I regret that I cannot agree that it is lawful to use force against Iraq without a second Security Council resolution … particularly since an unlawful use of force on such a scale amounts to the crime of aggression; nor can I agree with such action in circumstances which are so detrimental to the international order and the rule of law.
– Elizabeth Wilmshurst, on resigning as a Foreign Office legal adviser
INTERNATIONAL LAW EXPERT Elizabeth Wilmshurst resigned from her lofty government post two weeks after the Koza message was made public. Her resignation shocked Great Britain in the days and weeks following revelations that the United States and Great Britain were up to dirty tricks in the United Nations Security Council; tricks that torpedoed a new resolution authorizing pre-emptive war against Iraq. It is not argued here that those tricks, played by the Bush administration, single-handedly killed all possibility of UN authorization for war. But the spy operation was, to many, absolutely the most significant factor, the fatal blow. And it had exploded in full view of the world public. The United States had gone too far. It was a case of, ‘Well, that does it!’
Rather than the embarrassing spy fiasco, Bush and Blair primarily blamed France, with its UNSC veto power, for shooting down the resolution. President Jacques Chirac had warned that a no vote was all but certain. But Chirac was referring not to any resolution for war, but to the one under consideration with its hurried timetable for action. It was the timing that troubled the French – and the Russians, the Germans, and others – who had serious doubts about WMD intelligence reports, and who wanted alternatives exhausted before an invasion. A victim of spin, Chirac’s position was misrepresented by both Bush and Blair, translated to an absolute veto on any military action against Iraq. As for China, there is the Chinese–Iraqi oil relationship that played into choosing sides. China was a major customer of Iraq oil and had a lot to lose should things go wrong at this point.
The spin was effective, even in the United States House of Representatives, which should have known better. As part of a protest against ‘our so-called ally’, French fries in the House cafeteria were renamed ‘freedom fries’, a display of silliness in the midst of desperate seriousness. Other eateries around the country followed suit, and it was implied that restaurateurs who continued to serve French fries were unpatriotic. In Reno, Tim Wright and Tommy Cortopassi, co-owners of the Chophouse restaurant, demonstrated their patriotism and annoyance at France by pouring expensive bottles of French wine into the street outside their front door. One news source reported that because a local ordinance prohibits pouring liquids into the gutter, the prominent restaurateurs dumped them into a five-gallon paint bucket.
‘It’s a strong statement,’ wine pourer Wright said.[1]
A more reasonable statement came from House member Jose Serrano of New York. ‘Should we ban French wine, Belgian waffles or Russian dressing? If Mexico votes no [against war], should Mexican restaurants also be banned?’
French wine and potato protests were the subject of press and public interest in the days following the revelation that America’s super spy agency had been conducting dirty business at the United Nations. That bit of unpleasantness essentially was ignored.
The fact that the two countries were spying on delegates would have surprised only the most naïve, and those who were about to vote on the new resolution were far from naïve. What was surprising, and damning, was the obvious and arrogant intent to steal the vote, to crush opposition by any means necessary. It was going beyond the carrot-and-stick song and dance to which the target delegations had become uncomfortably accustomed. It was unacceptable.
There were highly publicized reactions to the damaging leak that were more immediate than resignations from high places in the British government. The most vociferous came from Mexico’s Aguilar Zinser and Chile’s Valdés, colleagues who had led the anti–rush-to-war battle in the Security Council.
Aguilar Zinser made damning allegations about the NSA spy operation. He spoke of secret meetings among the uncommitted delegates where alternatives to the US position were discussed and proposed, ‘top secret’ meetings. At one, a document was prepared and not yet shared with anyone outside the room. ‘We had yet to get our capitols to go along with it – it was at a very early stage. Only the people in the room knew what the document said.
‘The meeting was in the evening and they [US officials] called us in the morning before the meeting of the Security Council and they say, “We appreciate you trying to find ideas, but this is not a good idea.” I say, “Thanks, that’s good to know.” We were looking for a compromise and they said, “Do not attempt it.”’[2]
At one point, a position worked out in secret was taken to John Negroponte, at the time the United States ambassador to the United Nations. But a copy of the position already lay on his desk.
It had puzzled Aguilar Zinser. Who was talking? Who was listening? Now he had his answer, and he was furious.
Later, when Katharine Gun was named as the intelligence officer responsible for identifying who was listening in on Aguilar Zinser’s meetings, the Mexican diplomat paid tribute to her courage and her concern for international law. She had done the right thing.
Letters went from the Mexican government to UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw asking him to ‘clarify whether GCHQ was involved in spying on its UN allies’. The Foreign Office refused to comment on the request.
