Straight Up: Vertical Flight in the U.S. Navy
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL HELICOPTERS: SOMEONE ELSE’S PROBLEM
The story of naval aviation is the tale of a century spent surpassing artificial boundaries and constraints, often imposed by individuals who were not themselves naval aviators. The history of rotary-wing aviation in the naval Services is a parallel story. The first demonstration of the capability of a helicopter to operate from a ship was sponsored by the Maritime Commission and was conducted by an Army Air Force pilot on 7 May 1943. Colonel R. F. Gregory completed his preflight checks at Stratford, Connecticut, started the aircraft and “pulled pitch”—that is to say, raised the control lever in his left hand, the collective, increasing the pitch on all of the main rotor blades simultaneously. This increased pitch generated increased lift and the XR-4 helicopter rose into the air, stabilized for a moment, and headed for the Long Island Sound, where the SS Bunker Hill lay at anchor with U.S. Navy representatives embarked to witness the demonstration. The ship was a tanker modified with a plywood landing platform amidships. The arrangement of the landing platform, athwartships and surrounded by cargo-handling posts and booms, was less then optimal. Like many of the conditions in which naval rotary-wing aviation developed, this arrangement was a precedent that would require time to overcome. Colonel Gregory completed twenty-four1 flights from the deck of Bunker Hill that day, with intervening landings of the pontoon-equipped XR-4 on the water of Long Island Sound.2 In a sense, naval rotary-wing aviation was born that spring day, with an Army pilot at the controls. But the decisions that gave birth to naval rotary-wing aviation predate this demonstration. They were largely decisions made by officers of the United States Coast Guard.
There were a number of promoters of military helicopters. Colonel Gregory was a supporter, having been involved in efforts to adapt the Sikorsky VS-300 into a militarily useful aircraft. The senior leadership of the U.S. Navy did not include any advocates for this new technology. Far from embracing the helicopter, a series of attempts were made to assign the tasks associated with developing this new technology to someone else—anyone else! Initially, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations declined to participate in the development of military helicopters, requesting instead that the U.S. Army Air Force proceed with the development and advise the Navy once a suitable model was available.3 Even after the Army had determined that the VS-300 met the established criteria, the Navy remained skeptical. The Bureau of Aeronautics did issue a planning document in July 1942 calling for the procurement of four helicopters to be used in experiments, but in February 1943, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet assigned the task of exploring the use of ship-based helicopters for anti-submarine warfare to the Coast Guard.4 The U.S. Coast Guard operated as part of the U.S. Navy during time of war, but the assignment of the development task to that Service did not represent a ringing endorsement of the new technology.
The pontoon-equipped XR-4 flights from the USS Bunker Hill in May 1943 marked the birth of naval rotary-wing aviation.
The simple fact is that Navy helicopters, now so ubiquitous a part of every naval operation, owe their existence to the U.S. Coast Guard. The development of naval rotary-wing aviation begins before the U.S. Navy expressed any interest. In May 1940, when Igor Sikorsky conducted his first public demonstration, officers of the U.S. Coast Guard were present. Commander Watson Burton, the Commander of Air Station, Floyd Bennett Field, and Commander William Kossler, Chief of the Aviation Engineering Division at Coast Guard Headquarters immediately recognized the capabilities that the new technology represented. Additional demonstrations for the U.S. military followed, witnessed by an expanding circle of Coast Guardsmen including Lieutenant Commander Frank Erickson.
Erickson was destined to have a profound impact on the development of Navy helicopters. An early helicopter enthusiast, having read about Sikorsky’s prewar experiments, he “saw great possibilities for an aircraft that could be operated from the deck of a small ship.”5 In June 1942 Erickson had reported to Air Station Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn, New York, as the executive officer. Shortly after his arrival, Commander Kossler, who had taught at the Coast Guard Academy when Erickson was a cadet, made a routine visit to Floyd Bennett Field. The substance of their discussions revolved around Sikorsky’s helicopters. Before the end of the month Kossler’s assistant, Lieutenant Bill Kenly, was sent to an appointment with Igor Sikorsky—by way of Brooklyn. Kenly asked if he could get someone to fly him to Stratford, Connecticut, for his meeting. Erickson later learned that the stop at Brooklyn was a subterfuge aimed at judging the true level of his interest in the project.6 If Kossler had any doubts, they were alleviated by the enthusiastic response of the executive officer. The date was 26 June and Erickson was en route to becoming Coast Guard Helicopter Pilot Number One.
The fervor demonstrated by these Coast Guard pioneers was arrayed against determined skeptics at the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics. In November 1941 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order placing the Coast Guard under the operational control of the Navy.7 This fact constrained the efforts of the Coast Guard to purchase helicopters. By law, Coast Guard aircraft procurement was controlled by the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), an organization hostile to the idea of developing rotary-wing aircraft. In 1942 it was a large bureaucratic organization with a wide scope of responsibility including fleet operations, procurement, research, development of shipboard systems supporting aircraft, and numerous other functions. The divisions, committees, and boards that performed these functions had evolved into a variety of fiefdoms, none of which experimental helicopters fell into comfortably. The attitude of the Navy as perceived by the Coast Guard leadership was simple. The helicopter had originally been proposed as a “flying lifeboat.” When Commander Kossler initially discussed the procurement of helicopters with Coast Guard flag officers the response was emphatic: “Hell, Bill, the Navy is not interested in lifesaving, [sic] they just want to get on with the business of killing the enemy.”8 While the later assignment of submarines and patrol aircraft to the recovery of downed airmen belies this attitude, the realities in early 1942 of an avalanche of immediate, critical tasks assigned to the bureau at the very least drove experimentation on helicopters to a very low priority.
