One Book of Arguments which are advanced against the Existence of the Principle of Analogy 1. Speech is naturally divided into three parts, as I have shown in the previous books: its first part is how names were imposed upon things; its second, in what way the derivatives of these names have arrived at their differences; its third, how the words, when united with one another reasonmgly, express an idea. Having set forth the first part, I shall from here begin upon the second. As every offshoot is secondary by nature, because that vertical trunk from which it comes is primary, and it is therefore declined: so there is declension in words: homo ‘man’ is the vertical, hominis ‘man’s’ is the oblique, because it is declined from the vertical.
2. From the manifold nature of this sort there are these causes of the differences: for what reason, and to what product, and in what way, in speaking, the words are declined. The first two of these I shall pass over briefly, for two reasons: because there will have to be a rehandling of the topics when I write of the stock of words, and because the third of them has numerous and extensive subdivisions of its own.
3. Inflection has been introduced not only into Latin speech, but into the speech of all men, because it is useful and necessary; for if this system had not developed, we could not learn such a great number of words as we have learned — for the possible forms into which they are inflected are numerically unlimited — nor from those which we should have learned would it be clear what relationship existed between them so far as their meanings were concerned. But as it is, we do see, for the reason that that which is the offshoot bears a similarity to the original: when legi ‘I have gathered’ is inflected from lego ‘I gather,’ two things are clear at the same time, namely that in some fashion the acts are said to be the same, and yet that their doing did not take place at the same time. But if, for the sake of a word, one of these two related ideas was called Priamus and the other Hecuba, there would be no indication of the unity of idea which is clear in lego and legi, and in nominative Priamus, dative Priamo.
4. As among men there are certain kinships, some through the males, others through the clan, so there are among words. For as from an Aemilius were sprung the men named Aemilius, and the clan-members of the name, so from the name of Aemilius were inflected the words in the noun-clan: for from that name which was imposed in the nominative case as Aemilius were made Aemilii, Aemilium, Aemilios, Aemiliorum, and in this way also all the other words which are of this same line.
5. The origins of words are therefore two in number, and no more: imposition and inflection; the one is as it were the spring, the other the brook. Men have wished that imposed nouns should be as few as possible, that they might be able to learn them more quickly; but derivative nouns they have wished to be as numerous as possible, that all might the more easily say those nouns which they needed to use.
6. In connexion with the first class, a historical narrative is necessary, for except by outright learning such words do not reach us; for the other class, the second, a grammatical treatment is necessary, and for this there is need of a few brief maxims. For the scheme by which you have learned to inflect in the instance of one noun, you can employ in a countless number of nouns: therefore when new nouns have been brought into common use, the whole people at once utters their declined forms without any hesitation. Moreover, those who have freshly become slaves and on purchase become members of a large household, quickly inflect the names of all their fellow-slaves in the oblique cases, provided only they have heard the nominative.
7. If they sometimes make mistakes, it is not astonishing. Even those who first imposed names upon things perhaps made some slips in some instances: for they are supposed to have desired to designate things individually, that from these inflection might be made to indicate plurality, as homines ‘men’ from homo ‘man.’ They are supposed to have desired that male children be designated in such a way that from these the females might be indicated by inflection, as the feminine Terentia from the masculine Terentius; and that similarly from the names which they set in the nominative case, there might be other forms to which they could arrive by inflection. But they are supposed to have been unable to hold fast to these principles in everything, because the plural form scopae denotes either one or two brooms, and aquila ‘eagle’ denotes both the male and the female, and vis ‘force’ is used for the nominative and for an oblique case of the word.
8. Why such words are not so much at fault as men think, it is in most instances not hard to explain, but it is not necessary to do so at this time; for it is not how they have been able to arrive at the words, but how they wished to express themselves, that is of import for the subject which is before us: inasmuch as genitive scoparum can be no less easily derived from the plural scopae which they did impose on the object as its name, than if they had given it the name scopa in the singular, and made the genitive scopae from this — and other words likewise.
9. The reason, I say, why they made these inflected forms from the names which they had set upon things, is that which I have shown; the next point is for me to sketch by classes, but briefly, the forms at which they have wished to arrive by inflection, or have not wished to arrive. For there are two classes of words, one fruitful, which by inflection produces from itself many different forms, as for example lego ‘I gather,’ legi ‘I have gathered,’ legam ‘I shall gather,’ and similarly other words; and a second class which is barren, which produces nothing from itself, as for example et ‘and,’ iam ‘now,’ vix ‘hardly,’ eras ‘to-morrow,’ magis ‘more,’ cur ‘why.’
10. In those things whose use was simple, the inflection of the name also was simple; just as in a house where there is only one slave there is need of only one slave-name, but in a house where there are many slaves there is need of many such names. Therefore also in those things which are names, because the differentiations of the word are several, there are more offshoots, and in those things which are connectives and join words, because there was no need for them to be inflected into several forms, the words generally have but one form: for with one and the same thong you can fasten a man or a horse or anything else, whatever it is, which can be fastened to something else. Thus, for example, we say in our talking, “Tullius et ‘and’ Antonius were consuls”: with that same et we can link together any set of two consuls, or — to put it more strongly — any and all names, and even all words, while all the time that one-syllabled prop-word et remains unchanged. Therefore under nature’s guidance it has come about that we should not think that there are inflected forms from all these names which have been set upon things.