Juan Gabriel Valdés immediately ordered a sweep of Chile’s UN offices in New York. Angrily, he reported finding ‘hard evidence of bugging’. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Soledad Alvear asked Chile’s ambassador in London to check out the story. ‘We heard the accusation in the media and have instructed our ambassador to London to find out whether the information is correct or not.’ Deeply concerned, she also contacted Straw for an explanation.
Sadly, Valdés, a Princeton PhD, one of his country’s most illustrious intellectuals and most respected foreign policy experts, now found his opposition to the US position politically dangerous. President Ricardo Lagos, normally deferential to the United States and wanting to cultivate a middle ground in the war debate, was himself in a politically dangerous position. The public who had elected him were overwhelmingly opposed to a rush to war. News about the spy operation caught their immediate attention. And no wonder, given that US intelligence has for years been involved in Chile’s domestic affairs, including supporting the coup that replaced the duly elected Salvador Allende government with the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.
In response to the uproar, President Lagos had several conversations with Blair. Joining the fray was Mariano Fernandez, the country’s ambassador to Britain. Why, Fernandez wondered, was the United States spying on Chile? Relations between the two countries had been favourable since the first Bush. What was wrong with the second?
On the one hand, Lagos needed to please the United States; on the other, he needed to respond to constituent pressure. Furthermore, on the table was the eagerly sought, unsigned bilateral free trade agreement with Washington approved in December 2002. Bush had notified Congress that he would sign the agreement two days before the Koza e-mail was sent. But the promised signing was delayed – perhaps, thought many, because Chile had not bowed to pressure that it support the war resolution.[3] Valdés, therefore, was a serious problem to his president. Sources say that both US ambassador to Chile William Brownfield and Spain’s UN ambassador Inocencio Arias had made it known to Lagos that Valdés’s stinging oratory against the war was neither productive nor appreciated.
Lagos, nervous now about ratification of the trade agreement, announced that Valdés would be reassigned to Argentina; Heraldo Muñoz would be his replacement, effective 1 June. The agreement was signed on 6 June.
As for Aguilar Zinser, he was becoming a thorn in his president’s side. Mexico’s outspoken UN representative was doing little to improve the traditionally mercurial United States–Mexico relationship. The White House quit returning President Fox’s calls when Mexico would not give a firm yes or no to support of the war, a humiliating snub of monumental proportion. Fox suffered through the period of revelations and recriminations that followed publication of the Koza message and, although reluctantly, supported his old friend Aguilar Zinser. He did so, to one degree or another, until November 2003, when Aguilar Zinser, looking back at Washington’s unseemly bully tactics, said the United States treated Mexico like its ‘backyard’. It was too much. Fox fired Aguilar Zinser. His telephone calls to the Oval Office were once again returned.
Ironically, two years later United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice – identified in the initial Observer story and elsewhere as the probable mastermind of the NSA plot[4] – spoke highly of Aguilar Zinser after his death in a car crash. He was, she said at a Florida meeting of the Organization of American States, ‘a distinguished ambassador at the UN, a fierce defender of human rights and democracy in the hemisphere … His untimely death is a loss for all of us who cherish freedom and a vibrant civil society in the Americas.’[5]
There was a time when Aguilar Zinser’s fierceness was more than Rice could cherish.
Fallout from exposure of the NSA operation was widespread. Reaction included Russian claims that it played a role in destabilizing international finances.
‘The value of the United States Dollar went haywire on Monday in Mexico, as its economy is widely US-dependent. In Santiago, the price of the Dollar also went up on Monday as markets could play a decisive role in Chile’s final decision.’[6]
For the most part, nations affected by the NSA spy operation kept their political mouths shut about their reactions to what happened on 2 March 2003.[7] Reliable sources say that fear of retribution by the United States was – and is – real and profound. On the same day the original Observer story appeared, the Washington Post wrote about the swing voters, saying that, ‘Their indecision is not over war with Iraq; all have indicated dislike of the US measure and prefer a compromise … What they remain undecided about is whether to risk opposing the United States.’ Especially smaller countries, countries like those who were spied upon.
There were other stories now surfacing that pointed to alleged coercion being applied by the Bush administration. There were reminders of Yemen’s vote in opposition of the first Gulf War in 1991. James Baker, Secretary of State at the time, warned Yemen that its vote would be ‘the most expensive vote in history’. For Yemen, with much of its US aid cut off three days later, it was exactly that.
Some UN representatives made light of what happened to their missions, which surely must have pleased the United States. ‘It [spying] goes with the territory,’ said Pakistan’s ambassador, Munir Akram. ‘Anyone who thought it wasn’t going on is a bit naïve. It is regarded as one of the privileges of the host country.’[8]
Katharine Gun, noting Akram’s observation, says, ‘It’s true. Collecting information from UN delegations has become a surveillance art form. The problem here is how the information was to be used. Collection is one thing. Manipulation, perhaps even blackmail, is another. And this operation targeted not only offices, but also homes, private lives.’
