THE NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1914 BATTLES IN THE CARpathian Mountains left both the Russian and Austro-Hungarian combatants exhausted. In January 1915, Habsburg and Romanov commanders attempted to rehabilitate their battered forces, and they initially conducted only local battles to improve frontline positions. Believing that the first side to launch an offensive in the Carpathian Mountains would gain a critical advantage over its enemy, General Conrad planned his offensive operation where he believed the greatest chance existed of achieving a victory over the Russians. He was greatly influenced by the potential action of neutral European powers, following disturbing diplomatic reports suggesting that Italy and Romania might intervene in the war if the Habsburg military situation had not improved by spring. However, the main focus of the offensive was the liberation of besieged Fortress Przemyśl, which lay near the center of the Austro-Hungarian front some 150 miles southeast of Fortress Kraków.
Generals Conrad and Falkenhayn met on December 2, 1914, at Oppeln and again on January 1 at Breslau. The meetings produced no major results, but a prime concern at the conferences was the Fortress Przemyśl situation and the necessity to liberate it before food shortages forced it to surrender. The projected Carpathian Mountain offensive had three main objectives: to prevent the Russians from invading Hungary; to liberate Fortress Przemyśl, under siege for the second time since early November 1914; and to envelop the enemy’s extreme left flank mountain positions.
Similar to the December 1914 Habsburg offensive planning, the major effort would emanate from the Habsburg Third Army eastern flank area in an initial attempt to sever tsarist railroad lines, thereby cutting off Russian reinforcements and supply capabilities. Third Army left flank forces and Fourth Army eastern (southern) flank units would at first assume a defensive stance. Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin and South Army, the latter a new allied military entity created in early January 1915 consisting of units from both allied armies, would provide active support in the lower Carpathian Mountain region south of the Third Army’s projected operation. For Habsburg Supreme Command, a major impediment to planning such a major offensive involved the continuing lack of reserve units and reinforcements to replenish the already casualty-riddled ranks.
The success of General Conrad’s ambitious plan hinged on proper timing, the element of surprise, and maintaining close cooperation between the participating armies. If the offensive succeeded, the Russians would be unable to transfer reinforcements rapidly enough to launch a counterstroke once the action had commenced. Habsburg troops had to traverse the difficult winter Carpathian Mountain terrain to ultimately debouch onto the Galician plains. Conrad’s plans, however, failed to consider numerous critical factors that ultimately sabotaged the success of the campaign, including the shortage of railroad lines to the intended offensive operational area. With only four low-capacity railroad lines serving the Carpathian Mountain region, troop and supply movements remained severely limited over the circuitous routes. Providing regular food and ammunition supplies to the troops posed a serious logistical challenge that the Habsburg military never resolved. Furthermore, the earlier 1914 battles and harsh weather and mountain conditions left Austro-Hungarian troops exhausted, benumbed, and demoralized. General Conrad failed to give enough consideration to the inherent difficulties associated with the rugged mountain terrain, especially during winter months.
The Russians, on the other hand, possessed several significant advantages for launching their own campaign in early 1915, including well-constructed defensive positions established on higher terrain than those of their Habsburg counterparts, similar to the German situation on the western front. In addition, tsarist artillery remained far superior to the Habsburgs’ because of its greater accuracy and range. Russia’s better-developed railroad network also facilitated more-rapid transport of troops and supplies to the mountain front. Most significantly, the Russians’ recapture of vital Carpathian Mountain passes and ridges in late December 1914 provided them with a major strategic advantage for any operation on the mountainous terrain early in 1915.
Prior to the fall 1914 Carpathian Mountain military operations, neither the Russian nor the Austro-Hungarian commanders had experienced prolonged mountain winter battles, certainly not in a total war environment. In early January, meanwhile, it appeared to Habsburg Supreme Command that Stavka had reinforced its Carpathian units. The western front had settled into protracted trench warfare in late December 1914 and early 1915, and the Balkan arena remained quiescent after disease and battle decimated the Serbian army following its successful December 1914 campaign against the Austro-Hungarian invaders. These events set the stage for those that would follow.
General Ivanov had already planned to launch a major military operation in the Carpathian Mountains with the objectives of destroying the Habsburg armies, invading Hungary, and persuading neutral Italy and Romania to join the Entente. With their multiple railroad lines in close proximity to their Galician southwest front, the Russians could easily launch an offensive and transport significant supplies, troops, and reinforcements when it became necessary. However, at a meeting in Siedlice on January 17, 1915, Stavka determined that its main 1915 military effort would be to initiate a major offensive against Germany in continuation of its 1914 Vistula River campaign. The Austro-Hungarian front would therefore be relegated to a secondary theater.
As frequently occurred, however, Stavka had divided counsel, which enabled General Ivanov to focus on preparing for an early 1915 Carpathian Mountain campaign.1 Ivanov requested reinforcements from Stavka, insisting that his weak siege troops at Fortress Przemyśl could not repel a major Habsburg attack or the serious German troop numbers that had recently been deployed against his units. He emphasized that only two cavalry divisions currently defended key tsarist positions in the area between the Uzsok Pass and important Baligrod positions. He further projected that an invasion of Hungary would require additional troops as well as numerous mountain artillery batteries because of the treacherous terrain and inclement weather conditions that negatively affected regular artillery batteries’ effectiveness. The tsarist southwest front commander insisted that a major military victory against the Habsburgs was feasible and would simultaneously provide political capital vis-à-vis the neutral powers. Ivanov succeeded in acquiring XII Corps and six mountain artillery batteries as reinforcements on January 26. These reinforcements, originally destined for the projected offensive against Germany, weakened Romanov Tenth Army efforts against the Germans in that campaign and worked to the disadvantage of later tsarist efforts during the second battle of the Masurian Lakes in early February 1915. Meanwhile, General Ivanov finalized his plans on January 20 to launch a frontal assault on the Carpathian Mountain front and invade Hungary to knock the Dual Monarchy out of the war. Neither he nor General Conrad had any idea what a horrible effect this would have on their troops and themselves.
The turning point in the fortress’s fate came in 1915 because there was little chance of a timely liberation of the citadel due to the distance and severe winter mountain climate and terrain. Within the fortress itself, hunger and rationing increasingly weakened the troops’ physical condition and left them unable to launch any effective major sorties. Battle fatigue, hunger, sickness, and frostbite permeated the ranks, rendering many of the men unfit for military duty altogether. The declining effectiveness of the Habsburg armed forces worried the German High Command; the threat of neutral nations entering the war made it crucial that they provide aid to the floundering Austro-Hungarian army.
Fortress Przemyśl’s steadily worsening food situation and the deteriorating condition of its troops placed additional pressure on General Conrad to quickly initiate military action to liberate the citadel as soon as possible. In January, he ordered General Kusmanek to designate a minimal fortress defensive force to protect the bulwark. The remaining garrison troops had to launch an offensive to attempt to break through the Russian encirclement. The defensive force had the mission of destroying any important military objects within the fortress that the enemy could utilize after the bastion’s capitulation. With that mission completed, the garrison troops would join their fellow units in the offensive breakthrough attempt. During the latter part of January, General Kusmanek reorganized fortress troops in preparation for the projected efforts.
Meanwhile, General Conrad’s German counterpart, General Falkenhayn, began to fear the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army in early 1915 and thus begrudgingly designated four newly formed strategic German reserve corps, originally destined to participate in a western front offensive operation, to now be deployed in East Prussia to conduct a campaign to support the Habsburg Carpathian Mountain offensive operations. This infusion of German troops resulted in the second battle of the Masurian Lakes in early February, which, despite being a great German tactical success, provided no significant strategic advantage. The 375-kilometer distance between the German and Austro-Hungarian allied fronts also precluded any major positive effect on General Conrad’s Carpathian Mountain operation.
Harboring serious reservations concerning Conrad’s Carpathian Mountain offensive plans, Falkenhayn initially informed his Habsburg counterpart that he could not spare any additional German troops to support his approaching offensive operation. Furthermore, Entente troops outnumbered his forces by a two-to-one margin on the western front. Falkenhayn cited multiple arguments against General Conrad’s plans for launching a January Carpathian Mountain offensive. He contended that the distance separating the allied armies was much too extensive to achieve a major victory.2 He also cited the critical shortage of traversable roads and high-capacity rail lines as well as the inevitable communications and logistical problems that the army would encounter in winter mountain warfare. Conrad’s German counterpart further suggested that he might win a few local victories, simply forcing the Russians back, but not a decisive triumph. He also declared that the operation would not influence Italy and Romania. General Conrad, however, reiterated the necessity of launching the major mountain campaign particularly because of the increasing tsarist military presence in the region and the pressing necessity to liberate Fortress Przemyśl. Falkenhayn further argued that since the Save and Danube Rivers had frozen over, the Balkan front posed no imminent military danger to Austria-Hungary. Claiming that sufficient troop numbers existed to repel a Serbian attack, Conrad rapidly transferred entire corps units from that front to the Carpathian Mountain theater. The Fortress Przemyśl dilemma continued to dictate Conrad’s military operations to Habsburg disadvantage for the next several months.
Falkenhayn offered a counter suggestion that Conrad launch an offensive on the Serbian, rather than the Russian, front. He argued that heavy casualties, disease, privations, and material shortages had severely weakened the Serbian army. He also insisted that a military victory over Serbia would help restore lost Habsburg prestige because of the embarrassing 1914 Balkan front defeats. Conrad, in turn, responded that a Balkan campaign was simply not feasible; he simply could not spare any troops from the Russian front and brazenly repeated a request for German reinforcements to be deployed for his offensive endeavor. Falkenhayn’s numerous and sound negative arguments failed to deter Conrad from continuously insisting that his ally provide the necessary troops to prevail against Russia on the eastern front. To his utter dismay, Falkenhayn unexpectedly learned that during late December the Habsburg army had retreated fifty kilometers into the Carpathian Mountains.
