1.... They are a prey to extraordinary error, who prefer to teach what they do not know, rather than to learn that of which they are ignorant. In this position was the famous grammarian Crates, who placed his reliance on Chrysippus, a man of great acumen who left three books On Anomaly, and contended against Regularity and Aristarchus, but in such a way — as his writings show — that he does not seem to have understood thoroughly the intent of either. For Chrysippus, when he writes about the Inconsistency of speech, has as his object the showing that like things are denoted by unlike words and that unlike things are denoted by like words, as is true; and Aristarchus, when he writes about the Consistency of the same, bids us follow a certain likeness of words in their derivation, as far as usage permits.
2. But those who give us advice in the matter of speaking, some saying to follow usage and others saying to follow theory, are not so much at variance, because usage and regularity are more closely connected with each other than those advisers think.
3. For Regularity is sprung from a certain usage in speech, and from this usage likewise is sprung Anomaly. Therefore, since usage consists of unlike and like words and their derivative forms, neither Anomaly nor Regularity is to be cast aside, unless man is not of soul because he is of body and of soul.
4. But that what I am about to say may be more easily grasped, first there must be a clear distinction of three sets of relations; for most things are said indiscriminately in two ways, and of them some ought to be referred to one principle and others to other principles. First, the distinction of the relations of nature and use; for these are two factors which are diverse in the goals toward which they direct themselves, because it is one thing to say that Regularities exist in words, and another thing to say that we ought to follow the Regularities. Second, the distinction of the relations of extension and limitation, whether the use of the Regularities should be said to be proper in all words, or only in a majority of them. Third, the distinction in the relations of the speaking persons, how the majority of persons ought to observe the Regularities.
5. For some words and forms are the usage of the people as a whole, others belong to individual persons; and of these, the words of the orator and those of the poet are not the same, because their rights and limitations are not the same. Therefore the people as a whole ought in all words to use Regularity, and if it has a wrong practice, it ought to correct itself; whereas the orator ought not to use Regularity in all words, because he cannot do so without giving offence, and on the other hand the poet can with impunity leap across all the bounds.
6. For the people has power over itself, but the individuals are in its power; therefore as each one ought to correct his own usage if it is bad, so should the people correct its usage. I am not the master — so to speak — of the people’s usage, but it is of mine. As a helmsman ought to obey reason, and each one in the ship ought to obey the helmsman, so the people ought to obey reason, and we individuals ought to obey the people. Therefore, if you will take notice of each principle on which I shall base my argument in the matter of speaking, you will appreciate whether Regularity is said merely to exist, or it is said that we ought to follow it; and likewise you will appreciate that if the practice of speech ought to be reduced to Regularity, then this is meant for the people in a different sense from that in which it is meant for individuals, and that that which is taken from the entire body of speakers is not necessarily meant in the same form for him who is only an individual in the people.
7. Now I shall speak first in support of Regularity as a whole, why, as it seems, it not only should not be censured, but even should in practice be followed in a certain measure; and secondly, concerning the several charges against it, I shall give the arguments by which the objections can be refuted, arranging them in such a way that I shall include, item by item, those which have been narrated in the previous book and also those which can be presented but were passed over by me in that place.
8. First, as to their alleging that he who wishes to speak well ought to observe usage and not the theory of likenesses, because if he disregards the former he cannot do so without giving offence, and if he follows the latter it will not be without incurring rebuke: they are mistaken, because he who in speaking follows the usage which he ought to employ, is following it also without disregard of the theory.
9. For we see that nouns and verbs which we inflect in similar ways are in general usage, and we compare others with this usage, and if there is any error we make the correction with the help of usage. For if those who have arranged the dining-room have among the three couches set one that is of a different size, or among couches that match have brought one too far forward, or not far enough, we join in making the correction according to common usage and to the analogies of other dining-rooms; in the same way, if in speech any one in his utterance should so inflect the words as to speak irregular forms, we ought to revise his mistake according to the model of other similar words.
10. Now there are two kinds of wrong forms in inflection; one, that which has been erroneously accepted into general usage; the other, that which is not yet so accepted and may be called incorrect. The latter they grant ought not to be said, because it is not in usage, but as for the former they merely do not admit the propriety of saying it in this way; so that when they do this it is just as if they should grant that the boys ought to be corrected in case any of them in wilfulness begins to manage his feet awkwardly and to imitate the bowlegged, but should refuse to grant that one should be corrected if he in his habit of walking has already become bowlegged or knock-kneed.
11. Does it not follow that they act foolishly who fasten splints on the knees of children, to straighten their crooked leg-bones? Since even that physician is not to be censured who makes a healthier man out of one who has been ill as a result of a long-continued bad habit, why should he be blamed who brings into better condition a way of speech which has been less effective on account of bad usage?
12. The painters Apelles and Protogenes, and other famous artists are not to be blamed because they did not follow the ways of Micon, Diores, Arimmas, and even earlier craftsmen; then must Aristophanes be condemned because in some things he followed reality rather than usage?
13. But if the wisest men have been praised because both in warfare and in other things they had dared do much that was against old usage, then they must be despised who say that usage ought to be considered as better than good theory.
14. Or when a person has been accustomed to do something wrong in civil life, shall we not only not tolerate him but even visit him with punishment — and yet if a person has the habit of saying a word wrong, shall we not correct him, when this may be done without actual punishment?
15. And these men who send their boys to school to learn how to write words which they don’t know — shall we not likewise instruct these men, bewhiskered adults as they are, who do not know how the words ought to be spoken, that they may know by what logical theory they may properly be pronounced?
16. But as the nurse does not with suddenness tear her nurslings away from their wonted method of feeding, when she changes them from their first food to a better, so we ought to go gradually and judiciously in matters of speech, in changing older persons from less suitable words to those which accord with logical theory. Since among the illogical words which are in common usage there are some which can easily be eliminated, and others of such a sort that they seem firmly fixed, it is proper to correct at once in the direction of logic only those which are lightly attached and can be changed without giving offence; but those which are such that for the present you cannot make the correction so as not to speak them thus, these you ought, if possible, to refrain from using. For thus they will become unwonted and afterward, when already blurred to the memory, they can be more easily corrected.
17. Such new inflectional forms as are introduced by logical theory but are rejected by the speech of the forum, these the good poets, especially the dramatists, ought to force upon the ears of the people and accustom them to them. For the poets have great power in this sphere: they are responsible for the fact that certain words are now spoken with improved inflections, and others with worse. The usage of speech is always shifting its position: this is why words of the better sort are wont to become worse, and worse words better; words spoken wrongly by some of the old-timers are on account of the poets’ influence now spoken correctly, and on the other hand some that were then spoken according to logical theory, are now spoken wrongly.
18. Therefore those who summon us to obey usage, we shall follow, if it be to a correct usage. For in this also there is the principle of Regularity: if they invite us to that usage which is perverted and irregular, we shall not follow it unless it becomes necessary, any more than we follow bad examples in other things; for we do follow them too, though against our inclinations, when some force bears down upon us.
