AT THE BEGINNING OF MARCH 1915, THE PROLONGED FOOD rationing in Fortress Przemyśl had taken an enormous toll on garrison troops. In increasing numbers, they simply collapsed and died, while sickness rates became much more prevalent. Between March 1 and 10, the fortress reported 12,140 sick and 6,900 lightly wounded troops.1 General Kusmanek focused his attention on maintaining the fortress’s battle-worthiness, but that suffered as his troops’ health steadily declined and Russian military activity around the fortress accelerated.2 March would be the fatal month for Fortress Przemyśl as General Conrad continued his second Carpathian Mountain military campaign to liberate the citadel. When that operation failed, he launched a third, smaller offensive effort; but after the fortress’s surrender, that effort was doomed to failure before it even commenced. Several higher command officers suggested that the offensive not be launched until the severe snowstorms slackened and the extreme cold dissipated somewhat. They were justifiably concerned about the effects of frostbite; one unit reported that 200 of its 350 casualties resulted from frostbite rather than battle.3 Exposed to the elements day and night, the soldiers were particularly vulnerable to frostbite. Conrad’s critics argued that launching the renewed offensive under more favorable weather conditions would produce fewer casualties, but the Habsburg commander maintained that the military situation at Fortress Przemyśl was too critical to ignore and pushed ahead with his planned offensive regardless of the likely consequences.
In the fortress, the cost of tobacco skyrocketed, as smoking became almost as important as eating for the troops. When they ran out of cigarette paper, they used every imaginable substitute, even book pages. Meanwhile, horse meat had become inexpensive, and the fortress magazines even distributed it to the civilian population, each person receiving five kilograms per month. In addition, it became increasingly difficult to transport the swelling numbers of sick and overworked troops into the inner fortress from the outer walls. To accommodate the wounded, the city’s Polish theater was converted into a hospital. The need for beds, blankets, and straw for sick and wounded troops continued to escalate as the bulwark’s situation worsened daily. The working conditions for hospital personnel progressively worsened. One hospital’s sick bay even came under fire from enemy forces, requiring its evacuation.
A civilian recorded in her diary on March 4 that “yesterday there was great alarm as the Russians stormed the southern fortress front. By evening, the first wounded began arriving in the fortress, in the meantime it appeared that the Russians had begun to retreat.” The fortress enjoyed three days of improved weather before the snowfall intensified once again, this time bringing the heaviest snows of the entire winter. During the day, snowy and sunny conditions alternated as many as five or six times. The Russians received additional reinforcements while battle reports indicated that a major encounter was being fought south of the Dniester River.4
Incessant rumors continued to circulate throughout the fortress as the days passed, none of which received official confirmation or comment. Following the release of a secret report that delineated the Russian theater military activities, General Conrad began developing plans for the next Habsburg military operation to drive the enemy out of western and middle Galicia. The effort was of extreme significance, since its success would facilitate Fortress Przemyśl’s liberation. Recognizing that the fortress’s food supply would reportedly not last beyond mid-March, Conrad also formulated plans for a major breakout attempt in the event that the Galician field army operation failed.
Conrad ordered General Böhm-Ermolli to renew the Second Army offensive operation on March 6 in a further attempt to liberate the fortress and hurl enemy forces out of Galicia. To assure any hope for success of the reactivated offensive, the Second Army’s right flank desperately needed the cooperation of the Fourth Army southern flank, but Fourth Army had yet to reinforce those positions and even initiate intensive artillery preparations for its operation. Eager to get the offensive under way, Conrad suggested that they move their positions rearward, which left unusually weak forces in the Fourth Army’s forward ranks.
The Second Army then advanced toward Fortress Przemyśl, supported by Third Army right flank units. The Fourth Army assembled its strongest troop units at its right flank in preparation for the renewed operation, while its remaining forces moved into position to prevent an enemy advance over the Biala and Dunajec Rivers. Third Army left flank troops had to prevent enemy forces from intervening against the Fourth Army’s southern flank attack. What successes the Habsburg forces achieved would soon be negated by a Russian counterattack against the XIX Corps, which produced enormous casualties on both sides. Battle lasted day and night as troops became increasingly combat-fatigued.
Even before the March 1915 offensives commenced, the troops’ physical condition and morale declined enormously. Corps commanders reported increased casualties as frostbite and extreme weather conditions took their toll on the poorly equipped troops. Too weak to complete the required strenuous marches, soldiers vanished into the frozen abyss, their compasses all but worthless in the heavily wooded, snow-shrouded terrain. Many units lost their way and often found themselves marching in circles. Uniforms froze to the men’s skin as nighttime temperatures sank to below −20°C. Crossing creeks and moving through the snow only exacerbated the already widespread cases of frostbite. The continued lack of reserve troops and reinforcements contributed to the pervasive apathy that rapidly spread through the army ranks throughout the winter campaigns. Reports of exhaustion in the face of such miserable conditions, particularly among troops that had to be in close contact with enemy positions, became a fixture in Habsburg military unit communications.
Recruit basic training times were reduced from eight to two weeks as Habsburg casualties mounted. None of their limited and inadequate training prepared the troops for the rigors of mountain battle or the unique extreme weather and terrain conditions. Rather than being placed in combat units to replace battle losses, replacement troops were simply hurled into combat, often without trained officers, after long marches to the front. Facing a numerically superior enemy, the troops quickly became cannon fodder because of the lack of reserve troops to fill the many gaps that opened in the front lines.
Furthermore, logistical support troops proved incapable of transporting food to the forces attempting to advance. Hunger further weakened the troops, leaving them with little energy to march through the deep snow and mud. The shortage of draft animals forced the starving troops to help transport machine guns, ammunition, and artillery pieces over the difficult terrain. Icy slopes had to be hacked and shoveled step by step under enemy fire.
