On Sunday 7 December, 700 members of 2 Royal Scots and the Middlesex Regiment were marching to St John’s Cathedral for the church service. Major-General Maltby was reading a passage from the book of Matthew, when his aide de camp Lt. I. MacGregor brought him a message. On 5 December the HKVDC was already fully mobilized, but the bulk of Hong Kong had behaved as if nothing had happened; the Happy Valley racetrack recorded its highest attendance. As part of the invasion of Hong Kong the Japanese started to move their force into assembly areas as soon the orders were given for war on 1 December. However, the IJA did not have far to move; in the autumn of 1941, the 23rd Army was already stationed in the west of Guangzhou (Canton); some were as far as Foshan Town, while others were in Zhuhai, a town west of Hong Kong across the mouth of the Pearl River. In preparation for the invasion of Hong Kong, the 23rd Army moved to Humen (a town south-west of Guangzhou) and Shilong Town (just east of Guangzhou) and Guangzhou itself. The Japanese were seen landing at Mirs Bay on 4–5 December 1941 and the 228th Regiment moved into its staging area in Buji Town, now part of Shenzhen City; these movements were reported to Maltby, whereupon he hurriedly left the service and proceeded to issue an order for immediate stand-to. Despite the ominous signs, there were people within the military community that doubted the seriousness of the situation and the possibility of war, with talk of the ‘astonishingly erroneous intelligence summary to the War Office’. This was at the same time that the IJN was massing just beyond Hong Kong waters.
Luo Hu (Luo Wu) Border Crossing in 1938, British and Sikh soldiers and policemen facing off the IJA in a tense stand-off. The railway bridge seen in the photo is still present at the Luo Hu border post, now no longer in service but preserved as a historical memorial. (Hong Kong Library)
1. Japanese forces began landing in Mirs Bay on 4/5 December 1941. In preparation for the invasion of Hong Kong, the 23rd Army moved to Humen, Shi Long Town and Guangzhou itself. The 228th Regiment’s assembly areas were in Buji Town in modern Shenzhen City. The 66th Regiment was responsible for rearguard operations and securing the assembly areas against the Chinese National Army and Communist Guerrillas.
2. The IJA Southern Expeditionary Army Group, 23rd Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Sakai Takashi, was tasked with capturing Hong Kong. The invasion itself was codenamed Operation C and the 38th Division under Maj. Gen. Sano Tadayoshi led the invasion.
3. Sakai gave the order to launch the invasion at 0351hrs and the 230th, 229th and 228th Regiments crossed the Shenzhen River at 0600hrs on 8 December 1941. Initial objectives for the 228th Regiment were to cross Shenzhen River at Lok Ma Chau, Lo Wu and Man Kam To, passing Lam Tsuen Village to take the low ground at the southern foot of Grassy Hill/northern foot of Needle Hill. The 229th Regiment crossed the start line at Sha Tau Kok then went via Luk Keng to Sha Lo Tong and then to Chek Nai Ping village. They then were to cross Tide Cove landing at Tai Shui Hang, the objective for the following day was to take Buffalo Hill. The 230th Regiment was responsible for the west flank and was to split into two parts, one part was to reach the foot of Tai Mo Shan and another was to go west via Yuen Long and Castle Peak Bay to clear the west flank of British troops.
4. The light cruiser Isuzu was the flagship of the Hong Kong invasion fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Niimi Masaichi of the Second China Expeditionary Fleet. The Naval invasion force included the15th Escort Squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Hara Kiyoshi, with Torpedo Boat Division 1, Minesweeper Divisions 4 and 44. Seconded to the Second China Expeditionary fleet were the destroyer Tsuga and the auxiliary gun boat Tosho Maru from the China Area Fleet based in Shanghaias well as the destroyers Ikazuchi and Inazuma from Destroyer Division 6 of the First Fleet.
5. On 8 December 1941, IJAF planes left Guangzhou at 0720hrs for Hong Kong. At c.0800hrs 12 Ki-36s from the 45th Sentai, escorted by nine Ki-27s from the 10th Independent Chutai led by Captain Takatsuki Akira, attacked Kai Tak airport. All five of the token RAF aircraft stationed at Kai Tak were quickly damaged or destroyed, as were numerous light trainers and civilian cargo planes. In the harbour, Pan Am’s visiting Sikorsky S-42B flying boat the ‘Hong Kong Clipper’ was bombed, set on fire and sunk. Japanese aircraft also attacked Shamshuipo Camp where the Winnipeg Grenadiers were based. The Taikoo and Kowloon Docks and city of Kowloon were also bombed.
6. 9/10 December: the Shing Mun Redoubt on the western flank of Gin Drinkers Line was breeched by 3/228th Regiment.
7. 10 December: HMS Cicala on station near Tsing I Island shelled the Japanese 230th Regiment. Troops on Castle Peak road are attacked by Japanese bombers.
8. The 229th Regiment was only able to cross Tide Cove on the afternoon of 10 December having been held up by delaying actions.
9. 11 December, morning: Japanese naval landing forces landed on Lamma Island and tried to cross the straits to Aberdeen Island but were driven off. British forces began to withdraw from Kowloon after the collapse of the Royal Scots’ positions in and around the Shing Mun Reservoir area.
10. 12 December, dawn: advance IJA forces reached the southern tip of the Kowloon Peninsula. Japanese bombers dived on Mt Davis battery. The last of the British Forces were evacuated by the Navy from Devil’s Peak on the 13th.
The KIB consisted of 5/7 Rajputs at the centre, 2/14 Punjab in the east, and 2 Royal Scots in the west, with its C Coy under Maj. S. Burns forward, patrolling along Castle Peak Road all the way to Yuen Long. C Coy, 2/14 Punjab, was the Brigade screen and took up positions in the area of Shueng Shui and Taipo Market with four Bren carriers and two armoured cars of the HKVDC. With C Coy, 2/14 Punjab, were the engineers of the HKVDC and 22nd Fortress Company Royal Engineers. Under the command of the KIB were 1st and 2nd Bty. and the 25th Medium Bty. of the 1st Hong Kong Regiment, Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery.
The Canadians, initially part of the HKIB with the Winnipeg Grenadiers at Victoria City (today’s Sheungwan and Western, on the north-west coastline of Hong Kong Island) and the Royal Rifles of Canada were based on the northern-eastern shores of Hong Kong Island from Saukiwan to Lyemun. HKIB HQ with Brigadier Lawson in command was located at the Wongneichong Gap in the centre of Hong Kong Island.
At 0355hrs local time on 8 December the code word ‘Blossom Blossom’ was given; 11 minutes later, Lt. Gen. Sakai gave his order to commence invasion. Some 50 minutes later, at 0445hrs Maj. Charles Boxer, formerly of the Lincolnshire Regiment, the senior intelligence officer and a fluent Japanese speaker, was woken by Radio Tokyo telling its citizens that war was imminent. Governor Young and Maj. Gen. Maltby were immediately informed. By 0500hrs Maj. Gray OC C Coy, and battalion second in command of the 2/14 Punjab, and the engineer company of the HKVDC under Maj. J. H. Bottomley successfully blew all forward demolition points. At 0645hrs the garrison was told that the British Empire and Japan were at war. Seventy-five minutes later an air-raid siren sounded and immediately clouds of smoke were seen rising from Kai-Tak Airport. In a matter of minutes, all the Wildebeest, Walruses, as well as the biplanes of the HKVDC and several civilian planes were left blazing. Luckily two Ju-52s of the Eurasia Corporation and one CNAC7 T32 Condor escaped destruction. Attempts to disperse the aircraft were futile as no dispersal bays had been built because of a lack of funds. The Japanese then switched to secondary targets by dropping bombs on Shamshuipo Camp and the neighbouring police station. The Canadians largely escaped any large-scale casualties except for the signal platoon’s Sgt. Routledge and Signalman Fairley. They became the first Canadian soldiers to be wounded in World War II. Despite the war, theatres, cinemas and restaurants were still functioning as if nothing had happened on Hong Kong Island!
A formation of Type 98 ‘Mary’ bombers and ‘Nate’ fighters flying due west having just passed Kowloon Peninsula on 8 December 1941. The area from which smoke is bellowing is Shamshuipo, the location of the Canadian barracks. (Author’s collection)
The demolition proved to be no more than a minor irritant to the Japanese. No sooner had bridges been blown, than the Japanese had installed replacements. The Japanese were crossing into Hong Kong on three fronts; on the western route came the 230th Regiment with a two-battalion frontage, proceeding westwards towards Yuen Long and the Castle Peak area. The immediate objective was the bottom of the northern slope of Tai Mo Mountain (957m). In the centre was the 228th Regiment operating with two battalions forward. Their advance was to follow the Sheung Shui–Taipo–Kowloon road to reach the southern foot of Grassy Hill just north of the Shing Mun Redoubt. On the east came 229th Regiment. It crossed the border at Sha Tau Kok and by boat at Starling Inlet and proceeded towards Taipo via Sha Lo Tong before crossing Tide Cove to land at Tai Shui Hang village and then cross Ma On Mountain. Whenever the IJA encountered strongly defended localities, instead of fighting them, they simply bypassed these positions.
During the first day there were intermittent skirmishes all around the New Territories. The first encounter occurred at around 1300hrs, when the Punjabis gave the Japanese a bloody nose; later at 1830hrs the Punjabis again successfully ambushed and wiped out several platoons of Japanese, just past the causeway south of the market town of Taipo. These early successes were not limited to the regular army. Farther down the road the armoured cars and Bren carriers of the part-time HKVDC also wiped out another group of advancing Japanese. The reconnaissance platoon Bren carriers of the 2 Royal Scots made contact with elements of the 229th Regiment around Yuen Long. Despite these minor successes, the Japanese continued to advance, aided by stolen British maps as well as expert guidance from fifth columnists. By late afternoon on the 8th, to avoid being outflanked, the Punjabis had already withdrawn to a point close to Grassy Hill. The Gunners played an active role also, with 12th Bty. engaging an IJN destroyer and the IJA in Taipo, inflicting serious casualties.
At 2200hrs, farther south on the Taipo–Kowloon highway towards the town of Shatin, the rapidly advancing Japanese managed to catch the defenders by surprise and cut the fuse at one of the HKVDC’s demolition points, but their jubilation was short lived; the HKVDC’s engineers completed the back-up circuit and blew up the bridge along with the Japanese soldiers.
By the end of the first day, early on the 9th, orders were given for all mainland units to withdraw to the Gin Drinkers Line. The Punjabis were already at the head of Tide Cove at Shatin Wai and, although under pressure and continuous shelling, continued to hold for the next two days. The HKVDC were near Fotan, a village just south of Shatin. To plug the gap between the 2 Royal Scots and 2/14 Punjab, Maltby order the reserve company, D Coy, 5/7 Rajputs, under the command of Capt. H. R. Newtons to Smuggler’s Ridge. The same day the armoured cars and Bren carriers of No. 1 Coy, HKVDC, were patrolling along Castle Peak Road and HMS Cicala was on patrol station by Castle Peak Bay having survived two air attacks. The IJN was already on station holding a blockade but somehow it still allowed HMS Thanet and Scout to slip anchor and escape to Singapore at around 2130hrs.
The surviving CNAC and Eurasia planes took off with VIP evacuees including Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s wife and her two equally famous sisters (the Soong sisters), Chinese Finance Minister H. H. Kung as well as Lt. Col. H. Owen-Hughes of the HKVDC, who was on a secret mission to coordinate with the Chinese Nationalist Army to come to aid Hong Kong by attacking the IJA from the rear.
At around 1500hrs on the 9th, Col. Doi, CO of the 228th Regiment, was ahead of his two battalions on Needle Hill (532m), just north of Gin Drinkers Line. For the last two hours he had conducted reconnaissance on the main British defensive line. Although he could see no soldiers, he could see trenches and bunkers and to his surprise white clothes hanging on washing lines! This clearly illustrated the lax and unprofessional nature of the 2 Royal Scots at this location. Suddenly heavy fog fell on the area and visibility dropped to less than 20m and heavy rain prevented further reconnaissance.
Japanese landing in Tide Cove (today named Tolo Harbour) on the first day of the battle of Hong Kong. Note the ‘landing craft’ in the background. These boats were part of the 1st and 2nd River Crossing Material Company attached to the 20th Independent Engineer Regiment. (Author’s collection)
Doi could sense the unique opportunity and wanted to attack immediately but the weather caused him to lose touch with his battalions. Another problem he faced was that the Shing Mun Redoubt was not within his regimental boundary; attacking it was not his responsibility! Furthermore, when Doi’s battalions did arrive, the supporting artillery was not available, as they were held back by the demolition on the Taipo Road.
Despite the possibility of serious punishment, Doi decided to attack. He ordered his 2/228th with about 800 men under Maj. Takeyoshi Inagaki to go left (east) to reconnoitre the route and preparation area as well as the enemy locations, while the 3/228th was to spearhead the attack. Major Nishiyana Haruja, CO of the 3/228th ordered Lt. Wakabayashi Touiti OC 10th Coy and Lt. Kasugai Yoshitaro8 OC 9th Coy with 150 volunteers to lead the attack.
The Shing Mun Redoubt consisted of five pillboxes: 400, 401a, 401b, 402 and 403 and an artillery OP (341m) that doubled as the redoubt HQ. These were all built of reinforced concrete with steel doors and protectors for firing loopholes. Connected to the pillboxes and OPs was a system of underground concrete tunnels punctuated by open top concrete trenches; each tunnel was named after a famous London landmark (Piccadilly, Haymarket, etc.). These pillboxes were situated on the small knolls, described by the Japanese as points 255m (Pillbox 401b) and 341m (OP), on the south-east side of the reservoir across Jubilee Dam, at the time the tallest dam in the British Empire. The majority of the redoubt was, in fact, situated at the lower western reach of Smuggler’s Ridge, in the vicinity of 381m spot-height (the British military map reference).
