possesses ingenium, a rather unspecific term that describes natural ability; he also has the two qualities relevant to the successful practice of the two disciplines he will combine: scientia, “knowledge,” for philosophy, and copia, “eloquence,” for oratory. His function in the passage is to provide a famous predecessor—and the validation that such a predecessor implies—for Cicero’s project, but with a twist: his motivational process moves in the opposite direction from Cicero’s. Aristotle, a philosopher, is induced by the example of Isocrates to make rhetoric an element of his teaching. The reason why he was “moved,” motus, by Isocrates’ gloria is not mentioned, but the rest of the sentence reveals it to be a result of the traditional Greek competition between philosophers and rhetoricians in the educational arena:35 Aristotle’s reaction to Isocrates’ success is described exclusively in terms of the changes he makes to his curriculum. While reflecting a historical reality, this emphasis on education also reveals Cicero’s preoccupation with the educational aspect of his own attempt at joining philosophy and oratory.36
The fact that Cicero here mentions both Isocrates and Aristotle, but compares himself only to the latter is in itself noteworthy, given Isocrates’ influence on Cicero and the many similarities in their thought (in particular their common emphasis on the practical side of what each refers to as philosophia and their explicitly pedagogical focus).37 However, the context here requires emphasis on the integration of rhetoric and philosophy, but Isocrates, a figure whom most would identify as a rhetorician, himself studiously avoided the term rhetorike, styling himself instead as a practitioner of philosophia. He would not seem, then, to be nearly as useful a comparandum as Aristotle.38 Yet even Aristotle is not depicted as a perfect model for what Cicero sees himself doing, for the very fact that it required Isocrates’ success to convince him to take up the teaching of rhetoric in addition to philosophy reveals that, by Cicero’s standards, he underestimated the importance of joining the two disciplines. Cicero ultimately sees himself alone as the one who truly understands the importance of this integrating move, a sentiment that he expresses in one of his last works, De Officiis.
The treatise is addressed to his son Marcus, who is studying in Athens. In comparing the style of his speeches and his philosophical works and commenting on their respective benefits to Marcus’ educational progress, Cicero in effect states that no one has been as accomplished and successful as he in both areas of rhetorical endeavor:
et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium: utrumque certe secuti sumus. equidem et Platonem existimo si genus forense dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere et Demosthenem si illa, quae a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse; eodemque modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudico, quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit alterum. (Off. 1.3–4)
And indeed, I see that none of the Greeks up till now succeeded in working in and pursuing both the type of speaking we use in the forum and this quiet type of discussion, except perhaps Demetrius of Phalerum can be considered in this group, a subtle philosophical debater, and an orator, though not sufficiently vigorous, but nevertheless delightful so that you could recognize in him a student of Theophrastus. Yet what I have accomplished in each genre, let others judge; I have certainly pursued both. Indeed, I think that both Plato, had he been willing to practice the public type of speaking, would have been able to speak most weightily and eloquently, and Demosthenes, if he had mastered those matters, which he had learned from Plato, and had been willing to present them publicly, would have been able to do so in a brilliant manner; I hold a similar opinion about Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom, pleased with his own field of endeavor, looked down on the other.
This classification is revealing in several ways. In the first place, it is typical of Cicero’s procedure in the prefaces to focus on style rather than content. Here it allows him to create a space where comparing Plato and Demosthenes becomes possible: their accomplishments in using language are made to transcend the difference in their respective chosen arenas. Even as Cicero praises their individual accomplishments, he criticizes quite an impressive selection of famous ancient Greeks for having, in comparison to himself, too narrow an intellectual focus. The choice of Demetrius of Phalerum39 as the Greek who comes closest to fulfilling the Ciceronian ideal is conditioned by a third unexpressed element that is of importance to Cicero: in addition to pursuing philosophy and oratory, playing an active role in politics was essential to him.40 Demetrius thus perfectly suits Cicero’s purposes.41
At the same time, the fact that Demetrius’ main claim to fame is that he was reasonably good in all the necessary fields, but not exceptional in any, throws Cicero’s own accomplishment into even sharper relief, the humble aside—“let others judge”—notwithstanding. His presence in the passage shifts some of the weight of the comparison with the four great Greeks away from Cicero. They are set against each other, and against Demetrius, who serves as the point of contact with Cicero. The pair that represented philosophy and rhetoric in the Tusculans, Aristotle and Isocrates, also reappears, this time cited for having failed to appreciate the value of each other’s disciplines, a failure that Cicero (and only Cicero) is going to correct.