Bulgaria’s ambassador Stefan Tavrov was coyly flattered by the NSA attention. Having the United States target his country made it more prestigious in the international arena. ‘It’s almost an offense if they don’t listen,’ he observed. ‘It’s integrated in your thinking and your work.’[9]
On Sunday, 9 March, the Observer reported that the United Nations had begun a top-level investigation into the bugging of its delegations by the United States. The night before, sources in the office of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan told the Observer that the UN’s counterterrorism committee had discussed the gross violation of international accords and would be following up with an investigation. The British article quoted American Daniel Ellsberg, ‘the most celebrated whistle blower in recent American history’, who leaked the infamous Vietnam War-era Pentagon Papers.
Gun’s leak, said Ellsberg, was ‘more timely and potentially more important than the Pentagon Papers’. Mainline US press, in its determination to avoid the NSA story, chose not to carry his comments. Much later, in speaking with the authors, Ellsberg reiterated his assessment of the value of Gun’s leak.
International attention was quickly directed toward the NSA and how it collected its information. There was speculation that the West’s super eye in the sky, Echelon, was the culprit. Two days after the UN spy operation was made public, New Zealand MP Keith Locke complained that his country’s Waihopai spy base in Marlborough was being used as part of the US ‘dirty tricks campaign’.[10] He pointed to Echelon’s worldwide programme to intercept electronic communications shared by listeners in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
‘New Zealand could easily be helping the NSA intercept communications between UN delegates and their home countries,’ Locke worried. Were US interests driving work at the Waihopai spy base? If so, what did that say about his country’s foreign policy independence?
Echelon targets the United Nations. It collects e-mail and telephone information going to and from UN missions. Its largest installation is at Menwith Hill in Yorkshire. It seems incredible that Locke would be surprised by the possibility that Waihopai was involved with the business going on at Menwith and elsewhere in the network. What is credible is that Locke was surprised by the nature of this particular bit of it.
Shortly after the spy operation was revealed, France’s foreign minister Dominique de Villepin, who had been lobbying anti-war support, left Paris to visit Cameroon, Angola, and Guinea, perhaps to commiserate with the three spy targets. Unknown to de Villepin was that UK Attorney General Lord Goldsmith had been receiving information about secret French negotiations.[11] France also was a target.
Among those deeply concerned about pressure applied in support of the war during this time were the archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, and Pope John Paul. The pope, actively fighting against a rush to war, would be revealed later as another target of US/UK spying. As for the archbishop, he said of Blair that the prime minister would account for himself ‘at the “judgement seat”’.
‘For Christians,’ he added, ‘that is the point of entry to heaven or to hell.’[12]
Tough talk for a man of the cloth.
The world press, except, of course, in the United States, had a field day reporting reactions to the ‘dirty tricks’ story and speculating about its impact on gaining broad-based support for a war so few seemed to want.
Five days after news of the NSA operation was published, in the midst of the ensuing storm, Attorney General Lord Goldsmith delivered to Tony Blair his formal opinion questioning the legality of a pre-emptive strike against Iraq without an authorizing resolution. It was an opinion researched and supported by his government’s most senior legal advisers, including Elizabeth Wilmshurst.[13] Blair went back to Goldsmith; the opinion was not to his liking. On 17 March, quite a different opinion was delivered to Parliament and Blair happily told the world that launching a war against Iraq was unquestionably in accord with international law. Cautions raised in the original opinion had disappeared.
Loss of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing war led to three highly publicized resignations – those of Wilmshurst, Robin Cook as leader of the House of Commons, and Clare Short as Secretary of State for international development. The authors met with both Wilmshurst and Short in London; Cook declined to be interviewed.
Wilmshurst’s resignation was straightforward and uncomplicated. She needed to leave her position because her views on the legitimacy of the Iraq action ‘would not make it possible for me to continue my role as a Deputy Legal Adviser or my work more generally’. Leaving her senior government post after three decades was far from easy. Retired or not, the UK government continues to value her advice.[14] Now at Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, she has no regrets about her resignation. There simply was no choice in the matter. Wilmshurst, impressive, painfully honest, is a woman of ethics, of high moral standards that are not subject to compromise.
Because one paragraph in Wilmshurst’s letter of resignation was censored by the government ‘in the public interest’, there was enormous interest in just what that paragraph said. The full document was released by the BBC on 3 March 2005, under the Freedom of Information Act. The missing paragraph revealed that the attorney general’s second opinion differed markedly from the first. With Wilmshurst, he had shared the belief that pre-emptive invasion of Iraq could be seriously open to legal challenge, even, although remotely, to war crimes charges. But his second, hurry-up opinion had switched to ‘what is now the official line’. Details of what the original opinion contained would come later, when the prime minister was forced to reveal its full content.