In defence of the redoubt was A Coy, 2 Royal Scots, under the command of Capt. C. R. Jones. Attached to A Coy was a FOO party from 2 Bty. 1st Hong Kong Regiment HKSRA, under the command of Lt. L. C. Wilcox; with him were two British and two Indian other ranks. A Coy, 2 Royal Scots, at Shing Mun was seriously undermanned. In the Coy HQ were one officer and nine other ranks. Under A Coy was effectively only one platoon, 8th Platoon, commanded by 2nd Lt. J. S. R. Thompson with platoon Sgt. Robb and 25 men. In total, three officers and 39 men were facing an attacking force of 150 Japanese with a further battalion and a half, close to 1,500 troops, in reserve. In keeping with brigade orders, Lt. Col. White, CO of 2 Royal Scots, impressed on all ranks that the concrete defence works were to be used only by the Vickers medium machine-gun team and for storage and protection against artillery and mortar fire. The need for sustained patrol activities was stressed; critically, no mines could be spared for the redoubt.
The Shing Mun Redoubt. The picture on the wall is Lt. Wakabayashi Touiti OC 10th Coy, 3/228th Regiment. The vertical writing on the left is carved on the wall of the redoubt – ‘Captured by Wakabayashi’s unit’. This is located on the entrance of Shaftesbury Avenue on the map on page 44–45. (Author’s collection)
On the night of the 9th about half of the defenders were inside the OP. The remaining half were said to have been deployed at locations in or near pillboxes 401b and 402. The 2 Royal Scots Battalion HQ was at ‘Skeet Ground’ on the south-west side of the redoubt, just east of Castle Peak Road below Smuggler’s Ridge. On the south-east of the redoubt, along the eastern end of Smuggler’s Ridge, was D Coy, 5/7 Rajputs, commanded by Capt. H. R. Newton, with interlocking firing arcs over Shing Mun Valley and orders to patrol the area around Needle Hill and Jubilee Dam.
By 1800hrs on the 9th the main body of the Japanese force was only some 500m off the dam, conducting battle preparations. At around 2000hrs, 2nd Lt. Thompson with a group of nine soldiers went on patrol. His orders, given by Lt. Col. White himself, were to ‘patrol to the north, to check on any enemy on the southern slope of Needle Hill and in the Shing Mun Valley, and his patrol should then return via D Coy, 5/7 Rajputs. Thompson returned at 2220hrs, having spent some time with Capt. Newton, incredibly after two and a half hours of patrolling, failing to detect either the 150-strong attacking force or any signs of the two battalions of Japanese nearby (even though the closest group of Japanese was only 500m away9). Meanwhile the attacking force led by Lt. Kasugai had crossed the Jubilee Dam, gone past the unmanned bungalow Post X at the south-west end of the dam, all without being detected, and by 2130hrs had assembled below Point 255 (Pillbox 401b). By 2200hrs 2nd Lt. Yamada Shoji of the 1st Platoon, 9th Company, had already cut through two lines of barbed wire. Seeing their progress, Maj. Nishiyana dispatched 10th Coy under Lt. Wakabayashi to join the attack. Lieutenant Wakabayashi immediately ordered his 1st Platoon to begin to move to attack Pillbox 403. H-Hour was intended to be at 2300hrs and, almost at the same time, L/Cpl. J. Laird at Pillbox 410b heard noises in the bushes and immediately opened fire. The Japanese responded with grenades and gunfire and rushed towards pillboxes 401a and 401b. One group of Japanese entered the tunnel and another group remained above ground and hurled grenades into the tunnel air vents. Corporal Campbell in the vicinity of Pillbox 402, heard the commotion, turned his Vickers machine gun and fired towards Pillbox 401. Members of the 3/228th HQ were caught in the open and suffered casualties. The attack alerted Sgt. Robb and he immediately gathered a force to counter-attack. Of the 13 that counter-attacked five became casualties (L/Cpl. Bankier, Ptes. Basnett, Coyle, Casey and Jardine). As Robb withdrew, Casey was killed and the Japanese managed to capture the party except for Pte. Jardine, who managed to escape. The battle also alerted Wilcox and he immediately called down a fire mission with both 4.5in. and 6in. guns from the HKSRA. Without strong back-up and strong leadership, about four members of the Royal Scots and an Indian sentry located in the northernmost posts abandoned their forward positions and withdrew southwards to take shelter in the OP.
Captain Cyril. R. ‘Potato’ Jones of A Coy, 2 Royal Scots, seen in a Japanese newsreel while marching to captivity on 25 December 1941. Jones was actually commissioned into the East Lancashire Regiment in 1926 and became a temporary major on 23 November 1940. (Author’s collection)
The news of the attack was reported to brigade HQ and Jones was ordered by Wallis to lead the counter-attack to evict the enemy; Jones delegated Thompson to do the job but, as he tried to leave the OP, he found that it was locked from the outside. By this time 2nd Lt. Mochizuki and his platoon (10th Coy) had infiltrated through open trenches and began attacking the OP from the top, trying to gain entrance via the hatches.
How did this debacle come about? Just before the attack began, 2nd Lt. Thompson received a civilian at the OP, at the request of F. W. Kendal of Z Force, under the command of SOE/Force 163 Singapore (which carried out sabotage work behind enemy lines). Private Wylie was dispatched, taking the key to the OP from Lance Naik Kishan Singh, an Indian soldier from the HKSRA and, on exiting, locked the OP gate from the outside. Therefore at the most critical moment, the three officers were literally ‘locked out’10 of the battle. Sometime after 0100hrs on the 10th, Kendal reached the vicinity of the redoubt and found L/Cpl. Bankier wounded at the roadside; the remaining defenders of the Shing Mun Redoubt were either trapped in the OP or were starting to withdraw in scattered groups towards the south-east for 5/7 Rajput. Of the pillboxes, 402 was still holding out. As the battle heated up, Maj. Nishiyana brought up his 2nd Company to try and capture this stubborn pillbox. After several attempts, at around 0230hrs in the morning, the Japanese brought up sappers with explosives; Sapper Cpl. Fujimori Sakae and three others forced explosives down the air vent and blew up the pillbox.
Meanwhile rear elements of the 3/228th continued to pour across the dam and advance along the dyke and some pushed down the valley. A group of Rajputs was out patrolling, just as the attack began; as they heard the noise, they were proceeded rapidly towards the redoubt and in the river valley (south-west of the dam) chanced upon some 200 Japanese and immediately engaged the attackers. This firefight continued throughout the attack on the redoubt and the Rajputs even managed to drive the attacking Japanese back up the river valley to the redoubt itself.
Sensing that the redoubt was in trouble, Lt. Col. White moved D Coy 2 Royal Scots from Castle Peak Road to Golden Hill and C Coy, less one platoon, which was to guard the Castle Peak Road junction vacated by D Coy, from Texaco Peninsula (near today’s Tusen Wan) to the area of 2 Royal Scots HQ.
The Japanese were held for some three hours and at last managed to blow up the steel shutters of the OP and in the process killed two Indian signallers; Thompson was badly wounded in the eye by a grenade; Jones and WO2 Mead, the company sergeant-major were both wounded. Stunned, the remaining 15 defenders surrendered and 11 became casualties. With the OP lost, communication to the 2 Royal Scots HQ was also lost. In an attempt to facilitate a counter-attack, the defenders’ long-range batteries (notably on the filter beds, Taipo Road, Stonecutters Island and Mt Davis) bombarded the redoubt for two hours till 0500hrs. As the artillery opened up, Capt. Newton of D Coy, 5/7 Rajputs, reported that 19 men had arrived at D Coy’s location and, despite the wounded, 13 of them took up position on the left of D Coy. One last pillbox managed to hold out for another 11 hours but it too was blown up; the Japanese dug out four survivors. By 0400hrs on 10 December, the redoubt was entirely lost. For the cost of a mere two killed the Japanese won a strategic victory that tipped the balance of the entire campaign. By the morning a Japanese flag was seen flying proudly on Point 225.
‘This was calamitous,’ wrote Maltby, ‘for Shing Mun was the key to the whole of the left position.’ While the British felt the loss of Shing Mun was a disaster, the Japanese saw otherwise. Paradoxically, having punched a hole in the British line, Doi to his astonishment was ordered to withdraw by his superior for he had entered into 230th Regiment’s sector and had not followed the carefully prepared war plans. Doi refused to obey the order and, after much argument with Ito and Sakai, his initiative was later censured. A divisional staff officer Oyadomani was made the scapegoat and he was sharply rebuked for not curbing Doi’s enthusiasm.
With the redoubt in Japanese hands, Doi was pouring troops into the area and throughout the 10th the Japanese were unsure of their gains and decided on a cautious approach taking advantage of the British disarray to send out small-scale probing patrols. Wallis, the commander of the KIB, ordered the 2 Royal Scots to counterattack immediately at dawn with support from the Rajputs and artillery, but Lt. Col. White, CO of the Royal Scots, refused, on account of his battalion having no chance of success. As a result the ‘counter-attack’ on Shing Mun, if it could be called that, was only a half-hearted affair. At first light on 11 December, the Japanese put in a forceful effort on Golden Hill but were stopped by Newton’s 5/7 Rajputs and support from 6in. shells from HMS Cicala11, which had been covering the left flank of 2 Royal Scots. Lieutenant-Colonel White instead deployed D Coy to take up a position on Golden Hill where there were only shallow shell scrapes and rusted wires, which did nothing to stop the attacking Japanese. Captain D. Pinkerton, the OC of D Coy, 2 Royal Scots, personally led a bayonet charge to clear the Japanese temporarily off the hill on the morning of 11 December, allowing the withdrawal of the wounded and survivors. Some of the casualties were caused by poorly aimed British artillery. B, C and D Coys took the full force of the Japanese attacks with heavy losses to all three companies, so much so that both Capts. W. R. T. Rose and F. S. Richardson, the OCs of B and C Coys, were killed. With the Royal Scots having vacated, X Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, and three Bren carriers of No. 1 Coy, HKVDC, and two armoured cars pushed west to cover the gap between Taipo Road and Castle Peak Road, on the left of D Coy, 2 Royal Scots, stretching out in a line running all the way to Shumshuipo. The Rajputs and Punjabis were virtually untouched throughout.
IJN soldiers of the 230th Regiment rushing to the Star Ferry Pier area in Tsim Sha Tsui. In the background is the clock tower of the then Kowloon Canton Railway Terminus. This clock tower still stands, as does the Star Ferry Pier. (Author’s collection)
The front page of a Japanese wartime propaganda magazine – a Christmas special edition – depicts Mitsubishi Ki-21 (Army Type 97 Heavy Bomber) ‘Sally’ bombers flying over Hong Kong Island. What would later be known as HMS Tamar can clearly be seen towards the bottom on the left-hand side of the magazine. (Author’s collection)
During the attack on Shing Mun, Maltby was distracted by reports of the Japanese landing on Lantau Island, south-west of Hong Kong. The attack was eventually driven off by heavy long-range artillery fire and a second probing attack on Aberdeen (the SNLF was only some 300 yards from the Aberdeen Naval Base but was driven off by machine-gun fire from the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the guns of 3 Bty. HKVDC). In hindsight these were nothing more than diversionary attacks and were never intended to be the main effort of the Japanese. The diversion worked: Maltby kept his garrison reserves, the Middlesex and the two Canadian battalions on Hong Kong Island. If Wallis could have put in a forceful counter-attack on 10 December with the 2 Royal Scots and brigade reserve, the Rajputs could have driven the Japanese off the vital ground of Shing Mun since, for most of the 10th, the Japanese were still in disarray after the unexpected success of then 228th Regiment, and Col. Doi had been brought before an irate Sakai who had flown down specially from Guangzhou to Taipo, New Territories, the HQ of the 38th Division, for a pre-court-martial hearing.
Maltby now decided, after only 48 hours of fighting, that it was too risky to attempt to hold the mainland and the three battalions there were to be brought back intact to Hong Kong Island to take up their allocated role in the defence of fortress Hong Kong. The security of Hong Kong Island was always the first consideration, and there was never any intention to make an all-out stand on the mainland. The naval commodore protested that he was not ready to carry out the necessary demolition, transfer of stores or the ferrying of troops across to the island, and so the order to evacuate the mainland was delayed 24 hours until noon of 11 December.
At noon the decision was made for the mainland to be evacuated under cover of darkness. Further demolition was carried out, including the China Light & Power (CLP) Station as well as the cement works on Tsing Yi Island. The docks were also destroyed. However even at this late stage, Wallis still believed that Maltby’s order was only a precautionary measure as he did not anticipate a total withdrawal for at least a week. The evacuation plan was designed to avoid the city, where the British force might be delayed by street fighting or attacks by fifth columnists. If the withdrawal had taken place in Kowloon, the British would have had to deal with an IJA advance column of 350 men from the 3/230th that had infiltrated Kowloon on the morning of the 12th to cut off the retreating British. The 2 Royal Scots and the Canadians, along with most of the gunners, retired south to Shamshuipo Barracks and the Jordan Road Pier, located at western Kowloon, while the Rajputs and the supporting artillery were to retire east to Ma Lau Tong which protected the fortified Devil’s Peak Peninsula. At this stage Maltby’s intention was to retain the Devil’s Peak Peninsula up to the Ma Lau Tong line permanently because it occupied a commanding position and could be easily supplied from Hong Kong across the narrow Lyemun Strait.