Habsburg troops were in a most unfavorable situation prior to launching Conrad’s major offensive. Combat strength declined at a disturbing rate owing to cold-related casualties and low morale. Troops were not equipped to deal with the severe winter mountain conditions. Discipline had become a problem in several units, and many troops simply lacked the physical strength necessary to mount an effective resistance. Exposure often proved a more serious threat than enemy fire, and the horrendous weather wreaked havoc on operational timetables, especially when vital supplies could not be delivered by rail. Mountain train wrecks halted troop unit efforts in their tracks and disrupted the operational timetables critical for success.
During January 1915, a fortress civilian diarist noted multiple interesting facts. She wrote, “We do not have time to talk because of days of great work on the fortress works.” It had become a do-or-die situation for the fortress, but the citadel inhabitants considered their duties ended. Sadly, on January 5, the last great sortie, which strove to attain liberation on New Year’s Day, did not have the hoped-for success. Thus, the diarist recorded that it was a “severe blow to the fortress.” Earlier New Year’s greetings over the radio ended with the exciting words “We are coming!” from the Second and Third Armies. The conviction grew within the place d’armes that “we will be freed before the winter is out,” but the inhabitants also recognized that, because of the severe winter mountain conditions, it would be almost impossible for any Habsburg advance in the Carpathian Mountains to succeed. In fact, the field armies floundered in the deep snow during the particularly severe winter conditions. Casualty numbers drastically increased from rampant illness and frostbite, and the Third Army, the main offensive force, would sacrifice almost one hundred thousand troops by February 6, 1915.3
The diarist also indicated that the Orthodox Christmas (January 7) produced a brief pause in the fighting. Tsarist officers exchanged good wishes with Habsburg officers, trading cigarettes for “sardines and salami. This irony is happily laughed at throughout the fortress.” The holiday spirits, however, proved to be short-lived.4
A further entry on January 15 explained that horse meat had become more important with each passing day because the military and civilian population now existed almost entirely on it. This presented a problem for the Jewish population, which could not eat the meat, but garrison troops had already been consuming horseflesh for three to four weeks. For variety, cooks prepared it into wurst and goulash and cut it into small pieces to add to rice soup as well. Although it tasted terrible, no alternative existed. Fortress inhabitants even attempted to utilize horse lard to expand their meal contents. In contrast, before the second siege commenced, some officer messes had their own chicken coops, calves, and pigs.5
Under the increasingly desperate circumstances, food prices rose sharply. Women farmers brought hens to the market, selling them for twenty kronen or more. People purchased them in spite of the now exorbitant prices, but inflation had left money almost entirely worthless. A piglet now cost five hundred kronen and a cow up to one thousand kronen.
On January 1, a garrison troop stand report did not mention or describe the troops’ or horses’ physical condition. Many soldiers could not perform forefield duty. The reduction in food rations and the lack of winter equipment or uniforms resulted in ever-increasing exhaustion, illness, frostbite, and freezing to death. Some sources claimed that two hundred soldiers succumbed each day to exhaustion alone, but this has not been confirmed. During the siege, twenty-four thousand men would be listed as incapable of service. At least 4,500 wounded soldiers remained in hospitals and 1,280 were listed as invalids. A sufficient number of horses no longer existed for fortress duties, and the few available animals had been starved and driven to skin and bones. The January 3 pause in battle between the opposing Habsburg and Romanov armies may have spared troops the dangers of combat, but the conditions on the front made day-to-day survival extremely difficult.
A January 15 fortress report calculated that the slaughter of thirty-five hundred additional horses would extend the garrison’s food supply until March 7. Recognizing the increasingly dire food situation within the citadel, Russian siege troops joked about how at Troy the warriors rode inside the Trojan horse, while at Fortress Przemyśl the horses ended up in the bellies of the defending troops.6 Also during January, rutabaga replaced other vegetables for the garrison diet. Desperation led to increasing troop desertions, especially in the case of Slavic troops, particularly Ruthenians who lived within the fortress region. All Slavic soldiers, but particularly Ruthenians, were most unhappy about fighting their Russian cousins.
Crime also became more frequent at all levels of society. Many soldiers, by now dressed in rags, begged for pieces of bread or a bowl of hot soup from civilians. Others risked the death penalty by looting private apartments. Courts martial punished supply officers when they gave away food, but discipline soon collapsed completely. To retain at least some semblance of normalcy, the 23rd Honvéd Infantry Division band performed regularly in the main square for soldiers and civilians alike, while movie theaters showed old films.
The Carpathian Mountain front also remained isolated from other Habsburg operational theaters, while division and corps fronts were spread too thinly on the torturous mountain terrain, making the threat of an enemy breakthrough a constant concern. Relative to troop quality, the Ersatz (replacement troops) were not adequately trained or supplied. They also contained highly unreliable national elements such as the Ruthenians.
On January 5, the first airmail letters left the fortress environs. Three aircraft carried 140 kilograms of postage to the fortress one day later. Also on January 6, Fortress Przemyśl Post Office Number 1 opened and established regular flights between Kraków and Fortress Przemyśl.7
The Habsburg Third Army situation in the Carpathian Mountains remained passive. All attempts to advance toward the fortress encountered serious resistance. Additional reports emphasized the shortage of officers and lack of effective artillery support, while heavy snowfall and meter-deep snow hampered visibility, forward movement, and artillery fire accuracy. When General Conrad again requested reinforcements from the Germans, he was promised one division but was refused further requests from early January through February 25 despite the fact that the Carpathian offensive was originally supposed to be reinforced with four to five German divisions.
As the date for launching Conrad’s Carpathian Mountain offensive approached, everyone remained well aware that time was running out for the fortress. The food situation required immediate action. To make matters worse, Conrad’s Russian counterpart, General Ivanov, planned to attack and seize the Dukla Pass and the Laborcz valley. If Ivanov succeeded, Russian forces would control Mezölaborcz, a vital railroad and communications center. Conrad allowed these circumstances to dictate his strategy, which partially explains the desperate and deadly frontal assaults that were launched.
On January 9, the commander of Fortress Przemyśl issued an order allowing the delivery of citadel mail by paper balloons. All postcards received a special “Balloon Fortress Przemyśl 1915” stamp. The balloons were constructed from varnished wrapping paper to be as light as possible and small enough to avoid easy detection. A load of eight cubic meters of illuminating gas could carry approximately five to six pounds of mail. The balloon then had to ascend into the air and travel about 120 kilometers over the front and enemy-occupied territory.8
On January 11, the two chiefs of their General Staffs met at Breslau to agree on future offensive operations.9 On the next day, the danger of Romanian intervention increased because the Russians had occupied almost all of the Bukovina near the Transylvanian frontier. The situation had become increasingly unfavorable, and only successful military action could forestall further difficulties. If tsarist troops entered the eastern Dual Monarchy territory, Romania would almost certainly decide to intervene. General Falkenhayn suggested that Viennese leaders buy Bucharest’s neutrality through diplomacy by surrendering territory rather than risking another Carpathian Mountain offensive. The Habsburg position, however, held that negotiations would be absolutely worthless; only a military victory could avert the danger.10
By 1915, the Austro-Hungarian army bore little resemblance to the proud force that had mobilized during July 1914. The opening August–September and fall 1914 campaigns, as mentioned, had resulted in most professional soldiers becoming casualties. The enormous number of Miliz, or militia troops, had reduced the Habsburg army to an improvised force of reservists. The official Austrian history of the war described the 1915 army as a Volksheer (People’s Army) because of the catastrophic battlefield casualties involving professional soldiers, leaving only reserve officers and new recruits to continue the battle. The multivolume publication Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg (Austria-Hungary’s Last War) claims that the Habsburg army sustained 800,000 casualties during the January 23 to mid-April 1915 Carpathian Mountain Winter War campaign, which attempted to break the siege of Fortress Przemyśl and liberate the 130,000-troop garrison. Due to the universal inaccuracy in assessing casualties, the losses could very well have been much greater. Official reports failed to mention that the majority of casualties did not result from combat action; rather, many of the troops succumbed to der weisse Tod (the White Death), or froze to death, suffered from frostbite, or succumbed to serious lung or intestinal illness.
The large, hostile Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population that inhabited much of the Carpathian Mountain region was sympathetic to the Russians, with whom they shared religious practices and language. This made the theater even more dangerous for Habsburg soldiers, and the presence of so many Ruthenian troops within the fortress increased the other soldiers’ paranoia. Many Ruthenians were found guilty of treason and hanged. In addition, the influx of the supposedly unreliable Romanian and Czech/Slovak replacement troops on the Habsburg eastern front reputedly resulted in mass troop desertions. According to the Habsburg military High Command, this disturbing trend, especially relative to the Czechs, continued throughout the Carpathian winter campaigns and the remainder of the war, fueled by antimilitary and antidynastic propaganda from the hinterland.11 This has recently been proven to be largely a myth.
During January 1915, thirty-five Habsburg infantry divisions opposed twenty-nine tsarist units on the Carpathian Mountain front. South of Fortress Przemyśl, a 140-kilometer line led to the Uzsok Pass and then extended another 250 kilometers to the Romanian frontier. The fortress’s three-and one-half starving divisions countered four infantry and two cavalry tsarist siege divisions.
Meanwhile, General Conrad commenced transferring troops from the other Habsburg fronts into the Carpathian Mountains in preparation for his January offensive. For example, V Corps, designated to secure the Third Army’s weak right flank positions in the offensive effort, arrived from the northern Habsburg First Army front. Troops already deployed on the mountain terrain encountered enormous obstacles, including snowbound roadways that transformed into seas of mud during thaws. At most other times, these areas experienced deep snow and icy conditions. Sleds transported supplies and artillery batteries into the higher elevations, where the transport and emplacement of artillery pieces proved increasingly difficult. Numerous Habsburg artillery batteries were abandoned behind the rearward lower-level mountain ridges. Without this artillery support, attacking troops suffered enormous casualties. Poor visibility (fog and snow) and frigid weather did not deter Russian activity around Fortress Przemyśl. Citing the dwindling food supplies, General Kusmanek inquired of General Conrad whether the fortress would be liberated in the near future or whether he should plan to launch an effort to break through enemy lines to attempt to reach the field armies. Conrad delayed responding to the fortress commander’s query to await results from his initial Carpathian Mountain offensive efforts, which commenced on January 23, 1915. Meanwhile, garrison troops continued to forage for food around the fortress perimeter.