And in fact Lysippus did not follow the defects of the artists who preceded him, but rather their artistry; just so should the people do in their speech, and even the individuals, so far as it may be done without offence to the people as a whole.
19. There are some persons who not only hunt for lost articles, but even of their own initiative give any information which they may have: do the same persons, if something has been lost from speech, not only not exert themselves in hunting for it, but even fight against the informers, to keep it from being put back into its place?
20. As for a word that is new and has been introduced according to logical theory, we ought not for this to shun giving it a hospitable welcome.
For long-standing custom is not a hindrance to novelty in garments, buildings, and utensils, when it is a question of use; what victim of a habit does the love of that habit rather keep in rags, when the love of novelty is leading him toward new garments?
Are not old laws often annulled and succeeded by new laws?
21. Have not the forms of the old-fashioned pots and cups been swept into oblivion by the unfamiliar shapes of the vessels recently brought from Greece? Shall they then, on account of old-time habit, be unwilling to use these unsullied forms of words, which good reason has taught them? And do they claim that there is such difference between the two senses, that for their eyes that are always seeking some new shapes of their furniture, but they wish their ears to have no share in similar novelties?
22. Out of how many slave-owners is there now one who has slaves bearing the ancient names? What woman calls her outfit of clothing and jewelry by the old words? But it is not so much at the unlearned that anger must be felt, as at the advocates of this perversity.
23. For if there were Regularity in no place at all, then it follows that there would be none in words either; not that when it is everywhere present (as it is in fact), there is none in words.
For what part of the world is there which does not have countless Regularities? Sky or sea or land, what Regularities are there in these?
24. As in the sky there is a division from the Equator to the Tropic of Cancer, and from there to the Arctic Circle, is not also its counterpart, extending from the Tropic of Capricorn in the other direction, likewise divided into equal sections? Is it not a fact that as far as the North Pole is removed from the Arctic Circle and this from the Tropic of Cancer, around which the sun travels when it comes to the summer solstice, so far the South Pole is from that Circle which the astronomers call the Antarctic, and this from the Tropic of Capricorn? Is it not true that in the fashion in which each constellation has risen in the sky this year, in just the same fashion it rises each and every year?
25. The sun does not come in one way from the Tropic of Capricorn to the Equator, does it, and on the other hand, when it comes to the Tropic of Cancer, return in a different way to the Equator and thence to Capricorn? The moon, when it goes away from the sun to the north and returns from there into the same path which the sun pursues, goes on from there to the south and comes back again in just the same way, does it not? But why should I speak further of the stars, in the case of which there is unusual difficulty in finding any irregularity which exists or takes place in their motions?
26. But in the sea, I suppose, the motions do not have the twofold likenesses — the motions which in twenty-four lunar hours change themselves four times, and when the tides have risen for six hours, and have ebbed for just as many, they likewise rise again, and in the same fashion ebb after this time. Or do they keep this Regularity for a day’s space, and not likewise for a month, since similarly they have another set of motions which agree with one another? Of these I have written in the book which I composed On Tidal Inlets.
27. On the earth, is not Regularity preserved in the case of plantings? Does it not give us to-day fruits of precisely the same kind as it has given us in the past? Does it not regularly return to us a crop of barley when barley has been sown, even as it returns a crop of wheat when wheat has been sown? Does not Asia have rivers and lakes, mountains and plains, even as Europe has?
28. Is not Regularity preserved among the birds, according to their kind? As the progeny of eagles are eagles and the progeny of thrushes are thrushes, are not the progeny of the other birds all of their own proper and special kind?
Does the process go on in another way in the water, than in the air? Are not the shell-fish here all like their own kind, despite their countless number? Are not the fishes? Is a sea-bass or a sea-carp produced of a moray? Is not one head of cattle like another, when compared, and so also the calves which are procreated by them? Even where the offspring is unlike the parents, as the mule born of a he-ass and a mare, even there there is Regularity none the less: the offspring of any ass and mare whatsoever is a mule, male or female, as the offspring of a stallion and a she-ass is a hinny.
29. Are not in this way all the offspring of man and woman alike, in that they are boys and girls? Do these not have all their limbs mutually alike, in such a way that item by item they are pairs in likeness, in their own special kinds? As all are made up of soul and body, are not also the parts of soul and body alike with the same regularity?
30. What then of the fact that the souls of men are divided into eight parts — are these parts not mutually alike with regularity? Five with which we perceive, the sixth with which we think, the seventh with which we procreate, the eighth with which we utter articulate words? Therefore since the word with which we talk is speech, speech also must by nature have its Regularities; and it does.
31. Do you not see that the Greeks have divided speech into four parts, one in which the words have cases, a second in which they have indications of time, a third in which they have neither, a fourth in which they have both — and that in the same way we have all these divisions? Do you not know that among them some words are definite, others not — and that both kinds are present in our language also?
32. For my part I have no doubt that you have observed the countless number of likenesses in speech, such as those of the three tenses of the verb, or its three persons.
Who indeed can have failed to join you in observing that in all speech there are the three tenses lego ‘I read,’ legebam ‘I was reading,’ legam ‘I shall read,’ and similarly the three persons lego ‘I read,’ legis ‘thou readest,’ legit ‘he reads,’ though these same forms may be spoken in such a way that sometimes one only is meant, at other times more? Who is so slow-witted that he has not observed also those likenesses which we use in commands, those which we use in wishes, those in questions, those in the case of matters not completed and those for matters completed, and similarly in other differentiations?
33. Therefore those who say that there is no logical system of Regularity, fail to see the nature not only of speech, but also of the world. Those who see it and say that it ought not to be followed, are fighting against nature, not against the principle of Regularity, and they are fighting with pincers, not with a sword, since out of the great sea of speech they select and offer in evidence a few words not very familiar in popular use, saying that for this reason the Regularities do not exist: just as if one should have seen a dehorned ox or a one-eyed man and a lame horse, and should say that the likenesses do not exist with regularity in the nature of cattle, men, and horses.
34. Those moreover who say that there are two kinds of Regularity, one natural, namely that lentils grow from planted lentils, and so does lupine from lupine, and the other voluntary, as in the workshop, when they see the stage as having an entrance on the right and think that it has for a like reason been made with an entrance on the left; and say further, that of these two kinds the natural Regularity really exists, as in the motions of the heavenly bodies, but the voluntary Regularity is not real, because each craftsman can make the parts of the stage as he pleases: that thus in the parts of men there are Regularities, because nature makes them, but there is none in words, because men shape them each as he wills, and therefore as names for the same things the Greeks have one set of words, the Syrians another, the Latins still another — I firmly think that there are both voluntary and natural derivations of words, voluntary for the things on which men have imposed certain names, as Rome from Romulus and the Tiburtes ‘men of Tibur’ from Tibur, and natural as those which are inflected for tenses or for cases from the imposed names, as genitive Romuli and accusative Romulum from Romulus, and from dico ‘I say’ the imperfect dicebam and the pluperfect dixeram.
