THE BATTLE OF GORLICE-TARNOV, WHICH COMMENCED ON May 2, 1915, proved the greatest Central Powers victory of the war and represented the apex of Austro-Hungarian and German coalition warfare. Germany’s successful tactics of short but massive artillery preparations followed by frontal infantry attacks became the norm for General Falkenhayn’s operations for the next two years. The offensive not only rescued the floundering Habsburg ally in the Carpathian Mountains but also prevented Romania from renouncing its neutrality and declaring war on Austria-Hungary.1
The Central Powers’ military situation on the eastern front in early April 1915 appeared very unfavorable. On the western front, the French and the English had launched offensives with a numerical superiority of six hundred battalions. The outcome of these western front battles remained uncertain, but the Germans anticipated that the Entente armies would achieve only local victories because of previous defensive successes. On the eastern front, the Austro-Hungarian armies continued to retreat from incessant Russian attacks throughout winter and spring 1915, particularly during the Easter battle. The tsarist Eighth Army and part of its Third Army had successfully battled their way across the key ridgelines to the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. General Conrad repeatedly demanded German reinforcements to buttress that faltering front, where the Russians continued their assaults unabated. He callously pressured his battered troops, including X Corps, which had been bled white, to halt the enemy’s progress. By early spring, Austro-Hungarian forces had come perilously close to collapse. As the Habsburgs continued their successive retreats, the threat increased that Italy would soon enter the war against Austria-Hungary to gain its irredenta territory within the Dual Monarchy. Conrad needed a major offensive success against Russia to prevent this.2 Constant Russian advances toward the Hungarian plains also encouraged Romania to enter the war to gain Transylvania and the Bukovina. Although Fortress Przemyśl capitulated in late March, the Russians themselves suffered enormous losses as Dual Monarchy troop numbers also rapidly decreased. The Habsburgs also desperately needed a victory to hold the k.u.k. army together. Increasing war weariness was taking a toll on the troops, and it appeared that the army had begun to disintegrate.3 A noticeable decline in troop effectiveness also became evident within certain Austro-Hungarian army units, especially those with Czech, Romanian, Italian, and South Slav soldiers. In a number of cases, predominantly Slavic units allegedly surrendered en masse to the enemy.
Although tsarist forces continued to succeed militarily during April 1915, they lacked the necessary troop strength to fully exploit their victories by mid-April. After sustaining such enormous losses throughout the war, Russia had been forced to deploy inadequately trained and armed troops, which effectively transformed its forces into a peasant army. In addition, the Russians increasingly suffered from a shortage of weapons and ammunition, particularly artillery shells, which quickly became an acute weakness.
Compounding Austria-Hungary’s difficult eastern front situation was that the outcome of the French and British Gallipoli campaign in the Dardanelles remained unclear. The Entente hoped to open the straits to Russia and the Black Sea and possibly knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. General Falkenhayn desired, as a priority, to relieve Entente pressure in the Dardanelles, but had to await the victorious allied October 1915 campaign against Serbia to finally achieve his Balkan plans. The successful campaign became possible as a result of the Gorlice-Tarnov operation. Throughout the Carpathian Winter War campaigns, he suggested to Conrad that the allies launch a campaign against the Serbs, but the Habsburgs had no extra troops at their disposal. However, the real military emergency existed on the Habsburg eastern front, as the Russians, by early April 1915, threatened to invade Hungary and defeat Austria-Hungary. The German High Command realized that it had to assist its reeling ally, but since the entire Carpathian Mountain region had proved so unfavorable for successful battle, General Falkenhayn sought a more appropriate location to initiate a major military operation. However, the German Beskid Corps was scraped together and transferred to the threatened Habsburg front to prevent its immediate collapse. The insertion of the German troops halted further tsarist successes against the battered X Corps, bringing some relief to their ally.
On April 4, as battle raged in the Carpathian Mountains, Generals Conrad and Falkenhayn conferred in Berlin and agreed to remain on the defensive on the Habsburg Balkan front. They also determined to maintain a defensive position on the Italian front should Italy enter the war. However, General Falkenhayn failed to be completely honest with his counterpart during their meeting. A few days earlier, he had begun to consider launching an offensive in the area west of Fortress Kraków to relieve pressure on the Habsburg mountain front. Thus, when Conrad returned to his headquarters after their meeting, he learned that the German liaison officer, General August Cramon, had met with Habsburg Railroad Bureau personnel to investigate the possibility of major German troop transports to the region south of Fortress Kraków. Cramon had replied to a Falkenhayn telegram that such a deployment would require eight days. The initial objective of the operation was the Wisloka River toward the Dukla Pass and Fortress Przemyśl. General Falkenhayn therefore had to terminate his plans for a western front offensive effort in order to rescue his hapless Habsburg ally.
Conrad responded to Falkenhayn immediately on April 6, requesting that seven German divisions be deployed to the Italian frontier and three to the Romanian frontier as a defensive measure to free Habsburg troops for deployment to support the threatened Carpathian Mountain front. By April 10, the Russian Eighth Army and a portion of its Third Army had reached the far side of the Carpathian Mountains. Three tsarist divisions had been transferred to the Bukovina and three deployed into the Carpathian Mountains, weakening the tsarist Third Army. If the Russians came within striking distance of the Hungarian plains, Romania would also certainly attack Austria-Hungary. General Falkenhayn did not inform Conrad of his intentions until three weeks before the allied offensive occurred.4 Then, on April 13, at their next meeting in Berlin, General Falkenhayn announced, without revealing specific details, that he intended to create a new German Eleventh Army, to be deployed to the Gorlice-Tarnov area where the Habsburg Fourth Army had battled in early March. At that battle, the Fourth Army’s VI Corps failed to conquer its objective because of inadequate troop numbers, the unfavorable winter weather conditions, and particularly strong enemy defensive positions on that front.
Gorlice served as a crucial transportation center for the Russian southwest front with its good railroad connections. Conrad originally anticipated that General Falkenhayn would deploy four German divisions to the Russian front for the approaching offensive operation, but now learned that he intended to deploy four army corps instead. On April 14, the two generals reconvened and finalized the planning details, in full agreement about the campaign.5 The plan called for the newly formed German Eleventh Army to launch an offensive toward Zmigrod, Sanok, and the Dukla Pass, and then liberate Fortress Przemyśl. Then, with the Habsburg Third and Fourth Armies protecting its flanks, it would attack tsarist Eighth Army positions at the Lupkov Pass. The Germans, however, demanded some command control over the two Habsburg armies during the operation. Although irritated by the request, General Conrad appreciated that General Falkenhayn finally intended to intervene on the Carpathian Mountain front, where Habsburg troops fought on the last mountain ridges before they would have to retreat onto the Hungarian plains.6
On April 20, General Conrad learned the offensive goals of the mission. The German Eleventh and the Habsburg Fourth Army would break through tsarist positions west of the Lupkov Pass saddle from the west. The southern flank troops would move in the general direction of Zmigrod-Dukla-Sanok to pierce tsarist defensive lines along the Becken (basin) line Gorlice-Jaslo. On April 21, the first German soldiers began their railroad transport to the Galician front.
A controversy arose that continued long after the war concerning whether Conrad or Falkenhayn had conceived the original idea for what became the most successful Central Powers victory of the war. Was it General Conrad, who had earlier recognized the critical military significance of the Gorlice area, or General Falkenhayn, who also recognized the strategic importance of this area, but could provide the troop strength necessary to achieve the victory? The debate raged long after the war ended. It should be noted that General Falkenhayn, aware of the Habsburg army’s debilitating defeats in August and September 1914 and then during the 1915 Carpathian Mountain Winter, held little regard for the Dual Monarchy’s military capabilities.
Meanwhile, when Fortress Przemyśl capitulated in March, the Russians occupied it and began reconstructing some destroyed citadel positions to improve defensive capabilities should it be attacked. As mentioned earlier, Tsar Nicholas II visited the compound between April 23 and 25, after which serious improvement work on the fortress commenced. Heavy tsarist artillery pieces and numerous troop units converged on the desolate fortress.
By the end of April 1915, the Central Powers’ military situation remained very unfavorable. On all fronts, they stood on the military and political defensive and had lost the military initiative. The threat of Italy entering the war against Austria-Hungary escalated, which could also bring neutral Bulgaria and Romania into the conflagration. Indications abounded of major allied offensive plans for the western front, and by April 25 the second phase of the Gallipoli campaign against the Dardanelles had commenced. This raised the question of the fate of Turkey and, to General Falkenhayn, the necessity of launching an offensive against Serbia to open the Danube River and enable Austria-Hungary and Germany to supply the Ottoman ally with the materials necessary to continue the war and simultaneously relieve allied pressure in the Balkan Peninsula. The Central Powers’ military and diplomatic leadership also desired to shift the Balkan Peninsula balance of power back in their favor, but this required leaving multiple German units in the Balkan theater after a successful campaign against Serbia. Between February and March, allied offensives failed at Champagne and Artois on the western front. Now that the Central Powers felt free to strike in the east, Falkenhayn targeted the northern portion of Russia’s southwest front for the Gorlice-Tarnov operation.