General Conrad, increasingly concerned about the fortress’s worsening food crisis, ordered General Kusmanek to devise a plan for a major breakout operation to be launched by mid-February. Meanwhile, the tsarist troops tightened their siege on the fortress. The New Year brought even stricter food rationing; bread portions were reduced by one-quarter and animal feed mixed with food for human consumption to quell the troops’ hunger pangs. The slaughter of horses, despite providing additional sustenance and increasing the supply of oats for human consumption, seriously reduced fortress mobility because of the troops’ declining physical condition.
The fortress commander requested medicine to be delivered to the bulwark because supplies had run dangerously low by mid-December. On January 17, 1915, General Kusmanek requisitioned narcotics, chloroform, camphor, glycerin, insecticide, antidiuretic gastric juice, codeine, castor oil, and other such supplies. Airplanes flew medicine to the citadel but were seriously limited by how much weight they could carry. The fortress had meanwhile run out of important medicinal needs such as aspirin, codeine, and alcohol by February 1915.
Fortress inhabitants also had to contend with intermittent artillery and airplane bombardments from Russian siege forces. According to a January 18 civilian diary entry, the attacks did much to worsen an already difficult situation: “There were anxious moments during the entire day as Russian airplanes encircled the fortress. Shrapnel shells fell on numerous occasions, therefore, there was no quiet. Fortress airplanes attempted to intercept the enemy aircraft and individual soldier rifle fire. The bombings did some damage but the main effect was psychological.” Thousands of windows had been destroyed, while supplies and replacement items disappeared from store shelves. Many windows were covered with paper or other material, but observers claimed that the civilian inhabitants reportedly did not complain.12
As the launch of the Habsburg Carpathian Mountain offensive approached in late January, heavy rain, a change in the weather, turned road surfaces into rivers of mud. Soldiers struggled to navigate through the quagmire, supply columns became bogged down, and reconnaissance efforts were severely hampered. Nevertheless, Habsburg troops had to launch the offensive to break the Russian siege of Fortress Przemyśl.
Reports emanating from the fortress indicated that the enemy had transferred troops from its Uzsok Pass mountain positions and deployed two further divisions in the citadel area. General Conrad commenced his Carpathian Mountain offensive operations during late January, February, and mid-March mainly because the time pressure to liberate Fortress Przemyśl left no alternative. Meanwhile, Russian forces continued to hurl Habsburg defenders back from the critical Dukla Pass region in an effort to seize the key railroad and communications junction at Mezölaborcz. Its capture in early February crippled all future Habsburg attempts to liberate the fortress.
The Third and South Armies would launch deadly frontal assaults against strong tsarist defensive positions. In the face of steadily deteriorating weather conditions on January 21, twelve Third Army divisions deployed along the 100-kilometer front prepared to commence the offensive operation while some field army units deployed a mere sixty kilometers from the fortress. The stage had been set for history’s first protracted mountain warfare in the age of total war.
During the next several months, Generals Ivanov and Conrad doggedly pursued their individual strategies, both disregarding the potentially enormous human cost. Ivanov failed to appreciate the danger for the Russians should major tsarist units be drawn too deeply into the frigid Carpathian Mountain ranges. Moreover, if his forces advanced too far into the mountains, the tsarist northern (German) flank would become exposed. Meanwhile, General Conrad ordered his weakened Third Army to launch the frontal attack along the shortest route to the fortress. As the Russian and Austro-Hungarian commanders prepared to unleash their respective Carpathian Mountain offensives, they did not foresee that eventually two-thirds of the Habsburg armed forces and four Russian armies would become embroiled in the enormous mountain struggle.
From the outset of the offensive, which began on January 23, 1915, the Habsburg army’s haste in launching an offensive put the participating troops in a terrible tactical situation. Prior to the attack, unit combat strength had declined at an alarming rate, primarily due to cold-related casualties; subzero temperatures, deep snow, and bitter wind blasted troops still wearing summer uniforms. Lacking regular meals, they suffered from every imaginable form of deprivation, which in turn produced a steep decline in morale, discipline, and physical stamina. There could be no adjusting to the unimaginably brutal winter mountain environment; every day became a struggle for survival.
Once the offensive commenced, supply difficulties not only persisted but grew consistently worse. Destroyed railroad lines and tunnels had to be repaired, damaged bridges had to be rebuilt, and train stations required constant maintenance. The inferior roads in Galicia could be utilized only by lighter (panja) Polish wagons. Potholes harassed troop and supply columns but proved even more dangerous for unwary horses. It required a gargantuan effort to maintain the roadways in usable condition. Snow had to be shoveled continually due to the heavy snowstorms. Trees and horse carcasses became temporary expedients to prevent wagons from sinking into the mire up to their axles. The conditions proved a logistical nightmare for moving large military formations, reinforcements, artillery, and basic supplies into the war theater. Mountain slopes and ridgelines often forced advancing columns to make uncoordinated and isolated attacks in the often man-high snow.
Reacting to the time pressure to liberate Fortress Przemyśl, General Conrad gambled that the temporary break in the inclement weather conditions would continue. However, to his troops’ misfortune, a sudden blizzard struck the Carpathian Mountain front, causing Habsburg troops to have to battle two fierce adversaries: tenacious Russian soldiers and fearsome weather conditions. Before they could advance, Habsburg troops exhausted themselves either shoveling through the deep snow or hacking their way one step at a time up the ice-covered mountain slopes. Dense fog at higher elevations further exacerbated the difficult situation, frequently shrouding the mountain terrain from view, thus preventing artillery support for the infantry. A pre–main offensive undertaking to recapture the Uzsok Pass, launched on January 22, failed to achieve its objective because the deep snow and dense fog conditions wreaked havoc on the operational timetables so critical for Habsburg success. The horrendous weather, in conjunction with the terrain conditions, often halted the attacking units in their tracks, while frostbite and exposure constantly posed an increasingly greater threat to Habsburg troops than enemy rifle fire. Numerous pack animals also succumbed to the conditions, often faltering on the slippery mountain slopes and falling to their deaths.
Intermittent periods of warming weather often replaced the blizzard conditions, which melted the snow and produced concomitant flooding everywhere, particularly in the valley areas. The horrific turn of events prompted one Habsburg officer to lament, “It’s as if heaven is against us!”13
The main Habsburg attacking force, the Third Army, had expanded to fifteen infantry and four cavalry divisions for the operation. The newly created neighboring South Army, composed of new German and Austro-Hungarian troop units, would protect the Third Army’s right flank area and also attack, but significant mountain terrain features created a major barrier between the two armies. The Third Army’s 175,000-man attack force proved far too weak to accomplish its Herculean mission to launch a frontal assault on a one-hundred-kilometer-wide front. South Army would attack along a sixty-kilometer area. The expansive front and insufficient troop numbers also forced many units to attack in single-file formations because of the lack of manpower. Given the circumstances, the offensive operation’s dual mission of enveloping the tsarist extreme left flank positions and liberating Fortress Przemyśl proved quite impossible to achieve. A combined twenty and one-half divisions launched the offensive on January 23. Meanwhile, on the entire Galician front, forty-one Habsburg infantry and eight cavalry divisions opposed thirty-eight tsarist infantry and fifteen cavalry divisions, which possessed much larger troop stands.14
The artillery movement and placement in the mountain war theater proved to be a monumental hindrance to operational success and would never be adequately resolved during the three Carpathian Mountain winter campaigns. Habsburg Supreme Command had failed to overcome this critical disadvantage during the November and December 1914 campaigns, which should have served as a stark warning of worse things to come once winter weather fully arrived. The often unavoidable and excessive preparation delays encountered before launching the initial effort gave the Russians adequate time to initiate effective countermeasures. In addition, several infantry divisions designated to participate in the offensive did not arrive in a timely manner for the actual launching of the endeavor, a factor that would haunt all Carpathian Mountain operations. These combined factors did not bode well for the initial offensive success intended to liberate Fortress Przemyśl.
The offensive proceeded in stages, but the countless unfavorable conditions impeded that effort. Mountain ridgelines and slopes separated the advancing columns from each other, resulting in uncoordinated, individual, and isolated attack efforts. Furthermore, the Third Army could not advance if the neighboring Fourth and South Armies did not achieve forward progress on their respective fronts because of the resulting serious threat to the Third Army’s flank positions. The ice and heavy snow also damaged telegraph and telephone lines, and the lack of reliable wire communications severely hampered operations.
Biting winds exacerbated the terrible conditions; attacking troops achieved only slow, tedious progress through the often man-high snowdrifts. Even if the initial offensive operation had proved successful, the lack of reserve formations signified that the troops could not long maintain attack momentum, particularly at the most crucial portions of the front. As casualties mounted, front lines became overextended, making it impossible for the surviving troops to provide even adequate defensive coverage over the wide frontal area. The major Attack Group Puhallo advanced northward into a forty-kilometer gap in the Russian lines toward Lisko-Sanok south of Fortress Przemyśl on a mission to seize these key occupied tsarist railroad and road connections. This elusive objective remained Conrad’s goal throughout the 1915 Carpathian Mountain campaigns. If those key railroad locations could be captured, the enemy could not supply its troops. However, Group Puhallo’s attack force lacked sufficient troop numbers to successfully complete this crucial mission. General Conrad failed to concentrate his limited manpower at the main attack, instead allowing excessive troop numbers to provide flank protection for the operation. This resulted in thrusting the few available reinforcements piecemeal into battle to no positive effect.
