{1} This number is cited in Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio, 2013), 265.

{2} Ahmed Rashid, “Afghanistan: Taliban’s Second Coming,” BBC News, June 2, 2006.

{3} Mahaney’s words and the account of Operations Nish and Adalat are drawn from an email exchange with the author on March 13, 2013; an author interview with him on March 8, 2013; and a written account of Special Operations Task Force 71’s service achievement in Operation Enduring Freedom that was submitted for a unit citation.

{4} McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 265.

{5} The statistics are cited in the unit citation narrative cited above; the account of the enemy situation and the battle is drawn from an author’s interview and email exchanges with Chris Castelli, March 13, 2013. According to Castelli, the three principal Taliban leaders operating in this area were Mullah Shakur, Haji Lala, and Mullah Tahir.

{6} Author interviews with Castelli and Mahaney.

{7}  “Taliban Launch Rare Frontal Assault,” Associated Press, August 8, 2007.

{8} Author interviews; unit citation narrative.

{9} Author interview with Mahaney; Patrick J. Mahaney Jr., “Observations for Practitioners of Complex Operations,” in Christopher M. Schnaubelt, ed., Complex Operations: NATO at War and on the Margins of War, NDC Forum Paper 14, NATO Defense College, Research Division, July 2010.

{10} The quotation is from an author interview with a special operations officer, June 10, 2011. Numerous special operations officers characterized the early approach taken in Afghanistan in this way in author interviews. Lieutenant General John Mulholland was interviewed on February 15, 2012. There is a large literature on Afghan militias and the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process in Afghanistan. See the work of Antonio Giustozzi, especially his Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 2002–2007 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

{11} The two forces linked up in Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan to ready their drive to capture Kandahar from Taliban control. As Karzai’s men and the special forces gathered to stage their attack on Taliban-held Kandahar, they came under attack from Taliban forces. Karzai and the team were bombed after the GPS device reset; the aircraft was incorrectly given their coordinates instead of those of the enemy in trucks bearing down on them. Karzai survived unscathed, though others died, and shortly thereafter he received the call from Bonn informing him that he had been chosen by the Afghans gathered there as the interim president of the new Afghanistan. See Eric Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying For (New York: Harper, 2010). Reeder’s statements and his recollection of Eikenberry’s statement are from an author interview conducted on November 16, 2011.

{12} Another short-lived initiative was the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, formed in 2006. Afghans were recruited in six provinces to supplement the Afghan National Police. They were given ten days of training and assigned to static security duty. The program received minimal support, with few safeguards to properly vet recruits, weed out opportunists, and prevent tribal imbalances, according to Mahaney. See also Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010), 175–176; Mathieu Lefèvre, Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-Backed Initiatives (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010).

{13} One of the polls showing Taliban support at about 10 percent of Afghans was conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes and posted on WorldPublicOpionion.org on January 30, 2006; possibly 8 percent of Afghans surveyed expressed favorable views of the Taliban. Some poll results—for example, one by the Asia Foundation in 2011—show higher levels of support (29 percent) for the “aims of the Taliban.” This result may reflect support for conservative Muslim values or for Pashtun representation, or opposition to a foreign presence in Afghanistan. In the 2012 Asia Foundation survey, only 10 percent of respondents expressed sympathy for armed opposition groups, and of those, 34 percent said they supported them because they were Afghans and 33 percent said they supported them because they were Muslim. Four out of five Afghans supported reintegrating the Taliban fighters, and 52 percent believed the country was headed in the right direction. See “Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People,” Asia Foundation, available at http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/989.

{14} See Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counter­insurgency Study vol. 4 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008); Seth G. Jones and Arturo Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010); Thomas J. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

{15} Author interviews with Eric Olson, January 27, 2012, and an IJC official, April 4, 2012.

{16} Author interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Brad Moses, Bagram, October 7, 2011, and March 29, 2012.

{17} Author interview with Reeder, November 16, 2011.

{18} This account of the Community Defense Initiative is drawn largely from the author interviews with Reeder, November 16, 2011, and Scott Mann, November 21, 2011.

{19} According to Reeder, at his request Karzai’s half-brother Ahmed Wali used his Popalzai network to secure the proof that Bergdahl was still alive. Rateb Popal, a member of the tribe and a cousin of the Karzais, agreed to go to Pakistan to find out whether he was being held by the Taliban. Popal had been an interpreter for the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan during the Taliban’s rule. In 2005, to cash in on the spigot of US funds entering Afghanistan, Popal and his brother formed Watan Risk, a private security company that received lucrative contracts from the military to provide convoy security for trucks resupplying US forces in the south; his brother pleaded guilty to heroin trafficking in a US court. Inquiries into contracting corruption began in 2009. An agreement was finally reached in 2011 that barred Watan from further contracts. However, the Popals remain active in many other businesses. See Associated Press, “Fraud Fighting Effort in Afghanistan Criticized,” updated September 14, 2011.

{20} Scholars such as American anthropologist Tom Barfield have noted that the largest militias tended to be Tajik and Uzbek. A demobilization program after 2001 had seized most of the Uzbek and Tajik heavy weaponry, and most of the foot soldiers had been sent home or inducted into the army or intelligence service. Most of the senior leaders of the politico-​military groups were given high posts in the government, although Abdul Rashid Dostum was eased out of the country for a time. Northern Alliance leader Mohammed Qasim Fahim Khan became chief of the army and later vice president. On the Pashtun side, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had joined forces with the Taliban. He continued to fight from his base in Pakistan, along with the Haqqani network that belonged to the Mohammad Yunus Khalis faction of the Hezb-e Islami Party. The Durrani of southern Afghanistan are the wealthier, landholding Pashtuns and have traditionally played political roles, while the Ghilzai Pashtuns that predominate in eastern Pakistan are more martial in nature and will fight to defend their valleys and small farms.