At this point, the withdrawal was more or less going to plan. The Canadians and Royal Scots withdrew under the cover of the Punjabis and embarked at the pre-arranged points on the afternoon and evening of the 11th. The Punjabis had a more difficult task in making a moonlight trek along the steep Kowloon hills, laden with supplies but without the necessary allocation of mules. One group missed a critical junction and split into two; one proceeded towards Devil’s Peak as planned but Bn. HQ came down to Kai Tak Airport and had to go through Kowloon City before being evacuated by Star Ferry at Tsim Sha Tsui, almost at gunpoint, fighting up to the final minute as the last man stepped aboard the ferry. On the night of the 12th the CO of the Rajputs, having failed to make contact with his counterpart in the Punjabis, decided to give up the Ma Lau Tong line and retire to the Hai Wan line, closer to Devil’s Peak. By 0400hrs on the 12th, the Punjabis and one company of the Rajputs, plus the gunners of the 25th Medium Bty. HKSRA made it across to Hong Kong Island across the Lyemun Straits. The evacuation continued in the morning, surprisingly without much interference from the Japanese. With the additional effort of the Navy the evacuation was complete by the morning of the 13th, albeit without 170 mules because of the desertion of Chinese labourers. The mules were to be sadly missed in the subsequent campaign. The last to leave was Capt. N. Forsythe OC of C Coy, 2/14 Punjab. During this time, the IJN tried its hand at shore bombardment, but, despite being at the extreme range of the guns of the 30th Bty., the defenders, by virtue of their longer range 9.2in guns, were able to inflict considerable damage on the IJN, in particular its cruiser, even at extreme range; and because of this incident, for much of the remaining battle of Hong Kong, the IJN kept an arm’s length from the shores of Hong Kong and played a minor role in the subsequent battle. The decision to withdraw and the speed with which it was done appeared to have taken the Japanese by surprise. The most probable explanation was that the Japanese expected to have to take Devil’s Peak by full-scale attack with ample bombardment because, just a day earlier, an infantry attack without any artillery preparation had been driven off with heavy losses, and the Japanese probably thought that the British were stronger than they had anticipated. The defence of the mainland lasted only five days.
With the mainland in Japanese hands, the next phase was to launch an assault on Hong Kong Island. The first move was not military but took the form of a peace mission to attempt to persuade Governor Young to surrender. At 0900hrs on 13 December a small boat bearing a white flag crossed the harbour with Col. Toda, Lt. Mizuno12, Mr Othsu Dak and Mrs Macdonald, a prominent, highly pregnant European and her friend Mrs C. R. Lee, wife of the secretary to the Governor and her two dachshunds. The terms of surrender were categorically rejected. Major Boxer delivered the written rebuff in person. Mrs Macdonald remained in Hong Kong to have her baby, and Mrs Lee, along with her dogs, returned to Kowloon.
STOP USELESS RESISTANCE – Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) Japanese 1941 style, one of the many propaganda leaflets that the Japanese scattered on Hong Kong Island prior to the invasion of the island. The promise on the leaflets, that the Japanese will ‘guarantee’ lives for those who surrender, sounds particularly hollow. (Hong Kong Library)
The Japanese then began systematically shelling selected targets. On the 13th, a 9.2in. gun on Mt Davis was knocked out and Belcher’s Fort was hit. Next day the 3in. gun on Mt Davis was hit, causing casualties among the Chinese gunners; morale collapsed and some deserted. On the 15th the shelling switched to targets on the northern shoreline, deliberately aiming at the pillboxes. At 2100hrs on the same night after some preparatory bombardment, approximately three companies of Japanese attempted to cross the harbour in rubber and improvised rafts towards Pakshawan but were driven off by machine-gun fire. Fifth columnists were also active; some signalled with mirrors, others were used as snipers. One group engaged in propaganda and persuaded the Chinese to desert. Their efforts would have caused more damage if it had not been for Rear-Adm. Chan and Col. Yee with their gangs of ‘loyal’ Triads. Armed with tommy guns and grenades, they systematically eliminated many of these fifth columnists.
A drawing by Japanese war artist Yuamaguchi Hoshum, depicting Hong Kong under attack. The clock tower on the right is the terminus building of the Kowloon Canton Railway in Tsim Sha Tsui. It still stands and bears war damage from 1941. (Author’s collection)
On 13 December 1941 the Japanese delegation on Kowloon Docks is about to depart for Hong Kong Island on a ‘peace’ mission. The man in the centre is holding a folded white banner, which will be unveiled with the words ‘PEACE MISSION’ on it. (Author’s collection)
Despite the efforts of the gunners and the Navy, the Japanese continued to round up boats in preparation for the crossing. By the 16th, half of the pillboxes between the racecourse and the Lyemun Straits had been destroyed; it was clear where the crossing would occur. On the morning of the 17th the Japanese sent a second peace mission, this time with the same Japanese team accompanied by two women hostages – Mrs Lee with her two dachshunds and a pregnant Russian woman. Their overtures were again bluntly rejected. On the 18th the bombardment intensified still further, and all indicators pointed to an imminent assault; the oil storage tanks were hit and set on fire, and for some days a pall of dense black smoke covered the north-east corner of the island, giving perfect cover to the Japanese.
This captured Japanese war map depicts the situation just after Kowloon was evacuated on the 13th and invasion of Hong Kong Island on the 18th. This map shows the bombardment zone, landing and embarkation locations, unit boundaries as well as phase lines with dates. What is interesting is that the IJA envisaged that the final assault on Victoria City would commence on 19th; however, the stand at Wongneichong Gap on the 19th total derailed the IJA timetable and it was not until 25th that the defenders surrendered. (Author’s collection)
By the night of the 14th, units evacuated from the mainland had taken up new positions on the island. The defence was now reorganized into the East and West Brigades. Brigadier Wallis commanded the East Brigade with headquarters at Taitam Gap, while Brigadier Lawson acted as CO of West Brigade with headquarters at the Wongneichong Gap. The former included the 5/7 Rajputs holding pillboxes on the north-east perimeter of Hong Kong Island, covering a frontage of over 3,500m. In depth, B Coy was located on the hills behind Taikoo Docks13, co-located with battalion HQ and a reserve company at Taihang village just north of Causeway Bay. The Royal Rifles of Canada’s battalion HQ were at Taitam Gap, covering the north-east corner of Hong Kong, from the west at Stanley to the south with a reserve company at Lyemun. There were two companies of the HKVDC – No. 1 Coy at Taitam Valley and No. 2 Coy at Pottinger Gap (today’s Ma Tong Au, an area of low ground north-east of Mt Collinson, south-west of Pottinger Peak). The old soldiers of the Hughsiliers defended the North Point power station. In support were British coastal and field artillery as well as Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5th Btys. of the HKVDC, the latter being an anti-aircraft unit.
The West Brigade comprised 2/14 Punjab, with their tactical area of responsibility stretching off the northern-west shore of Hong Kong Island from Causeway Bay to Belcher’s Point, also defending the Governor’s House and Maltby’s HQ. The Punjabis’ HQ was located on MacDonnell Road, at Mid-Level. The Winnipeg Grenadiers had their battalion HQ at Wanchai Gap, in a defence role, covering the south-west corner of Hong Kong Island with one company detached to defend the brigade HQ at Wongneichong Gap. The Middlesex Regiment was spread out along 72 pillboxes dotted around the entire shoreline of the island. One improvised company, Z Coy, comprising ‘odds and sods’ – cooks, musicians etc. – was located at Leighton Hill, just north of Causeway Bay, defending the battalion HQ. The 2 Royal Scots, having being badly mauled, were now reinforced with replacements from the HKVDC and held in reserve at Wanchai Gap. The HKVDC’s No. 4 Coy was at High West, No. 5 Coy at Mt Davis, No. 6 Coy in an anti-aircraft role was deployed along the northern shores of Hong Kong Island. No. 7 Coy was at Magazine Gap high on the hills of Hong Kong and No. 3 Coy at Jardine’s Lookout. The HKVDC’s HQ was at Peak Mansion on the Peak. Artillery in support of the brigade consisted of 9.2in. and 6in. guns on Mt Davis, and 4.7in. guns at Belcher’s Point. No. 3 Bty. HKVDC was located in Aberdeen to protect the naval base.
Men of No. 2 (Scottish) Coy, HKVDC, parading in Wanchai on the last Sunday before the start of the Pacific War. The OC, Major Henry Russell Forsyth, was killed in a desperate rearguard action on the night of 23 December 1941. For his actions Forsyth was awarded a mention in dispatches. (Hong Kong Library)
Disposition of artillery on map opposite
8th Costal Regt., 1st Hong Kong Regt. HKSRA – Lt. Col. S. Shaw
(N) 12th Bty –3 x 9.2in. guns – Maj. W. M. Stevenson
(L) 30th Bty – 2 x 9.2in. guns – Maj. C. R. Templer
(K) 36th Bty – 4 x 6in. guns – Maj. W. N. J. Pitt
12th Costal Regt. HKSRA – Lt. Col. R. J. L. Penfold
(A) 24th Bty – 3 x 9.2in. guns – Maj. E. W. S. Anderson
(H) 26th Bty – 3 x 6.in guns – Maj. A. O. G. Mills
965th Defence Bty HKSRA (of 16th Regt. RA but attached to 12th Regt. HKSRA) – Maj. B. T. C. Forrester
(C) No. 1 Troop – 8 x 18-pdrs
(B) No. 2 AA Troop – 2 x 4.7in. QF guns
(G) No. 3 AT Troop – 6 x 2-pdr AT guns
(M) 5th AA Regt HKSRA – Lt. Col. F. D. Field
7th AA Bty – 8 x 3.7in. AA and 3in. guns – Maj. W. A. C. H. Morgan
18th AA Bty – 8 x 40mm Bofors and 6 x Lewis Guns – Maj. J.C. Rochfort-Boyd
17th AA Bty – 8 x 3.7in. and 3in. guns – Maj. A. R. Colquhoun
(J) 1st and (E) 2nd Mountain Bty HKSRA
Each has two troops with one troop equipped with 2x 3.7in howitzers and second troop with 2 x 4.5in. howitzer
(I) No. 3, (D) No. 4 and (F) No. 25 Medium Bty HKSRA Each battery has 2 x 6in. howitzers
(i) 1st (Coastal Artillery) Bty HKVDC – 2 x 4in. naval guns – Capt. G. F. Rees
(ii) 2nd (Coastal Artillery) Bty HKVDC – 2 x 6in. naval guns – Capt. D. J. S. Crozier
(iii) 3rd (Coastal Artillery) Bty HKVDC – 2 x 4in. naval guns – Capt. C. W. L. Cole
(iv) 4th (Coastal Artillery) Bty HKVDC – 2 x 6in. guns – Capt. K. M. A. Barnett
(v) 5th AA Bty HKVDC – 3in. guns – Capt. L. Goldman
IJA troops landing on Hong Kong Island. These troops were all carrying Type 38 rifles, the standard rifle of the Japanese throughout World War II. The long bayonets would have been blackened for night operations. Note that the landing craft are merely boats and not dedicated landing craft. (Author’s collection)
On the night of the 17th, the Japanese sent out two reconnaissance teams. One failed, but the one team from the 3/229th, led by Lt. Masushima Zempei, managed to swim ashore at Taikoo. Despite being detected and shot at they managed to escape unhurt. An additional 18 bombers from the 14th Heavy Bomber Regiment from Guangzhou and another 18 Navy bombers and 26 fighters from Taizhong (Taichung), Taiwan, were brought over to assist. The crescendo of shelling on the 18th, with dive-bombing and the amassing of small craft on the Kowloon side all pointed to a Japanese assault that night. In preparation for the crossing the Japanese moved all the headquarters forward. The 23rd Army moved its HQ to Taipo in the New Territories, while the divisional HQ of the 38th Division was shifted to Ma Tau Wei, just off Tai-Tak Airport. The deposition of the Hong Kong Island invasion force was as follows:
| Infantry | Artillery | Engineers/bridging materials | |
| Right flank units | Div Inf. Group HQ 2/228th: 1st wave 1/228th plus HQ/228: 2nd wave 3/228th: held back* 3/230th: 1st wave 2/230th plus HQ/230: 2nd wave 1/230th: held back* |
5th Ind. Rapid-fire Gun Bn. 1st Bty. 38th Mt. Arty Regt. |
38th Eng. Regt. Less 1 Coy |
| Left flank units | 3/229th: 1st wave 2/229th plus HQ/229th: 2nd wave |
2nd Ind. Rapid-fire Gun Bn. less 1 Coy 5th Coy of 10th Ind. Mt. Arty Regt. |
1 Coy 38th Eng. Regt. |
| Right artillery | 38th Mt. Arty. Regt. less 1st Bn. | ||
| Left artillery | 1 Plt. 229th | 10th Ind. Mt. Arty. less 1 Coy 20th Ind. Mt. Arty. Regt. 21st Mor. Bn. 1 Coy 2nd Ind. Rapid-fire Gun Bn. |
|
| Landing engineers | 20th Ind. Eng. Regt. 1st and 2nd River Crossing Material Coy of 9th Div. with 18 motorized boats and over 200 collapsible rafts |
||
| Landing support | 5th Coy of 10th Ind. Mt. Arty Regt. | 1 Coy 38th Eng. Regt. | 2nd Coy 14th Ind. Eng. Regt. |
| Divisional reserve | 1/229th (less 1 Plt.) |
The right flank was to embark east and west of Kai Tak Airport, while the left flank would step off from the Devil’s Hill area. The order for invasion was issued at Shatin at 1800hrs; by 1930hrs Sakai and Higuchi, the deputy Chief of Staff, had arrived at Kowloon to supervise the crossing personally. At 2000hrs, H-Hour, 2/228th Regiment silently embarked in small collapsible craft and began paddling with towards their objectives of the Taikoo Docks and nearby sugar factory; the artillery support also commenced. Colonel Doi climbed onto a large barge with 80 members of his TAC HQ and crossed the harbour with 1/228th as part of the second wave. The weather was perfect; it was a moonless night and showery; thick black smoke from burning oil tanks aided the crossing and the Japanese were able to get half way without detection. Then, searchlights and machine-gun fire forced the boats to scatter; as a result commanders were separated from their units. Both 2/228th and 3/230th battalion commanders were wounded and Doi was forced to take over the direct assault. At 2140hrs precisely the artillery switched to depth targets and just five minutes later the first wave of 3/230th landed at North Point, followed by 2/228th at 2150hrs and 2/229th at 2158hrs. The 2/229th landed at Saiwan and the 3/229th battalion at Aldrich Bay, just west of Lyemun. Three red flares were deployed to signal a successful landing. The Rajputs bore the brunt of the weight of the Japanese onslaught. The 3/320th and 2/228th were directed at positions held by D and C Coys of the 5/7 Rajputs, while 3/229th’s landing fell on A Coy. Despite many days of shelling, the Rajputs put up a stiff fight and Japanese losses were heavy. The anti-tank company lost so many men that only one gun could be manned. By midnight, all six battalions had landed but men were forced to wait at the water’s edge for some time; wire fencing blocked the way, further delaying the advance, and marauding Bren carriers contributed to the chaos. One hour later Sano arrived at Taikoo. The Japanese plan was to bypass isolated resistance for mopping up later and to press forward to high ground. Overwhelmed by a vastly superior force, the Rajputs lost most of their officers and resistance crumbled.
