In September 1867, the city of Nashville went through what was probably the most controversial municipal election in its history. One of several exciting episodes in Tennessee’s Reconstruction, the Nashville election pitted two unforgiving opponents against one another: the Conservative incumbents, led by Mayor W. Matt Brown, and the Radical Republican challengers, backed by Governor William G. Brownlow, a man notorious for his vitriolic hatred of anything that smacked of rebellion. The respective platforms were unimportant; political power was the objective, and the election was a showdown. In their efforts to prevail, both sides insisted on election procedures that would guarantee them victory. The ensuing legal dispute resulted in a resort to armed force, the Conservatives relying on a “special” police force composed of ex-Confederate soldiers, the Radicals receiving a battalion of Tennessee State Guard, a partisan militia body created earlier in the year. Caught in the middle of this power play was the federal garrison, a presumably neutral law enforcer that was duty bound to prevent political riots. What followed was an election that nearly degenerated into a street battle.
The politics of Reconstruction in Tennessee was the politics of force. As unconditional Unionists during the Civil War, the Radicals naturally saw themselves as the only trustworthy citizens in the state. Since coming to power in early 1865, however, Governor Brownlow and his party, whose strength lay mostly in East Tennessee, exercised tenuous control over the state. A majority of Tennessee whites, either as Conservatives or as ex-Confederates, opposed Radical rule. Conservatives may have denounced secession during the war, but they also disapproved of emancipation even as they now objected to Brownlow’s authoritarian style. Ex-Confederates, not surprisingly, rejected everything about the Republican makeover in the postwar South; they increasingly resorted to paramilitary politics as a means to defeat the Reconstruction process. From the numerous leftover guerrilla bands that continued to prowl the rural parts of the state to the nascent Ku Klux Klan, which commenced its night riding as early as 1866, black Tennesseans and their white Radical benefactors faced a widespread Rebel insurgency.1
Radicals understandably believed that their state was still within the “grasp of war.” To counter these threats, the General Assembly enacted two franchise laws (June 1865 and May 1866) that deprived all ex-Confederates and many Conservatives of the right to vote. Moreover, through a third franchise law passed in February 1867, Radicals took the controversial step of bestowing suffrage on the freedmen, who invariably became Radical voters. Political activism among blacks, most notably as members of the highly politicized Union League (five chapters of this organization existed in Nashville), theoretically served to enhance the legitimacy of political Radicalism. Governor Brownlow was well aware that his dual policies of white proscription and black empowerment had ushered in a political-racial revolution. Such drastic measures required vigilant law enforcement. To this end, the governor appointed all voting registrars in the state and vested them with complete control over the electoral process. Furthermore, in February 1867, the Brownlow administration mobilized the Tennessee State Guard—essentially a standing army of about nineteen hundred men, including about five hundred blacks, virtually all of whom were loyal to the Radicals. During the gubernatorial election in August 1867, this force effectively protected the registration of black voters, ensured a relatively safe political canvass, and policed the precincts both to thwart Rebel interference and to prevent the disfranchised from voting. Despite anti-Radical charges of military despotism, Brownlow and his party won a landslide victory over their Conservative rivals.2
Disappointed by the outcome of the gubernatorial election, Conservatives and ex-Confederates looked for new opportunities to defy what they termed Brownlowism (i.e., Radical tyranny). The upcoming mayoral contest in Nashville in September seemed a good occasion to offer fresh resistance. For over a year, the Conservative-dominated city council, led by Mayor W. Matt Brown, had orchestrated an effective policy of counter-Reconstruction. Brown’s anti-Radical credentials were especially impressive. As city marshal in 1862, he denounced Union occupation and publicly refused to take the oath of allegiance. After his dismissal by the military governor, Andrew Johnson, Brown’s wartime activities are unclear, but he may have offered aid and comfort to Rebel guerrillas in the Nashville area. Shortly after the war, Brown won mayoral elections in 1865 and 1866, winning each time with over 70 percent of the vote. In his second term, he directly challenged Radical power over the pending creation of a metropolitan police force. In the wake of the bloody Memphis race riot of May 1866, when local authorities unabashedly sided with the Rebel mob, Governor Brownlow urged the General Assembly to transfer urban police powers in Memphis, Chattanooga, and Nashville to the executive branch. The ensuing legislation granted the governor a power over big-city law enforcement similar to what he wielded over the state’s electoral machinery. Correctly surmising that any metropolitan police force would constitute another tool of Brownlowism, Mayor Brown retaliated by obtaining a legal injunction that postponed indefinitely its formation in Nashville. Fortyseven years old in 1867, Matt Brown was a person to be reckoned with.3