{21} In an interview with the author in Kabul on October 30, 2011, Nader Nadery of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission expressed concerns that politicization, corruption, and lack of professionalism in the government would hamper the ability of the Ministry of the Interior to play its intended role. Furthermore, he noted, it would be difficult for the special operations personnel to understand all the political crosscurrents in a given area.

{22} Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Worries on Afghan Plans,” New York Times, January 25, 2010. This article quotes the cables, which were also published by the paper. For a fuller account of the policy review, see Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), and for the ensuing bureaucratic sniping, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (New York: Random House, 2012).

{23} The description of Miller’s contributions and approach to command are drawn from interviews and email exchanges with the author, including on June 11, 2011, and November 21, 2011, and direct observation at the commander’s conference and in Afghanistan. See also Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio, 2013).

{24} Author interview with special operations officer, September 14, 2011.

{25} Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone, June 22, 2010, www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622. See also Helene Cooper and David Sanger, “Obama Says Afghan Policy Won’t Change After Dismissal,” New York Times, June 23, 2010.

{26} Author interview with General David Petraeus, August 22, 2011.

{27} Details of the program are from a copy of Afghan Presidential Decree No. 3196, August 16, 2010; Afghan Interior Ministry guidelines; and author interviews with Afghan and US officials, including Afghan Ministry of the Interior Brigadier General Ali Shah Ahmadzai, October 29, 2011.

{28} Author interview with J. R. Stigall, June 10, 2011, during weeklong visit to CFSOCC-A.

{29} This short-lived experiment in village stability operations as part of Operation Restore / Uphold Democracy was chronicled in Bob Shacochis, The Immaculate Invasion (New York: Viking, 1999).

{30} This account of the formulation of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police plan design is compiled from multiple author interviews with Brigadier General Austin Scott Miller and his staff; author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Scott Mann; attendance at SOF Academic Week in Eglin, Florida, September 13–14, 2011; and multiple videos and written products created by the command for training operators in the procedures to be used.

{31} The civilian surge statistics come from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s September 8, 2011, report, SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift. The DST personnel were earnest and committed people—and in some cases extraordinarily experienced and effective—but by and large they were young or even temporary civilian government hires on their first deployment in a war zone. Moreover, they were severely restricted in their ability to move around the countryside. So the Village Stability Operations / Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) initiative was in many places the first sustained village-level outreach to rural Afghanistan—that is to say, most of the population of the country. One exception was USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, which worked in some villages through local hires to conduct the Afghan Stabilization Initiative and its follow-on program, the Community Cohesion Initiative.

{32} Don Bolduc cited this number in an article he wrote for Special Warfare magazine and in author interviews. See Donald C. Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare, October–December 2011.

{33} Mann became Mr. VSO/ALP for the rest of his active-duty career, setting up the predeployment academics training described later in this chapter. He was a patient and indefatigable promoter of the concept and champion of the equal role that governance and development efforts should play. He founded a networking website, www.stabilityinstitute.org, to build and maintain a community of interest among current, future, and former participants as well as a widening circle of academics, NGOs, and other interested parties.

{34} Author interview with Geno Paluso, Kabul, June 11, 2011.

{35} Author interviews with Miller and Petraeus.

{36} Personal observations and interviews during trip to Balkh and Kunduz, June 9–10, 2011.

{37} Author interview with Colonel Art Kandarian, commander, 101st Airborne, 2nd Brigade, November 5, 2012; DOD News Briefing with Colonel Art Kandarian, April 14, 2011; visit to Zhari district center and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Pasab, February 23, 2011.

{38} This account is principally based on author interviews with Colonel Chris Riga, February 15, 2011, and May 8, 2013, and his operations officer for 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Sullivan, May 14, 2013. See also Joshua Partlow and Karin Bruillard, “U.S. Operations in Kandahar Push Out Taliban,” Washington Post, October 25, 2010, and, on Tarok Kolache, Joshua Foust, “How Short-Term Thinking Is Causing Long-Term Failure in Afghanistan,” The Atlantic, January 24, 2011.

{39} The allegations against Raziq are detailed exhaustively in Matthieu Aikins, “Our Man in Kandahar,” The Atlantic, November 2011. See also Yaroslav Trofimov and Matthew Rosenberg, “In Afghanistan, U.S. Turns ‘Malignant Actor’ into Ally,” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2010; Matthieu Aikins, “The Master of Spin Boldak,” The Atlantic, December 2009.

{40} Megan McCloskey, “Petraeus Promises Villagers U.S. Will Rebuild What It Has Knocked Down,” Stars and Stripes, December 21, 2010.

{41} All the quotations for this section on ODA 3314 and Maiwand are from author interviews with the team members and local Afghans or my direct observation, October 2011 and February 2012. Brant is quoted from an author interview conducted on October 23, 2011.

{42} Major Tyler Oliver, “The Economics of Opium Poppy and Substitution of Wheat in Maiwand, Kandahar,” District Augmentation Team Maiwand Information Paper, February 2012. Oliver’s paper is based on interviews he conducted with Maiwand farmers. He found that “the low price for wheat [19 cents per pound] is the result of massive wheat distribution programs in Afghanistan artificially affecting the market. The inefficient planting techniques used locally cannot produce wheat cheaply enough to compete with wheat grown by modern production methods.” He concluded, “The vastly higher profitability of opium poppy, combined with the high costs of wheat production, makes the large-scale adoption and substitution of wheat as a licit crop virtually impossible in Maiwand.”