Against this backdrop, Erickson accompanied Kenly to Stratford, Connecticut. After conducting what the official history termed an “inspection,”9 he spent two nights composing his report.10 The proposal was also shaped by the state of the war in the Atlantic. May and June 1942 were the months in which the Allies lost the greatest tonnage to date to submarines. Of over 1.2 million tons of merchant shipping lost in two months, over 90 percent was lost on the fringes of North America.11 Erickson recognized the potential utility of the helicopter for anti-submarine warfare. Initially envisioning these aircraft as scouting platforms that could extend the search horizon of convoy escorts, the proposals redefined the proposed use of rotary-wing aircraft from the Coast Guard–specific task of rescue operations to a task with which the Navy was struggling: anti-submarine warfare. Erickson’s concept involved the operation of helicopters from platforms mounted on merchant vessels, providing additional search assets and allowing a smaller number of escorts to protect effectively a larger convoy. Unescorted merchantmen could also be provided with a means of detecting and thus avoiding submarines.12 Erickson also posited the use of helicopters to deliver depth charges more accurately than did fixed-wing aircraft. He proposed a procedure that would later become helicopter in-flight refueling (HIFR) and suggested that helicopters could rescue the crews of vessels that did fall victim to submarines. These rescue operations, while a core Coast Guard capability, were couched in terms of relieving other ships in convoys of this dangerous task that made them more vulnerable to submarines. While the broad array of potential benefits did convince his immediate superiors within the Coast Guard, the Navy remained skeptical. The Bureau of Aeronautics did issue a planning directive that called for the procurement of four Sikorsky helicopters for further research and development.13 A planning directive proved to be a far different thing than an aircraft on hand.
Erickson’s proposals did receive strong support from his chain of command. The Commanding Officer of Air Station Floyd Bennett Field and the District Commander, Rear Admiral Stanley Parker, who was a qualified aviator himself, both strongly endorsed Erickson’s letter.14 In November 1942, Parker also made the pilgrimage to Stratford to see Sikorsky and his machine. More importantly, Parker wrote a personal letter to Vice Admiral Russell Waesche, Commandant of the Coast Guard, suggesting that the commandant view a demonstration of the Sikorsky helicopter. On the advice of Parker, Coast Guard pilot number seven and the senior aviator in the Coast Guard, Vice Admiral Waesche, did just that on 13 February 1942, witnessing what Erickson called “a very impressive demonstration.”15 So impressed was the commandant that upon his return to Washington he requested a meeting with Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
Outside the Coast Guard, events were in motion that would further the cause of developing Navy helicopters. Grover Loening, a German immigrant who received the first postgraduate degree in aeronautical engineering granted by Columbia University, was an aviation pioneer. He was also a consultant to the War Production Board, an organization chartered to regulate the production of war material and the allocation of resources. Loening supported development of helicopters for anti-submarine warfare. He also advocated that the project not be carried forward by the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, but rather that it be assigned to the Maritime Commission, War Shipping Administration, or the Coast Guard. Concurrent with Loening’s intercession on behalf of rotary-wing, anti-submarine aircraft, Britain weighed in with an order for two hundred Sikorsky helicopters for anti-submarine work.16 If the U.S. Navy was not sold on the concept, the Royal Navy certainly was.
All these events converged to provide the background for the meeting between Admirals King and Waesche. King remained under significant pressure to stem the losses among merchant shipping caused by submarines.17 The British support for helicopters was a double-edged sword, as King and his British counterparts were famously adversarial.18 In the end, the needs of the Battle of the Atlantic prevailed. Waesche offered another tool with which to combat the German U-boats. Two days after Waesche returned from Connecticut, King, either in his capacity as CNO or as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, began issuing a series of directives. The Coast Guard was given responsibility for developing helicopters to combat the submarine threat. The Bureau of Aeronautics was directed to carry out tests to determine the suitability of the Sikorsky helicopter for ship-based anti-submarine warfare. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, in turn, appointed Kossler to lead the Coast Guard effort, which, in effect, made him responsible for the development of all naval helicopters. Kossler, in turn, arranged for orders for his friend Frank Erickson to report to Stratford, Connecticut, to begin training as a helicopter pilot. His instructors were Igor Sikorsky and C. L. “Les” Morris, Sikorsky’s chief test pilot.
In May, a Combined Board for the Evaluation of Ship-Based Helicopter in Antisubmarine Warfare was appointed, with representatives drawn from the staffs of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; the Admiralty (Royal Navy); the British Air Commission; the U.S. Coast Guard; and the Bureau of Aeronautics. Representatives of the Army Air Forces, the War Shipping Board, and the National Advisory Commission on Aeronautics—the predecessor of NASA—later joined the board. This board was, in today’s lexicon, an interagency effort. Some question exists whether this helped or hindered the effort.
Colonel Gregory’s demonstration on board SS Bunker Hill occurred three days after the creation of the board, long before the board would reach any decisions. The U.S. Maritime Commission did not provide a representative to the Combined Board but did work closely with the War Shipping Administration, which had split off from the commission. The commission did provide the ship for the demonstration. Grover Loening, observing as a consultant to the War Production Board, pronounced the tests successful and described the takeoffs as “remarkable.”19 The Bureau of Aeronautics was less sanguine, citing the calm conditions under which the tests were conducted. The board met ten days after the test and raised a series of additional questions. The most important questions revolved around the manner in which the helicopters would be employed operationally.20 Specifically, questions of basing the aircraft on merchant vessels versus escorts, the number of aircraft needed for an effective screen, and the number of flight hours between overhauls for the helicopters as compared to the hours required to cover convoys at all points to the acceptance of their value.