On 17 March, the same day Blair announced that war would not be in violation of international law, Robin Cook delivered his resignation speech to the House of Commons. Applause for the resigning leader of the House was said to have been unprecedented. Cook was generous in his comments about the prime minister, expressing his hope that Blair would remain in office and making it clear he would not support those who wanted to use the current crisis to displace him. But Cook was clear in his opposition to Blair’s determination to go to war. Cook, like Short, wanted UN approval and more time for alternatives, especially continued inspections.
‘It is not France alone that wants more time for inspections,’ Cook said. Germany wanted more time, as did Russia. There was not the necessary international support for abandoning alternatives to war. ‘The reality is that Britain is being asked to embark on a war without agreement in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading partner – not NATO, not the European Union, and now, not the Security Council.
‘Only a year ago,’ Cook said, ‘we and the United States were part of a coalition against terrorism that was wider and more diverse than I would ever have imagined possible.’ Sadly, he noted, ‘History will be astonished at the diplomatic miscalculations that led so quickly to the disintegration of that powerful coalition.’
Cook said he would resign if the United States and the United Kingdom went ahead with their planned pre-emptive attack, and he did promptly, as promised. A year later, looking back with no regrets, he said, ‘President Bush was definite and apocalyptic,’ quoting the president as having claimed that ‘Saddam is building and hiding weapons that could enable him to intimidate the civilized world.’[15]
It was different with Clare Short, and she suffered for that difference. Short, head of the Department for International Development (DfID), had declared her intention to resign from Blair’s cabinet if the attack took place without UN approval, but she did not, at least not immediately. Convinced that her efforts were needed in getting a UN mandate for reconstruction and the subsequent redevelopment of Iraq, she decided to stay on – even to the degree of supporting Blair’s decision to invade. War was now inevitable, and attention should be turned toward post-war exigencies. Without the necessary mandate and broad international support, the victors would simply be occupiers, rather than implementers of a new political system, protectors of the citizenry, builders of a new infrastructure.
In spite of focusing on reconstruction, Short was active in last-minute attempts to avoid war, meeting with Blair, pleading for more time. One of those attempts involved an anti-war plan conceived in the United States by a federation of churches. A federation leader, evangelical minister Jim Wallis, had called Short in February asking to bring a delegation united against the war to London. She was immediately supportive.
The church delegation had an alternative, a five-point plan worth serious attention. It had purchased advertisements in newspapers, but the American public was not responding, its attention captured by a constant White House spin. How bizarre that the policies of George Bush and company, who had taken ownership of ‘values’ and Christian faith, were so challenged by dedicated believers in both.
The church plan included a process for deposing Saddam by indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity, intensifying WMD inspections, fostering a democratic Iraq, organizing immediate and massive humanitarian efforts for Iraq, and implementing the road map to a Palestinian state by 2005. It sounded good to Short, better than what was coming from Downing Street or Pennsylvania Avenue, but it appeared that neither occupant of those addresses was interested. They were packed for the trip to Baghdad.
Because she did not resign when the attack against Iraq was launched, Short was widely criticized for flip-floppy behaviour. On 12 May, after the war was a ‘mission accomplished’, she did leave the cabinet. As was true with both Wilmshurst and Cook, there seemed to be no other choice. She had no UN mandate for reconstruction in hand, which, given her DfID responsibilities, was of critical import. Further, she had no doubt that Blair had lied to her on numerous occasions.
She writes, ‘I was absolutely clear I had to leave the government. Blair had failed to restrain the US rush to war and then broken his promise on internationalising reconstruction. The situation in the Middle East was disastrous and the behaviour of the Prime Minister indefensible.’[16]
Blair accepted Short’s resignation, offering compliments for her work as head of DfID, but also questioning her complaint about ‘internationalising’ reconstruction of a defeated Iraq. He said he was working on getting a UN mandate. Why was she questioning him?
Short has spoken candidly about the run-up to the war and the American involvement, more so than any other member of her government. Although she left the cabinet, her constituents continue to elect her to office. She is loved, despised, praised, and castigated, depending upon the eye of the beholder. It is not difficult to determine the view in Blair’s eye. Asked about her ensuing relationship with the prime minister, she told the authors, ‘There isn’t any.’ When they happen to run into each other in one hallway or another, he ‘simply looks away’.
What is most amazing is that within the United States, Britain’s partner in war and peace, almost no notice was taken of the enormous upheaval across the Atlantic, an upheaval placed at Washington’s doorstep by much of the world community. Clearly visible, parked at that same doorstep, was the outrageous violation of international law and ethics perpetrated by the United States in its spy operation designed to coerce support for an unpopular war.
How could America fail to notice what was happening abroad? How could it fail to care? Perhaps, just perhaps, because that failure was carefully and skilfully engineered.