OCTOBER 1914 MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A VERY EVENTFUL period for Fortress Przemyśl. After besieging the San River bastion in late September, Russian forces sought to capture the fortress before an anticipated Habsburg liberation attempt could be made. When their bloody storm assaults failed, Russian troops hastily retreated from all but the eastern bulwark perimeter areas. Overwhelming supply challenges stymied Habsburg efforts to liberate the fortress and pursue the retreating Russians. Heavy supply wagon traffic, combined with weeks of inclement weather, rendered the inadequate Galician roadways nearly impassable, thus thwarting the Habsburg objective to rapidly relieve the fortress. The ensuing October, late November, and December campaigns revealed just how excruciatingly difficult it could be to wage war over mountain terrain during the depths of winter.
On October 1, a military aircraft flew from Habsburg Supreme Command headquarters in Neu Sandec into the fortress with new orders. It flew back on October 6 carrying one hundred field postcards with messages from staff personnel. The plane, struck by enemy fire, crash-landed about thirty miles from Neu Sandec. The postcards were then transported by car to the headquarters. Habsburg offensive efforts began on October 1, 1914, and extended the Third Army front some ninety miles from its major railroad depot. This left many Habsburg troop units without sufficient food or ammunition as they advanced toward the bulwark. In addition, once liberated, the fortress became a food and supply depot for the victorious field armies’ troops, which created further strain on the already limited citadel resources. Dwindling supplies and appalling weather conditions also resulted in widespread cholera, which killed hundreds of soldiers. Dysentery and typhus were rampant, and some soldiers resorted to self-mutilation to escape the horrific situation. Once field army troops departed the fortress, the bastion was cleansed to prevent the spread of further disease.
Major battle erupted as Habsburg First Army troops reached the Russian fortress at Ivangorod along the Vistula River. Allied High Commands initially ordered the German Ninth Army and the Habsburg First Army to maintain their positions at the fortress, but after Russian troops crossed the Vistula River, the First Army received orders to withdraw. After a significant number of tsarist troops completed the crossing, the First Army received orders to attack them. However, the defeat of the Germans on the battlefield at Warsaw exposed the Habsburg First Army’s flank, forcing it to retreat.
Meanwhile, in early October, the plans evolved to launch the Austro-Hungarian offensive that would encircle left flank tsarist forces, liberate Fortress Przemyśl, and allow troops to march to the San River. General Conrad hastily launched the operation for fear that the fortress would be incapable of repulsing mass tsarist attacks. The Germans simultaneously advanced from East Prussia to the area northeast of Fortress Kraków with the allied objective of reaching the San-Vistula River line. The Habsburg First Army advanced northward into Russian Poland and, in conjunction with German forces, attacked the enemy near Ivangorod. The plan illuminated serious discord among the Central Power military leaders regarding a unified command structure for eastern front operations. As was common throughout most of the war, neither side proved willing to relinquish power, ultimately to the detriment of both.
Between October 1 and 10, advancing Habsburg troops successfully purged the wooded Carpathian Mountain region of enemy troops, temporarily neutralizing the threat of a Russian invasion of Hungary. By October 4, Second Army units reached the Dukla Pass, advancing toward their major objectives. This brought the war to the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains and the Romanian frontier. Habsburg units repulsed the few tsarist troops that had penetrated into Hungary and the wooded mountain terrain. Then, between October 2 and 7, the Second Army deployed a strong right flank force, traversing the Carpathian Mountains south of Fortress Przemyśl.
By October 1, the Russian Third Army had established its siege of Fortress Przemyśl, as its neighboring Fifth Army bivouacked in the mountain terrain to the west. Five new infantry and two artillery divisions deployed close to the bulwark. The renewed Habsburg offensive campaign to recapture Fortress Przemyśl and attain the San River line depended on allied German forces maintaining the northern Vistula River line to protect its northern flank. The Russians accelerated their timetable to attempt to capture the fortress before Habsburg forces could liberate it. The heavy rain produced a morass of mud and meter-deep potholes on the difficult mountain terrain, which sorely delayed the attacking soldiers and their supplies. The tsarist strategy for conquering the fortress involved attacking the most important and strongest position at its perimeter, the Defensive District VI (Siedliska) series of six forts while launching diversionary attacks at other citadel positions. The western fortress perimeter walls were not as well armed and provided the Russian siege forces with greater promise of successfully blocking a Habsburg retreat from the fortress if it became necessary. Habsburg forces remained only a three- to four-day march from the fortress, which the Russians had to consider before they attempted to capture the bulwark. The initial tsarist offensive demonstrations were intended to divert citadel attention and draw reserve forces away from their intended target. They then launched their major offensive effort against the northwest and southeast citadel fronts.1
The Habsburg Third Army had destroyed railroad lines and bridges in the wake of its September retreat, just as the Russians had done during the new Third Army offensive and their retrograde movement. Ironically, these were crucial for the October offensive operation’s success.
The fortress commander learned that some enemy troops were already evacuating the fortress area.2 A new siege army, later designated the Russian Eleventh Army, replaced Russian Third Army divisions that had besieged the bulwark. The Habsburg Third Army marched toward the citadel as Russian intentions to attack the fortress became evident. General Brusilov sought to hasten the attack amid allegations that some garrison units had become increasingly unreliable. However, he also realized that Fortress Przemyśl lacked serious defensive strength and that a renewed Austro-Hungarian offensive would soon follow. Thus, General Brusilov rapidly prepared his troops to attack the fortress.
Renewed tsarist military strikes against the bulwark required the continuous shifting of Habsburg garrison reserve troops to stem the latest threat. Such frantic and exhausting efforts usually occurred when the enemy attempted to sap troops closer to the fortress at night. Nonstop Russian artillery barrages pounded the citadel’s defensive barbed wire emplacements. Then, enemy troops assaulted the fortress walls, but powerful defensive artillery fire halted their efforts. Enemy artillery interfered with post-battle repair work on the fortress environs, forcing the work to be done at night. On twenty-four-hour alert, the garrison troops had no time to rest. Repairing trenches, telephone lines, barbed wire, emplacements, and damaged fortress walls took priority. Habsburg troops had to remove the Russian corpses to the bastion perimeter to prevent the spread of disease, but tsarist artillery efforts made it impossible to do so.
By the end of September 1914, Germany found itself in a highly unfavorable military situation. The fatal defeat at the Marne signified that it could not keep its prewar promise to transfer major forces to the eastern front in a timely manner. It also represented the failure of the Schlieffen Plan. German High Command now faced a second serious crisis on the Russian front. By mid-September 1914, it had become obvious that the Austro-Hungarian army desperately required assistance to prevent its collapse.
Initially, the Germans planned to transfer two army corps to Silesia to serve as the cadre of a new army. These numbers, however, would not be sufficient, since Habsburg forces had suffered a more serious defeat than originally thought. German troops had to be deployed north of Fortress Kraków to support the tottering ally, while the newly designated German Ninth Army marched to the Vistula River to deflect enemy attention from the reeling Austro-Hungarian army. The Ninth Army’s mission was intended to shore up Habsburg forces and prevent Russian attempts to regain the initiative.
The German advance on September 29 reached the area east of Lodz and achieved its objective. The enemy began shifting major troop numbers to the north Vistula River front to meet the new threat, relieving tsarist pressure from the Habsburg front. Enemy radio messages described Russian intentions to use their large concentration of forces to outflank the German Ninth Army in the vicinity of Warsaw, their major railroad and communication junction. This release of enemy pressure on the Austro-Hungarian front proved critical in liberating Fortress Przemyśl by October 9.
Aware that the enemy had transferred large troop numbers north of the Vistula River, Habsburg forces’ objective was to prevent them from crossing the river. The German Ninth Army and the Habsburg First Army maneuvered between the northern San River area and Warsaw.3 Then the Germans discovered the plan for the Russian Vistula River offensive campaign on the body of a dead Russian officer, which alerted them to the enormous threat. Meanwhile, heavy rains deterred German attempts to entrench in the saturated and flooded Vistula lowland terrain.
The Habsburg offensive campaign began in early October when Fourth Army units advanced toward the San River area from north of Fortress Przemyśl. The offensive objective, launched through a broad portion of the Carpathian Mountains, had the Second and Third Armies liberating Fortress Przemyśl. Garrison troops would then join the Third Army’s battle east of the fortress front. It began with the Second Army maneuvering south and southeast of the Third Army between the Carpathian Mountain passes Lupkov, Uzsok, and Dukla and south of Fortress Przemyśl; its IV Corps endeavored to encircle the retreating Russian troops at the Stary Sambor railroad junction. During this operation, the fortress served as a major supply depot and rallying point for Habsburg troops and cemented its front lines. The crisis of supplying the advancing field armies with food, artillery pieces and shells, and other vital equipment forced the Fortress Przemyśl garrison to surrender a significant portion of its food stores and ammunition (particularly artillery shells) to the field armies. Russian Eighth Army counterattacks against the Second Army forward lines at Chyrov halted that army’s offensive effort, but not before the fortress had relinquished a nineteen-day food supply and a twenty-six-day supply of oats to the advancing Habsburg field armies.4
Map 3.1. Fortress Przemyśl, 1914.
Terrain and weather conditions continued to hinder supply of even the most basic necessities to the Habsburg offensive forces.5 As a result, the field armies commandeered many lighter fortress supply wagons to replace their heavier, obsolete models, nearly half of which were never returned. On October 9, the Third Army received a thousand fortress wagons, and the Second Army an additional three hundred.6
Initially, only one tsarist cavalry division (the 9th) served as a siege force on the northwestern and western fortress fronts. On October 2, tsarist artillery ceased firing as a parliamentarian approached Fort XI Dunowiczki waving a white flag and conveying a request that the fortress surrender. General Kusmanek firmly replied, “Herr Kommandant, your ridiculous suggestion does not warrant the favor of a reply.” Habsburg troops proceeded to blindfold the Russian emissary and took him by auto on a three-hour trip to fortress headquarters. There they sought to convince him that an entire army occupied the fortress, even going so far as to include signs on the doors identifying the location of Army Operation Bureau and other army departments.7
Habsburg Supreme Command dispatched an airplane to the fortress to inform the commandant of the forthcoming Austro-Hungarian offensive operation, as well as ancillary details.8 The Albatross double-decker airplane landed in the fortress amid heavy tsarist artillery barrages, an unprecedented event. A General Staff captain provided General Kusmanek with details about the planned allied offensive as the Russians launched an attack against the fortress with the support of intense artillery fire. However, the majority of the tsarist guns remained too distant from the fortress to support a sudden, overwhelming attack.9 General Brusilov rushed reinforcements (XII Corps’ 12th and 19th Infantry Divisions, 68th Reserve Infantry Division, three heavy cannon and three mortar divisions, and the 3rd Schützen Brigade) to the front as the Russians prepared to launch a powerful attack against the citadel on October 5.10 The only outside contact with the encircled garrison came from radio traffic and aircraft.