11. In the word-classes in which inflections may develop, the parts of speech are two, unless, following Dion, we divide into three divisions the ideas which are indicated by words: one division which indicates also case, a second which indicates also time, a third which indicates neither. Of these, Aristotle says that there are two parts of speech; nouns, like homo ‘man’ and equus ‘horse,’ and verbs, like legit ‘gathers’ and currit ‘runs.’
12. Of the two kinds, noun and verb, certain words are primary and certain are secondary: primary like homo ‘man’ and scribit ‘writes,’ and secondary like doctus ‘learned’ and docte ‘learnedly,’ for we say homo doctus ‘a learned man’ and scribit docte ‘writes learnedly.’ These ideas are attended by those of place and time, because neither homo nor scribit can be asserted without the presupposition of place and of time — yet in such a way that place is more closely associated with the idea of the noun homo, and time more closely with the act of writing.
13. Since among these the noun is first — for the noun comes ahead of the verb, and the other words stand later relatively to the noun and the verb — the nouns are accordingly first. Therefore I shall speak of the form-variations of nouns before I take up those of verbs.
14. Nouns are varied in form either to show differences in those things of which they are the names, as the woman’s name Terentia from the man’s name Terentius, or to denote those things outside, of which they are not the names, as equiso ‘stable-boy’ from equus ‘horse.’ To show differences in themselves they are varied in form either on account of the nature of the thing itself about which mention is made, or on account of the use to which the speaker puts the word. On account of differences in the thing itself, the variation is made either with reference to the whole thing, or with reference to a part of it. Those forms which concern the whole are derived either on account of plurality or on account of smallness. On account of smallness, homunculus ‘manikin’ is formed from homo ‘man,’ and capitulum ‘little head’ from caput ‘head.’ On account of plurality, homines ‘men’ is made from homo ‘man’; I pass by the fact that others use cervices ‘muscles of the neck and shoulders’ in the plural, and Hortensius in his poems uses it in the singular cervix.
15. Those which are derived from a part, come either from the body, as mammosae ‘big-breasted women’ from mamma ‘breast’ and manubria ‘handles’ from manus ‘hand,’ or from the mind, as prudentes ‘prudent men’ from prudentia ‘prudence’ and ingeniosi ‘men of talent’ from ingenium ‘innate ability.’ The preceding are quite apart from movements; but where there are important motions, the derivatives are similarly from the mind or from the body, as strenui ‘the quick’ and nobiles ‘the noble,’ from strenuitas ‘quickness’ and nobilitas ‘nobility,’ and in this way also pugiles ‘boxers’ and cursores ‘runners’ from pugnare ‘to fight’ and currere ‘to run.’ As some derivations are from the mind and others from the body, so also there are others which refer to external things, as pecuniosi ‘moneyed men’ and agrarii ‘advocates of agrarian laws,’ because pecunia ‘money’ and ager ‘field-land’ are exterior to the men to whom the derivatives are applied.
16. It was for the use of the speakers that the case-forms were derived, that he who spoke of another might be able to make a distinction when he was calling, when he was giving, when he was accusing, and other differences of this same sort, which led us as well as the Greeks to the declension of nouns. The oblique forms which develop from the nominative are without dispute to be called cases; but there are those who question whether the nominative is properly a case. At any rate, we have six forms, and the Greeks five: he who is called, as (nominative) Hercules; how the calling is done, as (vocative) Hercule; whither there is a calling, as to (accusative) Herculem; by whom the calling is done, as by (ablative) Hercule; to or for whom there is a calling, as to or for (dative) Herculi; of whom the calling or called object is, as of (genitive) Herculis.
17. There are certain words which are like added family names, such as Prudens ‘prudent,’ Candidus ‘frank,’ Strenuus ‘brisk,’ and in them differences may be shown by a suffix, since the quality may be present in them to a greater or a smaller degree: therefore to these words a kind of inflection is attached, so that from candidum ‘shining white’ comes the comparative candidius and the superlative candidissimum, formed in the same way as similar forms from longum ‘long,’ dives ‘rich,’ and other words of this kind.
18. The terms which are derived for application to exterior objects, are for example equile ‘horse-stable’ from equus ‘horse,’ ovile ‘sheepfold’ from oves ‘sheep,’ and others in this same way; these are the opposite of those which I mentioned above, such as pecuniosus ‘moneyed man’ from pecunia ‘money,’ urbanus ‘city man’ from urbs ‘city,’ atratus ‘clad in mourning’ from atrum ‘black.’ Thus sometimes a place is named from a man, and then a man from this place, as Rome from Romulus and then Roman from Rome.
19. The nouns which relate to exterior objects are derived in sundry ways: those like Latonius ‘Latona’s child’ and Priamidae ‘Priam’s sons,’ which are derived from the names of their progenitors, are formed in one way, and those which come from an action are made in another way, such as praeda ‘booty’ from praedari ‘to pillage’ and merces ‘wages’ from mereri ‘to earn.’ In the same way there are still others, which can be enumerated without difficulty; but because this category of words is now clear to the understanding and other matters press for attention, I pass them by.
20. Inasmuch as in the class of words which indicate also time-ideas there were these three time-ideas, past, present, and future, there had to be three sets of derived forms, as from the present saluto ‘I salute’ there are the past salutabam and the future salutabo. Since the persons of the verb were likewise of three natures, the one who was speaking, the one to whom the speaking was done, and the one about whom the speaking took place, there are these derivative forms of each and every verb; and these forms will be expounded in the account of the stock of verbs which is in use.