A hand-drawn map made by a member of 1 Middlesex whilst in a POW camp, detailing the location of the regiment during the battle of Hong Kong, as well as key events of the battle on the island. (NAM)
Despite all indications, Maltby still believed that the main force would come directly at Victoria from Kowloon, therefore he held back on the counterattack, instead ordering a platoon of the Middlesex along with some Royal Marines and naval personnel, together with the Rajputs’ reserve company at Taihang, supported by artillery, to establish a defensive line to block the Japanese advance to Central District. Three armoured cars of the HKVDC were dispatched to protect East Brigade’s HQ and two cars went to reinforce the Middlesex’s battalion HQ, all quite inadequate against six battalions of IJA. In the post-war dispatches, Maltby admitted that he totally underestimated the Japanese landing. He thought that he was facing at most two battalions.
As the 3/230th broke through D Coy, 5/7 Rajputs, the 2/230th also came ashore in the vicinity and turned westwards towards Victoria City, but the advance was blocked by a group of older men of the HKVDC’s Hughsiliers Platoon holed up in the North Point power station. There were four officers and 36 men of the HKVDC, 39 volunteers of the CLP and HK Electric, including Pte. Vincent Sorby, the manager of the power station, as well as eight Free French and their commander, Capt. Jacques Egal (a former representative of the Free French in Shanghai, and a wealthy wine trader who happened to be in Hong Kong on 8 December). All were old World War I veterans and some had even fought in the Boer War; without exception all were over the age of 55 and they managed to hold up the entire Japanese 230th Regiment. Major, the Honourable J. J. Patterson, OC Hughsiliers, had once served with Allenby’s Camel Corps and had been mentioned in dispatches six times. He was at the time the Chairman of Jardine Matterson, a prodigious trading house (which still exists today) and a member of the legislative council; Pte. Sir Edward Des Voeux 8th Baronet, nephew of a former Hong Kong Governor, millionaire gold bullion trader and secretary of the prestigious Hong Kong Club, enlisted as a private after he was found to be too old for mobilization duties. Private T. A. Pearce, 67 years young, Chairman of J. D. Hutchison & Co., secretary of the Hong Kong Jockey Club; Capt. Bruch, second in command, was 60 and chairman of trading house Moutire & Co.; the list goes on. Under pressure, Patterson called for help and Maltby dispatched an HKVDC armoured car with a platoon from Z Coy, 1 Middlesex, but it was ambushed before reaching the power station. Only nine managed to reach it, including 2nd Lt. Caruthers, the armoured car commander. Unable to dislodge the old men, the IJA decided to bombard the power station into submission. Captain Frédéric Jacosta, Head of Free French Military Intelligence in Singapore, was in Hong Kong visiting his friend Egal when the war started and both decided to join the HKVDC. Jacosta advised Sir Edward to withdraw to a safer place. Sir Edward said ‘he was far too old go dashing about and preferred to fight in comfort.’ Shortly after, Sir Edward was killed by mortar splinters. He was 77 years old.
Japanese Type 94 tankettes on the march in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, with the North Point power station in the background. The Type 94 was a 3-ton two-man thinly armoured tankette, which could be penetrated by 0.30in. armour-piercing rounds at ranges up to 300m. (Hong Kong Library)
At 0145hrs on the 19th, the Hughsiliers reported the power station surrounded. Outnumbered by twenty to one and with ammunition exhausted, Pte. Pearce, Geoghan, V. Sorby, J. Roscoe and Cpl. R. P. Dunlop of the Middlesex withdrew to King’s/Electric Road and continued to fight using a broken-down bus as cover. Sorby was shot in both knees. The Japanese tried to rush the bus but were defeated; Dunlop and Roscoe were mortally injured from sword wounds. The Japanese deployed three machine guns, killing or seriously wounding all except Geoghan. Expecting that all were killed, a Japanese officer carefully approached the bus, but Geoghan despite being wounded, was still in fighting mood. He leapt up and charged the Japanese officer, killing him and four soldiers. Somehow Geoghan survived. The old men halted the westward advance of the entire Japanese IJA for 18 hours, enabling Maltby to withdraw forces and to establish a new front line.
IJA troops advancing on Hong Kong Island, probably 18–19 December 1941. Below is North Point and in the background is the Kowloon Peninsula, looking north-west. Note the sunken ships in the harbour; many had been scuttled to deny them to the IJA. This picture was likely to have been taken on Braemer Hill or the lower slopes of Mt Butler. (Author’s collection)
An IJA Type 41 75mm mountain gun in the area of the North Point power station. The Type 41 could be split into seven parts, each carried by a horse. Each gun was served by a crew of one NCO and nine men and backed up by a section of ammunition bearers, usually made up of two horses, one NCO and 12 men. (Author’s collection)
While the 2/229th Regt. moved south uphill towards Mt Parker, the 3/229th landed at Aldrich Bay, turned eastwards towards Lyemun and captured an HKVDC 6in. gun. Unaware of the landing, Maj. Bishop, OC C Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, dispatched 15 Platoon under Lt. Scott to check on A Coy, Rajputs, when unexpectedly 15 Platoon exchanged fire with a group of armed men in civilian clothes at the gate of Lyemun garrison. At first, as with so many other early reports, accounts of Japanese landings and loss of position were not taken seriously by senior officers, so much so that, at the garrison at Lyemun Fort, 5th Anti-aircraft Bty. HKVDC was taken completely by surprise and was captured after only a brief fight. The Japanese then started to commit one of many massacres by bayoneting 29 survivors. Alerted by 15 Platoon’s report, Bishop decided to conduct a counter-attack to retake the fort with 13 and 15 Platoons, but failed to scale a 6m wall and retired with nine men killed.
As the 2/229th proceeded southwards uphill to Mt Parker they came upon the Salesian Mission which was now acting as an Advance Dressing Station. No. 8 Coy 2/229th entered the Mission and were instructed to kill all of the medical personnel and injured. In the confusion, Gunners Y. K. Chan, Martin H. C. Tso of the 5th Bty., Capt. Osler Thomas HKVDC, Capt. Martin Banfill RCMC and Cpl. Norman Leath RAMC from the Mission survived the ordeal and lived to testify at the war crimes trial of Col. Tanaka. Reinforced with extra machine guns, some left behind by fleeing Rajputs, C Coy gave the Japanese a bloody nose and caused one Japanese company to suffer over 65 per cent casualties. Unable to get past the Canadians, the Japanese moved around the flank of the Royal Rifles of Canada. The encounter also left the Canadians with heavy casualties, losing almost two platoons. In need of replenishment C Coy withdrew leaving only one reinforcement platoon from A Coy under Lt. Blaver on Mt Parker. At about 0300hrs Capt. Clerke from HQ Coy was ordered to take 16 Platoon from D Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, to reinforce Mt Parker, but poor navigation caused the Canadians to lose their way and they did not arrive at their destination until 0730hrs. Clerke found that over 100 Japanese had already occupied Mt Parker, with Blaver fighting a desperate rearguard action. With only two platoons and no artillery support, Clerke could never hope to defeat over 100 Japanese and decided to withdraw, leaving Mt Parker in Japanese hands.
At 0845hrs on the morning of 19 December 1941, six MTBs (British power boats – 60ft class), Nos. 7, 9, 11, 12, 27 and 26, are massing off the north-western coast of Hong Kong Island beyond Green Island, under the command of Lt. R. R. W. Ashby HKRNVR. Ashby decides to attack in pairs and he is leading with the first pair. This first pair, MTBs 7 and 9, head off into Victoria Harbour travelling from west to east; 7 is the more northerly of the MTBs as they travel across the harbour, passing the ferry pier on the southern edge of Kowloon Peninsula, and then past the Kowloon Canton Rail (KCR) terminus, to the east of the ferry pier, to Holt’s Wharf. When just outside Holt’s Wharf, around 200m ahead to the north-north-east, they see a cluster of Japanese craft including a motor boat towing some wooden sampans (1). This group of three craft, with about 15–20-odd Japanese on each of the boats attempting to cross the harbour, is leading the cluster. At the command of Ashby, MTB 7 immediately pushes to full speed at 37 knots towards the Japanese with all its Lewis guns (a pair each at the front and the rear, plus a spare at the bridge) blazing (2). As MTB 7 moves in to attack, a flight of Japanese Ki-27 (Nate) fighters, on station above the harbour, provides air cover and immediately dives to shower the two MTBs with machine-gun fire (3). At the same time Japanese troops on their craft begin to return fire, disturbing the water around the MTB. At 100m 7 begins firing and 9 joins in, although, for the most part, the latter’s line of fire is blocked by the former. MTB 7 comes as close as 5m (point blank) to the leading Japanese craft, with all guns on full auto. It also drops two depth charges but they fail to explode because of the shallowness of the water, being so close to the wharf. Nevertheless all boats burst into flames and capsize on account of the wake generated by MTB 7. Lieutenant Ashby reported no survivors. He was awarded the DSC for this action.
At the end of the day, it had been a disaster for the East Brigade. The infantry force was halved, and even more embarrassing were the losses to the artillery. A series of mix-ups and misinterpretations of orders caused the coastal guns at Capes D’Aguilar and Collinson to be destroyed and abandoned, either accidently or deliberately. In the confusion, one troop of 965 Bty. destroyed its guns in error while another lost its guns to the Japanese. What was left were one 18-pdr and two 3.7in. field guns.
18 December 1941 edition of Asahi Shimbun, a top-selling Japanese newspaper of the day, showing a report on the battle of Hong Kong on the front page. The picture at the top left shows the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. (Author’s collection)
Wongneichong, or yellow muddy creek in Chinese, is located in the centre of Hong Kong Island, separating Mt Parker (532m), Mt Butler (436m) and Jardine’s Lookout (433m) to the east from Mt Nicholson (430m), Mt Cameron (410m), Mt Gough (384m) and Victoria Peak (552m) to the west. This valley forms a vital communication route linking the north of Hong Kong to the south. Brigadier Lawson placed the West Brigade HQ on this vital ground. Realizing its exposed position after the landing on the 18th, Maj. Lyndon, the brigade major, located a new site for the Brigade HQ to the south of Mt Nicholson and scheduled the move for the following day.
In response to the landing, Lawson dispatched three platoons from the Winnipeg Grenadiers to block the Japanese advance. Lt. C. D. French took 18 Platoon to Mt Butler, Lt. G. A. Birkett’s 17 Platoon went to Jardine’s Lookout and Lt. L. B. Corrigan’s platoon moved to the north-west of the Gap. As on Mt Parker, Birkett’s and French’s platoons had as much success as one might expect after being sent to meet battalions-worth of enemy with artillery support. Both Birkett and French were killed and survivors went on to HKVDC’s pillboxes, holding out until the afternoon. By the morning of the 19th two battalions of 230th and two battalions of the 228th were pushing for the hills. The 2/230th moved rapidly to occupy Jardine’s Lookout, while the 3/230th moved to occupy Mt Nicholson and the 2/228th headed towards the Gap. No. 3 Coy, HKVDC, under Maj. E. Stewart occupied pillboxes around Jardine’s Lookout, while No. 1 Coy, HKVDC, under Capt. Penn was holding positions around Taitam Valley with forward positions in Quarry Gap, south-west of Jardine’s Lookout. The pillboxes were soon overwhelmed but not before the Japanese suffered heavy casualties. Some managed to hold out for 24 hours. Stewart held his Coy HQ until the 22nd, ensuring four days of continuous fighting until exhausted by lack of ammunition, food and water. In the battle of Wongneichong, No. 3 Coy, HKVDC, suffered 80 per cent casualties and ceased to exist as a formation.