General Kusmanek had to determine the garrison troop numbers necessary to either launch an offensive action or defend the citadel.5 Conrad dispatched a revealing letter to the Emperor’s Military Chancellery justifying his March 6 decision to renew the stalled Second Army offensive. He reiterated that the objective of the second Carpathian Mountain offensive operation remained to liberate Fortress Przemyśl and drive the Russians out of Galicia. To achieve this mission, the Second Army’s operation received support from four Fourth Army southern flank divisions. The South Army’s six infantry divisions and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s six (later seven) infantry divisions assisted the South Army’s attempt to escape from its mountain entrapment. Conrad claimed that every available division had been deployed to the Carpathian Mountain hellhole to achieve success, a serious exaggeration of the truth. He emphasized that the Austro-Hungarian army’s main objective remained the liberation of Fortress Przemyśl.6
The consistent Habsburg battlefield defeats in the Carpathian Mountain campaigns again raised the critical issue of neutral countries, especially Italy, entering the war if the fortress had to capitulate. Its food stores would be depleted by March 23, adding four days to the previous estimates. Conrad claimed that the time pressure to liberate Fortress Przemyśl had not yet become critical, but the Carpathian Mountain offensive operations continued nevertheless. In the meantime, Colonel Veith reported:
On March 1, fog and heavy snow falls, we have lost all sense of direction; entire regiments are getting lost, resulting in catastrophic losses. March 6 brings a complete change in the weather: clear skies, thaw during the day and −20 degrees at night; with the result that all slopes are iced over. On March 20, a snowstorm breaks over us with a ferocity found only in Arctic regions. All forward movement ceases; none of our wounded can be evacuated; entire lines of riflemen appear as if covered with a white cloth. The icy ground, sanded smooth by the storm, we are unable to move in front of the enemy defensive work; the artillery is several days march behind.7
Fortress inhabitants nevertheless harbored great hopes of being liberated. They had not thought it would be possible during the worst winter months, but in March, their high expectations were revived.8 By March 6, fortress troop losses reached twenty-four thousand, the majority resulting from battle.9 Complicating the situation, food supplies, boots, uniforms, and other bare necessities kept dwindling at an alarming rate. Increasing numbers of artillery pieces failed because their barrels had worn out, and the firing range of those that remained operable had decreased from eight to six and one-half kilometers. The supplies of 15-centimeter howitzer granite shells were expended, and already during December, artillery shell supplies had vanished at a rapid rate. Meanwhile, newly constructed fortress factories continued to produce the most sorely lacking primitive goods, creating whatever basic day-to-day commodities were possible under the circumstances, while army cooks continued to add unhealthy fillers, such as sawdust, to food to extend the provisions for the troops. In early March, the Second Army received its orders to renew the offensive along the same direct route to Fortress Przemyśl in a new attempt to liberate the garrison.10 The Russians, fearing a disruption of their major transportation and communications links between Galicia and Poland, also accelerated their military activities.
Meanwhile, the March 6 Second Army offensive collapsed during its first day. By not launching cooperative attacks to bind opposing enemy units, adjacent Habsburg armies certainly contributed to the operation’s failure. However, both the Second and South Armies’ units conducted their efforts in two meters of snow, dense fog, and −25°C temperatures. The troops suffered terribly from the debilitating and frigid conditions, but again attacked with insufficient troop numbers on too narrow a front to obtain a decisive victory despite the soldiers’ sacrificial efforts. The Second Army had orders to cooperate with a fortress troops’ sortie for mutual benefit.11 Second Army Command received numerous messages from Habsburg Supreme Command urging it, because of the extreme time pressure, to liberate Fortress Przemyśl.12
On the fatal day of the failed renewed attack effort, General Kusmanek informed Habsburg Supreme Command that he had to report the horrendous conditions within the fortress following the six months of uninterrupted close contact and battle with the enemy. Since September 1914, the majority of the garrison had continued to wear summer-issue uniforms, particularly the men serving in fortress forefield earthen positions or huts. The troops also endured more than three months of reduced food rations, thus the Landsturm and even the more physically fit Landwehr units exhibited progressively worsening troop conditions. Complete exhaustion became rampant and over sixty front-line troops died in February from exhaustion soon after their arrival at a fortress hospital. The number of soldiers reporting to sick call also continued to escalate.13
The fortress command now wrestled with the problem of establishing which combat units they would designate for either a major fortress breakout effort or a breakthrough operation to attempt to reach the Habsburg field armies fighting to liberate the citadel. Enemy action naturally became a major factor in determining which forces would participate in either effort. General Kusmanek reported in January that he could mobilize a maximum of twenty-four to twenty-six battalions consisting of about eight hundred troops each for a breakout effort toward Na Gorach. The main fortress units could advance along the road to Bircza, while security forces had to deploy at the northern and southern flank positions toward the important railroad connection at Nizankovice. General Kusmanek anticipated attacking an equal number of enemy forces, but the unfavorable fortress conditions in March rendered multiple citadel regiments incapable of battle.14
On March 3, tsarist artillery fire increased against the fortress, especially against the barracks at the airfield of Zuravica and Siedliska in Defensive District VI. During early March, Russian troops easily broke through Habsburg Second and Third Army lines with impunity, bleeding the troops white and creating a precarious Habsburg military situation that continued until the conclusion of the early April Easter battle. The Habsburg armies continued to sustain defeat after defeat under the most atrocious conditions. Meanwhile, also on March 3, General Ivanov informed Stavka that Austria-Hungary and Germany had reputedly launched a powerful offensive toward Sanok-Lisko with the ultimate objectives of liberating Fortress Przemyśl, unhinging the extreme left flank tsarist positions, and forcing the enemy’s evacuation of Galicia. He further insisted that if he could halt the Habsburg offensive, it would be possible to destroy the Dual Monarchy’s armies. Surprisingly, Stavka accepted Ivanov’s arguments.