Concerned that Mayor Brown’s leadership helped rally opposition throughout Tennessee, Governor Brownlow was determined to establish Radical control over the state capital and its twenty-five thousand residents. The municipal election scheduled for September 28 provided the perfect opportunity; under the franchise laws, the potential white electorate could be reduced from about four thousand to a few hundred, whereas the new black electorate would number slightly more than two thousand voters. Taking blacks’ ballots for granted, a Radical victory thus seemed inevitable. Unfortunately, Radicals in the city bickered over whom to run for mayor. One faction nominated Brownlow’s friend Augustus E. Alden. A Union army veteran from Minnesota, Alden had ably served the party as voting registrar for Davidson County during the recent gubernatorial election. But Alden was also a carpetbagger disliked by many native Radicals, who suspected him of unethical conduct in his business practices. A second faction preferred Abram Myers, the likable owner of a Nashville stagecoach company. Delighted by this rift, Mayor Brown sought to complicate further the political canvass. He and his Conservative followers backed yet another, albeit much smaller, Radical faction that endorsed a third candidate, H. S. Scovel, a respectable, though uninspiring, Republican moderate.4
The course of the mayoral election took a dramatic turn following two important events on September 7. First, President Andrew Johnson issued a new amnesty proclamation that had direct bearing on voting restrictions. Condemning what he considered the “unnecessary disqualifications, pains, penalties, confiscations, and disfranchisements” that Reconstruction had imposed over the entire South, Johnson offered a pardon to the vast majority of ex-Confederates. Presidential amnesty ostensibly invalidated the punitive aspects of Tennessee’s franchise laws. Second, the nominee Abram Myers died from injuries sustained when he fell from a hotel balcony. The significance of Myers’s accidental death was that, though it initially simplified the political choices in Nashville, it polarized the political atmosphere. Most Radicals, including virtually all the city’s registered blacks, united behind Alden. Alarmed by this development, but encouraged by the spirit of President Johnson’s amnesty plan, Mayor Brown abruptly declared his intention to conduct the municipal election in accordance with the city charter, which stipulated that only adult white males could vote and that local authorities, not registrars appointed by the governor, controlled the electoral process. In effect, the Conservatives were arguing that their city government operated like a state-chartered bank or railroad and that therefore the state franchise laws, with their much-despised provision for black suffrage, did not apply to the upcoming election. Repudiating this assertion of “municipal sovereignty,” city Radicals were quick to call on the governor for help.5
Governor Brownlow took firm measures to defeat the Conservative challenge. First, he appointed B. J. Sheridan, a party stalwart, the new city registrar. Sheridan immediately organized a team of Radical election officials, instructing them to scrutinize the qualifications of all prospective voters. Then, on September 18, the governor proclaimed: “The franchise law is a part and parcel of the constitution, has been sustained by the supreme court of Tennessee, and all elections held in violation of said law are null and void, and of no effect whatever.” Brownlow’s words electrified Nashville’s black community. For the next week, black Union Leaguers marched through the streets pounding kettle drums and waving American flags, confident of victory. Prominent among their ranks were Randal Brown, who worked at an office of the Freedmen’s Savings and Trust Company, and James H. Sumner, a saloon keeper who had recently served as the only African American company commander in the Tennessee State Guard. Conservatives viewed these street demonstrations with disdain. Dropping their support for the aged Scovel, a hastily assembled Conservative convention nominated Matt Brown for reelection. Three other Nashvillians soon announced their candidacies for mayor as well, one running a simple daily advertisement requesting: “You who (either white or black) please to vote for me.” With six men seeking the mayoral office, some in accordance with the state franchise laws and others under the city charter, the political campaign was turning into a circus.6
Not a man to be trifled with, Governor Brownlow prepared for battle. On September 22, he ordered his militia commander, Gen. Joseph A. Cooper, to concentrate the Tennessee State Guard around the Nashville precincts. Anticipating such a command, Cooper had already put his soldiers in motion. In a matter of days, a battalion of six hundred militiamen was camped within the city limits, many of them at Buena Vista Springs. The ultra-Radical Knoxville Whig praised the Brownlow administration’s decisive response. “The militia,” this newspaper smugly predicted, “will quelch this incipient rebellion in Nashville.”7