Nine and one-half infantry and two cavalry divisions (150 battalions, 48 cavalry squadrons, and 800 artillery pieces) comprised the tsarist offensive force (the entire Eleventh and Third Armies and parts of the Eighth). Russian light and medium artillery units and forty 18- and 21-centimeter field howitzer artillery barrages initially concentrated on the fortress’s Defensive District VI area. From October 3 through October 6, they launched increasingly powerful storm attacks against Fortress Werk I/1 of that defensive district in preparation for the main assault. Simultaneously, tsarist maneuvers supported by heavy artillery barrages began along the northern fortress perimeter, but Habsburg defenders quickly recognized the timing of the enemy’s artillery fire and reacted accordingly.11
Meanwhile, the Russian Third Army prepared to launch a major attack against Fortress Przemyśl, but tsarist units had to sap forward four to five kilometers from the fortress before they could storm the citadel. General Brusilov ordered the commander of the siege forces on the San River right bank, to launch a massive attack against the fortress. However, there was not enough time to sufficiently prepare for such a powerful assault.12 Inadequate planning was a major factor in the preceding tsarist failures.
From October 6 to 9, garrison troops endured unrelenting battle consisting of waves of artillery barrages and infantry storm attacks. Each tsarist assault produced horrendous casualties for both sides and brought the attacking troops closer to the fortress perimeter areas. One would have expected the old forts to be badly damaged by the enemy artillery, but Russian shells exploded too rapidly. While individual works sustained many direct hits, they suffered only minor damage and would be repaired during nighttime hours.
Tsarist artillery fire did, however, largely destroy the infantry defensive positions between the various interval fortress works, barbed wire emplacements, and trenches. Fortress reserve formations deployed in the open fields directly behind the fortress walls. With no overhead protective cover, the men became easy targets for enemy shrapnel shells. Telephone communications quickly broke down, raising the question of whether the defensive positions could be held under the constant artillery fire. In the meantime, the weather worsened; snow began to fall, and heavy cloud cover continued to negatively affect artillery fire and air reconnaissance missions.
Enemy infantry troops sapped closer to the fortress walls as small units rapidly traversed the terrain 100 to 150 paces at a time. The soldiers then dropped to the ground seeking momentary shelter, dug in, and repeated the maneuver to rapidly approach the fortress walls. The Russians utilized the nearby Radymno-Rokietnica railroad line to move supplies rapidly for their storm attacks. Meanwhile, on the other side of the fortress, the Habsburg Third Army encountered no serious tsarist resistance as it advanced. Habsburg Supreme Command Daily Report (AOK Operation Nr. 2870) indicated that tsarist troops continued to maneuver toward the area north of the fortress and east of the San River in preparation for the battle to occur along the eastern Vistula River front.13
During these early October days, efforts were undertaken to improve the fortress’s defensive strength throughout the citadel area. Telephone connections were extended to the perimeter and forefield positions, while infantry blocking sites also expanded outward between six and thirty meters. Patrols outside the citadel walls doubled at night, while thick clouds often ruled out air reconnaissance missions. The few intelligence reports indicated that the enemy continued to shift troops around the Fortress Przemyśl perimeter.
On October 3, under enemy artillery fire, fortress troops observed small Russian infantry and cavalry units approaching the western and southwestern fortress perimeter areas and continuous troop movements east of the San River. The fortress dispatched five Honvéd battalions to Walawa and Dusowce, as reconnaissance missions confirmed that tsarist Eleventh Army troops had replaced Third Army troops at the siege lines. Heavy tsarist artillery fire commenced against the citadel forts at the northern, eastern, and southern fronts, while large troop units shifted forward and advanced north of the bulwark. Four or five enemy infantry divisions advanced to the southern and eastern citadel areas.14 Meanwhile, tsarist troops had been transferred from the fortress area to participate in the developing battle along the eastern Vistula River front. As Russian forces continued to sap toward the citadel, they sustained heavy casualties from defensive artillery fire. Nevertheless, the enemy acted with uncharacteristic speed, intensifying artillery barrages against the fortress walls. Siedliska (Defensive District VI) continued to bear the brunt of the assaults, but Defensive District IV also sustained increased enemy cannon fire.15
As Habsburg Second Army troops advanced toward the fortress through the Dukla Pass, General Kusmanek reported that Russian columns had been observed in the vicinity of the bulwark from Radymno toward Rokietnica. In retaliation, he launched a sortie with a twelve-infantry battalion, four field cannon, and three 15-centimeter howitzer batteries in the direction of Rokietnica. To prevent tsarist troops from withdrawing from the bulwark area, the Habsburg Third Army launched its offensive toward the fortress. Sortie units encountered strong enemy forces and heavy artillery fire. This forced them to retreat into the fortress after dark with some captured prisoners of war and war materiel. General Kusmanek proclaimed the sortie a success because it had supposedly disturbed Russian troop movements.
Reconnaissance reports indicated massive tsarist troop movements on the right San River bank region. Enemy cannon fire against the fortress’s Defensive District IV intensified after dusk. General Kusmanek launched a mission toward Dusowce with five infantry battalions of Honvéd Infantry Regiment 5 and artillery support from the fortress’s Defensive District XIII, while a small troop contingent maneuvered along the railroad tracks at Defensive District XII. At the same time, large numbers of tsarist troops reportedly advanced toward Malkovice, but inclement weather conditions delayed the launch of the proposed fortress operation.
On October 4, following a Russian diversionary strike, the first serious fortress battle commenced. The action was intended to lure General Kusmanek into diverting major reserve formations to that area away from their major storm attack objective. Russian artillery bombardment against the citadel doubled in intensity, introducing the bogus attack. Then, tsarist troops unleashed their main assault against the north and southwest garrison perimeters. Russian generals reasoned that if their forces quickly captured the fortress, the siege troops would be free to join the armies battling in the Carpathian Mountains. In early October, the entire Russian Third Army (IX, X, XI, and XXI Corps), part of the Eighth Army (XII Corps and portions of VII Corps), and three additional rifle brigades remained at the fortress front. Tsarist generals postulated from Habsburg prisoner of war testimony that troop morale was low and that the defending garrison forces consisted of only five regiments and eight Landsturm companies.16 Allegedly, the fortress’s Habsburg defenders had slept very little and would surrender at the first opportunity. October 4 reconnaissance reports reconfirmed earlier indications of the northward deployment of enemy units.17 Consequently, the Russians were determined to quickly overpower the fortress.
To support their frantic efforts, the Russians deployed the 78th heavy howitzer battery in the wooded region north of the Siedliska Defensive District VI front, the main assault area, to fire against Forts Hurko, Borek, and Siedliska. The northern battery group deployed six to seven kilometers from Forts Borek and Siedliska, while the 1st and 2nd heavy howitzer batteries were positioned six to eight kilometers from the Siedliska battle zone (Defensive District VI forts I/1–5). The tsarist 4th and 5th heavy howitzer batteries fired from positions five to seven kilometers from the fortress front. All possible guns targeted Defensive District VI Fortress Siedliska positions. Russian commanders postulated that the lack of heavy artillery pieces presupposed that their artillery fire could be effective against the fortress only in concentrated barrages.18
Russian artillery bombardment intensified with great ferocity. During the night of October 5, powerful assault units rapidly approached the fortress in an attempt at a hand strike against the six Siedliska forts. Under cover of the sustained artillery barrages, more than seven and one-half infantry divisions, three rifle brigades, and additional supporting units, totaling 117 battalions, twenty-four cavalry squadrons, and 483 artillery pieces, participated in the initial tsarist efforts.19 The artillery complement included forty field howitzer and field cannons, while 24-centimeter howitzers, their heaviest guns, fired from multiple positions on the high terrain at Magiera against the forward Siedliska positions.20 Three infantry divisions launched an attack at 8 a.m. with a 1,000-officer and 92,000-man strong force against the Siedliska group of forts, initiating seventy-two hours of bloody battle.21 The tsarist first-day mission encompassed hurling back Habsburg forward defensive positions as supporting artillery fire intensified its already heavy barrages, now utilizing additional 10-centimeter field cannon and 15- and 21-centimeter batteries.
Severe weather and terrain conditions continued to frustrate both the Habsburg Third Army efforts to liberate Fortress Przemyśl and the tsarist attempts to seize it. Second Army units traversed the Carpathian Mountain ridges over a broad front and launched a three-pronged attack from their right flank positions toward Dobromil and Sambor in an attempt to encircle tsarist troops in the San River area. However, because of troop exhaustion resulting from the adverse march conditions, the operation did not begin until the next morning.22 Although inclement weather conditions caused severe problems, the Second Army’s XII and VII Corps encountered no serious resistance from the defending tsarist cavalry, which retreated without opposition.23 Habsburg infantry had to battle without artillery support because the guns lagged far behind the frontline troops. This, coupled with the inadequate training of replacement troops in the army ranks, caused casualty numbers to soar. On October 5, Second Army troops advanced in an attempt to encircle the Russian forces pressing into Chyrov through the important Uzsok Pass, with some units also traversing the middle Lupkov Pass saddle and the left flank of the Dukla Pass.24 Tsarist VII Corps troops halted the effort, allowing Russian forces to cover the critical Stary Sambor-Lisko-Sanok siege line. Severe weather, coupled with a limited number of supply routes, slowed Habsburg support efforts, creating significant deficiencies in the timely transport of food, ammunition, and artillery shells to the advancing Habsburg troops.