Meanwhile, the constant interruptions of heavy support supply traffic along the single Habsburg supply route to the Second Army again created significant delays. This allowed the Russians time to transfer reinforcements to any threatened portion of their front, enabling them to successfully counter all Habsburg offensive efforts. Defensive flanking artillery fire halted the Russian attack along portions of the front, but increasingly Habsburg units reported that their offensive capabilities had been destroyed as a result of the battles. During March, in near-continuous battle while fighting the elements, daily Habsburg casualty figures rose enormously.
By March 7, it already appeared evident that the fortress could not be liberated before it had to capitulate.15 An airplane pilot was informed in the strictest confidence on March 6 that there was no possibility of the fortress being liberated and that a breakout attempt would be launched. All aircraft were prepared to depart from the fortress. This resulted in repair work becoming necessary because the aircraft were worn out and would have to fly in the same appalling weather conditions that had originally grounded the planes. When they finally departed, the aircraft carried official documents and files from the fortress command.
Meanwhile, the Fourth Army’s reinforced southern flank forces continued their offensive efforts in the key Gorlice-Jaslo area, but transporting artillery forward through the deep snow retarded its movement. After a twenty-four-hour delay, four Fourth Army infantry divisions (the 8th, 10th, 12th, and 39th) launched an unsuccessful attack toward Gorlice. The excellent enemy defensive positions, as Fourth Army Command had anticipated and reported to Habsburg Supreme Command, proved much too formidable, and the failure to reposition artillery pieces in a timely fashion hindered the infantry attack, resulting in wasted effort and heavy casualties. Six weeks later, on May 2, the Central Powers achieved their greatest victory of the war during the Gorlice-Tarnov campaign when German forces launched an offensive in the exact same area. The German army provided the manpower that Conrad lacked, and the May operation ultimately rescued the Dual Monarchy from a potentially catastrophic defeat.
After anticipated replacement troops had arrived and been assimilated into their new units, the Third Army could recommence its right flank attack activity, but it had to maintain its western flank positions until those replacement troops arrived. The Austrian official history of the war emphasized that the unrelenting winter snowstorms forced rapid termination of all offensive efforts. Transport of sick and wounded soldiers from the front lines proved futile on the impassible snow- and ice-covered terrain. In the meantime, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy had constructed additional defensive lines twenty-five to thirty kilometers behind the present front, which precluded any timely liberation of Fortress Przemyśl. Tsarist forces utilized the inclement weather conditions to their advantage by launching counterassaults after Habsburg offensive efforts had been halted, which resulted in numerous retreat movements.
Possessing no reserve formations, the Habsburg forces could not initiate the customary counterattack to halt the Russian assaults. Man-high snow blanketed the fronts, while losses to battle and unfavorable conditions continued to mount. For example, the 41st Honvéd Infantry Division numbers had plummeted from 12,000 to 2,110 troops since February 20. Artillery support proved useless because of the wind-driven snow, while machine gun mechanisms continued to freeze and malfunction. Troops continued to starve while the repetitive High Command order to “unconditionally maintain positions” remained meaningless.16
The blizzard conditions also severely reduced the troops’ resistance powers, while the continued arrival of tsarist reinforcements and escalating casualties made defending the front lines increasingly difficult. The physically and psychologically exhausted troops realized the futility of continuing to assault the well-fortified enemy positions even if Conrad did not. In early March alone, forty thousand frostbite cases were reported.17 The various battles repeatedly witnessed failed attempts at coordination between attacking units, and fatal communication breakdowns remained a common occurrence. The time pressure to rescue Fortress Przemyśl prevented levelheaded minds from creating a more advantageous strategy. General Böhm-Ermolli meanwhile prodded his battered Second Army troops to continue their attempts to seize their key objective, Baligrod, while Conrad constantly harangued his field commanders about the deteriorating Fortress Przemyśl situation. However, the enemy successfully countered all Habsburg offensive efforts by rapidly transferring reinforcements to any threatened frontal areas and launching counteroffensives.
The commander of the 8th Honvéd Infantry Regiment, explained on March 7 that everyone spoke of the possibility of launching some type of action outside the fortress, but all believed that such an undertaking would be impossible to achieve, particularly since the troops could no longer walk ten kilometers (6.25 miles). He claimed that his regiment was thoroughly enfeebled from the continuous lack of adequate food and equipment. It could be anticipated that in a desperate foray, those troops that did not immediately retreat into the fortress would surrender. The commander complained bitterly that senior officers did not check the condition of field combat units and distrusted their field officers’ reports.18
On March 9, fortress inhabitants witnessed the passage of heavy mobile guns (30.5- and 24-centimeter mortars) through the city streets toward the southern fortress perimeters. The Russians apparently concentrated their main troop numbers to await the anticipated Habsburg attack. “We know nothing about the details. Many rumors continued to circulate without confirmation,” one fortress inhabitant lamented. It appeared that most inhabitants had lost all hope of the fortress being liberated; the lack of details in recent war reports only exacerbated the situation.19
Reports from Vienna, reputedly from a reliable source, claimed that the fortress would be liberated in five days. The expectations of the inhabitants of the bulwark rose again, but both troops and civilians remained apprehensive. Meanwhile, the troops stationed in the forefield positions continued to suffer from extreme nervousness and psychological pressure from being so close to the enemy, the perpetually inadequate food supply, inhuman conditions, and the stress of continuous battle. However, the expectation that the fortress would soon be liberated transformed these exhausted troops. Such renewed expectations released some of the fearful pressure on the troops and civilians. “God be with us” became the prayer.