The tenor of the board’s deliberations demonstrated a shift in the direction the Navy was pursuing. As the board was chartered by Admiral King as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and included a substantial number of Navy members, the former policy could have been preserved or at least the requirements set forth could have impeded development rather than focus the effort on creating an effective weapons system. While the initial test had been arranged by Igor Sikorsky before the board began functioning, the initial meetings, conducted to consider the implications of the test on Bunker Hill, demonstrated the synergistic effects of an interagency team. The obstructionism of the Bureau of Aeronautics was transformed into a more constructive conservatism, grounding the project’s sound logistic and operational principles. The enthusiasm of the Coast Guard and the Maritime Commission was tempered, avoiding attempts to overstate the effectiveness of the new technology, an all too common fault of advocates of any new weapon system or doctrine. In the end, the board sought to define the doctrinal parameters within which the helicopters would be utilized and to ensure the decisions were made on the ability to operate effectively over the longer term.
The immediate result of these deliberations was to schedule three additional tests. Modern flight tests are still conducted in a “build up” fashion, beginning with familiarization and relatively simple tasks and expanding the operating envelope by stages. This process minimizes the additional risk incurred with each progressively more difficult phase of testing. The design of this series of tests employed this same philosophy. The first test was to be conducted in calm water, replicating Gregory’s success on the Bunker Hill and familiarizing the new helicopter pilots with the necessary procedures. These airmen would, in turn, conduct further tests. The second phase was designed to explore the effects of ship motion in a seaway on the operability of helicopters. The third phase, what today would be termed operational test and evaluation, involved conducting operations from a vessel in convoy to and from Europe.21
The merchant vessel SS James Parker, the former SS Panama, was a troop transport. Fitted with a trapezoidal platform on the stern, she foreshadowed the flight deck configuration of most future vessels operating helicopters.22 On a short run from New York to the Virginia Capes, she was the platform for three days of testing in the Chesapeake Bay. The tests were successful in their stated aim with ninety-eight flights completed by the embarked helicopters, the XR-4 used in the original test on Bunker Hill and the improved YR-4A version.
The second phase of the tests was conducted aboard MV Daghestan, a bulk freighter acquired by the British under Lend-Lease. The “seaway” in question was the Long Island Sound. While the sound has a fearsome reputation as a dangerous body of water in a storm, the sea was smooth for the majority of the test. A team of twenty-six pilots and observers, led by Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander Frank Erickson, conducted over three hundred launches and recoveries in November 1943. The only deficiency noted was one familiar to a later generation of helicopter pilots—starting and stopping the rotor blades in high winds proved difficult or impossible unless the ship maneuvered to reduce the apparent wind over the deck.23 The “success” triggered the third and most challenging phase of the test series. The unfortunate choice of the Long Island Sound as the test location would have serious implications for Lieutenant (jg.) Stewart “Stu” Graham, Coast Guard Helicopter Pilot Number Two, who would lead the next effort.
The third phase, an operational test under combat conditions as part of a convoy, followed in January 1944. Stu Graham would embark with the British Helicopter Service Trial Unit and two YR-4B helicopters aboard Daghestan. The test proved to be a grueling trial. High sea states, high winds, and convoy doctrine that precluded the Daghestan from varying from her assigned course and position in the convoy effectively grounded Graham for all but two days of the voyage. The ship rolled, pitched, and yawed. Her bulk cargo of grain shifted in the hold, giving it a permanent list of 5 degrees. In the end, the helicopters did very little patrolling. The brief windows of opportunity for flying were spent demonstrating that the helicopters could launch and recover under open-sea conditions. The fragile nature of the aircraft and the limited utility due to operational restrictions led the board to recommend that no further ship-based helicopter operations be conducted until a more robust aircraft became available. Admiral Waesche reluctantly agreed, downgrading the R-4, re-designated the HNS-1, to service as a training aircraft. This setback did not dampen Frank Erickson’s determination to demonstrate the potential of the helicopter.
Newly promoted and assigned as the Commanding Officer of Air Station Floyd Bennett Field, Commander Frank Erickson continued to apply his drive and imagination to the development of the helicopter. In December, before the Daghestan debacle, the Chief of Naval Operations had directed the establishment of a separate helicopter training program, to be established at Floyd Bennett Field. Erickson found himself in charge of establishing a naval helicopter training program. Having trained Graham and others, he had the credentials. His fertile imagination put in place various innovations. A 40-foot by 69-foot movable platform was developed to simulate ship motion ashore. Pilots could experience worst-case conditions in an environment where a stable landing surface was readily available in the event of mechanical problems or student difficulties. The Royal Navy still maintains a similar device today, used primarily for flight test; while mechanically more sophisticated, it is essentially the same device invented by Erickson and his command.
Erickson had been instrumental in equipping the test aircraft with float-type landing gear. He continued to pursue a variety of other innovations. Under Erickson’s direction, and frequently with him at the controls, various new devices were introduced. Development of an autopilot for the HNS-1 was begun in 1944. In a parallel effort, the Hayes dunking sonar, originally developed for blimps, was successfully mated to the XHOS-1 helicopter, the newest Sikorsky variant. In March 1945 the tests were reported complete and successful. Unfortunately by the time an effective antisubmarine helicopter had been developed, the submarine threat in the Atlantic had been extinguished, as would be the Nazi regime that spawned that threat. A sling for carrying a stretcher was demonstrated and a hydraulic rescue hoist was also developed, but the Navy was still not interested in the helicopter as a rescue vehicle. Budget cuts, programmatic cuts, and further delays were on the horizon, but the concept had been proven. It would require further crises to spur further development.
EARLY HELICOPTER OPERATIONS: SOMEONE ELSE’S SOLUTION
Erickson’s innovations charted the course for Navy helicopters for over half a century. In possession of these fragile, awkward aircraft, the Bureau of Aeronautics included them in a series of postwar tests. In the changing strategic environment, these tests were part of an effort to demonstrate the capability of the carrier to operate in the arctic regions, where potential crises involving the United States and the Soviet Union were expected to play out. The embarked HNS-1 helicopters, wearing Coast Guard colors and flown by Coast Guard pilots, demonstrated an ability to cope with the extreme conditions. The confluence of events again furthered development of Navy helicopters.