{43} This assessment of moderate corruption on the part of Barwari comes from author interviews with US officials, including the team leader. Sources for this section also include author interview with Barwari, October 21, 2011, and multiple shura meetings in October 2011.

{44} Author interview, March 13, 2012.

{45} Author observations on visits to Kandahar Province. Fazluddin Agha’s death was reported by Reuters on January 12, 2012. He was killed by a suicide car bomber along with two sons and two bodyguards.

{46} This account is principally based on author interviews with Dee on August 18, 2012, and Bill Carty on February 1, 2013, and email exchanges. See also “Kandahar Police Chief Survives Suicide Attack,” Aljazeera.com, January 11, 2012.

{47} Author interviews with Bill Carty, October 28, 2011, and February 15, 2012.

{48} {48}The team members’ quotations and actions in this chapter are principally drawn from direct observation and author interviews with Hutch, Greg, Dustin, Cameron, and other team members, October 9–10, 2011; with Hutch and Greg on February 14, 2012; and with Hutch and Cameron on October 24, 2012.

{49} {49}Bob Woodward revealed the existence of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Pursuit Teams in Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010).

{50} {50}Author interviews with ODA 3325 members in October 2011, and with Aziz in Paktika, October 11, 2011, and March 27, 2012. Aziz’s history with the special forces, his role in Paktika, and his hospitalization were also discussed by Brigadier General Chris Haas in an author interview on October 4, 2011.

{51} {51}In addition to interviews with Hutch and other team members about their views and approach, this characterization draws on an unpublished paper written by Hutch entitled “Twenty Tribes at a Time.”

{52} {52}These events in Rabat and Nawi Kalay, and the first battle in Pirkowti, were recounted by team members in the author interviews cited above. Details of Aziz’s actions were also provided by him in the separate author interviews cited above.

{53}Hutchinson, “Twenty Tribes at a Time,” and Powerpoint presentation prepared by ODA 3325.

{54}Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Meyer, October 10, 2011. The quadrupled rate of fire from the Pakistani side of the border is also cited in a DOD News Briefing given by ISAF Joint Command Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti on October 27, 2011. He said, “With respect to the number, in the south along Paktika’s Khost—Patika border area with Pakistan, the cross-border fires this year are about—are over four times higher than they had been in the past year, so considerably higher.”

{55}Author interview with Mary Kettman, October 27, 2012, and subsequent email exchanges regarding her experiences and OTI activities in Paktika. Additional information about the Afghan Stabilization Initiative was supplied by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives in Washington, DC, on March 18, 2013.

{56}Details about Abbasin and his role are cited in a US Treasury Department press release, ”Treasury Continues Efforts Targeting Terrorist Organizations Operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” dated September 29, 2011. This account of the operation is based on the author’s observations.

{57}Julius Cavendish, “Afghanistan’s Dirty War: Why the Most Feared Man in Bermal District Is a U.S. Ally,” Time, October 4, 2011. An earlier version was published by The Independent on March 18, 2011, which includes the ISAF statement that its investigation could not substantiate the UN report: “A NATO spokesman said that its own investigation of Azizullah turned up nothing. ‘There was a derogatory report via UN channels last summer, but when we tried to research it, there was really little information to substantiate what were essentially claims,’ said Lieutenant-Colonel John Dorrian, chief of operations at NATO’s public affairs unit in Kabul. As a matter of due diligence, we subsequently tried to backtrack to the origin of the claim, but nothing credible could be found.”

{58}Author interviews with team members and Aziz. US State Department official Jess Patterson and an Afghan intelligence official in Kabul confirmed this description of the Paktika government and the elders’ response to the allegations about Aziz. The latter interviews occurred on December 30, 2012, and April 4, 2012.

{59}Author interviews with Aziz, October 11, 2011, and March 27, 2012.

{60}Author interview with Aziz, March 27, 2012.

{61} Author interview with Steve Townsend, Bagram, February 26, 2011.

{62} Jim Gant, “One Tribe at a Time,” Nine Sister Imports, Inc., 2009. Some readers, such as former Ambassador Ron Neumann, were concerned by Gant’s account, saying that he had taken sides in a dispute that pitted one tribe against another. According to the official VSO methodology formulated by the special operations command, the teams were to rely on the consensus of elders and to seek a tribal balance in areas populated by a variety of groups. Moreover, Afghan Local Police were supposed to perform purely defensive functions and promptly turn over any detainees to police custody.

{63} Author interview with CFSOCC-A official, June 8, 2011.

{64} The dialogue and action recounted in this section are based on the author’s observations during visits to Kunar in August and October 2011 and interviews with team members and Afghans, including Nur Mohammed and local police, the Afghan Interior Ministry in-processing team, acting district governor Shah Mahmoun, NDS intelligence official Abdul Shah Wali, District Augmentation Teams, and US district support team civilian officials. Post-tour interviews were conducted with the team leader and team sergeant at Fort Bragg on February 15, 2012.

{65} In addition to the interviews cited above, author interview with Lieutenant Jake Peterson, October 16, 2011.

{66} Author interviews with Jay Schrader on August 5, 2011, and February 15, 2011.

{67} Quotations are from author interview with Mark, senior communications sergeant, August 6, 2011, and Nur Mohammed, August 5, 2011.