In the comparison of Cicero to Aristotle in the above passage from the preface to the Tusculans, however, Aristotle received high praise both for his philosophical and rhetorical accomplishments, a necessary condition if he was to serve as the famous forerunner whose similarity to Cicero would validate the latter’s work. But the Aristotle half of the comparison does not contain a judgment on the relative value of the two elements, philosophy and rhetoric, that are being united. Its main purpose is to show that they can be successfully combined. Cicero then uses this as a basis for saying that his turn to philosophy need not entail a rejection of oratory. Here the comparison is turned to Cicero’s and his project’s advantage. Philosophy and oratory are no longer seen in a developmental relationship to one another, but are set squarely one against the other, and Cicero rules unambiguously in favor of philosophy. It is maior, greater, and uberior, more productive.
What could be the basis for a comparison between oratory and philosophy in terms of their productivity? The main product of oratory is persuasion. The orator uses his eloquence to bring the audience over to his view on a given issue. If oratory can be seen as less productive than philosophy, it is because its brand of persuasion is fairly superficial. The audience may vote as an effective speaker wishes it to vote, but the audience will not as a result share the general views held by the speaker. Should another issue come up, it will have to be persuaded anew. Philosophy elicits a deeper commitment from those persuaded—thus its potential to bear fruit is greater.42
The message that Cicero is trying to get across to the reader is that philosophy is not an alien new art; it is rather a further evolution of the already well-accepted art of oratory. At the same time he is establishing his own qualifications for the task of presenting philosophy to the Roman audience. In the last sentence of the Tusculans passage quoted above, he again emphasizes that the brand of philosophy he wants to offer to his fellow-citizens will incorporate oratory. It is as if he were reassuring the reader that his new works will not sound strange. A continuity of style will allow his audience to adjust rather painlessly to the change in content. In fact, the description of philosophy Cicero gives here, de maximis quaestionibus ornate . . . copioseque dicere, could be just as easily applied to oratory.43
At this point the preface moves from introducing philosophy in a general way to preparing the reader for the specific work he is about to encounter; namely, a disputation on philosophical subjects presented in dialogue form. As in the previous section, the justification of the authorial choice is made explicitly in terms of Greek precedent: etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus, “I even dared to have learned disputations in the manner of the Greeks.” Schola is the Greek term whose Latin translation, disputatio, gives its name to the entire work.44 It is significant that Cicero both introduces the Greek term in the beginning of his explanation of how the dialogue is going to function and uses the Latin term in his title. There is a paradox here. Cicero in trying to present himself as qualified to do philosophy has to rely on Greek models—the only models available—but at the same time he must protect himself from looking too Greek, and therefore suspect, in the eyes of his Roman readers. He counteracts this danger by introducing Roman parallels for the essentially Greek activity he is engaging in:
ut nuper tuum post discessum in Tusculano cum essent complures mecum familiares, temptavi, quid in eo genere possem. ut enim antea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit, sic haec mihi nunc senilis est declamatio. ponere iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut sedens aut ambulans disputabam. . . . fiebat autem ita ut, cum is qui audire vellet dixisset, quid sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. (Tusc. 1.7–8)
So recently after your departure when a number of close friends were with me at my Tusculan villa, I tried to see what I was capable of in this genre. For as before I would declaim my court speeches, a thing that no one did longer than I, so this [learned philosophical discussion] is now the rhetorical exercise for my old age. I told [my friends] to put forward what question each one wanted to hear about; in response to it I gave a discussion either sitting down or walking around. . . . Furthermore, what took place was that when the person who wanted to have the question debated had said what seemed to him to be the case, then I spoke and opposed him. For such, as you know, is the old Socratic method of arguing against the opinion of the interlocutor. For Socrates believed that in this manner what was nearest the truth could be discovered most easily. But to have our disputations presented more conveniently, I will set them forth as if the action is taking place, not as if it is being narrated.