Meanwhile, the number of citadel troops suffering from illness steadily increased. For example, during one night, eighty Honvéd troops entered the hospital, the majority suffering from complete exhaustion. Positive war reports from other fronts increased on March 4. “Strong Russian attacks had been repulsed in the Carpathian Mountains. Hundreds of dead soldiers lie before their positions.” The Russians also reportedly suffered serious setbacks in southeast Galicia. A four-day-old report dated March 9 stated that the liberation army was now only seventy kilometers from the fortress. Such reports gave the unrealistic impression that the citadel would be liberated in a matter of days.
Strong tsarist counterattacks abruptly halted the Habsburg field army efforts to advance on March 11. An enemy assault broke through the XIX Corps front on March 13. This terminated any chance of liberating Fortress Przemyśl as the enemy proceeded forward through the Uzsok and Lupkov Passes.20 On the same day, the Second Army’s commander reported to Habsburg Supreme Command that he had not guaranteed that his army could obtain its objective of Lisko by March 18. Thus, General Conrad determined that the fortress should launch a breakthrough attempt in the general direction of the Second Army for the honor of Habsburg arms.21 To most observers, however, such an effort was mere insanity.
Habsburg Supreme Command again drew the attention of the field armies to the deficiency in battle effectiveness of their artillery combat arm. A number of field commanders emphasized the need to conserve shells because of the monthlong trench battles and the unanticipated large number of rounds fired. Lengthy bombardments against reinforced enemy positions, especially those using shrapnel shells, had no effect and served merely to consume more artillery ammunition. Military planners noted that the most necessary and effective utilization of artillery occurred when the Russians attacked Habsburg positions. The important connection between infantry front lines and observation of enemy activity, as well as the necessity of changing artillery positions frequently for security purposes, had become obvious. Airplanes also added a new dimension to artillery reconnaissance and observation, including at Fortress Przemyśl.
On March 12, following ten days of continuous snow, icy wind, and frost conditions, sunlight appeared for the first time, thus ending the constant precipitation and −10°C temperatures that had endured for so long. When the snow finally melted, trenches filled with muddy slime and roads turned into running streams. Such conditions raised serious health risks for troops. A fortress civilian lamented: “This post-winter is a bad thing for us and for our armies because it delayed them for weeks, which was just one result of the inclement weather conditions. We cannot wait much longer.”22 Bulwark inhabitants also saw a major fire burning in the direction of Lemberg. Many believed that the Russians had evacuated Medyka and Dynov and set them on fire.
Within the fortress, military authorities seized large numbers of dairy cows and food supplies from the civilian population, extending fortress rations until March 24. On the mountain battlefields, the horrific terrain conditions and enormous snow masses delayed the initiation of the ill-fated third Carpathian Mountain offensive effort. A March 13 order to the citadel conveyed a much more serious message than previous communications had as General Conrad finally acknowledged that the fortress could not be liberated in a timely fashion. Extensive preparations had commenced in February for the last great fortress offensive action before it had to capitulate. These preparations included Landsturm and military laborers receiving infantry training to fill depleted garrison troop ranks.
The only possibility for a successful fortress breakthrough attempt would have required Third Army troops to simultaneously attack toward Bircza to establish contact with the fortress troops attempting to advance toward them. The minimal number of garrison troops remaining in the fortress during the breakthrough effort had to ward off any enemy assaults. According to Habsburg Supreme Command’s March 14 orders, the fortress distributed rations to the participating troops before the mission to assure success.23 Given the logistical circumstances, the offensive action could not be initiated before the early hours of March 19.
A fortress civilian working in the citadel hospital recorded that on the previous day, March 13, enemy artillery fire increased enormously during the day and recommenced between midnight and 2 a.m. Fortress morale sank as the enemy bombardment intensified. During the morning of March 14, the enemy barrages slackened somewhat and the frost conditions eased, although it continued to snow. The same civilian lamented how horrible it must be for the troops stationed in the forward fortress positions: “The [fortress] inhabitants are more dead than alive!”24
On March 13, tsarist forces sapped closer to the fortress, in particular at Defensive District III and forefield positions at Pod Mazurami and Helica. During the night, strong enemy forces approached the fortress, attacked, and successfully overran the forefield positions at Na Gorach–Batycze and the northern section of Fort Dunkowiczki. The surprised and weakened defending troops of Landsturm Infantry Regiment 35 could not halt the Russian assaults and surrendered some of their positions. Lacking sufficient numbers, the fortress troops could not launch a counterattack. Malnutrition and exhaustion forced the evacuation of all remaining forward forefield positions.25
The main Russian thrust at Na Gorach proved a complete success. Close to midnight, large enemy troop numbers overpowered the weakened Landwehr forces in hand-to-hand combat. A vast majority of defending troops became casualties, whereupon the few surviving troops retreated into the fortress. At Batycze, the Russians defeated Honvéd Infantry Regiment 5 troops when they approached their defensive positions; large numbers became prisoners of war. Defensive Districts IV and II artillery opened fire against the lost positions, resulting in an artillery duel.
The fortress’s Zuravica airfield remained a safe haven for airplanes only as long as fortress troops occupied the high terrain in the area of Na Gorach at Defensive District VI (Siedliska). At the commencement of the second fortress siege, two additional airfields were constructed, the first at Buszkovice, north of the San River, and the second at Iwowski, south of the river. Once the Na Gorach positions surrendered to the enemy, the Zuravica airfield came under heavy tsarist artillery barrages and suffered extensive damage. This forced aircraft to be flown out. Toward the end of February, the airfield located at Iwowski also had to be abandoned because of the excessively muddy conditions. Flight company Flik 11 remained for fortress service until the end of the siege.