The state guard’s swift arrival in Nashville was not well received by most white residents. During the previous spring and summer, when some twenty-one militia companies patrolled large sections of the state during the gubernatorial canvass, the anti-Radical press was replete with warnings about the “bloodhounds of Brownlow” and “Cooper’s Bummers.” But the predicted “reign of terror” never materialized as the state guard kept the peace with minimal abuse of authority. By mid-September, most of the companies had been disbanded, including those with black militiamen. Those still active—the force deployed to Nashville—comprised the very best units under the most reliable officers. Not only were Maj. John T. Robeson, Capt. Joseph H. Blackburn, Capt. William O. Rickman, Capt. Robert L. Hall, Capt. Edwin R. Hall, Capt. George W. Kirk, and Capt. William C. Holt Tennessee veterans of the Union army, but their recent experience at Reconstruction law enforcement also ably prepared them for the challenges of a disputed election. Commanding them all was Gen. Joseph Cooper, a native of Campbell County whose exemplary conduct leading a brigade during the Atlanta Campaign and against Hood’s invasion of Middle Tennessee in 1864 earned him a brevet major generalship. Cooper was also a teetotaler and a martinet who expected his officers to act responsibly. Such mature leadership would prove especially crucial during the volatile situation in Nashville, for, with Governor Brownlow frequently bedridden with poor health, Cooper possessed de facto executive authority.8
As his men set up camps inside the city, General Cooper sternly admonished the Conservatives not to hold any election in violation of the franchise laws. Crying that the general intended to enforce the governor’s decree “by the bullet by the bayonet or by matches,” anti-Radicals denounced the “high-swelling and blood-portending” actions of the Brownlow administration. The Union and Dispatch ran a lengthy editorial in which it emphasized that “the leading lawyers of the city” all considered the governor’s interpretation of the law “arrant nonsense.” Mayor Brown was especially vehement. On September 24, he proclaimed that the election would take place as required by the city charter, adding: “We shall hardly be deterred from the performance of that duty by any force of mere militia with which our good and quiet citizens are threatened.” Furthermore, in anticipation of a “murderous assault” by the state guard, he vowed to augment the size of the city police force to three hundred men.9
As an armed counterforce to the militia, the municipal police was hardly imposing. The actual force consisted of about forty or fifty constables under City Marshal James H. Brantley and Capt. Robert S. Patterson, an ex-Confederate officer. In the early years of Reconstruction, the Nashville police displayed racial prejudice and partisan bias. Black residents complained of almost daily police harassment, and, in one instance, two officers nearly bludgeoned to death a black man and his wife. (To his credit, Mayor Brown cashiered those two particular officers.) During the mayoral contest, the police targeted Radical political activities. When J. P. Rexford, a carpetbagger from Michigan, made abusive remarks about the city government during a public speech on September 18, Marshal Brantley accosted the man on the street a day after the event and pummeled him to the ground with a cane. After another Radical meeting on the night of September 23, a squad from the night watch followed seven party members and then arrested them for heckling the homes of known Conservatives. As the state militia arrived in strength, however, the city police curtailed this brand of intimidation. Fiery editorials exhorted the mayor to match the Radical military buildup by deputizing more policemen: “Let a thousand be called out if Brownlow threatens force.” Although the newspapers bandied about the figure of three hundred volunteer deputies, it is unclear exactly how many extra policemen the mayor placed on duty during the election. Nevertheless, the Radical Daily Press and Times claimed later: “There is no doubt that a force of several thousand men many of them ex-soldiers could have been obtained.”10
Hoping to avoid a clash of arms, the Conservatives sought alternative courses of action. In a public statement, Mayor Brown surprisingly encouraged the Radicals to hold their own election under the franchise laws. In effect, he was recommending that the city hold a dual election, with both sides refraining from any interference, and then “let the courts, the only proper arbiters, decide in the end.” It was a shrewd ploy that made the Conservatives appear conciliatory. But the mayor hedged his tactics. He wrote President Andrew Johnson, explained his predicament, and then urged the commander-in-chief to use federal troops against Brownlow’s militia should the latter attempt “the seizure by armed force of our City.” Though sympathetic to the Conservative position, Johnson delegated the matter to the appropriate military leaders.11
The federal garrison in Nashville watched these developments closely. As the tension mounted, the army officers debated their proper role in the affair. Gen. Thomas Duncan, the post commander in Nashville, believed that Mayor Brown’s position was “the correct one” and suggested that federal troops provide security for both elections. “For those who hold their election illegally,” he reasoned, “it will only be an innocent amusement.” The departmental commander, Gen. George H. Thomas, disagreed with his subordinate. For him, two competing elections guaranteed violence. Accepting Brownlow’s “construction of the law,” Thomas instructed Duncan to recognize only the governor’s authority and to aid the state guard in enforcing the franchise laws. As a result of Mayor Brown’s communication with President Johnson, however, General of the Army Ulysses S. Grant overruled Thomas and imposed new constraints on the federal troops in Nashville. Grant ordered Thomas to “go to Nashville” and personally oversee the whole affair, yet he stressed that “the military cannot set up to be judge as to which set of election judges have the right to control, but must confine their action to putting down hostile mobs.” These instructions seemed to vindicate the position of Mayor Brown, who was “exceedingly pleased,” for it appeared that two elections would be held after all.12