35. Therefore in the voluntary derivations there is inconsistency, and in the natural derivations there is consistency. Inasmuch as they ought not to deny the presence of both of these in speech, since they are in all parts of the world, and the derivative forms of words are countless, we must say that in words also the Regularities are present. And yet Regularity does not for this reason have to be followed in all words; for if usage has inflected or derived any words wrongly, so that they cannot be uttered in any other way without giving offence to many persons, the logic of speaking shows us that because of this offence the logic of the words must be set aside.
36. As far as concerns the general cause why likeness is present in speech and ought to be observed, and also to what extent this should be done, enough has now been said. Therefore in the following we shall set forth its several parts item by item, and refute the individual charges which they bring against the Regularities.
37. In this matter, you should take notice that by nature there are four elements in the basic situation to which words must be adjusted in inflection: there must be an underlying object or idea to be designated; this object or idea must be in use; the nature of the utterance which has designated it, must be such that it can be inflected; and the resemblance of the word’s form to other words must be such that of itself it can reveal a definite class in respect to inflection.
38. Therefore it is not to be demanded that from terra ‘earth’ there should be also a terrus, because there is no natural basis that in this object there ought to be one word for the male and another for the female. Similarly, with respect to usage, while Terentius designates one person of the name and Terentii designates several, it is not to be demanded that in this way we should say faba ‘bean’ and fabae ‘beans,’ for the two are not subject to the same use. Nor is it to be demanded that as we say acc. Terentium from nom. Terentius, we should make case-forms from A and B, because not every utterance is naturally fitted for declensional forms.
39. The likeness which the word has in its shape must be investigated not in the comparison of the basis merely, but also sometimes in the effect which it has. For thus the Gallic wool and the Apulian wool seem alike to the inexperienced on account of their appearance, though the expert buys the Apulian at a higher price because in use it lasts better. These matters, which have been touched upon hastily here, will become clearer in a later discussion. Now I shall start.
40. To their question in what respect a word ought to be similar, sound or meaning, we answer that it should be so in sound. But yet sometimes we ask whether the objects designated are like in kind, and compare a man’s name with a man’s, a woman’s name with a woman’s: not because that which they designate affects the word, but because sometimes in case of an unlike thing they set upon it forms of an equivalent appearance, and on a like thing they set unequal forms, as we call shoes women’s shoes or men’s shoes by the likeness of the shape, although we know that sometimes a woman wears men’s shoes and a man wears women’s shoes.
41. In like fashion, we say, a man is called Perpenna, like Alfena, with a feminine forma; and on the other hand paries’ house-wall’ is like abies ‘fir-tree’ in form, although the former word is used as a masculine, the latter as a feminine, and both are naturally neuter. Therefore those which we use as masculines are not those which denote a male being, but those before which we employ hic and hi, and those are feminines with reference to which we can say haec or hae.
42. For this reason it amounts to nothing, that on the premise that Regularity adopts the unlikenesses of the objects as a criterion for difference in the forms of the spoken word, they say that Theon and Dion are not alike if the one is an Ethiopian and the other is a white man.
43. As to what they say, that Aristarchus was shameless in his instructions that to see whether one name was like another you should view it not only from the nominative, but also from the vocative — for the same persons say that it is absurd to judge from the children whether the parents are alike: those who say this are mistaken, for it does not come about from their oblique cases that the nominatives are shown to be of like appearance, but through the oblique cases can be more easily seen what evidential force lies in the likeness of the nominatives — even as a lamp in the dark, when brought, does not cause that the things which are there should be alike, but that they should be seen in their real character.
44. What seems more closely alike than the last letter in the words crux ‘cross’ and Phryx ‘Phrygian’? No one who hears the spoken words can by his ears distinguish the letters, although we know from the declined forms of the words that though alike they are not identical; because when the plurals cruces and Phryges are taken and E is removed from the last syllables, from the one there results crux, with X from C and S, and from the other comes Phryx, from G and S. And the difference is likewise clear, when S is removed; for the one becomes cruce, the other Phryge.
45. As to what they say, that since likeness does not exist in the greater part of speech, Regularity does not exist, they speak foolishly in two ways, because Regularity is present in the greater part of speech, and even if it should exist only in the smaller part, still it is there: unless they will say that we do not wear any shoes, because on the greater part of our body we do not wear any.
46. As to what they say, that we find unlikeness pleasing and acceptable rather than likeness, and therefore in clothing and in furniture we take pleasure in variety, and not in having our wives’ undertunics all identical: I answer, that if variety is pleasure, then there is greater variety in that in which some things are alike and others are not; and just as a side-table is adorned with silver in such a way that some ornaments are alike and others are unlike, so also is speech adorned.
47. They ask why, if likeness is to be followed, we prefer to have some couches inlaid with ivory, others with tortoise-shell, and so on with some other kind of material. To which I say that unlikenesses are not the only thing which we follow, but often we follow likenesses. And this may be seen from the same piece of furniture; for no one makes the three couches of the dining-room other than alike in material and in height and in shape. Who makes the table-napkins not like each other? Or the cushions? And finally the other things which are several in number but of one sort?
48. Since speech, they say, was introduced for the sake of utility, we should follow not that kind of speech which has likeness, but that which has utility. I grant that speech has been produced for utility’s sake, but in the same way as garments have: therefore as in the latter we follow the likenesses, so that a man’s tunic is like a man’s, and a toga like a toga, and a woman’s dress is like a dress regularly and a cloak like a cloak, so also, as words that are names of persons exist for the purpose of utility, we ought still to employ men’s names that are like one another, and women’s names that also have mutual resemblances.
49. As to the fact that they say that Regularity does not exist because there are no perfects periacuit ‘remained lying’ and percubuit ‘remained lying,’ like persedit ‘remained sitting’ and perstitit ‘remained standing,’ in this also they are mistaken: for the two perfects have no presents from which to be inflected, whereas Regularity promises only that from two like words inflected in like manner there will be like forms.
50. Those who say that there are no Regularities because from Romulus there is Roma and not Romula and there is no bovilia ‘cow-stables’ from bos ‘cow’ as there is ovilia ‘sheepfolds’ from ovis ‘sheep,’ are in error; because nobody professes that one word is derived from another word, from nominative singular to nominative singular, but only that from two like words like case-forms develop when they are inflected in like manner.
51. They say that because the words denoting the Latin letters are not inflected into case-forms the Regularities do not exist. Such persons are demanding the declension of those words which by nature cannot be inflected; just as if Regularity were not said to belong merely to those forms which had already been inflected in like fashion from like words. Therefore not only in the names of the letters must this kind of Regularity not be sought, but not even in any syllable, because we say nominative ba, genitive ba, and so on.