For protection against enemy aerial attacks, the airfields received 9-centimeter field guns to be utilized as antiaircraft weapons. Originally deployed at Buszkowice, these artillery pieces never shot down any enemy airplanes but often succeeded in turning them away. Nevertheless, the airfield would be bombed on numerous occasions, resulting in extensive damage and casualties.
The Russians continued to take advantage of the stormy weather to attack the battered garrison troops. The field army defenders did not have the advantage of artillery support to halt the enemy advance. During the Carpathian Mountain offensives, tsarist troops continued to employ their usual tactics to avoid battle when they abandoned offensive operations, and then they would launch night assaults. The major improvements in the Fortress Przemyśl forefield positions, such as the construction of new defensive areas with connecting trenches, proved extremely beneficial. However, the primitive cover and barbed wire emplacements offered inadequate protection for the troops.26 By the end of the second offensive to liberate the fortress, field army troop desertions had increased. The most frequently cited example in the historiography involved Czech Infantry Regiment 28, which will be discussed later. Tsarist propaganda promised Ruthenian soldiers that if they surrendered, they could safely return to their homes located behind the front lines.
The inclement weather conditions made it impossible for Habsburg artillery to locate and neutralize enemy guns. Tsarist artillery barrages fired against Defensive District III caused little damage but did destroy telephone wires, disrupting vital communications for a few days. The continuous enemy artillery fire further lowered garrison morale. The inability of fortress artillery to neutralize its tsarist counterpart left the bulwark inhabitants feeling helpless. Sustained high-intensity enemy artillery fire usually occurred between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. and then tapered off.
As the days progressed and troop conditions worsened, the fortress could initiate only defensive actions. The projected breakout troops now consisted of only twelve to fifteen infantry battalions with an average seven-hundred-man battle stand, far smaller than the earlier estimates that twenty-four to twenty-eight battalions, each with eight hundred soldiers, could participate in such an operation. Garrison troops prepared to launch their fateful effort, aware that the bulwark’s food supply would last only until March 24. Troops also had to defend the fortress while they destroyed all useful war materiel before the fortress capitulated. Because of the declining food supplies, the attempted breakthrough effort had to be initiated before the afternoon of March 20. The smaller “minimal” defensive group remaining in the citadel during the operation had to follow the offensive troops no later than the second day after the attempt commenced. The soldiers then possessed only four days of reserve food rations, the absolute minimum, assuming that they could reach Sambor and seize food supplies from enemy depots.
After temporarily defending the fortress, the “minimal” troop garrison also had to perform a rearguard action against the enemy to protect the attacking forces’ rear echelon positions. A unified command structure was an absolute necessity to ensure operational success. General Kusmanek originally hoped to command both garrison groups but later determined that he could not. He requested that Habsburg Supreme Command accept his operational plans for the fortress breakthrough effort as he outlined them in a dispatch to General Conrad.27 Habsburg headquarters received that fortress communication at 10:45 a.m. on March 15.
Between December 1914 and the fortress’s capitulation on March 22, 1915, the number of troops reporting to sick call expanded enormously. The only detailed report of garrison troop casualties determined that this occurred mainly during the March 19 breakthrough attempt. Illnesses that earlier in the siege would not have been considered dangerous or life-threatening now became lethal for even lightly wounded soldiers because of their prolonged malnourishment. The first reports of a serious decline in fortress garrison troop numbers had appeared in January 1915. By February 1915, troops serving in forward perimeter positions displaying no symptoms of illness other than total exhaustion would die within half an hour of reaching a hospital. On December 1, 1914, 4,879 garrison troops had been listed as sick, while another 4,683 suffered from exhaustion. These numbers increased significantly by March 1915. On March 1, 10,581 citadel soldiers were reported ill and 6,441 listed as totally exhausted. Fortress hospitals had become so overcrowded that they could admit only the most serious cases. By March 10, the number of troops listed as ill had risen to 12,140, and those listed as exhausted to 6,920. Between March 8 and 10, many soldiers reported to hospitals suffering from complete exhaustion; twenty-seven died quickly. On March 13, of the 7,873 soldiers designated as ill, 2,493 consisted of exhaustion cases, of which 10 died immediately. Meanwhile, on the field army’s battlefield, a Russian counteroffensive, launched during the fierce snowstorms, crippled the Second Army’s offensive operation toward Baligrod. The troops retreated to new defensive positions. The Second Army’s main attack force commander claimed that he required forty thousand additional soldiers merely to hold the new front because of the heavy losses his forces had sustained.28
On March 12, Captain Rudolph Holecka reported the first defection of a Habsburg pilot to the enemy. A fortress Flight Company 10 Czech pilot flew to Tarnov, in tsarist territory, where the Russians captured the mail and medicine destined for the fortress his plane was transporting. The Russians then dispatched airplanes over the citadel’s Brzesko airfield and dropped a parcel with a letter thanking the personnel for the airplane they had just captured, but they did return the mail that had been on board. Meanwhile, flights to the fortress continued, delivering military and civilian correspondence. An individual described how on March 13, 1915, five k.u.k. airplanes took off from the Fortress Buszowiczki airfield in extremely inclement weather. All had to return, but engine failure forced one plane to land behind Russian lines. The Russians probably captured the operational plans for the March 19 fortress breakthrough attempt because of this unanticipated turn of events.29
Additional flights into the fortress during March included one airplane carrying mail from Brzesko on March 17, two with mail on March 21, and a flight out of the fortress toward Brzesko on March 22 carrying additional mail from the fortress. A large number of mail packets fell into Russian hands when airplanes and balloons were forced to land behind enemy lines.30
Habsburg Supreme Command ordered General Kusmanek to launch the citadel’s major breakthrough effort in the general direction of Lisko, Stary-Sambor, or Turka, declaring that the latter target selection would probably surprise the enemy the most. The destruction of San River area railroad connections, though, received General Conrad’s highest priority. The order further specified that the fortress commander should assure, to the maximum degree possible, that the remaining fortress garrison defend the fortress and, if necessary, destroy all materiel and equipment that could be utilized the enemy.