By late April 1915, one-third of a million Central Powers troops had assembled to launch a surprise offensive against the unsuspecting Russian Third Army formations. Superior troop numbers would assault the defending tsarist forces. The German artillery complement included approximately five hundred heavy and light artillery pieces, ninety-six trench mortars, and six hundred machine guns, the greatest concentration of artillery to date on the eastern front. The operation was even more successful than expected because the Russians proved so ill-prepared to counter the offensive. The Russian Third Army possessed 675 light artillery pieces, 4 defective heavy artillery guns, 600 machine guns, and no trench mortars. The army’s frontline trenches were only three feet deep, this portion of the front having been quiescent for weeks. Although some sources claim that the Russians had previous notification of the military operation, tsarist commanders appeared not to have noticed that the peasants, who had been tilling the fields between the opposing lines, had disappeared for several days.
Before the Gorlice-Tarnov offensive was launched on May 2, General Falkenhayn pressured General Conrad relative to negotiations with Italy. He demanded that Vienna meet Rome’s territorial demands. He also urged Vienna to commence negotiations with Bulgaria concerning an alliance against Serbia. General Conrad replied that he encouraged the Habsburg foreign minister to seek an agreement with Sofia.7 He also declared that even if the Galician campaign proved to be a decisive victory and Italy remained neutral, a military campaign against Serbia was out of the question before the end of May. He refused Falkenhayn’s request to divert forces from his Fifth Army, which was deployed on the Serbian front, because he feared a surprise enemy attack into Bosnia.8General Falkenhayn replied that the Serbians could not launch an offensive into Habsburg territory because of the swollen rivers. Therefore, if the Serbians could not attack, General Conrad could shift troops from his Fifth Army.9 General Conrad then recontacted his German counterpart, inquiring about the required strength of the participating forces and the time factor involved, as well as when he could anticipate German military units being deployed to assist his forces against Italy if it came to war against the perfidious ally. General Conrad also pressured his foreign minister to keep Italy out of the war and informed General Falkenhayn of his action.10
As the Gorlice-Tarnov offensive approached, Russian artillery had proved ineffective in combat due to the serious lack of artillery shells. Following the opening German artillery barrages against the opposing tsarist Third Army trenches, at 9 a.m. on May 2 mortars commenced an hour of devastating fire against the shallow enemy trenches. The artillery shifted its fire forward to usher in the first German infantry attack wave. This first assault operation advanced rapidly, a desperate necessity given the lingering threat of neutral European states entering the war. The German hurricane artillery bombardment, the greatest in the war so far, quickly pulverized the Russian Third Army trenches and destroyed all communications links between the defending units. The result produced an enormous, yet unanticipated, early success as large Russian troop numbers surrendered when German soldiers easily overran the inadequately prepared tsarist trench lines. According to one of the corps commanders, the troops quickly vanished into dust and smoke. Soon thousands of Russian soldiers became visible marching down a slope, but they were not attacking German positions; they had become prisoners of war. The first breach in the enemy positions had occurred.11 Significant numbers of tsarist troops were killed or wounded in the initial artillery barrages, and because there was no second tsarist defensive line, although the army commander had been ordered to establish one on April 16, many Russian soldiers died as they fled rearward over the open terrain. Of the 250,000-man Russian Third Army not involved in the Carpathian Mountain battle, 210,000 became casualties in just one week, including 140,000 prisoners of war. Two tsarist corps (X and XXIV) had been destroyed. A pilot of Flight Company 10 witnessed the destruction during the battle because of well-directed artillery fire resulting from excellent ground and air observation.12
The newly created German Eleventh Army and Habsburg VI Corps had launched their offensive at a very weak portion of the Russian front, the tsarist Third Army northern front position, which served as the connecting point between the Romanov, German, and Austro-Hungarian theaters (north and southwest fronts). After intense consideration of the potential locations to launch a successful offensive operation, German military planners selected the thirty-mile area in western Galicia between the villages of Gorlice and Tarnov. The opposing tsarist Third Army had deployed many of its troops as reinforcements for the Carpathian Mountain front offensive. Thus, when attacked, there was insufficient time for the Russians to transfer reinforcements from the mountain front to the suddenly threatened army.
The subsequent multimonth troop movements and battles created enormous devastation, the worst occurring during the six weeks before the great Russian retreat that eventually extended three hundred miles into the defeated enemy’s interior. Artillery barrages, plundering troops, or the burning of villages completely or partially destroyed the remaining village homes east of Fortress Przemyśl. Fleeing civilians filled local roads, delaying the forward movement of Central Powers troops and hindering tsarist retreat efforts.
When Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915, Generals Conrad and Falkenhayn quickly agreed to maintain a defensive stance against the former ally and to continue the successful Gorlice offensive operation. Fortunately for the Dual Monarchy, the Italians waited a month to launch the first of eleven Isonzo assaults at the end of June 1915 with overwhelming troop numbers. The attempted invasion of Austria-Hungary failed, however, because the inexperienced Italian troops attacked uphill, without machine guns and artillery support, against a numerically inferior but well dug-in Habsburg defensive force. In addition, the small, ragtag number of defenders had gained enough time to rush reinforcements to hold the line because of the Italian hesitancy in launching the offensive.13
General Conrad desired to crush his former Italian ally immediately, but lacked the necessary troop numbers to accomplish this because of the Gorlice-Tarnov offensive on the Russian front. He therefore had to pin his hopes on the defensive capabilities of his few local troops defending their mountain terrain. The sheer size of the eastern front ensured that it would be extremely difficult to obtain a decisive victory in that theater against the tsarist foe. Four Russian armies soon became entrapped in the Carpathian Mountain terrain in a desperate situation. The more deeply Russian troops penetrated into the mountains, the more problematic their circumstances became. As the Gorlice-Tarnov offensive progressed further east, it outflanked the tsarist troops, now entrapped in the Carpathian Mountains.
In order to provide new formations for the Gorlice-Tarnov operation, a reorganization of the German army occurred. German divisions reduced the number of their regiments from four to three, which added eight hundred soldiers or more and machine guns to each one. This created eight new infantry divisions that General Falkenhayn originally intended to utilize on the western front and to launch an offensive against Serbia. However, the extremely precarious situation on the Habsburg front forced the German general to alter his plans.14
The German Eleventh Army consisted of combat-hardened veterans from the western front. These troops had training superior to that of the Russians and much higher morale. Before commencing the offensive operations, well-supported military feints and demonstrations were launched along the eastern front at Courland and Bukovina to conceal the assembly of soldiers and heavy artillery deploying for the Gorlice operation. General Falkenhayn also launched an offensive on the Flanders Ypres front to camouflage the transfer of eight German divisions to the eastern front to participate in the offensive on the rolling hilly terrain, a much more favorable terrain than the inhospitable Carpathian Mountain theater.
However, already on April 27, a telegram from Grand Duke Nicholas to General Ivanov ordered the southwest front commander to prepare to launch an offensive to finally invade the Hungarian plains. The communication also reported a German raid far into the Baltic area lines, termed a diversionary assault. The next day the grand duke informed the tsar of a large concentration of Central Powers troops in the Gorlice region, repeating the message on April 28. As one Russian historian has written, Nicholas did not appear to realize the magnitude of the potential threat, so he did not order any major military measures.
Earlier attempts to create a unified Central Powers command on the eastern front had not succeeded. This difficulty continued to plague the allies when bitter problems arose in directing and controlling the joint theater operations. The Russian army remained in semi-good order, able to fight very effective rearguard actions. The Habsburg Third and Fourth Armies protected the German Eleventh Army flanks during the campaign, which represented the first Austro-Hungarian–German troops fighting under unified command. General Falkenhayn demanded that a German command the Gorlice-Tarnov campaign. He chose General August von Mackensen, who would be subject to orders from the German High Command and the formal commander. Conrad ultimately had to accept General Mackensen, which forced him into the background during the successful campaign. Since the numerically superior German army led the offensive against Russia to rescue the Austro-Hungarian army, Conrad had to accept his field commanders receiving German Supreme Command orders. To ease Conrad’s mind, General Falkenhayn claimed that he did not desire to bypass him and that he would personally inform him and seek his acceptance of all major orders to German units.15
General Falkenhayn’s minimal campaign goal encompassed crippling Russian military potential to the extent that time and his resources allowed and seizing and maintaining the strategic initiative on the eastern front. Falkenhayn remained wary of the inherent dangers as well as problems with large-scale operations against tsarist Russia. His immediate objective was to relieve the Habsburg Carpathian Mountain front, which was very close to collapse, and to defeat the opposing Russian forces. The initial operational successes provided that opportunity, while the immediately discernible Russian battlefield weaknesses enabled the Central Powers forces to obtain further victories. During the initial Gorlice attack, the Russians could neither rapidly nor effectively reinforce their Third Army, which proved disastrous. Within forty hours that army had been shattered, and within three days its defensive positions had been completely overrun. Under heavy German artillery fire, thousands of Russian soldiers fled rapidly from their shallow trenches into open country to be massacred by German artillery shrapnel shells and low-trajectory rounds. This rapid defeat resulted partially from the insufficient and fragmented tsarist High Command (Stavka).
By the end of the first day of battle, allied attacking troops had advanced one and a half to three and a half miles. Part of the explanation for the rapid tsarist defeat was that their Third Army lacked strength in depth. The majority of troops deployed in forward defensive lines were decimated by the pre-offensive artillery bombardment. General Ivanov now had to depend on the III Caucasus Corps for reinforcements, as it served as the major southwest front reserve force. Already Stavka failed to initiate an effective response.