On the next day, October 6, cold and rainy conditions continued to cause nearly insurmountable delays in supply traffic. The constant rainfall commencing in mid-September prevented units from attaining their march goals and made any movement extremely difficult. Habsburg Second and Third Armies nevertheless advanced slowly toward their objectives of Bircza and Nizankovice located close to Fortress Przemyśl. The Second Army continued its attempt to encircle tsarist forces deployed east of the fortress from a southerly direction.25
Tsarist command deployed three infantry divisions against the forts’ Defensive Districts Xa and XII on the northern front, half a division at the southern front, two cavalry divisions at the western and southwestern fronts, and six divisions to launch the attacks at the eastern and southeastern fortress fronts. As the three tsarist infantry divisions stormed the Siedliska Group forts I/1–6 at 7:00 a.m., they concentrated shrapnel fire at Fortress I/1, while troops and sappers reconnoitered the fortress minefield and barbed wire defensive emplacements. The enemy troops sought to destroy these obstacles, while a tsarist division unsuccessfully attacked Forts I/5 and I/6. Between October 5 and 7, large numbers of Russian forces continued to cross the north Vistula River. Habsburg Third Army units meanwhile approached Fortress Przemyśl, impeded by thousands of horse cadavers littering the sides of the heavily trafficked roadways. The farther field army troops advanced from their far rearward railroad depots, the more difficult the maintenance of the supply situation became. Meanwhile, gunfire could be heard from the western fortress perimeter, indicating to the inhabitants that help would soon arrive.26
The Russians then attacked the Defensive District IV ring and simultaneously launched storm attacks against Defensive Districts VI and VII. Tsarist soldiers pressed the furthest Habsburg infantry outposts rearward, drawing ever closer to the citadel. Russian artillery fire targeted fortress artillery units and defensive obstacles.27 Habsburg fortress troop commanders tried to determine where the main enemy effort would ultimately strike. Terrain obstacles eliminated the northwestern, northern, and southern fortress fronts. The weakest citadel defensive position, the southwestern, held promise for tsarist success because the forested terrain could conceal troop movement almost to the perimeter walls. The hilly terrain and poor roadways, however, made it extremely difficult for the Russians to transport their artillery forward to assist their offensive operation.
As General Kusmanek correctly calculated, based on the amount of enemy artillery fire, the massive major enemy storm attack occurred at the southeastern fortress front against the inviting Siedliska Defensive District VI situated between the San and Wiar Rivers. The jutting portions of terrain resulting from the elliptical shapes of the northern and southern Siedliska fortress ring attracted enemy flanking fire, while their troops could deploy in the wooded terrain undetected. Under cover of artillery fire, tsarist troops also approached the northern Forts X to XII, southeast I/1–6 (Siedliska), and IV and V on the southern front.28 Much of the preparation took place at night, while secondary assaults continued to be utilized as diversionary strokes against other perimeter positions, particularly at the northern citadel front. Because the Siedliska forts proved especially inviting, the Russians advanced to within five hundred meters of Forts I/1–3, but their supporting artillery fire failed to suppress the infantry defensive lines or defensive artillery fire at any of the six Siedliska forts.29
Realizing the imminent danger to the Defensive District VI front, General Kusmanek reinforced the eleven battalions defending that critical area. Fourteen additional infantry battalions were rushed forward with 350 23th Honvéd Infantry Division artillery pieces (twenty-five batteries), including some that quickly unleashed flanking fire against the attacking enemy forces at the threatened Forts I/1 and I/2.30 Overpowering defensive fire halted most mass enemy storm attacks against the Siedliska positions, but, nevertheless, some of the forward defensive positions had to be abandoned. The fortress commander ordered the strengthening of all citadel perimeter areas that the enemy artillery targeted. Defensive artillery fire inflicted enormous casualties on the attacking troops.
In the meantime, the Habsburg field armies faced their own significant challenges. During the September Habsburg retreat, the armies destroyed numerous railroad lines and bridges, and the Russians had followed suit during their retreat. The damage proved a significant hindrance to Habsburg offensive efforts; it would eventually require three weeks to repair the lines and place them back into service after the fortress was liberated. In the meantime, however, wagon supply trains had to transport the Third Army’s eight-hundred-ton-per-day supply requirements from the rearward echelon railhead to the front along the few muddy and eroded roadways, a journey that often stretched up to ninety kilometers.31
In late October, the bridges were reconstructed and made operational, but this also stretched the Habsburg railroad traffic and resupply efforts between the northern and southern flanks, as no rail line led directly to the rear of the fortress. This shortcoming hampered the mobility of troops and supplies, and proved especially disastrous to resupply efforts after the fortress was liberated. General Conrad estimated that his field armies would reach the fortress by October 10, but the consistent supply problems signified that soldiers received only a quarter of their normal food rations.32 Transport had become completely limited to the smaller Galician panja wagons and horses bearing light loads as the cumbersome army-issue wagons became bogged down in the muck, making them unusable.
The Third Army’s offensive objectives directed it northward toward Radymno and Nizankovice, along the Bircza-Nizankovice road, and then on to the fortress. Two Second Army corps were ordered to march to the strategic area at Chyrov and its key railroad station by October 10, and another group to Stary-Sambor. The two armies were to cooperate to liberate Fortress Przemyśl.
Second Army units deployed south of Fortress Przemyśl in the Carpathian Mountains battled harsh weather and inadequate supply lines. Only one road led to the army’s left flank forces. Artillery and supply wagons suffered serious delays, and some never reached their destination, casting doubt on whether the army could achieve its objectives.33 Exacerbating the situation, seven Second Army divisions entered a narrow pass at Chyrov where it proved almost impossible to maneuver, and instead of meeting weak enemy forces as anticipated, the Second Army encountered the entire Russian Eighth Army.
Russian troops at Fortress Przemyśl had hastily prepared their offensive to seize the fortress; however, as they lacked heavy caliber artillery weapons, these last-ditch efforts failed. At the same time, tsarist light artillery on the fortress front concentrated their most intense firepower, 21-centimeter caliber guns, against Habsburg trenches and artillery batteries, aiming specifically at the positions jutting out of the Siedliska Fortress. The Russian barrages, however, failed to destroy or even badly damage the fortress walls, and the attacking troops again sustained severe losses.
During the morning, portions of the Russian 19th Infantry Division rapidly advanced four to five kilometers to within eighty to five hundred meters of fortress defensive positions, less than one kilometer from the northern Siedliska fortress rings. However, defensive flanking firepower wrought heavy casualties and forced the Russians to retreat.34 At the same time, a concentrated tsarist attack targeted Werk I/4, while comparable action proved unsuccessful at Werk I/5.35 The three-infantry division enemy storm column failed to take advantage of the approaching darkness to reach the Habsburg defensive barbed wire.
Map 3.2. Defense of Fortress Przemyśl, 1914–1915.
At the fortress walls, two meters of concrete protected defensive artillery positions from tsarist artillery shells and prevented serious damage to the major positions. Nonetheless, nightfall brought no rest to the weary Habsburg troops. Continuous shelling, the urgent need to transport shells to the fortress walls, and repairing the damaged ramparts left no time for sleep. Between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m., tsarist artillery barrages against the fortress walls recommenced. The fortress defenders’ nerves cracked in the wake of utter helplessness and exhaustion. Garrison troops placed sandbags to fill in large gaps along the fortress walls, while the infantry deployed in the interval positions faced the enemy onslaught with no protection from its artillery fire. With the telephone cables destroyed, Habsburg commanders had to resort to delivering orders on horseback. Once tsarist artillery barrages halted, the sudden silence wreaked havoc on the garrison troops’ psyche. Russian sappers advanced until they had reached the bulwark’s walls.36 Battle alarms were followed by gunfire and screaming as enemy troops approached. As the Russians attacked Fortress I/1 fore-field positions, neighboring fortress works fired shrapnel shells at that specific position, producing what eyewitnesses likened to “the sound of hell.”
During the ongoing enemy efforts, the 23rd Honvéd Infantry Division units’ artillery targeted enemy infantry flank positions. The Russian 19th Infantry Division and Infantry Regiment 76, the main attack units against Werk I/1, reportedly sacrificed three thousand men in their attack. The Russians also launched a strong assault against the fortress’s Defensive District IV, which received Defensive District IX and X supporting artillery flanking fire against the attacking enemy forces. The enemy attack collapsed. A tsarist retreat movement reportedly commenced at Defensive Districts IV, VI, and VII as enemy artillery barrages subsided in intensity.
The Russians also launched their 58thInfantry Division, as well as a brigade of the 69th Reserve Infantry Division in addition to 19th Infantry Division forces, against the east and southeast front along the Grodek roads’ Defensive Districts XV (Hurko) and VI (Siedliska), supported by continuous artillery support. A Reserve Infantry Division brigade assaulted the villages of Popowice-Siedliska. The tsarist 60th Reserve Infantry Division stormed the area from the south, while 12th, 78th, and 82nd Reserve Infantry Divisions with the 11th and 12th Mortar Divisions attacked the Batycze-Malkovice front. The failed Russian storm attacks produced further significant bloodshed.37
The tsarist 78th and 82nd Reserve Infantry Divisions plus the 3rd Schützen Brigade positioned at the left flank attacked the fortress’s southeast sector front at Grochawce, supported by twenty-four artillery pieces. Flanking fortress artillery fire from Fort Hurko prevented the Russians from receiving any substantial additional reinforcements. When the attack bogged down at the northern fortress front, only three hundred paces from the defensive lines, some assaulting troops had almost attained their objectives along the extensive four-kilometer front.38 However, fortress defensive fire had not been subdued or even weakened, as the armored cupolas withstood all tsarist artillery barrages.