52. But if any one should wish to say that in this also there are Regularities in the things, he can maintain it. For as they themselves say that some nouns, because they have five forms, have five cases, and others have four, and others fewer in like manner, they will be able to say that the letters and syllables which have one case-form apiece in sound, have several in connexion with the things; as they will compare only with each other those which have four case-forms for the words, and likewise those which have three apiece, so let them compare with each other those which have only one form each, saying that nominative E, dative E is like nominative A, dative A.
53. As to the fact that they say that there are certain words which have declensional forms, like caput ‘head,’ genitive capitis, and nihil ‘nothing,’ genitive nihili, a match for which cannot be found, and therefore the Regularities do not exist, answer must be made that unquestionably any word which is the only one of its kind is outside the systems of Regularity; there must be at least two words for a likeness to be existent therein. Therefore, in this case, they eliminate the possible existence of the Regularities.
54. But the word nihilum ‘nothing’ is found in the nominative in the following:
The body she’s given Earth doth herself take back, and of loss not a whit does she suffer, which is the same as ‘nor of loss does she suffer anything.’ This same word is found in an oblique case in Plautus:
I see, beside Philolaches you count all men as nothing.
The word is from ne ‘not’ and genitive hili ‘whit’; therefore he has been called nihili ‘of naught’ who was not hili ‘of a whit’ in value. Change is made only in the case-forms of that about which the speaking is done, as about a man; for we say a man nihili ‘of no account’ in nominative, in genitive, in accusative, changing the forms of homo but not changing the form nihili. If we were to make changes in it, then we should say not hic nihili but nihilum as the nominative, like linum ‘flax’ and libum ‘cake,’ and dative not huic nihili but nihilo like lino and libo. The genitive case can however be said with various nouns set before it, like nominative casus ‘mishap’ Terentii ‘of Terence,’ accusative casum Terentii, and nominative miles ‘soldier’ legionis ‘of the legion,’ genitive militis legionis, accusative militem legionis.
55. They say that since every nature is either male or female or neuter, from the individual spoken words there should not fail to be forms of the words in sets of three, like albus, alba, album ‘white’; that now in many things there are only two, like Metellus and Metella, Aemilius and Aemilia, and some with only one, like tragoedus ‘tragic actor’ and comoedus ‘comic actor’; that there are the names Marcus and Numerius, but no Marca and Numeria; that corvus ‘raven’ and turdus ‘thrush’ are said, but the feminines corva and turda are not said; that on the other hand panthera ‘panther’ and merula ‘blackbird’ are used, but the masculines pantherus and merulus are not; that there is no one of us whose son and daughter are not suitably distinguished as male and female, as Terentius and Terentia; that on the other hand the children of gods and slaves are not distinguished in the same way, as by Iovis and Iova for the son and the daughter of Jupiter; that likewise a great number of common nouns do not in this respect preserve the Regularities.
56. To this we say that although the object is basic for the character of all speech, the words do not succeed in reaching the object if it has not come into our use; therefore equus ‘stallion’ and equa ‘mare’ are said, but not corva beside corvus, because in that case the factor of unlike nature is without use to us. But for this reason some things were formerly named otherwise than they are now: for then all doves, male and female, were called columbae, because they were not in that domestic use in which they are now, and now, on the other hand, because we have come to make a distinction on account of their uses as domestic fowl, the male is called columbus and the female columba.
57. When the nature goes through the three genders and this distinction is made in use, then finally it is seen, as it is in doctus ‘learned man’ and docta ‘learned woman’ and doctum ‘learned thing’; for learning can go across through these three, and use has taught us to differentiate a learned thing from human beings, and among the latter to distinguish the male and the female. But in a male or a female or what is neither, the nature of the male does not shift, nor that of the female, nor the neuter nature, and for this reason there is no saying of feminus, femina, feminum, and so with the rest. Therefore they are called by special and separate words.
58. Wherefore in the names of those things in which there is no likeness of nature or of use as the basis, a relation of this sort ought not to be sought. Accordingly, as a surdus ‘deaf’ man is a current term, and a surda woman, so also is a surdum theatre, because all three things are equally intended for the act of hearing. On the other hand, nobody says a surdum sleeping-room, because it is intended for silence and not for hearing; but if it has no window, it is called caecum ‘blind,’ as a man is called caecus and a woman caeca, because not all sleeping-rooms have the light which they ought to have.
59. The male and the female have by nature a certain association with each other; but the neuters have no association with them, because they are different from them in kind, and even of these neuters there are very few which have any elements in common with other neuters. As for the fact that the names of a god and of a slave do not vary like our free names, there is the same reason, namely that the variation is connected with use, and had to be established with reference to free persons, but as to the rest had no consequence, because among slaves the clan quality has no foundation in practice, but it is necessary in the names of us who are in Latium and are free. Therefore in that class Regularity makes its appearance, and we say Terentius for a man, Terentia for a woman, and Terentium for the genus ‘stock.’
60. In first names the situation is not the same, because these were in practice established as individual names, by which the clan names might be differentiated; from the numerals came Secunda, Tertia, Quarta for women, Quintus, Sextus, Decimus for men, and similarly other names from other things. When there were two or more persons of the name Terentius, then that they might have something individual to distinguish them they marked them perhaps in this way, that he should be Manius who was said to have been born mane ‘in the morning,’ and he who has been born luci ‘at dawn’ should be Lucius, and he who was born post ‘after’ his father’s death should be Postumus.
61. When any of these things happened to females as well, they derived the first names of women regularly in this manner — that is, in former times — and called them by them, for example, Mania, Lucia, Postuma: for we see that the mother of the Lares is called Mania, that Lucia Volumnia is addressed in the Hymns of the Salians, and that even now many give the name Postuma to a daughter born after the death of her father.
62. Therefore as far as the nature and the use of a word have jointly advanced, so far has Regularity been extended in like manner by a corresponding relationship, since of the words in which there are voluntary inflections of male and female and neuter, those which are voluntary in inflection ought not to be inflected in similar manner, but in those in which there are natural inflections there are those regular inflections which are actually found to exist. Therefore in the matter of the three genders they are unfair in setting aside the Regularities.
63. Moreover those who find fault with the Regularities, because some words are singulars only, like cicer ‘chickpea,’ and others are plural only, like scalae ‘stairs,’ although all ought to have the two forms, like equus ‘horse’ and equi ‘horses,’ forget that the foundation of Regularity is nature and use taken in combination. That is singular which by nature denotes one thing, like equus ‘horse,’ or which denotes things that by use are joined together in some way, like bigae ‘two-horse team.’ Therefore just as we say una Musa ‘one Muse,’ we say unae bigae ‘one two-horse team.’
64. Plural words are of two sorts, the one indefinite, like Musae ‘Muses,’ the other definite, like duae ‘two,’ tres ‘three,’ quattuor ‘four’; for as we say Musae in the plural, so also we say unae bigae ‘one two-horse team,’ and binae ‘two’ and trinae bigae ‘three two-horse teams,’ and so on. Wherefore unae and the masc. uni and the neut. una are in a certain manner as much singulars as unus and una and unum: the word changes in this way because the one set of forms is said of individual things, the other of things joined together in sets; and just as duo and tria are plurals, so also are bina and trina.