21. Since two points have been discussed, why derivation exists and to what products it eventuates, the remaining third point shall now be spoken of, namely, how and in what manner derivation takes place. There are two kinds of derivation, voluntary and natural. Voluntary derivation is that which is the product of the individual person’s volition, directing itself apart from control by others. So, when three men have bought a slave apiece at Ephesus, sometimes one derives his slave’s name from that of the seller Artemidorus and calls him Artemas; another names his slave Ion, from Ionia the district, because he has bought him there; the third calls his slave Ephesius, because he has bought him at Ephesus. In this way each derives the name from a different source, as he preferred.
22. On the other hand I call that derivation natural, which is based not on the volition of individuals acting singly, but on general agreement. So, when the names have been fixed, they derive the case-forms of them in like fashion, and in one and the same way they all say in the genitive case Artemidori, Ionis, Ephesi; and so on in the other cases.
23. Sometimes both are found together, and in such a way that in the voluntary derivation the processes of nature are noted, and in the natural derivation the effects of volition; of what sort these are, will be recounted below. Since in the two kinds of derivation some things approach likeness and others become unlike, the Greeks and the Latins have written many books on the subject: in some of them certain writers express the idea that in speaking men ought to follow those words and forms which are derived in similar fashion from like starting-points — which they called the products of Analogy; and others are of opinion that this should be disregarded and rather men should follow the dissimilar and irregular, which is found in ordinary habitual speech — which they called the product of Anomaly. But in my opinion we ought to follow both, because in voluntary derivation there is Anomaly, and in the natural derivation there is even more strikingly Regularity.
24. About these two kinds of derivation I shall write two sets of three books each: the first three about the principles of these derivations, and the latter set about the products of these principles. In the former set the first book will contain the views which may be offered against likeness in derivation and declension; the second will contain the arguments against unlikeness; the third will be about the shape and manner of the likenesses. What I have set in order on these topics, I shall write in the three separate books; then on the second set of topics I shall begin to write, with due division into the same number of books.
25. Inasmuch as it is the task of this book to speak against those who follow likeness — which is like the relation of boy to old man in the matter of human life, and like that of girl to old woman, and in verbs is the relation of scribo ‘I write’ and scribam ‘I shall write’ — I shall speak first against Regularity in general, and then thereafter concerning its several subdivisions. I shall begin with the nature of human speech.
26. All speaking ought to be aimed at practical utility, and it attains this only if it is clear and brief: characteristics which we seek, because an obscure and longish speaker is disliked. And since clear speaking causes the utterance to be understood, and brief speaking causes it to be understood quickly, and since also habitual use makes the utterance clear and the speaker’s self-restraint makes it brief, and both these can be present without Regularity, there is no need of this Regularity. For if Regularity should instruct us whether we ought to say Herculi or Herculis for the genitive, as in the phrase ‘the club of Hercules,’ we must not fail to disregard its teaching, since both are in habitual use, and both forms are equally short and clear.
27. Besides, if from a thing one has secured that useful service for which it was invented, it is the act of a person with a great deal of idle time, to examine it further; and since the useful service for which names are set upon things is that the names should designate the things, then if we secure this result by habitual use alone, Regularity adds no gain.
28. There is the additional fact that in those things which are taken into our daily life for use, it is our practice to seek utility and not to seek resemblance; thus in the matter of clothing, although a man’s toga is very unlike his tunic, and a woman’s stola is very unlike a pallium, we make no objection to the difference.
29. In the case of buildings, although we do not see the persistyle bearing resemblance to the atrium nor the sleeping-room bearing resemblance to the horse-stable, still, on account of the utility in them we seek for unlikenesses rather than likenesses; so also we provide winter dining-rooms and summer dining-rooms with a different equipment of doors and windows.
30. Therefore, since difference prevails not only in clothing and in buildings, but also in furniture, in food, and in all the other things which have been taken into our daily life for use, the principle of difference should not be rejected in human speech either, which has been framed for the purpose of use.
31. But if one should think that the sum of those natural goals to which we ought to attain in actual use consists of two items, that of utility and that of refinement, because we wish to be clothed not only to avoid cold but also to appear to be decently clothed; and we wish to have a house not merely that we may be under a roof and in a safe place into which necessity has crowded us together, but also that we may be where we may continue to experience the pleasures of life; and we wish to have table-vessels that are not merely suitable to hold our food, but also beautiful in form and shaped by an artist — for one thing is enough for the human animal, and quite another thing satisfies human refinement: any cup at all is satisfactory to a man parched with thirst, but any cup is inferior to the demands of refinement unless it is artistically beautiful: — but as we have digressed from the matter of utility to that of pleasure, it is a fact that in such a case greater pleasure is often got from difference of appearance than from likeness.
32. On this account, identical rooms are often ornamented in unlike manner, and couches are not all made the same in size and shape. But if Regularity were to be sought in furniture, we should have all the couches in the house made in one fashion, and either with posts or without them, and when we had a couch suited for use beside the dining-table, we should not fail to have just the same for bedroom use; nor should we rather be delighted with furniture which was decorated with varying figures of ivory or other materials, any more than in camp-beds, which with regularity are almost always made of the same material and in the same shape. Therefore either we must deny that differences give pleasure, or, since we must admit that they do, we must say that the un-likeness in words which is found in habitual usage, is not something to be avoided.