The Russians concentrated artillery fire against the Siedliska group in the early morning hours of October 7. Between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., tsarist troop masses again stormed the fortress on a broad front from the southeast until 6:00 a.m., still intending to capture the Siedliska positions before Habsburg relieving troops arrived. Meanwhile, the tsarist Eighth Army reported that advancing Habsburg forces had reached the Carpathian Mountain passes. The failure of that first assault against the Siedliska positions, a result of intense defensive machine gun and artillery fire, was followed by a second bloody onslaught at 9:00 a.m., which the defenders also repulsed with severe enemy losses. The Russians failed to get closer than a thousand paces to the fortress walls. Only a few brave troops reached the barbed wire entanglements. Despite the continuing deadly defensive artillery fire, the third attack occurred at 2:00 p.m.39 Smaller assaults targeted other fortress positions, but the heaviest enemy artillery concentrations continued to focus on the most important fortress Defensive District VI front resistance points. By daybreak, a battalion of tsarist Infantry Regiment 76 (19th Infantry Division) succeeded in penetrating the Fort I/1 infantry defensive zone unnoticed, having overrun the protective barbed wire given the absence of fortress lighting in that area.40 Infantry Regiment 73 troops also utilized the light from mortar fire to reach the fortress barbed wire lines and forward infantry positions without the assistance of artillery support or reserve units. Tsarist troops then overran forward Habsburg defending infantry positions and barbed wire emplacements. Some even scaled the fortress walls and penetrated Fort I through deadly defensive machine gun fire. This produced utter chaos as two tsarist infantry companies, in bloody hand-to-hand combat, pushed the few Habsburg defenders into the interior of Fort I. Battle continued until 9:00 a.m the following day. A company of Hungarian troops from Landsturm Infantry Regiment 18 rushed to counterattack the tsarist troops. The disorderly tsarist storm attacks would ultimately be halted when major Habsburg field army troops approached the fortress from the west.41 Meanwhile, tsarist infantry troops, consisting of an infantry battalion and one sapper squad, had advanced from elevated terrain against Forts I/1 and I/2 in cold, stormy conditions with assistance from the 19th Artillery Brigade’s forty-eight gun tubes.
Tsarist Infantry Regiment 75, meanwhile, launched a storm attack against Fort I/2. The attack evolved from two directions in an attempt to encircle the fort at both flanks. A frontal attack ensued between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m., but by daybreak it became obvious that the concentrated tsarist artillery fire had again caused no serious damage to the main fortress structure. Nor had the barbed wire and flanking infantry positions been destroyed; therefore, the regiment had to retreat to await artillery support.
Any tsarist troops caught between the firing zones and minefields became prisoners of war.42 The Russians, however, failed to reach the barbed wire entanglements in front of several forts (Xa, XIa, XI, and XII). Additional tsarist assaults occurred against Forts XIV, XV (Hurko), I/2 through I/6, and IV, I/1.43
The Russians resumed offensive efforts, attempting to launch a surprise attack during the night of October 8 despite the failures of the previous day. Repeated powerful assaults against Defensive Districts IV and VI again brought tsarist troops forward to the defensive obstacles. Their artillery barrages, however, pounded Defensive Districts III and VII to no avail. The tsarist Third Army began to retreat to the right bank of the San River to defend the river line, while a snowstorm delayed enemy supply train movement. As the Habsburg field armies finally approached the fortress environs, the besieging tsarist cavalry divisions retreated from the citadel’s western front in the early morning hours. A relentless assault was unleashed over the forefields in an attempt to seize the Siedliska positions at noon on that bright, sunny day. The fortress troops expected another attack during the morning hours against Forts I/1 and I/5, and they successfully repulsed it. Waving Red Cross flags, Honvéd troops attempted to collect the dead and wounded in the midst of battle, but the Russians ignored the flags and fired on them anyway.44
When the storm attacks finally ended, thousands of dead and seriously wounded tsarist troops lay in the open at the Siedliska position, but their own artillery fire prevented them from tending to their wounded until nightfall. A mass grave was dug the following night close to the fortress walls, but some tsarist units could not retreat until the following day because their attack positions remained too close to the fortress. After seventy-two hours of bloody battle lasting from October 6 to 9, 1914, the tsarist attack ended in failure. Meanwhile, Habsburg Third Army troops approached the fortress from south of Dynov, where they initially encountered no enemy troops. The only tsarist unit in that area, the tsarist 10th Cavalry Division, deployed in the Bircza area. As the Habsburg Third Army IX Corps reached that same region, enemy infantry and cavalry units retreated from the west, then northwest, fortress fronts to the east. Some friendly troop units moved into the terrain south of the San River; the III Corps moved into the San valley.
Temperatures dropped as cold rain, fog, and the first snowstorms of the season commenced. The inclement weather led to growing concerns about the maintenance of Habsburg field armies’ supply routes as Third Army supply trains continued to lag far behind the advancing combat troops. In addition, the troops deployed along the seventy-kilometer front suffered from complete exhaustion.45 Neither the Second nor the Third Army encountered serious enemy resistance as they continued their advance toward the citadel, but the poor weather conditions prevented air reconnaissance activity, producing uncertainty about the prevailing enemy situation and intentions.
Some Habsburg sources listed Russian casualties in the unsuccessful attempt to capture Fortress Przemyśl at seventy thousand, but the actual number was probably close to ten thousand. Some four thousand died, and three times that number were probably wounded or captured. The tsarist 19th Infantry Division alone lost forty-four officers and thirty-four hundred soldiers, 25 percent of its original stand. Russian corpses reputedly could be seen stacked a meter deep on the ground surrounding the fortress, though this estimate is probably exaggerated. Fortress defenders had repulsed nine tsarist divisions and inflicted enormous casualties on the Russian foe.46 General Brusilov initially intended to launch another major attack the next day, but his left flank positions had become exposed when the tsarist Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Armies (ten corps) marched to the Vistula River front to prepare for an overpowering invasion of German Silesia.47 Moreover, Stavka would not allow another storm attack at any price. Thus, large troop concentrations deployed west of the Vistula River in the area of Fortress Kraków were shifted to provide flank security for their Austro-Hungarian front operations.48 The Tsarist Third and Eleventh armies received orders to retreat across the San River, but because their assault troops remained in close proximity to the fortress walls, they could not retreat until the night to October 9.
The Russian October storm attacks failed for multiple reasons. The designated offensive troops had already been exhausted, having endured a two- to three-day approach march in rainy and muddy conditions and arriving at the fortress siege lines just prior to launching the assaults. Furthermore, the hastily prepared offensive plans proved flawed, neglecting many crucial details. Faulty intelligence reports suggesting that fortress troop morale had sunk so low that the citadel garrison would capitulate if pressured contributed to the failed plan of attack. No tsarist reconnaissance missions occurred at the fortress prior to the attack; they were undertaken only when the offensive operation commenced. Although tsarist infantry troops received new weapons such as hand grenades and wire cutters before their storm assaults, they had not been properly trained in how to use them. Technical details for the operation had also been neglected. For example, of the Russian siege army’s 483 artillery pieces, only about 6.5 percent of that complement consisted of heavy guns capable of destroying the bulwark’s perimeter walls. In addition, tsarist artillery failed to adequately support the attacking infantry by neutralizing the defensive artillery throughout the storm attacks. A shortage of experienced combat officers and serious supply difficulties stemming from the inclement weather and hazardous terrain conditions also took their toll. Night attacks, which were originally planned, would probably have allowed the Russian troops to attain the opposing barbed wire entanglements. Unfortunately for the Russians, a confused command structure initiated the storm attacks after dawn. These Russian mishaps, combined with devastating defensive fortress fire, particularly in the major Siedliska battle area, proved decisive during the operation. Multiple tsarist assaults were routinely halted at the first major defensive obstacles, while mounting casualties wreaked havoc on the attacking troops’ morale.49
General Conrad planned to launch a double envelopment offensive against tsarist forces in middle Galicia by October 12, in particular, to roll up the Russian front from south of Fortress Przemyśl.50 The Habsburg First Army had to attack toward the lower San-Vistula River area at Zawichost, while the Fourth Army supported them by aiding with their river crossing and providing flank protection to the east toward Lemberg.
On October 8, strong Third Army forces marched north to the area of Radymno and the critical railroad bridge at Nizankovice, but the tsarist Eighth Army blocked the positions at Bircza. The Russians ultimately evacuated Nizankovice and Chyrov, but previously destroyed railroad bridges had to be rebuilt, delaying Third Army progress; the mass of III Corps entered the San Valley to approach the fortress north of Jaroslau. On October 9, the Fourth Army advanced to the San River stretch near Rzeszóv, with the Second Army’s VII and XII Corps following the next day. There they would prepare to ford the lower San and Vistula Rivers and open the approaches to the fortress and Radymno.51 Yet, despite multiple hindrances, intelligence reports indicated that the Russians had terminated their siege of the fortress in the area west and southwest of the citadel.
The Habsburg Fourth Army pressed forward toward Jaroslau-Krzeszóv between October 8 and 11, but the continuous rains halted its progress. The army’s XVII Corps advanced to the hilly terrain south of the Wisloka River while the II Corps and XIV Corps protected the army’s northern front area. A corps followed to protect the army’s left flank positions. The 2nd and 6th Cavalry Divisions commenced reconnaissance to the northeast toward the San River, while 10th Cavalry Division protected the army’s northern flank. On October 8, Fourth Army command reported that the II and XVII Corps encountered strong resistance allegedly consisting of five to six Russian divisions. Its XIV Corps advanced to the southeast in an attempt to cut off the enemy retreat from the Fortress Przemyśl area to behind the San River. However, General Conrad’s attempted double encirclement failed because Russian Third Army units west of the river had promptly evacuated their positions during the night of October 9.52
Third Army Command initially assumed that tsarist forces would defend all approaches to the fortress extending from the area of Dynov, close to the citadel, with equally strong forces deployed along both sides of the San River. As the Third Army prepared to counter the threat, damaged bridges along the advance route, which could not be repaired until at least October 10, delayed their movement. The area east of the San River at Dynov lacked the resources necessary to conduct major operations, limiting deployments to smaller troop units. Thus, south of the San River, only Group Tschurtschenthaler and the 6th Infantry Division from III Corps advanced. North of the river, the mass of III Corps (22nd and 28th Infantry Divisions) advanced to the San River Valley roads leading to the fortress from Rokietnica. Third Army forces crossed the high waters of the San River and moved some troops toward Bircza, where they encountered no enemy troops on the area’s elevated banks. The Fourth Army’s left flank units north of the San River approached the fortress and the Radymno area, encountering strong enemy resistance. On the same day, Habsburg Supreme Command ordered a general attack against enemy forces in the fortress area.53 As usual, the overall enemy military situation remained unclear.