65. There is also a third class which is singular though expressed by a plural form, namely uter ‘which of two,’ in which the plural form is for example utrei: uter poeta ‘which of two poets’ in the singular, utri poetae ‘which of two sets of poets’ in the plural. Now that the nature of this has been explained it is clear that plural nouns are not all under obligations to have a like singular form; for all the numerals from two upwards are plural, and no one of them can have a singular to match it. Therefore it is quite wrongly that they demand that all singulars that there are, must have a corresponding plural form.
66. Likewise those who find fault because there are no plurals aceta and gara to acetum ‘vinegar’ and garum ‘fish-sauce’ like unguenta to unguentum ‘perfume’ and vina to vinum ‘wine,’ act ignorantly; they are looking for a plural name in connexion with things which come under the categories of quantity and weight rather than under that of number. For in plumbum ‘lead’ and argentum ‘silver,’ when there has been added an increase, we say multum ‘much’: thus multum plumbum or argentum, not plumba ‘leads’ and argenta ‘silvers,’ since articles made of these we call plumbea and argentea (silver is something else when it is argenteum, for that is what it is when it has now become a utensil; thus argenteum if it is a small cup or the like), because in this case we speak of many argentea ‘silver’ cups, and not of much argentum ‘silver.’
67. But if those things which have by nature the idea of quantity rather than that of number, exist in several kinds and these kinds have come into use, then from the plurality of kinds they are spoken of in the plural, as for example vina ‘wines’ and unguenta ‘perfumes.’ For there is wine of one kind, which comes from Chios, another wine which is from Lesbos, and so on from other localities. Likewise unguenta ‘perfumes’ themselves are now properly spoken of in the plural, for of perfume there are now a number of kinds. If in like fashion there were great differences in olive-oil and vinegar and the other articles of this sort, in common use, then we should employ the plurals olea and aceta, like vina. Therefore in both these matters their attempt to destroy the Regularities is unfair, since they expect that the words will be alike though their uses are different, and since they think that articles which we measure and objects which we count should be spoken of in the same way.
68. Likewise they find fault with the Regularities, because public baths are spoken of as balneae, with the form in the plural, and not as balnea, in the singular; and on the other hand they speak of one balneum of a private individual, though they do not use the plural balnea. To them answer can be made, that fault ought not to be found because scalae ‘stairs’ and aquae caldae ‘hot springs,’ mostly with good reason, have been called by plural names and the corresponding singulars have not come into use: and vice versa. The first balneum ‘bath-room’ (the name is Greek), when it was brought into the city of Rome, was as a public establishment set in a place where two connected buildings might be used for the bathing, in one of which the men should bathe and in the other the women. From the same logical reasoning each person called the place in his own house where baths were taken, a balneum; and they were not accustomed to speak of balnea in the plural, because they did not have two in one house — though our forbears were accustomed to call this not a balneum, but a lavatrina ‘wash-room.’
69. So also, the hot springs, on account of the locality and the water which gushed out there, came to be frequented for our use, since some of the springs were beneficial to one disease and others to another; and because those which they used were several in number, as at Puteoli and in Etruria, they called them by a plural word rather than by a singular. So also with the scalae ‘stairs’; because they are named from scandere ‘to mount’ and there were separate steps to be mounted, it would be a more difficult problem to answer if they had called them scala, in the singular, inasmuch as the origin of the name shows their plural nature.
70. Likewise they find fault about the cases, because some nouns have nominative forms only, and others have only oblique forms: whereupon they say that all words ought to have both the nominative and the oblique forms. To them the same answer can be given, that there is no Regularity in those instances which lack a relationship in use or in nature....
71. But they should not look for complete Regularity even in these names which are derived by passage from one nominative form to another. Still, such words do not in general depart from the path of logic without valid reason, such as there is for those gladiators who are called Faustini; for though most gladiators are spoken of in such a way that they have the last three syllables alike, Cascelliani, Caeciliani, Aquiliani, let them take note that the names from which these come, Cascellius, Caecilius, Aquilius on the one hand, and Faustus on the other, are unlike: if the name were Faustius, they would be right in saying Faustiani. In the same way, from Scipio some make the bad formation Scipionini; it is properly Scipionarii. But, as I have said, since appellations are rarely derived from surnames of this kind and they are not fully at home in use, some such formations fluctuate in form.
72. Likewise they say, that although stultus ‘stupid’ and luscus ‘one-eyed’ are like words, and stultus is compared with stultior and stultissimus, the forms luscior and luscissimus are not used with luscus, and similarly with many words of this class. To which I say that this happens for the reason that by nature no one is more one-eyed than a one-eyed man, whereas he may seem to become more stupid.
73. To their question why we do not say mane ‘in the morning,’ comparative manius, superlative manissime, with a similar question about vesperi ‘in the evening,’ I reply that in matters of time there is properly no ‘more’ and ‘less,’ but there can be before and after. Therefore the first hour is earlier than the second, but not ‘more hour.’ But nevertheless to rise magis mane ‘more in the morning’ is an expression in use; he who rises in the first part of the morning rises magis mane ‘more in the morning’ than he who does not rise in that first part. For as the day cannot be said to be more than day, so mane cannot be said to be more than mane. Therefore that very magis ‘more’ which is commonly said is not consistent with itself, because magis mane means the first part of the mane, and magis vespere the last part of the evening.
74. Similarly, Regularity is found fault with on account of unlikenesses of this sort, that although anus ‘old woman’ and cadus ‘cask’ are like words, and from anus there are the diminutives anicula and anicilla, the other two are not formed from cadus, nor from piscina ‘fish-pond’ are piscinula and piscinilla made. To this I answer that words of this kind have the Regularities, as I have said, only when the size must be noted in each separate stage, and this is in common use, as is cista ‘box,’ cistula, cistella, and canis ‘dog,’ catulus ‘puppy,’ catellus ‘little puppy’; this is not indicated in the usage connected with flocks. Therefore the usage is more often that things be divided into two sets, as larger and smaller, like lectus ‘couch’ and lectulus, arca ‘strong-box’ and arcula, and other such words.
75. As to their saying that some words lack the nominative and others lack the oblique cases, and that therefore the Regularities do not exist, this is an error. For they say that the nominative is lacking in such words as frugis frugi frugem ‘fruit of the earth’ and colem colis cole ‘plantstalk,’ and the oblique cases are lacking in such as Diespiter ‘Jupiter,’ dat. Diespitri, acc. Diespitrem, and Maspiter ‘Mars,’ Maspitri, Maspitrem.