Lawson realized that the enemy had penetrated as far as Mt Butler, and that he needed to counter-attack quickly. D Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, was the Brigade Reserve and was holding vital positions in the Gap. Not wishing to expose the position, the only option was to bring up A Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, (plus one platoon from D Coy to make up for the platoon that had been left behind), commanded by Maj. A. B. Gresham, to clear the Japanese off Jardine’s Lookout and occupy Mt Butler. Gresham did not reach the start line until dawn. Initially the Canadians were successful in retaking Mt Butler, with WO2 J. R. Osborne leading a bayonet charge. By 2200hrs a strong counter-attack by three companies of Japanese pushed A Coy back, but the Canadians stood firm until about 1500hrs. Major Gresham decided to surrender after exhausting all the ammunition, but he was shot despite holding a white flag. In the confusion a Canadian shot back and killed a Japanese officer and the Japanese responded with a shower of grenades. Warrant Officer 2 Osborne returned the grenades as fast as the Japanese threw them; one landed in an awkward location and could not be picked up; Osborne threw himself on the grenade to save the others. This act of self-sacrifice won him a VC, the first Canadian VC of World War II.
IJA troops advancing along Black Links on Hong Kong Island. The long poles carried by these men as seen in the picture were Bangalore torpedoes, pipes filled with explosive used for clearing obstacles such as wires and mines when assaulting the pillboxes. (Author’s collection)
The St John Ambulance Brigade memorial at the Wongneichong Gap. Located just below the police station, this obelisk records the members of the brigade that were massacred at the Wongneichong Gap. This picture was taken on the Remembrance Sunday parade in 2010. (Author’s collection)
At dawn on the 19th, realizing the desperate situation at the Gap, Maltby dispatched A Coy, 2 Royal Scots, to the rescue under Capt. K. J. Campbell, but they lost all their officers and only 15 men managed to reach the HQ. A group of sailors under Cdr. A. L. Pears came from the south to its aid but, before reaching the Gap, were ambushed and only a few managed to reach a house – the Postbridge – just south of the Gap. Eventually the 3/230th captured the police station located on a mound at the southern point of the Gap; it then moved east and captured the anti-aircraft guns of 7th Bty. (less than 250m from the brigade HQ) and continued uphill towards Taitam Hill (now Parkview Road) to capture more guns – 6in. and 3.7in. In desperation Maltby called down final protective fire from the HKSRA in Happy Valley and inflicted massive casualties on the 3/230th. At about 1000hrs on the 19th, Lawson reported that his HQ was surrounded and he was about to ‘go outside and shoot it out’. Captain H. A. Bush was to provide covering fire and Lawson and his entire staff, including the Middlesex signallers, was cut down by machine-gun fire across the Gap. Lawson’s body was found two days later by the Japanese, halfway up the hill behind his HQ. He died of loss of blood from a gunshot wound to his thigh. Lieutenant Kerfoot, 2/14 Punjab, with his three Bren carriers arrived a few minutes too late to save Lawson.
At 1330hrs Maltby issued ‘Operation Order No. 6’ calling for a massive counter-attack to commence some 90 minutes later. The plan was for A and D Coys from the 2/14 Punjab to attack east from Victoria to North Point to relieve the Hughsiliers, but the orders never reached Lt. Col. Kidd, the CO of the Punjabis. HQ Coy Winnipeg Grenadiers on the right (on the north side of Mt Nicholson) and 2 Royal Scots on the left (or the south side) of the Punjabis formed the centre of the line and were to attack the Gap and Jardine’s Lookout. Eight field guns were promised but again did not materialize. There was no recce or proper orders given. The plan was for the Canadians to meet up with the 2 Royal Scots at Middle Gap at 1530hrs, but the Scots were late and the Canadians moved ahead without them. The officer commanding D Coy, 2 Royal Scots, was Capt. Pinkerton (attached to the Royal Scots were Capt. K. S. Robertson and Lt. I. P. Tamworth HKVDC, commanding a group of sappers acting as infantry) whose task was to move up the south side of Mt Nicholson, via Black’s Link, a narrow mountain pass, and attack the south-west side of Jardine’s Lookout with a composite company from HQ and B Coy under Capt. D. Ford to his right. C Coy, 2 Royal Scots, was to follow D Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers. For some unexpected reason the order was changed at the last minute and Pinkerton was told to attack up Wongneichong Gap Road along the same route taken by A Coy, 2 Royal Scots, just seven hours earlier, because it was ‘lightly held’. Captain A. M. S. Slater-Brown led the advance with the three remaining Bren carriers and the attached engineers, followed by D Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, on foot. Just as the Bren carriers reached the burnt-out trucks of A Coy, they too were ambushed. Mortars and machine-gun fire rained down from Jardine’s Lookout, with the Japanese using captured pillboxes from the HKVDC. Captain Slater-Brown and 2nd Lt. Bell, the battalion’s intelligence officer, were killed instantly. Crouched beside the ditch by the road, the Royal Scots waited till 0200hrs before launching an attack on the police station, succeeding in reaching the steps before Pinkerton was seriously wounded. The attack by Capt. Ford’s composite company at 0300hrs also failed. Almost at the same time an independent action by C Coy, 2 Royal Scots, under Lt. F. L. Stanier attacked Jardine’s Lookout and also failed. This series of escapades cost the Royal Scots eight officers and 68 soldiers.
At 1500hrs on 19 December another counter-attack force begins to move on to Wongneichong Gap, but this time it is late setting off as, according to plan, it be at Middle Gap by 1530hrs. By the time it reaches the Gap it is twilight. This counter-attack force is composed of elements of D Coy, 2 Royal Scots, and D Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, with Capt. Robertson and Capt. Tamworth of the HKVDC and a group of Chinese sappers acting as infantry. The HKVDC and Chinese sappers are placed under the command of Capt. David Pinkerton, the OC D Coy, 2 Royal Scots, who is also the overall commander of this ad hoc counter-attack force. Leading the advance is Capt. A. M. S. Slater-Brown in a Bren carrier with 2nd Lt. McCallum Bell, the Intelligence Officer of 2 Royal Scots in the second Bren carrier. A third Bren carrier follows on and this forms the vanguard of the attacking force. Moving with the three Bren carriers are Canadian infantrymen from the D Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, and Chinese sappers, who accompany the three carriers on foot. The Royal Engineers were one of the few British Army units in Hong Kong that recruited local Chinese as regular soldiers; many are armed with US-made Thompson sub-machine guns that carry a drum magazine of 50 rounds with potent hitting power. Despite being few in numbers these Hong Kong Chinese soldiers were well regarded as a professional fighting force and were especially mentioned for their contribution by Maltby in his post-war report. This plate depicts the scene moments before the Japanese open fire, as the Bren carriers and infantry (1) are just passing the wreckage and the dead from A Coy, 2 Royal Scots (2), who had attacked up the same road just seven hours before. The lack of military transport forced the British to commandeer civilian cars (3) throughout the campaign and it was a common sight to see the standard British Army transport of its days, the Morris C8 15-CWT truck, abandoned alongside Bren carriers and civilian cars in the battle of Hong Kong.
QF 3.7in. anti-aircraft guns of 7th Bty. 5th Heavy Anti-aircraft Regt., shortly after capture by the IJA at the Wongneichong Gap. Note how bare the hills are leading towards Jardine’s Lookout in the background; today it is a heavily wooded area. (Author’s collection)
Maltby was getting increasingly desperate. He ordered Maj. Hodkinson OC HQ Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, to attack the Gap and proceed to Mt Parker. HQ Coy was understrength and Hodkinson asked for a platoon from A Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, and reinforcements from the 2 Royal Scots. Covering fire was provided by Lt. Corrigan from Mt Nicholson but the Grenadiers managed to reach Mt Nicholson with five unwounded men, but Corrigan eventually succeeded in advancing just 300m short of the Gap road. While Hodkinson’s group was skirting round Black’s Link, he suddenly came upon 500 Japanese, probably from the 3/230th, eating lunch, incredibly without posting sentries. The Winnipeg Grenadiers wasted no time and inflicted heavy casualties. By 1745hrs the Winnipeg Grenadiers were only 100m short of Repulse Bay Road, to the south-south-east of the Gap. Hodkinson and four men with a 2in. mortar worked their way round the south-west spur of Mt Nicholson to reach the abandoned Brigade HQ, together with 20 walking wounded, and established a foothold at the Gap, while at the abandoned HQ, Hodkinson received orders from Fortress HQ to attack the police station at 2200hrs. Two HKVDC armoured cars with Vickers medium machine guns came in support but these were disabled by accurate enemy fire. Like Pinkerton, Hodkinson succeeded in getting close to his objective but was also seriously wounded. For this action Hodkinson was awarded the DSO.
East Brigade HQ at the Wongneichong Gap as it appears today. Lawson tried to run up to the hill behind along the path just to the left of the steps, but was cut down halfway up and died from uncontrolled bleeding. (Author’s collection)
By the morning of the 20th it was clear the Japanese had gained control of the Gap. However, elements of D Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, were still holding out in various pillboxes north of the Gap. Initially 17 and 18 Platoons were in a forward position with Coy HQ and 16 Platoon to the rear, located across Wongneichong Road almost directly opposite to brigade HQ. The forward positions were soon overwhelmed and cut off from the rest of the company. They fought on leaderless until they withdrew to the battalion’s HQ. With Capt. A. S. Bowman, the OC, killed and second in command, Capt. R. W. Philips, wounded, the command of the company rested on Lt. T. A. Blackwood. An attempt to relieve D Coy by B Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, on the evening of the 20th failed, with heavy casualties, killing all the officers and 29 men. With less than 50 men, all wounded, Lt. Blackwood continued to inflict heavy casualties on the Japanese until 22 December when, exhausted and without ammunition or food and water, D Coy surrendered. D Coy killed more than 200 enemies. In a post-war report the Japanese refused to believe that only one company of Winnipeg Grenadiers had held the Gap. For their stubborn defence Philips and Blackwood were awarded the MC and three of their men were awarded the Military Medal.
The battle of the Wongneichong Gap was characterized by a lack of coordination and planning. On the night of the 19th/20th, no less than three separate companies attacked the police station with another company at Jardine’s Lookout, all within the space of five hours, all separately organized and initiated by the local commander. Had it been possible to coordinate these individual actions into a single simultaneous attack, it seems possible that the objective set by Fortress HQ might have been met.
By the end of the 20th the British lost the vital ground of Wongneichong, except for Postbridge House, a large mansion in the area of Wongneichong Gap. For the Japanese, Wongneichong was the single most costly battle since the invasion; they suffered over 800 casualties and the CO of the 3/230th was seriously wounded.
At dawn on 20 December the IJA was at the following positions:
• On the east side of Hong Kong, the l/229th, the divisional reserve, and 2/228th were ready to advance from Taitam and Saiwan towards Stanley
• In the area around Stanley Gap – an area west of the Wongneichong Gap, south-east of the Jardine’s Lookout, west of the reservoir the 2 and 3/229th were ready to turn south to Repulse Bay
• East of Wongneichong Gap, the l/228th was ready to advance towards Deep Water Bay
• The 3/228th, one of the original reserve units, had just landed on the northern shore of Hong Kong
• On Jardine’s Lookout, two battalions, 1 and 2/230th, were ready to advance west across the Gap.
At the same time, the West Brigade was holding an ill-defined defensive line with Z Coy, 1 Middlesex, and the remnants of the Rajputs at Leighton Hill in the north, 2 Royal Scots in the centre was holding the northern slope of Mt Nicholson and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, less D Coy, was still holding pillboxes at Wongneichong Gap.
First to move was the 228th from Wongneichong, to clear Postbridge House of the remaining resistance. At the same time, the 229th sent a recce party past Violet Hill at the south of the reservoir to the cliff that overlooks the Repulse Bay Hotel, which was and still is a five-star beachside resort. In December 1941, the hotel not only housed its regular customers, but also evacuees, a mixture of soldiers and sailors, and the scene was set for an epic three-day siege. Despite having gained much ground, the Japanese later admitted that the opposition had been much stronger than they had anticipated, with the result they were forced to spend the 20th consolidating their positions, bringing up fresh supplies. For now the IJA was content to hold on to its captured positions.
The garrison was, however, not in a position to rest; Brig. Wallis sent a Royal Rifles of Canada company and two HKVDC platoons to the Repulse Bay Hotel in hope of attacking the Gap from the south via Violet Hill. This force soon recaptured the hotel garages and outhouses but without artillery support did not manage to get much beyond the hotel. Worried about the situation there, Maltby sent a vastly understrength A Coy, 2/14 Punjab, (only 25 strong) to help and proceed along the road on the south side of Hong Kong Island, but it was held up at Shouson Hill (just north of Deep Water Bay, north-east of today’s Ocean Park), trying to link up with the 20 or so sailors held up on the summit in two houses. Colonel Kidd the CO of 2/14 Punjab, with a mixed force of sailors and Punjabis, personally led the assault on Shouson Hill (150m). Kidd was killed and the mixed force failed and retreated with heavy losses. By the 22nd, after moving from Shouson Hill, the Japanese succeeded in taking Brick Hill (where Ocean Park is today) held by elements of 1 Middlesex and a nearby HKSRA Bty.; they proceeded to behead all survivors.
The IJA advancing along Electric Road on Hong Kong Island. The abandoned wooden carriages are most likely horse-drawn ammunition or supply baggage train, something rarely seen but which was a vital part of any army in the early 1940s. (Author’s collection)
An IJA 37mm RF (rapid-fire) gun carried by a packhorse is seen here, moving up Sir Cecil’s Ride. Most likely this is part of the 2nd Independent RF Gun (anti-tank) Artillery Battalion. The term RF was used to confuse foreigners about the true nature of the weapon.