Soon after the inadequate three-division main Group Puhallo force advanced, a twenty-kilometer gap formed separating its troop formations. Because there were no reserve units, this dangerous situation could not be rectified. Tsarist military leadership quickly recognized the dangerous Habsburg military predicament and, on January 26, 1915, launched a massive counteroffensive: General Ivanov’s previously planned offensive. Meanwhile, the horrendous conditions continued along critical supply routes; road maintenance crews found it impossible to complete the arduous task of keeping the roads open. Landsturm and regular army units had to assist in maintaining the travel routes. Efforts to keep snowbound railroad stretches clear faltered as well due to the shortage of labor crews. Heavy snowfall, fog, and deep snowdrifts hampered visibility and artillery transport. Consequently, Habsburg troops also regularly experienced a critical shortage of equipment, ammunition stores, and food supplies. The few defending Russian forces put up fierce resistance before retreating to newly prepared defensive positions, allowing the terrain, heavy snow, and ice to hinder the progress of the attackers. The dangerous cycle of severe casualties and thinning extended troop front lines doomed the surviving Habsburg troops, who had to remain in their positions for weeks without any rest or rehabilitation.
As the major Habsburg offensive commenced, everyday necessities continued to disappear in Fortress Przemyśl. The shortage of leather forced both military and civilian personnel to wear damaged shoes and boots. Boot soles had to be replaced with rags.15 At the listening posts before the fortress perimeter walls, duty soldiers wore sandals that fit over their boots. Because of the accelerating lack of basic goods, factories were constructed inside the citadel, since the bulwark could not expect any assistance from the homeland. In one factory, they constructed a machine that mixed wood shavings with salt and other substitutes for flour. The factories also produced other products, such as soap, because there had been none available to wash clothes for some time. Anything that could be useful was collected from local farmers and fortress city inhabitants because most raw materials had been consumed. Horse feed became a major problem because of the thousands of animals in the fortress. Many would be slaughtered to feed the troops, which also conserved supplies of oats. Any horse meat not consumed was made into conserves.
The Zündholz question, a burning one in the literal sense of the word, related to the shortage of matches necessary for light, warmth, and food. A fortress commander order demanded that everyone conserve matches and that none be removed from the fortress magazine without permission. This was strongly regulated; each day, two soldiers received one match, with the matches often further divided into two or three pieces. Every morning, the troops passed them around to light cigarettes and pipes, while in the hospitals they were passed from bed to bed. Many troops became specialists at stretching their meager supplies and quickly learned how to conserve valuable items.
The inhabitants of Fortress Przemyśl desperately desired to be informed about efforts to liberate them. Because they were cut off from the outside world, garrison newspapers became very significant even as paper supplies grew scarce. Printed in different colors for each language, the newspapers appeared in German, Hungarian, and Polish. The citadel regularly received radiograms later published under the title of war reports in the daily editions that circulated on the streets. People stood outside their homes, guesthouses, restaurants, and local stores in the morning to receive a copy; everywhere people anticipated receiving the latest news. Young people ran through the city streets delivering the latest edition and, for a brief time, became the most important people in the citadel as they shouted the news throughout the fortress environs. People rushed out of their homes or buildings without hats or coats to stand in the cold to read the latest copy, hands shaking in anticipation. Even wagons traveling through the streets stopped so that their drivers could read the news; people held onto the papers for dear life even in the snow. Specifically, everyone craved reports about the field armies’ attempts to liberate the fortress.16
On January 24, General Ivanov informed Stavka that reinforced Habsburg troops and numerous German units had attacked his weakly held positions. Further claiming that the Habsburg offensive’s ultimate objective remained the relief of Fortress Przemyśl, the general requested four to five infantry divisions as reinforcements so that he could launch his offensive. On January 26, Stavka released the XII Corps and six mountain artillery batteries so that Ivanov could launch a major Carpathian Mountain front offensive to prevent the loss of Fortress Przemyśl. Meanwhile, the attacking Habsburg field army troops, delayed by snowfall and dense fog, encountered multiple difficulties when preparing to continue their advance on January 25, while they futilely attempted to reconquer the main Carpathian Mountain ridgelines that had been surrendered to the Russians during December 1914 battles.
The required Habsburg Third and South Armies’ cooperative efforts failed largely because of the rugged mountain terrain that separated the two armies. Neither gained a significant tactical advantage over its opponent or overcame the unfavorable weather and terrain conditions. South Army units, delayed by the necessity of shoveling through chest-deep snow, advanced scarcely ten kilometers. The resulting troop exhaustion further retarded rapid forward movement and lowered troop morale.
Unbeknownst to Habsburg leaders, the Russians had assembled major troop contingents in preparation to initiate their own major counteroffensive. The Habsburg Third Army’s efforts to expand its meager right flank military successes proved elusive, while enemy resistance to its left flank efforts forced them back to their starting positions. The main attack group meanwhile proved unable to attain its goals, thus the fierce battle that raged between the Dukla and Uzsok Passes produced a turning point in Habsburg military fortunes.
On January 26 and 27, the Russians attacked Fortress Przemyśl’s forefield positions at Pod Mazurami–Helica and advanced their siege lines closer to the fortress perimeter. Citadel observers witnessed Russian reinforcements, as well as artillery units, approaching Defensive District VIII. Reportedly, the entire 81st Russian Reserve Infantry Division had deployed before that area, while tsarist Infantry Regiments 321 and 322 deployed in the San River left flank area.17
On January 26, the major tsarist counteroffensive forces smashed into the Third Army’s left and middle positions. The already weakened and battered Habsburg troops could not withstand the assault and sustained additional heavy casualties while being forced rearward to their original positions. The tsarist operation preempted the Third Army offensive effort and dashed any possibility of further Habsburg offensive plans in the near future. The tsarist troops skillfully utilized the most direct route to Budapest through the Dukla Pass; as a result, the ensuing battle of attrition produced enormous casualties. On the Habsburg Third Army front, three corps now protected the key invasion route to Hungary, an expansive seventy-seven-kilometer front that extended between the Dukla and Lupkov Passes.18
The Russian objective in entering the strategic Laborcz valley was to sever the main Habsburg railroad connections, effectively driving a wedge between their armies and neutralizing the threat of the major Habsburg attacking force. Success would also terminate any efforts to liberate Fortress Przemyśl. As Habsburg defensive lines along the South and Third Army fronts buckled under the weight of the tsarist onslaught, apathy and battle fatigue wore the troops down. The Austrian official history of the war concedes that the initial territorial gains made during the first Carpathian Mountain offensive did not justify the bloodletting or the physical and moral suffering of the troops. The Habsburg military situation quickly became untenable. the Third Army, having sacrificed nearly 80 percent of its troop stands, including the thirty thousand replacement troops it received, reported that it could no longer conduct offensive action because of the terrible weather conditions, its excessive casualties, and superior enemy troop numbers.
The Russians’ frontal assaults in December that enabled them to seize all the important Carpathian Mountain ridges gave General Ivanov a tremendous advantage for his January 1915 offensive plans to capture the remaining key mountain positions needed for an invasion of Hungary. On January 28, Russian assault troops forced the Third Army’s left flank III Corps to retreat to its reward positions. The continued enemy pressure also negatively affected Fourth Army southern flank units, which received orders to launch an offensive in the coming days in conjunction with the Third Army’s operation. VII Corps also had to retreat when the enemy attacked its 1st Cavalry Division and pushed it to the south, which forced the corps’ 2nd and 20th Landwehr Infantry Divisions back even farther. Snow and fog prohibited launching any air reconnaissance missions.
By concentrating their main forces against the Third Army, the Russians suddenly threatened Mezölaborcz.19 As the main railroad and communications center in the region, Mezölaborcz was critical for any operation hoping to liberate Fortress Przemyśl. General Ivanov recognized that capturing it would stymie all Habsburg efforts to relieve the citadel. On January 29, the Russians launched another major assault into the Laborcz valley with the objective of seizing the city. The campaign would eventually culminate with the surrender of the critical position on February 5 following brutal battle under the worst possible weather conditions.
Weather played a significant role during all three Carpathian Mountain offensives, just as it had during the October to December 1914 campaigns. Moving supply trains and artillery pieces under the prevailing winter weather conditions posed an enormous challenge. Heavy Habsburg ammunition wagons bogged down in the mud. The weather, including persistent cloud cover that enveloped the mountain regions until noon, also stymied reconnaissance efforts; many air reconnaissance missions had to be canceled. The mountainous terrain quickly exhausted the troops as they struggled to advance. Snow had to be shoveled from lengthy stretches of railroad track as well as roadways. Skis and sleds often served as the only viable mode of transporting men and material. Marches and troop deployments experienced serious delays as sudden melting conditions caused flooding in the valleys, sweeping away bridges and inundating troop positions. These factors added significantly to the mental and physical exhaustion of the troops.
The conditions also proved harmful to the health and well-being of the animals. Horses sank to their bellies in the deep snow. Many starved to death due to the lack of feed combined with extreme physical exertion. Horses had proven a critical resource for many aspects of the mountain campaign, and their loss adversely affected supply efforts. The resulting stoppages or slowing of supplies hampered battlefield planning and the implementation of all three Carpathian Mountain offensives.
Meanwhile, fortress personnel raised money for widows and orphans of those who died defending the fortress, including pilots. Everyone donated, even wounded soldiers, officers, and civilians. At the same time, much concern centered on the surviving soldiers, called “poor devils,” who desperately sought bread because of the reduced garrison rations. One thousand civilians had to be fed in the area of Wapowa alone. Several reservist troops were accomplished singers, cello players, pianists, and the like. Someone composed a “Kusmanek March,” played at every public concert with the usual accompanying patriotic songs. General Kusmanek was supposedly beloved not only by garrison troops but by civilians as well. During the periodic concerts when the “Kusmanek March” was played, everybody stood up and gave him a standing ovation. “Hoch Kusmanek, Heil Kusmanek! Zivio, Eljen Kusmanek, evviva!”20
On the mountain front, the winter conditions continued to make movement and battle very difficult for the battered, apathetic Habsburg troops. Habsburg troop apathy intensified particularly as a result of the persistent lack of reinforcements and the general fear of the “White Death.” Brutally cold temperatures made it too dangerous for the troops to sleep at night. Some soldiers stood up in enemy fire to escape the nightmarish situation. The battle-weary, outnumbered troops received orders to “hold to the last man,” a directive repeated so often that it soon lost any meaning. The crisis on the Habsburg front resulted in the questionable practice of hurling inadequately trained, inexperienced Ersatz replacement units into combat under the leadership of reserve officers. The troops rapidly became cannon fodder against the numerically superior enemy. No adequately trained troops could be found to stem the enemy drive. As the Habsburg military situation steadily worsened, the training time of recruits shrank to just a few weeks, ensuring that the newly minted soldiers would prove completely unprepared for the rigors of mountain battle and the concomitant severe weather conditions.21 This often resulted in their deaths.