By March 17, it remained apparent that the fortress would capitulate, but the garrison continued its “honorable activities.” In addition to maintaining Habsburg military honor, a large mobile fortress offensive force had to attempt to break through enemy siege lines toward the field armies in a direction that provided the best chance for success and, in addition, inflicted maximum damage on the enemy. In light of the fortress’s critical food situation, General Kusmanek had to report the latest day that he perceived the breakthrough effort could commence.
Kusmanek ultimately chose to launch the offensive in an eastern direction, basing his decision on the fortress troops’ terrible physical condition, but he did not have much confidence in the mission’s success. Although General Conrad considered the Lemberg-Sambor and Lemberg-Stryj railroad lines much more significant objectives, General Kusmanek opposed attempting to advance toward the field armies because all previous fortress sorties had been launched in that direction and experienced only fleeting success. In the interim, the Russians had constructed additional rear echelon fortified positions since earlier battles in February. The difficult terrain conditions and forced marches required to reach the field army positions raised the question of whether the garrison troops would be physically capable of making such an effort. Two-thirds of the fortress regiments had, after all, been designated as incapable of battle.31 Company commanders, understanding the terrible condition of their troops, considered it preposterous to even suggest that the garrison troops could reach the field armies.
General Kusmanek had determined that only the eastward advance direction remained feasible for the fortress mission, because of the reputed enemy weakness in that region (possibly only the 48th Reichswehr Infantry Brigade defended that entire region). Furthermore, if successful, the starving garrison formations could reach enemy food depots.32
By March 1915, all Second Army corps deployed in the Carpathian Mountains had reported that their troops had developed serious psychological problems. The units remained deployed in incredibly squalid conditions with no protection from the adverse elements and had sustained enormous casualties, most resulting from frostbite and disease.33 As a result, depression and apathy had become rampant in the ranks. Then, on March 15, General Falkenhayn telegraphed Conrad that he could not transfer the desperately requested German reinforcements until March 24, which would be too late to affect the fate of the fortress.
Citing the increasing urgency to liberate the fortress, General Conrad ordered the launching of a renewed Second Army offensive on March 16, barely one week before the fortress would have to capitulate, although Second Army troop offensive and resistance powers had declined precipitously. The unrelenting, bone-chilling weather and impassable terrain conditions placed extreme physical and mental demands on the soldiers. The recent severe winter storms on March 6, 10, and 11 further demoralized the already apathetic troops. The consistent lack of artillery shells, continued Russian numerical superiority, and horrendous weather conditions more than justified the termination of the Second Army’s offensive efforts on March 14. As during the first Carpathian Mountain efforts, the Habsburg Second Army had to surrender significant territory that it had previously captured with great human sacrifice. Although the Second Army offensive was unlikely to have made a difference in the fortress’s fate, its cancelation assured that Fortress Przemyśl’s surrender was inevitable.34
As Conrad’s plans for a final offensive effort crumbled, the Russian 81st Reserve Infantry Division besieged Defensive District VIII and the southern and southeastern fortress areas. The elevated terrain opposite the fortress perimeter walls at those locations allowed enemy troops to easily outflank the defensive positions. The southeast and southern fortress positions also contained impassable areas, making them unsuitable as marching targets.
On March 15, General Conrad apprised General Kusmanek of the friendly and enemy military situations. Habsburg Second Army center and right flank units remained in battle, while the South Army and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin remained deployed south of the fortress in extremely difficult mountain terrain. The fortress commander received additional information on March 16.35 Habsburg intelligence sources placed the following tsarist units at the respective fortress fronts: northwestern: 82nd Reserve Infantry Division; northern: 21st Reichswehr Infantry Brigade; eastern: half of the 58th Reserve Infantry Division; southeastern: 68th Reserve Infantry Division; southwestern: a reserve division; western: 9th Cavalry Division reinforced by infantry units. Half of the 58th and the entire 60th and 69th Reserve Infantry Divisions redeployed to the Carpathian Mountain front, representing a significant weakening of the siege army.
On March 16, General Kusmanek informed Conrad that because of the desperate food situation and poor physical condition of the troops, the breakthrough attempt had to occur no later than March 19. The proposed operation sought to disturb and destroy local enemy railroad traffic in that vicinity and reach enemy food depots to alleviate the terrible physical condition of the garrison troops. The advance direction would be toward Mosciska and Lemberg, but Kusmanek still had little faith that the mission could succeed. The element of surprise would be critical, but with so many citadel infantry regiments incapable of sustained battle, the fortress commander believed that any attempt to advance toward the field armies would be disastrous.36
Despite the prevailing blizzard conditions, an airplane flew urgent orders and information relative to the Habsburg military situation to General Kusmanek. The orders demanded the launching of the breakthrough attempt to cooperate with Second Army eastern flank units within the next three days. On its attempted return flight, enemy fire caused the plane to burst into flames. The pilot managed to land in a field between fortress fortifications, and the crew returned safely to the fortress.