The 37mm gun was known as Type 94 37mm RF gun (1) and could be broken down into four parts, each carried by a packhorse. Each battery had two gun troops and one ammunition/maintenance troop. The gun troop was commanded by an officer, usually a lieutenant. Under him were two sections, each with a gun and an ammunition team.
Each gun was crewed by a team of eight with a junior NCO, usually a corporal, in command who issued orders and positions the gun. Under him was his gun crew of seven:
Crewman No. 1: moved the gun, sets the trail, sets up the breech block.
Crewman No. 2: was responsible for the cleaning rod and moving the gun into position. If there was a misfire crewman No. 2 would retrieve it using the extra firing cord.
Crewman No. 3: moved the gun, set the trail, set up the breech block, adjusted the height, open and shut the breech block, loaded the gun and retrieved the empty cases.
Crewman No. 4: sets the sight and prepares the gun position as well as firing the gun.
Crewman No. 5: carried the gun-sight and also carried a toolkit.
Crewman No. 6: carried the second toolkit and prepared the ammunition.
Crewman No. 7: carried one round for immediate use and helped to fuse the shell, as well as assisting Crewman No. 6.
Crossing ahead of the gun crew is a Type 92 7.7mm medium machine-gun crew (2). The gun was effective to 4,300m with 450 rounds per minute and is being handled by a crew of ten with two horses, supported by an ammunition section of ten men and eight horses.
The gun crew leader, also known as the gun No. 1 (not seen in this plate), was usually a sergeant and usually carried the gun toolkit and a pick. The pick was to set the position of the gun, the job of the section leader.
The gun No. 2 was usually a lance-corporal, and was also the second in command. He was responsible for loading the gun and carried part of the Type 96 sight.
Gun crew No. 3 was usually a senior private soldier. He carried another part of the Type 96 sight and his job was to assist the section leader.
No. 4 was the actual gunner, usually a private first class. He carried the toolkit and also a part of the Type 94 sight.
Gun crewmen Nos. 5–8 were usually ammunition carriers, each ammunition box carrying 600 rounds (only two are seen in this plate).
Gun crewmen Nos. 9–10 were horse handlers and usually tasked with carrying extra ammunition and tools as well as the spare barrel. This item is not shown in the plate.
Despite the success in pushing back the British on all fronts, much of the ground that the Japanese had conquered contained pockets of stubborn resistance. The HKSRA was still hanging on at one end of Brick Hill. A mixed bag of HKVDC, Navy, Canadians and Middlesex under Maj. Dewar were holding on to Little Hong Kong’s ammunition store. In the meantime HMS Cicala was holding a position in Deep Water Bay providing artillery support; however, it was hit from the air and scuttled, eventually sinking in the Lamma Channel.
The West Brigade was also developing a counter-attack. Colonel H. B. Rose, CO of the HKVDC, took over West Brigade after the death of Lawson and used much of the 20th to prepare a plan for the next day. His plan was for 2 Royal Scots and the Winnipeg Grenadiers to attack towards the Gap from the west. B Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, under Maj. G. Trist was brought up from Pokfulam on the west coast of Hong Kong Island and was to join up with the Scots. The attack got off to a bad start. B Coy was late moving off as it waited in vain for 2 Royal Scots who for some unknown reason had already moved off from the eastern slopes of Mt Nicholson. The Winnipeg Grenadiers were thus left alone to mount the attack in pitch darkness and pouring rain. Split into two, they circled Mt Nicholson from opposite directions and met above the Gap where they were to assemble and attack on the morning of the 21st. Also for some unknown reason, the summit of Mt Nicholson was left unoccupied and Col. Doi once again demonstrated his aggressiveness; in a snap decision he ordered the 1/228th in a three-company forward formation to take advantage of this lapse in concentration and, using heavy rain as cover on the afternoon of the 20th, took the summit without opposition. B Coy stumbled on the three companies of Japanese and a fierce firefight developed that cost the Winnipeg Grenadiers all its officers; the CSM, seven NCOs and 29 men also became casualties. Facing an overwhelming force, B Coy was forced to withdraw to the west side of Mt Nicholson. Meanwhile Doi was preparing to follow up this success and assault Mt Cameron.
As dawn broke on the 21st, Wallis came up with a new plan to attack the Gap, this time in coordination with Rose. Wallis was to bring D Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, and No. 1 Coy, HKVDC, and one medium machine-gun section from No. 2 Coy, HKVDC, together with the two remaining Bren carriers, all under the command of Maj. T. G. MacAuley Royal Rifles of Canada, to move on Wongneichong. Moving off from Stanley Mount at 0915hrs the group soon encountered accurate mortar fire from Red Hill; the Canadians were soon engaged in hand-to-hand fighting at the summit of Bridge Hill and the HKVDC on Notting Hill, two features that had to be secured before pushing to the Gap via Violet Hill. By 1700hrs, MacAuley, as well as all the officers of the HKVDC, had been wounded. Wallis had no choice but to withdraw. Opposing Wallis was an overwhelming IJA force, which amounted to two battalions, 1/229th and 1/230th, backed up by artillery and three tankettes.
Taking advantage of the chaos, the Japanese mounted another landing at 1030hrs on the 21st and pushed towards Victoria City, reaching the east side of what is today’s Victoria Park. In the process an anti-aircraft gun manned by No. 6 Bty. HKVDC at the Watson’s factory in Causeway Bay was knocked out. Heavy mortar fire rained on the naval yard and all guns were put out of action.
Major C. R. Templer, formerly of 30th Coastal Bty., was ordered by Maltby to take command of the situation at Repulse Bay. Having succeeded in holding off numerous probing attacks, Templer was ordered by Maltby to attack the Gap with two platoons of Royal Rifles of Canada, one from HQ Coy and one from C Coy, with two of the HKVDC’s Vickers medium machine guns and two trucks. On the way, Templer gathered two more platoons from A Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, that were on Middle Ridge, but then he saw the size of force that the Japanese had in the area of the Gap and decided to cancel the planned attack and withdraw to the far side of the ridge.
At daybreak on the 22nd, the IJA finally managed to bring heavy artillery to Hong Kong Island. The IJA had two battalions of the 229th in the Repulse Bay area attacking the hotel. Two of the three divisional reserves, 1/229th and 1/230th, were deployed against East Brigade, which by the 22nd was establishing the last line of defence around Stanley Peninsula. The defences of Stanley were divided into three areas: in the forward area was Lt. Col. Home with elements of 1 Middlesex, B, C, D Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, and No. 2 Coy, HKVDC, supported by a single 2-pdr under 965 Bty. In the second line of defence located at Stanley village under Lt. Col. Wilcox were elements of B and D Coy, 1 Middlesex, under the command of Capt. M. P. Weedon, survivors from No. 1 Coy, HKVDC, and Stanley Platoon HKVDC supported by two 18-pdr and 2-pdr guns. Finally at the reserve area at Stanley Hill and Fort under Lt. Col. S. Shaw were 1 and 2 Bty. HKVDC with 30 and 36 Bty. RA fighting as infantry, supported by two 18-pdr, two 3.7in. howitzers under Maj. Forrester as well as 9.2in. and 6in. coastal guns.
Over on the west, British forces were barely holding on. C Coy, 2/14 Punjab, were holding the northern position, followed by Z Coy, 1 Middlesex, on Leighton Hill. South of Z Coy were B Coy 4/7 Rajputs, followed by B Coy, 2/14 Punjab to the south of the Rajputs. The Royal Scots and C Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, were in the area of Mt Cameron. South of Mt Cameron were D and B Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, and finally on the southern coast of Hong Kong Island was a mixed bag of British and HKVDC.
By noon the Japanese launched an attack on Stanley Mound (386m) and Sugarloaf, both occupied by B Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, augmented with one platoon from HQ Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, and two platoons from D Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada. Despite repulsing the Japanese several times the Canadians were forced to retire to the southern slopes of Stanley Mound when ammunition ran low. In the meantime the situation at Repulse Bay Hotel was deteriorating fast, but Maj. Templer was still able to hold out, despite many assaults there.
Japanese troops of the right flank advancing along Mt Butler and the Jardine’s Lookout area. In the background is the Kowloon Peninsula. The tall structure at the tip of the peninsula at Tsim Sha Tsui is the clock tower of the Kowloon–Canton Railway Terminus. This clock tower still stands today. (Hong Kong Library)
With resistance at Wongneichong finally over, the Japanese focused on taking Mt Cameron. The situation was desperate; Mt Cameron overlooked Wanchai Gap, the site of West Brigade’s new HQ as well as the Winnipeg Grenadiers battalion HQ. The Japanese were concentrating in large numbers of troops on a front just over a kilometre long, in the area between the lower southern slopes of Mt Cameron and Little Hong Kong. Colonel Rose brought up Nos. 4 and 7 Coys, HKVDC, to a line running from Wanchai Gap to Mt Kellet. During the afternoon there was a very strong attack on the area held by the 2/14 Punjab’s B Coy (under Maj. Kampta Prasad), who were beaten back and reduced to only eight men with two light machine guns. A gap was opened up between the Punjabis and Scots, but B Coy 4/7 Rajputs’ counter-attack hit at the Japanese flank and prevented the gap from getting worse. The Middlesex moved up to fill the gap in the line. The IJA attacked positions south of Mt Cameron but was driven off by D Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers.
Any further westward penetration by the Japanese would result in further isolation of the remaining troops. Elements of 1 Middlesex (only 40 strong), 2/14 Punjab and 5/7 Rajputs were still holding out at Leighton Hill and the racecourse. Major G. Trist, battalion second in command, was ordered to take command of a mixed force of about 100 members of C Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, later reinforced by 30 sappers to counter the Japanese westward move. The sapper platoons and two Winnipeg Grenadiers platoons were placed on the right under Lt. H. L. White. Three platoons of Winnipeg Grenadiers under Capt. N. O. Bardal (acting OC A Coy) were under intensive artillery bombardment and, without entrenching tools, were hit hard, and by 2200hrs the Japanese broke through on the right and worked through to the rear, trying to surround the Canadians, but the Canadians managed to withdraw to Mt Gough and escape encirclement.
On the 23rd the situation in the urban parts of the island had also become critical. The Rajputs who were on the right of 1 Middlesex at Leighton Hill had been heavily bombed and fell back at 0800hrs, exposing the Middlesex right flank. Rapidly the Japanese infiltrated around 1 Middlesex and together with heavy mortar managed to destroy all the remaining positions.
By this time the Japanese had advanced far enough to cut off the main water supply to Victoria. Pipes were damaged and key water reserves were in the hands of the Japanese; water shortage was beginning to hit both civilians and troops. Without water it was just a matter of time before the British had to capitulate.
Christmas Eve arrived with all the defenders in unenviable situations. In Stanley the Royal Rifles of Canada, who had borne the brunt of the attacks, were withdrawn into Stanley Fort, but not before a heated meeting between Lt. Col. Home and Brig. Wallis, in which the Canadians accused the rest of the brigade of not ‘pulling their weight’ in the battle. With the Royal Rifles of Canada back in the fort, the Stanley defences were reorganized. No. 2 Coy, HKVDC, was at Chung Homkok. Stanley Platoon, HKVDC, under Lt. Fitzgerald was north-east of the Stanley police station. Middlesex with its medium machine guns was in the pillboxes surrounding No. 1 bungalow, with a small force of the Royal Rifles of Canada towards Taitam Road by Pillbox 27. Stanley village was held by ten men of No. 2 Coy, HKVDC. The second line of defence ran across Stanley Peninsula close to the north of St Stephen’s College with the police station defended by British, Chinese and Indian policemen with Lewis guns and grenades. With the policemen was No. 1 Coy, HKVDC, and, with all the officers and senior NCOs gone, it was left to Cpl. E. C. Drown to take command. Finally, the last line of defence running across St Stephen’s Prep School just north of the prison was held by one section of No. 1 Coy, HKVDC, under Sgt. Murphy and 1 Bty. HKVDC under Capt. F. G. Rees.
British troops waiting to be marched into s POW camp. The man on the right is probably a sailor. In December 1941, the weather in Hong Kong was quite cold and thus long sleeves and long trousers were definitely a must. (Author’s collection)
By this stage European prison staff, wardens and even prisoners were incorporated into the HKVDC. An unofficial commander was prisoner ‘Crumb’ Chattey, formerly captain and adjutant of 1 Middlesex, who had been court-martialled and was serving a two-year sentence for homosexual offences, according to the law of the times. Chattey took charge of 40 jailers and assorted men, including the colony hangman who put up a spirited fight.
The Japanese were massing troops on Taitam Road with the obvious intention of crushing the remaining defence at Stanley; the attack failed but not before destroying two 18-pdrs belonging to 965 Bty. and two 2-pdrs at Deep Water Bay. Just short of 2100hrs, the second attack began, this time supported by three tankettes. Two were destroyed by the 2-pdrs but, in the skirmish, No. 2 Coy, HKVDC, was forced back to Stanley village losing most of its men on the way. Major H. R. Forsyth the OC of No. 2 Coy was recommended for a VC by Wallis for his stubborn defence against overwhelming odds. Soon after midnight, the pillbox manned by C Coy, 1 Middlesex, was overrun; Sgt. Sheehan and his crew were killed, with the exception of Pte. Foley, 1 Bty. The HKVDC line broke and the IJA overran St Stephen’s College, which was now an overcrowded temporary hospital and proceeded to commit the sadistic massacre and rape of all occupants. Eventually the Japanese broke through the eastern side of the prison and by dawn they reached Tweed Bay and St Stephen’s Prep School and the defenders were reconciled to a last stand on Christmas Day.