On January 30, strong tsarist forces struck the hapless Third Army after initially concentrating their forces on both sides of the Dukla Pass and threatening the critical railroad junction. Accumulated snow made all movement very difficult in that area. On the next day, February 1, Russian artillery fired intense barrages against Habsburg defensive positions at Mezölaborcz and the defending X Corps supply trains. That corps had fought for twelve days in the open without protective cover for its troops.22 The persistent unfavorable conditions caused the troops to lose their will to fight. On that same day, a combined brigade (Infantry Regiments 81 and 82) began boarding trains to be transferred to reinforce the Third Army in an attempt to hold this critical area.
By the end of January, Russian soldiers had pursued the retreating Austro-Hungarian troops behind the main Carpathian Mountain ridges critical to preventing an invasion of Hungary. Meanwhile, it had become obvious that the weakened VII Corps troops could not maintain possession of the Dukla Pass. The increasingly dangerous, unfavorable military situation raised the question of transferring the Habsburg VIII Corps from the Balkan front to this critical portion of the Russian front.23 Something had to be done quickly to continue the so far unsuccessful attempts to reach Fortress Przemyśl.
Although resulting in a tactical victory, the German battle of Masurian Lakes failed in its intent to draw a large number of Russian troops from the Carpathian Mountain front. The battle produced no significant strategic results and had little impact on the Habsburg front. Fortress Przemyśl remained besieged.
On February 1, General Kusmanek received intelligence reports indicating that a number of tsarist siege troop units had been transferred to the Carpathian Mountain front. An airplane landed at Fortress Przemyśl carrying orders for the fortress commander to form combat-ready divisions from his garrison troops. In a worst-case scenario, a skeletal garrison force would remain in the citadel, while the other units launched a breakout effort to pierce the enemy siege lines and attempt to join the field armies. On the same day, a Habsburg airplane was shot down and the pilot and copilot captured by the enemy and shipped to a prisoner-of-war camp in Siberia.24
As Habsburg field army troops retreated, the Russians did not disturb their movement. Exhausted reinforcing soldiers marched all night in an attempt to help attain and secure the critical Mezölaborcz-Lupkov railroad line. Most infantry companies counted only thirty to forty men remaining in their ranks.
Because of the Third Army’s difficult eastern flank situation, General Conrad ordered one Fourth Army division and two and one-half additional divisions from other deployment locations to be transported by railroad to the Mezölaborcz area to strengthen that buckling army’s troops. VIII Corps would then be transferred from the Balkan theater to launch what Conrad hoped would be a decisive counteraction between February 7 and 8. Until then, the Third Army had to defend its threatened positions, which also protected the exposed South Army flanks.
On February 2, as troops fought in the snow-covered mountain forests and cold temperatures, the extreme conditions hastened their exhaustion. Thus, they offered little resistance to the enemy. The nights remained deadly, as bitter winds chilled the soldiers to the bone and snow and ice crusted their eyes. The virtually zero visibility led to many getting lost when marching, while compasses did not function in the higher elevations. Frostbite cases became rampant along the entire front.25 The number of frozen bodies encountered horrified all observers.
After twelve days of battle with no shelter in the abysmal weather, troops had become almost completely ineffective and faced catastrophe if they did not retreat soon and receive rehabilitation. X Corps’ commander reported to General Conrad that neither of his divisions could possibly halt an enemy night attack, while a serious gap had formed between III and VII Corps’ positions. The Russians continued to hammer the armies’ thin lines as the battered troops attempted to retreat.
The troops, also desperately requiring new boots, could not attack fortified enemy positions because of the deep snow and ice on the higher ridges. The soldiers, unable to find cover on the frozen terrain, could fire their rifles only while standing up. As the temperature dipped to −18°C, the extremely cold nights caused many troops to fall ill and suffer from frostbite and lung disease. Only troops on skis could move forward.26
Also on February 2, concern mounted about the continuing X and VII Corps retreat, which endangered the entire Habsburg eastern front military situation. The continually extended front lines endangered the overall situation. All units repeatedly received orders to unconditionally defend their positions, but the troops had suffered enormous hardships during the almost two weeks of constant battle. Hurling reinforcements piecemeal into the front line inferno to fill the multiple gaps in the front seriously worsened the military situation, because they should have been utilized as solid troop entities for launching counterattacks.27
Habsburg field commanders could no longer guarantee that their troops could maintain their positions, especially since the enemy closely pursued the retreating troops. In the meantime, the Balkan front VIII Corps did not arrive at the threatened mountain front area until February 9 or 10, far too late to significantly affect the battle at Mezölaborcz. On February 2, Habsburg newspapers reported that any further mail delivery to Fortress Przemyśl had been banned. Nevertheless, many people continued to write letters to their relatives and close ones besieged in the fortress, as news of the ban produced a shocked reaction throughout the Dual Monarchy. Meanwhile, the Etappen High Commander announced that the wagonloads of accumulated mail simply could not be delivered.28
In Fortress Przemyśl, according to Lieutenant Colonel Molnar, commander of Honvéd Infantry Regiment 7, one of the best circulating garrison jokes had the Russians besieging the fortress, but the garrison had to pay a great deal of money to prevent them from retreating. Meanwhile, one of his fellow officers, a captain, was arrested once again because his mistress sold canned food and fed her pigs hardtack he gave her.29 A further entry in Molnar’s diary related that until February, apart from individual artillery duels and skirmishes, the fortress had remained relatively undisturbed. But on February 9, Russian activity increased, particularly artillery fire partially aimed at various fortress strong points. As tsarist troops sapped forward, they increased the number of their bombing flights to demoralize the garrison and the civilian population. He also mentioned the arrival of Habsburg Aviatik 317 and Albatross HP 100 double-decker planes to conduct reconnaissance missions over enemy positions and supply routes as well as the established air courier service initiated between Fortresses Kraków and Przemyśl. Aviation Company (Flik) Number 11 had been stationed at Fortress Przemyśl, and Flik Number 10 at Kraków. These aircraft also maintained contact with the homeland in addition to conducting reconnaissance missions. They also delivered military orders, documents, mail, chemicals, and medicine to the fortress, but the weight of their cargo was seriously limited due to space.30
In February, as hunger intensified in the fortress, requisition committees raided apartments and homes seeking extra food and warm clothes. Soldiers’ rations, already at starvation levels, were further reduced. Troops now received only 8.8 ounces of bread daily, 2.1 cups of watery soup without any fat, and a spoonful of rice. Black, sugarless coffee supplemented the meager rations at dinner. Birch bark was ground with flour for baking and accounted for 20 percent of the citadel’s bread content. Even as conditions within the fortress deteriorated, however, the inhabitants clung stubbornly to the faint hope of rescue, as shown by a February 4 civilian diary entry:
Again the fortress is filled with rumors, one has a strong Austro-Hungarian army of fresh troops advancing in the Carpathian Mountains and heading toward the fortress. It is heartrending how everybody grasps the smallest ray of hope, even the pessimists. Every one hopes that the citadel will be liberated because they cannot last much longer and know that February would be a difficult time for all concerned. Officers and troops eat very little, they receive only the most necessary food, “we must persevere!”31
An air reconnaissance mission revealed that a seven-kilometer-long tsarist infantry and artillery column had moved toward Sanok and Bircza.32 February 3 events intensified the Habsburg crisis as the Russians continued to hammer the Habsburg VII and X Corps in the Mezölaborcz area. The Third Army received orders to gradually retreat until reinforcements could arrive to support it. Conrad expected Third Army left flank units to halt the Russian advances with the arrival of the in-transit Fourth Army reinforcements. However, during the night the enemy broke through several positions that had no reserve units or reinforcements available to assist them, baring their flanks and causing X Corps’ 2nd and VII Corps’ 20th Infantry Divisions to retreat as far as three kilometers to the south.33 The unfavorable events sharpened the developing personal friction between General Conrad and the Third Army commander, General Boroević. Weather conditions continued to negatively influence battle activity, causing half the casualties and making further retreat necessary with the cumulative severe losses, troop exhaustion, and insufficient available reserve troops. These factors worsened the already dismal chances of liberating Fortress Przemyśl.
The Russians finally entered Mezölaborcz, initiating hand-to-hand combat during a raging snowstorm. Habsburg defenders momentarily halted the attacking Russians at the only major Carpathian Mountain two-track railroad station, while enemy artillery barrages continued to pound Habsburg defensive positions and retreating supply columns. Defending X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division now consisted of only a thousand soldiers.34 Meanwhile, Russian swarm lines hurled the defending Third Army left flank forces back into the city, where they pierced the center of two infantry divisions.
When the 2nd Infantry Division flank position troops suddenly retreated, it exposed other units’ flank and rear echelon areas. In the ensuing retreat, many of the exhausted soldiers simply remained in their positions to be captured.35 The retreat occurred in extremely cold temperatures and deep snow in a densely wooded area. This time, the Russians pursued their tottering enemy relentlessly. Numerous Habsburg units were outflanked and surrounded before they could retreat, which explained the large number of prisoners of war that fell into tsarist hands. For three days, the exhausted soldiers had no regular food or supplies and suffered from increasingly numerous cases of frostbite.36 Both sides sacrificed huge numbers of troops.