On May 3, the German Eleventh Army had accomplished a fifteen-to twenty-kilometer-wide breakthrough. The Habsburg Fourth and Third Armies’ advance on the German army’s two flanks worsened the enemy’s already perilous situation and caused them to retreat further, to the San River. Although the Russians had already suffered enormous battle losses and lost many prisoners of war as well as huge quantities of weapons and equipment in their sudden defeat, they attempted to launch a counterattack with their III Caucasus Corps at the Carpathian Mountains Dukla Pass. One division received orders to be transferred from the tsarist northwest front to the southwest front.
Generals Falkenhayn and Mackensen realized that the opposing tsarist forces were fighting and retreating on their own terrain with a still-intact railroad network and unlimited opportunities to continue withdrawing. They also recognized the geographical obstacles to be overcome and the necessity to extend their supply efforts as their troops advanced, but the critical Habsburg military situation had left General Falkenhayn with no alternative but to launch the May offensive campaign. Falkenhayn’s main concern, however, remained the western front situation. Therefore, one of his major objectives involved continuing the eastern front offensive in the hopes of inflicting unacceptable casualties, crippling the Russian army, and forcing them to sign a separate peace treaty.16 To that end, he launched small, limited, but effective offensive actions to paralyze Russia’s offensive power and stabilize the eastern front situation for the Central Powers before turning his major attention back to the trenches on the western front.
Falkenhayn concentrated on obtaining limited offensive successes, cautiously planning each operation. He did not seek enormous territorial acquisitions, which could prove illusory and create major problems, but rather to always protect his limited gains. He remained cognizant of the pitfalls and dangers inherent in conducting large-scale operations in Russia. Thus, in early May his initial operational goal was to seize the road junction at Zmigrod, which would effectively sever the tsarist army’s lateral communication in the Carpathian Mountains. He then intended to outflank them. Zmigrod fell on May 9. On May 4, the third day of the Gorlice offensive, as the tsarist Third Army continued its retreat, Stavka (headed by Grand Duke Nicholas) assumed he could halt the Central Powers advance without major difficulty. One week after the offensive commenced, the Eleventh Army had achieved all its objectives ordered on April 24.17
As the offensive progressed, General Falkenhayn had agreed that the Habsburg Third Army could have the honor of reconquering Fortress Przemyśl when the victorious troops approached the citadel. Thus, the Third Army marched toward the fortress with the intent to seize it by storm attack.18 However, that army’s progress lagged because of enemy resistance, so Eleventh Army units ultimately captured the fortress. The poor roads leading to Fortress Przemyśl slowed supply movement and created difficult problems for the allies. General Falkenhayn determined that because of the lack of Habsburg Third Army progress, his Eleventh Army had to alter its attack direction and plans for seizing the citadel, as it advanced more rapidly than the Habsburg Third and Fourth Armies.
The rapid and overwhelming success of the Gorlice-Tarnov offensive kept Romania from entering the war, while the tsarist military weakness provided the opportunity to achieve the great Central Powers military victory, which included the recapture of Fortress Przemyśl. The tsarist front meanwhile rapidly collapsed in the area of Tarnov as the German Eleventh and the Habsburg Fourth Armies quickly advanced, while the Russian Eighth Army, entrapped in the Carpathian Mountains, retreated to the Lupkov Pass because of the threat of being encircled. Effective German artillery played a major role throughout the campaign. Its heavy guns proved indispensable in laying the groundwork for the multiple short infantry attacks against the defending Russian troops. As during much of the war, Habsburg artillery during this campaign was described as ineffective and inadequate.
The Russians, for example, claimed not to have had to move their battery positions during the entire Carpathian Mountain Winter campaign because of the total lack of effectual Habsburg counterfire.19 German artillery forward observers proved extremely effective, particularly when their efforts were combined with air reconnaissance missions, both of which precisely charted Russian artillery positions down to the individual gun, often enabling German gunners to neutralize enemy defensive firepower. Airplane reconnaissance pilots witnessed the destruction caused by the well-directed artillery fire and tsarist reinforcements rushing to the endangered battlefront.20
The Russian army suffered from numerous disadvantages during the campaign, although it remained in semi-good order and conducted its customary effective rearguard retreat actions. Difficulties included an increasing shortage of weapons, particularly rifles, ammunition, and artillery shells, while the faulty early May Third Army troop dispositions had made it impossible to halt the determined German advance. Tsarist field commanders at the operational level often dispersed their reinforcements ineffectively as well as piecemeal into the front lines, thus consuming them too rapidly when launching counterattacks into German artillery barrages. Meanwhile, the Russians continued their previous Ninth Army offensive operation in the Habsburg province of the Bukovina, which had also consumed multiple Russian Third Army units throughout the month of May. This operation threatened Habsburg forces deployed at the Romanian frontier and increased the danger of that country entering the war against Austria-Hungary.
The III Caucasus Corps had been deployed in two groups far to the rear of the Gorlice battlefront; therefore it could not arrive on the battlefield until May 4 as the major southwest front reserve force. Their intervention slowed the allied advance for the next two days, but on May 4, the German Eleventh Army accomplished its tactical success when its right flank forces pierced the Russian Third Army front. On May 4 the Russian Supreme Command did not believe their military situation to be too serious, thus they launched a counterattack with the III Caucasus Corps. Meanwhile, the tsarist Third Army had retreated behind the Wisloka and Wislok Rivers. The Russian command hoped for local military successes that would have changed the military situation in their favor.21
The Russian Carpathian Mountain front also began to crumble, as the allies determined to continue their advance toward the San River, which trapped the four tsarist armies ensconced in the mountains. The Germans had begun to advance ten miles a day, forcing tsarist armies in the mountains to retreat to the San River to avoid annihilation. Thousands of tsarist troops either perished from machine gun fire or drowned attempting to cross the river. During the next two weeks, Central Powers troops reached the San River line; however, the advancing troops soon encountered serious supply, logistical, and transport problems because the Eleventh Army’s main railroad supply depot was situated more than fifty miles to the rear of the troops.
During the night of May 4, Habsburg Fourth Army troops crossed the Dunajec River and then advanced. The army’s middle forces attained mountain positions south of Tarnov where the Russians established serious resistance, while continuing to protect the Eleventh Army’s left flank. It achieved success on both its flanks on that day, and the Austro-Hungarian Third Army approached Fortress Przemyśl from the west and south to attempt to capture it.22 Once Jaroslau became the major allied objective, the German Eleventh Army had to shift its main forces across the San River to the right bank. Allied corps then received the mission to seize that objective.
The tsarist X Corps received the brunt of the enemy offensive and had to retreat, creating an enormous gap in the Russian line. In the meantime, tsarist X Corps numbers had dropped to fifteen hundred troops.23 The overall Central Powers success forced a tsarist retreat to the Wisloka River area, a short distance to the east of their present positions. General Ivanov, however, wanted to retreat to the San River line. Stavka negated this idea; the retrograde movement must halt at the Wisloka River.
Between May 5 and 8, the advancing Central Powers armies completed a series of planned short advances; the mountain roads and the necessity of resupply, particularly of artillery shells, still delayed the main effort, which enabled Russian troops to escape to the northeast. With Eleventh Army corps in pursuit, the Russians failed to destroy the pontoon bridges constructed by the advancing Central Powers divisions. Meanwhile, at the Eleventh Army flanks, the Habsburg Third and Fourth Armies commenced additional offensive efforts, Third Army forcing the Russians out of the Dukla Pass. Habsburg troops advanced through the series of basins at Jaslo-Krosno-Sanok, which made the tsarist Lupkov Pass position untenable. After constructing bridgeheads that offered the opportunity to expand the operation eastward, the German army crossed the river. The width of the river required that the troops initially capture the most favorable crossing points. The selected Jaroslau and Radymno areas, where the major north-south railroad line traversed, partially isolated Fortress Przemyśl.
On May 5, the III Caucasus Corps, instead of launching a tsarist counterattack against the German offensive formations, became drawn into battle and was badly mauled. By late May 5, the corps contained only 4,000 to 5,000 troops of its original 34,000. The Russian Third Army’s X Corps, which received the brunt of the German attack, was annihilated. By May 6, Central Powers troops had forced open a large gap into the Russian Third Army front, while tsarist forces were in total disarray.
The May 5 seizure of the Lupkov Pass, the immediate geographic target objective to exploit the Gorlice breakthrough, resulted in the victorious allied troops continuing their advance to the San River as the Russian Carpathian Mountain front began to crumble. German advances forced the tsarist armies in the Carpathian Mountains to retreat as quickly as possible to the San River to avoid annihilation.