{68} The quotation is from an author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson on February 14, 2012; he also discussed the issue in an interview on August 4, 2012, as well as in interviews with 3310 commander Major Eddie Jimenez and Sergeant Major Rotsaert on August 7, 2011, and October 14 and 15, 2011. Wilson also said he experienced the same “red-centric” or enemy-focused approach when he tried to persuade the brigade commander based in Khost to conduct operations to close two passes on the Pakistan-Paktiya border to support efforts to establish Village Stability Operations there. A senior US officer recounted that Jack Keane, an influential but unofficial adviser to General Petraeus, had urged that brigade commander to focus on enemy kill-and-capture operations. Several US officers related accounts of such pressure during battlefield circulations conducted by Keane.

{69} Author interviews with Wilson (cited above); Colonel Mark Schwartz, October 6, 2011; and Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti, ISAF Joint Command, April 2, 2012.

{70} Author interview with 3310 commander Major Eddie Jimenez and Sergeant Major Rotsaert on August 7, 2011, and October 14–15, 2011.

{71} The account of the operation and dialogue in this section is principally drawn from author interviews with the ODA 3316 team leader, Matt; the chief warrant officer of ODA 3313; 3310 company commander Jimenez; and battalion commander Wilson.

{72} This account draws principally on author interviews with the participants and secondarily on the unclassified version of the official investigation, known as the Clark Report. The Pakistani government has never acknowledged that its personnel fired first on the American and Afghan troops. See Stephen A. Clark, “Investigation into the Incident in Vicinity of the Salala Checkpoint on the Night of 25–26 Nov 2011: A Report,” United States Central Command, 2011, www.centcom.mil/images/stories/Crossborder/report%20exsum%20further%20redacted.pdf.

{73} Clark Report, as well as author interviews with Mike, chief warrant officer 2, who was the ground force commander for the operation, February 15, 2012; his battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson, February 14, 2012; the CJSOTF-A operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Brad Moses, March 29, 2012; and Colonel Heinz Dinter, CFSOCC-A, March 10, 2012.

{74} Quotes are from author interview with Mike, February 15, 2012; additional information was supplied by interviews and email exchange with Wilson.

{75} Initial press reports contain Pakistani government denials, as in Dion Nissenbaum, Tom Wright, Owais Tohid, and Adam Entous, “Airstrike Ravages U.S.-Pakistan Ties,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2011. Press questions of Clark are in his DOD News Briefing on the report, December 22, 2011, www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?tran​scriptid=​4952. For Pakistan’s official reply to the Clark Report, see “Pakistan’s Perspective on Investigation: Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark into 26th November 2011 US led ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency,” published by Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), January 23, 2012, available at www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf.

{76} The report states that “RC-E did not forward the CONOP to NBCC [the Nawa Border Coordination Center] or ODRP [the US Office of Defense Representative in Pakistan].” Clark Report, p. 21, paragraphs (4) and (5).

{77} Author interview with General John Allen, Kabul, April 3, 2012.

{78} This account is based on author interviews with General John Allen, April 3, 2012; Brigadier General Chris Haas, April 3, 2012; Colonel Heinz Dinter, April 5, 2012; and three other US officials with direct knowledge of the events.

{79} ISAF press release 2011-11-CA-013, dated November 26, 2011. The text of the release read: “The International Security Assistance Force is investigating an incident that occurred early this morning along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.”

{80} See Stephen A. Clark, “Investigation into the Incident in Vicinity of the Salala Checkpoint on the Night of 25–26 Nov 2011: A Report,” United States Central Command, 2011; DOD News Briefing with Brigadier General Clark on December 22, 2011, posted at www.defense.gov.

{81} The observations from Haas are from author interviews with him on August 9, 2011; October 4, 2011; October 31, 2011; and April 3, 2012.

{82} Author interviews with Ryan Crocker, August 8, 2011; October 30, 2011; and April 1, 2012.

{83} CJSOTF-A ALP Weekly Tracker, October 31, 2011.

{84} Author interview with Dinter, Kabul, March 10, 2012.

{85} Author interview with Colonel Mark Schwartz, Bagram, October 6, 2011.

{86} RAND used a polling firm that hired and trained Afghans to do the polling. The firm conducted three “wave” polls between November 2010 and June 2011. The sample size was 10,000 in 26 districts that had Afghan Local Police, with an average of 430 Afghans interviewed per district. See “Assessment of Opinion Poll and Team Reporting for Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Wave 3,” RAND unclassified briefing, October 30, 2011. Wave 2 was produced in April 2011.

{87} Author interviews with team leader in Kunar, October 17, 2011, and with Chris Haas, October 31, 2011.

{88} Author interview with member of Haas’s staff, April 7, 2012. The issues and events in this section draw on interviews with Haas, Dinter, Colonel Beau Higgins, Captain Wes Spence, Colonel Pat Stevens, and other members of Haas’s staff.

{89} Author interviews with the Group Support Battalion commander and numerous CJSOTF-A staff, October 2011 and March 2012.

{90} James R. Marrs, “Findings and Recommendations of AR 15-6 Investigation: Credibility Assessment of Allegations of Human Rights Violations Appearing in a Human Rights Watch Report,” USFOR-A-DJ2, United States Forces–Afghanistan, 2011; author interviews with Schwartz, Bagram, October 6, 2011, and March 29, 2012.

{91} Author interviews in Kabul, October 3 and 5, 2011, and March 9, 2012.

{92} This account is drawn from author interviews with Haas, Dinter, Schwartz, Higgins, Spence, Stevens, and other members of Haas’s staff as well as two Afghan officials.

{93} Author interview with Haas, Kabul, April 3, 2012.

{94} Author interview with Dinter, March 10, 2012, and Haas, April 3, 2012.