Following the conclusion of World War II, the Coast Guard successfully navigated the delicate passage between operational control of the Navy and its administrative home waters within the Department of the Treasury. In doing so, Coast Guard helicopters also departed the Navy inventory. In response, the Navy acknowledged the potential of these assets, establishing Helicopter Development Squadron THREE (VX-3) to “study and evaluate the adaptability of helicopters to naval purposes.”24 The critical fact remained the need to adapt equipment that had not been designed for shipboard operations to that most demanding environment. During the war, the Coast Guard leadership had been skeptical of the Navy’s commitment to rescue operations. It proved to be an inaccurate assessment in the long term. Plane guard, providing an airborne alert for conducting the rescue of downed aviators, was the principal mission delegated to the helicopters. “Study” by VX-3 led to evaluation, including assigning a detachment of HOS-3 helicopters to the spring Atlantic Fleet exercise of 1947. During this period, the helicopters conducted twenty-two plane guard missions, leading to six rescues. A contemporaneous article in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute extolled the superiority of the helicopter as a rescue platform, as well as its versatility in performing numerous other missions.25
The deployment proved a fateful one, leading to the establishment of two helicopter utility squadrons. These squadrons would form the nucleus around which the rotary-wing community would grow over the ensuing seven decades. The Helicopter Utility Squadron TWO (HU-2) would be assigned the responsibility of training future rotary-wing naval aviators, assuming this responsibility from VX-3, which was disestablished at the same time HU-2 began operations. This would raise questions regarding the standardization of helicopter training. Some aviators, like Lieutenant William Knapp, the first Navy helicopter pilot to be so designated, were trained by the Coast Guard. Others obtained their qualifications through VX-3, while still others were designated after receiving training at Helicopter Utility Squadron ONE, or at the Naval Air Technical Center at Patuxent River, Maryland, or from the Sikorsky Aircraft Company directly. Standards for the qualification of aviators as helicopter pilots were issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in June 1948. These standards provided for the recognition of these variously obtained qualifications but placed the responsibility for future qualifications on HU-2.26 Providing this training while simultaneously supporting detachments for utility and search and rescue missions would prove a daunting task, so daunting, in fact, that it would rapidly become apparent that a dedicated training establishment would be required.
A new command, in a new location, would assume the responsibilities of training Navy helicopter pilots. As Pensacola, Florida, assumed a larger role in the peacetime naval aviation training establishment, it was only logical that dedicated helicopter training would be transferred south as well. In December 1950, Helicopter Training Unit ONE (HTU-1) was established at Ellyson Field. In January of the following year, the training and qualification responsibilities of HU-2 were reassigned to HTU-1.27 The subsequent evolution of the training mission would see various re-designations of this command, but Helicopter Training Squadron EIGHT (HT-8) still provides “advanced helicopter flight instruction to all U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard helicopter flight students.”28
Strategic considerations would shape the future development of rotary-wing aviation. In 1946, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman focused on a new maritime strategy. Forward, offensive operations dominated the new strategy and anti-submarine warfare was central to the operational concept. The introduction of the German Type XXI submarines at the end of World War II had sparked a revolution in submarine warfare.29 The acquisition of numerous Type XXI boats by the Soviet Union at the end of the war, combined with tensions between the emerging superpowers, would have a dramatic impact. Sherman focused on offensive operations against the bases for hostile submarines, but the lessons of the recently concluded conflict were not lost. The difficulty inherent in degrading the submarine threat at the source was recognized, but so too was the reduced effectiveness of aircraft as ASW assets as a result of the Type XXI–induced revolution. During the war, the mere presence of an aircraft was enough to disrupt submarine attacks. The new generation of submarine was far less vulnerable.30 New technologies would be required to augment the defensive measures that would facilitate Sherman’s offensive posture. Frank Erickson’s foresight in mating the dunking sonar to the helicopter would provide part of the answer.
The Hayes dunking sonar used in World War II experiments would evolve, as would the underpowered helicopters. In the immediate postwar years, twin rotor–configured aircraft like the McDonnell XHJD-1 and the Piasecki H-21 would garner increasing attention. Sikorsky Aircraft would develop a competing model based on the earlier successful configuration of a single main rotor. Originally developed to compete for the Air Force rescue helicopter contract, the S-55 was adapted for a Navy operational investigation of helicopter ASW using dipping sonar. Designated the HO4S-series in naval service, it was underpowered and could carry either the dipping sonar or antisubmarine torpedoes, but not both simultaneously. Naval rotary-wing aviation continued to be an exercise in adapting equipment originally intended for other purposes. In spite of this handicap, the project would succeed and would set the stage for the next generation of ASW helicopters.
Concurrent with the demonstration of the ASW capabilities of the Sikorsky variant, Piasecki would also enter the competition with a tandem-rotor variant, the HUP series aircraft. When Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron ONE (HS-1), the first squadron of its type, was established in October 1951, it was equipped with HUP-1/2 aircraft. As with the rapid development that occurred in all naval aviation communities during the decade following the end of World War II, the early HS squadrons would experience a rapid transition through a series of airframes including the HUP and the Sikorsky HRS, HO4S, and HSS-1 helicopters. This rapid evolution would slow with the introduction of this last model beginning in 1955.31 Representing the highest evolution of the piston-engine helicopter, the night-capable HSS-1N Sea Bat (Sikorsky S-58) would remain the standard antisubmarine helicopter until the advent of the turbine-engine helicopters in the following decade. Following the transition to turbines, the Sea Bat, by then re-designated the H-34-series, would continue to serve as a search and rescue platform as well as in the Marine Corps. Various foreign navies would continue to fly it for decades.