On May 6, General Falkenhayn notified General Conrad that the German ambassador and the military attaché in Rome had recommended that the Dual Monarchy submit its maximum concessions to Rome within twenty-four hours. General Falkenhayn emphasized that “we stand at a crossroads.”24 The general agreed that they could not launch an allied offensive against Serbia before the end of May and that it was necessary to obtain Bulgaria as an ally.25 He then strongly suggested to General Conrad that the Habsburg diplomats avoid war with Italy “under any circumstances.”26 On May 4, he pressured Foreign Minister Istvan Burian to keep Italy neutral and notified General Falkenhayn of this action. Conrad continued to press the Habsburg Foreign Office relative to the ongoing Italian negotiations on May 5. By April 28, Conrad had also appealed to Emperor Franz Joseph to drop his opposition to initiating military defensive measures along the Italian frontier.27
Meanwhile, the tsarist supply lines extended fifty miles west of the San River, while Russian units increasingly became threatened by Habsburg troops advancing in the Carpathian Mountains. At the same time, the Russian Third Army inserted its few reserves (two infantry regiments) between Fortress Przemyśl and Jaroslau. The Russian Carpathian Mountain front also began to crumble, as the allies determined to continue their advance toward the San River, which trapped the tsarist armies in the mountains.
The Russians established a defensive line on the Wisloka River that extended almost one hundred kilometers in a north-south direction eighty kilometers west of the San River. Habsburg troops advancing from the Carpathian Mountain front could have outflanked the new tsarist position. Initially, General Ivanov requested that he be able to retreat to the San River, but Stavka ordered him to defend that line because they anticipated that Italy would enter the war soon. In addition, they expected that tsarist Ninth Army success in the Bukovina theater would bring Romania into the war on the Entente side.
On May 7, III Caucasus Corps launched its counterattack just as German reinforcements initiated their own assault across the Wislok River; on May 7 and 8, the Central Powers continued their advance toward the San River. This trapped the tsarist armies ensconced in the Carpathian Mountains. Again, General Ivanov sought to retreat to the San River to save what remained of the Third Army, but Grand Duke Nicholas had announced that no retreat could be initiated without his permission. This condemned the Russian Third Army. Two divisions from the tsarist northwest front received orders to reinforce the buckling southwest front. Without large numbers of reserve troops, units would be drawn helter-skelter.
Stavka originally ordered the Third Army to hold its positions, but the intervening events made the order superfluous. The tsarist armies in the Carpathian Mountains proceeded to retreat to the San River to avoid annihilation. The Germans utilized every means available to rebuild the local railroad lines and repair destroyed bridges as rapidly as possible. They constructed bridgeheads from which to launch further advances, which proved of great assistance as they pushed further east, and expanded their maneuver room so that the Eleventh Army could shift its attack direction, which soon became necessary.
When General Mackensen discussed the next operational allied objectives with General Conrad, he proposed that the offensive continue to hurl the retreating Russians behind the San River line. The successful Central Powers tactical battle had become a strategic triumph. Then, on May 10, General Ivanov received orders to defend the San-Dniester River line when his forces remained deployed well forward of that line.
Russian command issued multiple confused orders, countered and reissued, to defend the San-Dniester River line. Three other corps (Habsburg VI, German XLI Reserve, and ad hoc Corps Kneussl) mobilized to the south and southwest to isolate the fortress from the north and east. The strong Russian defensive positions west of Jaroslau hindered Habsburg Third Army forward progress, so it could not rapidly capture Fortress Przemyśl; therefore, the German Eleventh Army had to halt its movement to accomplish that mission.
In addition, Conrad requested further German troops for deployment on General Planzer-Baltin’s front in the southern Carpathian Mountains because the Russians launched a major attack in the Bukovina. General Falkenhayn replied by emphasizing that he could not spare additional German troops from the western front because the long-awaited Anglo-French offensive had just commenced, which bound all available German reserves on that front.28 Falkenhayn also stated that the “spearhead” of the offensive should not be weakened for a secondary front.
Claiming that the two requested German divisions were necessary to support the Bukovina front, General Conrad also raised the question of neutral Romania and Italy, stressing that a major Habsburg defeat in the Bukovina could entice Bucharest to enter the war against Austria-Hungary. Conrad and Falkenhayn agreed on the necessity of continuing the Gorlice-Tarnov offensive but momentarily failed to determine a specific objective. Thus, their personal long-distance exchanges proved inconclusive, and they required private meetings to decide such matters as the disposal of captured materials, weapons, ammunition, and equipment. The allied generals exchanged a flurry of memoranda between May 9 and 12, when they met personally. Consensus quickly followed, and on May 12 they continued the offensive to the San River. The broad attack objectives included attaining the river to the north and east of Fortress Przemyśl, which the disarray of Russian military forces made easier.
On May 9, General Falkenhayn wired General Conrad that his Eleventh Army had to complete its original mission, then requested his counterpart’s input relative to future allied strategy. The German chief of the General Staff also stated that the success of the present offensive would most likely make it easier to transfer troop reinforcements against Italy. General Conrad replied that the successful operation should include the “relentless pursuit of the defeated enemy with all our forces.” The Russians had to be prevented from constructing a strong defensive line so that Central Powers troops could cross the San River in pursuit of the enemy. General Conrad also reported that the Russians had mounted a massive offensive against the Habsburg Seventh Army in the Bukovina, forcing him to dispatch two divisions to halt the tsarist advance.29 Meanwhile, the Germans established new eastern front headquarters, indicating that for the time being the main German war theater remained in the east.
On the same day, the Russians attempted to establish defensive positions on the San River, but these had not been prepared in time, and they did not establish any such lines north of Fortress Przemyśl. They began to suffer from low troop numbers while being attacked on the San River during the original offensive. General Ivanov’s forces had few reserves; for example, only two infantry regiments defended against Central Powers forces between Fortress Przemyśl and Jaroslau. Grand Duke Nicolas personally telegraphed General Ivanov, reemphasizing that he could not initiate a retreat movement without specific orders from Stavka.
General Conrad’s May 9 telegram to General Falkenhayn also emphasized that the main goal of Habsburg diplomacy remained preventing a war with Italy.30 On that same day, he reported to the Emperor’s Military Chancellery about the May 7 conference at German headquarters, where a consensus was reached that Italy would most likely intervene against Austria-Hungary in the war. Germany promised solidarity with Austria-Hungary; its contribution of military forces, however, would be dependent upon the momentary situation. Falkenhayn also accepted that absolutely no chance of any agreement existed with Italy, thus he turned to studying various defensive measures to initiate on the southwest front. Yet, he continued to pressure Habsburg diplomats to avoid war with Italy “under any circumstances” and argued that the present offensive would most likely make it easier to transfer troops to the threatened Italian front.31
General Falkenhayn again indicated to Conrad that the newly launched Anglo-French offensive made it impossible to divert any forces from the western to the eastern front, while the divisions promised by Hindenburg and Ludendorff had not yet been freed.
Then, on May 10, the tsarist Third Army center buckled; the severely weakened army had lost much of its fighting capability. This forced Stavka to reverse its earlier decision and order a retreat to the San River. The Grand Duke (Nicolas) stipulated that tsarist forces defend the San-Vistula River lines and prepare to launch an offensive. Stavka’s main concern had become that tsarist troops must not surrender Galicia. However, the Third Army had to retreat behind the San River, which forced the entire theater’s forces to retreat.
By May 10, the tsarist Third Army had lost nearly 200 artillery pieces and 140,000 prisoners of war. From the original 200,000 Russian troops and 50,000 replacement troops hurled into the battered front lines, only 40,000 unwounded soldiers now defended the threatened San River line. The Russian losses proved so severe that the X and XXIV Corps barely existed; the IX Corps had lost 80 percent of its manpower, and III Corps 75 percent; and its XXI Corps now consisted of only 2,000 troops.32 Tsarist commanders possessed few reserve formations—only the two infantry regiments mentioned between Fortress Przemyśl and Jaroslau.
As Franz Joseph approved initiating military activity on the southwest front, the Germans launched a diplomatic offensive in a last-ditch effort to prevent the Italians from entering the war. Naturally, Habsburg concerns about a possible third front also increased. The allied generals, Conrad and Mackensen, exchanged a series of memoranda before they met personally. Consensus quickly followed and, on May 12, they had determined to continue the offensive to the San River. The broad attack objectives became attaining the river to the north and east of Fortress Przemyśl, which the chaotic Russian retreat facilitated. Tsarist forces had to be prevented from constructing a strong defensive line so that Central Powers troops could rapidly defeat them, cross the San River, and pursue the retreating soldiers.
The Russian Third and Eighth Army forces had almost been annihilated, while the Central Powers recovered 130 kilometers of Galician terrain extending to the San River. During the next two weeks, carefully controlled assault efforts would be launched over the San River. German air reconnaissance reports provided accurate and invaluable information on the movement of tsarist forces and their artillery emplacements.33 The May 12 events ended the first phase of the Gorlice-Tarnov campaign. During that period, western Galicia had been recaptured and the tsarist front hurled back to the Nida River and Carpathian Mountain forelands. The depleted Habsburg morale that resulted from the disastrous Carpathian Mountain winter campaign disappeared in their frontline formations and civilians in the hinterland.
Renewed self-confidence and elation replaced the gloom and doom of the Carpathian Mountain campaign, and again hopes for victory emerged. However, while the bulk of the allied troops deployed forward, General Falkenhayn noticed a continuous disintegration of Habsburg units, particularly those of the Fourth Army, as tsarist reinforcements began to arrive on the battlefield. Meanwhile, General Conrad admitted that the Gorlice military success resulted from the German efforts.34
The Germans found themselves delayed more by logistical problems than by any serious Russian resistance. Russian forces were in complete disarray by this time. Over the next two weeks, the Germans initiated their series of carefully controlled advances toward the San River. A major objective became to build bridgeheads to extend the allied advance over the river to the east and also provide maneuver space if necessary for the Eleventh Army to change its offensive’s direction. The most feverish activity, however, occurred on the railroads, because the nearest major railhead was sixty miles from the advancing armies. Changing the direction of the attack would be vital for the offensive, targeted toward the southeast.