General Conrad quickly conceived a plan to launch a counterstrike against the enemy utilizing the Fourth Army’s XVII Corps to commence on February 7. The five infantry and one cavalry division attack force would initiate an offensive at the Third Army’s left flank area, but the failure of that army’s units to hold their lines there temporarily negated such plans.37 Conrad then ordered the unconditional defense of Mezölaborcz while he rushed the cited combined corps to that front to fill the dangerous gap that had appeared between III and VII Corps, which threatened to result in a tsarist breakthrough of Habsburg lines.38
The retreat of these two corps seriously worsened the already desperate Habsburg military situation; both corps lost their resistance power while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. The continued snowfall required daily shoveling of positions, drastically hindering the operational situation.39
Fighting on its one-hundred-kilometer front, with no reserve forces, hampered Third Army efforts to liberate Fortress Przemyśl. The VII and X Corps had been battered in continuous combat, but frostbite accounted for many of the corps’ troop losses. Yet the reeling army received orders to recapture Mezölaborcz. X Corps had to hold its lines until XVII Corps arrived and counterattacked to relieve the pressure on them, but two of the X Corps divisions had already retreated. The critical Third Army situation now required the Fourth Army to launch an attack; but as a precondition, Third Army’s left flank forces had to maintain their present position, as it appeared likely that the Fourth Army could suffer heavy losses if they launched an offensive. Group Kritek (XVII Corps) had to transport heavy artillery pieces to the front for infantry support before they could initiate their assault.40
General Conrad originally planned to insert the in-transit VIII Corps as a unified force into the raging battle in an attempt to turn the tide and deploy the Fourth Army’s XVII Corps against the advancing Russians. As the Habsburg battlefield situation worsened, many of X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division troops were captured by the enemy, but even more suffered from frostbite. Because the corps possessed no reserve forces, it retreated, its few remaining troops manning a thirty-kilometer front (twenty-five kilometers for VII Corps). General Conrad, when ordering Third Army to maintain its positions, insisted that the enemy did not possess superior numbers.41 The military crisis had reached its high point as the outmanned and outgunned Third Army’s position worsened by the hour. Its continuing retrograde movements threatened the entire army front.
The Russian Eighth Army continued its overpowering assault against the Third Army’s left flank and middle areas on February 6 as the Third Army’s offensive efforts stalled. It rapidly became obvious that the Third Army, lacking sufficient reserve formations, could not halt the Russian advance, which commenced at the Dukla Pass and now threatened the possession of the Laborcz valley. The three decimated X Corps divisions continued to retreat. A combined offensive of the Third Army right flank forces and neighboring South Army units now provided the only hope for Fortress Przemyśl’s liberation. On February 6, continuous gunfire also erupted at the fortress’s extended Pod Mazurami forefield positions.42
By February 7, any tsarist attack could easily achieve success on any of Third Army’s front sectors. X Corps’ commander dispatched a personal letter to General Conrad explaining that his corps was in a catastrophic situation and could no longer conduct any offensive action. The inclement weather, terrain conditions, sickness and frostbite, and small troop stands could easily cause the entire operation to collapse.
Large numbers of VII Corps casualties occurred because of the great extension of the battlefront (twenty-five kilometers), which resulted in poor communication between individual units in an almost completely forested area. Snow created further difficulties, as did the poor visibility, which limited necessary supporting artillery fire. In addition, the few available reserve units were not inserted into battle rapidly enough, yet VII Corps received orders to save the offensive operation by unconditionally hurling the numerically superior enemy forces back.43 If the Fourth Army’s southern flank troops had to launch a supporting attack to reduce the pressure on the Third Army, it would occur under extremely difficult circumstances, because they would be attacking strongly fortified enemy positions. The troops would also have to shovel through one and a half to two meters of snow before they could launch an attack. And even if the Fourth Army operation succeeded, they would certainly suffer enormous losses. The lack of artillery shells also proved detrimental to the infantry.44 Meanwhile, the Lupkov Pass had been surrendered, while a Russian night attack, launched on February 7, produced further heavy Habsburg losses. XIX Corps also had to retreat after its front lines were broken through by a strong Russian assault.
On February 8, a sudden warming trend produced melting snow and flooding conditions, hindering military operations and worsening the already desperate supply problem. Once VIII Corps units arrived, the reinforced Third Army western flank forces attempted to repel the advancing enemy forces coming out of the Dukla and Lupkov Passes. The army’s eastern flank assumed a defensive posture until the reinforced Habsburg Second Army, to be transferred back to the Carpathian Mountains from Germany, could be inserted into the front lines. This led to the division of Third Army forces, some to be transferred to the soon-to-arrive Second Army. A second major offensive would eventually be launched toward the earlier objectives of Lisko-Stary-Sambor.45 The unrelenting Third Army setbacks in the Mezölaborcz area also enhanced the danger of the enemy capturing other areas vital for supplying the Habsburg army. At Fortress Przemyśl between February 8 and 10, various Honvéd units would be transferred into the city or forefield positions at Batyce. A battalion of Honvéd Infantry Regiment 7 marched toward Pod Mazurami, while further east the fourth battalion of Honvéd Infantry Regiment 8 marched to Helica. On February 7, to raise morale, many fortress inhabitants gathered at the market square to attend a concert.46
On February 9, General Boroević ordered the arriving XVII and VIII Corps to launch an attack. Two additional Fourth Army divisions received orders to transfer into the Carpathian Mountain front to help stem the tsarist tide, while the Third and Fourth Armies were to attempt to launch a cooperative offensive effort at their inner flank positions. Meanwhile, Third Army eastern flank units continued to receive the brunt of heavy Russian attacks.
According to a fortress civilian, February 9 witnessed the first true winter weather; morning temperatures dropped from −8°C to −12°C. The diarist proceeded to deplore troop conditions: “Our poor soldiers in the forefields have a difficult time, in spite of the fact that the great cold was natural and daily.” Many suffered from frostbite and would be trundled to a fortress hospital. Further, “for many weeks they have not eaten much food, their bodies no longer have the resistance power to counteract the frost and cold weather.” Reputedly, no soldiers wanted to report to sick call. At one guard post the duty officer inquired, “Are you all right, can you continue?” The soldier replied, “I can do it!” Half an hour later he collapsed and was hurried to the hospital the next day.47
Increasing casualties resulted from overexhaustion. Some field watch posts situated only three hundred paces from enemy positions could be relieved from duty only at night. Patrols dispatched from the forefield positions, many lasting for multiple hours, surrendered to the enemy because of the horrendous conditions and uncertainty about the future destiny of the fortress. Ruthenians comprised the majority of the deserters whose homes and families resided behind the siege lines. Czech, Romanian, and Hungarian troops also deserted, but the Landwehr Infantry Regiment 35 Ruthenians, who proved untrustworthy in battle, exemplified the most notable dereliction of duty.
The Russians also increased the number of bombing flights over the fortress to demoralize the civilian population, while the citadel airplane courier service continued between Fortresses Przemyśl and Kraków. Thus Habsburg Supreme Command orders, other documents, mail, and medicine continued to be delivered to the bulwark. One fortress diary entry deplored the effect the extreme tension had on the soldiers’ nerves: “Thus the people burn like a candle that is lit on both ends.” Relative to the dwindling food situation during the last several days, the food portions for the troops had improved, but for the past ten days the troops received horse meat only twice; on the other days, they ate frozen flesh and meat conserves.48
Tsarist artillery fire had been relatively quiet around the fortress environs for days, but this changed when enemy troops advanced closer to the fortress lines. Then, during the morning of February 11, enemy artillery fire intensified against the fortress, the Russians concentrating on the southern fortress perimeter with their heaviest caliber guns. Many citadel inhabitants expected the enemy to initiate storm attacks against the bulwark as enemy troops sapped closer to portions of the fortress perimeter. That day, pilots reported that long wagon columns with supplies waited to deliver food, including beer, to the fortress. There had been no beer or other basic necessities available for three months. “We learn how to live without them,” a diarist observed. The besieged troops and civilians hoped that their ordeal would end soon. They had recently been informed that the Habsburg offensive in the Bukovina and the Carpathian Mountain fronts progressed well despite the deep snow and cold weather conditions. Exhausted garrison troops perked up when they believed that the fortress would soon be liberated.49
Bread for the troops had to be prepared without milk, eggs, and yeast because only sugar, water, flour, and some sourdough were still available. The “potato catastrophe” occurred when potatoes became the only food available for meals. The civilian population ate mainly rice, potatoes, and local Polish foods. Despite this, a diarist insisted that one did not hear complaints: “Everyone thanked God if there’s food to eat at all!” In contradiction to most historical sources, that writer reported: “We are restocked more than during the first siege. During the three weeks between the first and second siege many new guns and ammunition arrived.” Radiograms reached the fortress addressed to “the heroes of Przemyśl.” “Many have heard nothing from the Hinterland for many months, thus they have no idea what is happening in the world.”50
The Habsburg Carpathian Mountain offensive efforts, however, failed largely because of the severe weather and terrain conditions and the enemy’s ability to rapidly reinforce its frontline formations. Powerful Russian attacks greatly diminished Habsburg Third Army resistance capabilities, but specifically made any further attempts to launch an offensive senseless before the Second Army could launch the next major effort to liberate Fortress Przemyśl.51
On February 12, General Conrad apprised the Emperor’s Military Chancellery of the present situation of the fortress. He stated that the second siege had now lasted for more than three months (since November 6), during which time the Russians had not seriously threatened the fortress. Thus, it could be assumed that the unsuccessful but powerful tsarist storm attacks of early October 1914 had convinced Stavka to await the arrival of heavy artillery batteries before again initiating serious military action against the citadel. Intelligence sources indicated that heavier caliber tsarist artillery had begun to arrive near the fortress. A January 27 fortress daily report mentioned the commencement of tsarist artillery barrages, which intensified in early February. The fortress could not launch a decisive sortie because of the troops’ worsening physical condition, while citadel food supplies would reportedly run out on March 7 if the fortress was not liberated by then. General Conrad ordered that any troops not absolutely essential on other Habsburg fronts be transferred to the Carpathian Mountain theater to enable the Habsburg armies to advance.52 It is unclear why this had not been done earlier to enhance offensive efforts. Field unit reports increasingly described their troops as apathetic and no longer capable of defending their positions and, by February 12, also emphasized the effect of the shortage of rifles and the inadequate training of Ersatz units.