{95} This incident was related in an author interview with Brad Hansell, March 12, 2012. The issue of corruption and the drug eradication campaign in Maiwand and Kandahar Province generally was also discussed with Major Brian DeMarzio and other members of the SOTF-S staff, VSCC-South’s Lieutenant Colonel Brian Mack, and Major Sean Walrath in briefings on March 11, 2012. The information in this chapter is primarily based on author interviews with ODA 7233 and local Afghans, as well as personal observation during March and August 2012 visits. Other sources are noted below.

{96} Author interviews with Najibullah and Hansell, March 2012. The quotation is from an author interview with Najibullah on March 13, 2012. Some Afghans, like Najibullah, only use one name.

{97} Author interview, March 14, 2012.

{98} Author interviews with Hansell and direct observation in a meeting with Kala Khan.

{99} Author interviews with Abdullah Niazi and Hansell; direct observation.

{100} Author observations of events in Maiwand in the immediate aftermath of the massacre.

{101} Author interview with Chris Haas, April 3, 2012, and direct observations of command staff lawyer.

{102} Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Richard Navarro, August 13, 2012.

{103} Author conversation on patrol, March 14, 2012.

{104} This incident is cited in the preliminary and final reports of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on the protection of civilians. The final report says, “According to reports, the ALP commander along with two other ALP members beat and kicked the detainees, tied the detainees to their car and dragged them behind the moving car, killing both detainees. ALP members informed international military forces that the detainees had escaped.” See United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2012. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul: UNAMA, 2013), 44. See http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D&tabid=12254& for online text of the report.

{105} This account is based on author interviews with Hansell, Navarro, Angel Martinez, Jim Huggins, and other US officers, as well as email communications.

{106} Author interviews with team members and Afghans and direct observation, August 2012.

{107} Author interviews with J. R. Jones, Martinez, Navarro, and Brian Rarey, August 2012.

{108} Author interviews, August 1–3, 2011, with the command master chief senior enlisted adviser; the N3 operations officer; the senior chief petty officer in charge of ALP program support; the Support Center director of Special Operations Task Force–Southeast, Uruzgan; and command group and team members in Tarin Kowt. The official name of SEAL Team Six was changed in 1987 to United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG), or DEVGRU. It and the army’s Delta Force are also referred to as “special mission units” or “tier-one” forces.

{109} Author interviews with SEALs in Tarin Kowt; author interview with a retired senior special operations officer in charge of the Philippines operation, August 31, 2012. The author also viewed a videotape of the operation that killed Abu Sayyaf commander Abu Sabaya on June 21, 2002. See also Geoffrey Lamber, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall, “Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines: Civilian Harm and the Indirect Approach,” Prism 3, no. 4 (2012): 117–135; Colonel David S. Maxwell (ret.), “Foreign Inter­nal Defense: An Indirect Approach to Counter-Insurgency/Counter Terrorism, Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines for Dealing with Non-Existential Threats to the United States,” paper delivered at Foreign Policy Research Institute conference, Washington, DC, December 6, 2011. For SEAL activities in Africa, see Ethos, published by Naval Special Warfare Command, Issue 8, n.d., 4–9, www.sealswcc.com/pdf/navy-seal-ethos-magazine/ethos-magazine-issue-8.pdf.

{110} Author interview with Mike Hayes, Uruzgan, March 17, 2012, and copy of his commander’s guidance.

{111} The events of 2012 recounted in this chapter draw on author interviews with Hayes, members of his command group, teams under his command, the Village Stability Coordination Center director, and a company commander in March and August 2012, as well as the author’s direct observation. Some interviews were conducted by video teleconference.

{112} Author interview with Hayes, Uruzgan, March 19, 2012. See Ann Marlowe, “The Back of Beyond: A Report from Zabul Province,” World Affairs Journal, March/April 2010. A battalion of 4/82 BCT posted in Zabul and Uruzgan in 2009 was ordered to pull back to focus on Highway One in January 2010. One of the two Afghan battalion commanders, however, did make the effort to learn Pashto, as Carlotta Gall reported on May 23, 2011, in the New York Times in “A Slice of Afghanistan Well Secured by Afghans.”

{113} Author interview with civil affairs team sergeant, August 2012.

{114} Author interview with Dan Green, March 20, 2012, and numerous author interviews with Brian Strickland in August 2011 and March 2012. The Strickland remark is quoted from a March 19, 2012, interview.

{115} Maria Abi-Habib, “SEALs Battle for Hearts, Minds and Paychecks,” Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2012.

{116} The training of the commandos and the mission in Zabul were recounted in interviews with Marshall, the SEAL platoon commander; Lieutenant Colonel Ahmadullah Popal; and operations officer Shah Janan, March 18, 2012.

{117} Information in this passage is from author interviews. See also Tom Vandenbrook, “Black Hawk Crash Kills Seven U.S. Troops,” USA Today, August 16, 2011; Bill Roggio, “11 NATO, Afghan Troops Killed in Helicopter Crash in Kandahar,” Long War Journal, August 16, 2011.

{118} This account is based on author observations and conversations, August 17, 2012.

{119} Details on career from author interview with ODA 1114 team sergeant Russ, March 24, 2012.

{120} Author interview with ALP commander Abdullah Khan, Zarghan Shah, March 25, 2012. Two of his brothers had joined the regular police and army and had been sent to Balkh and Farah provinces in the north and west, respectively. One of them had been killed. The ALP commander said he was determined to stay in Paktika to take care of the widow and his mother.

{121} This account is drawn from author observations at the shura, the lunch, and a tour of Yahya Khel and author interviews with Haji Yar Mohammed and other Afghans on March 26, 2012.