The major field army battle scene now shifted to the Habsburg Second Army eastern flank positions, where the first phase of the battles of Fortress Przemyśl and Chyrov occurred. The enemy’s destruction of numerous bridges delayed the arrival of two Second Army corps to the two major railroad stations and junctions at Lisko and Sanok overlooking the San River. These locations became significant military objectives during the early 1915 Carpathian Mountain Winter War campaigns. The Second Army had sought to advance through the narrow confines at Chyrov between October 8 and 10, but, on the first day, the effective defensive efforts of the tsarist Eighth Army halted its northern and middle flank movements.
Enemy troops at the northern and southern siege lines finally displayed indications that they too might retreat, while troops on the southeastern and eastern fronts remained at their positions. As Habsburg field army forces approached the fortress, the besieging Eleventh Army withdrew to just east of the citadel with its XXIX Corps initially covering the evacuation of its Jaroslau bridgehead positions at the San River. Battle commenced there on October 10 and ended with the tsarist army retreating. Yet Habsburg forces progressed slowly. The Russian Third Army established a cavalry screen at the San River as its main units retreated across it to establish defensive positions given the flank threat from the north. Strong forces (four corps) covered the tsarist Third Army’s southern flank retreat through Radymno-Jaroslau-Sieniava. The effect of battle on the German front at the Warsaw-Ivangorod area suddenly threatened the tsarist position on the Habsburg Galician front, particularly at the San River. Russian Ninth Army radio transmissions revealed that three tsarist armies were being redeployed to the Vistula River line south of Warsaw. This represented a serious weakening of tsarist troop numbers on the Habsburg front and brought about a significant battle at Ivangorod.
At about noon on October 9, a Habsburg Second Army XII Corps Hussar cavalry patrol reached the outer perimeter of the western fortress at Fort Pralkovce, after being delayed for days by the difficult terrain and unrelenting weather. Fortress observers rejoiced at the sight of friendly forces. Infantry units followed the cavalry formations, and the field armies finally liberated the fortress. Three Russian corps retreated behind the San River, including the tsarist siege troops, which offered little resistance to the Habsburg troops at the northern fortress front. However, tsarist forces established strong defensive lines within artillery range of the fortress’s eastern and southeastern fronts at the San River and a major stronghold on the Magiera Heights, which soon became the scene of fierce, bloody battle. Strong forces had to protect the movement of supplies from the Jaroslau area; two corps also guarded the San River crossings as the Russians created a defensive line along the river east of Fortress Przemyśl.54
Third Army troops battled some of the retreating enemy flank units. However, IX Corps troops (northern army flank) again met strong enemy resistance on unfavorable terrain. As the enemy conducted a scorched earth withdrawal, Habsburg forces reached the San River without serious resistance.55 The war expanded into the Carpathian Mountains and spread to the Romanian frontier.
Habsburg army ranks contained ill-trained replacement troops that lacked ammunition and artillery shells, which resulted in sustaining excessive casualties. During the night of October 10, Habsburg Fourth Army units approached the San River, focusing on pursuing enemy forces at the Sieniava bridgehead, while one corps advanced in the area of Jaroslau and another at Radymno. Tsarist Third and Eighth Army forces, however, successfully blocked the Fourth Army’s attempts to cross the San River. The Habsburg army encountered strong enemy forces covering the tsarist retreat, and attempts to advance the Fourth Army’s right flank failed. In the interim, General Conrad ordered the army to encircle tsarist forces west of the San River. The Third Army attacked south of Jaroslau as its main forces advanced to the fortress, but met strong enemy numbers at the San River.56
Fortress Przemyśl quickly became a major strong point on Austria-Hungary’s eastern front battlefield. During the tsarist retreat, repair work commenced on the damaged citadel walls. In addition, new fore-field positions were reestablished forward of the fortress at the northwest and southern citadel perimeters. However, the condition of roads and railroad bridges prevented any major food or ammunition supply deliveries to the fortress immediately after its liberation. Furthermore, evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers could not be completed, leaving seven thousand wounded in the bulwark when Habsburg troops eventually had to retreat again.
The main fortress offensive unit, the 23rd Honvéd Infantry Division, rejoined the Third Army to assist in the pursuit of the retreating Russians and participated in the bloody battle at the heights of Magiera from October 10 to 14. Meanwhile, General Conrad briefly considered transferring Habsburg Supreme Command headquarters back to the fortress. However, his chief of telegraph services convinced him that the present communications system would be seriously hindered because the Russians had destroyed all fortress wire connections and removed telegraph and telephone poles during their siege. It would require some time to restore such services, so Conrad dropped the idea.57
On October 10, General Conrad ordered the launching of a general offensive against the enemy troops remaining in the fortress environs. He insisted on maintaining the initiative and planned to roll up the tsarist Vistula German front from the south, disregarding the serious losses his troops had sustained during the initial war operations. While no notable progress had occurred on the Habsburg Balkan front, preparations commenced to cross the lower San and Vistula Rivers. One Habsburg corps advanced toward Bircza, then Nizankovice, against strong enemy defensive positions east of the fortress. First Army mission became to seize the San River area that stretched to the lower San River area at the Vistula River Zawichost location.58 The German Ninth Army’s left flank units marched toward the lower Pilica River and then on to Warsaw, partly to protect the present northern Habsburg flank.59
On October 10, the northern deployed Russian Ninth and Fifth Armies threatened Habsburg positions at the gap between the San River and the Carpathian Mountains, while additional troop units initially would launch a major offensive, the infamous Dampfwalze (steamroller), into Germany.60 The presence of such a large enemy force threatening to cross the Vistula River between the mouth of the San River and the fortresses in Poland created a serious military crisis for the Central Powers.61
During the night of October 11, strong tsarist rearguard units finally evacuated their last positions at Fortress Przemyśl. Then, Fourth Army southern flank forces advanced simultaneously with the neighboring Third Army left flank units (III Corps) to pursue the enemy to Radymno. Tsarist defensive positions at Jaroslau were attacked from the south, west, and northwest, but enemy resistance hardened at Sosnica and Radymno. Third Army IX Corps seized bridges while the Jaroslau bridgehead positions remained at the front combat zone as tsarist forces retreated from the citadel’s eastern and southern perimeter. The Fourth Army, meanwhile, had finally made contact with First Army units at the San River and subsequently received orders to cross the San and Vistula Rivers.
General Conrad, having no indication of Russian intentions, ordered his troops to maintain constant contact with the enemy to ascertain if they would continue to retreat. The Russians, however, merely intended to protect their artillery units, which were slowly withdrawing toward Lemberg, and established a defensive bridgehead at Sosnica on the western San River bank. The Habsburg Third Army could not launch its intended operation toward Radymno until October 12 because of the terrible weather and terrain conditions. Twenty-two fortress infantry battalions and twenty-seven artillery batteries participated in the field army battle, while tsarist forces tenaciously defended key San River crossing points. Widespread troop exhaustion, lack of protection against the elements, and hunger placed Habsburg troops in an unenviable situation. Many horses abandoned by the field armies during the September 1914 retreat assisted Third Army resupply efforts.62
Overpowering tsarist troop numbers regularly attacked Habsburg soldiers. Many such attacks ended in deadly hand-to-hand combat. The horrendous conditions resulted in many soldiers simply never waking up. Transporting artillery shells to the front lines caused particular problems. The destruction of railroads in middle Galicia had limited traffic to only four stations, which significantly and negatively affected all military operations south of the San River. In addition, Habsburg units lacked bridge-crossing materials to traverse the San.63 Meanwhile, Third Army vanguard troops entered the area of Bircza without battle, but the northern flank IX Corps encountered strong Russian resistance. The unfavorable conditions continued to prevent Habsburg units from attaining their assigned march goals.
Third Army X Corps initially seized the Jaroslau bridgehead, which partially utilized fortress artillery for its defense. On the following day, October 11, Habsburg troops pursuing retreating tsarist formations attempted to achieve a double encirclement in the Jaroslau area, initially against weak enemy resistance.
As Russian troops retreated, they destroyed roads, bridges, and key railroad lines essential to supplying the advancing Habsburg armies. It became imperative that the railroads and bridges be rebuilt as quickly as possible, since the Habsburg armies sequestered a twenty-one-day food supply from the fortress, as well as artillery, artillery shells, and other material needs. Thus, the fortress became a major supply depot for the field armies, but the armies were then expected to replace or return the food, artillery units, and unexpended shells to Fortress Przemyśl.
The Russians finally evacuated the left San River bank at Radymno, leaving cavalry forces as rearguard protection, and established new positions on the right San River bank. When they abandoned their locations at the eastern and southern fortress perimeter areas, they established their new defensive positions on the San River line where the Dniester River flowed out of the Carpathian Mountains in the Stary Sambor area. Their flank and rear echelon positions thus had protection from the Dniester River swamps, and they dominated all approach routes to their new positions. The Habsburg Third Army’s commander had entered the fortress as his troops intercepted enemy forces at Rokietnica and seized Jaroslau and its bridgeheads before commencing an advance toward Radymno. Progress proved slow given the flooded conditions and enormous casualties sustained when they encountered Russian rearguard troops at Sosnica and Radymno.