On February 13, a soldier of the 23th Honvéd Infantry Division noted in his diary that fortress horses had become useless for combat service, continued to die from hunger, and could not lie down at night because the stables had stone floors but no hay or straw to cover them. He complained that everyone talked about the fort being liberated, but he did not believe it would happen. He also revealed that troops now ate rutabaga because nothing else remained; thus it became an additive for bread. But this and other fillers often proved indigestible, sometimes even resulting in troops becoming sick. After stating that the Russians had barraged the fortress Helica position with 21-centimeter shells, destroying one bunker, he lamented the fact that the fortress situation now appeared hopeless; he believed that he would never get out alive. On the next day, he wrote that garrison morale kept sinking and that every day produced new reports of officers committing fraud and theft. Even senior sergeants had become corrupted because everybody knew the end of the ordeal approached.53
The February 14 Third Army left flank position events proved discouraging; thus, one could not expect to achieve any positive or decisive military results on that portion of the front. Third Army troops suffered from increasingly severe battle fatigue, thus attempts to initiate effective military activity proved impossible to achieve. The Habsburg field army desperately needed replacement troops to fill the gaping holes in its front lines. Only the most critical supplies could be transported to the front lines because all routes remained impassable and a perpetual shortage of road maintenance crews continued; numerous artillery pieces still remained in rear echelon valleys.54
On February 15, Archduke Friedrich, nominal commander of the Habsburg army, received an order from the Emperor’s Military Chancellery that every means possible had to be utilized to prevent Fortress Przemyśl’s capitulation.55 Meanwhile, General Conrad had determined that he had to launch a new offensive, this time with the Second Army, to liberate Fortress Przemyśl. Two weeks later, he launched sixteen Habsburg infantry divisions against seven to eight similar enemy units on a twelve-kilometer front. Despite the hasty preplanning and deployment, the operation could not be initiated by the ordered launch date. Thirteen of the sixteen designated Austro-Hungarian divisions eventually attacked. As plans progressed toward this second major Carpathian Mountain offensive, 24-centimeter Fortress Przemyśl Defensive District VIII mortars fired against the Russians advancing toward the heights of Helica. Nine-centimeter field cannons recently deployed from the citadel artillery reserve raised the total number of defensive district artillery pieces to over one hundred. Tsarist airplanes continued to fly over the fortress city, observing garrison troop movements and dropping bombs.56 Machine gun fire could be heard from the direction of Lipowica. Then the persistent cold spell broke; rapid melting conditions quickly swamped roads and made bridges unusable.
Almost every day, village farm women came to the fortress market with geese, ducks, and chickens, but charged steep prices. One egg cost 1 to 1.2 kronen. A liter of fresh milk cost 2 Kronen, while other necessities were not available. Military cooks mixed dry with fresh milk, while the troops’ breakfast continued to consist of black coffee or rice soup. The major troop complaint arose from the deficiency of bread; troop units received only a quarter loaf of bread per man each day. The civilian population received none. One local woman provided a frank assessment of the grim food situation: “If you do not have flour, you have no bread.”57
On the same day, a Honvéd officer criticized General Kusmanek, claiming that he never visited his troop units and conversed only with Hungarian officers. He also complained that Kusmanek had begged for Hungarian soldiers for the fortress garrison before the siege commenced but no longer appreciated their service. The next day he described the fortress commander’s behavior as inappropriate. Instead of showing true concern for the troops’ conditions, he constantly strolled around the main street demanding that everyone salute him. He also reputedly never visited the wounded in the hospital, where an unbelievable number of soldiers died from inadequate dressings, surgeries, and lack of hygiene. The diarist also claimed that every third wounded soldier died from blood poisoning and that only a few horses remained for the entire 23rd Honvéd Infantry Division. General Kusmanek, meanwhile, rode in a coach while “our beautiful horses are being slaughtered.”58
Meanwhile, on the Carpathian Mountain front, XIX Corps and the 29th Infantry Division retreated soon after launching an attack. These units, critical for any future Habsburg operations to liberate the fortress, now required reinforcements merely to maintain their present positions. The Russians unleashed more than seven infantry divisions against the weakly defended Lupkov Pass and other important nearby positions. The defending Habsburg troops found themselves in desperate straits, partly because the Russians continued to receive plentiful reinforcements, while they did not.
In addition, a serious lack of cooperation existed between Habsburg field commanders and their units, resulting in the launching of repeated, uncoordinated, and isolated battles, partly a result of poor planning. Fortunately for the Habsburgs, their enemy did not usually follow up its battlefield successes with a serious pursuit. Habsburg infantry units continued to receive inadequate artillery support partly because multiple gun batteries had recently been transferred behind the mountain ridgelines due to of a lack of shells, but also because of the recurring enormous difficulties encountered in positioning the guns. General Conrad berated the Third Army’s commander, General Boroević, for his lack of success, whereupon the latter replied that Conrad should instead blame the inclement weather conditions, lack of support units, and effective tsarist troop tactics for the ultimate operational failure. Nevertheless, pressured by the increasingly critical Fortress Przemyśl situation, Conrad ordered the army to halt its retreat and launch an attack.
The weather improved briefly in mid-February but immediately reverted to the normal ice and snow, particularly on the mountain terrain, followed by melting and rainy conditions. This made supply routes impassable again. On February 16, wagons sank to their axles in mud, while one meter of snow remained on the higher mountain terrain. The Habsburg military objective continued to focus on the liberation of Fortress Przemyśl and the seizure of key tsarist railroad terminals at Lisko-Sanok. All nonessential railroad cars were rerouted south of the mountains to alleviate some of the rail chaos. Despite the enormous and sacrificial efforts to maintain continuous wagon movement, the flow of supplies to the front lines remained extremely erratic. The inclement weather conditions and significant casualties also continued to negatively affect major battle conducted between February 17 and 22. Soldiers sank to their knees in the mud, making it extremely difficult to even move, as they quickly exhausted themselves.
As Fortress Przemyśl troop numbers continued to decline from disease and exhaustion, a major fortress sortie was launched nevertheless. In preparation for the effort, defensive district artillery fired at enemy positions for several days as the Honvéd units launched the sortie in an attempt to join the field armies, which simultaneously launched their own operation to liberate the fortress.
Fortress Przemyśl Defense District VIII artillery fire had forced enemy units to retreat, but tsarist forces immediately received reinforcements and threatened to encircle the Honvéd Infantry Regiment 5 sortie troops that retreated to Pod Mazurami. The Russians then attacked the forefield positions again at midnight, supported by continuous artillery fire. Barbed wire emplacements failed to protect the field positions during the battles.59 Defensive District III troops, with the main column of Landsturm Regiment 18 on the right flank, moved forward, supported by 3-centimeter heavy howitzer batteries, but little maneuvering room could be found at the forefield positions. A demonstration launched from Defensive District IV protected the right flank garrison troops, but the Honvéd formations encountered heavy enemy infantry and artillery fire during their flank movements. The sortie failed dismally, and the troops retreated to the fortress. An active citadel defensive strategy was no longer possible because of the troops’ worsened physical condition. Their duties had to be reduced just as the Russians became more active by seizing forefield positions at the fortress perimeters and capturing patrols. Daily artillery fire continued, but tsarist battery positions remained a mystery. Through the light created by mortar fire, garrison defenders could observe entire rows of tsarist soldiers advancing as their gunfire intensified. Habsburg troops occupied the forward forefield positions that the Russians had earlier used to fire artillery barrages into the city.
Fortress troops, exhausted and traumatized, had by that point endured a nearly five-month ordeal. Soldiers in perimeter forefield positions rarely received anything to eat, and their morale sank as they continued to suffer from the cold weather and chilling dampness of their earthen bulwarks: “Thus everyone waits from day to day, from week to week, from month to month . . . wait, wait.”60
In the interim, fortress coffeehouses had served only tea for a month with just a small amount of sugar to accompany it. A pilot periodically delivered a newspaper from the homeland, so people read it and then wrote down its contents to share with others.61
On February 16, Russian troops advanced against the northwest and western fortress fronts. To counter such efforts, all artillery batteries of the targeted defensive districts fired barrages into the enemy positions while Honvéd Infantry Regiment 2 troops deployed to the Pod Mazurami defensive lines.62 Russian soldiers also approached the southwest fortress perimeter on February 18. During the night of February 19, a tsarist regiment attacked the Pod Mazurami and Helicha forefield positions. The attackers sustained bloody losses and left behind 140 prisoners of war, but they nevertheless continued their efforts.
At 6 a.m., the initial heavy fortress artillery fire opened against enemy troop assembly areas. By 9 a.m., 30.5 mm mortars commenced firing into the adjacent wooded area, forcing the enemy troops to retreat with heavy losses. Meanwhile, Landsturm Infantry Regiment 18 suffered from a murderous attack, which caused numerous casualties. The Russians then launched a concentrated two-regiment attack against the fortress perimeter. Reportedly, the ultimate disaster for the defending Habsburg units occurred because of insufficient security measures at its left flank positions, inadequate training, an insufficient number of machine guns, and the lack of offensive spirit, all of which combined to produce bloody losses. The Russians cut through the defensive barbed wire at three different positions and then penetrated them in an attempt to overpower the position. Reinforcements were rushed to Defensive District VIII for the Pod Mazurami action and a nearby strong point. Four hundred fifty prisoners of war were seized, while the number of tsarist dead and wounded could not be calculated because the enemy carried the bodies away during the night. Nevertheless, over 230 rifles and forty Russian corpses remained at the scene of battle. Later, tsarist prisoners of war stated that the Russians lost one thousand troops. During the battle, soldiers could not tell friend from foe in the darkness because orientation proved very difficult. Then, having sustained enormous casualties, the Russians finally retreated. At 3:45 p.m., the garrison regiment also retreated on a broad front, its losses including 5 officers dead, 211 troops and 7 officers wounded, and 200 missing in action.63
The next day, it was presumed that the enemy would launch a night attack against the fortress because Landsturm Infantry Regiment 18 troops were mentally and physically exhausted. This regiment was regarded as one of the best Slavic Landsturm regiments in the fortress.