In light of previous discussion, it comes as no surprise that oratorical practice is once again the sphere that provides Cicero with his most useful models.45 A philosophical disputatio is presented to the Roman reader through the familiar activity of declamatio.46 Declamatio brings with it connotations of the early stages of the oratorical process: it is an exercise meant for the orator in training to display and improve his powers, or a rehearsal of a real speech. Disputatio appears, by analogy, also as an exercise for the philosopher in training.47 This has implications for the author and for his audience. If the Roman reader is just now being introduced to the practice of philosophy, then disputatio presented in these educational terms is entirely appropriate for him.48 It is at the same time helpful for the author’s relationship to the reader that he does not portray himself always as an expert: he may be more qualified to introduce philosophy to Rome than the average potential reader, but he too is new to the task of blending Greek philosophical knowledge and Roman tradition—he too needs practice. Thus, a disputatio in which he will arrive at the truth thanks to the promptings of a number of his familiares is an arrangement with maximum potential to satisfy the reader. He will identify with the questioners and feel as gratified by the outcome of the discussion as if he had contributed to it himself.49
Cicero calls the upcoming discussion his declamatio senilis, a declamation of his old age. He has put in his time practicing traditional rhetorical declamation; his success didn’t make him too proud to exercise, rather, he may be implying that it is precisely his unique willingness to keep doing the basic exercises that is responsible for his superiority as an orator—quod nemo me diutius fecit, “the thing that no one did longer than me.” Against this background, calling his philosophical exercises declamatio has a number of connotations beyond the recurring theme of making philosophical practice appear analogous to oratorical practice. The factor of continuity is undeniable and very important, but the use of senilis makes it more than a simple linear connection—it introduces the idea of progress: his switch to philosophical exercise emerges as the culmination of his previous rhetorical exercise, as if the cumulative effect of repeated performance were a qualitative shift. In addition, there is the promise that the author will apply the same kind of dedication in his new-chosen arena as in his earlier field.
The rest of the introductory section is spent detailing the workings of the Socratic method, which will be used to organize Cicero’s disputatio.50 The level of detail is somewhat surprising given that even those with a fairly superficial acquaintance with Greek philosophy would likely be familiar with the Socratica ratio. One obvious function of the evocation of Socrates here is to provide a solid Greek parallel for Cicero’s own practice, the same function that Aristotle served a bit earlier on. Yet the point of both appeals to tradition is that the names are easily recognized as famous, and not so much their specific associations. Thus, the extra detail of the reference to Socrates requires more of an explanation. Cicero has a general tendency to use his preface to prepare the reader as much as possible for what he will find in the main body of the work, and this is a fair reason for the amount of detail we find here. I propose, however, that the particular way in which Cicero describes the Socratic method and the way he and his interlocutors will put it into practice is meant to evoke interactions between parties during a trial—a specific and solidly Roman instance of the application of oratory.51
Although Cicero’s account of the interaction does not correspond exactly to any specific phase of a trial, several elements of court proceedings are recognizable: the overall structural set-up of two parties arguing against each other (contra alterius opinionem disserendi); the series of questions and answers that are reminiscent of the questioning of a witness by an advocate; and the avowed goal common to the court case and philosophical debate, to get as close as possible to the truth (quid veri simillimum esset inveniri). Finally, the description of the chosen manner of reporting the discussion, quasi agatur res, is noteworthy. It refers in this context to Cicero’s authorial decision to present it as if it were taking place in the present, as a dramatic dialogue.52 Yet the use of the phrase res agere cannot but bring to the mind its common meaning of conducting a legal case. I do not by any means contend that Cicero is trying to convince his reader that a philosophical discussion is identical to a legal proceeding. Nonetheless, I believe that he uses language that purposefully presents philosophy as in many particulars similar to familiar and respectable kinds of public activity, and that he does this in order to make it appear less alien to his audience.53
• • •