76. To this I answer that the former have nominatives and the latter have oblique case-forms. For the nominative of frugi is by nature frux, but by usage we say frugis, like avis ‘bird’ and ovis ‘sheep’; so also, the nominative of the other word is by nature cols and by usage colis. Both of these agree with the principle of Regularity, because it is perfectly clear of what sort that form ought to be which is not in use, and in that which is now in use in the nominative there is the same kind of Regularity as most words have that are hard to pronounce when they pass from the plural to the singular. So when the passage was made from the spoken plural oves, the form which was pronounced was not ovs without I, but an I was added and the word became ambiguous as to whether the case was nominative or genitive. Like the nominative ovis is also the nominative avis.
77. Thus I do not see why they say that in the oblique cases Diespitri and Diespitrem are lacking, except because they are less common in use than Diespiter. But the argument amounts to nothing; for the case-form which is uncommon is just as much a case-form as that which is common. But let us grant that in the list of case-forms some words lack the nominative and others lack some one of the oblique cases; for this charge will not for that reason be able in any way to destroy the existence of a logical relationship among the forms.
78. For as some statues lack the head or some other part without destroying the Regularities in their other limbs, so in words certain losses of cases can take place, with as little result. Besides, what is lacking can be remade and put back into its place, where nature and usage permit; which we sometimes find done by the poets, as in this verse of Naevius, in the Clastidium:
With life unburied, glad, to fatherland restored.
79. Likewise they find fault with the nominatives strues ‘heap,’ Hercules, homo ‘man’; for if Regularity actually existed, they say, these forms should have been strus, Hercul, homen. These nouns do not show that Regularity is non-existent, but that the oblique cases do not have a head or starting-point according to their type of Regularity. Is it not a fact that, if you should put a head of Philip on a statue of Alexander and the limbs should be proportionately symmetrical, then the head which does correspond to the statue of Alexander’s limbs would likewise be symmetrical? And it is not a fact that if one should in practice sew together a tunic in such a way that one breadth of the cloth has narrow border-stripes and the other has broad stripes, each part lacks regular conformity within its own class.
80. Likewise they say that the Regularities do not exist, because some say cupressus ‘cypress-trees’ in the plural and others say cupressi, and similarly with fig-trees, plane-trees, and most other trees, to which some give the ending US and others give EI. This is wrong; for the tree-names ought to be spoken with E and I, fici like nummi ‘sesterces,’ because the ablative is ficis like nummis, and the genitive is ficorum like nummorum. If the plural were ficus, then it would be like manus ‘hand’; we should say ablative ficibus like manibus, and genitive ficuum like manuum, and we should not say accusative ficos, but ficus, just as we do not say accusative manos but manus; nor would usage speak the oblique cases of the singular genitive fici and ablative fico, just as it does not say genitive mani but manus, nor ablative mano but manu.
81. Moreover, they think that there is proof of the non-existence of Regularity, in the fact that Lucilius writes:
Priced a ten-as, or else we may say at ten-asses.
They are in error, because Lucilius should not have been uncertain as to the form, since both are right. For in copper money, from the as to the hundred-as, the number adds to itself the meaning of the copper coin, and all its case-forms are limited by its numerical value, starting from the dupondius ‘two-as piece,’ which is used by many in two ways, masculine dupondius and neuter dupondium, like gladius and gladium. From tressis ‘three-as’ there is a masculine plural, tresses in the nominative and tressibus in the ablative, as in “I trust in these three asses,” singular tressis as in “I have this three-as” and “I trust in this three-as.” The same usage is followed all the way to centussis ‘hundred-as.’ From here on, the numeral does not denote money any more than other things.
82. The numerals which do not signify money, from quattuor ‘four’ to centum ‘hundred,’ have forms of triple function, because quattuor is masculine, feminine, and neuter. When mille ‘thousand’ is reached, it takes on a fourth function, that of a singular neuter, because the expression in use is mille ‘thousand’ of denarii, from which is made a plural, milia ‘thousands’ of denarii.
83. Since therefore so far as concerns the Regularities it is not essential that all words that are spoken should be alike in their systems, but only that they should be inflected alike each in its own class, those persons are stupid who ask why as and dupondius and tressis are not spoken according to a regular scheme; for the as is a single unit, the dupondius is a compound term indicating that it pendebat ‘weighed’ duo ‘two’ asses, and the tressis is so called because it is composed of tres ‘three’ units of aes ‘copper.’ Instead of asses, the ancients used sometimes to say aes; a usage which survives when we hold an as in the hand and say “with this aes ‘copper piece’ and aenea libra ‘pound of copper,’” and also in the legal formula “to have bequeathed a thousand (asses) of aes ‘copper.’”
84. Therefore, because the numerals from tressis to centussis are compounded of parts of the same kind, they have a likeness of the same kind; but the word dupondius, because it is different in formation, has a different system of declension, as it should have. So also the as, because it is a single unit and is the beginning, means one and has its own indefinite plural, for we say asses; but when we limit them numerically, we say dupondius and tressis and so on.
85. Thus it seems to me that since the definite and the indefinite have an inherent difference, the two ought not to be spoken in the same fashion, the more so because in the words themselves, when they are attached to a definite number in the thousands, a form is used which is not the same as that used in other expressions. For they speak thus: mille denarium ‘thousand of denarii,’ not denariorum, and two milia denarium ‘thousands of denarii,’ not denariorum. If it were denarii in the nominative and it denoted an indefinite quantity, then it ought to be denariorum in the genitive; and the same distinction must be preserved, it seems to me, not only in denarii, victoriati, drachmae, and nummi, but also in viri, when we say that there has been a decision of the triumvirs, the decemvirs, the centumvirs, all of which have the genitive virum and not virorum.
86. The old numbers have their Regularities, because they all have one rule, two acts, three grades, and six decades, all of which show regular internal correspondences. The rule is the number nine, because, when we have gone from one to nine, we return again to one and nine; hence both ninety and nine hundred are of that one and the same nine-containing nature. So there are numbers of eight-containing nature, and going downwards they arrive at those which are merely ones.
87. The first act is from one to nine hundred, the second from one thousand to nine hundred thousand. Because one and thousand are alike unities, both are called by a name in the singular; for as we say’ this one ‘and’ these two,’ so we say ‘this thousand’ and ‘these two thousands,’ and after that all the other numbers in the two acts are likewise plural. The unitary grade is found in both acts, from one to nine; the denary grade extends from ten to ninety; the centenary grade from hundred to nine hundred. Thus from the three grades, six decades are made, three in the thousands, and three in the smaller numbers. The ancients were satisfied with these numerals.
88. To these, their descendants added a third and a fourth act, imposing names which started from deciens ‘million’ and deciens miliens ‘thousand million’; and though the names were not formed by logical relation with the lower numerals, still their formation is not in conflict with the Regularity about which we are writing. For inasmuch as deciens is used as a neuter singular like mille, so that both words are without change of form for the various cases, we shall use deciens unchanged as nominative and as genitive, even as we do mille; and none the less shall we set before mille the signs of nominative and of genitive plural, because mille is also in the other number — and so also shall we speak of’ these deciens’ in the same cases.