The Brownlow administration was indifferent to Grant’s assessment. Committed to defeating the mayor’s political maneuvers, branded a “Little Rebellion” by Radical newspapers and outright treason by General Cooper, the administration steadily strengthened its military hold on the city. On September 25, the state guard took possession of the city armory to prevent its “seizure by Rebels.” The next day, several hundred militiamen “were on the street under arms.” Flaunting the power of the state guard, Capt. William Rickman deliberately paraded his company past the capitol with “his Band playing and Colors flying.” In response to the mayor’s creation of a “special” police, General Cooper recalled three recently disbanded all-black militia companies for use as a reserve force. As had been the case during the gubernatorial campaign, the existence of “negro militia” produced much consternation among white Nashvillians (these particular black units were never actually reactivated, however, the crisis having passed before the men could muster). Finally, on September 27, Governor Brownlow proclaimed that “an insurrection exists in the City of Nashville” and then called on the federal garrison to render assistance in suppressing it. In the meantime, Major Robeson dispatched units to the city’s ten voting districts, the militiamen cheering for Brownlow as they marched toward their destinations. Once in place, Robeson then instructed his company commanders to bivouac at the polling sites and permit only those election officials appointed by Registrar Sheridan to operate the polls. Appalled by these martial displays, Conservatives derided the militiamen as “scarce weaned, beardless bumpkins” who “looked frightened and homesick.” The Republican Banner moved beyond caricature and rallied its readers: “We can not be intimidated and we shall not be compelled.”13
This militant posturing convinced General Thomas that the army could not remain neutral during the election. Warning that “a collision is inevitable,” he asked General Grant for clarification of the rules of engagement. Thomas contended that, if the militia and city police came to blows, the army would have to choose sides or prevent both elections altogether. But to enforce a dual election, he added, would “be a practical decision against State authority and against the franchise law.” Clearly, Thomas favored the Radicals, but Grant repeatedly ordered him not to take sides, stating that his duty was simply to “prevent conflict” and “preserve peace.” After exchanging telegrams with his superior throughout the day on September 26, however, Thomas received orders that resolved his dilemma. Late that evening, Grant significantly modified his instructions to Thomas. “The military cannot be made use of to defeat the executive of a State,” Grant explained. “You are not to prevent the legal State force from the execution of its orders.” Thomas could now in good conscience uphold actions taken by the Tennessee State Guard. The next morning, as Brownlow was declaring a state of insurrection, the general visited Mayor Matt Brown and bluntly informed him that the army would “sustain the governor in case of collision.”14
Mayor Brown and the city council were crestfallen at the sudden turn of events. Brown denounced Thomas’s decision as a “signal and deplorable mistake,” but, under pressure from several councilmen, he agreed to concede the contest to Brownlow. Alderman John Coltart alone urged the council to continue its resistance and hold an election under the city charter “at all hazards, no matter what may be the consequences.” No one seconded his motion, however. General Thomas had reinforced his garrison with over one thousand men, bringing federal troop strength in Nashville to fourteen hundred. This force, combined with the six hundred militiamen of the state guard, left the city police heavily outnumbered, even if the force did muster an additional three hundred deputies. On the afternoon of September 27, Brown notified the public of the council’s decision and then withdrew from the race (as did the other anti-Radical candidates). Blaming Thomas for “forcibly preventing a peaceable election,” the mayor insisted that enforcing the franchise law in Nashville was “clearly illegal.” In a bitter letter to President Johnson, Brown opined that the city was in “a state of organized anarchy never parallelled.”15
Jubilant Radicals staged a huge rally on the eve of the election. White and black speakers harangued the audience well into the night. Identifying Brown’s mayoralty as “a remnant of the rebellion,” one politico shouted that “the great Radical Republican party would smash everything that came its way.” Another speaker directed his comments to the large number of freedmen in the crowd: “Governor Brownlow says you shall vote, and has sent the glorious old Joe Cooper here to see that you do vote.” Evidently, the state guard provided security for the event, for, when an irate observer broke through the crowd shouting epithets, several militia sentries pounced on the man and dragged him away. The Conservatives canceled a counterrally of their own, apparently owing to the congestion and confusion in the streets. Instead, their news organs printed excerpts of a purportedly scientific study that equated black people to chimpanzees.16