In the presentation of his philosophical project to the elite Roman readership, Cicero faced a number of serious and deeply rooted prejudices; in particular, the unwillingness to accept intellectual activity as a primary negotium worthy of an elite man, and the belief that the practice of philosophy was incompatible with an active public life. One of his major strategies to combat these views was a multi-faceted use of oratory, calculated to give philosophy a more familiar face. Through the rhetorical style that he uses in the treatises, through his emphasis on the theoretical similarity between rhetoric and philosophy, and, finally, through the presentation of the continuous presence of philosophy in his successful prior public career, Cicero creates a series of links between philosophy and standard political practice as conducted through oratory. Philosophy is thus constructed not as a foreign and potentially subversive practice, but rather a beneficial practice, fully consonant with Roman public life. But at the same time as Cicero uses oratory to open a way for philosophy, he pits the two disciplines against each other. He presents philosophy as an improvement, a way to achieve persuasion that is more stable than what oratory can accomplish. His is not a bid to replace oratory with philosophy, the way his philosophical works are meant to replace their Greek sources. Instead, he implies that the way forward is to use philosophy to ground traditional Roman practice, just as his own public actions have been grounded in philosopohy. Yet this essential element of his argument is also its weakest link. A look back at Cicero’s career brings to light many instances of what he in his later philosophical mode might call a misuse of rhetoric. Like the failing state he hopes to revive, Cicero is a captive of his own past.
1Edwards 1993.138.
2On this phenomenon in general, see Grilli 2002 and the work of Michel; cf. Gilson 1953. Particular instantiations are treated by, among others, Leonhardt 1999, Inwood 1990, and Gaines 2002. See Gildenhard 2011 for holistic treatment of the (broadly) philosophical underpinnings of Cicero’s speeches. For an opposing approach that does not want to see Cicero as interested in making the connection between the two fields, see Arweiler 2003.
3The distinction between practical occupations and liberal arts found in this preface is unusual. The term ars has a more general meaning elsewhere in Cicero. See, e.g., de Orat. 1.6–11, where the goal of the author is the opposite of that in the passage from the Tusculans; namely, to associate oratory with the more practical and more obviously Roman occupations. For a discussion of Cicero’s use of the term, see Gilson 1953.10–11.
4For a general treatment, see Clark 1957 and Bonner 1977; in the context of de Orat., Fantham 2004 ch. 4.
5Connolly’s recent study (2007) argues for the essential and constitutive role of rhetoric in Cicero’s thinking about the functioning of the res publica.
6Fantham 1997, Steel 2006, ch.1, Alexander 2007; on the contio, Morstein-Marx 2004.
7Smith 1995.
8For a treatment that sees Cicero’s rhetorical approach as philosophically productive, see, e.g., Inwood’s (1990) analysis of book two of De Finibus and Schofield 1986 on the connection between Academic suspension of judgment and the form of De Divinatione. Cf. the examples given by Lefèvre (2008.23), whose own work is attentive to the impact of rhetorical strategies.
9Dugan 2005 argues in ch. 2 that Cicero is deliberately transgressive in his depiction of the ideal orator and is exploiting the performance-based overlap between orator and actor. His provocative argument, in my opinion, overemphasizes the transgressive intent. On Cicero’s use of theatrical parallels in the practice of oratory, see also, e.g., Vasaly 1985 on Pro Roscio Amerino and Geffken 1973 on the Pro Caelio.
10It is interesting that another writer chose oratory as a related discipline useful for representing his chosen subject to the Roman audience. Macrobius tells us that Roscius the actor grew so bold from his association with Cicero that he composed a book in which he compared acting and oratory (Saturnalia 3.14.12). In Roscius’ case, however, the point of contact would have been different. Representations of the connection between philosophy and oratory are based on their shared theoretical framework; in the case of oratory and acting the basis is their nature as performance. While Cicero’s success in his bid for reinterpreting philosophy is debatable, he certainly had a better chance than Roscius. For, given the degree of distrust and social stigma attached to acting, the association that Roscius was trying to establish was more likely to bring to the surface the ambivalent status of oratory as performance than to elevate the status of acting. On the problematic relationship between acting and oratory, and the orator’s struggles to dissociate himself from the actor, see Dupont 2000; cf. Gunderson 2000a.111–48; in Cicero’s thought, Connolly 2007.200–208; on the negative representations of actors in Roman moralistic discourse, see Edwards 1993.98–136.