{122} The quotation is from an author interview with company commander Major Mike Bandy, Sharana, March 25, 2012. The account is based on interviews with team members and Jess Patterson. See also Kevin Sieff and Javed Hamdard, “Rogue Afghan Police Officer: A Taliban Infiltrator’s Road to Fratricide,” Washington Post, April 1, 2012.

{123} Author interview with Jess Patterson, December 30, 2012.

{124} Author interview with Russell, December 17, 2012.

{125} Author interviews with 1st Special Forces Group team members. The Sar Howza shooting, which occurred on March 26, 2012, was reported in a US Department of Defense casualty report press release dated March 28, 2012. Sergeant William R. Wilson III of 2-28, 172nd Infantry Brigade died of his wounds suffered in the shooting.

{126} This section is based on author interviews with Captain Jae Kim, other members of ODA 1411, and Afghans in Paktika in November 2012, in addition to follow-up emails with the team leader.

{127} The MATVs were equipped with the Common Remotely Operated Weapon System, or CROWS.

{128} The information on OTI projects was supplied by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives.

{129} Author interviews with ODA 1411 members.

{130} I witnessed the meetings described in this section in Surobi and Orgun and conducted interviews with Afghans and team members who were present on November 11 and 12, 2012.

{131} Kimberly Dozier and Adam Goldman, “Counterterrorist Pursuit Team: 3,000 Man CIA Paramilitary Force Hunts Militants in Afghanistan, Pakistan,” Associated Press, September 22, 2010; Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, “U.S. Military Seeks to Expand Raids in Pakistan,” New York Times, December 20, 2010; Greg Miller, “CIA Digs In as Americans Withdraw from Iraq, Afghanistan,” Washington Post, February 7, 2012.

{132} Author observations at the shura, Orgun, Paktika, November 11, 2012, and interviews with Afghan and US officials.

{133} Greg Miller, “Secret Report Raises Alarms on Intelligence Blind Spots Because of AQ Focus,” Washington Post, March 20, 2013. A webcast of Brennan’s confirmation hearing on February 7, 2013, is posted at the website of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

{134} The events in these paragraphs are largely based on the author’s email communications with Captain Kim and phone interviews with battalion and other special operations officers.

{135} Rebecca Parr, “Special Forces Soldier James Grissom, of Hayward, Remembered by Friends, Family,” Mercury News, April 1, 2013, www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_22917925/special-​forces-​soldier-grissom-hayward-remembered-by-friends.

{136}In August 2012, a special operations team was sent to Andar from northern Afghanistan for the final weeks of its tour.

{137}Author interviews with team intelligence officer in Andar, November 10, 2012.

{138}Author interview with Major Jason Clarke, AOB 1320, Sharana, November 9, 2012. The degree of Taliban control in the districts of Andar and De Yak was outlined in a New York Times article, and RC-East officials at the time verified the accuracy of this article for the author. See C. J. Chivers, “Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Government,” New York Times, February 6, 2011. See also Joshua Foust’s post, “The Push into Andar,” at Registan.net, February 2, 2011.

{139}The quotations from Andar officials Diciwal and Ramazon are from author interviews with them and personal observations in Andar, November 10–11, 2012.

{140}The conventional forces were pulling back their small footprint from Maidan Shah, Sayadabad, and Jagatu to FOB Shank in Logar. They would have small advisory Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs) at FOB Airborne in northern Wardak and at Shank to mentor the Afghan army corps and kandaks.

{141}This account is drawn from author interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Brad Moses, Bagram, October 7, 2011, and March 29, 2012. See also Jean McKenzie, “War by Other Means,” Part 3, “Guardians of Wardak,” Global Post, June 28, 2010, www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/100625/us-aid-afghanistan-taliban-3-qaeda?page=0,0.

{142}Author interview with Afghan army chief General Sher Mohammed Karimi, April 3, 2012. The description of Wardak and of the events that took place in that province is drawn from numerous author interviews with Afghan officials and US officers responsible for operations there at different points in time, including Major General John Campbell and his RC-East staff on February 25–27, 2011; Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson on October 6, 2011, and February 14, 2012; Lieutenant Colonel Brad Moses on October 7, 2011, and March 29, 2012; and CJSOTF-A J-3 on November 14, 2012, as well as other interviews cited in this section and personal observations.

{143}Author interview with Major General Tony Thomas, Kabul, November 6, 2012.

{144}Ibid. Statistic from the CJSOTF-A ALP Weekly Tracker, January 28, 2013.

{145}The statement issued by Karzai’s presidential office is quoted in Thom Patterson, “NATO: No Evidence for Afghan Claim of Possible Torture, Murder by U.S. Forces,” CNN, February 25, 2013.

{146}Yaroslav Trofimov, “U.S. Set to Pull Forces from Afghan District,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2013.

{147}Dylan Welch and Hamid Shalizi, “Insight: Afghan Move Against U.S. Special Forces Tied to Abuse Allegations,” Reuters, February 26, 2013.

{148}Author phone interview with Major John Bishop, US Special Operations Task Force–East, March 30, 2013.

{149}The chief public affairs officer of NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Bryant, said in an email on April 28, 2013, in response to the author’s query, that the ISAF investigation had found that “there were no US Special Forces involved in any way with misconduct or any other alleged misdeeds that may or may not have occurred in Nerkh district.” Janan’s role was also reported by Ben Brumfield and Thom Patterson in “ISAF Begins Pulling Out of an Afghan Province with a Legacy,” CNN, March 20, 2013.

{150}Mirwais Harooni and Phil Stewart, “Afghan’s Karzai Blasts U.S., Marring Hagel Visit,” Reuters, March 10, 2013.