Meanwhile, the Habsburg Third Army accomplished only slow forward progress against the Russian Eighth Army at the San River, which defended the southern and western approaches to Fortress Przemyśl. The terrible condition of the supply roads slowed all efforts east of the Carpathian Mountains. The German X Corps and the Prussian Garde Corps advanced east of the San River to establish blocking positions to protect the Eleventh Army’s right flank position. The remaining three corps, the VI, the German XLI reserve, and the ad hoc Corps Kneussl, would swing to the south and southeast to isolate the fortress from the north and east.35
When the Russian Ninth Army launched the mentioned major offensive into the Bukovina, General Falkenhayn did not want to weaken the main offensive operation against the Russians by diverting divisions to the Habsburg Seventh Army defending that province. He refused to weaken the Third, Eleventh, and Fourth Armies for the sake of what he termed a secondary theater and a highly questionable action. To him it was of little significance if the Habsburg Seventh Army had to retreat multiple kilometers. General Conrad, however, replied that if the Seventh Army suffered a decisive defeat, it would reverse the favorable situation of the Gorlice offensive and make a major negative impression on neutral European states. Thus, he intended to transfer his III Corps to that theater. A meeting at German headquarters did not produce any change.36
In the meantime, the Russian Ninth Army won a considerable but basically irrelevant success in that province; thus, by mid-May the Habsburgs had lost much of the Bukovina (120,000 tsarist troops had attacked 80,000 Habsburg Seventh Army soldiers).37 On May 13 an interesting exchange occurred between the Central Powers generals relative to the deployment of German Alpine Corps with Habsburg troops at the Italian frontier. The Germans requested that General Conrad instruct his forces to avoid any incident that might unfavorably influence an Italian response. Conrad immediately instructed his commander on the Italian front to avoid any provocation.38 Then General Falkenhayn stated that it was absolutely essential that the Habsburg deployment not disturb the diplomatic efforts in Rome at this critical moment.39
When Conrad and Falkenhayn met in Pless, they discussed the situation in Galicia and the Balkan front, deciding that the Bulgarians should be informed that now was the time to “immediately” prepare for a campaign against Serbia, but the uncertain situation relative to Italy caused Bulgaria to shy away.40
The German Eleventh Army and Habsburg VI Corps commenced another short advance on May 13 along the northern San riverbank as General Mackensen prepared to launch an attack on Fortress Przemyśl. Air reconnaissance efforts extended into the area north of the fortress. The bridgehead at Jaroslau provided a position for the German XLI Corps to push through Russian positions at Radymno from which to attack the fortress. This action also covered the flank of German Corps Kneussl approaching from the west. That corps, consisting of the 11th and 119th Infantry Divisions, attacked the fortress from the northwest after coordinating its advance with the Habsburg ally.41 The troops then advanced from Sanok toward Bircza and the fortress. However, those forces encountered serious Russian resistance, which slowed them down.
The slackened combat activity that commenced on that day provided a welcome respite for Eleventh Army troops who had just endured nine straight days of battle, partly in pursuit of the retreating Russians. Conrad dispatched a memorandum to Falkenhayn and Burian suggesting that the allied offensive be halted at the San-Dniester River line and that a defensive posture commence. This, he calculated, would free twenty infantry divisions to counter an Italian attack.
Air reconnaissance reports provided continual accurate and invaluable information to higher field commanders on the tsarist forces and artillery locations.42 The next major concern dealt with potential Russian intentions. German aerial reconnaissance revealed that tsarist troops had initiated a retreat movement, but a question remained: Did they intend to defend Fortress Przemyśl? Throughout early May, the Russians actually could not determine whether to defend or surrender the fortress. Meanwhile, wagons rapidly prepared to transport troops and weapons out of the citadel, as commanders had actually taken the initial steps toward evacuating it during mid-May. Then, during the latter part of the month, they reversed the decision and determined to defend the fortress as a May 12 Russian radio transmission indicated. Then, on May 21 they determined to abandon it, as heard on the radio traffic. The German assumption that the Russians would attempt to avoid decisive battle on the San River, however, proved erroneous.
On May 14, a Habsburg and German corps (VI and Garde) attacked and seized the key tsarist defensive positions west and south of Jaroslau. The Russians hoped to halt enemy progress with arriving reinforcements to protect Fortress Przemyśl and the lower San River defensive line. A tsarist counterattack followed. The important San-Dniester River line had not yet been crossed, although the Habsburg Second and Third Armies had attacked enemy positions at the southern Fortress Przemyśl front.43
Meanwhile, on May 11, Emperor Franz Joseph finally approved the activation of the forts on the Italian frontier.44 Habsburg leaders anticipated Rome’s intervention in the war in the immediate future. The following day, Foreign Minister Burian agreed, as did both Central Powers emperors, to the secession of nearly all Habsburg territory inhabited by Italians. The territory, however, could not be surrendered until the end of the year, but the effort proved fruitless. General Conrad informed General Falkenhayn relative to the stable condition on the Galician front and the fact that Serbia could not presently launch an offensive. Therefore, the Bulgarians needed to be informed that the time for a military campaign against Serbia had arrived. The tumultuous situation relative to Italy, however, caused the Bulgarians to decline a treaty with the Central Powers to launch an offensive against Serbia.45
Allied discussions commenced relative to appropriate military measures to be initiated on the Italian front when that country declared war. Habsburg military leadership anticipated Italy entering the war by July 4. On May 14 orders approved by Emperor Franz Joseph were disseminated to initiate defensive measures against an Italian attack at the Italian frontier.46 Meanwhile, General Falkenhayn raised the question of the probability, with the assistance of German and Bulgarian troops, of simultaneously knocking Serbia out of the conflict.47 The next day, Conrad suggested that if Italy could be kept neutral in the near future, a joint allied operation with Bulgarian and Turkish troops could be launched against Serbia.48
The next day the Eleventh Army offensive continued during rainy conditions. That army’s right flank positions became protected against the launching of a possible tsarist sortie from Fortress Przemyśl when the German X and Garde Corps successfully advanced east of the San River and established blocking positions to protect its flank.49 The arrival of a critical resupply of artillery shells allowed renewal of the assault, which finally drove some Russian troops across the San River. Air reconnaissance, however, confirmed that significant enemy forces remained ensconced west of the river.
To the south Russian forces retreated into Galicia from the Carpathian Mountains. General Ivanov received orders to maintain their present positions, while the Ninth Army continued its attack in the Bukovina. The tsarist shortage of artillery shells began to be a major factor for the Russians’ tactical decision making.
Then, on May 16, German Corps Kneussl crossed the river and advanced, as it appeared that the Russians had prepared to resist behind the San River, forcing enemy units protecting Jaroslau to capitulate. (Jaroslau was one of the earlier bridgeheads defending the approaches to Fortress Przemyśl from tsarist attack during September 1914). The rapid collapse of tsarist Jaroslau positions negated any tsarist plan to launch a counterattack. In the meantime, as the allied advance continued, air reconnaissance units would be deployed forward to enable long-range missions and provide reconnaissance reports and pictures of tsarist units and artillery.50
The Eleventh Army’s southern flank units arrived at the bridgehead at Radymno on May 16, but because of a heavy tsarist counterattack and supply difficulties, those troops’ offensive would also be halted. Meanwhile, X Corps attacked the fortress positions at Fort Pralkowce, but could not seize them owing to insufficient pre-attack artillery support. Tsarist resistance increased against the Fourth, Third, and Eleventh armies even as they retreated across the San-Dniester River line. Seven divisions stood ready to pursue the defeated enemy if the Armee Ober Kommando (AOK) approved.
During mid-May, the Third and Fourth Habsburg Armies advanced toward the south, southwest, and western Fortress Przemyśl fronts, while the German Eleventh Army approached the citadel from the southern San River after capturing the important Radymno bridgehead. However, because of the mentioned tsarist counterattack and continuing supply difficulties, the Austro-Hungarian and German troops were forced on the defensive.
Also on May 16, General Falkenhayn replied to Conrad’s earlier telegram, declaring that once the allied troops attained the San-Dniester River line, the allied front extending from the Vistula River to the Bukovina could be held with thirty Habsburg divisions. That would free troops for deployment against both Italy and Serbia. Conrad had explained that if Italy could be kept neutral during the near future, a joint front could be maintained by only seven divisions, freeing seventeen to eighteen Austro-Hungarian and seven German divisions excluding the Eleventh Army. Twenty-four or twenty-five divisions could then be utilized to attack Italy and Serbia if the Russian forces continued to retreat. A combined German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish offensive could be launched again Serbia.51
Falkenhayn also claimed that the Vistula River to Bukovina front could be maintained by three Habsburg divisions. On May 17, Conrad expressed his regrets that General Falkenhayn now contemplated removing his Eleventh Army after it attained the San-Dniester River line. Furthermore, he considered that no more than twenty divisions could be made available against Italy when it declared war on Austria-Hungary (the Eleventh Army’s nine divisions, Beskid Corps [one division], and ten Habsburg divisions) under Habsburg command.52
The Central Powers’ assault continued toward the San River, where forced crossings proved successful. In the meantime, Stavka commanded General Ivanov to defend particularly the left bank to prevent the loss of Fortress Przemyśl. Everything must be done to prevent having to abandon the citadel.53 On the next day the Grand Duke informed General Brusilov that the fortress must be kept and the general situation maintained.