11Cf. Connolly 2007.234 on Cicero as “the solution” to the problems posed by interface between the power of the orator and an irrational collectivity. This strategy can be seen as an extension to philosophy of the reliance on ethos central to Roman oratory and studied by May 1988 (cf. Gildenhard 2011, Part I on Cicero’s “anthropology”).
12For the date of the treatise, see Wassmann 1996.36–37; cf. Ronnick 1991.2, n.4.
13For Cicero’s own contribution to the creation of the Cato myth, see Hall 2009b.94–99, Wassmann 1996, ch. 5; cf. Stem 1999. On the contestation of Cato’s memory in the immediate aftermath of his death, cf. Steel 2005.34.
14The political significance of the work is treated by Wassmann 1996, ch. 4.
15Cf. his exhortation in a letter to Varro, Fam. 9.2.5, “to read and write “Republics” (scribere et legere discussed in ch. 2.
16This passage, and the whole enterprise of the Paradoxa contrasts markedly with a passage from the preface of De Oratore (and the spirit of that work more generally), where Cicero uses abhorreo to indicate the crucial importance of adhering to common sense in oratory: ceterarum artium studia fere reconditis atque abditis e fontibus hauriuntur, dicendi autem omnis ratio in medio posita communi quodam in usu atque in hominum ore et sermone versatur, ut in ceteris id maxime excellat, quod longissime sit ab imperitorum intellegentia sensuque disiunctum, in dicendo autem vitium vel maximum sit a vulgari genere orationis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere, “pursuits of other arts are drawn from sources for the most part hidden and concealed, but the entire art of speaking, accessible to all, is found in common usage and in the mouths and words of men, so that in other arts the greatest achievements are those that are the farthest removed from the understanding and appreciation of the inexperienced, but in speaking it is rather the greatest fault to shrink from the ordinary type of speech and from the habits of commonly held opinions” (de Orat. 1.12).
17For a similar use of abhorreo, cf. Cicero’s request for indulgence for his unconventional choices in giving the Pro Archia: sed ne cui vestrum mirum esse videatur, me in quaestione legitima et in iudicio publico, cum res agatur apud praetorem populi Romani, lectissimum virum, et apud severissimos iudices, tanto conventu hominum ac frequentia hoc uti genere dicendi quod non modo a consuetudine iudiciorum verum etiam a forensi sermone abhorreat, quaeso . . ., “But lest it seem strange to some of you that in a legal proceeding and in a public court, where the case is conducted in front of the praetor of the Roman people, a most excellent man, and in front of the most severe judges, in such a greatly crowded assembly of men, I employ this type of speech which is removed not only from the custom of the courts but even from forensic speaking in general, I ask . . . .” (Arch. 3).
18Cicero’s presentation here is geared to his own rhetorical needs and should not be taken to reflect a reality. On Cicero’s own attack on Cato’s Stoicism in Pro Murena as out of place in the public arena, see Craig 1986. Stem 2005 synthesizes Cicero’s discussions of Cato’s style to show that Cicero did in fact find Cato the most eloquent of all Stoics.
19Orat. 69. Cicero here divides the task of the orator into probare, delectare, flectere; cf. de Orat. 2.116. For this classification and its variants in Cicero’s works, see Michel 1960.153–57.
20For a concise treatment of Carneades’ views, see Long 1986.94–100; on the meaning of pithanon, most recently Obdrzalek 2006. On the place of the concept in light of Cicero’s affiliation with Academic Skepticism, see Glucker 1988.62–66. For probabile as the Academic pithanon, see TLL s.v. probabilis II B 2 a. See also Glucker 1995 on the relationship between probabile and veri simile and the Greek terms they may be translating in different contexts in Cicero’s works. For a different view, cf. Görler 1992.
21ludens, Parad. 3.