89. When a noun is the same in the nominative though it has more than one meaning, in which instance they call it a homonymy, Regularity does not prevent the oblique cases from the same starting form in which the homonymy is, from being dissimilar. Therefore we say Argus in the masculine, when we mean the man, but when we mean the town we say, in Greek or in the Greek fashion, Argos in the neuter, though in Latin it is Argi, masculine plural. Likewise, if the same word denotes both a noun and a verb, we shall cause it to be inflected both for cases and for tenses, with different inflection for noun and verb, so that from Meto as a noun, a man’s name, we form gen. Metonis, acc. Metonem, but from meto as a verb, ‘I reap,’ we form the future metam and the imperfect metebam.
90. They find fault when from the same utterance two or more word-forms are derived, which they call synonymns, such as Alcmaeus and Alcmaeo, and also Geryon, Geryoneus, Geryones. As to the fact that in this class certain speakers interchange the case-forms wrongly — they are not finding fault with Regularity, but with the speakers who use those case-forms unskillfully: each speaker ought to follow, in his inflection, the case-forms which attend upon the nominative which he has taken as his start, and he ought not to make a dative Alcmaeoni and an accusative Alcmaeonem when he has said Alcmaeus in the nominative; if he has mixed his declensions and has not followed the Regularities, blame must be laid upon him.
91. They find fault with Aristarchus for saying that the names Melicertes and Philomedes are not alike, because one has as its vocative Melicerta, and the other has Philomedes; and likewise with those who say that lepus ‘hare’ and lupus ‘wolf’ are not alike, because the vocative case of one is lupe and of the other is lepus, and with those who say the same of socer ‘father-in-law’ and macer ‘lean,’ because in the declensional change there comes from the one the three-syllabled genitive soceri and from the other the two-syllabled genitive macri.
92. Although the answer to this was given above when I spoke about the kinds of wool, I shall make here some further statements: the likenesses of spoken words rest not only upon their form, but also upon some attached strength and power which is usually hidden from our eyes and ears. Therefore we often say that two apples that are identical in appearance are not alike, if they are of different flavour; and we say that some horses of the same appearance are not alike, if by breed they are different on the sire’s side.
93. Therefore in buying human beings as slaves, we pay a higher price for one that is better by nationality. And in all these matters we take the points of likeness not merely from the appearance, but also from other factors, as in horses their age, in asses the kind of colts that they beget, in fruits the flavour of their juice. If therefore one proceeds in the same way in deciding whether words are alike, he is not to be found fault with.
94. Wherefore as the pronoun is sometimes taken as an aid to distinguish the resemblances, so we take some case-form, as in nemus ‘grove’ and lepus ‘hare,’ lepus being shown by it to be masculine and nemus neuter: therefore they go in different directions and the plurals are lepores and nemora. So also, if anything else whatsoever is taken from outside to enable a thorough examination of the problem of likeness to be made, it will not be too far from the natural qualities: for you cannot even see whether two magnetic stones are alike or not, unless you have brought close to them from outside a particle of steel, which like magnets attract to a like degree, and magnets different in strength attract with different powers.
95. That which concerns the Regularity of nouns has, I think been so cleared up that material for answering all objections can be drawn from these sources.
We now come to the logical system of verbs; this has four parts: tenses, persons, kinds, and divisions. As they find fault with respect to each and every part, I shall make answer to the objections one by one.
96. First as to their saying that the Regularities are not preserved in the tenses, when they give perfect legi ‘I have read,’ present lego ‘I read,’ future legam ‘I shall read,’ and others in just the same way: they are wrong in finding fault with those forms like legi as denoting completed actions and the other two, lego and legam, as denoting action only begun; for the same verb which has been taken from the same kind and the same division, can be paraded through the tenses of non-completion, like discebam ‘I was learning,’ disco ‘I learn,’ discam ‘I shall learn,’ and the same of completion, thus didiceram’ I had learned,’ didici ‘I have learned,’ didicero ‘I shall have learned.’
From this one may know that the logical system of verbs is consistent with itself, but that those who try to speak the verbs in their three tenses, do this in an ignorant way; 97. that likewise those do so ignorantly who find fault because we say amor ‘I am loved,’ amabor ‘I shall be loved,’ amatus sum ‘I have been loved’; for, they say, in one and the same series there ought not to be one verb made up of two words while the other two verbs are each of one word. Yet if you would put down verb-forms from a division of one kind, they would not differ from one another; for all the forms denoting incomplete action are alike single, and the forms of completed action are in all verbs double, quite like one another: such as amabar, amor, amabor, and amatus eram, amatus sum, amatus ero.
98. Wherefore likewise they do ill to cite ferio ‘I strike,’ future feriam, perfect percussi; because the proper order is ferio, feriam, feriebam, and percussi, percussero, percusseram. And in this fashion answer can be made to the one who finds fault in the matter of the other tenses.
99. They make a similar mistake who say that all verbs ought to change the radical syllables in both divisions, or no verb should — as in pungo ‘I prick,’ future pungam, perfect pupugi, and tundo ‘I pound,’ tundam, tutudi; for they are comparing unlikes, namely verbs of the incomplete phase with the completed. But if they were comparing only the incomplete, then all the stems of the verb would be seen to be unchangeable, as in pungebam, pungo, pungam, and on the other hand changeable, if they instanced the completed, as in pupugeram, pupugi, pupugero.
100. Likewise they do ill to compare fui ‘I was,’ sum ‘I am,’ ero ‘I shall be’; for fui is a form of completed time, whose series is consistent with itself in all its parts, as it should be, namely fueram, fui, fuero. Of the incomplete, that which is now pronounced sum used to be spoken esum, and the series is consistent in all its persons, because they used to say present esum es est, imperfect eram eras erat, future ero eris erit. In this same fashion you will see that the other verbs of this kind preserve the principle of Regularity.
101. Besides, they find fault with Regularity in this matter, that certain verbs have not the three persons, nor the three tenses; but it is with lack of insight that they find this fault, as if one should blame Nature because she has not shaped all living creatures after the same mould. For if by nature not all forms of the verbs have three tenses and three persons, then the divisions of the verbs do not all have this same number. Therefore when we give a command, a form which only the verbs of uncompleted time have — when we give a command to a person present or not actually present, three verb-forms are made, like lege ‘read (thou),’ legito ‘read (thou)’ or ‘let him read,’ legat ‘let him read’: for nobody gives a command with a form denoting action already completed. On the other hand, in the forms which denote declaration, like lego ‘I read,’ legis ‘thou readest,’ legit ‘he reads,’ there are nine verb-forms of uncompleted action and nine of completed action.
102. For this and similar reasons the question that should be asked is not whether one kind disagrees with another kind, but whether there is anything lacking in each kind. If to these there is added what I said above about nouns, all difficulties will be easily resolved. For as the nominative case-form is in them the source for the derivative cases, so in verbs the source for other forms is in the form which expresses the person of the speaker and the present tense: like scribo ‘I write,’ lego ‘I read.’