The following six days were spent making those preparations necessary for launching the next phase of the operation, again requiring the stockpiling of artillery shells and awaiting the arrival of Ersatz troops to replace recent severe casualties. Between May 20 and 23, the Eleventh Army received orders to sever the eastern Fortress Przemyśl communications while the Habsburg Third and Second Armies captured the citadel. Stavka now became concerned about their northwest front against Germany, as it had to protect its positions along the Vistula and Narev Rivers. That front could initiate a retreat only as a last resort. Grand Duke Nicholas, although consistently ordering his troops not to retreat, reluctantly rescinded his resistance because of the continuing battlefield setbacks.
On May 18, Generals Conrad and Falkenhayn agreed to continue the attack toward Fortress Przemyśl. On May 20, General Falkenhayn determined to maintain the overall offensive operation to eliminate the Russian military danger, and by May 22, the Central Powers forces had advanced fifty-five miles in just three weeks.54 Meanwhile, the poor mountain roads hampered Habsburg Third Army efforts to approach and attack Fortress Przemyśl positions because heavy artillery shells could not be transported to that area. The continued slow progress against the tsarist Eighth Army forces defending the western and southern fortress approaches also delayed the Third Army’s commencement of assaults against the fortress. The German Eleventh Army therefore shifted its advance direction after a short battle pause to attack the fortress from the north. Meanwhile, another battle pause became necessary on May 19 to restock artillery shells to support further offensive action at the San River.
The operation also had to be halted until supply trains could reach the advance formations because of the destroyed roadways, bridges, and railroad lines that delayed the delivery of much-needed equipment and food. The German Eleventh Army had meanwhile advanced sixty-two miles from its nearest supply railhead depots, the insufficient road networks and inclement weather conditions seriously compounding its supply problems.55 Feverish repairs continued on the damaged railroads. The unrelenting logistical problems could be resolved only by moving railroads closer to the front and restocking artillery shells as rapidly as possible. Fortunately, the Russians proved incapable of launching counterattacks, although they managed to increase resistance against the Central Powers forces, particularly the Habsburg Fourth Army.56 Generals Conrad and Falkenhayn had to reassess the strategic situation, particularly because of the Italian threat to enter the war against the allies.
But even as Habsburg and German forces prepared to liberate the fortress, the question of when Italy would declare war also dominated military planning. General Falkenhayn particularly became concerned about the protection of Bavaria and southern Germany. Because of the time pressure, Habsburg troop transports started moving to the Italian frontier and preparations commenced on preparing fortified defensive lines. The situation also raised questions about Romania’s intentions. Conrad wanted twenty divisions from the eastern front to launch a powerful offensive against Italy but reported that two-thirds of Habsburg forces on the Serbian front were not capable of launching an effective offensive.57 The German High Command, however, wondered what effect such a troop movement would have on the Russian theater. In the meantime, Stavka ordered the transfer of a corps from its German northwest front to the Habsburg southwest front. The question of whether to defend Fortress Przemyśl became increasingly significant. The argument became whether it would be expedient to defend the citadel from a military point of view or whether it should be abandoned if defending it did not assist the field armies and their travail. Grand Duke Nicholas believed that defending Fortress Przemyśl made no military sense, but it had to be held for political reasons.58
General Falkenhayn also suggested launching an offensive against Serbia to draw Bulgaria to the Central Powers’ side, but for the time being Conrad rejected the proposal. Such an offensive called for the deployment of fourteen German and three Habsburg divisions under Habsburg Supreme Command control. Conrad also argued that if the Habsburg forces had to go on the defensive against Russia, the Romanians might attack them from the rear.
The next major strategic question concerned troop numbers necessary to obtain military success against Serbia, particularly units that Bulgaria would deploy, and whether Turkey would provide up to six infantry divisions for the operation. When comparing numbers, estimates had Germany deploying 140,000 troops and the Bulgarians 120,000. These troop numbers should be sufficient to overpower the Serbs, who could muster 200,000 troops. Falkenhayn wanted to attack Serbia first before launching a surprise attack against Italy, because he did not judge Italian troops to be particularly good.59
Conrad calculated that in the Tyrol, a division would be strong enough to defend the frontier, and the Germans promised to transport and deploy their Alpine Corps made up of twelve Bavarian battalions. On May 19, Conrad contacted Foreign Minister Burian, emphasizing that ruthless measures against Italy had become necessary and that any delay would prove disastrous. Because of insufficient troop numbers on the Italian front, the Habsburg military initially had to use guerrilla warfare tactics against an Italian invasion. Meanwhile, Bulgaria announced that it would remain neutral if the Central Powers invaded Serbia so as not to give the impression that a secret treaty existed between Germany and Bulgaria.60
The Habsburg Fifth Army would be transferred from the Balkan front as a first echelon force to the Italian frontier. Crown Prince Eugene would command new southwest front forces. Naturally, the strongest possible number of troops had to be deployed against Italy, but the numbers would be pathetically low. General Falkenhayn telegrammed Conrad to remind him that a decision needed to be made to maintain the Russian front before any units could be deployed against Italy.
On May 21, Falkenhayn declared that no indication existed of a possible Serbian offensive being launched against the Dual Monarchy, and he doubted that the Italians would initiate an offensive immediately if war broke out.61 He did, however, promise some German units to be deployed on the Italian front, so long as they did not emanate from the eastern front. Conrad replied that he anticipated an Italian invasion of the Dual Monarchy almost immediately. His defensive forces would be too weak to launch a counteraction or a counteroffensive, leaving the Italians free to march almost unopposed into Habsburg territory.
The German commander, however, adamantly opposed fielding large numbers of troops against Italy, especially from the Galician front. Falkenhayn eventually convinced Conrad at a meeting at Teschen that the offensive against Russia had to be continued and that any forces intended for Italy should be fielded at the frontier.62 It remained unclear, however, whether the potential ten divisions (five from the Balkans, two German, and three Austrian) could halt an Italian offensive.
Conrad ordered his few Landesschutzen troops to hold the Italians at the frontier if possible, because the five divisions that would eventually be deployed would be too weak to launch an offensive. He also accepted Falkenhayn’s advice to delay launching an attack under all circumstances until a major military decision could be obtained against Russia. General Falkenhayn calculated that the Italians could only advance slowly and that they would not attain combat operational readiness until later in June.63
While Falkenhayn’s attention remained focused on the western front, he recognized the necessity of exploiting his military successes on the eastern one, at least for the near future. Conrad also accepted the necessity of defending the Habsburg frontier against Italy with the weak available forces. In return for this, his German counterpart promised to deploy token German troops at the Italian frontier to bolster Habsburg morale. His consistent pressure to launch an offensive against Serbia had to be momentarily dropped because of the Bulgarians’ refusal to join the Central Powers at that time. However, General Falkenhayn refused to relinquish his ideas on this matter because of Turkish requirements for weapons and ammunition to remain in the war.
Preparations commenced for the May 24–June 6 battle to conquer Fortress Przemyśl, including stockpiling artillery shells and awaiting the arrival of troops to replace the recent casualties. Multiple problems arose before the continuation of the operation. The foremost difficulty involved a critical shortage of large-caliber artillery shells and the persisting negative effect of delayed logistical efforts, partially because the closest railhead head lay between sixty and ninety kilometers behind the present front. In addition, besides a lack of motor vehicles, a shortage of fodder limited horse productivity during this rapidly moving battle. The military could utilize few roads because of the terrible terrain conditions, thus the presently attained positions represented the furthest possible operational distance until railroads could be constructed and extended farther east.64 Such logistical problems impeded the German offensive more than enemy resistance.
On May 24, two hours of preparatory artillery barrages initiated an artillery duel with the enemy and the launching of a major attack against Fortress Przemyśl, particularly against heavy tsarist gun positions, until Forts XI and XII capitulated. Central Powers troops launched a major offensive during the next three days once enemy positions at Radymno collapsed and the German XLI Reserve Corps had reached striking distance of that village, where the last eastward road from the fortress came within German artillery range. The Habsburg Third and Second Armies’ advances continued slowly to the northeast toward Mosciska. Increased pressure would be applied on the fortress from the south. Aerial reconnaissance reports, however, indicated that tsarist preparations to abandon the fortress had commenced.
As the allied forces approached Fortress Przemyśl, Falkenhayn became increasingly concerned with the slow advance of Habsburg troops at the Eleventh Army’s southern flank. He telegraphed General August Cramon, ranking liaison officer at Conrad’s headquarters, to request that he order his Second and Third Armies to attack with all means possible, because the Eleventh Army’s success could only be attained through such cooperation. General Cramon replied that such an order had already been issued from Habsburg headquarters.65 The Eleventh Army, advancing north through Radymno to the northwest fortress front, and Third Army, advancing from the southwest, would seize the fortress.