In accordance with a last-minute agreement between the militia general Cooper and the army general Thomas, the state guard relinquished control of the polls to the federal garrison shortly after the election began. The militiamen returned to their nearby camps, and the army presided over a generally quiet election. Registrar Sheridan reportedly combed the streets ensuring that every black man in the city voted the Radical ticket, while a detachment of militia under Capt. Joseph Blackburn patrolled the streets on horseback, some of his men allegedly scouring the “cellars and attics” in search of surreptitious charter voting. “Martial law reigned as completely as it did during the battle of Nashville,” observed the Republican Banner. To this Conservative newspaper, the election was little more than “military dictation” from the “unmilitary” Thomas. To other anti-Radicals, the election was a “disgusting farce” enacted by “Satan’s twin brother”—Governor Brownlow. Desperate to prevent the impending Radical triumph, Mayor Brown made a final plea to General Thomas on the afternoon of September 28, asking permission to hold an election under the charter, “late as it is,” or to hold one at a subsequent date. “If you, general, desire to see equal justice,” the mayor chided, “you will see that we are permitted to hold such an election without the interference from the State militia.” Thomas politely refused the mayor’s request, reiterating that a peaceful election under the charter was impossible.17
In the end, the carpetbagger A. E. Alden became mayor in a landslide over his remaining opponent, H. S. Scovel, 2,423 votes to 258. Mayor Brown picked up three votes. A correspondent for the New York Times remarked: “The colored voters were out in considerable numbers, while the mass of whites declined to vote.” Indeed, black votes accounted for all but a few hundred of Alden’s total. One disgruntled Conservative accused Registrar Sheridan of permitting many nonresident blacks to cast ballots, while another aptly noted that there were “almost as many bayonets as voters in our streets.” Regardless, an elated Governor Brownlow contacted state guard headquarters to express his “entire approval” of General Cooper’s leadership and the militia’s performance during the crisis. The Daily Press and Times similarly praised the militia general as a “model soldier” who “discharged his duty like a hero and patriot.” That newspaper then exulted: “The moral effect of bayonets was wonderfully illustrated [throughout the mayoral contest].” The politics of force had prevailed; Radicals had taken control of the city council. But, in the sobering words of General Thomas: “How narrowly [Tennessee] escaped from a condition of War.”18
The drama of the Nashville election did not end with the closing of the polls. With federal troops departing as quickly as they had arrived, and with the saloons reopening, Mayor Brown, the lame duck, pursued an injunction against Registrar Sheridan’s certification of the election returns. On the morning of October 2, after the Radical chancellor Horace Harrison dismissed the injunction, the mayor’s friends on the city council warned him that the state guard planned to “make a ‘clean shuckling’ of the old administration” if he remained defiant. Brown remained defiant. When Mayor-Elect Alden arrived at city hall to assume his duties, Brown barred his entrance. “I believe you to be illegally elected,” he declared, “and therefore cannot surrender you the office.” Alden immediately reported this to Governor Brownlow, who instructed General Cooper to use “whatever force is necessary . . . to overcome any illegal resistance.” Accordingly, Cooper ordered one of his most trusted militia officers, Capt. Joseph H. Blackburn, to effect the transfer of municipal power.19
The anti-Radical press depicted Blackburn’s confrontation with Brown as a piece of burlesque. In the late afternoon of October 2, Blackburn arrived outside city hall with about forty mounted men. At the approach of a large crowd of black and white onlookers, the militia formed a line of battle, the “ignorant young tow-heads” presenting a “horrid front.” Blackburn, accompanied by a lieutenant and five enlisted men, then entered the building and, after supposedly getting lost on the third floor, found the mayor in conversation with several Conservative politicians, including Marshal Brantley. According to one witness, the militiamen “sported shockingly bad hats.” As Brown feigned surprise at the arrival of this inelegant armed party, Blackburn ordered him to turn over the mayoral books and keys. When Brown asked the militia captain if he intended to use force, Blackburn, who reportedly “trembled with excitement,” replied that he had orders to “take possession” of the office. Brown then demanded to see written authorization, which Blackburn produced after some hesitation. As the mayor slowly read the orders, his fellow Conservatives growled protests at the militiamen, who “manifested considerable uneasiness.” Evidently satisfied with the authenticity of Blackburn’s orders, Brown departed the building and addressed the multitudes in pompous style: “I have surrendered my office, but I want you to understand that I yield only to the bayonet.” The whites in the crowd cheered wildly at their mayor’s audacious exit, while the “shabby” detachment of militiamen and its black allies countered with a “hideous ‘yi, yi.’” Leaving a squad behind to protect Mayor Alden, who apparently had been waiting outside, Blackburn and his “critter company” sauntered off toward the courthouse, where they spent the night. “Thus ended the Brownlow-Alden coup d’ etat.”20