Wartime has historically spurred innovation. One enduring concern in conducting combat flight operations is the retrieval of downed aircrewmen in hostile territory. During the conflict in Korea, the logical evolution from utilizing helicopters for rescue operations at sea to recovery of pilots ashore came to fruition. Primarily relying on the older HO3S helicopters, rescue units were staged forward in order to speed these recoveries. Even after the Chinese offensive had pushed United Nations forces well south of Wonsan, the waters of the harbor served as a haven for naval operations. Yo Do, an island in the harbor, remained under the control of U.S. forces and was the site of an emergency landing strip. In early 1951 LST-799 was modified to include a mid-ship flight deck for the launch and recovery of helicopters and was assigned to the Wonsan Harbor Control System.32 From this location, it and other modified LSTs provided a secure base from which rescue operations could be mounted swiftly. A new, dramatic, and dangerous chapter in the employment of Navy helicopters had opened.
Between the establishment of the force at Wonsan and the end of active hostilities, twenty-two successful helicopter rescues were conducted. Such high-risk missions were not, however, without a cost. In July 1951, Lieutenant (jg) John Koelsch and his observer, Aviation Radioman George Neal, launched in an effort to recover a Marine aviator down near Wonsan. Successfully locating Captain James Wilkins, their helicopter was hit by ground fire and crashed while attempting to hoist him aboard. Successfully evading the enemy for nine days, Neal and Koelsch carried the injured Marine to the coast before being captured. Koelsch did not survive captivity, but in 1955 was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, becoming the first helicopter pilot so honored.33 He would not be the last. CPO Duane Thorin, the model for the helicopter pilot in James Michener’s novel The Bridges at Toko-ri, Lieutenant (jg) John Thornton, Lieutenant Edward Moore, and their crews all faced capture or death rescuing fellow aviators during the conflict.34 The tales of heroism by helicopter crews would fill an entire volume.
DESIGN WITH A PURPOSE
The year 1960 saw the transformation of rotary-wing aviation. The Sikorsky S-58 had been designed to meet U.S. Navy requirements, but with an eye toward meeting the requirements of other Services and commercial markets. In 1957 Sikorsky Aircraft began design efforts to meet a U.S. Navy circular of requirements for the next generation anti-submarine helicopter. The resulting aircraft, tested and accepted by the Navy in 1959, would become the H-3 series helicopters. The Sea King would remain the backbone of aircraft carrier–based, rotary-wing aviation for over thirty years. In a search and rescue capacity, they would serve into the twenty-first century and in Marine colors as of 2010 they still fly the president of the United States. While Sikorsky developed this large, turbine-engine helicopter, Vertol and Kaman married the increased power of the “jet” engines to design concepts for other Navy requirements. The engine in question, powering all three designs, would be the General Electric T-58. The H-2 Sea Sprite and the H-46 Sea Knight, in conjunction with the Sea King, would lay the foundation for successful naval operations into the next century. They were also the first helicopters point-designed to meet the Navy’s requirements. It is not surprising that these platforms proved so enduring.
SH-3A (HSS-2) flown publicly for first time, 24 March 1959.
The turbine era would see the rise of a submarine-centric Soviet navy, war in Southeast Asia, and support to a range of humanitarian, scientific, and space missions. These three models would bear the brunt of these efforts.
Countering the expanding Soviet submarine threat proved to be the principal challenge. The development of nuclear-powered submarines added complexity to an already difficult problem. The need to track these adversaries using passive acoustics, prosecute them with active sonar, and, if necessary, attack them with rapidity would dictate the need for larger, more capable helicopters. The Sea King was the first to meet the requirement. Operationally capable of carrying two torpedoes, a dozen expendable sonobuoys, and equipped with a dipping sonar, this was the platform of choice for holding contact with the submarines deployed by an adversary. The small number of sonobuoys carried rendered it less effective as an open-ocean search platform, but once integrated into an anti-submarine team, the precision with which the sonar could locate a submarine and rapid rate at which that sensor could be repositioned made it difficult for a submarine to break contact.35
Another approach to improving this capability resulted in a program that was innovative, if perhaps ahead of its time. There were persistent efforts, culminating in 1960, to develop an unmanned platform for weapons delivery combined with improved, longer-range ship-mounted sonars. The Drone Antisubmarine Helicopter (DASH) program continued throughout the decade with mixed results. Simulated attacks using exercise torpedoes were demonstrated over 19,000 yards from the controlling ship, but anti-submarine rocket (ASROC) launchers could obtain greater ranges; the greatest difficulty continued to be the initial acquisition of contact and the difficulty of recovery aboard a DD. The requirement for a sensor deployment platform would be met with a rotary-wing aircraft, one that was originally designed as a utility aircraft.36
The Kaman H-2 Sea Sprite was not built as an ASW platform. As requirements evolved, so did the weapon system. The initial configuration involved a single engine, but by 1970 virtually all models had been converted to a twin-engine configuration. Many of these aircraft were also converted to the interim Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) configuration. These SH-2D aircraft were the forerunner of the SH-2F, a fully integrated anti-submarine warfare platform. The problem of initial submarine detection would be answered by delivering sensors across a broader area and linking them back to the ship. The Sea Sprite would also possess some capability to monitor these sensors internally and was equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector (MAD). By 1973 most H-2 Sea Sprites had been converted to the LAMPS configuration.37 A small number of utility versions were retained for specialized missions. Sea Sprite detachments supported oceanographic research vessels and some search and rescue missions, but the end of the Vietnam War had relieved them of the missions that perhaps garnered the most fame. H-2 and H-3 aircraft had figured prominently in the air war over Vietnam; these would be the recovery vehicles for combat search and rescue, retrieving downed aviators under fire.