On October 11 and 12, a fortress sortie was launched in unrelenting rain northward toward Sosnica to cooperate with Habsburg Third Army III Corps, advancing toward Radymno and the southern San River line. The attempt would hurl the enemy across the San River. Third Army III Corps troops and a mobile 9-centimeter cannon battery protected the left flank of the sortie units against two enemy corps. The Third and Fourth Armies advanced to the San River, but, because of the unfavorable conditions, could not cross, delaying the offensive for several days. Other major hindrances to further forward movement involved the lack of bridge-crossing equipment and sheer exhaustion of Habsburg troops. The enemy had also constructed strong positions across the river. General Conrad ordered the Fourth Army to cross the river on October 14, but that action would be delayed until October 17 because the army could not penetrate the strong tsarist defensive positions, and vital bridge-crossing equipment still had not reached the army.64 Conrad’s order to cross the San River assumed that the Russians had retreated from the river line, leaving only rear echelon defensive units to protect it. The Fourth Army thus expected to encounter no serious resistance, but heavy Russian artillery fire halted its units attempting to cross the river, resulting in numerous casualties.65
Although Russian forces had occupied the vital river crossing points after destroying all the pertinent bridges, tsarist defensive efforts represented only part of the problems facing Habsburg forces. Supply efforts in the midst of heavy rainstorms exhausted the soldiers, as the mud rendered the wagons virtually unmovable. The deteriorating supply situation gave Third Army officers and soldiers an excuse to plunder the fortress food supplies.66
On October 11, south of the fortress, Third Army right flank units battled the Russian XII Corps but failed to seize strong defensive positions such as the high terrain of Magiera and Tyskovice. The First Army’s situation worsened at the crossing of the lower San River, where they discovered that the approach routes consisted of deep mud. Despite the unfavorable terrain and supply conditions, they were compelled to cross the river on October 12.67 For the next few days, Conrad ordered the Fourth and Third Armies to pursue the retreating enemy. The Third and Second Armies were ordered to hinder the tsarist retreat movement of its siege artillery and other war materiel. Habsburg forces had to seize the various San River crossing points, causing as much damage to the enemy as possible. Relentless rain flooded the entire region between the San and Vistula Rivers, turning the terrain into a large swamp and preventing the forward transportation of heavy bridge-crossing equipment. Following time-consuming attempts to prepare to cross the river on October 11, the Habsburg offensive ground to a halt.
On October 12, the Second Army’s VII and XII Corps received orders to attack Russian forces, the majority of which were deployed east of Chyrov, but its commanders reported that accelerating the troops’ movements would neutralize their battle worth.68
Over the next twenty-four hours, troublesome reports arrived from the German Vistula River Ivangorod battlefield. Defeat there could threaten the entire northern Habsburg flank positions, as the adverse conditions there left little chance of First Army traversing the San River even after seizing its crossing points.69 Meanwhile, the war’s first significant mountain battle erupted at Magiera—one of the bloodiest encounters on the eastern front. On October 17, the offensive operation against Radymno also failed, forcing the Fourth Army into a defensive stance along the line between the San River inlet to Fortress Przemyśl.
The perpetual supply crisis was a critical aspect of the Fortress Przemyśl saga. Providing the Habsburg field armies with food supplies during the early October fortress liberation campaign remained difficult. This was the case not only because of terrible weather and terrain conditions, but also because the railroad connection to the attacking troops remained almost a hundred kilometers from the fortress. Although not published in the historical accounts, on October 4, General Conrad ordered fortress bakeries to prepare a four-day supply of bread rations and straw to feed the equivalent of four field army division troops and horses, or fifty-six battalions (88,000 portions), which required 61,600 kilograms of bread.70 Unbeknown to the general, this would be the initial step toward the downfall of the fortress and its garrison of 120,000 troops on March 22, 1915. For the first time in history, a citadel under siege for many weeks and preparing for a new enemy attack against it received orders to bake bread for an approaching field army.71
The bread was to be delivered to the Third Army, but upon entering the fortress, starving Third Army soldiers plundered the garrison’s food stores. One postwar source estimated that in a period of about a month, between September 19 and October 22, the Third Army and the fortress garrison consumed a seventy-nine-day supply of bread, forty-two days’ worth of vegetables, eighty-eight days’ worth of meat, and 230 days’ worth of hay. The Third Army also abandoned thousands of sick and wounded soldiers in the fortress when it retreated, raising that total to fifteen thousand. The fortress had also provided necessary food supplies for the October 9–12 Third Army offensive efforts in its environs.72
Although several historical accounts make note of the Third Army’s “provisioning” at Fortress Przemyśl’s expense, none of them point out that the citadel supply command also provided four division days of R rations to the Second Army and three division days of N rations, bread, rusk, and hay to the Fourth Army on October 5. Furthermore, on October 12, Logistics Command approved the transport of ten division day supplies of bread, or rusk, preserved meat, vegetables, and oats to the Fourth Army. On October 18, the fortress provided thirteen division days of N rations and five days of R rations to the Third Army. The Logistics Command then forbade further supplies from being removed from the fortress.73 Austrian postwar writings have conveniently ignored these factors, as well as the following information.
The Third Army seized a four-day food supply to nourish its two hundred thousand troops and fifty thousand horses. Fortress food supplies thus provided at least nineteen days of food and twenty-six days of hay to the field armies. Given the extent of unsanctioned plundering of the food stores, however, the actual total may have been significantly higher. It is reasonable to question whether the fortress would have had to surrender on March 22, 1915, if such quantities of supplies had not been removed during the October 1914 fortress liberation campaign and immediately afterward.
In the meantime, to resupply its plundered warehouses, Fortress Przemyśl desperately needed to repair the railroad bridges that the enemy had destroyed during its retreat. On October 27, the critical railroad line between Chyrov and Nizankovice reopened, while October 28 finally witnessed the arrival of some resupply services to the fortress following the repair of the Nizankovice railroad bridge. One hundred locomotives, hundreds of rail cars, and many railroad personnel participated during the short resupply efforts. Habsburg Supreme Command had requested the construction of a railroad line to the rear of the citadel since 1902 to no avail. After the war, General Kusmanek and Habsburg General Staff officers faced an investigation committee that inquired why no railroad line extended to the rear Fortress Przemyśl area. The investigation ultimately determined that the railroad had not been constructed because of the lack of funding.
To its disadvantage, the Habsburg military could not utilize the local Karl Ludwig railroad line because its close proximity to enemy lines placed it within artillery range of Radymno and Jaroslau. Fortress resupply efforts continued until 7:00 a.m. on November 4, when the field armies again retreated from the citadel and destroyed the Nizankovice Bridge to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. If the Chyrov railroad link had been restored a week earlier, far more supplies could have been delivered to the fortress, and it might not have had to surrender on March 22, 1915.74 The resupply efforts, however, lasted for only six days. On November 5, Russian troops again besieged the fortress.
Statistics relating to the fortress resupply effort are complicated. Most Austrian sources give the amounts necessary to supply a prewar planned fortress garrison of 85,000 troops, 3,700 horses, 18,000 civilians, and 20,000 prisoners. However, the October fortress garrison average stood at 128,000 troops, 14,500 horses, and 18,000 civilians. Thus, although Austrian statistics claimed that the resupply effort provided 172 days of bread portions, 214 of vegetables, 111 of meat, and 510 of oats, since the actual garrison numbers were larger, the supply numbers decline to a 111-day supply of bread, 139 of vegetables, 72 of meat, and 90 of oats.75
A Habsburg Supreme Command memorandum dispatched to Emperor Franz Joseph’s Military Chancellery, dated April 13, 1915, claimed that during the six days of railroad resupply activity, 128 trains arrived at the fortress, which was an undoubted exaggeration to protect General Conrad’s reputation.76 Loading supplies onto a fortress horse-drawn field railroad line and unloading them in the citadel proved an extremely time-consuming process. Fortress troops, in the interim, managed to forage a twenty-one-day supply of vegetables from the fields outside the fortress perimeter. General Conrad halted efforts to commandeer additional supplies destined for the fortress.77 Anticipating the enormous transport problems with the citadel resupply effort, General Kusmanek, on his own initiative, ordered the construction of the horse-drawn railroad line, which extended from Nizankovice over the Wiar River to the fortress. While this supply line expedited the transfer of goods from the restored railroad bridge, it still proved time-consuming. It also required a large number of horse teams to transport the supplies.78
The horse railroad field line required eight to ten days to construct, and despite the repairs, the railroad lines and bridges still proved insufficient for the fortress resupply efforts. Making matters worse, the reconstruction and constant maintenance of the bridges, combined with the need to also equip the Second and Third Armies, proved time-consuming and costly. It would be claimed that four and a half months of food supplies, or sufficient quantities to last until the second half of March, had been delivered to the fortress, but this was a serious exaggeration. The destroyed railroad bridges could not be repaired while enemy siege troops remained along the southwest and southern fortress perimeters. Furthermore, much of the renewed rail traffic occurred at night, with only a few trains originating from the hinterland.79
The Railroad Bureau reportedly dispatched 213 supply trains to the Carpathian Mountain front, which also carried some wounded Fortress Przemyśl troops on the return trip. Although thousands of wounded soldiers as well as eight thousand civilians were evacuated from the fortress, another seven thousand wounded and eighteen thousand civilians remained when the Russians renewed their siege. According to Habsburg Supreme Command, 128 of these trains reached Fortress Przemyśl, while the other 85 continued to the field armies. Another official report claimed that nine of the trains transported replacement troops, fifteen ammunition, eighteen material and armaments, fourteen medical supplies, fifty-five food items, and nine hay.80 The fortress ammunition magazines and supply depots were reportedly refilled to one-half capacity. Military authorities’ claims that the garrison now possessed sufficient provisions for a long siege did not fit the facts. For example, the field army and fortress troops did not receive desperately needed winter uniforms and equipment, so they had to continue to wear summer-issue uniforms through the January 23 to mid-April 1915 Carpathian Mountain Winter War campaign. Thus, frostbite ran rampant, particularly for troops deployed at fortress perimeter outpost positions.81
Returning to the field armies, the troops participating in the Austro-Hungarian offensive campaign in early October sustained enormous casualties, particularly when the Third Army fought at the bloody battle of Magiera between October 11 and 15. On October 11, 23rd Honvéd Infantry Division soldiers, supported by Third Army troops, stormed the newly constructed Russian bridgehead at Sosnica, rapidly driving tsarist siege troops from the northern and southern fortress fronts back across the San River. During the hasty retreat, the bridges at Sosnice collapsed and numerous San River bridges were destroyed, resulting in the drowning of many Russian soldiers.