Though hardly tyrannical, Augustus Alden’s tenure as mayor did typify the Radicals’ frustrating quest for legitimacy. One of Alden’s first acts was to lift the injunction against the metropolitan police. By the end of October 1867, the new city council and Nashville’s blacks enjoyed the protection of a partisan police force consisting of fifty men under Commissioner Henry Stone, a Radical politico handpicked by Governor Brownlow. Mayor Alden next implemented a whole series of social programs—a public school system, a charity hospital, a free meal program—that directly benefited the black community. To pay for it all, Alden raised taxes on the city’s mostly white propertyholders and then resorted to floating bonds and borrowing money from Northern banks, all of which plunged the city deeply into debt. Critics dubbed the Radical city council “Alden’s Ring.” Eventually, a team of Conservative lawyers brought suit against the mayor for alleged corruption and forced the city into receivership in June 1869. So much for the “coup d’etat.”21
The Nashville election is an instructive case study, not just of Brownlowism, but of the general use of military force in a peacetime political setting. Conservative newspapers howled that the whole episode was a case of “might overruling right.” Radical “might” was unmistakable, but Conservative “right” was a matter of debate. Radicals denied that the use of militia constituted military usurpation. Rather, the governor had employed justifiable force against a “pestiferous rebel Mayor.” Regardless, Brownlow could not have permitted such an unprecedented event as a dual election, however reasonable the idea may have seemed to people like Mayor Brown, without subverting the franchise laws and losing credibility. When Brown and his allies pressed the issue, the state guard stymied their efforts. To be sure, the federal garrison played a critical role, but its involvement mostly prevented a street battle, one in which the more numerous and better led, trained, and equipped militia would have surely routed the city police and arrested the Conservative leadership. Arguably, the aggressive use of militia risked civil violence, but, without its employment, the Conservative scheme would likely have been carried to fruition. The army certainly would not have stopped it, for, without a potential clash between militia and city police to give it a pretext for intervening, U.S. soldiers would have stayed in their barracks on September 28. Consequently, the dual election would have taken place in spite of Brownlow’s decrees. Whether the Conservatives retained control of the city or merely held the Radicals at bay temporarily while the courts sorted out the confusion, the opponents of Reconstruction would have gained immeasurable political capital.22
All things considered, the various instruments of coercion performed commendably during the Nashville impasse. The anti-Radical press had prophesied “conflagration and massacre,” but there were no serious disturbances, violent or otherwise. To be sure, the muscular presence of the state guard was certainly extraordinary, but General Cooper and his officers appreciated the gravity of the situation and exercised tight control over their enlisted men throughout the crisis. Captain Blackburn’s conduct during the standoff at city hall is an especially noteworthy indicator of the state guard’s disciplined behavior. The militia captain had authority to oust the mayor physically, yet he responded to Matt Brown’s condescending obstinacy with politeness and restraint. Similarly, the municipal police might have provoked trouble, but it mostly steered clear of the militia. After the election, both Marshal Brantley and Captain Patterson resigned, the latter lodging an angry protest against the incoming administration. Finally, the U.S. Army also conducted itself well despite the fact that it was really just beginning to define its role as a Reconstruction peacekeeper. According to one historian, the Nashville controversy was the army’s “baptism of fire in the art of preventing election disorders in a state over which it had no civil jurisdiction.” To that end, the soldiers efficiently assumed security over the polls when they opened and just as smoothly departed the scene when they closed. The politicians on both sides may have engaged in bombast and hyperbole, but the three rival law enforcers—militia, police, and regulars—kept their cool.23
Overall, the Nashville election of 1867 exemplifies in microcosm the political struggle that was taking place throughout Tennessee. To Governor Brownlow and the Radicals, the outcome vindicated their use of force. To the Conservatives and ex-Confederates, the event was exploited as yet another instance of Radical despotism. Regardless, the power play in Nashville demonstrates that the Civil War did not really end in 1865. Although no bloodshed occurred during this particular political event, the enduring enmity produced by four years of brutal warfare was manifest to all. It was a visceral hostility that adversely affected all facets of politics during the period of Reconstruction.