With the offensive to recapture Fortress Przemyśl under way, Conrad turned his attention to the pressing matter of Italy. There was some confusion regarding the May 23 Italian declaration of war. On May 25, the commander of the Habsburg Railroad Bureau stated that no one could guarantee when railroad transports would be ready to commence, while Conrad decided that the first arriving troops could not be thrown into battle at the frontier.66 That same day, allied troops crossed the San River and regrouped while receiving reinforcements for the attack on Fortress Przemyśl. Meanwhile, the Third Russian Army had been forced to retreat rapidly, forcing the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Armies to similarly withdraw from their Carpathian Mountain positions to avoid being encircled.
Conrad remained concerned about Romania’s intentions. If it intervened on the Habsburg side, he postulated that then the Central Powers could win the war. Victory remained possible even if the Romanians simply remained neutral. But Conrad had become convinced that if Romania joined the war against the Central Powers, defeat was inevitable. He recommended incorporating Romania into the Dual Monarchy as the Germans had done with Bavaria. The suggestion raised questions about Bulgaria, which sought to seize Macedonia to the Enos-Midia line. Conrad believed that if Bulgaria could not be gained as an ally, Romania would certainly join the Entente to ensure military defeat for the Central Powers. The diplomatic and political machinations of Bulgaria and Romania thus remained pivotal factors in the Central Powers’ calculations.67
Allied forces meanwhile continued to push toward Fortress Przemyśl, and the Eleventh Army’s heavy artillery barrages forced six tsarist divisions to retreat. On May 26, as the Central Powers advanced to the fortress, fighting continued along the San River, causing a shortage of supplies for several days. Then, beginning May 27, tsarist forces launched a powerful counterattack from the northern and northeastern fortress fronts against the German Eleventh and Habsburg Fourth Armies. Grand Duke Nicholas reported to the tsar on May 28 that the situation remained most serious, but by May 30 he felt somewhat more confident.68
On May 29, Stavka altered its strategy; now determined to defend the fortress, it deployed reinforcements to the citadel.69 It chose, however, not to defend the bulwark with the demoralized Third Army but rather with VIII Corps troops.70 On May 30 at 11:00 a.m., heavy German artillery began bombarding the citadel. An assault was planned for the next day despite the numerous supply and troop delays caused by multiple destroyed bridges and damaged roads. Toward evening, two Habsburg infantry regiments stormed Fort Prakovce but failed to seize it because of insufficient artillery support. This convinced the tsarist command that the enemy would launch their major attack at this location. Therefore, they considered the fighting occurring at the northern citadel front merely to be a feint. Thus, the mass of tsarist reserve artillery pieces was transferred to the southwest fortress front.
On May 31, at 11 a.m., heavy artillery fire, assisted by precise aerial guidance, turned several of the Fortress Przemyśl forts into rubble. A Bavarian division stormed several ruined fortress walls and seized the three northernmost positions. The German High Command then had to postpone plans for any further assaults until June 1, again because of a lack of heavy artillery pieces and shells. Available gun batteries, however, continued blasting the fortress on May 31. Night artillery barrages, including devastating 42-centimeter heavy mortar fire, targeted fortress Forts X, Xa, XI, and XIa, transforming several into rubble. Central Powers troops then stormed two fortress fronts, and X Corps attacked the southwestern portion. The Germans now determined to initiate a more direct approach to attacking the fortress.
The 11th Bavarian Infantry Division, part of a larger force, stormed several fortress work ruins and seized the three northernmost ones. Also, a Habsburg regiment finally pierced the western fortification area near Fortress Work VII, while artillery fire battered the ramparts at Fort Work XI’s locations. A lucky German howitzer shell destroyed key Russian trenches on the west flank of the bulwark, and several other citadel positions received the brunt of powerful artillery barrages. Precise aerial artillery observation continued to improve German firing accuracy significantly. On June 1, German offensive units finally directly attacked the citadel, whereupon a Bavarian infantry unit seized Forts X and XI and another battalion seized Fort XII. By evening, German troops had successfully penetrated the fortress defenses; although Russian reinforcements had arrived, they were too late to affect the outcome of the battle.
During the early morning hours of June 2, the Russians launched a heavy counterattack at the Fortress Defensive District XI, but effective allied rifle, machine gun, and artillery barrages halted the effort. Russian defensive positions then quickly collapsed, and the soldiers who could escape the battle retreated to the east. Remaining tsarist troops burned the remaining fortress supplies and destroyed the last bridge across the San River. They then attempted to establish a defensive position north of Zuravica, but this also collapsed. A plan to launch a major assault against the fortress city on June 3 proved unnecessary, since it capitulated during the afternoon hours. At this point, German Eleventh Army troops occupied the bulwark, capturing eight thousand prisoners of war.71 Estimates of Russian losses during the battle for the fortress vary. The Central Powers’ spoils, however, proved disappointingly small.
When the Russians abandoned the citadel during the night of June 2, they established defensive positions to the east of the fortress along a line extending between Medyka and Siedliska. Central Powers troops advanced toward the critical Siedliska fortresses and captured them.72At 3:00 a.m., the Bavarian 11th Infantry Division had entered the citadel from the north, and a Habsburg cavalry division from the northwest. Habsburg X Corps followed them several hours later. Allied forces then rapidly drove tsarist units from the Siedliska fortress area and continued their advance. Once tsarist forces retreated, the Central Powers military situation became very complicated when Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary (but not Germany) on May 23, 1915. Habsburg Supreme Command had to immediately strengthen its very thinly manned defensive lines along the Italian frontier while the two allied commanders adjusted to the new military situation.
In the interim, the Austro-Hungarian–German forces advanced eastward to Mosciska and then Lemberg; therefore, Fortress Przemyśl would have no further influence on the overall Habsburg strategy and military situation. No one considered rebuilding the entire damaged fortress, but because the citadel presently remained so close to the immediate front, some repair work had to be performed on the northern and eastern bulwark perimeter areas. Infantry strong points were established, although the earlier artillery damage proved too extensive at Forts I/1, XI, XII, and XIII for any improvement. However, many of the remaining fortress works could be partially utilized, despite the Russians having destroyed them once again before their retreat.
Although Generals Conrad and Falkenhayn had originally agreed that Habsburg forces should recapture the fortress for prestige reasons, German forces actually achieved the capture. General Falkenhayn, in a tactless gesture, offered the fortress at the feet of Emperor Franz Joseph, while General Conrad had to accept German units liberating the fortress.73 The citadel capitulated just 4 days after being attacked, compared to the 137 days the Russians had to starve the garrison during their second siege before its surrender in March 1915. The tsarist retreat from Fortress Przemyśl signified that the Russian army had relinquished its most powerful defensive pivot point on the San River front. The Habsburg Second Army then continued its advance toward Lemberg, the capital of Galicia.
Following the two-month Russian occupation, the fortress’s civilian population welcomed the arrival of the conquering Central Powers troops. The successful campaign also provided a diplomatic success, because an original objective—to prevent Italy and Romania from entering the war—was partially accomplished. The major Russian military collapse convinced the Romanian leadership to maintain their neutrality. The Gorlice-Tarnov campaign continued after the capture of Fortress Przemyśl as the German Eleventh and the Habsburg Third Armies now had to assist the embattled Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army, which had suffered from some battlefield defeats and compelled General Falkenhayn to adjust his offensive plans. A Russian counterattack against the Fourth Army’s southern flank positions had forced it to retreat behind the San River, which interrupted the Habsburg Third and South Armies’ forward progress. The overall Gorlice-Tarnov campaign proved disastrous for the Russian southwest front. Tsarist armies sacrificed at least 412,000 troops and, by May 17, surrendered 170,000 prisoners of war and huge quantities of war materiel.
Once tsarist military leaders had determined not to defend the San River line, their defensive positions at Jaroslau and Radymno had to surrender and their occupation of Fortress Przemyśl was doomed. The Russian High Command should have accepted that situation and reacted accordingly; however, General Ivanov brought in reinforcements but deployed them too slowly.74 The Central Powers’ campaign to recapture Fortress Przemyśl neutralized the four tsarist armies embroiled in the Carpathian Mountain battle by threatening to encircle them and finally ended the Russian threat to invade Hungary. This greatly improved morale on the Habsburg home front. By the end of June 1915, the Central Powers had regained most of the territory the Habsburg troops had surrendered during the Carpathian Mountain Winter War campaign.75 The Gorlice-Tarnov campaign continued throughout the summer of 1915 and into the fall season. Russia lost at least one million prisoners of war during the campaign and another million to combat casualties. The German offensive methods utilized during the entire operation characterized their later tactics—rapid, deep breakthrough movements with excellent artillery support that produced a string of unbroken Central Powers victories on the eastern front.