103. Wherefore, if it has happened in verbs as it does happen in nouns, that in the pattern the starting-point is lacking or belongs to a different kind, we give the same arguments here which we gave there, with suitable changes in application, as to why and how Regularity is none the less preserved. And as in nouns the word will have its own peculiar starting-point and in the oblique cases there will be a change to some other pattern, on the assumption of which it can be more easily seen from what the word-forms are derived (for it happens that the nominative case-form is sometimes ambiguous), so it is in verbs, as in this verb volo, because it has two meanings, one from wishing and the other from flying; therefore from volo we appreciate that there are both volare ‘to fly’ and velle ‘to wish.’
104. Certain critics find fault, because we say pluit ‘rains’ and luit ‘looses’ both in the past tense and in the present, although the Regularities ought to make a distinction between the verb-forms of the two tenses. But they are mistaken; for it is otherwise than they think, because in the past tense we say pluit and luit with a long U, and in the present with a short U; and therefore in the law about the sale of farms we say ruta caesa ‘things dug up and things cut,’ with a lengthened u.
105. Likewise certain persons find fault, because they think that active sacrifico ‘I sacrifice’ and passive sacrificor, active lavat ‘he bathes’ and passive lavatur, are the same: but whether this is so or not, has no effect on the principle of Regularity, provided that he who says sacrifico sticks to the future sacrificabo and so on in the active, through the whole paradigm, avoiding the passive sacrificatur and sacrificatus sum: for these two sets do not harmonize with each other.
106. In Plautus, when he says:
The fish, I really think, that bathe through all their life, Are in the bath less time than this Phronesium, lavari ‘are in the bath,’ with final I instead of E, does not attach to lavant ‘bathe’: Regularity refers lavari to lavantur, and whether the error belongs to Plautus or to the copyist, it is not Regularity, but the writer that is to be blamed. At any rate, lavat and lavatur are used with a difference of meaning in certain matters, because a nurse lavat ‘bathes’ a child, the child lavatur ’is bathed’ by the nurse, and in the bathing establishments we both lavamus ‘bathe’ and lavamur ‘are bathed.’
107. But since usage approves both, in the case of the whole body one uses rather lavamur ‘we bathe ourselves,’ and in the case of portions of the body lavamus ‘we wash,’ in that we say lavo ‘I wash’ my hands, my feet, and so on. Therefore with reference to the bathing establishments they are wrong in saying lavi ‘I have bathed,’ but right in saying lavi ‘I have washed’ my hands. But since in the bathing establishments lavor ‘I bathe’ and lautus sum ‘I have bathed,’ it follows that on the other hand from soleo ‘I am wont,’ which is in the active, one ought to say solui ‘I have been wont,’ as Cato and Ennius write, and that solitus sum, as the people in general say, ought not to be used. But as I have said above, Regularity exists none the less for these few inconsistencies which occur in speech.
108. Likewise, they present as an argument against the existence of Regularity the fact that like forms are not derived from likes, as from dolo ‘I chop’ and colo ‘I till’; for one forms the perfect dolavi and the other forms colui. In such instances something additional is wont to be taken to aid in the making of the other forms, just as we do in the tiny art-works of Myrmecides: therefore in verbs, since the likeness is often so confusing that the distinction cannot be made unless you pass to another person or tense, you become aware that the words before you are not alike when passage is made to the second person, which is dolas in the one verb and colis in the other.
109. Thus in the rest of the paradigm of the verbs each follows its own special type. Whether in the second person the paradigm of verbs has in the final syllable AS or ES or ĬS or ĪS, is of importance for distinguishing the likenesses. Wherefore the mark of Regularity is in the second person rather than in the first, because in the first the unlikeness is concealed, as appears in meo ‘I go,’ neo ‘I sew,’ ruo ‘I fall’; for from these there develop unlike forms by the change from first to second person, because they are spoken thus: meo meas, neo nes, ruo ruis, each one of which preserves its own type of likeness.
110. Likewise, many find fault with Regularity in connexion with the so-called participles; wrongly: for it should not be said that the set of three participles comes from each individual verb, like amaturus ‘about to love,’ amans ‘loving,’ amatus ‘loved,’ because amans and amaturus are from the active amo, and amatus is from the passive amor. But that which Regularity can offer, which the participles have, each in its own class, is case-forms, as amatus, dative amato, and plural amati, dative amatis; and so in the feminine, amata and plural amatae. Likewise amaturus has a declension of the same kind. Amans has a somewhat different declension; because all words of this kind have a regular likeness in their own class, amans, like others of its class, uses the same forms for masculine and for feminine.
111. About the last argument in the preceding book, that Regularity does not exist for the reason that those who have written about it do not agree with one another, or else the points on which they agree are at variance with the words of actual usage, both reasons are of little weight. For in this fashion you will have to reject all the arts, because in medicine and in music and in many other arts the writers do not agree; you must take the same attitude in the matters in which they agree in their writings, if none the less nature rejects their conclusions. For in this way, as is often said, it is not the art but the artist that is to be found fault with, who, it must be said, has in his writing failed to see the correct view; we should not for this reason say that the correct view cannot be formulated in writing.
112. As to the man who uses as ablatives monti ‘hill’ and fonti ‘spring’ while others say monte and fonte, along with other words which are used in two forms, one form is correct and the other is wrong, yet the person who errs is not destroying the Regularities, but the one who speaks correctly is strengthening it; and as he who errs in these words where they are used in two forms is not destroying logical system when he follows the wrong form, so even in those words which are not spoken in two ways, a person who thinks they ought to be spoken otherwise than they ought, is not destroying the science of speech, but exposing his own lack of knowledge.
113. The considerations by which we might think that the arguments could be refuted which were presented against Regularity in the preceding book, I have touched upon briefly, as best I could. Even if by their arguments they had achieved what they wish, namely that in the Latin language there should be Anomaly, still they would have accomplished nothing, for the reason that in all parts of the world both natures are present: because some things are like, and others are unlike, just as in animals there are unlikes such as horse, ox, sheep, man, and others, and yet in each kind there are countless individuals that are like one another. In the same way, among fishes, the moray is unlike the sea-bass, the sea-bass is unlike the sole, and this is unlike the moray and the codfish, and others also; though the number of those resemblances is still greater, which exist separately among morays, among hakes, and in other kinds of fish, class by class.
114. Now although in the derivations of words a great number develop from unlike words, still the number of those in which likenesses are found is even greater, and therefore it must be admitted that the Regularities do exist. And likewise, since general usage permits us to follow the principle of Regularity in almost all words, it must be admitted that we ought as a body to follow Regularity in every way, and individually also except in words the general use of which will give offence; because, as I have said, the people ought to follow one standard, the individual persons ought to follow another.
115. And this is not astonishing, since not all individuals have the same privileges and rights; for the poet can follow the Regularities more freely than can the orator. Therefore, since this book has completed the exposition of what it promised to set forth, I shall bring it to a close; and then in the next book I shall write about the form of inflected words.