As with the air war in Korea, some consideration had been given before the war to the use of helicopters for the recovery of downed airmen. In the Navy, this consideration stopped well short of an integrated concept of operations. Upon the commencement of punitive strikes after the Tonkin Gulf incident, utility helicopters already on station on the aircraft carriers were pressed into service. In addition, the helicopter anti-submarine squadrons also answered the call. Three squadrons were pressed into service in succession: HS-2, HS-6, and HS-4. During 1966, the Black Knights of HS-4 would establish a record that still stands. The squadron would conduct twenty-four combat rescues, earning special recognition. The color guard of HS-4 is attired in black berets in recognition of this remarkable deployment.38 The other squadrons that participated in this rotation also conducted dramatic rescues under duress, but this was not without a heavy cost. The toll taken would lead the Navy to re-evaluate procedures for combat rescues and would give birth to a new squadron and new procedures to increase the survivability of the rescuers going in harm’s way.
Author James Michener, serving as a war correspondent on board an aircraft carrier in Korea, was a second-hand witness to several dramatic rescue attempts. On one occasion the price of a failed attempt to rescue one pilot included the loss of five additional escort airplanes and the loss of the rescue helicopter and crew. Operations in Vietnam would lead to similar heroics and to similar losses. Serious efforts were made to learn lessons from both the successes and from the failures. New syllabi were developed to give pilots bound for duty in the combat zone the skills necessary for survival. This effort was strengthened by the establishment of a new squadron to conduct search and rescue efforts in the Vietnam Theater.
In 1965, HU-1 was re-designated Helicopter Combat Support Squadron ONE (HC-1). With detachments supporting aircraft carriers and logistic support ships, conducting combat search and rescue, minesweeping, and helicopter gunship operations, it rapidly became obvious that the diverse platforms and missions could best be served by splitting off unique missions as separate squadrons. The parent squadron retained the search and rescue detachments on board the aircraft carriers, but the specialized detachments supporting overland search and rescue and minesweeping elements that were stationed at Cubi Point in the Philippines and Atsugi, Japan, became Helicopter Combat Support Squadron SEVEN (HC-7), a unit that would be awarded medals for valor out of proportion to its size and brief history. In an article in the aviation journal Foundation, former HC-7 detachment Officer in Charge Robert Jones made a persuasive argument that it was the most decorated Navy squadron in the Vietnam War.39
The detachments that consolidated to form HC-7 drew on the experiences of the anti-submarine squadrons and HC-1 detachments that had been pressed into service earlier. Between the establishment of the squadron in September 1967 and its final mission in 1975, 156 individuals were rescued. These missions included routine missions and medical evacuations, but at least 58 of those rescued were recovered during combat missions.40 During the war, the squadron transitioned from single-engine UH-2A helicopters to a mix of HH-2C and HH-3A aircraft, the latter two better armed and armored to withstand the rigors of the combat mission. The combination of more capable aircraft, dedicated crews, and an inherently heroic mission produced a Medal of Honor and four Navy Crosses as well as a host of other awards for valor.
Lieutenant (jg) Clyde Lassen became the second Navy helicopter pilot to be awarded the nation’s highest medal following a pre-dawn mission to recover the crew of an F-4 Phantom, making multiple approaches under fire in the UH-2A.41 The level of bravery would not slacken, even in the face of more determined opposition as the war progressed. During the bombing halt ordered by President Lyndon Johnson, the squadron’s exploits were limited to “routine” rescues, but following the resumption of strikes against North Vietnam combat rescues also resumed. In the squadron’s brief history, 1972 would prove the busiest year, with fifty-nine personnel rescued. Perhaps the most dramatic recovery belonged to Lieutenant Harry Zinser’s crew, with both pilots awarded the Navy Cross after a harrowing series of flights during which they plucked a downed pilot from under the field of fire of a 37-mm antiaircraft gun.42 All this came from a squadron once described as the “Orphans of the 7th Fleet.”43 The search and rescue detachments would be deployed on over 2,100 consecutive days in support of combat operations in Southeast Asia.
Four other detachments from HC-1 formed yet another squadron that engaged in dramatic operations in Vietnam. These units were re-designated as Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron THREE (HAL-3). Equipped with former Army UH-1B gunships, these crews performed critical missions in support of the riverine patrols of Operation Game Warden, the interdiction of Viet Cong supplies along Vietnam’s inland waterways. This mission was essential to pacification efforts in the Mekong Delta and in attempts to preserve the Saigon government. Armed with pilot-operated mini-guns, rockets, and crew-served .50-caliber machine guns, these were formidable weapons against enemy concentrations that sought to interfere with the operations of the patrol boats of the “brown water navy” that they supported.
At the same time that HC-7 was engaged in dramatic, high-risk missions, the squadron also participated in groundbreaking work in other mission areas. These tasks, while more mundane, are perhaps even more critical to the success of naval operations. Specially modified H-3 Sea Kings would be configured for airborne minesweeping and would see service off the Vietnamese coast. The squadron would also begin experiments with the UH-46A Sea Knights originally inherited from HC-1. Similar experiments were conducted in the Atlantic by Helicopter Combat Support Squadron FOUR (HC-4), and eventually the Pacific Fleet mission would be transferred to Helicopter Combat Support Squadron THREE (HC-3) in San Diego. The speed and efficiency with which pairs of “phrogs” (as the H-46 was nicknamed due to resemblance to a frog when viewed from the front) could transfer cargo between ships was truly remarkable. Over time this vertical replenishment mission would become so critical to Battle Group operations that five squadrons would eventually be established supporting this mission. The ubiquitous “phrog” would symbolize the Navy’s ability to sustain extended operations at sea, yielding only when these aging aircraft gave way to a successor after over a quarter of a century.