22For Cicero’s response to potential criticism on this point, see, e.g., Off. 2.7–8, N.D. 1.12. For the skeptical response to the charge of apraxia, see, e.g., Burnyeat 1980 and Frede 1984.
23In this sense this preface is in line with Pro Murena, where one of Cicero’s main accusations against Cato’s brand of Stoicism is that it was not in accord with the mos maiorum. Cf. Craig 1986.
24For a list of rhetorical devices used in the Paradoxa, see MacKendrick 1989.91. See also Achard 1999, who posits Cicero’s desire to give an example of elevated style to Atticists as Cicero’s primary motivation in writing the Paradoxa.
25On the particular appropriateness of Academic Skepticism to Cicero’s needs in presenting philosophy as fitting into the Roman context, see Cambiano 2002 and Schofield 1986.
26Parad. 2. Cicero demonstrates the difference between the two schools’ manner of expressing their views rather dramatically in the third book of the Tusculans. The Stoic views are first set out in 14–21 in the Stoic propositional manner, with no rhetorical relief. Then in 22–27 Cicero presents his own version, the difference being in large part stylistic, as he emphasizes his desire to keep to the manly Stoic position on the issue in question, the wise man’s insusceptibility to distress. Cf. Graver 2002, ad loc.
27In the same preface Cicero expresses great faith in the powers of rhetoric, again with probabilis occupying a prominent position: sed nihil est tam incredibile quod non dicendo fiat probabile, nihil tam horridum, tam incultum, quod non splendescat oratione et tamquam excolatur, “but nothing is so difficult to believe that it cannot be made credible through the power of speech, nothing so rough, so unadorned that it does not shine in speech and become as though refined” (Parad. 3).
28On Cicero’s procedure in transforming the Stoic paradoxes from Stoic dialectic and logic through Academic/Peripatetic theses into rhetorical commonplaces, see Englert 1990.
29The metaphor of light recurs frequently in his presentation of what he is doing: cf. splendescat in Parad. 3, quoted above (n.27) and inlustranda in Tusc. 1.5, discussed in the previous chapter.
30Habinek 1994.59 notes that the theme of return is emphasized in the opening sentence of the preface through the use of four verbs with the prefix re-.
31Cicero emphasized this point frequently: e.g., Tusc. 5.5, de Orat. 1.2, Rep. 1.7. For a discussion of philosophy’s continuous presence in Cicero’s life and its integration into his political and oratorical activity, cf. Görler 1990.
32Cf. Sallust’s use of arduum to describe his intellectual activity, discussed in chapter chapter 1, the section “Sallust, or Anxiety about Writing.”
33This is a change from his approach to philosophy in the pre–civil war De Oratore. See Fantham 2004, ch. 3 and Connolly 2007.121–29 on the dialogue as a response to Plato’s charges against rhetoric.
34Michel 1960, taking his cue from Cicero, investigates the philosophical foundations of Cicero’s rhetoric, both in the speeches and in the rhetorical treatises; Gildenhard 2011 treats the speeches and uses a broadly based definition for identifying philosophical material, making a more powerful argument for maxime philosophabamur in Cicero’s oratorical practice than Cicero himself could.
35See Nightingale 1995, ch. 1 on Isocrates’ attempt at rhetorical appropriation of philosophia.
36On the “conflict” between Aristotle and Isocrates and its representation in Cicero, see Michel 1960.107–108; on this passage, cf. Gildenhard 2007.150.
37For Isocrates’ influence on Cicero, see Smethurst 1953. Cf. Hubbell 1914.16–40 and Michel 1960.101–104.
38See Garver 2004 for a comparison of the place of rhetoric in the thought of Isocrates and Aristotle.
39Sources on Demetrius are collected and translated in Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf, eds., 2000.
40Gottschalk 2000 is a concise treatment of Demetrius’ philosophical and political activity. More explicit political emphasis is also a feature of Cicero’s post-Caesarian treatises in general, see ch. 6.
41Dyck 1996.67, ad loc. suggests that Demetrius’ comparatively humble background, an additional similarity between the two men (cf. Cicero’s status as a novus homo), also contributed to Cicero’s sense of their affinity. A further important similarity is Demetrius’ exile, described by Cicero as iniuria, and his philosophical output during that period, in illo calamitoso otio (Fin. 5.54).