{151}Ibid.; author phone interview with Bishop, March 30, 2013.

{152}Ibid.; Bryant email exchange.

{153}Author phone interview with Bishop, March 30, 2013.

{154}See Lester W. Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 2 (2007): 10; Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America’s Longest War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 64; Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan in the Post–Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 87–88.

{155}Qari Ziaur Rahman, quoted in interview with Syed Saleem Shahzad{155}, “At War with the Taliban: A Fighter and a Financier,” South Asia Times, May 23, 2008. QZR also acknowledged how the terrain of upper Kunar and Nuristan put the Americans at a great disadvantage, fixing them in bases that the guerrillas then attacked. He said, “Thank God that this is a mountainous region. NATO has a presence in the bases only, other than that they do not control anything. The mujahideen patrol everywhere and they carry out attacks freely.…Koranghal is our main operation theater in Kunar. It is a slaughterhouse for the Americans. Many Americans have been killed there. Kamdesh in Nooristan is our main operation front. We killed many Americans there as well. Similarly, we are very active in Sarkano, beside many other areas.”

{156}This account is based principally on author interviews with Gant’s superior officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson, Colonel Mark Schwartz, and Brigadier General Chris Haas. In addition, the author was provided with email communications between senior US Army officers regarding the detailed allegations about Gant and the events in Kunar.

{157}Comment made to author by general officer at Fort Bragg.

{158}Author phone interview with Nur Mohammed, March 21, 2012.

{159}Captain Rick Holahan and other members of Major Kent Solheim’s company staff provided a detailed briefing on, among other things, the plotting of the battle on Google Maps, in Jalalabad, March 22–23, 2012.

{160}This section is based on author interviews with members of ODA 3436, Waliulah Hamidzai, and other Afghans, Kunar, March 21–22, 2012, and Major Kent Solheim, Nangahar, March 22, 2012.

{161}This section is based primarily on the author’s direct observations during a November 2012 visit to Kunar and author interviews with members of ODA 3131, Afghan Local Police commanders, and other Afghans.

{162}Author interviews with Afghans and members of ODA 3131, November 2012, and personal observations.

{163}Information on Qari Zia Rahman can be found in NATO ISAF press releases and Long War Journal articles by Bill Roggio. See “Afghan, ISAF Forces Secure Eastern Afghan Town,” International Security Assistance Force, press release, July 20, 2010; Bill Roggio, “Afghan, US Forces Hunt Al Qaeda, Taliban in Northeast,” Long War Journal, August 2, 2010; Bill Roggio, “US Hunts Wanted Taliban and Al Qaeda Commander in Kunar,” Long War Journal, July 20, 2010; “Several Insurgents Killed, Two Detained by Afghan and Coalition Force in Kunar,” August 2, 2010, www.dvidshub.net/news/53811/several-insurgents-killed-two-detained-afghan-and-coalition-force-kunar#.UZvKhqJJOAg.

{164}Operation Strong Eagle I is recounted in the three-part series “Fight and Flight,” by Dianna Cahn, in Stars and Stripes, September 20–21, 2010. Operation Strong Eagle II was reported in several press releases issued by US Army public affairs, including “Marawara District Shura After Operations Strong Eagle II,” July 22, 2012. Operation Strong Eagle III details were reported in “Forces Conclude Operations Near Pakistan Border,” American Forces Press Service, April 7, 2011.

{165}Author interviews with Captain Tim Ambrose, November 7–8, 2012, and with OTI official in Kabul, November 15, 2012. USAID OTI subsequently provided additional information about its projects.

{166}Author’s personal observation of events in Marawara, November 7, 2012.

{167}Vladimir Grigoriev, “Facts of the War History: Marawara Company,” June 23, 2006, Art of War, http://artofwar.ru/g/grigorxew_w_a/text_0080.shtml.

{168}Author interview with Major Ben Hauser, November 9, 2012.

{169}Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Chris Fox and his command staff at Camp Montrond, November 14, 2012.

{170}Author interview with Colonel Tony Fletcher at Camp Vance, November 14, 2012. I also interviewed his operations and plans officers.

{171}Rod Nordland, “After Airstrike, Afghan Points to C.I.A. and Secret Militias,” New York Times, April 18, 2013. In another account, Faizi told a reporter that a decree Karzai had issued in late February 2013, following another civilian casualty incident caused by the CIA-led force in the same district, abolishing parallel structures, “was aimed primarily at dismantling CIA-controlled teams.” See Emma Graham-Harrison, “Hamid Karzai Seeks to Curb CIA Operations in Afghanistan,” The Guardian, April 19, 2013. A press release on Karzai’s February order is posted on the Afghan presidential office website; see “President Karzai Assigns Delegation to Merge All Armed Units Outside Government Structure into Afghan Security Institutions,” February 28, 2013, http://president.gov.af/en/news/17849. It reads, in part: “President Hamid Karzai has issued an executive order assigning a delegation tasked to bar operation by any armed grouping or units outside the formal government security structures and to completely merge them into government security institutions. The delegation chaired by National Security Advisor Dr. Spanta shall be responsible to identify and merge into government structures all those armed units and groups run and operated by international coalition forces as local security units. The delegation will be responsible to demand from the international coalition to hand over all such armed groupings to Afghan security institutions within three months.” See also Kate Clark, “What Exactly Is the CIA Doing in Afghanistan? Proxy Militias and Two Airstrikes in Kunar,” April 28, 2013, Afghanistan Analysts Network, http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=3370.

{172}Author interview with Gudjer, November 7, 2012.