33. But if we must follow Regularity, either we must observe that. Regularity which is present in ordinary usage, or we must observe also that which is not found there. If we must follow that which is present, there is no need of rules, because when we follow usage, Regularity attends us. But if we ought to follow the Regularity which is not present in ordinary usage, then we shall ask, When any one has made two words in four forms according to the same pattern, must we employ them just the same, even though we do not wish to — as for example a dative Iuppitri and an accusative Marspitrem? If any one should persist in using such ‘regular forms,’ he ought to be rebuked as crazy. This kind of Regularity, therefore, is not to be followed.
34. But if the proper thing is that all words that start from similar forms should be inflected similarly, it follows that from dissimilar starting forms dissimilar forms should be made by inflection; and this is not what is found. For from like forms some like forms are made, and other unlike forms, and from unlike forms also come some like forms and some unlike forms. For instance, from likes come likes, as from bonus ‘good’ and malus ‘bad’ come the neuter forms bonum and malum; also from likes come unlikes, as from lupus ‘wolf’ and lepus ‘hare’ come the unlike datives lupo and lepori. On the other hand, from unlikes there are unlikes, as from the nominatives Priamus and Paris come the datives Priamo and Pari; also from unlikes there are likes, as nominatives Iupiter ‘Jupiter,’ ovis ‘sheep,’ and datives Iovi and ovi.
35. So much the more now must it be denied that Regularities exist, because not only are unlikes made from likes, but also from identical words unlikes are made, and not merely likes, but identicals are made from unlikes. From identical names unlikes, it is clear, are made, because while there are two towns named Alba, the people of the one are called Albani and those of the other are called Albenses; while there are three cities named Athens, the people of the one are called Athenaei, those of the second are Athenaiis, those of the third Athenaeopolitae.
36. Similarly, many words made in derivation from different words are found to be identical, as when I say accusative Luam from Saturn’s Lua, and also luam as future of luo ‘loosing.’ Almost all our names of men and women are unlike in the nominative case of the plural, but are identical in the dative: unlike, as the men Terentii, the women Terentiae, but identical in the dative, men Terentiis and women Terentiis. Unlike are Plautus and Plautius, Marcus and Marcius; and yet there is a form common to both, namely the genitive Plauti and Marci.
37. Finally, if Regularity does exist for the reason that in many words there is a likeness of the word-forms, it follows that because there is unlikeness in a greater number of words the principle of Regularity ought not to be followed in actual talking.
38. In the last place, if Regularity does exist in speech, it exists either in all its parts or in some one part; but it does not exist in all, and it is not enough that it exists in some one part, just as the fact that an Ethiopian has white teeth is not enough to justify us in saying that an Ethiopian is white: therefore Regularity does not exist.
39. Since those who declare that Regularities exist, promise that the inflected forms from like words will be alike, and since they then say that a word is like another word only if it can be shown that starting from the same gender and the same inflectional form it passes in like fashion from case to case, those who make these assertions show their ignorance both of that in which the likeness must be found and of how the presence or absence of the likeness is wont to be recognized. Since they are ignorant of these matters, it follows that we ought not to follow them, inasmuch as they are unable to pronounce with authority on the subject of Regularity.
40. For I ask whether by a ‘word’ they mean the spoken word which consists of syllables, that word which we hear, or that which the spoken word indicates, which we understand, or both. If the spoken word must be like another spoken word, it makes no difference whether what it indicates is male or female, and whether it is a proper name or a common noun; and yet the supporters of Regularity say that these factors do make a difference.
41. But if that which is denoted by like words ought to be like, then Dion and Theon, which they themselves say are almost identical, are found to be unlike, if the one is a boy and the other an old man, or one is white and the other an Ethiopian; and likewise if they are unlike in some other respect. But if the word must be like in both directions, there will not quickly be found one that is not defective in one respect or the other, nor will Perpenna and Alfena prove to be alike, because the one name denotes a man and the other a woman. Therefore, since they are unable to show wherein the likeness must exist, those who assert that Regularities exist are utterly shameless.
42. The other matter that I have mentioned, how the likeness is to be recognized, they clearly fail to appreciate in that they set up a precept that only when the passage is made from the nominatives to the vocative forms can it be said whether the nominatives are like or unlike; for this would be as if a man, on seeing the Menaechmus twins, should say that he could not decide whether or not they were alike, unless he should scrutinize their children, to see if they showed any differences from one another.
43. Nothing, I say, whereby that which you are comparing with the other may be made more like it or less like it, ought to be brought in from outside, for the purpose of aiding the decision. Therefore, since they do not know in what way the likeness ought to be drawn, they are incompetent to speak about Regularity. I should have said this more plainly, if I were not wishing now to speak more briefly because later on a these matters are to be treated at greater length. Accordingly it is sufficient now to have touched upon them as far as is connected with the general nature of words.
44. I shall next speak of what concerns the individual parts of speech. Since there are several methods of division thereof, I shall now take by preference that by which speech is according to its nature divided into four parts: that which has case-forms, that which has time-forms, that which has neither, that in which both case and time are indicated. Some grammarians call these the parts respectively of naming, saying, supporting, joining: the part of naming is said to be such words as homo ‘man’ and Nestor, that of saying such as scribo ‘I write’ and lego ‘I read,’ that of joining such as scribens ‘writing’ and legens ‘reading,’ that of supporting such as docte ‘learnedly’ and commode ‘suitably.’