On June 6, a large parade was staged in the reconquered citadel. Habsburg Supreme Command then dispatched an officer to the northern fortress front to investigate the possibility of rebuilding the fortress works in that area. At the same time, the Habsburg liaison officer to the German Eleventh Army reported that the destruction of the fortress positions before the March 22 capitulation was not as effective as had been reported or assumed. For example, many of the old 1861 vintage cannons remaining in the fortress interval positions between the works remained in good condition with plentiful shells. Tsarist troops had prepared hundreds of these antique artillery pieces to be transported into Russia as war spoils, but the rapid recapture of the citadel prevented it. Even the German High Command claimed that, with a few exceptions, the destruction of fortress material in late March had been largely insufficient.76
In hindsight, the recapture of Fortress Przemyśl on June 3 did not provide as significant a victory as is usually proclaimed in Austrian historiography. The attacking Central Powers troops failed to encircle and capture the tsarist forces deployed in the fortress, which enabled them to evacuate the bulwark in a timely fashion. The Russians, however, committed a major blunder when they deployed all their reserve artillery pieces to the southern citadel front to counter what they anticipated would be the main Austro-Hungarian–German assault. This reduced the northern front’s defensive capabilities just as Central Powers troops attacked there. Even Austrian newspapers reporting the battle that drove the Russians out of Fortress Przemyśl did not claim it to be a major victory.
The bloody failure of the French-British offensives on the western front resulted in the transfer of three German divisions from that front and two from the Hindenburg-Ludendorff forces to the north to reinforce the Eleventh Army. General Mackensen maintained command of the Habsburg Second and Fourth Armies, while Third Army was disbanded and multiple units transferred to the Italian front. The offensive continued through the summer months until fall 1915.
By June 21, 1915, garrison troops had performed all the required restoration work within the fortress with the construction of multiple infantry defensive positions. No extra artillery batteries were provided to support these troops. Given the potential cost of reconstruction and the fact that the fortress had lost much of its previous military significance, it was not rebuilt. Habsburg Landsturm units and ten thousand Russian prisoners of war reconstructed the few selected infantry positions, while life returned to normal within the fortress city. Twenty Russian, five Polish, and two Italian prisoner of war labor companies relocated to the citadel to complete the few reconstruction projects.77
Court hearings were scheduled to punish citadel collaborators during the Russian occupation, but few were convicted. However, after the war’s end, on December 19, 1918, serious charges were leveled at both General Kusmanek and the Habsburg Supreme Command General Staff. One of the more serious allegations involved the failure of the military to construct a railroad line during peacetime extending from the rear of Fortress Przemyśl toward the hinterland to expedite traffic to it. Three rail lines existed, from the northwest, east, and south of the citadel, but not one led to the west of the San Valley toward the interior of Hungary. Two officers were charged with criminal negligence.78 Although the Habsburg General Staff had requested that such a railroad line be constructed since 1902, no government money had been allocated for it. The investigation commission completed its sessions by April 1921, reporting that the serious and fatal problems encountered at the fortress had resulted from a deficiency in government financing for prewar military preparations. Thus, neither General Conrad nor General Kusmanek would be found guilty of committing treasonous acts during the war, and the World War I saga of Fortress Przemyśl finally ended. The documents utilized for the commission’s hearing can be found in AOK, faszikel 523, in the Vienna War Archives.
In another story that circulated for years after the war, Lieutenant Colonel Molnar, commander of Honvéd Infantry Regiment 8, had reputedly hidden his diary and documents in his living quarters although the fortress commander had ordered that all such material be destroyed before the surrender of the bulwarks. Immediately after the war, several searches for these materials proved fruitless. Decades later, when that building was being renovated, the cache was finally discovered under some floorboards; it included maps, military orders, and fortress newspapers.
After the recapture of the fortress on June 3, 1915, it remained in Habsburg possession for the duration of the war. Its garrison was skeletal, as the major battle raged much further east. At the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, a struggle exploded between Poles and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic for possession of the fortress environs, and Polish Legion forces quickly occupied the fortress. Habsburg officers had not understood the extent of the hostility and turmoil between the two ethnic factions, but they also wanted to avoid becoming involved in the region’s nationality machinations.79
On June 3, 1915, plans were finalized to continue the offensive after a meeting at Pless. The objective of the new operation would be Lemberg. General Mackensen received operational command of the Habsburg Second and Fourth Armies, while the Third Army would be removed from the Russian front and deployed on the Italian war theater. A ten-day pause in operations allowed the Eleventh Army to receive badly needed replacement and reinforcement troops, rebuild its stockpile of artillery shells, and conduct a thorough aerial reconnaissance of the Russian defensive positions located between the San River and Lemberg. The renewed attack objective became the railroad line located between Lemberg and Rava Russka.
The Eleventh and Fourth Armies received the mission to secure the crossings at the San River, then all three armies continued the offensive. Following Italy’s declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, the touchy problem arose of how to utilize the German Alpine Corps, which produced a bitter conflict between Generals Conrad and Falkenhayn. Falkenhayn notified Conrad that he had learned that the Alpine Corps had been ordered to be deployed to the Habsburg front lines, which placed them partially in Italian territory. The German general insisted that they not invade Italy because that country had not declared war on Germany.80
General Conrad quickly informed General Falkenhayn that he would take corrective action, but in the meantime Falkenhayn had already dispatched orders to the Alpine Corps over Conrad’s head. If a clash occurred between German and Italian troops on Tyrolean territory, the Italians had to appear to be the aggressors.81 An infuriated General Conrad quickly informed his counterpart that the Tyrolean defense command had corrected the orders to the German troops. Conrad’s direct orders to German commands (to be under Habsburg Supreme Command) should be sent to them as well, as would occur if Habsburg commanders were fighting within German armies.82 General Falkenhayn extended his apologies the next day to his counterpart.83
Meanwhile, the Russians broke through the Habsburg Seventh Army’s right flank positions between Delatyn and Kolomea, but Conrad was discreetly informed that he should avoid deploying reinforcements to this front area, because it would be advantageous if the Russians would be occupied in that direction.84
By June 13 the allied troops were prepared to resume the offensive, which resulted in the collapse of Russian defensive positions within two days. Following a subsequent four-day advance, the Eleventh Army attained the area along the chain of lakes and forests west of Lemberg. After another brief pause to receive reinforcements and supplies, renewal of the attack resulted in piercing the Russian defensive positions.
The allied forces severed the railroad line between Lemberg and Rava Russka on June 20. The demoralized Russian troops, fearing they would be encircled, quickly retreated from Lemberg.
The Habsburg Second Army conquered the capital of Galicia on June 23. This substantially raised Dual Monarchy morale.85 The southwest tsarist front lost an army; only the tsarist Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Armies remained. The badly mauled Third Army retreated north from Lemberg to the Russian northwest front. Now consideration of two different courses of action followed the conquest of Lemberg. The logical move appeared to be to advance to the north into Russian Poland. The major objective became Brest-Litovsk, the hub of the Russian Polish railroad network. Its capture would be a serious blow to the Russian army.
After being briefed, Generals Conrad and Falkenhayn agreed on June 24 that a successful campaign in Russian Poland could possibly force Russia to conclude a separate peace. Then the German Eleventh Army crossed the frontier into Russian Poland during June 28 and 29, encountering very little enemy resistance except for some weak rearguard actions. On the Eleventh Army’s left flank, the Habsburg Fourth Army crossed the Tanev River and advanced into the region east of the Vistula River, then made liaison with the Eleventh Army’s right flank X Corps.
South Army forces fought their way across the Dniester River southeast of Lemberg on June 30, then halted briefly to replace their losses and equipment before advancing to their next objective, the Gnila-Lipa River line. The Habsburg Second Army lagged behind the South Army as they advanced.
During the last week of June, combat eased; strenuous marches occupied the allied troops as they approached the northern edge of the Carpathian Mountains. In the meantime, the weather remained favorable. Much of the terrain to be traversed was flat, but there were also some swampy areas. The sandy roads turned into bottomless pits of mud with heavy rainfall.
On July 1, the advancing Eleventh Army encountered a new Russian defensive position on both sides of the Wiar River. Meanwhile, during the last week of June, the Russian retreat movement created a much shorter and straighter front line along the southern portion of the Russian Polish salient.
Once assaulting infantry penetrated the Russian lines, they widened the shoulders of the newly created salient while other units drove as far as possible into the Russian positions. At times the strategy was costly in terms of the number of casualties, but proved most successful in destroying frontline Russian units and defeating local reserve formations deployed behind the front lines. These efforts were greatly aided by Russian defensive tactics, which included the launching of immediate counterattacks in attempts to regain any lost terrain.86 The resultant penetrations of enemy lines achieved sufficient width and depth that such assaults normally resulted in the collapse of entire enemy frontline positions. Examples of this included the opening battle of Gorlice-Tarnov and the crossing of the San River.
Logistics proved to be a major factor on the eastern front battle, so the Germans’ slow, methodical approach worked very well. Once General Mackensen’s victorious forces advanced about sixty miles from the nearest railroad depot location, they were forced to pause to resupply, which usually took about a week. During this activity rearward lines were extended forward, ammunition stocks—especially artillery shells—were replaced, reinforcements were placed in their units, and heavy artillery batteries moved forward.
German aerial reconnaissance quickly proved of extreme significance during the entire campaign, aided by the Central Powers’ aerial superiority, which ensured that they encountered very little opposition. In-depth photographic images of Russian defensive positions helped identify crucial targets for allied artillery, which proved extremely helpful, because for the Central Powers every artillery shell counted. Another major factor explaining the success of the offensive operations was that the Russians’ primitive trench systems could not withstand heavy German artillery barrages, which usually lasted between ninety minutes and two hours, unlike the major western front artillery preparations, which could last for days and weeks.