The decade following the end of the conflict in Vietnam would see a continued high operational tempo for the Navy. This tempo was necessary to meet an increasingly aggressive Soviet presence throughout the world. A significant element of this threat was composed of an ever-quieter, ever-more sophisticated submarine force. Among the weapons employed by these vessels, mines proved particularly problematic. An integrated approach was required to counter the many capabilities of this potentially hostile force.
First and foremost, individual ships and Battle Groups would be required to spend longer periods at sea. To maintain the level of operations necessary to monitor Soviet activity, rapid re-supply of ships at sea was essential. Vertical replenishment was the only effective answer.
Beyond critical logistic support, better detection and tracking of submarines was required. The original helicopter-based solution to this problem, DASH, had proved unsatisfactory due to the inability to deploy sensors, among other technical problems. The first solution was the LAMPS-configured SH-2D aircraft. While providing a dramatic improvement over ship-based sensors, this aircraft and the successor SH-2F proved to have limitations. All acoustic data were data-linked back to the ship and evaluated there with an inherent time delay in transmitting critical tactical data to the helicopter crew. On board the helicopter, the aircrew could listen to the sonar signals aurally and had real-time data from the MAD and radar, but relied heavily on communications with the destroyer or cruiser on which they were embarked. In addition to the time lag, the communications between the ship and the helicopter also served to make the ship more vulnerable by pinpointing its location.
The foundations of the Navy helicopter community rest on adaptation of aircraft developed for other purposes and other Services. The Navy would seem to have returned to this method in developing the next generation of shipboard helicopter. When the decision was made to replace the H-2 with a larger airframe, capable of supporting on-board acoustic processing, it did not simply adapt the Army UH-60 Blackhawk to Navy purposes. The entire airframe was completely redesigned, shifting the main structural supports to accommodate the stresses of shipboard landings and the low-mounted hard points necessary for torpedoes and external fuel tanks. The SH-60B Seahawk, also called LAMPS-III, proved a remarkably reliable and robust platform. More than an airborne adjunct to the ship, the Seahawk was capable of independent prosecution of submarines while maintaining contact with the ship through a discreet, directional data link that did not give away the ship’s position. It proved so reliable that when the time came for a replacement for the venerable H-3 on the carriers, another version of the H-60 would be chosen.
Following the end of the Vietnam War, Navy helicopters returned to their traditional missions. Frank Erickson had proposed, and Commander Malcolm Cagle had extolled, the value of helicopters for ASW, logistics, and search and rescue. The valuable contributions of helicopters in other mission areas were willfully ignored. The Vietnam missions—gunship and combat search and rescue—were delegated to the reserves. The future would require a re-examination. Operations in Grenada would develop too quickly to admit the mobilization of the reserve CSAR squadron. The HS community would once again be pressed into service. The gunship squadrons, one on each coast, would transform into special operations support squadrons with CSAR as a secondary mission, equipped with yet another variant of the H-60. These squadrons would also experience obstacles in deploying for Operation Desert Storm. While they would be sent to the desert, their assignment to the Special Operations organization would preclude taking part in the Navy CSAR Task Force that operated in the Arabian Gulf. Instead, the HS squadrons, flying SH-3H airframes, armed with only M-60 machine guns and without self-sealing fuel tanks, would again be called on. Ironically, it was not the HS-12 Wyverns who established the CSAR helicopter detachment in the northern gulf, nor the other HS squadrons with whom they shared that duty, but a LAMPS detachment that would record the only opposed Navy rescue of Desert Storm.
Most of the drama for Navy helicopters in Desert Storm proved to be reserved for the LAMPS detachments. While the destroyer on which the CSAR helicopters were based was repositioned southward for replenishment, Lieutenant Kenneth Szmed and his crew were called on to rescue an Air Force pilot down in the water off Kuwait City. LAMPS crews also provided radar guidance to British Lynx helicopters, enabling them to approach enemy patrol boats at wave-top heights to avoid detection before firing their ship-killing missiles. The CSAR detachments did participate in the liberation of the first Kuwaiti territory set free, Qaruh Island, which was liberated by embarked SEALs, transported in Wyvern H-3s, covered by Army OH-58 helicopters.44
The successors to the RH-3 minesweepers of Vietnam were also busy. In the intervening years, a new helicopter community was born. The increasing sophistication of Soviet mines required larger and more sophisticated detection and sweeping gear. To handle these larger payloads, the massive H-53 heavy-lift helicopters were adapted to the mine countermeasure mission. These MH-53E aircraft swept channels to allow ships to approach the Kuwait coast, a key enabler for devastating naval gunfire support missions.
The collapse of the Soviet threat, combined with the lessons of Desert Storm, demonstrated a need for a re-evaluation of the structure, missions, and equipment of Navy helicopters. New missions, or rather old ones re-acknowledged, have come to dominate training and planning. Combat search and rescue, support to naval Special Warfare, armed helicopters for striking small craft, surveillance using infrared sensors—all these missions reflect the legacy of Vietnam. They also represent necessary changes as other platforms have left the naval inventory. With the departure of the S-3 Viking from the scene, a new set of missions falls to Navy helicopters.
As naval aviation shapes a course for the future, rotary-wing aviation continues to play in increasingly important role. Ironically, as Navy helicopters assume more roles and a larger place in plans, fewer models will be available. In the end, after fifty years, only three H-3s remained in Navy service, performing SAR duty at NAS Patuxent River. These too were retired in 2009. Both the H-2 and H-46 airframes have been retired. The Navy is moving toward two H-60 models for all missions—the MH-60R and MH-60S. However, in recognition of the growing requirement for more helicopters and more pilots to fly them, a third helicopter training squadron was established at Naval Air Station Whiting Field on 25 May 2007. The Helicopter Training Squadron TWENTY-EIGHT Hellions will help train the increasing percentage of naval aviators who fly these rotary-wing aircraft. “The helicopter community remains at the core of Naval Aviation, and a robust and highly capable helicopter fighting force is a fundamental requirement for any Navy operation,”45 so opined the Navy’s director, Air Warfare, in a 2004 article in The Hook, the Journal of Carrier Aviation. These sentiments, by a career fixed-wing pilot, represent a sea change. Naval helicopters have come of age.