{173}An argument for such small combined civil-military teams is made in Carter Malkasian and J. Kael Weston, “War Downsized: How to Accomplish More with Less,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 111–121. The inflated role assumed by regional security officers at US embassies often overrides the ambassador’s intent, and in any event prevents civilians from operating freely throughout the countries to which they are assigned. Without a revised approach, the military-intelligence-civilian triad model outlined here cannot be realized. It was a key feature of the CORDS program in Vietnam and subsequent Cold War conflict zones. In the wake of the Benghazi fatalities and subsequent recriminations, however, the trend toward more restrictive policies for civilians may increase rather than decrease.

{174}Information on OTI provided by USAID OTI officials, March 18, 2013.

{175}Author interview, November 12, 2012.

{176} Quotations by Tony Thomas are from author interviews, Kabul, November 6 and 15, 2012. “Task force” is special ops’ shorthand for special mission units; although many military formations are task-organized, the term refers to those special mission units organized for rescuing hostages or hunting terrorist leaders. This task force has been given different numbers over the past decade, so to minimize confusion this account will simply refer to special mission units. When commanded by General Stanley McChrystal, it was Task Force 714; it was later renamed Task Force 535. A subordinate task force is Task Force 310. See Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio, 2013), 92; Donald C. Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare 24, no. 4 (2011): 22–28.

{177} Brigadier Mark Smethurst, National Defense Industrial Association conference, Washington, DC, January 28, 2013; author interview with Colonel Duke Christy, deputy commander of ISAF SOF, Kabul, April 7, 2012.

{178} Major Michael E. Gates, “Creating SOF Networks: The Role of NATO Special Operations as a Testing Ground for SOF Integration” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011); Lieutenant Colonel Buck Dellinger, “Special Operations Command Europe: Strengthening Partnerships for Global Security,” Special Warfare, April–June 2012, 12–15. One of McRaven’s initiatives as commander of the US special operations command in Europe in the mid-2000s had been to found a NATO SOF headquarters to provide a permanent venue for common education and training of NATO special operators.

{179} McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 367.

{180} In My Share of the Task, McChrystal describes his relationship with Thomas but uses his initials instead of his name (p. 99). Thomas’s profile on the networking site LinkedIn includes the titles and dates of his command and staff assignments. Some of his positions are also described in his “Department of Defense Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Thomas from the Pentagon,” May 15, 2013, the transcript of which is posted at www.defense.gov.

{181} Author interviews with Colonel Tony Fletcher, November 14, 2012, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Navarro, August 18, 2012.

{182} Email exchange with the author, May 3, 2013.

{183} Comments attributed to Bolduc are from author interviews in Kabul, November 6 and 15, 2012, and subsequent emails, and two unpublished, unclassified documents from the command, “ALP Information Paper & Talking Points” (undated), and the ALP Map weekly tracker, January 28, 2013.

{184} Meeting with RAND, December 19, 2012, Arlington, Virginia, and briefing deck.

{185} UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2012. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan [UNAMA], 2013), 9, 42–47; author interview with Ali Shah Ahmadzai, Kabul, April 7, 2012. The UNAMA report noted that the Afghan Interior Ministry had acted promptly to investigate and detain Afghan Local Police officers accused of murder in Zhari, but the suspects were subsequently released by local officials.

{186} The statistics are from the Military Assistance Command Vietnam–Studies and Observations Group website, www.macvsog.cc.

{187} Email communication with senior special operations commander, January 10, 2013.

{188} The official US military definition of unconventional warfare is: “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” See Joint Publication 3-05, “Special Operations,” and Joint Dictionary 1-02. For comparative historical research on transition of civil defense, see Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt, and Todd C. Helmus, Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond (Santa Monica, CA: RAND/National Defense Research Institute, 2012). In an April 3, 2012, interview with the author, Brigadier General Christopher Haas, then commander of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan, observed that the planned growth of the Afghan Local Police would test the special operations forces’ span of control.

{189} A good description of ALP in Baghlan is in Luke Mogelson, “Bad Guys vs Worse Guys,” New York Times Magazine, October 19, 2011.

{190} See DOD News Briefing with Major General Robert Abrams, Regional Command–South commander, March 13, 2013, transcript posted at www.defense.gov, and Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Villagers Take on Taliban in Their Heartland,” New York Times, March 20, 2013.

{191} Eighty-two percent of the Afghan army and police patrols in southern Afghanistan were conducted unilaterally—without coalition forces—in the period from July 2012 to March 2013, according to Major General Robert Abrams, Regional Command–South commander, in a March 13, 2013, press conference with the Pentagon press corps. The 205th Afghan Army Corps conducted six large-scale operations and in the last one was able to sustain continuous operations for sixteen days. One of its brigades sustained a battalion-sized operation one hundred kilometers away for three weeks. The air wing serving southern Afghanistan was still tiny, however, consisting of five Mi-17 and Mi-8 helicopters. It conducted its first independent air-assault operation in October 2012. It took thirty hours to mount two sorties of Mi-17s to respond to an attack by an estimated two hundred or three hundred Taliban in Day Kundi, but the Afghan army did successfully resupply its troops and evacuate the most serious casualties. The confusing terminology adopted by ISAF made it difficult to understand which units were capable of fully independent operations. Development of sufficient lift and logistics capacity had lagged as ISAF had focused on building infantry units, so an infantry unit might be well trained and led but still not capable of “independent operations” since it could not support itself. See the semiannual, congressionally mandated reports entitled Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in Accordance with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2009–2012).

{192} Author interview with Colonel Sean Swindell, November 4, 2012.

{193} T. E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, 1917; republished as e-book (Seattle: Praetorian Press, 2011).