General Conrad had previously judged the fortress situation too optimistically when he ordered General Kusmanek to launch a sortie rather than attempt a major breakthrough operation to the field armies. Launching a sortie operation would have signified that the field armies had to liberate the fortress rather than the fortress garrison having to undertake a major military effort to reach the field armies. The breakthrough attempt, to the contrary, would prevent the enemy from deploying additional troops against Habsburg Third Army rear echelon positions. The new Habsburg Supreme Command attack order also ignored the fact that the exhausted and apathetic Second Army troops critically required rehabilitation.37 When responding to a Conrad question regarding the fortress’s choice of operational direction, General Kusmanek replied that the fortress would make the greatest possible effort to complete the newly assigned mission, but he also emphasized that his starving troops would be attacking, at a minimum, an equal number of enemy forces.38 In addition to preparing a breakthrough attempt toward Sambor, the evacuation of the fortress and destruction of any war equipment or materiel had to be accomplished by March 21.39
A fortress inhabitant’s diary entry for March 17 indicated that “yesterday dread and dismay” swiftly affected the hospital atmosphere where the writer worked as rumors quickly circulated that the Habsburg Third Army had been forced to retreat. Most of the local conversations that followed dwelled on the impending “death march” of the garrison troops. The starved fortress Honvéd troops were described as being at the end of their physical capacities, while the civilian inhabitants realized that the field armies could not save the fortress within the next few days.40
Thousands of Honvéd fortress troops had earlier been sacrificed in attempts to reach the intended liberation army, but it now appeared that all those efforts had been for naught and that the fortress would soon have to surrender nevertheless. Rumors circulated that wounded officers had been issued weapons for the defense of the fortress, while in fact Sanitation Department medical troops were armed, as large unit formations began to march through the fortress city on the evening of March 18. The soldiers’ malnourished faces mirrored the seriousness of the situation and the weight of the looming circumstances. Although suffering from extreme overexertion, garrison troops had to endure yet another battle. During March 17, they began to prepare for the breakthrough operation, many units requiring seven hours to march through the snow on the next day from their fortress deployment areas to reach their offensive positions in a timely manner.
In the meantime, Second Army V Corps continued preparations for the doomed third Carpathian Mountain field army offensive attempt to relieve the fortress. It required three days just to transport additional artillery units to the mountain front positions to support the ridiculously small number of attacking troops. V Corps units engaged in a moderate evening firefight, while the 31st Infantry Division began preparing its troops to participate in the offensive effort.41 The restricted attack front area and inadequate troop numbers (33,000) could not liberate the fortress in sufficient time to prevent its capitulation. Regrettably, no additional plans existed to reinforce the attack force or provide the necessary labor units to prepare and maintain the roads required for proper supply and troop movement for the impending relief operation.
The offensive mission of V Corps’ primary attack force, Group Lieb, supported by seven additional artillery batteries, began to attack the objective, Loziov, and then secure the surrounding high mountain terrain by March 20. Neighboring Group Szurmay units supported Group Lieb’s operation. An additional seven-infantry battalion group, Group Fox, would follow Group Lieb’s attack. The artillery batteries designated to support the offensive, however, did not possess their full quotas of guns; therefore, the only effective artillery support for the attack emanated from neighboring Group Szurmay.
On March 18, General Kusmanek determined that the fortress’s financial assets must be destroyed the next day. At the commencement of Fortress Przemyśl’s second siege in early November 1914, Kusmanek and those authorized to destroy the monetary assets determined to burn all the money resources if and when it became necessary. On March 16, the fortress commander ordered that all paper money be burned on March 19 before the military breakthrough operation transpired. The only exception would be the troops’ April payroll, to be distributed to them in advance because it could not be distributed during the actual operation. A commission to destroy the financial assets assembled on the morning of March 19 and convened until 5:00 p.m. The members first counted the money (6.7 million kronen), then burned it and destroyed the ashes at 9:00 p.m., concluding the commission’s work.42
On March 18, General Kusmanek telegraphed Habsburg Supreme Command that he had granted his troops a rest day and increased their food rations for the next day’s military operation. He then appealed to his soldiers.43 The garrison troops received their last rations at midnight when they also learned that they must fight their way through Russian territory to reach the field armies.
As the garrison troops made preparations to launch their ill-fated mission, citadel civilians had no idea what the future had in store for them. Reportedly, the last flour had been consumed and all horse meat eaten, and there only remained enough food to suffice for a few more days. Starving soldiers desired additional bread rations to supplement the quarter-loaf they had received daily for many weeks. This paltry sustenance did not halt their hunger pangs. Meanwhile, hurried preparations commenced at the fortress perimeters for the approaching operation, while the troops awaited the release of the attack order. Officers’ faces revealed their innermost feelings, while the troops despaired on the eve of their “last fearful death struggle.” The garrison troops could barely stand because of their extreme exhaustion. General Kusmanek’s attack order, when released, contained no mention of the attack direction to prevent further panic spreading in the ranks. Emperor Franz Joseph opposed launching the endeavor, contrary to the opinion of Habsburg Supreme Command. Meanwhile, all airplane and balloon pilots prepared to leave the citadel in haste on March 19 as snowstorm conditions continued.44
The main garrison units, 23rd Honvéd Infantry and Combined Division Waitzendorfer, commenced preparations for the March 19 operation. During the night of March 18–19, garrison troops marched silently from their bivouac areas to their designated fortress perimeter jump-off points. At daybreak, they received orders to carry only forty rifle rounds for their personal defense. Only a relatively small garrison detachment would remain to defend the fortress perimeter positions against possible enemy attacks. Officers, recognizing their troops’ terrible physical condition, marched them at a snail’s pace to their attack assembly areas. Nevertheless, multiple starving soldiers collapsed and even died during the pre-offensive preparation period, while all troops harbored strong forebodings concerning the approaching operation. Many hoped to merely be taken as prisoners of war. One officer claimed that his troops required fourteen days of nourishment just to be capable of attempting the mission.