45. The kinds of naming are four, of which the words which are like (masc.) quis, (fem.) quae ‘which’ have by certain grammarians been called Provocables; those like scutum ‘shield’ and gladium ‘sword’ have been called Vocables; those like Romulus and Remus have been called Proper Nouns; those like (masc.) hic, (fem.) haec ‘this’ have been called Pronouns. The two middle kinds are called Denominations; the first and last are called Articles. The first class is indefinite, the second is almost indefinite, the third is almost definite, the fourth is definite.
46. Each of these ought to be threefold in nature, as concerns gender, number, and case: gender, whether it is masculine or feminine or neuter, as masc. doctus, fem. docta, neut. doctum ‘learned’; number, whether it denotes one or more, as masc. sing, hic, pl. hi ‘these,’ and fem. sing, haec, pl. hae; case, whether it is in the nominative, as Marcus, or in an oblique case, as Marco, or in a non-distinctive case-form, as ovis ‘sheep.’
47. Now that these divisions have been made, examine them one by one, that you may the more easily see that there are nowhere any Regularities which we ought to follow. To be sure some words had to have three several forms, as in this example: masc. humanus, fem. humana, neut. humanum ‘human’; but some have only two apiece, like cervus ‘stag,’ cerva ‘hind,’ and certain others have but one, like aper ‘boar’; and so on with many others. Therefore Regularity simply does not exist in classes of this sort.
48. In number also, as pater ‘father’ denotes one and patres ‘fathers’ denotes more than one, all ought in this fashion to have two forms. But many are singulars only, like cicer ‘chickpea’ and siser ‘skirret’ — for nobody says cicera and sisera in the plural; and there are words that are plurals only, such as salinae ‘saltworks’ and balneae ‘public baths’: for from these there are no singulars salina and balnea in use. Nor from the singular balneum does general usage make a plural: for because balneum ‘bath’ is like praedium ‘farm estate,’ there ought to be plurals, balnea as well as praedia, but this is not the case. Therefore in these also there is no Regularity.
49. Some have both nominatives and oblique cases, others have nominatives only, others oblique cases only: both, as in nom. Iuno, gen. Iunonis; nominatives only, as in Iupiter, Maspiter; oblique cases only, as in gen. Iovis, dat. Iovi. Therefore in these Regularity does not exist.
50. Now let us look into those of the fourfold division. First, if there were Regularity in the indefinite articles, the proper forms would be feminine quae, gen. quaius, like masculine quis, gen. quoius; and as quoi is dative to masculine quis, so quae would be used as dative to feminine qua. For it is similar by proportion: dea bona qua ‘a good goddess who’ is like deae bonae quae ‘to a good goddess to whom.’ Similarly, the nom. masc. ques stands in the same relation to acc. quos, as the sing. masc. quis to the acc. quern; therefore for the qui homines ‘which men’ which is now used in the nominative, we ought to say ques.
51. Besides, as from masc. is ‘this’ there is dat. ei, so from fem. ea there would be spoken a dat. eae, which is now actually spoken as ei; and like the dat. pl. in ieis viris ‘to these men,’ there would be pronounced a dat. pl. fem. eais mulieribus ‘to these women.’ And as in the nominatives there are masc. is, fem. ea, in the oblique forms there would be masc. eius, fem. eaius; but now eius is said for the genitive not only in the masculine and the feminine alike, but even in the neuter articles, as eius viri ‘of this man,’ eius mulieris ‘of this woman,’ eius pabuli ‘of this fodder,’ although masc. is, fem. ea, neut. id are distinguished in the nominative. I have touched upon this classification more sparingly, because I am of opinion that the copyists will not take proper care in transferring these quite confusing matters.
52. From the appellations which come nearest to the indefinite nature of the articles and are called common nouns, such as homo ‘man’ and equus ‘horse,’ there are four kinds of derivation: one of name-giving, as equile ‘horse-stable’ from equus ‘horse’; the second that of the cases, as accusative equum from equus; the third that of augmentation, as albius ‘whiter’ from album ‘white’; the fourth that of diminution, as cistula ‘little box’ from cista ‘box.’
53. The first class, as I have said, is that in which words in the nominative are derived from some part of speech, as balneator ‘bath-keeper’ from balneae ‘public baths.’ This class has in general three sources, because it develops from a common noun, as venabulum ‘hunting spear’ from venator ‘hunter,’ and from a proper name, as Tiburs ‘man of Tibur’ from Tibur, and from a verb, as cursor ‘runner’ from currere ‘to run.’ In none of these will you see Regularity preserved.
54. First, although from ovis ‘sheep’ and sus ‘swine’ there are said ovile ‘sheepfold’ and suile ‘hog-sty,’ there is no bovile from bos ‘ox’; and although avis ‘bird’ and ovis ‘sheep’ are alike, we do not say oviarium from ovis as we say aviarium’ aviary from avis, nor do we say avile from avis as we say ovile ‘sheepfold’ from ovis; and although there ought to be a sediculum ‘chair’ from sessio’sitting’ like cubiculum ‘sleeping-room ‘from cubatio ‘reclining,’ there is not.