Battle of Hong Kong anniversary parade in front of the cricket pavilion, since demolished. The soldier in the centre wears an old-style backpack, with wooden frame and Korean ox-hide cover for waterproofing, identified by its central vertical straps. On the right is the newer 1938-model backpack, made entirely of cloth fastened with two parallel straps. (Hong Kong Library)
On Christmas morning Brig. Wallis ordered C Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, to lead a counter-attack to establish a line on the high ground north of the fort by retaking the bungalows on the ridge in Stanley village. Lieutenant-Colonel Home of the Royal Rifles of Canada refused to obey the order and Wallis instead deployed D Coy, Winnipeg Grenadiers, under Maj. Parker to lead the attack. At 1300hrs the attack went in, unsupported by artillery. The 18th Platoon under Sgt. McDonnell penetrated as far as Stanley village, inflicting heavy loss on the Japanese in hand-to-hand fighting but was eventually forced back to the fort. Of the 148 who started the attack only 44 answered roll-call at the end.
Living conditions in Stanley Civil Internees Camp. Mr A. Raven from Yorkshire and Mrs Tribble from Somerset, whose husband was in the Hong Kong Civil Service, enjoying the first square meal after the arrival of Rear-Adm. Harcourt in Hong Kong. (IWM)
In urban areas, through clever use of mines and the use of a Bofors L60 40mm in an anti-personnel capacity, the 230th Regt. advanced into the Wanchai and was held up at the China Fleet Club. At Wanchai Market, 965 Bty.’s 18-pdr was destroyed and soon the Japanese reached the western boundary of the Naval Dockyard. The Rajputs were pushed back west of the racecourse and Mt Parish fell, leaving the way to Victoria City open to the Japanese.
At 1530hrs on 25 December, Governor Young officially surrendered. A white flag was raised and Mark Young with Maj. Gen. Maltby crossed the harbour from Queen’s Pier and officially surrendered to Sakai. They met at the Peninsula Hotel, now named the ‘Toa’ by the Japanese. Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Lamb Royal Engineers and Lt. J. T. Prior drove down from Fortress HQ to Stanley to order Wallis to surrender. Wallis refused to obey without written instruction. Major Harland, the Brigade Major 2 Royal Scots, was sent to get written confirmation. At 0230hrs on 26 December 1941, Wallis finally surrendered; he and 2,000 men walked across the lines.
On the 28th, the Japanese mounted a 2,000-man victory parade led by Lt. Gen. Sano on a white horse; while the general was parading, his troops were on three days of officially sanctioned ‘R&R’ of rape and pillage.
Rear-Admiral Chan Chak, the ‘one-legged’ Chinese admiral, came to Hong Kong in 1938 under the guise of General Manager of Wah Kee & Co, a stockbroker who was in fact the head of the Chinese Military Mission in Hong Kong with the specific objective of coordinating China’s war effort with the British. Chan was working closely with the police special branch and intelligence services to coordinate the activities of the Nationalist agents, many of whom were Triad members, and to winkle out Japanese sympathizers and traitors. Chan was assisted by Col. Yee Shiu Kee of the Chinese Secret Service (in disguise as an insurance salesman), Lt. Cdr. Henry Hsu as his aide de camp, and Coxswain Yeung Chuen as his bodyguard.
On the morning of 25 December 1941, Chan was given permission to command the remnants of the 2nd MTB Flotilla and a mixed party of civilians, soldiers and sailors to escape before the official signing of the unconditional surrender of British forces in Hong Kong, which was expected sometime in the late afternoon. MTBs 7, 9, 10, 11 and 27 were at holding positions around the south side of Aberdeen Island waiting for Chan, who, after a precarious journey through the ruins of Victoria, eventually reached Aberdeen. On his arrival the MTBs were not to be seen and, instead, after searching around, he found HMS Cornflower II, the HKVDC’s launch and decided to board it to search for the MTBs. In order to get out of the Japanese bombardment zone, the boat moved toward open sea, but IJA machine guns opened up and the launch was stopped. Abandon ship was called and Rear-Adm. Chan jumped in after removing his wooden leg and giving his lifebuoy to his non-swimming bodyguard Yeung. Just as Chan dived in with Hsu, the one-legged admiral was shot in the wrist – which made swimming with one arm and one leg almost impossible. Despite all odds Chan and Hsu attempted to land but were still under fire. By now the IJA was shooting tracers, trying to drive the two back down to the sea by setting alight the grass on the hill. Colonel Yee did not jump and was last seen on the bullet-riddled boat. Yee later managed to hide on Hong Kong Island for a few days before making his way to unoccupied China.
Rear-Admiral Chan meeting the Nationalist Chinese Generals of the 7th War Zone. From left to right, Deputy GOC Jiang Guangnai, David MacDougall (Ministry of Information), Cdr. Hugh Montague Royal Navy, Chinese Senior Officer, GOC Yu Hanmou, Rear-Adm. Chan Chak, Col. H. Owen-Hughes HKVDC and Chinese Chief of Staff Wang Zhun. (IWM)
Every man for himself, the rest of the escapees scattered to various points on Aberdeen Island. On hearing the gunfire, the MTBs, which were hiding on the other side of Aberdeen Island, approached cautiously, rescuing survivors on the way, including Chan, Yeung and Hsu.
By 2130hrs on Christmas Day the 68 survivors were speeding towards Mirs Bay to meet up with the CCP guerrillas. On arriving, the MTBs were scuttled after all valuables had been retrieved. The CCP guerrillas were there to protect, guide and provide food and lodging to the escape party all the way to Huizhou in unoccupied China. Chen and his party were welcomed as heroes. This dramatic escape was the first of many and marked the beginning of cooperation between the Allies and the CCP guerrillas.
Boy soldiers of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Independent Brigade (HKKIB), a sub-unit of the ERC that operated exclusively in Hong Kong. The HKKIB was formally established in a Catholic church in Sai Kung on 3 February 1942 with Cai Guoliang as commander and Chen Daming as commissar. (Author’s collection)
As soon as the British withdrew from Kowloon, a new force, the Guangdong People’s Anti-Japanese Guerrillas East River Column (ERC), took over the struggle against the Japanese invaders. Except for some heavy equipment that was destroyed, the British Army left behind a sizeable quantity of small arms and ammunition in Kowloon. Under the direction of Lin Ping, the party secretary of the Third and Fifth Column, 50 members infiltrated Hong Kong as early as 9 December 1941 to scavenge for leftover weapons. The ERC was a pro-CCP force that was founded in 1938 by combining various local anti-Japanese forces in the South Guangdong area that sprang up after the capitulation of Guangzhou to the Japanese. Two key local guerrilla forces formed the core of the ERC – the Baoan People’s Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Main Force, founded by Zeng Sheng, later the commander of the ERC, and East Baoan People’s Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Regiment of Wang Zuorao (later Chief of Staff of the ERC).
Just before the invasion of Hong Kong, the Third and Fifth Column already had a force 1,500 strong. It was a battle-tested force that had been fighting the Japanese since 1938 in Guangdong Province. At the same time, Chinese Hong Kongers, mostly farmers and fishermen, also began to take up arms against the Japanese; by the end of December 1941 over 100 members of the ERC were active in Hong Kong and, in order better to organize the anti-Japanese guerrilla force, the HKKIB was formed in February 1942 and was commanded by Cai Guoliang with Chen Daming as the Political Commissar. Cai was to report to Zeng Sheng, the overall commander of the ERC.
The first mission of the ERC was to rescue the many key Chinese and foreigners that were living in Hong Kong during 1941. While China was in flames, Hong Kong was still at peace. Many prominent Chinese, such as industrialists, politicians and authors as well as other VIPs came to the colony to escape the war. As early as 9 December 1941, on instruction from the highest authority of the Chinese Communists, the ERC was to rescue these selected VIPs and take them past Japanese lines to designated safe areas in China. From December 1941 to June 1942, over 800 key VIPs were rescued and escorted to safe areas. During this period the ERC also escorted over 2,000 overseas Chinese who came to China to fight in the anti-Japanese war.
The ERC also took an active part in rescuing POWs and aiding escapees. In March 1942, British POWs were forced to carry out hard labour in Kai-Tak Airport and the ERC successfully assigned English-speaking agents disguised as street vendors to infiltrate the airfield and rescue Capt. Thompson and four others through the rainwater culvert system. Other notable rescues included Lt. Col. Ride of the HKVDC, who went on to establish the British Army Aid Group (BAAG), numerous POWs and civilian internees. Amongst the military, notable escapees that were aided by the ERC included Lt. J. Douglas HKRNVR, Lt. J. W. Hursto Royal Navy, and Lt. G. D. CIagne RA, a number of Indian soldiers including Lashkar Singh, Mehnga Singh HKSRA, civilian VIPs such as HSBC banker T. J. J. Fenwick, Police Superintendent W. P. Thompson, and key expatriates working in Hong Kong at the time, including a number of Russians, Danes and Norwegians. Most of these escapees were escorted to unoccupied China, but two Royal Scots soldiers, Joseph Gallaher and Daniel Hodges, remained with the ERC for six weeks, training the guerrillas, mainly in the use of British arms, medium machine guns, etc., making them some of the very few non-Chinese to be fighting with the Chinese Communist force.
In recognition of the help rendered by the ERC to the British, especially by the HKKIB, General Sir Neil Ritchie (seen seated in the middle) presented a commemorative banner to the Sai Kung Chamber of Commerce in a ceremony on 12 April 1947. (Author’s collection)
From 1942 onwards the USAAF started to bomb Hong Kong periodically and these raids intensified from 1943. It was inevitable that planes would be shot down and the capture of any downed US pilot was a top priority for the Japanese. The ERC took the lead in rescuing downed pilots. On 11 February 1944, Flight Lt. Donald Kerr of 3rd Wing, 32nd Fighter Squadron, 14th Air Force was shot down while escorting 12 B-25s on a mission to bomb Kai-Tak Airport. Kerr was amongst the 20 P-51 Mustang fighters that took off from Guilin (Kweilin). After shooting down one Japanese fighter, Kerr was hit and had to bail out and landed on the hills over a kilometre north of the airport. As all this happened in broad daylight, the Japanese mobilized several companies of soldiers to capture Kerr. Injured and desperate to escape, Kerr was at one point only 3m from the IJA, hidden from view by a large rock. An ERC boy soldier or messenger by the name of Li Shi, who was only 13 years old at the time, took it upon himself to lead Kerr to safety and eventually to a safe house after instructing his father, who was also a member of the ERC, to aid Kerr. Eventually Kerr was able to rest in a safe mountain cave on Ma On Mountain where he stayed for two weeks to recuperate. Food, warm clothing and medicine were brought to him by an English-speaking female guerrilla, Lin Zhan, before he was escorted all the way back to Guilin airbase. Before leaving, Kerr met with Zeng Sheng, who gave him a letter for Gen. Claire Chennault of the 14th Air Force. In view of the increasing number of US pilots that the ERC had to rescue, Zeng requested a liaison officer be posted with the column. A US Army officer by the name of Merrill Ady served as the first liaison officer, later replaced by Lt. B. G. Davis, who served until the end of the war.
On 11 June 1944, an underground pro-Chinese Communist newspaper, Forward Press, published a thank you letter from Flt. Lt. D. W. Kerr USAAF to the ERC, depicting his escape from the IJA in a series of hand-drawn cartoons. (Author’s collection)
Other notable rescues included the crew of a B-25 that crashed into Bias Bay (Daya Bay) on 24 May 1944, Lt. G. Laverell, Sgt R. D. Shank, Sgt. D. Conleg, Sgt. H. Ellis and in 1945 Lt J. Egan of the 14th Air Force, who led a 60-bomber raid, were rescued by the marine detachment of the HKKIB, as was 2nd Lt. M. J. Crehan US Navy.
Soon the ERC gained a reputation for being tough, dependable and disciplined fighters, compared with the Nationalist-controlled guerrillas, who were nothing more than local warlords, and the Allies began to cooperate with the ERC on an official basis. In 1944, as the USA was still debating the final strategy for the invasion of Japan, one of the options was to use China as a launch pad. As part of the preparation of this plan, the US military contacted the ERC to conduct intelligence gathering of Japanese depositions, local weather conditions as well as conducting target recces for air strikes and post-strike reports.
Flt. Lt. Donald Kerr seen here thanking Zeng Sheng, the leader of the ERC. Kerr is leaving the ERC and returning to Guilin airbase. Kerr’s son, David, returned to China in 2008 to thank the ERC for saving his father. (Author’s collection)
Throughout the war, the ERC not only had to contend with fighting the Japanese but also with sporadic skirmishes with the Nationalist guerrillas as well as the KMT Nationalist Army. In 1943, from the months of January to November, ERC conducted over 70 offensive actions and expanded to a force 3,000-strong, split into seven columns (No. 2, No. 3, No. 5, Huiyang Column, Baoan Column, HKKIB and the Escort Brigade). Amongst them the HKKIB attacked the Kai Tak Airport, destroyed the Argyle Road railway bridge, raided a Japanese armoury, captured and kidnapped Japanese and their allies, and killed and executed traitors. The ERC together with the Escort Brigade and the Independent Bias Bay column sunk a number of Japanese patrol craft and captured several vessels. By the end of the war in 1945, the ERC had expanded to an 11,000-strong force that was divided into nine columns and six independent battalions in four combat groups, namely East River, South River, Northern Guangdong and Eastern Advance Corps.