The Russians launched a particularly strong attack against the Honvéd troops on February 20, which developed into a fierce battle. The combatants fought within 150 paces of each other, utilizing shrapnel, machine guns, infantry salvos, and other destructive means. Tsarist troops fell in rows by the hundreds, while at some perimeter positions not one soldier survived. One Honvéd regiment received orders to storm and seize a Russian strong point with a bayonet attack despite the extreme garrison troop exhaustion. Despite months of horrific conditions and shot nerves, they still had to continue to resist enemy assaults.
The last enemy storm attack also took its toll on the weary tsarist soldiers and, on February 23, they halted their attack and began to retreat. Habsburg bulwark artillery fire continued, while garrison civilians continued to hope for a rapid liberation of the bulwark. During the evening, the fortress city streets became filled with people on the first warm, spring-like day of the year. For four weeks the city had endured Russian bombings, with one commentator remarking, “As I write these lines, I can hear the explosions one after the other. During the afternoon, Russian Flyers again visited us.”64
On February 19, a Honvéd officer recorded in his diary that Honvéd Infantry Regiment 6 (in the Pod Mazurami area) had sustained 50 percent casualties during the bloody battle. He claimed that corpses, pierced by bayonets, had piled up at the fortress defensive lines. Battle had lasted all night; thus, only in the morning did the garrison troops realize that they had repulsed the tsarist attack. A captured Russian officer revealed that he knew the Honvéd units would attack when they did. The diarist also mentioned that friendly artillery failed completely, a too common complaint. On February 21, still complaining about Honvéd casualties at Pod Mazurami, the officer emphasized that when the Russians retreated after the initial sortie attack, they knew that they would return shortly to their original positions, and again lamented that the enemy had received information about the Honvéd foray beforehand.65 On February 27, he also recorded that the Russians placed fortress garrison prisoners of war in front of their attacking troops to prevent defensive fortress fire. He complained that the fortress Honvéd units did not have proficient noncommissioned officers and that the regular soldiers were ignorant and lacked common sense.
On the Carpathian Mountain front on February 18, overwhelming enemy counterfire halted any Habsburg troops’ attempts to advance. The unfavorable weather conditions compounded the horrendous traffic problems. The usual fog shrouded the battlefield until noon. The remaining heavily laden supply wagons accelerated the further deterioration of roads and bridges, while several key road sections required constant major repair. The Russians launched attacks, resulting in hand-to-hand combat on February 19. The heavily wooded mountain terrain allowed them to assemble their forces undetected by Habsburg defenders. Then, on February 20, heavy enemy artillery fire stymied Habsburg troops as thick fog again enveloped the battlefields until early afternoon. Habsburg troops, however, successfully repelled two enemy attacks and maintained the terrain they had seized earlier.
Meanwhile, General Böhm-Ermolli, commander of the Habsburg Second Army, still deployed on the German front, received orders to return to the Habsburg front and launch a second Carpathian Mountain offensive in conjunction with Third Army units to be placed under his command. The objective for this second major offensive included the recapture of the Lupkov Pass to regain access to its narrow-gauge railroad to alleviate the very difficult Habsburg supply situation, recapture the key Mezölaborcz transportation and communications junction, and then ultimately liberate Fortress Przemyśl. Conrad insisted that he did not pressure the Second Army to capture Fortress Przemyśl on February 18, but nevertheless maintained that it should be liberated as quickly as possible. Attacking troops were advised not to wait for late-arriving divisions before launching the offensive operation. Six and one-half additional infantry divisions would reinforce the Second Army’s intended frontal attack against well-fortified tsarist defensive positions, which blocked the most direct route to Fortress Przemyśl.
The new offensive operation would launch its main forces along both sides of the road system Cisna-Baligrod-Lisko. A considerable disadvantage was that only one major supply route provided for the attacking force’s four army corps. This explains why a major priority for the offensive encompassed seizing the Lupkov to Cisna railroad connection. The Third Army main force received the mission to reconquer Mezölaborcz, thus a XIX Corps offensive on that army’s flank would be launched before the main operation commenced. Although the chosen invasion route to Fortress Przemyśl was certainly the shortest, it also represented the most difficult—steep cliffs and narrow passageways gave the enemy a great advantage. New obstacles appeared at every terrain turn. The Russians, of course, recognized the significance of this area for attempted offensive operations and had themselves utilized the region for their own purposes. They secured and blocked all of the possible invasion routes before the Habsburg offensive commenced. Heavy rainfall caused snow and ice to melt rapidly, compounding the supply traffic problems.
General Böhm-Ermolli faced an extraordinarily difficult situation before launching the second Carpathian Mountain offensive. All but one of the Third Army corps commanders that participated in the first offensive operation reported total troop exhaustion after the three-week campaign. Their efforts had been seriously retarded for many reasons, but the lack of sufficient numbers of mountain artillery batteries proved devastating partly because they did not have the appropriate equipment to transport the artillery into the mountains, so many batteries remained idle far behind the front. The priority for the deployment of mountain artillery batteries, however, was assigned to the Balkan-Serbian campaign. Thus, similar to the first offensive, the infantry suffered many casualties because they had to attack without the necessary artillery support, although the weather again proved an important factor in the battle’s outcome.
Before the Second Army could launch its offensive, the casualties from the first operation had to be replaced because of the huge losses sustained during that campaign, while the Russians threatened to attack Habsburg forces before the Second Army could be organized to launch its offensive. To help refill the depleted ranks, Second Army command preferred to deploy replacement troops to its front before the six reinforcing infantry divisions would be transferred to participate in the offensive because of the present inadequate troop numbers at the front.
Although the offensive was set to commence on February 22, sudden melting conditions created extremely difficult communications problems. All supply and troop movement had to contend with terrain that had become quagmires of mud. Masses of snow melted and flooded passageways and trenches; the smallest brooks became tremendous obstacles, and the few roads that previous status reports termed “neck-breaking undertakings” had now been totally washed out. Such desperate conditions resulted in the Second Army offensive being delayed. Just prior to the scheduled operation, a report revealed that twelve kilometers of supply roads critical for the maintenance of the operation had been destroyed by overuse and the inclement weather conditions. The only recourse became to postpone the invasion.
On February 21, the offensive’s launch day was rescheduled for February 26 because of the horrendous terrain conditions. Two hours after the order had been issued, two more messages reported similar catastrophes: “Ground totally destroyed, countless wagons broke down and stuck in the mud, horses stranded on the roadside.” It became necessary to initially postpone the operation for twenty-four hours. General Boroević reported to Second Army command on February 25 that only a very slim chance existed of reconquering Mezölaborcz. Meanwhile, the unrelenting rain continued to wreak havoc on any efforts to maintain the supply traffic. The road conditions became so horrendous that all supply efforts had to be suspended for forty-eight hours to allow for repair work.
The XIX Corps finally launched its preliminary attack toward Mezölaborcz on February 27, followed by the main attack force on the next day. Unfortunately, the Habsburg effort ended quickly, again owing to inadequate artillery support. Infantry reinforcements and the few available mountain artillery batteries had extreme difficulty in reaching the front lines; most artillery pieces had to be left behind at the lower base camps, far behind the vulnerable assault troops. Fighting continued on March 1 as fog and heavy, driving snow set in, destroying all sense of direction. Entire regiments became lost in the mountains. The result was catastrophic.
Military and political pressure to liberate the fortress remained a constant and influential factor throughout the second Carpathian Mountain offensive, which lasted from February 27 until mid-March 1915. The fortress leadership submitted multiple exaggerated reports claiming that the citadel garrison’s resistance power had rapidly declined, which certainly influenced Conrad’s decision to initiate the Second Army offensive along the shortest route to the citadel to coincide with a neighboring Third Army advance.
Limited rail access to the front lines and incessant pressure relative to Fortress Przemyśl caused General Conrad to transfer troops to the Third Army right flank positions during the second half of February. A simultaneous fortress breakout operation accompanied the Second Army offensive effort. Pressing time constraints relative to the fortress food situation resulted in the Second Army launching its offensive before all assigned troop units had been assembled on the delayed February 27 launch date. The undertaking, similar to the first Carpathian Mountain Winter War offensive, lacked sufficient materiel and manpower to accomplish its overly optimistic mission. Campaign planners also ignored severe weather warnings because recent Russian battlefield successes had to be neutralized. Renewed enemy assaults in the same area where the offensive would occur necessitated further Habsburg retrograde movements, raising serious concerns about any chance of success for the forthcoming endeavor to liberate Fortress Przemyśl.
Emperor Franz Joseph meanwhile admonished Habsburg Supreme Command to prevent the surrender of the fortress, only one example of the mounting pressure to liberate the citadel because of its deteriorating food situation and troop conditions. The emperor’s pressure also caused General Conrad to increase pressure on General Böhm-Ermolli to launch the Second Army offensive as soon as possible. Meanwhile, on the field army battlefields, severe Habsburg casualties and the concomitant deterioration of the soldiers’ psychological and physical condition continued unabated.
In the interim, the slaughter of additional horses in the fortress presented yet another attempt to extend food rations a few more days. Any additional decrease in the already starvation-level food portions would further diminish the troops’ physical health and ability to adequately perform their military duties. The loss of additional horses also significantly lessened the fortress’s rapidly diminishing maneuver capabilities. During early February, fortress troops suffered a sharp decline in combat effectiveness as illnesses became epidemic and a noticeable increase in mortality rates resulted from accelerating troop exhaustion. Calculations now had fortress food supplies lasting only until March 16, adding to the increasing pressure to launch a relieving offensive to liberate the citadel as quickly as possible.
The obsession with liberating Fortress Przemyśl resulted in the Second Army receiving the formidable mission of initiating a renewed offensive on the limited twelve-kilometer front compared to the far more extensive one-hundred-kilometer Third Army first offensive effort. When the second offensive finally commenced after the weather and supply delays, the Second Army would launch a frontal assault against strong enemy defensive positions established on dominating terrain with inadequate artillery support for its attacking forces. Meanwhile, sudden dense, pouring rain and windy conditions produced further snowmelt, causing additional serious road erosion. The bitter cold nights and wet conditions exacted a heavy toll on the troops’ health. Every day thousands became ill, many suffering from frostbite or succumbing to exposure as the losses to illness doubled. But Fortress Przemyśl had to be liberated!