NOTES
1. Sikorsky Aircraft, press release, n.d., “High Lights in the Development of the Sikorsky Helicopter,” Igor I. Sikorsky Historical Archives. While some sources indicate that fewer flights were completed, twenty-four is a consensus number and is supported by this and other documentation from the Sikorsky Archives.
2. U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Naval Aviation, 1910–1970, NAVAIR 00-80-P-1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1970), p. 120.
3. Robert M. Browning Jr., The Eyes and Ears of the Convoy: Development of the Helicopter as an Anti-submarine Weapon (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard Historian’s Office, 1993), p. 9.
4. U.S. Navy, United States Naval Aviation, p. 119; Browning, The Eyes and Ears of the Convoy, pp. 5–6.
5. Frank Erickson, “A Brief History of Coast Guard Aviation,” The Bulletin, (November–December 1966), p. 422.
6. Ibid.
7. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 8929, 6 FR 5581, 1941 WL 4041, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=60917 (accessed 19 August 2009).
8. Browning, The Eyes and Ears of the Convoy, p. 4.
9. U.S. Navy, United States Naval Aviation, p. 114.
10. Erickson, “A Brief History,” p. 423.
11. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947; Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001), pp. 412–13.
12. Frank Erickson, letter to Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard of 29 June 1942; cited in Robert M. Browning, “The Development of the Helicopter,” Igor I. Sikorsky Archives, http://www.sikorskyarchives.com/tdoth.html (accessed 10 July 2009).
13. U.S. Navy, United States Naval Aviation, p. 115.
14. Erickson, “A Brief History,” p. 423.
15. Ibid.
16. Browning, The Eyes and Ears of the Convoy.
17. Papers of Ernest J. King, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
18. Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p. ix; Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA, and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 189.
19. Grover Loening, memorandum to War Production Board, dated 14 May 1943, cited in Browning, The Eyes and Ears of the Convoy.
20. Browning, The Eyes and Ears of the Convoy, pp. 9–10.
21. Discussion of the similarity of the design of these tests and modern flight test procedures is based on the author’s experience as a rotary-wing test pilot, including participation in seven dynamic interface tests conducted to determine the compatibility of the H-60 and H-3 series aircraft with a variety of naval and naval service vessels.
22. Most ships that routinely operate helicopters have a flight deck located at the stern or have no superstructure aft of and above the flight deck. The few exceptions tend to be vessels like the hospital ships USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort, which were not originally designed to operate helicopters.
23. Arthur Pearcy, A History of U.S. Coast Guard Aviation (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 59. All naval helicopters experience these problems to some degree, with the extreme case being the H-46 series. The problems of “tunnel strikes” while starting and stopping the rotors led to an extensive flight test program in the mid-1990s, in which the author was involved, to determine the cause and remediation.
24. U.S. Navy, United States Naval Aviation, p. 163.
25. Malcolm W. Cagle, “The Versatile Windmills,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (July 1948): 833–35.
26. Roy A. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation, 1910–1995 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), p. 171.
27. Ibid., p. 756.
28. U.S. Navy, “HT-8 Eight Ballers: Squadron History,” https://www.cnatra.navy.mil/tw5/ht8/history.asp (accessed 15 December 2009).
29. Marcus O. Jones, “The Type XXI and Innovation in the German Navy during the Second World War,” paper presented at the Naval History Symposium, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, 10–11 September 2009.
30. Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945–1955 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 32–34.
31. Rick Burgess, “HS-1 Seahorses,” Naval Aviation News 81, no. 1 (November/December 1998), p. 12.
32. U.S. Navy, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 153–54.
33. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957), p. 416; Hill Goodspeed, “Whirlybirds over Korea,” Naval Aviation News 85, no. 1 (November/December 2002), p. 33.
34. Richard F. Kaufman, “Behind the Bridges at Toko-ri,” Naval Aviation News 84, no. 3 (March/April 2002), pp. 18–23; Goodspeed, “Whirlybirds over Korea,” p. 33.
35. Personal experience of author over eleven years in HS squadrons and in flight test; also author conversations with Lieutenant Commander David Moran, USN; Captain Douglas Roulstone, USN; and Captain Paul A. “Tony” Laird, USN, during the course of these tours.
36. Andreas Parsch, Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, Appendix 4, QH-50 DASH (28 April 2004), http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/qh-50.html (accessed 25 November 2009); “DASH History,” http://www.gyrodynehelicopters.com/dash_weapon_system.htm (accessed 5 December 2009).
37. Bill Gunston, An Illustrated Guide to Military Helicopters (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986).
38. The black berets and the reading of the CNO order authorizing their wear was an integral part of the HS-4 change of command ceremonies during the period the author served on the CVW-14 staff and as a department head in the squadron.
39. Robert E. Jones, “The Most Highly Decorated Navy Squadron in Vietnam?” Foundation 2, no. 1 (1981), pp. 91–97.
40. HC-7 Rescue Log, 3 October 1967 to 8 April 1975, unofficial document, http://www.hc7seadevils.org/draftrescuelog.pdf (accessed 10 December 2009).
41. Hill Goodspeed, “Into the Night,” Naval Aviation News 84, no. 6 (September/October 1998), pp. 27–29.
42. James R. Lloyd, “To Those Who Returned for Me,” The Hook 25, no. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 33–36.
43. Mark Morgan, “Orphans of 7th Fleet,” The Hook 26, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 26–37.
44. Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1998; Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 221–25.
45. Rear Admiral Thomas J. Kilcline, “Navy Helicopters at the Core of Strike Group Capability,” The Hook 32, no. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 8–10.