42For uberior used in the context of presenting philosophical arguments to achieve more deeply held conviction, cf. A.’s request at Tusc. 1.16: uberius ista, quaeso. haec enim spinosiora, prius ut confitear me cogunt quam ut adsentiar, “More fully, I ask. For these matters are so thorny that they force me to concede rather than agree.” Here the distinction is between different styles for the presentation of philosophical content, rather than between rhetorical and philosophical persuasion.
43Cf., e.g., the definition of eloquentia at Part. 79: nihil enim est aliud eloquentia nisi copiose loquens sapientia; quae ex eodem hausta genere, quo illa quae in disputando, est uberior atque latior et ad motus animorum vulgique sensus accommodatior, “eloquence is nothing other than wisdom that speaks with elegance, which is drawn from the same type as the one used in disputation; it is more full and expansive and more appropriate to the emotions and the perceptions of the common people.” Cf. Arweiler 2003.254–58.
44On the meaning and the history of this term, and its applicability to both rhetoric and philosophy, see Douglas 1995.199–202; on the negative connotations, Gildenhard 2007.12–14. Gorman 2005.64–84 argues that Cicero’s actual procedure in what follows transforms the traditional Greek schola through the infusion of Socratic dialectic, rendering it more Roman in the process. On the form of the work, see the compelling treatment of Gildenhard 2007; see also Lefèvre 2008.267–81.
45Fox 2007.51–52 comments on this passage as “strongly suggestive” of a connection between the two disciplines, in particular in the case of Cicero the orator-turned-philosopher.
46A classic treatment of declamatio is Bonner 1949; recent treatments are Gunderson 2003, a literary study of surviving declamationes (see 1–4 for a general definition and further bibliography); Stroh 2003, with extensive bibliography (n. 5), a study of the semantic development of declamatio and its cluster during Cicero’s lifetime (and based primarily on Cicero’s usage) to assume the technical meaning it had under the empire; Kaster 2001 and Corbeill 2007, with a focus on education and social function; see also Beard 1993 on declamations as Roman cultural myths.
47See Reinhardt 2000 on the connection between Academic rhetorical training under Philo and Academic dialectic.
48Gildenhard 2007.8–17 discusses the importance of the key terms discussed here, as well as exercitatio and sermo, in the context of the work’s genre. He sees Cicero as emphatically portraying his engagement in activities associated with youth, inappropriate for a man of his position, as a function and an indictment of Caesar’s tyranny (64).
49Another dialogue that is designed to replicate a conversation in which the reader could easily imagine participating is De Oratore. See Narducci 1997.28–34 for the influence of Platonic dialogue (as opposed to the Aristotelian model of disputatio employed in the Tusculans) and aristocratic conversational etiquette on the structure of De Oratore. On the role of politeness and social conventions on the interactions of characters in this dialogue, see also Hall 1996b.
50Gorman 2005 is a study that foregrounds Cicero’s use of Socratic dialectic for philosophical ends. On Cicero’s Socrates, see also Glucker 1997, Görler 2001.
51Cf. Stroup 2010.169: “And although the dialogues . . . resemble epideictic oratory . . . rather than, strictly speaking, the forensic sort, they nevertheless provide a pleasing echo of an established sort of display.” On Cicero’s use of legal metaphors in some of the other treatises, see Gebhardt 2009.58–68. Schofield 1986 (Appendix 2) compares the philosophical rhetoric of the second book of De Divinatione to forensic cross-examination and sets out parallels with some of Cicero’s speeches.
52In presenting his choice in this manner he is also alluding to Plato’s Theatetus 143b5.
53The method of argumentation in utramque partem, which, as Malcolm Schofield (1986.53–55 and 65) on the example of De Divinatione and Jürgen Leonhardt in his 1999 book have demonstrated, bears great rhetorical and structural similarity to Cicero’s forensic procedure of questioning an imaginary opponent. It serves both a philosophical purpose and a function analogous to this instance of the use of legal language in naturalizing his philosophical project in the eyes of his Roman audience.