The essay is a revised and expanded version of a discussion in my earlier Tennessee’s Radical Army: The State Guard and Its Role in Reconstruction, 1867–1869 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2005), 160–66.
1. The standard histories of the period are Thomas B. Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1950); and James W. Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 1860–1869 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934). A fine overview is contained in Paul H. Bergeron, Stephen V. Ash, and Jeanette Keith, Tennesseans and Their History (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999), 158–80. For postwar violence in the state, see Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 3–46, 175–85; and Ben H. Severance, Tennessee’s Radical Army: The State Guard and Its Role in Reconstruction, 1867–1869 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2005).
2. Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 73–75, 104–5, 130, 149–52; E. Merton Coulter, William G. Brownlow, Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 269–70, 283–87, 330–39; Eugene G. Feistman, “Radical Disfranchisement and the Restoration of Tennessee, 1865–1866,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 12 (1953): 140–45; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 26, 1867; Severance, Tennessee’s Radical Army, 121–44.
3. Peter Maslowski, Treason Must Be Made Odious: Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, 1862–1865 (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO, 1978), 148; Walter T. Durham, Nashville, The Occupied City: The First Seventeen Months—February 16, 1862, to June 30, 1863 (Nashville: Tennessee Historical Society, 1985), 254–55; Stanley F. Rose, “Nashville and Its Leadership Elite” (master’s thesis, University of Virginia, 1965), 30–31, 36–37, 67; Coulter, Brownlow, 341–42; Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 227–29; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 29, 1866.
4. Ninth Census, vol. 1, The Statistics of the Population of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1872), table III, p. 262, and table XXV, p. 654; Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 229; Robert M. McBride, “Northern, Military, Corrupt, and Transitory: Augustus E. Alden, Nashville’s Carpetbagger Mayor,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 37 (1978): 63–65; William G. McBride, “Blacks and the Race Issue in Tennessee Politics, 1865–1876” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1985), 262–64.
5. LeRoy P. Graf, Ralph W. Haskins, and Paul H. Bergeron, eds., The Papers of Andrew Johnson, 16 vols. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967–2000), 13:40–43; Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 229–31; Gary L. Kornell, “Reconstruction in Nashville, 1867–1869,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 30 (1971): 278; Nashville Daily Press and Times, October 2, 1867; Nashville Petition to Governor Brownlow, September 14, 1867, E. E. Patton Papers, Calvin M. McClung Historical Collection, East Tennessee History Center, Knoxville.
6. Nashville Republican Banner, September 17, 20, 1867; New York Times, September 23, 1867; McBride, “Blacks and the Race Issue,” 264; Graf, Haskins, and Bergeron, eds., Papers of Andrew Johnson, 13:82; Rose, “Nashville and Its Leadership Elite,” 68; Severance, Tennessee’s Radical Army, 51–52; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 17, 1867. Brownlow’s legal position was supported by the Radical state supreme court, which, in its decision in Ridley v. Sherbrook (March 21, 1867), upheld the constitutionality of the franchise acts. See Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 120–23.
7. Governor Brownlow to General Cooper, September 22, 1867, GP 21, reel 1, box 1, folder 1, Papers of the Governors, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville; Special Orders Nos. 133 (September 21, 1867), 136 (September 25, 1867), 139, 143 (September 26, 1867), Tennessee Adjutant General’s Office (TAGO), Papers, reel 9, vol. 33, RG 21, Tennessee State Library and Archives; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 25, October 1, 1867; Knoxville Whig, September 19, 1867.
8. See name index references for each listed militia officer in Severance, Tennessee’s Radical Army.
9. State Guard Proclamation, September 23, 1867, GP 21, reel 1, box 1, folder 1, Papers of the Governors; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 25, 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, September 24, 26, 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 25, 27, 1867; Kornell, “Reconstruction in Nashville,” 281. In rendering their opinions, some of the lawyers cited Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), the U.S. Supreme Court case that declared lawful charters inviolable unless all parties agreed to any modifications. Nashville Republican Banner, September 19, 1867.