The formal surrender of the Japanese force in China took place on 9 September 1945, but the end of one war marked the beginning of another, the Chinese Civil War. The ERC officially withdrew from Hong Kong on 28 September 1945 and, as instructed by the CCP, immediately took the surrender of all Japanese forces in Guangdong; those Japanese forces and Japanese sympathizers that refused to surrender were destroyed. According to the American-sponsored 10 January 1946 ceasefire agreement, the warring Chinese factions agreed to halt any military action against each other and consolidated forces; according to the agreement all Communist forces were to move to north-east China and the Nationalist force would concentrate to the south. Under the supervision of the tri-party peacekeeping force (Chinese Nationalist, Chinese Communist and the US Army), 2,533 members of the ERC were allowed to be transported, by courtesy of the US Navy, to Yantai in Shandong Province, where they were absorbed into the CCP’s Eastern China Field Army. However, despite the ceasefire agreement, the ERC was attacked in assembly areas, resulting in several deaths. The ERC story does not end here; the reputation of the ERC was such that the HKKIB, many of whom were local Hong Kong Chinese, were allowed to bear arms to assist the British authorities to maintain peace in the rural areas of Hong Kong until as late as September 1946.
From the formation of forces in 1938 until 1945, the ERC conducted offensive combat operations over 1,400 times, killed over 6,100 and captured over 3,500 Japanese soldiers or puppet government troops. It also suffered over 2,500 killed in action.
The British Army Aid Group was an MI9 organization set up by Lt. Col. Ride, the former OC of the Hong Kong Field Ambulance, with the aim of intelligence gathering and assisting POWs in escaping from the Japanese camps in Hong Kong. The BAAG is unique as the only British military organization that existed in the China theatre from 1942 onwards.
This BAAG recce report depicts a Japanese machine-gun position on Leighton Hill, an area of high ground between Causeway Bay and Wanchai of Hong Kong Island. The building at the bottom right-hand side is Po Leung Kuk, a Chinese charity established for the protection of women and children. This building still stands today. (Author’s collection)
Shortly after being captured, while camp security was still lax, Ride and Lt. Morley, Sub-Lt. Davis, both HKRNVR, and L/Cpl. Francis Lee of the HKVDC escaped from Shamshuipo POW camp to Free China. The dramatic escape was carried out with the help of the ERC and it prompted Ride to help others do the same; he decided to form a group that became known as the BAAG. For his part in leading the escape, Ride was awarded an OBE and Francis Lee the Military Medal.
The BAAG also gathered military intelligence in southern China and Hong Kong. The agents of the BAAG, many of whom were ex-POWs, helped to facilitate the escape of more POWs. Towards the end of the war, the BAAG’s influence reached as far as Hainan Island in south-west China, and it was engineering a mass escape of Australian POWs, under Operation Man Friday, which was cancelled on account of the Hiroshima bomb. The BAAG also conducted plenty of sabotage operations in Hong Kong. Before the onset of regular bombing by the US 14th Air Force, the BAAG conducted an unusual scheme to deny the Japanese ships repair facilities by bleeding dry the skilled labourers that were employed in the naval yard, through a strategy known as the ‘Matey Scheme’. It helped these skilled labourers and artisans to escape and even found them jobs in India. In a very short time in the latter part of 1942, over 153 dockyard workers as well as their families had escaped.
In three years of operation the BAAG rendered assistance to 33 British and Allied escapees, 400 Indians (of whom 140 were in the armed forces), 40 downed US airmen, and 120 European and 550 Chinese civilians, enabling them to escape from Japanese-occupied Hong Kong. There were 128 escapees who were re-trained for further operations with the Chindits. The BAAG also played a part in famine relief and other humanitarian services, took an active role in the battle of Guilin and carried out demolition work as well as gathering vital intelligence for air and naval operations in the China theatre. Above all, through the BAAG an active British resistance was maintained in Hong Kong in defiance of the Japanese occupation.
A post-war photograph of Lt. Col. Lindsey Tasman Ride, founder of the BAAG, at a veterans’ dinner. Note the BAAG unit emblem in the background. From 1948 to 1962 Ride served as colonel commandant of the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force. (Hong Kong Library)
A Royal Marine trooper is seen guarding Japanese prisoners. The Japanese soldier with his arms folded with a Star badge on his short sleeve is Lt. Col. Kanazawa, who was the head of the Kempetai, the feared Japanese ‘Gestapo’. (Author’s collection)
After the capitulation, the Japanese soon began systematically to transport POWs to Japan for hard labour. The first batch of prisoners, some 700, had already been processed in the first week of September 1942. On 25 September another 1,834 prisoners were embarking the Lisbon Maru to Japan under the command of Lt. Walda of the IJA, while the vessel was under Capt. Koyda Shigeru. The prisoners were held in three holds, the Royal Navy in the forward hold, the Royal Scots, 1 Middlesex and other small units and individuals were in the second hold, which was just forward of the bridge, and the third hold, which was aft of the bridge, held members of the RA. Also on board were 778 Japanese soldiers, who occupied most of the deck space forward. As for all Japanese POWs, the accommodation was limited to say the least.
On the morning of 1 October 1942, at about 0400hrs, USS Grouper SS-214, a Gato-class submarine, was patrolling off the coast of western China close to Shanghai and spotted a target moving north. At 0704hrs USS Grouper let loose three Mk. 14 torpedoes at a range of approximately 3,000m; two missed and one hit amidships but did not explode because of faulty detonators – a problem which plagued the US Navy during this period of the war. A fourth torpedo was fired and it struck the stern of the ship, causing it to lose control and shudder to a halt.
The few prisoners who at that time were on deck were immediately pushed back into the nearest hold and Japanese sentries were placed at the entrance to each hold and began to batten down the hatches. Coastal patrol vessels immediately responded with depth charges, and the ship’s 3in. deck gun began to fire spasmodically. At 0845hrs and 0937hrs, USS Grouper fired more torpedoes but missed both times; it was the last and seventh torpedo shot from stern tubes that found its mark and hit the Lisbon Maru.
During the whole period of the attack, many prisoners were suffering from dysentery and diarrhoea; without toilet facilities and fresh air, under tropical conditions, the situation could only be described as dire. Stewart, the CO of 1 Middlesex, remonstrated with the Japanese, requesting that they should at least leave one plank of timber to help provide a little air, but without success.
Surrender ceremony on 16 September 1945. To the right sits Maj. Gen. Okada Umekichi. Standing next to him in whites is Capt. Eccles, Royal Navy Head of Military Administration. Bending over Okada is Mr Makimura, a civil servant. Sitting opposite with hands clasped is Nationalist Chinese Maj. Gen. Pan Hwa Kuei, to his right is Adm. Sir Bruce Fraser, C-in-C British Pacific Fleet. (Author’s collection)
Number three hold was now taking in water and hand pumps were given to the prisoners. Some men, already weakened by disease, began to falter and a few died. Lieutenant Potter, a fluent Japanese speaker, broke free and approached Lt. Walda requesting air and water but was refused. Later a Japanese ship came alongside, the Japanese soldiers were taken off and the Lisbon Maru was taken into tow. Almost 24 hours passed; the ship began to lurch and stagger. Since all requests had been ignored or refused, Lt. Col. Stewart authorized a small party to attempt to conduct a mass breakout. Men with homemade knives began to push them up through the planks of timber and began to cut away ropes and tarpaulins. Lieutenant Howell, Lt. Potter and others climbed onto the deck and proceeded towards the bridge, asking to be allowed to talk to Capt. Koyda, but the Japanese opened fire, killing Potter. The ship was by now very low in the water and evidently about to sink. It was every man for himself. Some of the POWs began to hack at the ropes and made a mad scramble for the narrow opening, with some falling and injuring themselves. Stewart immediately took hold of the situation, exclaiming: ‘Steady the Middlesex. Remember who you are!’ Immediately the NCOs took charge and order was soon established. At about 1030hrs, the Lisbon Maru finally sank. The Japanese soldiers and sailors, who were standing by aboard ships alongside, now began to fire at the POWs in the water. On the four or so Japanese ships standing by, no one made any attempt to assist the POWs. Some managed to climb alongside the Japanese vessels but, as they were clinging to the side or clambering on the gunwales, they were shot at or bayoneted.
The US Army Air Force conducted extensive bombing of Hong Kong from 1942 onwards. This aerial photograph shows targeting information on the Kowloon Docks area. After the war this area was extensively reclaimed and forms roughly what is today’s Hung Hom, Whampoa Gardens. (Author’s collection)
After several hours, some of the stronger swimmers managed to get to the islands but many were lost in the water or sent crashing onto the rocks. At first Chinese fishermen on the islands did little to save the men from the sea, believing that they were Japanese, but on discovering they were Allied POWs they immediately sent boats out to the rescue. Eventually some 200 were picked up and taken to the Zhoushan Islands. POWs were treated with great kindness and given what little food the fishermen had and all of their clothing.
On 5 October, roll-call was taken in Shanghai; of the original 1,834 prisoners, 828 had perished. It was learned later that three men had managed to escape. On 7 October, 35 of the worst dysentery patients were left in Shanghai and the remainder were taken aboard the SS Shinsei Maru and SS Washington Maru; six died before reaching Japan. Finally, on the 10th, the POWs arrived at Moji and were immediately taken to Osaka where 50 more very sick prisoners were dropped off at Kokura with a similar number at Hiroshima. Eventually 500 went on to Kobe and the remainder to Osaka. The winter of 1942 was especially bleak and 200 were to die mostly from neglect, diphtheria, diarrhoea, pneumonia and malnutrition.
At 1500hrs on 29 August 1945, operating under code name Operation Ethelred, a British fleet with some 55 vessels including six aircraft carriers (HMS Illustrious, Venerable, Vengeance, Chaser, Striker and Vindex), two battleships (HMS Anson and Duke of York), three cruisers, six destroyers, five frigates, eight submarines, no less than 33 minesweepers and a host of other auxiliary ships led by Rear-Admiral Harcourt arrived just outside Hong Kong after two days steaming from Subic Bay in the Philippines. Harcourt was waiting for the final act of diplomatic negotiation before entering Hong Kong to take the surrender of the Japanese force. Whilst the fleet was waiting, the minesweepers were busy clearing a safe channel into Victoria Harbour and the accompanying Marines were busy clearing the outlying islands of Japanese forces, including de-arming a fleet of suicide boats that had been prepared to target the British liberation fleet. As the fleet entered the narrow channels approaching Victoria Harbour, three suicide boats came towards them. Taking no chances, covering fighters of the Fleet Air Arm blasted them out of the water.
With his back towards the camera, Capt. Eccles Royal Navy, a fluent Japanese speaker, is dictating terms to the IJA at the Peninsula Hotel while Capt. Shimauchi (on the right-hand side), Lt. Col. Kanazawa (centre) and Maj. Shies, head of the local police, take notes. Eccles said, ‘We have come here as conquerors, you will do as we say.’ (Author’s collection)
As part of the preparation for the arrival of the British force, an Avenger with an escort of four Hellcats from HMS Indomitable headed for Kai Tak Airport to pick up a Japanese liaison officer, Makamura from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and his escort, ex-POW Cdr. Craven Royal Navy, to prepare for the formal entry of Harcourt’s fleet into Hong Kong. On 30 August 1945, around midday, a fleet of minesweepers headed for the Lyemun Channel, followed by the destroyer HMS Kempenfeldt, cruiser HMS Swiftsure (to which Harcourt transferred the flag), followed by HMS Euryalus, HMCS Prince Robert (the same ship that brought C Force to Hong Kong in 1941) and finally Submarine Depot ship HMS Maidstone. Sub-Lieutenant William K.L. Lore, a Canadian–Chinese serving in the Royal Canadian Navy, became the first British officer to land on Hong Kong and proceeded to liberate Shamshuipo POW camp with a group of Marines.
However, the liberation of Hong Kong involved a lot more than just freeing the POWs and civilian detainees. Political manoeuvring at the last minute delayed the signing of the deeds of surrender. Behind the scenes there was the issue of who should be the Allied representative for the surrender ceremony. According to the 1943 Cairo Conference and orders from General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief US Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC), Japanese forces in Hong Kong were to surrender to Chinese National Forces under Chiang Kai-shek, then the leader of wartime China. Chiang was hoping President Truman would back China’s demand to receive the Japanese surrender in Hong Kong as the sole representative of Allied powers and thus enable China to reclaim Hong Kong from Britain. This diplomatic move was unsuccessful, Chiang was able to obtain only the concession of having a Chinese general attend the ceremony and this was a rare occasion when the Chinese flag flew alongside the British Union flag. This diplomatic manoeuvring delayed the formal ceremony of surrender at Government House until 16 September 1945.
Japanese suicide boats and crew, surrendering to the men HMS Whirlwind and Quadrant in Picnic Bay, Lamma Island. Picnic Bay is better known today as Sok Ku Wan. Caves hiding the suicide boats can still be seen in the area. (IWM)
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7 China National Aviation Corporation
8 Originally it was not Lt. Kasugai’s 9th Coy leading the attack; a nameless company commander had been sacked, having been accused of being ‘too noisy’ during battle preparation.
9 According to the Royal Scots archive: ‘It seems beyond doubt, in view of the short time that had elapsed, that Thompson did not patrol to Shing Mun River or Needle Hill.’
10 However, visitors to the Shing Mun Redoubt can see that there are five entrances to the OP, three hatches and an entrance via Strand Palace Hotel, as well as an observation platform, which anyone can climb in and out of with relative ease – it is a mystery why Capt. Jones and his party claimed to have been locked in the OP in subsequent battle reports.
11 HMS Cicala was hit on the stern and retired. HMS Tern replaced Cicala covering the left flank of the Gin Drinkers Line.
12 A week earlier, Mizuno had been a sports store manager in Hong Kong.
13 Now part of Taikoo Estate.