55. Since a shop where wine is sold is called vinaria from vinum ‘wine,’ and cretaria from creta ‘chalk,’ unguentaria from unguentum ‘perfume,’ then if words went in regular fashion a shop where caro ‘meat’ is sold would be called carnaria, one where pelles ‘hides’ are sold would be called pelliaria, one where calcei ‘shoes’ are sold would be called calcearia, instead of laniena ‘butcher’s shop,’ pellesuina ‘leather-shop,’ sutrina ‘cobbler’s shop.’ And just as from unus ‘one’ comes the plural uni ‘one set of,’ and from tres ‘three’ comes trini ‘three each,’ from quattuor ‘four’ quadrini ‘four each,’ so from duo ‘two’ there should be a duini and not a bini ‘two each’; also, after quadrigae ‘team of four’ and trigae ‘team of three,’ there should be rather duigae than bigae ‘team of two.’ There are a great many examples of this class, but I pass them by, since he who has had his attention called to them cannot fail to notice them.
56. If words which develop from proper names ought to be alike if from like names, then since Parma and Roma are identical we shall say Romenses, like Parmenses; or since Roma, Nola, Parma are alike, we shall say Parmani, like Romani and Nolani. And from Pergamum and Ilium we shall have not only Pergamenus ‘Pergamene,’ but also Ilienus; or like Ilius and Ilia ‘Ilian’ male and female, we shall say Pergamus and Pergama respectively for a man and a woman of Pergamum. And since Asia and Libya are like names, we shall call the people Asiatic and Libyatic.
57. The words which are made from verbs are such as scriptor ‘writer’ from scribere ‘to write’ and lector ‘reader’ from legere ‘to read’; that those also do not preserve a likeness can be seen from the following: although amator ‘lover’ from amare ‘to love’ and salutator ‘saluter’ from salutare ‘to salute’ are formed in like manner, there is no cantator ‘singer’ from cantare ‘to sing’; and though we say “I am tired with metendo ‘reaping’ and ferendo ‘carrying,’” the words from these do not represent a like relation, since there is no fertor ‘carrier’ made like messor ‘reaper.’ There are likewise many others of this class in which we follow usage rather than conformity to the verbs.
58. Besides these there are other words which also originate from verbs but are unlike those of which we have already spoken, because they have both cases and tenses, whence they are called participles. And as many verbs have opposite forms, such as amo ‘I love,’ amor ‘I am loved,’ lego ‘I read,’ legor ‘I am read,’ from amo and all verbs of this kind there develop present and future participles, such as amans ‘loving’ and amaturus ‘about to love,’ but from these verbs the third form which ought to be made, namely the past participle, cannot be found in the Latin language: therefore there is no Regularity. So also from amor ‘I am loved,’ legor ‘I am read,’ and verbs of this kind the word of this class is made for past time, as amatus ‘loved,’ but from them none is made for the present and the future.
59. Therefore there is no Regularity, especially since such a great number of words has perished in this class which we are mentioning. In these verbs which have not both voices, such as loquor ‘I speak’ and venor ‘I hunt,’ we none the less say loquens ‘speaking’ and venans ‘hunting,’ locuturus ‘about to speak’ and venaturus ‘about to hunt,’ locutus ‘having spoken’ and venatus ‘having hunted.’ This is not according to the Regularities, since we say loquor and venor, not loquo and veno, whence came the forms given above. The Regularities are the less preserved, because some of the verbs which have not both voices, make three participles each, like those which I have named, and other make only two each, such as those which I shall now name: currens ‘running’ and ambulans ‘walking,’ cursurus ‘about to run’ and ambulaturus ‘about to walk’; for the third forms, those of the past, do not exist, as in cursus sum ‘I am run,’ ambulatus sum ‘I am walked.’
60. But Regularity is not preserved even in those which indicate that something is done with greater frequency; for though there is a cantitans ‘repeatedly singing’ from cantare ‘to sing,’ there is no amitans ‘repeatedly loving’ from amare ‘to love,’ and similarly with many others. The situation is the same in the forms of the plural as in those of the singular: though the plural cantitantes is used, seditantes ‘sitting’ is not.
61. Since there is a class of words which they call compositional, saying that they ought not to be grouped in the same category with the simple words of which I have so far spoken, I shall deal separately with these compounds. Since from tibiae ‘pipes’ and canere ‘to play’ the tibicines ‘pipers’ are named, they ask, If we ought to follow the Regularities, why then from cithara ‘lute’ and psalterium ‘psaltery’ and pandura ‘Pan’s strings’ should we not say citharicen ‘lute-player’ and the rest in the same way? If from aedes ‘temple’ and tueri ‘to guard’ the aedi- tumus ‘sacristan’ is named, why from atrium ‘main hall’ and tueri ‘to guard’ is it not atritumus ‘butler’ rather than atriensis? And if from avis capere ‘to catch birds’ the auceps ‘fowler’ is named, they say, from piscis capere ‘to catch fish’ there ought to be a pisciceps ‘fisherman’ named like the auceps.
62. They remark also that establishments where aes ‘copper’ lavatur ’is refined’ are called aerariae ‘smelters’ and not aerelavinae ‘copper-washery’; and places where argentum ‘silver’ foditur ’is mined’ are called argentifodinae ‘silver-mines,’ but that places where ferrum ‘iron’ is mined are not called ferrifodinae; that those who caedunt ‘cut’ lipides ‘stones’ are called lapicidae ‘stone-cutters,’ but that those who cut ligna ‘firewood’ are not called lignicidae; that there is no term argentifex ‘silversmith’ like aurifex ‘goldsmith’; that a person who is not doctus ‘learned’ is called indoctus, but one who is not salsus ‘witty’ is called insulsus. Thus the words which come from this source also, it is easy to see, do not observe Regularity.