In frigid weather conditions, which consisted mainly of light rain mixed with snow, the troops trudged through the fortress’s ankle-deep, snow-covered mud. Defensive District artillery barrages commenced, intended to distract the enemy to believe that the breakthrough effort would emanate from a location other than the one designated. General Kusmanek rushed all available reserve artillery units to that defensive district to increase the firepower. Earlier, confidants and spies spread false rumors and reports to further confuse the enemy as to where they would launch the operation. The troops marched through the citadel area without talking, smoking, or using any light in an effort to camouflage their actions from the enemy. Apathy prevailed throughout the ranks, while the soldiers who collapsed and died prior to the actual operation were labeled stille Helden, or “silent heroes.”45
On March 18 at 4:20 p.m., when the alarm sounded for the various infantry battalions to prepare to move out by 6:00 p.m., General Kusmanek transmitted his final operational concept to General Conrad. He also telegraphed Emperor Franz Joseph, declaring that after six months of uninterrupted battle with the enemy, hunger would finally force the fortress to surrender.46 The emperor and nominal armed forces commander Archduke Friedrich also forwarded telegrams to the fortress, but they arrived after battle had already commenced outside the bulwark on March 19.
When General Waitzendorfer, Combined Division commander, heard grumbling about the operation orders from some of his officers, he replied, “If we are ordered to die, so must we die!”47 The commander of Honvéd Infantry Regiment 2 cut the unit’s battle flag into pieces and passed them out to his officers to preserve. The other Honvéd Infantry Regiment flags would likewise be distributed; a piece of one resides in the Budapest military museum today.
Of the participating units, only the 23th Honvéd Infantry Division and the 97th Landsturm Infantry Brigade arrived at their assembly area destinations on time, the Combined Division not until 2:35 a.m. This tardiness cost valuable time and delayed the commencement of the attack, which proved fateful for the overall action. Habsburg commanders neither reconnoitered the advance area nor oriented most troop units about the minefields that had been dug outside the Defensive District VI perimeter, which they now had to traverse. Only 97th Landsturm Infantry Brigade troops had been informed of the local field conditions and minefields.48 This resulted in miscommunication and friction, but also atrocious troop casualties as enemy artillery fire wreaked havoc when the troops paused and bunched up at the minefields and barbed wire entanglements.
Although apathy permeated the ranks, some troops initially exhibited unwarranted optimism only because of their lack of knowledge about the rapidly approaching situation. General Kusmanek demanded a solemn pledge of secrecy from his field commanders concerning the timing and direction of the breakthrough attempt. Thus, to prevent any treasonous acts or panic in the ranks, the weary troops were given no indication of their ultimate destination. Garrison officers understood that the Russians would have attacked the fortress in force earlier if they had known how thinly manned the citadel walls actually were.
On the Carpathian Mountain front, the V Corps offensive preparations included accelerated roadway maintenance efforts in an attempt to overcome the unfavorable march conditions and to supply winter-issue uniforms for the troops assigned to the mission. The Second Army V Corps’ third Carpathian Mountain offensive operation, however, commenced three days after the fortress’s March 19 attempt had failed. According to documented orders, the two operations should have occurred simultaneously. Neither Second Army Command nor V Corps headquarters received information concerning the fortress’s fateful and disastrous March 19 breakthrough attempt prior to the launching of their doomed offensive action. Thus, both the bloody fortress effort and the ill-fated third Carpathian Mountain offensive proved unnecessary, merely increasing Habsburg casualty lists.
Nevertheless, on March 18, persistent lower valley melting conditions and heavy mountain snowfall negatively affected the transport and deployment of the seven designated artillery batteries into their mountain positions to support the V Corps attack. Road conditions continued to deteriorate, and an insufficient number of labor units were made available to maintain the roads required for troop and supply movement. This delayed initiating the operation until the night of March 20–21 and allowed the Russians adequate time to prepare countermeasures to thwart the operation.49
As attack preparations continued, the flaws in the proposed V Corps operation became increasingly obvious. The thirty-three thousand designated mission troops were barely sufficient to seize the initial objective, Loziov, let alone take control of any further significant terrain or liberate the fortress in time to prevent its capitulation.50 The reinforced V Corps 31st Infantry Division and Infantry Regiment 76 ultimately launched the ill-fated undertaking, supported by the 33rd and 37th Honvéd Infantry Divisions.
Those in the fortress witnessed “silent despair” because the troops recognized that the forthcoming action was a doomed effort. Pre-offensive activity included the burning of all army service books at the last minute.51 Troops meanwhile prepared explosives to destroy any military objects that the enemy could utilize, while pilots hastily prepared fortress aircraft and balloons to depart the citadel. Meanwhile, snow fell for the seventeenth straight day.
By March 1915, little hope remained that the fortress could resist a major Russian assault. If the fortress could not be liberated immediately, capitulation was inevitable. As this realization became apparent, the rumor began to circulate that the fortress commander intended to launch a last great offensive undertaking, the aforementioned “death march,” despite the fact that the main fortress offensive weapon, the 23rd Honvéd Infantry Division, had already sacrificed much of its battle worth. To garrison troops, a breakthrough effort seemed absolute nonsense, and most troops did not believe it would occur. There were no longer sufficient horses to transport the artillery around the fortress environs. Also, many troops proved physically incapable of marching even a few kilometers with full field packs. Small sleds were built for troops to pull machine guns, because of the lack of healthy horses. Also, ski patrols were organized. While earlier rumors concentrated on the fervent hope that the fortress would soon be liberated, especially when the sound of cannon fire could not be heard in the distance, that hope had by now disappeared.