The enemy had besieged Fortress Przemyśl for three weeks, but the fortress had persevered through the numerous storm attacks and achieved its main mission of binding enemy forces. General Kusmanek thanked the garrison troops for their bravery and sacrificial duty during that episode. Meanwhile, a lack of artillery shells increasingly retarded Habsburg field army efforts, while the Russian Eighth Army had retreated to the elevated terrain southeast of the fortress in the area of Chyrov-Sanok. The tsarist Third Army remained a respectable distance from the fortress’s eastern front.
Fourth Army movement proved possible only on side roads. On the San River’s east bank (toward Fortress Przemyśl) strong tsarist forces prepared to recross the river.82 Tsarist positions were protected by the flooding San River, and the main Habsburg forces now deployed in the small area south of the river’s mouth with troops that desperately required rehabilitation.
Then, on October 14, Russian artillery barrages increased against the Chyrov battlefield as their troops prepared to launch a strong attack toward Habsburg positions. The tsarist Eighth Army XXIV and VII Corps troops counterattacked the Habsburg Second Army deployed south of the fortress to protect and secure their southern flank positions.83 Meanwhile, the temporary battle lull at the fortress allowed emergency repairs to continue on the damaged perimeter positions under more peaceful conditions, while the tediously slow unloading of supply trains at the end of the month produced additional delays for food and ammunition transports. Harassing tsarist artillery fire did not prevent the construction of additional forward fortress defensive positions, which commenced on October 9, particularly on the northern citadel sector.84 The forward extension of perimeter positions to Na Gorach–Batycze served to neutralize Russian artillery fire against the exposed San River Bridge and central city area. Meanwhile, vegetables, hay, and wood continued to be foraged far beyond the fortress forefields, although few wagons were available to transport the recovered goods.
Emperor Franz Joseph congratulated the fortress garrison for resisting the enemy storm assaults despite the terrible conditions. The Third Army prepared to advance forward of the fortress eastern front again, while the most difficult problem remained a sufficient supply of field howitzer shells.85 Between October 14 and 18, battle continued at Ivangorod on the German front. The Habsburg First Army had advanced to the San River and attempted to cross it, as well as the Vistula River line at Zawichost. However, the unsatisfactory road conditions, in conjunction with the well-conducted Russian retreat movements, dashed any possibility that the latter could be forced into battle west of the Vistula River. Russian forces originally retreated to Ivangorod, one of the two major Vistula River crossings along a ninety-mile front, while forming a new Second Army to defend the Warsaw depot and communications center. When the German Ninth Army forces advanced toward Warsaw, the Russians launched a major attack from the city against its left flank positions. The German army found itself in a vulnerable position after tsarist forces crossed the Vistula River and had to rely on Habsburg forces to bind enemy forces west of the river.
On October 15, Habsburg First Army attacked the Russian forces as they attempted to cross the Vistula River at Ivangorod. At Warsaw, the enemy extended its flank positions further west to increase pressure on the opposing German lines. The enormous Russian numerical superiority eventually forced a German retreat on October 20, but the Vistula River offensive operation successfully disrupted tsarist plans to launch a major invasion of Germany. The San-Vistula River line developed into a crucial Russian defensive front. A combination of accurate aerial reconnaissance and the capture of documents from a dead Russian officer apprised German High Command that they were suddenly confronting vastly superior enemy troop numbers. Retreat soon became inevitable.
After mid-October, much of the fighting in the Fortress Przemyśl area occurred at the east and southeast forefield positions, while battle raged along the San River east of Nizankovice. Enemy resistance proved strongest against the southeast fortress works and at Magiera. On October 16, Conrad transferred four infantry divisions to his First Army to strengthen its operations against the Russian flank positions. He hoped to obtain a military success at Ivangorod. Tsarist forces, however, had already crossed the Vistula River at that location, forcing the Habsburg Fourth Army to initiate flank security along the San River extending to the Vistula’s mouth. The Germans had debouched their troops on the west bank of the Vistula River, while General August von Mackensen’s three corps moved toward Warsaw. Further south, Conrad intended to cross the San River and advance toward Lemberg, the provincial capital.86
He planned to launch an attack by Third Army III Corps that would extend from Radymno across the river against the tsarist Eleventh Army siege flank positions from the south. The goal was to cut off enemy supply lines and isolate the formerly besieging army. Second Army right flank units would support the assault, but again the Russians intervened and circumvented Conrad’s operational plan as pressure continued to increase steadily against Habsburg forces. The Third Army, lacking sufficient artillery support, remained preoccupied in the mountains at Magiera southeast of the fortress. Offensive activity had to be halted and a defensive posture established because of the lack of artillery shells and terrible supply route conditions. The preliminary railroad supply movements commenced again on October 18. A week later, the first train departed from the key Chyrov station; however, it was not until October 28, when the bridge at Nizankovice had finally been repaired and become operationally ready, that transports actually reached the fortress in numbers.87
Costly victories at Magiera and Tyszkovice proved of great significance for fortress resupply efforts. Tsarist forces had previously been able to fire unmolested artillery barrages from these elevated locations at approaching Habsburg supply trains. With the capture of these two positions, train traffic could proceed more smoothly and without the danger of interruption.
Meanwhile, a dangerous eighty-mile gap opened between the Habsburg Third and Fourth Armies. The First Army deployed five divisions to the north, as the Russians advanced at the northern Vistula River, forcing that army’s northern flank to retreat from its San River positions. Reinforcements arrived at the Second Army battlefield, where that army fought in uninterrupted battle. The troops held their lines, but reinforced enemy attacks targeted their east flank positions at the high terrain south of Stary Sambor extending to the heights of Medyka near the fortress. The Russians also attacked the former Habsburg bridgehead at Jaroslau. General Kusmanek received orders to launch a sortie to the heights at Szechynic, followed by an energetic attack against enemy positions at Medyka.
Also, on October 18, the Russian Third Army crossed the San River at various locations and launched an attack to relieve the Habsburg pressure against their Eleventh Army and Eighth Army in the Carpathian Mountains. Habsburg Supreme Command then ordered that the Russian troops that had crossed the San River be destroyed by October 20.88 However, increasing tsarist pressure became so strong that it prevented the Third Army’s IX Corps from advancing south of the fortress and its X Corps from moving north of its positions. The Habsburgs could not progress anywhere, and the battle southeast of the bulwark area developed into a bloody position struggle. A tsarist Eighth Army counterattack forced Habsburg troops to provide better flank protection before launching an offensive from the area south of Fortress Przemyśl.
The Habsburgs failed on many attempts to cross the San River and pursue the Russians. The Fourth Army’s failure on October 17, for example, resulted from massive Russian defensive artillery fire, which caused serious losses and halted the operation almost immediately. The Russians, however, successfully crossed the river at four different locations, which forced the Habsburg Third and Fourth Armies into a defensive stance.89 A shortage of artillery shells compelled the Habsburgs to allocate their diminishing artillery resources against enemy attacks that the infantry could not repulse. Third Army’s III Corps commandeered three 15-centimeter howitzer batteries, and XI Corps three fortress March battalions, whereas III and XI Corps also divided a 9-centimeter M 75 artillery battery. A major detriment to the shortage of artillery shells was the lack of Dual Monarchy industrial capacity, which failed to produce vital military materiel.90 The enormous loss of horses also seriously slowed maneuverability, while Fourth Army troops’ negative psychological and physical condition hampered effective action.91
As the Russians launched their steamroller offensive with their Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Armies on the German north Vistula front, they hurled additional forces against the Habsburg Second Army, which constantly fought to maintain its lines. The Fourth Army estimated that nine to ten tsarist divisions had been deployed between Jarsolau and the mouth of the San River; thus their counterattacks failed. At Fortress Przemyśl, several enemy regiments had occupied the high terrain opposite Siedliska (Defensive District VI). Great concern mounted relative to replacing the food stores from the citadel.
On October 19, Third Army efforts to advance again proved unsuccessful against defending tsarist rearguard forces. Fortress Przemyśl Artillery Battery Number 5 and mobile reserve guns, in conjunction with Siedliska Defensive District VI support and some Honvéd units, assisted a garrison demonstration launched toward Medyka and the higher terrain opposite that location. Enemy attacks continued against the Habsburg Second and Third Armies.92 That same day, substantial numbers of Russian troops crossed the San River and launched a major offensive.93
On October 20, General Hindenburg commenced a new German offensive operation, moving his troops northward to avoid encirclement.94 Earlier, on October 18, Ludendorff had secretly ordered a German retreat. The German High Command hoped that the Habsburg First Army would be successful at the battle at Ivangorod, because as long as that army maintained its position, the Germans could launch an offensive across the Pilica River toward Warsaw.95 On October 23, Hindenburg informed the Habsburg First Army command that his troops would retreat. As the German military situation at Warsaw rapidly deteriorated, it became increasingly doubtful that the Habsburg First Army could maintain its positions at the Ivangorod Vistula River crossing after the Russians launched their own offensive there. As the German troops recoiled from their Warsaw campaign, the Russians also launched an offensive into Galicia, both events forcing a general Habsburg retreat into the Carpathian Mountains when their central and flank positions could not halt the enemy pressure. General Conrad had once again overestimated his armies’ capabilities against superior Russian troop numbers. In addition, enemy artillery remained superior to the Habsburgs’ in every category, and Conrad did not possess sufficient reinforcements to improve the outcome of the present battle.96
The Russian offensive smashed the badly shaken Habsburg First Army. That army’s Ivangorod offensive operation was a total failure, costing fifty thousand casualties and resulting in the survivors retreating to the Fortress Kraków area. The unanticipated German retreat, caused by an overwhelming Russian attack, opened First Army positions to an enemy-flanking maneuver. This endangered Habsburg positions along the Vistula River front and exposed the Habsburg Third and Second Army’s flank positions at Fortress Przemyśl and Chyrov. Following mutual allied recriminations and allied mistrust resulting from the retreats, the troops withdrew to their original positions by the end of October.97 The Germans, however, rapidly regrouped their forces to launch yet another offensive, while Habsburg troops withdrew slowly to enable resupply efforts to continue as long as possible at Fortress Przemyśl. Conrad could not allow his armies to retreat west of the San River’s mouth area because it would cause the entire river defensive line to collapse and leave Fortress Przemyśl vulnerable to attack.