10. Harvey W. Crew, History of Nashville, Tenn. (Nashville: Barbee & Smith, 1890), 150; Howard N. Rabinowitz, “The Conflict between Blacks and the Police in the Urban South, 1865–1900,” The Historian 39 (1976): 68–69; Rose, “Nashville and Its Leadership Elite,” 36; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 21, 25, 27, 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 21, 23, 30, 1867. A longtime member of the municipal police, R. S. Patterson commanded a militia company of Nashville Confederates prior to the Union capture of the city. See Nashville Daily Gazette, December 1, 1861.
11. U.S. Congress, House Executive Documents, Report of the Secretary of War, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867, ser. no. 1324 (hereafter cited as Report of the Secretary of War [1867]), p. 186; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 21, 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 25, 1867; Graf, Haskins, and Bergeron, eds., Papers of Andrew Johnson, 13:99–101.
12. Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 184–85, 187–88; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 28, 1867; John Y. Simons, ed.,The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 24 vols. to date (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1967–), 17:360–62. It should be noted that, because Tennessee was readmitted to the Union in July 1866 and, therefore, was not subject to the Reconstruction Acts, the U.S. Army did not possess the sweeping power it wielded in the other former Confederate states.
13. Knoxville Whig, September 25, 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 27, 29, 1867; New York Times, September 26, 1867; Governor Brownlow to General Cooper, September 25, 1867, GP 21, reel 1, box 1, folder 1, Papers of the Governors; Special Orders Nos. 139 and 144–46 (September 26, 1867), 147 and 149 (September 27, 1867), TAGO, reel 9, vol. 33; Governor’s Proclamation, September 27, 1867, GP 21, reel 1, box 2, folder 11, Papers of the Governors; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 28, 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, September 26, 1867.
14. Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 189–91; James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865–1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 229–30; John T. Morse Jr., ed., Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), 3:211–12.
15. Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 191–92, 460–61; Nashville Republican Banner, September 28, 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 28, 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 28, 1867; New York Times, September 28, 1867; Graf, Haskins, and Bergeron, eds., Papers of Andrew Johnson, 13:116. Johnson shared Brown’s disgust with the actions of Grant and Thomas, but the president learned of the army’s deployment too late to countermand its orders. Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861–1868 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 201–2.
16. Nashville Republican Banner, September 27, October 2, 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 29, 1867.
17. Report of the Secretary of War (1867), 193–97; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 28, 1867; Special Orders No. 152, September 28, 1867, TAGO, reel 9, vol. 33; Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 231; Nashville Republican Banner, September 29, 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 29, 1867. It is worth noting that Cooper served under General Thomas at the Battle of Nashville in December 1864; thus, the militia general was not averse to deferring to his former commander in matters of military protocol.
18. Kornell, “Reconstruction in Nashville,” 280; Rose, “Nashville and Its Leadership Elite,” 39; New York Times, September 29, 1867; McBride, “Blacks and the Race Issue,” 265–66; Nashville Union and Dispatch, September 29, 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, September 28, 1867; Governor Brownlow to General Cooper, September 29, 1867, GP 21, reel 1, box 1, folder 1, Papers of the Governors; Nashville Daily Press and Times, September 28, 30, 1867; Simons, eds., Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 17:362.
19. Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction, 231; Nashville Union and Dispatch, October 3, 1867; Nashville Republican Banner, October 2, 3, 1867; Certification Statement of B. J. Sheridan, October 1, 1867, MS 823, Samuel Arnell Papers, McClung Collection, Knoxville Tennessee, box 1, folder 12; Governor Brownlow to General Cooper, October 2, 1867, GP 21, reel 1, box 1, folder 1, Papers of the Governors; General Cooper to Captain Blackburn, October 2, 1867, TAGO, reel 9, vol. 33.
20. Nashville Republican Banner, October 3, 1867; Nashville Union and Dispatch, October 3, 1867; Knoxville Whig, October 9, 1867; Kornell, “Reconstruction in Nashville,” 279–81.
21. Nashville Republican Banner, October 4, 1867; Nashville Daily Press and Times, October 4, 1867; Henry Stone to Governor Brownlow, October 31, 1867, GP 21, reel 1, box 2, folder 2, Papers of the Governors; Kornell, “Reconstruction in Nashville,” 282–85; McBride, “Northern, Military, Corrupt, and Transitory,” 65–66. The so-called Alden Ring included the black activists Randal Brown and James Sumner, who won council seats the following year. Rose, “Nashville and Its Leadership Elite,” 68.
22. Nashville Republican Banner, October 2, 1867; Knoxville Whig, October 2, 1867.
23. Nashville Republican Banner, September 29, October 4, 1867; Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 229.