63. It remains to consider the problem of the cases, on which the Aristarcheans especially exert their energies.
First, if in these there were Regularity, they say that all names and articles ought to have the same number of cases; but that as things are some have one only, like all individual letters, others have three, like praedium praedii praedio ‘farm,’ others four, like mel mellis melli melle ‘honey,’ others five, like quintus quinti quinto quintum quinte ‘fifth,’ others six, like unus unius uni unum une uno ‘one’; therefore in cases there are no Regularities.
64. Second, in reference to what Crates said as to why those which have only one case-form each are not used in the forms alpha, dat. alphati, gen. alphatos, because they are Greek letters — if the same answer is given to me as to Crates, that they are not our words at all, but utterly foreign words, then I shall ask why the same persons use a full set of case-forms not only for our own personal names, but also for those of the Persians and of the others whom they call barbarians.
65. Wherefore, if these proper names were in a state of Regularity, either they would use them with a single case-form each, like the words of the Phoenicians and the Egyptians, or with several, like those of the Gauls and of the rest: for they say nom. alauda ‘lark,’ gen. alaudas, and similarly other words. But if, as they write, they say that the Greek letters received names with but one case-form each for the reason that they really belong to the Phoenicians, then in this way the Greeks ought to speak our words in six cases each, not in five: inasmuch as they do not do this, there is no Regularity.
66. If Regularity existed, they say, no case ought to be used in two forms; but the opposite is found to occur. For without censure quite commonly some say in the ablative singular ovi ‘sheep’ and avi ‘bird,’ others say ove and ave; in the plural, the nominative is puppis ‘ship’s sterns’ and restis ‘ropes,’ also puppes and restes; likewise there is the fact that in the genitive plural of words of this class there are used the variant forms civitatum ‘of states,’ parentum ‘of parents,’ and civitatium, parentium, and in the accusative plural monies ‘mountains,’ fontes ‘springs,’ and montis, fontis.
67. Likewise they say that, if there is Regularity, like forms ought to be made from like words declined alike, and that this can be shown not to take place; that therefore this theory is to be rejected. And yet this failure can be shown; for how can anything be more alike than gens ‘clan,’ mens ‘mind,’ dens ‘tooth’? Despite which their genitives and accusatives in the plural are unlike; for from the first word are made gentium and gentis, with I in both, from the second come mentium and mentes, with I in the former only, from the third dentum and denies, with I in neither form.
68. So likewise since surus ‘stake,’ lupus ‘wolf,’ lepus ‘hare’ are alike in the nominative, they ask why there is not said in like fashion suro, lupo, lepo. But if the answer is given that they are not alike, because in the vocative we use the unlike forms sure, lupe, lepus (this to be sure is what Aristarchus wished to say in reply to Crates; for when Crates had written that Philomedes, Heraclides, Melicertes were alike, he said that they were not alike, because in the vocative Philomedes is said with a short E, Heraclide with a long E, Melicerta with a short A), in this, they say, Aristarchus did not realize that he was not giving a solution of the question that was asked.
69. For in this way, whenever there was any difference in the oblique eases, he could say that for this reason the nominatives were not alike; but since the question is whether the two nominatives are like each other, or not, there should be nothing brought in from outside, they say, as to why they are alike or different.
70. Likewise if there were Regularity, then just as they say in like fashion the nominatives aves ‘birds,’ oves ‘sheep,’ sues ‘swine,’ they would say in the genitive suium just as they do avium and avium. If there is Regularity, he says, why do the people say dei ‘gods’ in Dei Penates ‘Household Gods’ and Dei Consentes ‘United Gods,’ although in the nominative singular deus ‘god’ is just like reus ‘defendant,’ ferreus ‘of iron,’ and so the plurals should be reei, ferreei, deei?
71. Likewise they ask, if Regularity exists, why do people all say the Temple Deum Consentium ‘of the United Gods’ and not Deorum Consentium? Likewise, why do they say a thousand denarium ‘of denarii’ and not a thousand denariorum? For this word denarius is in form exactly like Vatinius and Manilius, and therefore denariorum ought to be used as genitive, like Vatiniorum and Maniliorum. They say also that a cavalryman’s horse is worth not a thousand assarium ‘of assarii,’ but a thousand assariorum; for from the singular assarius comes the plural assarii, and from that should come the genitive assariorum.
72. Likewise, according to their theory, it is with long second syllables that we should pronounce Hectōrem and Nestōrem; for the accusatives quaestorem praetorem Nestōrem, and the genitives quaestōris praetōris Nestōris correspond to the nominatives quaestor praetor Nestor. And we ought not to say quibus das ‘to whom you give,’ his das ‘to these you give’; for it is dative his and quis, like nominative hi and qui, or else it is hibus like quibus.
73. Although the dative patri familias ‘to the father of the household’ is used, still, if they wished to follow Regularities, they ought never to have said nominative pater familias, because the word is genitive familiae, like Atiniae and Catiniae, and therefore nominative familia, like Atinia and Catinia. Likewise, they ought not to say patres familias ‘fathers of a household,’ but as Sisenna writes, they should say patres familiarum ‘fathers of households.’