On October 22, Conrad ordered the Third Army to hurl the advancing enemy troops from their positions at Radymno and then encircle them to enable the Galician operation to resume. However, tsarist troops prevented the Habsburg Second Army’s right flank forces from progressing south of Fortress Przemyśl, and Second Army units had to retreat. This prevented a Habsburg victory south of Fortress Przemyśl. The Second Army also was ordered to halt the enemy advance across the upper Dniester River, which could threaten the fortress. General Conrad argued on October 24 that if his First Army retreated behind the San River, it would become incapable of defending that important river line, and Fortress Przemyśl would again be under siege. When German High Command requested that General Conrad shift more of his forces from the Galician to the Russian Polish front, he declined. He reasoned that shifting troops to that battle area would prevent the decisive success he desired at the southeast Fortress Przemyśl front.98
The Habsburg First Army, however, could not maintain its lines much longer because of the major Russian attack hurled against its left flank positions on October 25, which threatened it with encirclement. By that point, significant tsarist forces had obtained a foothold on the other side of the Vistula River.99 On October 26, Habsburg troops retreated from the enemy forces advancing along the northern Vistula River bank, which effectively neutralized Conrad’s offensive plans. Despite its low ammunition supply, the Third Army was ordered to launch an attack near the fortress. The attack failed due in part to the lack of artillery support.100 The Russians held the strong bridgehead position at Radymno and roads and railroad at Jaroslau, blocking Fortress Przemyśl. Under such circumstances, Habsburg troops had no choice but to retreat. At the same time, the Russians encircled the Second Army XII Corps from the south and attempted to roll up its flank.
Fully operational railroads would be crucial to resupplying the citadel, but the area surrounding Fortress Przemyśl also lacked sufficient railroad connections to maintain such large Habsburg troop numbers. The few connections it did possess were much too small to accommodate the citadel’s supply demands. Resupply efforts were also dependent on field army success. Habsburg planners assumed that the Fourth Army would maintain its San River positions, but it could only do so provided that the First Army maintained its positions. Consequently, the entire supply chain threatened to collapse when the First Army had to retreat, but here again, the Russians did not press their advantage.101
October 27 marked a very important day for Fortress Przemyśl. Three weeks after its liberation, the railroad line connecting Chyrov to Nizankovice reopened briefly before closing again on November 4. Multiple trains accumulated at the Sanok railroad station to travel across the Zagorz Bridge to the citadel. However, after the reconstruction of the railroad bridges, many had to be further materially reinforced, losing additional valuable time. One in particular, the bridge at Ustrzyki, required seven hours of repair. Even when the railroad bridges had been rebuilt, they could not operate at full capacity, which was necessary to resupply the bulwark. The situation was exacerbated by enemy artillery fire aimed at the various bridges and railroad lines, which reportedly halted railroad traffic and eventually forced traffic along the southern route through Chyrov.
By the end of October, the Habsburg First Army was outmanned and outgunned along the Vistula River front, while the Russians hurled strong units across the San River toward Prussian Silesia. If the First Army had to retreat, it was not a viable option, as it would endanger Habsburg Vistula River positions and expose Third and Second Army flank positions at Fortress Przemyśl and Chyrov. The German military situation west of Warsaw also became increasingly threatened. The events ultimately forced the Habsburg First Army to retreat north of the upper Vistula River, where General Conrad ordered it to hold its lines. Under no conditions or circumstances would it be permitted to retreat. The military situation, however, had become so ominous that it was questionable whether the army could protect even the Nida River line if it had to retreat. The Third and Fourth Armies, meanwhile, held their positions at the San River lowlands and hills south of Fortress Przemyśl.102
Traffic conditions in the fortress area proved catastrophic during the last week of October.103 The few serviceable roads and the hilly terrain surrounding Fortress Przemyśl forced Third Army troops to fight in unfavorable circumstances in late October. Thus, following two days of particularly heavy fighting (by October 28), the Russians hurled back the depleted Habsburg ranks. The Second and Third Armies had to relinquish their strategically important positions, which then became their primary military objectives during the remainder of the year and during the early 1915 Carpathian Mountain Winter War campaigns. The First Army retreated to establish new positions north of Fortress Kraków, and Conrad ordered them to hold those positions as long as possible to facilitate fortress resupply efforts. Unrelenting Russian attacks, however, forced Conrad to allow the First Army to retreat even further back.104 The retreat, however, threatened to compromise the entire San River line and leave Fortress Przemyśl vulnerable to siege once again.
On October 31, the Russian Third Army crossed the San and the Ninth Army crossed the Vistula. General Ivanov ordered tsarist troops to defeat the Habsburg armies deployed along the San River line. Conrad’s armies were now in full retreat mode. He had launched his October offensive in great haste, largely because of his concern that Fortress Przemyśl could not repulse a mass enemy attack. The swift Habsburg retreat from the citadel in late October and early November proved far-reaching and marked the second time that Conrad allowed the fortress to dictate his military operations. The detrimental physical and psychological effects of the harsh troop conditions and poor supply efforts had become painfully obvious during the fall 1914 mountain campaigns. General Conrad nevertheless continued to launch offensives in the Carpathian Mountains in early 1915, even worse conditions than during the October campaign.
By the last day of October, the First Army had completed a rapid, four-day march to its new resistance lines. Its commander raised serious concerns, having reported to General Conrad on October 28 uncertainty about whether his army could defend the ninety-kilometer line extending from the San River mouth with insufficient troop numbers. Two significant problems included the slow supply of ammunition, particularly artillery shells, and whether the troops, in their present condition, could defend their new positions for at least three days.105
That persistent enemy pressure forced the First Army to retreat north of the upper Vistula River and the Second Army south of Fortress Przemyśl to avoid encirclement and major defeat. Third Army units retreated through the Dukla hollow into northern Hungary, and the Fourth Army defended the Dunajec River front. By the end of the month, the Central Powers’ offensive had failed, and their troops were in full retreat. The Russians, already enjoying numerical superiority, deployed approximately two million troops at the Vistula River bend in preparation for a massive Dampfwalze invasion of Germany.
Russian military leaders realized that Fortress Przemyśl had become a significant political and morale symbol, as well as the major Habsburg bulwark. Thus, its capture assumed increasing strategic and psychological implications. General Conrad believed that he could not surrender the citadel on military, political, and morale grounds. Conrad allowed these factors to overshadow the fact that, after its first siege, Fortress Przemyśl lost much of its strategic significance. In early November 1914, additional factors compelled Conrad not to surrender the fortress, particularly the issue of neutral Italy and Romania.106 He also had to consider hinterland morale, the effect of the fortress’s capitulation on enemy and ally alike, and increasing diplomatic and political concerns, including maintaining Polish sympathy in Galicia. He harbored serious concerns about potential criticism of the Habsburg Supreme Command and the fact that the Austro-Hungarian army continually suffered significant battlefield defeats. Furthermore, the surrender of the fortress would destroy any possibility for future offensive operations directed to the north to liberate the bulwark, as well as possibly precluding any further Balkan front offensive operations. Considering the fortress’s present military situation, General Conrad desperately requested that additional German units deploy to the eastern front to launch a decisive offensive against Russia—the only means by which the fortress could now be liberated.
During early November, before the Russians besieged the fortress again, Third Army commander General Svetozar von Bojna Boroević and the Fortress Przemyśl chief of staff recommended that the fortress be abandoned to its fate. The futile attempts to raise the second enemy siege in November resulted in enormous bloodletting and suffering for the fortress garrison and Habsburg field troops. During the month of November, the Russians temporarily shifted their major operations from the Galician to the northern Polish front to launch their massive invasion of Germany. This removed one of Fortress Przemyśl’s major raisons d’être—to protect retreating Habsburg armies and serve as a major Stutzpunkt or military base at the front lines. Furthermore, subsequent claims that the besieged fortress continued to bind significant enemy units were simply untrue. By the end of October, the tsarist Eleventh Army siege forces consisted solely of reserve and third-line units, which proved adequate to neutralize the fortress. Moreover, the October military operations revealed that rapid liberation of the fortress had become highly unlikely.
Once Habsburg troops had recaptured the fortress in early October, Russian soldiers entrenched themselves only a few kilometers east of the citadel walls. South of the fortress, enemy artillery fired at the bulwark railroad lines, and all attempts to drive the enemy back ended in failure. The Russians’ possession at Magiera had a significant effect on attempted repairs on the major railroad bridge at Nizankovice. Meanwhile, garrison troops hoped that they would not be besieged again and that the fort remained a strong point (Stutzpunkt) on the Habsburg eastern front. Then fortress inhabitants noticed that dead horses, broken wagons, and vast amounts of equipment covered much of the terrain west of the citadel. Increasingly, large supply trains moved westward, followed by long troop columns moving rapidly away from the fortress. Once again the fortress streets grew empty and silent.
The October 1914 Fortress Przemyśl saga unfolded in phases. During its first siege in late September and early October, the fortress achieved its main mission of binding significant enemy troop numbers, which prevented their deployment against the reeling Habsburg field armies and significantly delayed tsarist pursuits. Immediately upon its liberation from the Russian siege in early October, the fortress bastion became the “solid anchor” for Habsburg eastern front battle. The eleven tsarist siege divisions could have been deployed against Habsburg field armies, but the Russians could not ignore a 130,000-man garrison situated behind their forward lines because it posed a serious threat to their rearward transportation and supply connections. If it had maintained its offensive capabilities, the fortress could also have actively assisted field army operations to a greater extent. Following the early November siege, attempts to liberate the fortress continued to detrimentally influence Habsburg military operations, just as they had during the first encirclement.
The month had opened with a Habsburg offensive hurling the besieging Russian troops back and liberating Fortress Przemyśl, but the tsarist numerical superiority and massive Dual Monarchy casualties quickly turned the battlefield odds in the enemy’s favor. Austro-Hungarian forces could not achieve a military victory even though the Russians had redeployed their Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Armies (ten corps) to the Vistula River front against Germany, which left only the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Armies to counter the Dual Monarchy. By the end of October, Fortress Przemyśl faced another siege, as the Habsburg armies again retreated. What would the month of November have in store for Habsburg armed forces? More pertinently, what fate awaited Fortress Przemyśl?