74. Nor ought usage to fluctuate, in that some said herds boum ‘of cattle,’ others boverum, and others said statues Ioum ‘of Jupiters,’ others Ioverum, since like the genitive Iovis bovis struis were the accusative Iovem bovem struem and the dative Iovi bovi strui; and since these agreed in the oblique cases, they ought not to have varied in the nominative forms, in which it is now customary to use different formations, Iupiter for Ious, bos for bous, strues ‘heap of offering-cakes’ for strus.
75. Next I shall speak of a second class of words, in which degrees of comparison are made, like album ‘white,’ albius ‘whiter,’ albissumum ‘whitest,’ in which likewise it is clear that the Regularities are not preserved. For whereas salsum ‘salty’ and caldum ‘hot’ are alike, and from these are made the comparatives salsius and caldius, and the superlatives salsissimum and caldissimum, there should be made from bonum ‘good’ and malum ‘bad,’ since these are alike, the comparatives bonius and malius, the superlatives bonissimum and malissimum. But are not the actual forms in use bonum melius optimum, and malum peius pessimum?
76. In some words no form is lacking; for example, dulcis ‘sweet,’ dulcior, dulcissimus. In others the first or positive degree is lacking, as peium from peius ‘worse,’ pessimum ‘worst’; in others the second is lacking, as caesior from caesius ‘blue-eyed,’ superlative caesissimus; in still others two are lacking which are derived from the same word, and these in such a way that in some instances the second and the third are lacking, as manius and manissime in connexion with the adverb mane ‘early in the morning’; that in others the first two are wanting, as optum and optius from optimum ‘best’; and that in others the first and the third are lacking, as melum and melissumum from melius ‘better.’
77. Besides, if they were spoken in like manner, then since macer ‘lean’ and tener ‘tender’ are alike, and their superlatives macerrimus and tenerrimus, there would be no difference in their comparatives macrior and tenerior, nor would some such words have three syllables and others four. And if likeness ruled in such words, then just as we say candidissimus ‘most shining’ and fem, candidissima, pauperrumus ‘poorest’ and fem, pauperrima, so we should say candidus ‘shining’ and fem. Candida, pauper ‘poor’ and fem, paupera. And as we say docius ‘learned’ and fem, docta, doetissimus ‘most learned’ and fem. doctissima, so we should say frugalissumus ‘most thrifty ‘and fem, frugalissima, frugalus ‘thrifty’ and fem. frugala.
78. And if words were in regular relation to each other, as with one word we call a man and a woman sapiens ‘wise’ and diligens ‘diligent,’ sapientior ‘wiser’ and diligentior ‘more diligent,’ so we should speak in the same way when we had come to the superlative — a thing which we now do quite otherwise: for we call a man sapientissimus and diligentissimus, a woman sapientissima and diligentissima. As for examples of words of this class, there are many still remaining; but those which have been mentioned are enough for the formation of a judgement why in the comparison of words we do not have to follow Regularities.
79. Whereas there can be a set of three words to indicate size, like cista ‘casket,’ cistula, cistella, in some the middle terms do not exist, as in these: macer ‘lean,’ macricolus, macellus, and niger ‘black,’ nigricolus, nigellus. Likewise in certain words the terms for least size do not exist, such as avis ‘bird,’ avicula, avicella, and caput ‘head,’ capitulum, capitellum. Since in this class of words there are many forms lacking, we must say that in it theory must not be followed rather than usage.
As to the four classes of common nouns, I have said enough; and it can easily be observed that here usage governs rather than Regularities.
80. The matter of proper nouns now follows, which differ from common nouns in that they are definite and denote special things, like the names Paris and Helen, while common nouns are indefinite and indicate general ideas, like vir ‘man’ and mulier ‘woman.’ Among these there are some proper names from proper names, like Ilium from Ilus, and Ilia from Ilium; others are from a common noun, like Albius from album ‘white,’ Atrius from atrum ‘black.’ In neither set is Regularity preserved: for inasmuch as from Romulus comes the name Roma, there is not the form which should have come into existence by regular relation, namely, Romula and not Roma.
81. Likewise, Perpenna ought to be the daughter of Perpennus, not the son of Perpenna. For Perpenna ought to be the name of a woman, and to mean a child of Perpennus; this is like masculine Arvernus, Percelnus, feminine Arverna and Percelna, so also Perpennus and Perpenna. But if Marcus Perpenna is a man’s name and Regularity is to be followed, then Lucius Aelia and Quintus Mucia will have to be men’s names. Likewise the names which they use derived from Rhodus ‘Rhodes,’ Andros, and Cyzicus, are Rhodius ‘Rhodian,’ Andrius ‘Andrian,’ and Cyzicenus ‘Cyzicene’; but if made in like manner the last ought to be Cyzicius, and each name ought to denote a citizen of the place: not as a certain rhetorician is called Athenaeus, although he is not an Athenian by birth.
82. In this very matter, then, there is no Regularity, because some have names from the towns, others either have names from other sources or have names from towns from which they ought not to get them.
83. Most freedmen set free by a free town get their names from the town; in this matter, those who were slaves of guilds and temples have not observed the rule in the same way; and the freedmen of the Romans ought to have got the name Romanus, like Faventinus from Faventia and Reatinus from Reate. In this way the freedmen whose parents were state slaves would be named Romanus, who had been set free before they began to take the names of the magistrates who set them free.
84. From this practice came also such names as Lesas, Ufenas, Carrinas, Maecenas; since these are from the place of origin, like Urbinas, alongside Urbinius, there should from them have been formed, after the likeness of our names, the names Lesius, Ufenius. Carrinius, Maecenius....